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## INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT

DECEMBER 2005

No. 05-32

# Leader Challenges

Operation Enduring Freedom & Operation Iraqi Freedom



Mission Command

Unity of Command

Leader Development

Command Climate

Training

Reserve/National Guard

Operational Security

Safety

Information Operations

## Stability and Reconstruction Operations

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-1350

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## **Mission**

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) formed and deployed a seven-member collection and analysis team (CAAT) to Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76) (Afghanistan), 1st Infantry Division (ID) (Germany), and 81st Brigade Combat Team (Washington State National Guard) from 1-21 April 2005 to collect leadership observations, insights, and lessons and to provide lessons and recommendations to the visited units, future rotational units, and the U.S. Army.

## **Intent/Guidance**

- Focus at company (captain) and below; canvass senior leadership.
- Improve leadership by capturing and providing the experiences of other leaders.

## **Deployment**

On 8 March 2005, a seven-member team consolidated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and received predeployment training at the CALL. The team processed through Fort Bliss continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Center (CRC) and flew to Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan. The CAAT conducted interviews with units at Bagram and Salerno.

The CAAT flew out of Bagram to Rhein Main, Germany and conducted interviews with 1st ID units in Wuerzberg, Bamberg, Kitzingen, Schweinfurt, and Hohenfels. The team departed Germany for Washington State and conducted interviews with the Washington Army National Guard before out-processing through Fort Bliss's CRC. The entire mission was 8 March through 28 April 2005.

Many thanks are extended to all of the commanders, command sergeants major, staff officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers who assisted us during this trip, specifically:

CJTF-76, CJ9, CJTF-76 political advisor (POLAD), CJTF-76 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), A/13 Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Bagram Base Operations Information Operations and S5, 25th ID Division Artillery (DIVARTY), 25th ID Division Support Command (DISCOM), 25th ID Aviation Brigade, 249th General Hospital, 3-116th Infantry Battalion, 367th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Battalion-3rd Marines, and 58th Military Police Company.

1st ID G3, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)/1st ID Rear Detachment, 101 Chemical Company Rear Detachment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1-4 Cavalry Regiment, 1-26th Infantry Battalion, 1-77th Armor Battalion, 1st ID DISCOM, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 2-2d Infantry Battalion, 1-63d Armor Battalion, DIVARTY, and 1-6 Field Artillery Battalion.

Washington Army National Guard: 81st Brigade Combat Team, 1-61st Infantry Battalion, E Troop 303d Armored Cavalry, 898th Combat Engineer Battalion, and the Information Operations Group.

The team had unlimited access to information and, more importantly, to the leaders themselves who offered their valuable time so that this product would be useful to future deploying units.

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# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Executive Summary**

Units in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) conducted full spectrum operations on a continuous basis. The units' predeployment training focused on major combat operations; however, in theater they transitioned to stability operations and support operations. Understanding the commander's intent two levels above their own was critical for junior leaders to exercise disciplined initiative. The nature of the war changed into an insurgency. Foreign fighters and anti-coalition militia (ACM) did not respect the law of war; they did not have distinctive uniforms. Different skill sets were required in order to work with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to rebuild the country and conduct stability operations and support operations.

Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. The Leadership Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) examined the following areas of leadership: mission command; leadership development; training, command climate, and morale; active and reserve component integration; safety; operational security; information operations; unity of command; and command and control.

### **Mission Command**

Mission command is the command and control of Army forces. Mission command has four elements: commander's intent, subordinate's initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation. Commanders in OEF and OIF practiced battle command against a hostile, thinking enemy. Commanders and their units had the opportunity to experience the transition from major combat operations (MCO) to stability operations and support operations.

### **Unity of Command/Unity of Effort**

Unity of command is the Army's preferred method for achieving unity of effort. The optimum command environment has one commander over all forces. However, the war fought in OIF and OEF requires the capability of joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) organizations in order to accomplish the mission. Commanders must achieve unity of effort through coordination and cooperation.

### **Leader Development**

In OIF and OEF, the execution of missions is predominately at the squad and platoon level. The area of operations (AO) assigned to battalions and even companies may be larger than ten thousand square miles. As a result, junior leaders, both noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers, are increasingly finding themselves responsible for planning and executing missions that have previously been handled one or more echelons above. This situation is a tremendous developmental opportunity and has resulted in the rapid growth of many of the Army's junior leaders. Company-level leaders are regularly coordinating plans and activities with other agencies, meeting and coordinating with local national agencies (e.g., Afghan National Police, and Iraqi Army), and interacting with local national civil leaders. Company-level leaders are making decisions to take both lethal and nonlethal approaches and are utilizing all elements of national power (i.e., diplomatic, information, military, and economic [DIME]) to accomplish their missions. These are all activities that previously were held at the battalion level or higher.

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## **Command Climate, Communication, and Morale**

Stress is inherent in the military. The transition from garrison to combat is a significant change in environment which results in an increased stress. Common human emotions of fear, ambiguity, and uncertainty contribute to the rising tension of the deployment. Alternatively, the leader must also be aware of the stress that results from conducting the same routine seven days a week. Separation from friends and family add to a Soldier's stress as he or she is now separated from regular support systems. Leadership is the key factor in the relationship between stress and morale. In the presence of good leadership, unit morale appears to not be affected by the level of stress a unit endures.

## **Active and Reserve Component Integration**

The active and reserve components combine their capabilities to make one Army. Title 10 and Title 32 determine the federal and state responsibilities for the armed forces. There are inherent differences between the active and reserve components (National Guard and Reserves).

Mobilization of the reserve components for federal service highlights these differences and creates challenges to overcome. Key differences are property accountability, promotions, finance, and legal affairs. The challenge is greater with the National Guard because they are still controlled by each state's regulations while federalized.

## **Training**

Brigades trained primarily on stability operations and support operations prior to deployment during a mission readiness exercise (MRE). Some commands stated that the MREs were outstanding because they immersed their Soldiers in the contemporary operating environment. Others felt that the training conducted was good, but it did not prepare the unit for the MCO they encountered in theater because mission tasks varied so much from the training tasks during predeployment.

Units in OIF and OEF conducted full spectrum operations on a continuous basis. Units' predeployment training should have focused on both major combat operations and stability operations and support operations. Commanders that focused primarily in one area stated that they should have also emphasized the other area because training shortfalls were evident once they were in theater.

This chapter is broken down into three main topic areas: predeployment training, in-theater training, and redeployment training. Leaders were very interested in providing observations, insights, and lessons for all aspects of training.

## **Operations Security (OPSEC)**

The enemy continually attempts to gather information from any sources available. Laborers, delivery personnel, and interpreters are examples of just a few of the people who want to enter sensitive areas or listen in on radio transmissions. Units have security badges, sign-in rosters, and procedures posted; however, active measures must accompany passive measures to maintain OPSEC and communications security (COMSEC).

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### **Safety**

Training conducted at the combat training centers prior to deployment is providing opportunities for convoy operations training. However, during these training opportunities the driving conditions and practices found in theater (e.g., aggressive driving tactics and advanced driving techniques) are not adequately trained. Drivers in theater are required to use much more aggressive driving tactics than are permitted in predeployment training and exercises. To address this issue, units are conducting ad hoc training as time and mission requirements permit to develop driving skills. In some cases, mission requirements are such that drivers are beginning operations without receiving training and must develop these skills as operations are being conducted. This significantly increases the risks associated with convoy operations.

**Unity of Command and Information Operations** are areas that were not essential in the collection of insights at the junior leadership level; however, they are included in this report because of their importance at higher echelons of leadership.



# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 1**

### **Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

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#### **Summary**

The area the brigade combat team (BCT) covered was extremely large. The distance forced commanders to rely on the subordinate's initiative and maturity to handle the uncertainty and complexity of stability operations and support operations. Subordinates developed rapidly because the mission required a level of responsibility beyond their grade level. Junior leaders also adapted quickly. Soldiers working outside their military occupational specialty (MOS) were the norm. Artillery, armor, cavalry, and mechanized infantry units were converted to motorized infantry. Soldiers had to learn to operate different types of weapons, optics, and new equipment and to focus on weapons proficiency instead of just qualification. Air defense and artillery units were designated as military police. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) required the synchronization of all elements of national power. Joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) operations required diverse organizations to cooperate and coordinate their activities. Information operations (IO) are still improving.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic A: Mission Command**

Mission command is the command and control of Army forces. Mission command has four elements: commander's intent, subordinate's initiative, mission orders, and resource allocation. Commanders in OEF and OIF practiced battle command against a hostile, thinking enemy. Commanders and their units had the opportunity to experience the transition from major combat operations (MCO) to stability operations and support operations.

Units in OIF and OEF conducted full spectrum operations on a continuous basis. Units' predeployment training should have focused on both MCO as well as stability operations and support operations. Commanders who focused primarily in one area stated that they should have also emphasized the other area because training shortfalls were evident once units were in theater.

To exercise disciplined initiative, understanding the commander's intent two levels above their own was critical for junior leaders. The nature of the war changed into an insurgency. Foreign fighters and anti-coalition militia (ACM) did not respect the law of war; they did not have distinctive uniforms. Different skill sets were required in order to work with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to rebuild the country and conduct stability operations and support operations.

The objective was to rapidly rebuild essential services to gain support of the local populace. Funding for projects was available through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This program allowed commanders from company to division to manage projects at their level. Cultural awareness that provided knowledge of religion, politics, customs, history, and the centers of power at the local and tribal levels was important for leaders trying to build rapport and continuing to conduct offensive and defensive operations.

Leaders at company and platoon levels fought the war. Forward operating bases (FOBs) and main supply routes (MSRs) linked units together. Convoy movements provided the insurgents an opportunity to attack with direct fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). The only way to do convoy security is on the MSR. Commanders had to set and enforce standards to protect the Soldier's life and reduce complacency. Precombat inspections (PCI), weapons and vehicle maintenance, personal hygiene, physical fitness, and training were areas the leaders had to constantly check.

Commanders established trust and confidence in their Soldiers when they shared the dangers with them. Trust and mutual understanding facilitated the development of subordinates. Soldiers taking rest and recuperation (R&R) leave in the United States did not understand the media stories portrayed on television. The media portrayed U.S. operations in a negative light. The Soldiers knew they were making a difference, but their actions were either not reflected or the ACM activities made headlines. Commanders developed their own command information program that demonstrated the importance of the Soldier and Soldiers' accomplishments. The leaders knew their Soldiers as people. Leaders knew the families and significant others in a Soldier's life. Trust and mutual respect, combined with the Soldiers' confidence in their leaders,

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lead to a positive command climate. The junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the reason for success in the GWOT.

## **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Commanders must establish and maintain standards to prevent complacency.
- Senior leaders must continue to develop junior leaders during combat.
- Establish a command climate of trust and mutual understanding.
- Provide subordinate leaders the opportunity to develop the situation without interference.
- Junior leaders developed initiative because commanders had to rely on junior leaders' judgment as they could not be everywhere.
- Junior leaders rose to meet the challenge when given the opportunity.
- Commanders developed their own command information program to counteract negative U.S. television media.
- Leaders must share the danger with their Soldiers in order to establish credibility and respect.
- Leaders at all levels must understand the JIM environment.
- Improve the synchronization and application of IO.

## **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Doctrine:

- Develop doctrine on insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- Develop doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) on contingency contracting and project development and disbursement.

Organization:

- Develop and provide modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) and mission essential task lists (METL) for units that change their orientation to motorized infantry.
- Front load the equipment required for this type of mission change, especially weapons, optics, and communications equipment.
- Increase Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) authorizations for units to gain weapons proficiency and not just qualification.

Training:

- Tailor cultural awareness training to the units' area of operations (AO).
- Provide instruction on the use of interpreters.

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### **Leadership and Education:**

- Provide instruction on contracting, negotiation, and interpersonal skills that can influence the local population in Officer Education System (OES) and Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).
- Develop instruction on the interagency and how it supports the warfighter in stability operations and support operations in OES and NCOES.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mission Command	34238-80942
Command Intent and Planning	30590-67519
Army and Marine Planning Processes	30188-23963
Reconstruction Contracts	19099-95694
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157
Command Relationships	21507-20787
Cultural Awareness and Decision Making in OIF	47735-64981
Iraq's Culture and its Impact on Operations	26868-43230
Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change	18878-05028

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## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic B: Commander's Visualization**

Commanders set the conditions for mission accomplishment by combining the art of command with the science of control. Full spectrum operations demand situational understanding (SU) of the battlespace in their area of operation (AO) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Battle command is the exercise of command against a hostile, thinking enemy. In OEF, the enemies are Al Qaeda, extremist Taliban, Hezb-Islami-Gulbuddin, and other ACM. In OIF it is the Fedeyeen-Saddam, foreign fighters, and ACM. The commander's visualization starts with the commander's SU and uses the commander's intent to move the unit from where it currently is to the end state that represents mission accomplishment.

A commander's intent incorporates the guidance contained in the commander's intent from two levels above. Brigade and battalion staffs normally have the training and experience to translate commander's intent from higher levels. The challenge is to ensure subordinates understand the commander's intent at the company and platoon level.

Commanders and their staffs commented that they received information management systems and liaison personnel in theater and did not have these resources available for training before deployment. Plasma screens, Blue Force Tracker, information work stations, chat rooms, live feeds from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or other aerial platforms, and communications equipment (tactical satellite [TACSAT], Acorn, and Warlock) should be provided as part of the unit MTOE so the unit can train as it will fight.

Pay attention to the administrative side of the information management systems. Units did not anticipate the amount of administrative supplies required for 24-hour operations: paper, repair parts, and technical representatives (TR) for equipment repair. Shortage of TR in country for Blue Force Tracker, Acorn, and Warlock needs to be addressed. Train Soldiers to do higher level maintenance and repair on systems where there is a shortage of TR. Develop a tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) to include the administrative side of information management systems. It is important for the incoming unit to cover the administrative requirements during the relief in place.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Develop a standard TACSOP for deploying units.
- Order sufficient quantities of administrative supplies and repair parts for sustained operations.
- Train selected Soldiers on higher level maintenance and repair when there is a shortage of TRs.
- Place on the MTOE or establish sufficient quantities of information management equipment at home station for units to train as they will fight.
- Ensure commander's intent is translated and understood at the company and platoon level from two levels higher.

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## **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Training:

- Commanders and staffs have the opportunity to train on information management systems prior to deployment.
- Train selected Soldiers to be prepared to perform higher level maintenance and repair on required equipment when technical representatives are not available.
- Develop an Army TACSOP.

Materiel:

- Place information management equipment on MTOE or make sufficient quantities available for home station training.
- Add Blue Force Tracker, Acorn, and Warlock to MTOE.

Leadership and Education:

- Train leaders during the battle staff course on information management systems.
- Emphasize instruction in OES and NCOES to translate commander's intent from two levels higher for understanding at the company and platoon level.

## **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Commander's Visualization	23854-54647
Information Workstation OEF	32779-5799
MCS-Light for Dummies	40774-22448

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic C: Cultural Awareness and Decision Making in OIF**

Soldiers received rudimentary or very basic cultural awareness training prior to deployment to OIF. Cultural awareness training, generally, was a lecture lasting from one to two hours provided by a contractor. The instruction consisted of a short history, climate, geography, religion of Islam, and the "dos and don'ts" of a Muslim culture (i.e., do not show the bottoms of your feet and how to treat Muslim women).

Cultural awareness training needs to move from a rudimentary level to a more advanced level for leaders who will have direct contact with the population, especially at the higher political levels. Instruction should include information on the relationships between Kurds and Arabs; the Arabization Policy; the role of the governing ring councils; the workings of the provincial councils; the importance of Qada predetermined fate; the power of the extended family, tribes, and sheiks; the concept of saving face; and the differences in public and private behavior when meeting with an Iraqi group.

Cultural awareness training impacted decision making because it took leaders time on the ground to understand that often corruption infiltrated business transactions in Iraq. The sheik, tribal elder, senior police official, and mayor often wanted to receive a piece of the action to ensure successful accomplishment of desired activities. Leaders must understand the power of money and the relationship to the family when trying to rebuild a country. Loyalty is not to a central government, but rather to the members of the extended family. Membership in the Baath party was a prerequisite for conducting any type of activity in Iraq. The Baath party retained the technical expertise in running essential services like power, sanitation, water, food distribution, transportation, and health.

Cultural awareness training impacted decision making because leaders were unaware that the region of the country had strong ties to the former government, and attacks against the coalition were not from foreign fighters, but were from the local residents. Black marketing was a common practice with stolen vehicles providing cash for the residents as well as funding the insurgency. The decision to disband the Iraqi Army made conducting coalition operations more difficult. The officers from the disbanded Iraqi Army helped the insurgency or were insurgents themselves. They provided expertise for indirect fires (mortars and rockets) and making IEDs.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Understand the power of the extended family in conducting stability operations and support operations.
- Understand that corruption often exists in business negotiations.
- Understand public behavior does not reflect an individual's accurate intention. A person may be in agreement with a coalition plan in private but will not acknowledge acceptance in public.
- Learn the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare.
- Learn the importance for an Iraqi to save face and how the concept of saving face impacts negotiations and actions.

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- Iraqis understand that you are an American and as long as you are competent and professional in your interactions with them it does not matter if you are a man or a woman. The "dos and don'ts" were not followed as taught in predeployment cultural awareness training. This concept was also identified in OEF.
- Determine second- and third-order effects of disbanding the Iraqi Army and the Baath party because that action removed any incentive for these groups to cooperate with the coalition.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Training: Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) develops basic, intermediate, and advanced cultural awareness training modules for leaders at direct, organizational, and strategic leader levels. Realize that tactical-level leaders may be conducting negotiations that impact at the strategic level.

### Leadership and Education:

- TRADOC develops insurgency/counterinsurgency TTP and doctrine.
- Incorporate cultural awareness training and insurgency/counterinsurgency training into OES, Warrant Officer Education System (WOES), and NCOES.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953
Cultural Awareness and Decision Making in OIF	447735-64981
Iraq's Culture and its Impact on Operations	26868-43230

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## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic D: Terms of Reference, OEF**

A brigade commander provided terms of reference and duty descriptions for his four main staff officers to ensure they knew and understood their responsibilities. This is a common practice for counseling; however, the commander integrated a deputy commanding officer into the brigade (a non-MTOE position) and needed to define staff roles so the staff could synchronize themselves and understand their area of responsibility (AOR). The brigade commander also defined the responsibilities of the other staff officers so everyone knew their lane and the other staff members' lanes. This technique proved to be effective for two reasons: 1) most of the primary staff did not come from home station and were integrated in theater, and 2) a new staff position was created and needed to be defined.

**Insight/Lesson Learned:** When conducting non-standard operations, it is vital to define the role and responsibilities of all involved to ensure effective coordination and integration occur.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Terms of Reference OEF	22973-50023

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## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic E: Mission Change from Division Support to Theater Support in OEF**

Combat service support (CSS) is an integral part of sustainment during full spectrum operations. In preparation for deployment, the unit's training focused on support to division operations. Upon arrival in theater, their new mission required a change from support of the division to support of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The unit did not have the opportunity to plan or prepare for significantly different levels of support, not only to other Army units, but also to the Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Additional support requirements came from special operations forces (SOF), U.S. government and non-U.S. Government agencies, international security forces, coalition partners, foreign embassies, and international organizations.

The changed mission required them to work at two support levels higher than normal, similar to a theater support command. The unit had almost no operational experience, training, or education for support at this level. The change in mission forced a delay in the unit understanding and determining the support requirements of its customers. Another hindrance was the unit's limited cultural awareness training for OEF. Different language barriers (Pashtun and Dari) meant working through the tedious process of using interpreters. Little knowledge of the culture and customs of Afghanistan, as well as working with the Jordanian hospital (with 500-600 patients), increased the cultural challenges. The unit also had to understand the different service cultures of the joint forces they supported and understand the operating environment of higher support organizations like Army Materiel Command, Defense Energy Support Center, and the Defense Logistics Agency.

The higher support agencies provided liaison officers (LNOs) to the unit with the necessary training and operational experience to accomplish the support mission. There was a steep learning curve to integrate the knowledge of these agencies into the operation. The unit had to learn the support capabilities and limitations of the Navy and Air Force systems. The unit had to learn the different support requirements for a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) as opposed to Army logistics. The supported units required maintenance and repair of equipment different than that of their division, such as radios, communications security equipment, engines, vehicles, electronic maintenance, and electronic countermeasure equipment for IEDs. The NCOs demonstrated great initiative when they came across equipment they were unfamiliar with. They searched the Internet and called manufacturers to find ways to repair equipment.

The cross-border transportation of supplies and equipment required the coordination between the military, foreign embassies, and nongovernmental organizations. A political advisor (POLAD) section within the unit would facilitate greater efficiency of movement. There was not a central coordinating organization for movement of supplies and equipment. The unit had to coordinate separately for movement by host nation ground, rotary wing, and fixed wing aircraft. Joint transportation planners focused mainly on inter-theater vice intra-theater movement.

Training and knowledge of Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (time-phased force and deployment data [TPFDD]) to support the movement of supplies and equipment would have resulted in improved efficiency of the operation. The mission required interaction with civilian contractors, appointment of class A agents, and working with the

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Defense Contracting Management Agency. Training on contractor-military relationships would have been very useful. The unit conducted numerous humanitarian assistance (HA) operations; however, there was not a central coordinating office for HA. Units did not receive feedback on the results of the HA.

A well-crafted coordination and orientation program between the incoming and outgoing unit is critical for mission success. Utilize the predeployment site survey (PDSS) and the relief in place (RIP) programs to determine areas for improvement, new training, or education.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Employ the unit according to its training and capabilities.
- Support unit and supported units determine support requirements no later than (NLT) 90 days before deployment in order to (IOT) prepare for this level and type of support mission.
- Cultural awareness training should include language, history, culture, and customs orientation for Afghanistan and key border countries as well as use of interpreters.
- Provide knowledge of the operational environment with emphasis on working with U.S. government agencies, nongovernment and international agencies, foreign embassies, joint services, and SOF.
- Establish a HA manager for the CJTF.
- Obtain training and education on joint logistics.
- Establish a movement control center for the CJTF.
- Extensive coordination during PDSS and RIP between the outgoing and incoming units is critical for mission success.
- Conduct a reverse PDSS in which the outgoing unit conducts a survey and orientation for the incoming unit.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mission Change from Division Support to Theater Support OEF	18013-57820
Relief in Place OIF	20456-18813
Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change	18878-05028

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic F: Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change**

The mission directed the unit to transform some units from armor, cavalry, or artillery to motorized infantry. Once the unit was given the mission, logistics personnel should have provided them with MTOE equipment for an infantry battalion. The artillery unit did not have any M240 machine guns. The artillery MTOE had M60 machine guns assigned, but when the M60 went out of the inventory it was not replaced with the M240.

Another weapons system not authorized on the artillery or the cavalry MTOE was sniper rifles and related equipment. The unit did not have any trained snipers. A special forces operational detachment located on the same FOB provided sniper instruction to the unit. The artillery commander selected the combat observation and lasing team (COLT) to act as the sniper element. The cavalry commander selected his scouts.

The Soldiers in all units did not routinely train with close combat optics and night vision sights. Weapons qualification and proficiency increased over time. The armor and cavalry Soldiers had to learn slightly different skills for dismounted and mounted operations in a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The artillery Soldiers had a steeper learning curve. Normally, the NCOs would have the most tactical expertise, but in this case the lieutenants recently graduated from the basic course had more experience in infantry skills than the NCOs.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Once a new mission is identified, logistics personnel immediately obtain and “push” infantry MTOE equipment to the units.
- Add M240 machine guns to the artillery battalion MTOE.
- Snipers require specialized training and equipment. Mission planners must anticipate the need for additional training and equipment then push it forward to the unit.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Training: Provide a mobile training team from the advanced marksmanship training unit or SOF to provide sniper instruction to deploying units.

#### Materiel:

- Anticipate equipment requirements and provide time for new equipment training.
- Add M240 machine guns to the artillery battalion MTOE.

Leadership and Education: OES and NCOES provide instruction and practical exercise on mounted and dismounted infantry squad, platoon, and company operations in the common core of instruction.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

**Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mission Change from Division Support to Theater Support OEF	18013-57820
Relief in Place OIF	20456-18813
Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change	18878-05028

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 1: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces**

### **Topic G: Developing Subordinates While Deployed to OEF**

The types of missions encountered in OEF increase opportunities to develop subordinates. A mission can encompass offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations all within the same patrol. Many of the missions executed in theater were not previously trained. Missions included supporting and interacting with the local governor, local elders, Mullahs, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), other coalition forces, and other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (OGAs/NGOs). Subordinates must be included in meetings with these other organizations so they can see first hand how to interact with them.

Decentralized execution and an extended AO often requires multiple, simultaneous missions. Squad leaders are often required to be platoon sergeants and team leaders must often fill squad leader positions. There is an actual thinking enemy in the AO who continually improves. Following missions, after action reviews (AARs) are conducted to identify changes in enemy TTP and used to improve future operations.

Most platoons live together on a FOB. Caution must be exercised to keep the relationships between leaders and junior enlisted professional. This can be a real challenge for the younger NCOs who still look upon many of the members of the platoon as their buddies. More senior NCOs need to be careful about becoming so close to the Soldiers that they let that relationship be the key element of decision making rather than the mission.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Opportunities to develop subordinates are increased during deployment because of the wide range of missions performed, the diverse conditions under which these missions are executed, and multiple missions which require subordinates to operate above their level. However, leaders must capitalize on those opportunities by involving junior leaders during all phases of the operation.
- Leaders must have trust and confidence in their subordinates while allowing them (and others) to learn from mistakes.
- Leaders living together with Soldiers need to keep their relationship professional.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Developing Subordinates While Deployed to OEF	26735-84581
Mission Change from Division Support to Theater Support in OEF	18013-57820
Relief in Place OIF	20456-18813
Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change	18878-05028

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 2**

### **Unity of Command/Unity of Effort**

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Topic A: Unity of Command and Unity of Effort	16
Topic B: Nature of Interagency Operations	18
Topic C: The Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan	20

#### **Summary**

Unity of command is the Army's preferred method for achieving unity of effort. The optimum command environment has one commander over all forces. However, the war on terror fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) requires the capability of joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) organizations in order to accomplish the mission. Commanders must achieve unity of effort through coordination and cooperation.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 2: Unity of Command/Unity of Effort**

### **Topic A: Unity of Command and Unity of Effort**

Forward operating bases (FOB) in OEF and OIF contain diverse populations. Army, Marine, Navy, Air Force, and special operations forces (SOF) occupy the same area but have different missions with different chains of command. Military and interagency personnel must coordinate their activities as well as contractors, host nation military, and civilian personnel. Our coalition partners also contribute support to the overall mission and their activities must be coordinated as well.

Unity of command is not possible in this environment. Therefore, commanders must achieve unity of effort through cooperation and coordination among all elements of the force even if they are not part of the same command structure.

The utilization of interpersonal skills, such as communication, negotiation, and persuasion, are critical as the commander seeks to achieve synchronization and cooperation among diverse elements in order to accomplish the mission. The commander's knowledge and understanding of the various organizational cultures are paramount to successfully integrating the capability of JIM organizations.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requires the full utilization of the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic [DIME]). The challenge is that the institutional training system does not begin providing this education until senior field grade levels. The reality on the ground is this training must begin sooner in Officer Education System (OES), Warrant Officer Education System (WOES), and Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Major combat operations are not always the main effort in stability operations and support operations.
- Commanders must utilize more interpersonal skills to achieve unity of effort when unity of command is not possible.
- Develop the skills of communication, negotiation, and persuasion.
- Develop knowledge of the interagency and capabilities they bring to the fight.
- Understand the organizational culture of JIM organizations.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

##### **Training:**

- Incorporate interagency exercises and staff exchanges during mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), combat training centers (CTCs), Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and battle staff courses.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Develop case studies and exercises for full spectrum operations that require utilizing the elements of national power that equally reflect the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of stability operations and support operations as well as major combat operations.

Leadership and Education:

- Train leaders on the interagency process in OES with emphasis on Captains Career Course and Intermediate Level Education (ILE).
- Train leaders on the interagency process in NCOES with emphasis in Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), and First Sergeant (1SG) and Sergeant Major (SGM) Academy.
- Incorporate interagency exercises and staff exchanges during MRXs, CTCs, BCTP, and battle staff courses.
- Sponsor interagency developmental assignment program commencing after branch qualification.
- Provide sequential and progressive interpersonal skills training in OES, WOES, and NCOES.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Unity of Command and Unity of Effort	22389-75075
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157
The Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan	25485-68617
Accessing Civilian Based Skill Sets in Guard and Reserve Units	37278-69494
Preparation and Training for Civil Military Missions	33722-82637

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 2: Unity of Command/Unity of Effort**

### **Topic B: Nature of Interagency Operations**

GWOT must be fought with all the elements of national power (DIME). The military brings a dynamic, compelling, and persuasive element to the fight. The military establishes relatively secure conditions which enable the other elements of national power to operate. Normally, the Department of State (DOS) is the lead U.S. government agency overseas except when the area is a combat zone, and then the Department of Defense (DOD) temporarily has the lead until conditions improve for DOS to take the lead. Some sections of a country are able to begin reconstruction even while other areas are still in combat.

The DOS orchestrates the informational and economic element of power and brings in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to establish infrastructure, the Department of Agriculture for animal and crop production, and the Department of Treasury to establish banking and monetary concerns. The interagency brings skills that do not reside in the active duty military through investment bankers, agronomists, and chemical specialists. The reserve component has similar civilian skills required to get the country back on its feet.

The military possesses an organizational culture that is different from the rest of the interagency. The military skill sets are required in order to establish the rule of law initially, and then other elements of national power are better suited to restore economic and industrial power. Two main points of understanding are (1) civilians are not in the military chain of command and do not accept military leadership and (2) civilians cannot be ordered to do anything. The interagency operates on the unity of effort, while the military prefers unity of command. Civilians report to the country team lead by the U.S. Ambassador, Chief of Mission.

Future conflicts will require more warrior-diplomats: people who understand the complexity of war and the return to peace. USAID has a handbook on disaster assistance that has a chapter on dealing with the military.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- The interagency operates on the principle of unity of effort vice unity of command.
- The interpersonal skills of communication that emphasize negotiation and persuasion are the means to obtain coordination in a unity of effort environment.
- Organizational culture of the interagency is different than that of the military.
- Future operations will necessitate the need for the military to work more within the interagency process.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Training: Incorporate interagency situations into CTCs, BCTP, seminars, and MRXs.

Leadership and Education: Develop a program of instruction for OES, WOES, and NCOES for interagency operations.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Personnel: Establish exchange positions with the other U.S. government agencies that will expand the professional expertise of officers after branch qualification.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157
Coordinating Civil Military Actions	224208-92740
Maneuver Commander Carrot and Stick	91597-32168

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 2: Unity of Command/Unity of Effort**

### **Topic C: The Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan**

The reconstruction and development of Afghanistan was a success due to the unity of effort between U.S. and Afghani officials and agencies. Several techniques used by both parties aided in reconstruction efforts.

The Bagram Airbase bazaar supports 130 vendors who pay 9,000 Afghani each to sell their merchandise. The bazaar brings in approximately \$190 per stand, about \$25,000 per event (each bazaar). These monies are then deposited into the Afghani Bank located on Bagram and set aside for future village projects as determined by the village elders. Both the vendors and communities make money with this program. This program emphasizes capitalism while facilitating reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

The new government is trying to incorporate and use "old" warlord's talents and connections. A local Afghan Militia Force (AMF) warlord was selected as a local police chief. Afghan culture promotes giving a bad guy a chance in the new government. This accomplishes two tasks: it lets the government keep its potential enemies close while maximizing the potential of an influential community.

A local suspected former AMF member is now a local businessman and is building a school north of Bagram. Another past commander established a trucking company and is starting to expand his trucking business in and around the Kabul area. Bagram's gravel pit is a success story...not only has it provided jobs to over 500 local nationals, but it has shown the locals the "how" of the gravel industry. Bagram also maintains a scrap wood program. Local communities are allowed to load up scrap wood for actionable intelligence (caches and improvised explosive devices [IEDs]). This project provides much needed firewood to the locals, but also stimulates their economy because the person can trade or sell it if he does not need it for firewood. These programs are a win-win for all because they stimulate economic development and provide mutual support for both the Afghanis and coalition forces. Local soda and cigarette stands are proof that the local economy is starting to grow.

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) supports many projects in the four local provinces. All projects are run through the local governor to ensure reconstruction efforts aid in extending the reach of the government. President Kharzi is firing governors who are not on board with rebuilding their country.

U.S. Department of Agriculture representatives are aiding several agricultural and veterinarian projects based on their personal experience. They have helped to establish two vet clinics, medical clinics, and schools. The Afghani Ministry of Education approves all school projects because it must be able to certify staff and sustain the school prior to project approval.

USAID can be very helpful depending on personalities. Unfortunately, if the command and the USAID representative do not maintain a unity of effort, then individual agendas are served and reconstruction effectiveness is reduced. Several commanders stated that USAID can provide experience with project prioritization, management, and funding.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Economic development projects should be pushed through the local government to bring legitimacy to that government.
- Leaders at all levels must understand the mission, capabilities, and constraints of OGAs and how they can enhance reconstruction and development in OEF.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Training: MRXs should incorporate the use of OGA and NGO to teach leaders how to use these assets.

Leadership and Education: OES and NCOES should emphasize OGA and NGO operations, capabilities, and constraints as related to stability operations and support operations.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
The Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan	25485-68617
Accessing Civilian Based Skill Sets in Guard and Reserve Units	37278-69494
Preparation and Training for Civil Military Missions	33722-82637
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157



# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3**

### **Leader Development and Education**

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#### **Summary**

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the execution of missions is predominately at the squad and platoon levels. The area of operations (AO) assigned to battalions and even companies may be larger than ten thousand square miles. As a result, junior leaders, both noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers, are increasingly finding themselves responsible for planning and executing missions that have been handled one or more echelons above in the past. This situation is a tremendous developmental opportunity for these junior leaders, and has resulted in the rapid growth of many of the Army's junior leaders. Company-level leaders are regularly coordinating plans and activities with other agencies, meeting and coordinating with local national agencies (e.g., Afghan National Police and Iraqi Army), and interacting with local national civil leaders. Company-level leaders are making decisions to take both lethal and nonlethal approaches and are utilizing all elements of national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic [DIME]) to accomplish their missions. These are all activities that were previously held at the battalion level or higher.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic A: Developing Flexible and Adaptive Junior Leaders**

In both OEF and OIF, battalion and brigade commanders were challenged with the size of their AO. Subordinate units were dispersed geographically over a huge AO. A brigade was responsible for an area the size of Iowa and this AO was distributed to three maneuver battalions, giving them each areas the size of West Virginia. Conducting operations in an AO of that size mandates decentralized operations with a clear understanding that leaders cannot be everywhere at once.

Brigades and battalions executed virtually all operations by allocating resources to subordinate units and giving guidance. This required trust at every level of command. Battlefield circulation became essential for the brigade and battalion commanders to ensure subordinates were executing operations within the commander's intent. In nonlinear operations, a commander unaccustomed to trusting his subordinates can stifle initiative, and while ensuring perfection of a few missions, far fewer missions will be successful than by giving guidance, providing resources, and trusting subordinate leaders to accomplish the missions assigned. Effective commanders placed themselves into operations where their presence would be a combat multiplier.

Commanders stated that every level of leadership was working above their pay grade. Companies were not used to running their own motor pools, handling their own communication problems, or regularly gathering their own intelligence. Intelligence gathering and flow was from the bottom up, not top down. Battalions reduced their own capabilities, pushing out personnel with special skills (e.g., mechanics, S2 staff, and interpreters) to help the companies. Companies tactically controlled (TACON) elements of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Iraqi Army, working side-by-side with them on many operations.

Flexibility was identified as a critical "must-have" characteristic of leaders in current and future operations. Flexibility and adaptability can be developed during deployment in junior leaders through "stretch" assignments. A stretch assignment is a tasking above the normal span of control for a leader that enables him to exercise supervised decision making and directive authority in the execution of a task. This occurs in an environment where mistakes can be learned from and are not considered life- or injury-threatening. Stretch assignments can occur with the explicit intent to develop a junior leader, or simply as a by-product of environmental pressures. Junior leaders are regularly given stretch assignments in OEF and OIF due simply to the vast AO given to brigade and subordinate units. Senior leaders cannot be aware of all the details of their AO and manage all missions being conducted by their subordinate commanders.

Although these assignments are supervised to some extent, junior leaders are permitted the latitude to develop their own approaches and make mistakes along the way. Supervising leaders can then use the mistakes as a training opportunity to point out other courses of action that would be more successful as well as key features of the task situation that should be attended to in the decision-making process. Ultimately, the use of these types of taskings and assignments as developmental tools enables junior leaders to assume the responsibilities of more senior leaders with no detriment to unit effectiveness in accomplishing the mission. Utilization of stretch

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

assignments, intentionally or not, is permitting the Army to grow the adaptive and flexible leaders required for success in current and future operations.

In OIF, companies are regularly assigned an AO covering one hundred square miles or more and typically containing several large villages or towns. Personnel limitations forced company commanders to delegate authority for planning and executing operations in villages and towns to the platoon level, generally retaining control of resources and oversight at the company level. This breadth of assignment is comparable to the AO and mission scope handled by a battalion or brigade at the combat training centers (CTCs).

The units interviewed made extensive use of the after action review (AAR) process. The AAR process typically focuses on a detailed examination of what happened during the execution of a mission to identify areas that can be further strengthened for the unit and to identify changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) which are used to improve future operations. This information is usually distributed within the company, with regular updates of significant events and information passed up to higher levels (e.g., battalion and/or brigade). One aspect of mission execution that does not typically receive as much attention is the on-the-ground decision making of the mission leaders.

When junior leaders are assigned missions and tasks for purposes of leader development, it is equally important to review the actions executed (the "what") and decisions made (the "why") during the mission. It is quite possible for a mission to be entirely successful with decision making by the junior leader that is not optimal. Likewise, it is entirely possible for a mission to be only partially successful even with optimal decision making by the junior leader. Assuring that the junior leader is examining his own decision-making process, as well as the course of action chosen, provides multiple avenues for development of the junior leader. It also helps the junior leader focus on the decision-making processes being used, not just the actions executed during the mission. This approach better enables leader flexibility and adaptability in future missions. This will also enable leaders to better prepare for and plan future missions.

Currently, neither Officer Education System (OES) nor Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) adequately develops flexibility and adaptability in junior or mid-level unit leaders. OES and NCOES are strong in teaching doctrinal approaches to problems, but not as strong in teaching how to adaptively apply doctrine to problems and situations encountered during deployment to active theaters. In some instances, Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) has brought in senior leaders with experience in current deployment theaters to lead discussions of how mission requirements have necessitated adapting doctrinal approaches to problems. Company-level NCOs often noted that this approach of employing experienced senior leaders to help junior leaders think through the process of adapting doctrine should be pushed further down into Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), and possibly Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC). The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) program of instruction helps senior leaders develop flexible thinking skills; however, Officer Basic Course (OBC) and the Captains Career Course focus more on learning doctrine than adaptively applying doctrine to specific situations. Other approaches that provide junior leaders with opportunities to flexibly and adaptively apply doctrine prior to deployment (e.g.,

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

wargaming-type exercises) would better prepare junior leaders for current and future operational environments.

Two officers in OIF lived at the Province Police Station. Neither officer had any military police experience. Their mission was to advise the Iraqi police chief on how to run the police station and to train his police force. These junior leaders, the military police (MPs) working for them, and the security forces assigned lived with the local police force at the police station. U.S. forces provided 90 percent of the force protection assets at the police station.

The officer in charge (OIC), a captain, was charged with running the police station and logistically supporting the joint operations center (JOC), which later became the joint coordination center (JCC), and the brigade tactical command post (TAC CP). His primary point of influence was the Iraqi chief of police. The second lieutenant (2LT) was the JOC OIC and coordinated Iraqi elements in support of civilian police operations. Elements included Iraqi liaisons from the police, traffic police, Army, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), fire department, emergency services, and interpreters. The JOC/JCC mission was to coordinate requirements for civil disturbances and operations.

Changing the perception of the Iraqi police with the local population was a big issue, and changing that perception was well on its way when they arrived. The National Guard MP unit they replaced had many civilian skill sets that benefitted the unit - special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team members and trainers, desk sergeants, and criminal investigators. Before the U.S. forces began cohabiting with the Iraqi police, criminal investigations were typically more costly to local civilians than simply replacing or repairing whatever was damaged or stolen. The police force provided little to the community. However, once the U.S. forces began living and working with the local police, the local community started to see that the new police station was providing a service, and the police station started to become an intelligence gathering metropolis in the area.

The officers stated that caring about the job they were doing and critical (out-of-the-box) thinking skills were what enabled them to be successful. There was not a "cookie cutter solution" for their mission; they improvised, adapted, and just did it with the resources they had.

One redeployed battalion commander had his junior officers write an officer professional assignment on leadership.

Junior leaders were required to answer four questions:

- What was the biggest lesson you learned downrange about leadership?
- How do you rate against the leader attributes in FM 22-100 (FM 7-22, Military Leadership)?
- What is your greatest strength and greatest weakness?
- What is your greatest disappointment and greatest success of the deployment?

The premier question was, "What was the biggest lesson you learned about leadership during the deployment?" Answers varied, but a theme of four common lessons easily became apparent:

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- Enforce the standards. The ultimate test of a leader is whether his subordinates enforce standards on their own. A leader cannot do everything himself and will be ineffective if he tries.
- Trust your instincts. Many junior leaders commented that their gut feeling was usually the right course that should have been taken. There is little margin for error between right and wrong; if something is wrong there is no excuse for not fixing it, whether the decision is popular or not.
- Include subordinates in mission analysis and planning. Developing subordinates so they can accomplish the mission on their own is the most important thing a leader can do. Current operations, even at the company and platoon levels, required decentralized planning and execution. Leaders are most effective when they include subordinates in the process.
- Being a leader never stops. When in charge, take charge and accomplish the mission to the best of the unit's ability. Knowledge and competence do not necessarily equate to leadership ability; there is a certain quality some leaders possess that causes Soldiers to want to follow them.

Several junior leaders had similar responses about what makes an effective or ineffective leader:

- Effective leaders motivated their subordinates, provided clear mission statements/intent/guidance, and fostered an environment that allowed subordinates to learn from their mistakes.
- Ineffective leaders micromanaged their subordinates and provided unclear mission statements/intent/guidance.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- The size of AOs and scope of brigade, battalion, and company operations in OEF and OIF necessitate pushing resources, guidance, and responsibilities for planning and executing missions down to lower-level leaders.
- Junior leaders are developing the flexibility and adaptiveness to successfully complete these missions through experience, mentoring, and "on-the-job" training, not through formal education or self-development processes.
- Enforce the standards; the ultimate test of a leader is whether his subordinates enforce standards on their own.
- Flexibility and adaptability in junior and mid-level leaders can be developed through supervised stretch assignments.
- Developing subordinates so they can accomplish the mission on their own is the most important thing a leader can do.
- AARs should focus both on the actions executed during a mission, the decision-making processes used, and the decisions reached by the mission commander to better enable leader development.
- Leaders at the brigade and battalion levels can be most successful managing large AOs by pushing resources and guidance down and letting junior leaders get the mission accomplished.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Junior leaders are so successful in OIF and OEF because missions are so decentralized that they cannot be micromanaged.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Leadership and Education:

- NCOES and OES schools for junior leaders (e.g., OBC, Captains Career Course, BNCOC, ANCOC) should examine means to add a focus on flexible application of doctrinal approaches to standard problems that take environmental circumstances into account.
- OES schools for senior leaders (e.g., Command and General Staff College [CGSC], School of Advanced Military Studies [SAMS], Army War College [AWC]) should incorporate a focus on leadership in decentralized operations to allow senior leaders opportunities to develop appropriate leadership styles for these types of operations.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Developing Flexibility in Junior Leaders	28890-30823
Mediation and Crisis Management Skills Training	26389-23854
AAR Review of Decision-Making Process	26825-05524
Maneuver Commanders in OEF	12853-86281
Developing Subordinates While Deployed to OEF	26735-84581
DIVARTY as a Maneuver Brigade	45545-57218
Field Artillery Assets Supervising an Iraqi Police	23077-35999

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic B: Interagency and Civil-Military Operations**

The GWOT must be fought with all the elements of national power (DIME) at the tactical as well as the operational and strategic levels. The military brings a dynamic, compelling, and persuasive element to the fight. The military establishes relatively secure conditions which enable the other elements to operate. Except in areas that are combat zones, the Department of State (DOS) is normally the lead U.S. Government Agency overseas. In combat zones, the Department of Defense (DOD) typically has the lead until conditions improve for DOS to take the lead; however, in some combat zones some sections of a country are able to begin reconstruction even while other areas are still in combat.

As progress has been made in both the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, the focus of operations has shifted from combat toward stability and support. One critical aspect of stability operations and support operations for which Soldiers do not typically receive adequate preparation is civil military operations (CMO). Examples of these types of missions in the Afghanistan theater include medical assistance, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs and reconstruction efforts. In Afghanistan, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are a civil military organization currently headed by a military commander and include several U.S. non-military agencies (e.g., DOS, Department of Agriculture, U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]). These PRTs have advisors or liaisons with local national and regional governmental agencies (e.g., Afghanistan Ministry of Interior and Pahrwan Governor's office) and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) (e.g., International Red Cross and World Food Bank).

The DOS orchestrates the informational and economic element of power and brings in the USAID to establish infrastructure, the Department of Agriculture for animal and crop production, and the Department of Treasury to establish banking and monetary concerns. These non-defense agencies bring skills that do not reside in the active duty military (e.g., investment bankers, agronomists, and chemical specialists).

The military possesses an organizational culture that is different from other U.S. agencies, primarily based on the differences in the organizational missions of the agencies. The military skill sets are required in order to establish the rule of law initially, and then other skill sets are required to restore economic and industrial power. During the transition from strictly combat operations to Phase IV operations focused on stability and support for the host nation, it is increasingly common for the military to be working with civilians from other U.S. agencies.

Unity of command is the Army's preferred method for achieving unity of effort. The optimum command environment has one commander over all forces. However, the GWOT fought in OIF and OEF requires the capability of joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) organizations in order to accomplish the mission. Although joint and some multinational military organizations have unity of command, interagency and civil military organizations do not. Civilians are not in the military chain of command and cannot necessarily be ordered to do anything. Interagency and civil military organizations must operate on a basis of unity of effort, whereas pure military organizations typically operate on a basis of unity of command.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Unity of command is not possible in this environment. Therefore, commanders must achieve unity of effort through cooperation and coordination among all elements of the force, even if they are not part of the same command structure.

The integration of civilian governmental agency representatives into the PRTs in Afghanistan is a clear example of commanders achieving unity of effort in civil military organizations. In one command, a brigade commander was able to utilize the expertise of a USAID representative to vet reconstruction projects, advise on which projects were best suited in scope to the military-sourced funds available vice USAID or other sourced funds, and coordinate reconstruction projects so that the military was not duplicating efforts by other agencies and organizations. The brigade commander, in effect, integrated this USAID representative into his staff and regularly depended on advice from USAID to assure maximum effectiveness of the PRTs operating in the brigade AO. The commander also received input from the USAID representative on measures of effectiveness for the PRTs.

Specifically, because there is no directive authority for military command of the civilian organizations, interpersonal skills such as communication, negotiation, and persuasion are critical as the commander seeks to achieve synchronization, trust, coordination, and cooperation among diverse elements in order to accomplish the mission. The commander's knowledge and understanding of the various organizational cultures is paramount to successfully integrating the capability of JIM organizations.

Many commanders relayed the fact that doing something positive (CMO) was worth more in their AO than doing something negative (cordon and search). Commanders emphasized the importance of non-kinetic operations. Of the six Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76) objectives for OEF, two were kinetic (lethal) and four were non-kinetic (nonlethal). These four non-kinetic objectives were the focus of CMO in OEF.

Because formal preparation for these activities is often lacking, leaders are often left to their own devices to acquire or develop the skills necessary to effectively participate in or lead CMO. Junior leaders in particular are often left to develop these skills through on-the-job training (OJT) experiences.

CMOs in OEF met four of the six objectives from CJTF-76. Staff (S5, information operation [IO]) cells and PRTs continuously worked CMO projects. It became apparent that PRTs were resourced for CMO projects; however, some of the various S5 and IO cells were somewhat out of the mainstream of guidance and resources. It was at this level where junior leaders not formally trained in IO or S5 operations started to take initiative and develop strategies to support the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

A transportation captain assigned to the S3 volunteered to focus on IO efforts, although he did not have a background in IO or CMO at that time. He took the initiative and tried to learn what he could about IO and CMO. He created a network to include the PRT and CJ9 to vet his ideas and aid in resourcing his projects. He noted that within his AO no one was focusing on IO or CMO, although a PRT co-located with him on the base could be of assistance if requested.

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This captain was very positive and really enjoyed his job; he felt that he was making a difference. He had started an Afghan Education Extension Program on a variety of topics, including grape farming, midwifery, and basic sanitation. Some of these programs were in the form of lectures, while others were produced on videotapes. All, however, were done by Afghani nationals. The program was supported by the local governor and maintained the flavor of Afghans supporting Afghans with the U.S. in the background. These programs were very popular with local nationals, local officials, and the mullahs. This captain was also in contact with consulting firms (with support from USAID) to identify some economic development opportunities for the local Afghans. These opportunities included carpet/rug production, raisins (from their delicious grapes), drying apricots, nuts, cattle production, rose oil, and the possibility of creating a marble industry.

Increasingly, the responsibility for participating in CMO is being pushed to more junior officers (e.g., company commanders and platoon leaders in OEF and OIF are increasingly involved in CMO-type missions). The challenge is that the institutional training system does not begin providing this education until field grade levels. The reality on the ground is this training must begin sooner in OES, WOES, and NCOES.

Formal education, training, and opportunities to exercise these skills are necessary for leaders to be prepared to effectively lead and participate in these CMO. Prior to deployment, leaders should try to ensure that their junior leaders have adequate opportunities to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively perform these missions, such as:

- Knowledge regarding missions of other governmental agencies (OGAs)
- Knowledge regarding missions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
- Knowledge of working styles and potential points-of-conflict with representatives of OGAs and NGOs
- Practice performing CMO in training exercises including at the CTCs

The military can also learn from other agencies how they are training or educating their staff on how to work with the military. USAID has a section in their staff handbook that addresses how to work with the military. Gaining access to this training provides military personnel, at a minimum, a basic understanding of how personnel from other agencies are likely to view and relate to the military personnel. Closer interactions between the military and civilian agencies can better enable personnel from all agencies (military and civilian) to work together to accomplish U.S. goals in theater.

Future conflicts will require more warrior-diplomats: people who understand the complexity of war and the return to peace.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Leaders at all levels are increasingly required to participate in and coordinate actions for CMO with OGAs and NGOs.
- Leaders are currently developing the skills required to participate in and coordinate actions for CMO primarily through experience rather than through training or education.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Interagency organizations operate on the principle of unity of effort vice unity of command.
- Interpersonal skills of communication, negotiation, and persuasion are critical means to obtain synchronization, trust, cooperation, and coordination in CMO.
- Organizational culture of other non-defense agencies is different than that of the military.
- In the absence of a formal structure and process to coordinate interagency operations, current and future operations will necessitate that military leaders negotiate a structure and process for planning and execution with civilian organization leaders.
- It is the initiative to creatively and constructively engage at the junior leader level that is aiding the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

#### Leadership and Education:

- Develop an interagency operations/CMO program of instruction for the OES with emphasis on the Captains Career Course and Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Develop a program of instruction for the NCOES with emphasis on ANCOC, the First Sergeants Course, and the Sergeants Major (SGM) Academy.
- Develop case studies and exercises for full spectrum operations that require utilizing the elements of national power that equally reflect the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of stability operations and support operations as well as major combat operations (MCO).

#### Training:

- Incorporate interagency situations into CTCs, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), seminars, and mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs) and certifications.
- MRXs should incorporate the use of OGAs and NGOs to teach leaders how to use these assets.

Personnel: Human Resources Command (HRC) should establish exchange positions with other U.S. government agencies (e.g., DOS and USAID) that will expand the professional expertise of officers after branch qualification.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Preparation and Training for Civil Military Missions	33722-82637
Coordinating Civil Military Actions	24208-92740
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157
Maneuver Commander Carrot and Stick	91597-32168
Brigade-Level Military Education	19138-72187

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Maneuver Commanders in OEF	12853-86281
Team Building Skills Critical for Leaders	32664-13558
Unity of Command and Unity of Effort	22389-75075
Joint Coordination Center (JCC) OIF	25002-29492
The Reconstruction and Development of Afghanistan	25485-68617
Command Relationship within the Area of Operation	17119-64244
Reconstruction Contracts	19099-95694

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic C: Cultural Awareness**

Current operations in OIF and OEF require leaders to interact with local nationals on a regular basis for a variety of reasons. The Iraqi and Afghani cultures differ from American culture in important ways that leaders and Soldiers should know; however, there are often similarities between cultures that have been observed as well. To address the need for an understanding of foreign cultures that will be encountered in theater, cultural awareness training has been instituted in most predeployment training cycles. Although this training may be adequate to provide some basic knowledge on specific aspects of the Iraqi and Afghani cultures, there are several areas in which leaders can build a basis for understanding most cultures, not just the cultures of the specific theaters in which the Army is currently operating.

Several leaders noted that when dealing with Iraqis or Afghanis it is most important to generally treat them, as you would like to be treated, with dignity and respect. These leaders noted that the specific details of Arabic culture that were taught in the cultural awareness training were less important.

All three of the leaders interviewed stated that the cultural awareness training they received was too basic. The training had a Saudi focus and centered on how to treat the dominant Arab/Muslim male. The example of not showing or facing the soles of your feet to Muslims kept coming up. One of the leaders discussed this point with a local official and he stated that he was not offended by an American sitting with his legs crossed exposing the sole of his foot. The local official acknowledged that Americans had a different culture and that both cultures needed to understand one another. The leaders stated the cultural awareness training was probably good enough for someone having limited contact with local nationals. More importantly, they commented that the Army should focus on interpersonal skills. Treat someone how you would want to be treated or how a person should be treated.

It was noted that the Iraqis had a lot of misconceptions about America and truly thought that the Hollywood portrayal of our nation (violent cop shows) was the norm. One of the local police officers actually brought his wife in to be seen by the male American medic at the police station for a dog bite. This action showed the trust and respect that permeated throughout the police station. Trust and respect must be accompanied by sternness; it quickly became apparent that weakness was easily exploited.

The leaders commented that this trust and respect was carried over during raids conducted with the Iraqi police, Iraqi Army and U.S. Soldiers. When searching a house, women and personal property were respected. Soldiers and Iraqi police had the senior male show them around the house and had him move furniture and items as they cleared the rooms. This respect migrated to trust. On one occasion the raid did not provide anything; however, the male of the household went to the police station two weeks later and provided actionable intelligence, all based on the respect he was shown during the raid. The operation showed him that the Americans were not there to tear his house apart and that the Iraqi police were actually providing a public service.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

One of the leaders noted that understanding the social structure in a village and finding out who has the power to make decisions and who does not is as important as knowing what might offend someone. Other leaders reported that an understanding of government structures, both in general and specific to the theater, would be very helpful. Cultural awareness training does not address these issues.

Social structure, both formalized in government and the informal social structure in a village, are important hints about how coalition leaders should interact with local nationals to be most effective. Some villages may be more devout than others, and this will show up in several ways, including behavior of local nationals and the social structure of the village. In some areas of Iraq there are some of the same issues with drinking and driving that America has, even though drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islam. This was one example of part of the predeployment cultural awareness training that, if taken as an absolute for all of Iraq and Afghanistan, would be wrong. In some villages the tribal chiefs have more power than the local mullah; however, in other villages the reverse may be true. When the mullah (religious leader) possesses the most power, leaders can expect the local culture to be more devoutly Islamic (and the cultural awareness training to be more applicable).

Leaders noted that general education to develop the knowledge and skills related to understanding social structures would be more helpful than the specific cultural awareness training. Some leaders pointed out that there are important non-verbal cues and behavior that can help you figure out who the important people are in a village or when someone is annoyed, frightened, or nervous. Most importantly, learning about non-verbal communication and the social concepts that make up culture (e.g., social bases of power and importance of social relationships) will provide leaders with a basis to better understand any culture in which they are operating, not just the specific cultures of current theaters.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) have been established in company-level areas of operation (AO). The JCC is staffed by both coalition and Iraqi national forces and serves the purpose of coordinating a joint Iraqi-coalition response to incidents as they arise, and provides a formal avenue for information sharing.

Leaders have identified information sharing as one of the key hurdles to the success of the JCC concept. Because information is one base of power and social power is very important in Iraqi society, coalition leaders have found that local Iraqi officials tend to resist sharing information with other Iraqi officials or even with coalition leaders if other Iraqi officials might overhear the conversation or otherwise have access to the information. This tendency undermines the principal purpose of the JCC. Coalition leaders should be aware of this tendency and work with Iraqi representatives in the JCC to see the utility of sharing information with all members of the JCC, even to the extent of developing TTP and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the JCC to support information.

Future operations will continue to require leaders to regularly interact with local nationals. Developing leader education programs of instruction that help leaders understand cultures that they will encounter will enable cultural awareness training for a specific theater to effectively be a combat multiplier in terms of their effectiveness interacting with local nations. Most important,

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

basic interpersonal skills and practices (e.g., treat everyone with respect and dignity) will go a long way toward effective operations in foreign cultures.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Cultural awareness training is very important; however, interpersonal skills blended with a little respect were just as important.
- Recognizing basic social cues (e.g., sources of power) can help leaders understand the local culture and be more effective working with local nationals.
- Leaders should understand that cultural awareness training will not always be applicable to a local operating environment depending on social structure and other factors.
- Iraqi and Afghani people understand American Soldiers do not know everything about their culture and are typically forgiving of our lack of knowledge.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

#### Leadership and Education:

- OES and NCOES should emphasize the development of basic interpersonal skills and communication rather than instruct leaders on specific cultures.
- OES and NCOES should incorporate some basic information on understanding non-verbal communication to give leaders a general basis for interpreting cultural and social situations they encounter during deployment.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mediation and Crisis Management Skills Training	26389-23854
Impact of Culture on Negotiations in OEF	35499-74555
Risk Management for Soldiers Who Consistently Interact	27175-19906
Vignette about Field Artillery Assets Supervising an Iraqi Police	23077-35999
Cultural Awareness and Decision Making	14371-23361
Joint Coordination Center (JCC) OIF	25002-29492
Junior Leaders Knowledge – Government Organization	20734-26112
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953
Cultural Awareness OIF/OEF	23613-88516

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic D: Planning and Executing Lethal and Nonlethal Missions**

Many commanders relayed the fact that doing something positive (e.g., CMO) was worth more than doing something negative (e.g. cordon and search). Commanders emphasized the importance of non-kinetic/nonlethal operations.

The GWOT must be fought with all the elements of national power (DIME). The military brings a dynamic, compelling, and persuasive element to the fight. Military power establishes relatively secure conditions which enable the other elements of national power to operate. In OEF and OIF, leaders at the strategic-operational level have laid out both lethal and nonlethal objectives which will depend on the use of all elements of national power to achieve.

Military leaders are well versed in the use of military power in lethal missions to achieve operational and tactical objectives; however, they are less prepared to utilize the other three elements of national power in nonlethal missions to achieve those objectives. Leaders in both theaters have learned that to be most effective, they must be prepared to use both lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the objectives for the theater. Moreover, they have learned that they can be very effective on a local, tactical level through the combination of lethal (i.e., direct action) and nonlethal approaches (e.g., information operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, and CMO) to achieve their missions.

Although company-level officers report no formal education and training in the combination of lethal and nonlethal methods of achieving missions, they are nonetheless utilizing nonlethal approaches to accomplishing desired effects when

- a) resources are available, and
- b) the approach is believed to be feasible and effective for mission success.

Company-level officers in OEF and OIF report utilization of nonlethal approaches to achieve desired effects. Some examples include the use of diplomatic channels with local community leaders and economic channels, such as facilitating rebuilding community infrastructure.

One company commander reported the use of an infrastructure rebuilding project and the building of a soccer field for the community youth in order to build goodwill among community members. The ultimate objective was to remove the influence of anti-coalition forces in the community. Within weeks after the completion of these projects, anti-coalition incidents in the town declined and eventually ceased. Later, when anti-coalition forces tried to return to the community, local citizens reported identification and location information to coalition members, facilitating their removal. This achieved the desired effect of pacifying this portion of the company AO.

Other leaders reported utilizing diplomatic and economic instruments of power with local community leaders to elicit information on anti-coalition forces and suppress anti-coalition activities in their AOs. Company-level leaders, however, noted that use of nonlethal approaches to accomplish a mission was not the "default" mode of planning and required leaders and

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Soldiers to step outside their comfort zone in terms of planning actions. As such, it is critical for line commanders at all levels to be familiar with the use and application of all four instruments of national power (DIME) at their level of responsibility. It is also important for key staff members (e.g., S3, S5, and S2) to be familiar with the uses of the instruments of national power, and how lethal and nonlethal operations can be combined to achieve a desired effect.

Currently, nonlethal approaches to mission accomplishment and the use of all four instruments of national power is a subject of educational and professional development only at senior leader levels within the Army and joint service schools. Company leaders have been largely left to their own devices to develop an understanding of the combination of lethal and nonlethal approaches to missions. As previously noted with regard to junior leaders, this is an area in which company leaders are simply learning as they go by whatever means available. Company leaders, however, have consistently demonstrated that they are capable of planning and executing both lethal and nonlethal missions and combining lethal and nonlethal missions to maximize overall effectiveness.

Professional military education (PME) should incorporate some basic level education on the use of nonlethal approaches to accomplish objectives with a more detailed examination of the instruments of national power (DIME) and what the use of these instruments actually looks like at different levels of command. It is important that leaders recognize that diplomatic or economic power can be utilized at the local level as well as at the strategic level.

In addition to simply knowing what the instruments of national power are and how they can be used to achieve objectives, it is also important for leaders to have some basic knowledge of how resources, typically funding, can be obtained and correctly channeled toward achieving the desired objective. In OEF and OIF, one of the major objectives of the theater is to put a local face on projects: Iraqis doing for Iraqis, Afghanis doing for Afghanis. In OIF, company-level leaders are regularly working with local civic and government organizations to support them as they provide needed services and support to the civilian population.

In order to provide this support, leaders require knowledge of the structure of the host nation government both at the national and provincial levels (where budgetary resources are located) and city and town levels (where money is spent and projects are executed). At a minimum, leaders would benefit from education on several key examples of government forms. This general understanding would help leaders have some expectations of what agencies or ministries exist, how they will relate to each other, and how government funding moves from one to another.

When preparing for deployment to a specific AO, leaders could then acquire detailed knowledge of the laws and government structure of the host nation at the national and provincial levels and more specific knowledge of local agencies, offices, and key personnel in their particular AO. Some leaders have been successful in obtaining this information from the units they are relieving. Leaders at all levels should assure that this key information is provided to successor units in continuity books.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Senior leaders should facilitate the use of nonlethal approaches to mission accomplishment by providing resources and allocation discretion to company-level leaders when possible.
- Leaders should avoid gravitating to only the instruments of power that they are comfortable with; they should try to understand all instruments of power available on the modern battlefield and exploit them to meet their objectives.
- Military power is not always the most effective instrument of power in stability and support operations.
- Company-level leaders should consider the use of nonlethal approaches for mission accomplishment when the approach is feasible and resources are available.
- Company-level leaders will require detailed knowledge of local city and town governments, including names, locations, and contact information for key governmental personnel, to effectively provide support to local government officials.
- Leaders at all levels should assure that information regarding the host nation government at the national, provincial, and local levels is included in the continuity books for successor units.
- Leader education should include topics on government and civics as a general education primer for understanding the operations of government and the relationship of governmental agencies at different levels (e.g., national, provincial, and local).

## **DOTMLPF Implications:**

### **Leadership and Education:**

- Officers should become familiarized with the major instruments of national power and their application during the basic and career courses.
- Develop case studies and exercises for full spectrum operations that require utilizing the elements of national power that equally reflect the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of stability operations and support operations as well as MCO.
- Formal education systems (OES/NCOES) should incorporate education on the utilization of nonlethal approaches to mission accomplishment (i.e., effects-based operations [EBO]) for company level leaders (OBC, Captains Career Course, ANCOC).
- Leader education should include a requirement for a course or courses in government and civics to provide an educational foundation for understanding the various forms of government and the basic functioning and purpose of governmental agencies and the relationship of government at different levels (e.g., national, provincial/state, and local).

## **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Brigade-Level Military Education	19138-72187
Use of Non-Kinetic Missions to Achieve Missions	15731-31845
Maneuver Commander Carrot and Stick	91597-32168

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Maneuver Commanders in OEF	12853-86281
Junior Leaders' Knowledge - Government Organization	20734-26112

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic E: Stability and Support Operations**

In OEF and OIF, one of the primary objectives is to provide a secure environment in which a new government can be stood up and assume autonomous control of the country. Operations early in each theater were characterized by an emphasis on MCO. However, in each case, there was a relatively quick transition to stability operations and support operations with significantly less emphasis on combat operations (except when military force was necessary) to bring basic security to a particular locale. Even within stability operations and support operations, leaders and their Soldiers must be prepared to transition quickly from an orientation towards support to an offensive or defensive orientation. This environment challenges leaders in terms of the skills required to manage relationships with host nation government, host nation military personnel, and local civilians, as well as having the requisite knowledge of available resources to bring to bear on problems encountered in their AO.

Full spectrum operations call on leaders and Soldiers at all levels to be able to work with local national civilians in a variety of situations for which they feel ill prepared. Leaders and Soldiers who interact with local nationals have stated that they feel ill-prepared to deal with the variety of situations in which they find themselves. For example, civilians requesting access to coalition bases are often highly emotional because they have an urgent situation such as a medical emergency, a need for food or water, or are in desperate need of employment. Soldiers manning entry points sometimes must turn away these people without agitating them further and causing ill will among the population.

In other situations, leaders are in the local communities working with the local leaders to assess the needs of the community and the ways in which the military might be able to assist. In these situations they have been instructed by more senior commanders not to promise anything, but to simply assess the situation. However, they sometimes feel pressure by the local leaders to provide some token of good will. Leaders and Soldiers patrolling in the villages are also occasionally approached by local civilians who have disputes between them and are asking the Soldiers to settle the disputes. It was noted that some sort of mediation training would be useful. As one Soldier put it, “I wish I’d had as much training on reacting to people as reacting to direct fire.”

In the process of rebuilding host nation military units, it is common for one or more junior leaders to be embedded as an advisor within a corresponding size element in the host nation military for training purposes. Within team and squad size elements, units depend on synchronized, coordinated actions to effectively conduct operations. Moreover, coalition teams and squads themselves also require synchronized, coordinated actions - particularly when conducting operations in urban environments. When teams are required to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances typical of stability operations and support operations, this coordination can suffer when the team members are unable to anticipate the actions of other team members, or do not trust other team members to execute actions necessary for the preservation and effective action of the team. Junior leaders require skills in developing coordination and trust within small units to maximize the effectiveness of both the coalition units as well as the host nation military. These leaders must also be able to assist and advise host nation military leaders on how to

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

develop coordination and trust within their own units in anticipation of the host nation military conducting autonomous operations without the advice and assistance of the coalition.

One of the significant challenges of leaders involved in stability operations and support operations is effectively managing the resources available to develop the infrastructure, services, and security of the host nation. These resources encompass both personnel and units with specialized skills as well as funding and materiel to allocate toward reconstruction projects. In OEF, a strategy was developed to consolidate these resources into PRTs, which fall under the direction of brigade commanders. In OIF, reconstruction efforts are conducted and supervised at the company, battalion, and brigade levels in coordination with host nation organizations at corresponding levels (e.g., company commanders work with a neighborhood advisory council composed of local civic leaders).

Regardless of the structure adopted in theater, leaders have access to a variety of skilled personnel and units as well as funding of resources to conduct reconstruction efforts. Leaders need to be knowledgeable on the capabilities of personnel and units available to them (e.g., civil affairs, engineers, and special operations forces) and the available funding and materiel resources and the associated limitations. Two of the major sources of reconstruction funding are the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA). There are a variety of restrictions on the use of CERP and OHDACA funds that leaders need to be aware of in order to effectively plan and manage contracts for reconstruction efforts. Company-level leaders report inadequate coverage of stability operations and support operations related topics in the OES and NCOES. Company commanders suggested that these topics and skills be integrated into the curriculum of OES prior to the time frame in which officers would typically assume company command (e.g., OBC, Captains Career Course).

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Company-level leaders should be provided the opportunity to develop negotiation, crisis management, mediation, and coordination skills prior to company command, either through the formal education system or through practical training exercises (e.g., CTC).
- Direct leaders require team building skills to build cohesion, trust, and coordination to achieve mission success, particularly in rapidly evolving operational conditions.
- Company-level leaders require a more thorough knowledge of unit types of missions for stability and reconstruction operations.
- Commanders must be knowledgeable on resources available to support reconstruction of infrastructure and essential services.
- Commanders should be prepared to conduct reconstruction contracting as an integral part of stability operations and support operations.

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## **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Leadership and Education:

- Team-building skills should be incorporated or further emphasized early in the OES/NCOES (e.g., pre-commissioning education, OBC, Primary Leadership Development Course [PLDC], and BNCOC).
- Negotiation, mediation, and coordination skills should be developed in junior leaders either through the formal education system or through practical exercises.
- Fundamentals of contracting and basic parameters of the various funding sources for reconstruction should be integrated into PME for leaders at company command and higher.

Organization: Deployable contracting detachments, staffed by military or civilians, should be created to be held at division or brigade level.

## **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Reconstruction Contracts	19099-95694
Mediation and Crisis Management Skills Training	26389-23854
Technical Advisory Teams (PTAT)	27249-71741
DIVARTY as a Maneuver Brigade	45545-57218
Team Building Skills Critical for Leaders	32664-13558
Inadequate Leader Preparation for Stability Operations and Support Operations	21630-50308
Air Ground Integration (AGI)	43453-41571

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic F: Commander's Intent**

Commanders at the brigade, battalion, and company levels in OEF and OIF are tasked with extremely large AOs and decentralized operations. In order to be maximally effective throughout the AO, commanders are decentralizing decision making to subordinate commanders who are closer to the fight. This places a premium on the commander's intent being effectively communicated through the chain of command.

Battalion and brigade commanders were challenged with the size of their AO. They were amazed at the extent to which their subordinate units were dispersed. A brigade was responsible for an area the size of Iowa and was distributed to three maneuver battalions, giving them areas the size of West Virginia. The battalion's AOs were different across the board, making commander's intent even more crucial. Each company had to understand CJTF-76 objectives, intent from two headquarters above, and their local area and villages to be effective in their AO.

Although senior commanders in both theaters noted that they have communicated their intent to their subordinate commanders, junior leaders did not consistently understand the commander's intent, particularly at the company level. Some company-level leaders noted that they knew what the brigade commander's intent was, but that it did not seem very applicable to their AO given the situation they were facing on the ground. One reason for this disconnect may be the widely varying conditions in theater with some companies and battalions largely or exclusively conducting stability operations and support operations and others conducting almost exclusively combat operations based on the presence of anti-coalition forces in their AOs. The commander's intent, which is focused more on nonlethal reconstruction objectives, may not seem to make much sense to units focused primarily on combat operations.

Another barrier to effective communication of commander's intent is the modular assembly of units immediately prior to or during deployment. Deploying units often fall under new command headquarters with which they have no habitual relationship. When this condition exists, units begin from ground zero to build relationships both on the command and staff level. Understanding the new commander's vision and his intent takes time to be fully understood and implemented. Developing this new relationship is accomplished at the same time a unit gets accustomed to their mission and a new AO.

Senior commanders adopted a variety of strategies to assure that their subordinate commanders understood their intent. Some senior leaders executed virtually all operations by allocating resources and giving guidance. This required trust at every level of command. Battlefield circulation became essential for the brigade and battalion commanders to ensure subordinates were executing operations within the commander's intent. Senior commanders would regularly visit subordinate commanders to discuss operations, sit in on mission briefings and rehearsals, and go out on missions. This provided the senior commanders the opportunity to detect misunderstandings and correct them. This also provided an opportunity for them to convey implicit aspects of their intent to their subordinate commanders through discussions of how the senior commander might execute the mission, or what considerations the senior commander would pay attention to in the planning process.

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As one Soldier stated, not one mission during their whole deployment went as planned. That is why understanding the commander's intent for the mission was important. If modifications to the plan had to be made during a mission, the commander's intent could be used as guidance to ensure the intent was still met. Many leaders discussed ways in which senior commanders ensured their intent was understood. Some commanders had subordinates backbrief them. Some commanders observed the rock drills and rehearsals without disrupting them to see if the plan was consistent with the intent. Some commanders did backseat rides and observed how the missions went to see if plans were adapted on the ground in a way that was consistent with their intent.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Commander's intent is crucial to effective decentralized operations in a large AO.
- Many units deploying to OEF and OIF find themselves assigned to a new headquarters and must learn a new commander's vision and understand his intent simultaneously while learning a new AO.
- Commanders can help ensure that their intent is understood by circulating around the battlefield, supervising mission briefs, mission rehearsals, and missions as they are executed.
- A clear commander's intent can ensure a mission is successfully completed even if the plan has to be modified during execution.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Leadership and Education: Commanders at all levels should have opportunities to develop personally effective methods of communicating their intent in controlled settings (e.g., MRX and wargaming exercises in ILE).

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Developing Command Relationship During Deployment	33213-96434
AAR Review of Decision-Making Process	26825-05524
Maneuver Commanders in OEF	12853-86281
DIVARTY as a Maneuver Brigade	45545-57218
Command Intent and Planning	30590-67519

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic G: Professional Military Education (PME)**

Leaders at all levels had many things to say about the OES and NCOES, both praise and suggestions for improvement. Senior leaders were very positive in their comments on the senior leadership schools (e.g., CGSC, SAMS, Army War College [AWC], and United States Army Sergeants Major Academy [USASMA]). These leaders felt that these schools helped develop critical thinking skills and deepened their understanding of the profession of arms as both an art and science.

Overall, most leaders were generally pleased with their PME, although there were fairly consistent comments that the timing for school attendance was preventing the education received from being of maximal use. It was noted by several leaders that NCOs were attending PLDC, BNCO, and ANCOC after they had already been in leadership positions for which those schools are directly relevant. For example, Soldiers were attending PLDC after being promoted to Sergeant and assigned as a team leader. They reported that they had gained most of the knowledge and skills required to perform effectively as a team leader simply through doing the job, and the education received at PLDC duplicated what they had already learned. A second-order effect is that the NCO's morale suffers because he/she feels unsupported by the system. One NCO noted, "The Army says that NCOES is important, yet won't send NCOs." Third-order effects may include unit morale suffering because NCO morale is down, and NCO retention may drop as NCOs may feel undervalued by the Army.

In general, these NCOs reported that they would have found attendance to the next relevant school much more useful if they had attended the school prior to assuming the next leadership position – even if that meant attending the school before they were technically eligible. Because there are significant numbers of Soldiers being promoted and assigned to the next leadership position during deployment, it would be maximally useful to send these Soldiers to their next school prior to deployment rather than after the completion of deployment.

Several comments were received in relation to OES from company-level leaders, particularly from company commanders. There were several comments noting that the Captains Career Course seemed to be primarily geared toward staff positions with significantly less emphasis on company command. This was useful in preparing captains for serving on staffs at the brigade and battalion levels, which was the most common assignment reported following the Captains Career Course. However, it was significantly less useful for utilizing the instruction related to company command. Several captains noted that they had forgotten most of the command-related instruction by the time they actually got into company command, and that it would have been useful to have either a refresher course or a wholly separate course geared entirely toward company command. Given the growing criticality of company commanders in current and future operations and the potential impact company commanders can have on the development of company-level leaders at all levels, developing a separate course for company command should be strongly considered.

Most leaders made comments regarding the content of courses throughout OES and NCOES. Although many of these comments have been captured elsewhere in this chapter, some of the

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

most important comments are reiterated here, and others not captured elsewhere are noted as well.

Several senior leaders noted the importance of interagency coordination to accomplish operational objectives, particularly in employing non-military instruments of national power. One noted that it would be very helpful to have a "Goldwater-Nichols for interagency." Although the importance of interagency cooperation and coordination has already been discussed in reference to CMO (Topic B in this chapter), the emphasis that was placed on interagency aspects of current operations is worth noting here as well. Understanding the requirements for interagency coordination and cooperation and developing the skills necessary to accomplish this coordination is a critical component of PME that is currently lacking. Significant improvements could be made to both OES and NCOES by the development of interagency programs of instruction at all levels of OES and the mid and senior levels of NCOES.

Company leaders consistently endorsed the concept of a "combat leader course" that would be attended by all new platoon leaders and new platoon sergeants. Most of the leaders, ranging from specialist to company commander, all said that shooting, moving, and communicating were critical skills that need to be trained in such a course. One of the critical foci for this course would be basic infantry tactics at the team, squad, and platoon level for all branches and military occupational specialties (MOS). This comment reflects current realities found in OEF and OIF that all leaders and Soldiers must be prepared for direct action.

One NCO made a suggestion related to the shortage of personnel with mission relevant skills in theater and a possible solution beginning to address this shortage that may help increase retention of high-value mid and senior NCOs. A by-product of the current pace of operations in OIF and OEF is that individuals with critical mission relevant skills are in relatively short supply in theater. Units are regularly operating with a limited number of translators, tactical air controllers, civil affairs personnel, IO personnel, and snipers. Units are facing a situation where they either have to operate without these assets or are forced to try to develop these critical skills on the fly during operations.

One of the significant concerns of the Army is the retention of high quality junior and mid-level NCOs. These individuals are the backbone of the Army at the company level. These NCOs are responsible for providing the direct leadership and development of the Army's most junior Soldiers and for leading them in the fight during deployment.

One potential avenue to begin to address both the skill gap and developing retention issues is to offer additional training to high quality junior and mid-level NCOs in exchange for extensions of service obligations. One potential solution to address the skill gap and NCO retention is to offer the top three graduates from BNCOC and ANCOC the opportunity to continue directly to an additional training to obtain an additional skill identifier as a reward and recognition of their achievement in the course. These graduates could submit their top three to five choices for further training, and they could be placed in one of their choices based on current needs, course schedules, and their personal qualifications for attendance. This additional training would be intended to augment the assets already in theater, rather than replacing assets and skilled personnel currently available in theater.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

The Army benefits by having more Soldiers with theater relevant skills deployed into theater, and by increasing retention of high quality junior and mid-level NCOs. The individual NCOs benefit by acquiring further skills that will better enable them to perform their missions and generally enhance their professional development. The Army, by offering additional training to promising NCOs, is implicitly expressing to these NCOs that they are valued by the Army – an act which is likely to raise the commitment of these Soldiers to the Army. Moreover, the reward/recognition associated with the offer of additional training with the input of the Soldier may motivate more junior leaders to apply themselves in PLDC and BNCOC in order to obtain this reward and recognition.

If adopted, the Army would incur additional training expenses for these NCOs and would lose access to these high-quality NCOs for the period of their additional training. However, this cost may be reasonably offset by their increased value to the Army upon the conclusion of their training.

Leaders were also asked about the usefulness and content of a junior leader handbook. Virtually all leaders agreed that such a handbook could be very useful to junior leaders.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Significant improvements could be made to both OES and NCOES by the development of interagency programs of instruction at all levels of OES and the mid and senior levels of NCOES.
- OES and NCOES provide senior leaders with opportunities to develop critical thinking skills; however, junior leaders need more critical thinking scenarios in NCOES/OES.
- Provision of additional skill training to mid-level and senior NCOs can assist units in deployment by providing additional personnel with necessary skills in short supply and may increase retention of mid-level and senior NCOs.
- Junior leaders should attend schools prior to deployment when possible, rather than waiting until after redeployment, to maximize the potential benefit of the education for the junior leaders and to better prepare these junior leaders to assume responsibilities during deployment.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

#### **Leadership and Education:**

- The Army should familiarize officers during the basic and career courses and educate officers during ILE with interagency integration.
- Develop program of instruction on the interagency process in OES with emphasis on Captains Career Course and ILE.
- Develop program of instruction on the interagency process in NCOES with emphasis in ANCOC, first sergeant, and SGM academy.
- Provide top graduates from BNCOC and ANCOC with the opportunity to gain an additional skill identifier before returning to their units.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Establish a combat leader's course as an integral part of both OES and NCOES for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants.
- Junior leaders in units scheduled to deploy should be sent to PLDC and BNCOC prior to deployment when possible.

Training: Incorporate interagency exercises and staff exchanges during MRXs, CTCs, BCTP, and battle staff courses.

Personnel: Review the policy to promote Soldiers to sergeant without PLDC attendance with regard for the second- and third-order effects.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Leadership	29073-70571
Skill Development for High-Quality Mid-Level and Senior NCOs	28159-46741
OES and NCOES Recommendations OIF	25762-49194
Combat Leaders Course OEF/OIF	54583-27549
Preparing Junior Enlisted to Assume Leadership Positions	18845-72210
Nature of Interagency Operations	13419-93157
Brigade Level Military Education	19138-72187

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 3: Leader Development and Education**

### **Topic H: Mentoring and Role Models**

Within Army leadership doctrine, three pillars of leader development are identified: formal education, self-development, and experience. One of the most important but often unmentioned aspects of development through experience is mentoring. Junior officers are mentored by more senior officers and by their counterpart NCO with whom the junior officer has a critical relationship; the NCO is perhaps the most important mentor in the careers of many officers.

The NCOs defined one of their duties as mentoring their counterpart officers. Platoon sergeant mentored platoon leader, first sergeant mentored company commander, and command sergeant major (CSM) mentored battalion commander. One reason for the sometimes poor relations between an officer and NCO was the failure of an NCO to help shape the officer early in his career or the failure of the officer to listen to the counsel of the NCO. Repeatedly, officers and senior NCOs noted that the most important thing for a new platoon leader to learn from his/her platoon sergeant is the difference between their roles, particularly with regard to planning and execution of tasks.

When asked to talk about the role models they have had throughout their military careers, leaders repeatedly mention the same sorts of influences. When asked about positive role models (someone they wanted to be like), leaders identified someone who took a specific interest in them, was correctly confident in their own abilities and willingly shared information, presented a military bearing and discipline, and could be counted on to do what they said they would do.

When asked about negative role models (someone they did not want to be like), leaders identified someone who had yelled at a Soldier in front of people for making a mistake, did not care about the welfare of Soldiers, or who failed to live up to ethical and moral standards.

Ethical and moral standards were mentioned more than any other role model trait. Communication skills and tactical job-related knowledge were also mentioned frequently. Soldiers are looking for leaders who can readily communicate an idea and who are knowledgeable about the tasks they are asking their Soldiers to perform.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Soldiers are well served by leaders who are knowledgeable in the appropriate areas, who can communicate ideas, and who live up to the Army values.
- To maximize the effectiveness of the platoon and provide a solid foundation for the development of a new platoon leader, platoon sergeants should ensure that they adequately communicate the differences between the roles of the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant.
- NCOs regularly mentor their counterpart officers, and provide a critical and valuable source of leader development to the officers.

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**Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Role Models	20977-67316
Use of Communities of Practice During Deployment	54417-08340
Developing Subordinates while Deployed to OEF	26735-84581
Mentoring of Lieutenants by NCOs	40774-22448
Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Leadership	29073-70571
PLT SGT Mentoring of New PLT Leaders	29141-50296



# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 4**

### **Communication, Command Climate, and Morale**

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Topic B: Developing Leaders and Soldiers	56
Topic C: Integrating Replacement Soldiers	59
Topic D: Establishing and Maintaining Standards	61

#### **Summary**

A critical part of leadership is providing subordinates with the tools and training to be able to do their jobs. It is difficult for a Soldier to do his or her job well if preoccupied with family problems. It is equally difficult for the Soldier to perform well without a clear understanding of the commander's intent. A leader should not have to wonder whether or not the Soldiers on his or her team are capable of performing required tasks. One thing these concerns have in common is that they can be alleviated by communication. Leadership communication was directly responsible for the command climate in the observed organizations. Communication alleviated worry about family members, mission readiness, and Soldier capabilities.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 4: Communication, Command Climate, and Morale**

### **Topic A: Leadership, Morale, and Stress**

Stress is inherent in the military. The transition from garrison to combat duty was a significant change in environment for Soldiers which resulted in increased stress. Common human emotions of fear, ambiguity, and uncertainty contributed to the rising tension of the deployment.

Alternatively, leaders were aware of the stress that resulted from conducting the same routine seven days a week. Separation from friends and family added to Soldiers' stress as they were separated from their regular support systems. Leadership was the key factor in the relationship between stress and unit morale. In the presence of good leadership, unit morale was not affected by the level of stress.

One issue leaders monitored while assessing morale was the level of stress in the unit. Whether the stress was due to mundane issues, such as a repetitive work schedule, or more drastic events, such as a casualty or fatality in the unit, leaders found the best thing to do was communicate with the Soldiers.

Simply talking with Soldiers was the most prominent tool for a leader to monitor the morale of his unit. As one leader put it, "It's leadership by walking around." Many leaders dined with their Soldiers in the chow hall or talked with them while accompanying them on patrol. Some leaders had formal sensing sessions, where they talked with Soldiers "off their cord" to get a feeling for problems or issues in the unit. Many leaders felt it was especially important to keep tabs on the morale of units that were deployed away from the main operating base. This was done by visiting the remote units as often as is practicable, frequent phone calls, and emails.

Morale was more directly related to leader actions than facilities or comfort items available to the Soldiers. However, the use of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) facilities was ranked very high by all Soldiers when it comes to reducing stress. Soldiers used the gym, library, and movies as well as MWR facilities accessible by a 4-day pass in Kuwait and Qatar. Other Soldiers used their free time during deployment as an opportunity to take classes, either online or through the education facility.

The use of MWR Internet and telephone access paid huge dividends in reducing stress by allowing Soldiers to maintain contact with family and loved ones. Some units had a policy that every Soldier must contact his or her family at least once every two weeks. Other leaders encouraged contact with families by constantly querying Soldiers about their families. One leader went to the trouble to contact families through the rear detachment and Family Readiness Group (FRG) newsletter to ease their stress regarding the deployment and, by extension, reduced the stress of his Soldiers. Communication among leaders, Soldiers, and families contributed greatly to morale in the greater Army family. Leaders indicated that, especially those at remote sites, there is a scarcity of funding for morale items such as air conditioners, Internet access, and phone hookups.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Leadership was the key factor in the relationship between stress and unit morale.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Talking with Soldiers was the best tool for a leader to monitor the morale of his unit.
- Morale was more directly related to leader actions than facilities or comfort items available to the Soldiers.
- The use of MWR Internet and telephone access paid huge dividends in reducing stress by allowing Soldiers to maintain contact with family and loved ones.

**Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Taking Care of Soldiers	26918-76606
Manage Stress During a Combat Tour	32146-11113
Maintenance of Soldiers' Individual Internal Strength	86344-78158
Funding for Taking Care of Soldiers	21407-55650
Role Models	20977-67316
Manage Stress OEF	21596-97536
Monitor Morale and Welfare When Troops are Geographically Dispersed	45834-09712
Morale Issues in OIF	21407-02040
Helping Soldiers with Personal/Family Problems	22038-94828

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 4: Communication, Command Climate, and Morale**

### **Topic B: Developing Leaders and Soldiers**

Leaders communicated with Soldiers under many different circumstances. After a mission, the after action review (AAR) provided an opportunity for leaders and subordinates to communicate to see what went right and where the unit needed improvements or training.

Leaders developed their subordinates by allowing them the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. The complexity of the missions in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), coupled with the conditions under which these missions must be performed, left leaders searching for solutions. Subordinates often had positive influence on problem resolution because they had a different perspective to the problem. This was not only because they viewed the mission from a different proximity but because of their upbringing, different cultural influences, and age. This different perspective often let them see a problem and solutions with much greater clarity than their leaders. Bringing subordinates into the problem-solving process had the additional benefit of junior Soldiers' gaining ownership of the solution. Whenever Soldiers considered themselves part owner of a solution, they put more energy into the situation. Additionally, bringing subordinates into the process helped to mentor and develop them for additional responsibility. It also fostered trust of the chain of command. This, in turn, increased effectiveness of the leaders. Leaders who seriously considered innovations presented by subordinates found it developed junior leaders, built trust in the chain of command, and, in turn, increased their effectiveness as leaders. The converse of this also impacted some units. Soldiers who were constantly told exactly what to do and whose recommendations were treated lightly reached a point where they would not act unless told to do so.

The types of missions encountered in OEF increased opportunities for junior leader and Soldier development. Missions encompassed offensive, defensive, and stability operations all within the same patrol. Missions included supporting and interacting with the local governor, local elders, Mullahs, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), other coalition forces, and other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (OGA/NGOs). Leaders developed subordinates by allowing them to attend these meetings.

Decentralized control and an extended area of operation (AO) often resulted in multiple, simultaneous missions. The enemy continually developed new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) which required leaders to constantly adapt to new situations. Squad leaders were often required to be platoon sergeants, and team leaders must often fill squad leader positions. The AARs which followed each mission were an opportunity for leaders and Soldiers to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the unit and improve TTP.

Leaders fostered development in subordinates through "stretch assignments." Stretch assignments were taskings above the normal accepted span-of-control for a leader of that position or rank. These assignments enabled junior leaders to exercise decision-making and directive authority in the execution of a task while supervised. They normally were conducted in an environment where mistakes were learned from and were not considered life threatening.

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Although these assignments were supervised, junior and mid-level leaders were permitted the latitude to develop their own approaches and make mistakes along the way. Supervising leaders were able to use the mistakes as a training opportunity to point out other courses of action that might have been more successful as well as key features of the task that should have been addressed in the decision-making process. Ultimately, the use of these types of taskings as developmental tools allowed junior and mid-level leaders to successfully assume the responsibilities of more senior leaders with no detriment to unit effectiveness.

An essential method in leader development was lieutenants being mentored by noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The relationship between a platoon sergeant and a new platoon leader was one of the most critical observed. Platoon leaders were typically brand new officers with little experience. In contrast, platoon sergeants were typically seasoned NCOs with a great deal of knowledge and experience. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the platoon, the platoon sergeant mentored the new platoon leader in a variety of areas. Platoon leaders and senior NCOs insisted that one of the most critical areas was the differences between the roles of the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant, particularly with regard to planning and execution of tasks. It proved to be prudent for a new lieutenant to listen to the guidance from an NCO who had more experience. Several NCOs mentioned frustration with new lieutenants who came into the unit and changed policies without taking the time to understand why things were done a certain way. The NCOs were not expecting the lieutenants to keep things the way they were, they just wanted the lieutenant to take some time to understand the unit policies and get to know the people before making drastic changes. Units in which the lieutenants were willing to learn and take advantage of an NCO's knowledge had successful missions and appeared to have higher unit morale.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Lieutenants who took the time to listen to guidance from their NCOs learned about the unit and built solid relationships among the unit leadership.
- A junior Soldier's perspective on problems was often better than their senior's perspective because of the junior Soldier's proximity to the problem.
- Serious consideration of innovations by subordinates was a way for leaders to develop junior leaders.
- Flexibility and adaptability in junior and mid-level leaders was developed through supervised stretch assignments.
- Leaders had trust and confidence in their subordinates while allowing them to learn from mistakes.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mentoring of Lieutenants by NCOs	40774-22448
Leader's Actions which Build Confidence	32169-39058
Innovations Subordinates and Leadership	33289-27296

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Developing Flexibility in Junior Leaders	28890-30823
Developing Subordinates while Deployed to OEF	26735-84581
PLT SGT Mentoring of New PLT Leaders	29141-50296

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 4: Communication, Command Climate, and Morale**

### **Topic C: Integrating Replacement Soldiers**

Deployed units lost Soldiers for a variety of reasons throughout the deployment. In order to maintain unit readiness, individual replacement Soldiers were sent to deployed units in theater. Replacement Soldiers typically had not had the benefit of the predeployment validation training that the rest of the unit had prior to deployment. As a result, these Soldiers often lacked the skills required to perform mission relevant tasks when they arrived in theater. In-theater training ensured that Soldiers had the proper training to fulfill their duties and knew that the leadership had taken the time to ensure the Soldiers had what they needed to do their missions safely and successfully.

For example, one brigade found out soon after deployment that much of the predeployment training received was outdated or just plain wrong. After arriving in theater, the brigade was issued new equipment, some of which they had not previously been trained to use; new weapons had to be re-zeroed. Improvised explosive device (IED) training received was described as irrelevant at best.

The brigade established an initial training program for replacement Soldiers. Following a two-day travel recovery period, replacement Soldiers were put through a course of training which included weapons zero, weapons familiarization on those systems the Soldier would be using, explosive ordinance disposal training on latest IEDs, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used within the brigade. Convoy training was conducted during transport to and from the range area. The training culminated with on-the-job training at entry control points (ECPs) for military/commercial vehicle traffic, and civilian foot traffic. ECP training gave each Soldier an introduction to dealing with the local nationals and training on proper search techniques for people and vehicles. Upon completion of the initial training, Soldiers were released to their companies.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Deployed units expecting personnel replacements should obtain or develop certification training and testing to ensure that all replacement Soldiers have the requisite skills to perform job-related tasks prior to being utilized in theater.
- The time and resources invested for certification directly contributed to increased performance and reduced injury/death for new Soldiers.
- Predeployment training must be based on basic skills plus current TTP from theater to properly prepare replacement Soldiers.
- Certification training can assure that replacement Soldiers have necessary skills upon arrival in theater.
- In-theater training should reinforce predeployment training, thus instilling confidence in the Soldiers.

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### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Integration of Individual Replacement Soldiers into Deployed Units	54005-01509
Training while Deployed	40055-28406
Training and Integration of New Soldier	24370-15911
Integration of New Soldiers OEF	25165-67804

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 4: Communication, Command Climate, and Morale**

### **Topic D: Establishing and Maintaining Standards**

Discipline is the willingness and ability to maintain standards even though no one is checking. Leaders built discipline by establishing and consistently enforcing standards. Soldiers expected leaders to understand the job they did, establish reasonable standards and enforce the standards. Soldiers expected leaders to set the example in maintaining standards. Morale was directly affected when leaders set unrealistic standards. A unit who patrolled continuously throughout OEF while pulling guard shifts in between patrols had morale issues when a senior leader (who never left for patrols) told them to clean their body armor upon return because it was dirty. The Soldiers had the feeling that the leader was interested in superficial matters, such as the dustiness of their armor, and not safety.

Soldiers who did not know what to do in a situation looked to the nearest leader for guidance. Soldiers looked to their leaders to display confidence and calm in the most difficult situations. Soldiers followed their leaders' example when circumstances were difficult. They expected positive motivation from their leaders. Morale was highest in units where leaders shared the hardships and risks of their Soldiers. Leaders who endured hardships equal to or greater than their subordinates gained respect and had a positive influence on morale. When it appeared to Soldiers that leaders took advantage of things not available to all, morale declined.

Accompanying Soldiers on missions led to credibility when setting standards because Soldiers knew that the leader was not asking them to do anything he or she was not willing to do. Many leaders were concerned about being either too lax with discipline or, alternatively, stressing details Soldiers saw as irrelevant which lead to Soldiers not taking the leadership seriously. Leaders found they got a better idea of what standards were realistic and developed credibility by accompanying Soldiers on missions.

Leader's priorities change during a combat deployment. Most found it easier to get to know their Soldiers because they spent so much time with them. Some leaders indicated because they focused more on the mission, priorities changed regarding discipline, safety, and complacency. The general consensus among senior NCO leadership was that what constituted discipline in garrison was not what constituted discipline during deployment to a combat zone. Some things that were issues in garrison, such as making a bunk, having a pressed uniform, or wearing unauthorized sunglasses became less important to leaders as they became more focused on mission-related issues such as weapons safety, vehicle maintenance, and correctly wearing body armor and Kevlar. Conversely, some lower ranking Soldiers and young NCOs felt the leadership cared less about Soldiers during the deployment. While this appeared related to the change in mission focus by the leadership, it seemed to be more a result of leaders not being involved in execution of the mission with the Soldiers. Soldiers did like to be told what to do by leaders who never left "the wire."

Leaders informed Soldiers how established standards contribute to mission success. This made enforcement of the standards easier. Morale was directly related to the Soldiers knowing the expectations of their leaders. Information dissemination was critical. Soldiers wanted to know what was going on. Leaders of units with apparent high morale used nonverbal communication,

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

coaching, teaching, mentoring, development of trust, teamwork, and counseling as tools to lead their Soldiers. One important part of information dissemination was the commander's intent. Soldiers who understood the commander's intent adapted their plans but remained within the intent. One Soldier stated, not one mission during their whole deployment went as planned. It was critical that all Soldiers understood the commander's intent to ensure the overall mission goals were met. Many leaders discussed ways in which their commander's intent was presented to Soldiers. Some leaders had subordinates backbrief them while others observed rock drills and rehearsals without disrupting them to see if the plan was consistent with the intent.

Soldier complacency was an ongoing issue for leaders. Leaders determined that to avoid complacency they had to be proactive about things such as wearing seatbelts, clearing weapons, and wearing Kevlar and body armor correctly. Soldiers saw weapons clearing and safety belt wearing as steps taken to avoid something that rarely occurred anyway. As one leader put it, "Soldiers do what they know will be checked on." Leaders who stressed safety had to be willing to follow through with actions of spot checking those safety points. When a leader talked about safety issues but checked up on something else, neither task was done well by the Soldiers. It was up to all Soldiers of all ranks to ensure that complacency did not consume their fellow Soldiers. One leader stated, "For every negligent discharge or other accident, there was an NCO just as culpable."

In some units, NCOs found Soldiers becoming complacent after months of being deployed. This led to many of them not taking safety precautions seriously. One platoon sergeant took a copy of the Army Times and cut out the section listing all military members killed in Iraq and Afghanistan over a certain period of time. He cut out each name and had a formation with some of his complacent Soldiers. He distributed the casualty names evenly among the group and moved the formation to the base of a hill adjacent to the forward operating base (FOB). He led the group from the base to the top of the hill and, once at the top, the platoon sergeant had each Soldier read one of the names he was distributed. Once complete, the element walked back to the base of the hill and started over again. This process took most of the day until all names had been read. At the end of the day, the platoon sergeant explained how lucky his Soldiers were to be alive. No more complacency issues arose.

Another option some leaders used for complacency reduction was cross-training Soldiers into different roles within combat patrol units (e.g., swapping one of the dismounts with the gunner) and requiring patrol mission commanders to vary tactics, routes, and times to break up the routine aspects of the patrol. Others included rotating sector assignments for combat patrols and rotating mission assignments when possible (e.g., rotating squads among FOB security, quick reaction force [QRF], and combat patrol mission assignments on a weekly or bi-weekly basis). Rotating sector assignments was intended to prevent teams and squads from growing too accustomed to the environment in which they were patrolling.

Fraternization continues to present leaders with challenges and has had some affect on unit discipline in OEF/OIF. Most cases have evolved from friendly banter and teasing to forms of sexual harassment that crossed the line from appropriate behavior to unacceptable behavior. In these cases, informal nonjudicial punishment was an effective means to eliminate inappropriate behavior while giving the harassing Soldier the opportunity to continue to have a successful

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

career in the Army. One strategy of nonjudicial punishment was to assign the offending/harassing Soldier to receive counseling from the Equal Opportunity (EO) office, research and develop sexual harassment prevention training with review and approval of the EO office and unit leaders, administering the training to all personnel in the unit, and explain to the unit during the training why that Soldier was selected to develop and administer the sexual harassment prevention training. This strategy may not be appropriate for serious sexual misconduct offenses where judicial punishment is appropriate.

In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), General Order #1 directly bans fraternization among U.S. troops with the exception of married couples simultaneously deployed into the CENTCOM AOR. Leaders were faced with maintaining high levels of unit cohesion and morale while enforcing compliance with General Order #1. Most developed standing operating procedures (SOPs) specifying activities and specific hours that permitted limited visitation to other-gender quarters. For example, squads and teams used activities, such as movie night in quarters, that all unit members were permitted to attend with the specified caveat that such activities were limited to specific hours. At all other times personnel were not permitted in other-gender quarters. Squad and team leaders were required by SOP to be in attendance to ensure that the permissive time periods were not abused. Senior leaders (e.g., PLT SGT, 1SGT) would discreetly check on these activities to further ensure that fraternization violations were not occurring and to communicate to all Soldiers that fraternization is an important issue to the unit leaders.

The strategy of “trust but verify” allowed Soldiers to engage in activities that built and sustained unit cohesion and morale, while enforcing the compliance with General Order #1. The strategy permitted senior leaders to continue assuring compliance without undermining the authority of junior leaders or damaging the trust and confidence Soldiers had in the leadership.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Morale was highest in units where leaders shared the hardships and risks of their Soldiers.
- Leader’s priorities change during a combat deployment.
- Leaders should inform Soldiers how established standards contribute to mission success.
- An important part of information disseminated is the commander’s intent.
- Cross-train Soldiers into different roles within combat patrol units (e.g., swap one of the dismounts with the gunner).
- Require patrol mission commanders to vary tactics, routes, and times to break up the routine aspects of the patrol missions.
- Rotate mission assignments when possible so that teams and squads do not grow too accustomed to the environment.

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**Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Manage Stress during a Combat Tour	32146-11113
Complacency, a Leadership Challenge	42013-14525
Fighting Complacency	17236-06562
Complacency Check OEF	19259-73970
Leadership Consistency and Soldier Complacency	36000-87314
Command Intent and Planning	30590-67519
Informal, Nonjudicial Punishment for Sexual Harassment	28021-63535
Leaders Strategies to Minimize Fraternization	17715-46321
Discipline in Garrison and during Deployment	21733-16118

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5**

### **Training**

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#### **Summary**

There are inherent differences between Title 32 (National Guard) and Title 10 (Federal) responsibilities during the mobilization, integration, and synchronization of active and reserve component forces. All units receive some sort of training prior to deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Training consists of basic Soldiering skills, such as weapons qualification and land navigation, and specific issues, such as improvised explosive device (IED) awareness training and cultural awareness training. Mission rehearsal exercises (MRE) conducted at Hohenfels for OIF units were seen as a success by most junior leaders. They thought the MRE immersed them in the contemporary operating environment (COE) with the interaction of civilians on the battlefield. Every unit was given the opportunity to conduct at least one predeployment site survey (PDSS); however, all units were limited on the number of personnel that could go on the PDSS. One of the most vulnerable times for any operation is during a relief in place (RIP) between two units. A RIP should provide a seamless transition during mission handover. A great deal of training in theater is on-the-job training and, as such, it is often not labeled “training.” This training is implicit and comes from leaders mentoring subordinates and subordinates observing leaders. In-theater, task specific training

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usually takes place for one of three reasons: safety, mission change, new/different equipment, or replacement Soldiers.

For junior leaders, the transition back to garrison can be difficult. During deployment the primary focus is on the combat mission; decisions and issues that are not directly relevant to mission accomplishment tend to receive less focus. This focus changes once back in garrison. Junior leaders will face a situation where they have less day-to-day contact with their Soldiers. The decisions made by junior leaders in garrison will often be of significantly less importance than they previously experienced during combat. They will be responsible and held accountable for issues that they may perceive as being non-mission relevant in garrison that they were able to ignore during combat (e.g., uniform cleanliness and unauthorized equipment).

For most units, operational tempo in garrison was not nearly as high as during deployment where tasks/missions and the associated responsibility were pushed down to lower levels due to the number of mission requirements. In garrison, the lessened operational tempo and associated mission requirements resulted in junior leaders not being given the responsibilities to which they were accustomed during deployment.

Upon redeployment back to home station, all units conduct some form of reintegration training to help Soldiers transition back from combat. The schedule and practices adopted to conduct this training can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the training and the reaction of the Soldiers in the unit.

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## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic A: Predeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 1: Mobilization**

The war requires the mobilization, integration, and synchronization of active and reserve component forces. There are inherent differences between Title 32 (National Guard) and Title 10 (Federal) responsibilities. Unlike active duty forces, the National Guard, when federalized, is faced with numerous issues, such as property accountability, promotions, finance, and legal affairs.

Dental readiness was a key issue because many civilian medical insurance programs do not cover dental cost. When reserve and National Guard personnel reported to active service, many were identified as needing major dental work (category 3 or 4).

Often, units were scheduled for a mobilization station that did not have the facilities or trained cadre to conduct mobilization. One unit was scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan, but the mobilization station was prepared for Iraq deployments only.

Equipment fielding was critical for deployment to theater. Authorized but unfunded equipment requirements had to be reconciled. A well-prepared mission statement assisted the unit in task organizing and identifying equipment shortages.

Mobilizing the unit headquarters first allowed the leaders to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the requirement for deployment. Mobilizing a “pusher” unit to assist with the deployment proved useful. Establishing a training program which included a combat training center (CTC) rotation was helpful. Units used a reverse planning sequence to identify critical milestones and keep the mobilization on track.

Many lessons were taken from mobilization of a Reserve or National Guard unit. An alert date of at least 180 days prior to deployment allowed the Soldiers necessary time for planning for family issues and civilian job-related issues.

National Guard and Army Reserve units inherently possess Soldiers with skill sets beyond those associated with the particular unit type or military occupational specialty (MOS) of its Soldiers. Because the National Guard and Army Reserve are composed of “part time” Soldiers who have civilian occupations, the personnel in those units brought to the military a variety of unique talents. This gave the units significant flexibility to perform missions for which their MOSSs were not adequate. Most commonly mentioned among the skill sets used were those associated with public safety officers (e.g., police, state troopers, prison guards) and construction and engineering (e.g., electricians, carpenters, concrete workers, civil engineers, electrical engineers). Units used these personnel to train local national police forces, diagnose infrastructure issues within the forward operating bases as well as in local communities, and identify maximum payoff projects for building infrastructure in local communities. Leaders were aware of the value of these skill sets prior to deployment. Leaders were able to use these Soldiers to better support the mission to local governments and build the infrastructure.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Mobilize “pusher unit” to assist in training National Guard and Army Reserve units.
- Army Reserve and National Guard units often have Soldiers with valuable skill sets not normally associated with their unit type or the MOS of their Soldiers.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Personnel: Establish one system for finance, legal, and promotions regardless of active, reserve, or National Guard.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mobilize National Guard Units	17456-83771
Assessing Civilian-Based Skill Sets in Guard and Reserve Units	37278-69494

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic A: Predeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 2: Individual Readiness Training**

Predeployment training for units was described by leaders as uneven at best. Leaders were challenged to ensure timely appropriate training for their units. All units receive some sort of training prior to deployment to OIF and OEF. Training consisted of basic Soldiering skills, such as weapons qualification and land navigation, and specific issues such as IED awareness training and cultural awareness training.

The weapons refresher training was seen as redundant, but adequate. The IED training was often seen as dated and wrong. The cultural awareness training was found to be full of inaccuracies by Soldiers who had been deployed previously to a Muslim country. One unit received training designed for a unit deploying to Afghanistan while they were actually deploying to Iraq. Leaders were aware that predeployment training may be dated, inaccurate, or wrong and were prepared to provide additional training to Soldiers once in theater.

Leaders stated that the Army should ensure that personnel administering the predeployment training have the appropriate applied experiences and that the training be as accurate as possible.

Some training, such as the basic Soldier task of probing for mines, proved of little value in theater. The block of instruction received was sufficient; however, the practical exercises proved of little value. Each individual Soldier was required to probe for mines, which took over one hour for most of the Soldiers. The time wasted on the practical exercise of this training could have been better utilized for other training. Use of lessons learned from theater would have allowed the trainers to know that few Soldiers have probed for mines since the beginning of OEF and OIF.

Each Soldier completed individual readiness training (IRT) prior to deployment. Some Soldiers in the unit did not take the training very seriously due to their mechanics MOS. Upon deployment, and as a result of shortages of personnel in critical jobs, the vehicle mechanics were reorganized to conduct dismounted patrolling outside of the forward operating base. Upon arrival of additional forces, the mechanics were again reorganized to become detention facility guards, normally a military police function. These Soldiers and their leaders learned that “warrior ethos” tasks have to be taken seriously by all personnel during training.

The Army has a saying that Soldiers should “train as they fight.” However, Soldiers were often issued new gear after they deployed. Some of the gear affects the Soldiers’ ability to perform their duties. For example, some Soldiers explained that when dressed in full “battle rattle,” such as the interceptor body armor, Kevlar helmets, and knee and elbow pads, motion was restricted and took some getting used to in order to effectively use their weapon. While Soldiers trained with some protective gear, many Soldiers were issued new versions or additional gear once deployed. Other equipment, such as weapon sights and/or lights mounted on weapons, were seen as a hindrance when first issued since they interfered with weapon aiming and made it necessary to conduct weapon zeroing again. Soldiers stated that they often were not given the opportunity

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

after receiving new equipment to train on the equipment or to even zero their weapons again upon receiving new sights.

Various leaders indicated there was no confidence in a Soldier's ability to properly load radios using the automated network control device for tactical secure communications. In actuality, fewer than fifty percent of their subordinates could be given a radio and an automated network control device and know how to properly fill the radio. Of those who were able to do it, most were communications specialists, radio operators, and NCOs. Tactical situations found young Soldiers in charge with no communications and no ability to fix the situation by filling the radios.

One infantry battalion commander trained all his troops, regardless of MOS, on what he considered the basics for OEF. He trained every one as a rifleman and a human intelligence (HUMINT) collector. Fortunately, he had previous OIF G3 experience and believed his unit's training should cover the basics. He conducted primary, advanced, and live fire weapons qualifications with most individuals qualifying on more than one weapons system. This became vital when his headquarters and service company was tasked to support forward operating base (FOB) security, training Afghan National Police (ANP) and the FOB quick reaction force (QRF).

Physical fitness training should be emphasized by leaders at all levels prior to and during deployment to OIF and OEF to help prevent non-battle injuries. The Iraq environment was particularly harsh during the summer months, with daytime high temperatures ranging well above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. These extreme temperatures increased the risk of heat injuries overall, as well as decreased the effective time before physical exhaustion set in for Soldiers. One means to mitigate this is to increase physical activities prior to deployment. Although physical fitness was a regular focus of active duty units, reserve and National Guard units were often not able to maintain a focus on physical fitness to the degree of active duty units. Given the extensive use of reserve and guard units in both areas of operation, it was critically important for reserve and guard units to incorporate a strong focus on physical fitness during mobilization training prior to deployment.

There were many differences between what units were taught in predeployment training and what Soldiers learned once they were in theater. Soldiers felt that much of the predeployment cultural training proved not to be totally true. The units learned many different cultural lessons once they arrived in theater. Units were taught that during Ramadan the people would fast sun up till sun down. Many units found this custom was practiced by a minority of the people. They reported seeing no change in the population's eating and drinking habits during Ramadan. Other cultural tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) adopted by units in specific areas included:

- Expect local men to lie during questioning.
- Muslim women seem to be more forthright during questioning when the safety of their children is involved.
- Members of a tribe will often blame a different tribe even if there is no evidence.
- Sunnis blame the Shiites and Kurds and vice-versa, depending on the source; single source information can often deteriorate local relations.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Cultural awareness training did not cover issues that are common between the Iraq and the American cultures, although cultural awareness training covered a wide variety of topics. Many of these areas, while useful, were never used. For example, the training stressed never showing the bottom of your foot to an Iraqi. However, after discussion with leaders at different levels, it was learned that the Iraqis never worried much about the bottom of a Soldier's foot. The explanation was simple. The Iraqis knew we did not know everything about their culture, the same as they do not know much about our culture.

Many areas of cultural awareness that came into play were never presented in cultural awareness training. Soldiers were continuously trained on the Islamic culture, but found many of these practices did not apply. Many Soldiers discussed how the importance of praying was emphasized in training but for an entire year in Iraq they only saw a few people pray. Drinking alcoholic beverages is prohibited in Iraq but drunk driving was found to be common in the country. Prostitution was also more common than expected. In another instance, the local nationals started widespread celebratory fire with rifles outside a base. The base security force assumed the base was under attack. After an alert and reaction to the incident, it was found that the Iraqi people were celebrating their country's victory in a soccer game. None of these areas was covered in cultural awareness training, and would have been useful.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Predeployment training should cover cultural similarities and differences.
- Iraqi people are much more forgiving of our lack of knowledge on their culture than originally expected.
- “Warrior ethos” tasks have to be taken seriously.
- Combat support Soldiers found themselves conducting missions common to the infantry and military police.
- Incorporate time into predeployment training to allow Soldiers to train with all the equipment they will have in theater.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Physical Fitness Training Emphasis for Deployment to OIF	30760-67240
Little Value Training OEF	19679-84519
ANCD Training OEF	25051-32641
Additional Predeployment Training OEF	37670-33918
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953
Iraq's Culture and its Impact on Operations	26868-43230
Cultural Awareness OIF/OEF	23613-88516
Competent Predeployment Training	22681-32261

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic A: Predeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 3: Unit Training**

One brigade trained primarily on stability operations and support operations prior to deployment during a mission readiness exercise (MRE). Some commands stated that the MREs were outstanding because they immersed their Soldiers in the contemporary operating environment (COE). Others felt that although the training conducted was not useless, it did not prepare the unit for the major combat operations (MCO) they encountered in theater because mission tasks varied so much from the training tasks during predeployment.

The combat operations the unit encountered did not reflect the predeployment training. Instead of rebuilding or providing stability forces, the unit was engaged in direct combat action for most of their time in theater. The combat operations were primarily conducted at platoon level. Although unprepared for the mission facing them, the junior leadership stepped up and was successful using direct leadership and on-the-spot decision making. The leaders used doctrine but flexed it to meet the current situation.

The MREs conducted at Hohenfels for OIF units were seen as a success by most junior leaders. They thought the MRE immersed them in the contemporary operating environment (COE) with the interaction of civilians on the battlefield. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) training during the MRE was good and the additional training in Kuwait solidified it. The platoon leaders thought that a rudimentary education of the language (the only thing they learned to say was “stop”) should have been added. Training could have been improved by including crew-served weapons and more marksmanship training.

**Insight/Lesson Learned:** Immersion of the COE during MREs was critical for most units.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Military Police In Lieu of OEF	46210-44853
Technological Advancement Training OEF/OIF	28038-38529
Sniper Operations OIF	25910-84859
Junior Leader Knowledge of Government Organization	20734-26112
Mission Change from Division Support to Theater Support in OEF	18013-57820
Preparation and Training for Civil Military Missions	33722-82637
Mission outside MOS	33992-50074
Inadequate Leader Preparation for Stability Operations and Support Operations	21630-50308

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Additional Predeployment Training OEF	37670-33918
Predeployment Training OIF	25533-06115
MRE vs. MCO Training OIF	21100-51083
Information Workstation OEF	32779-57990
MCS-Light for Dummies OEF	40774-22448

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic A: Predeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 4: Predeployment Site Survey (PDSS)**

Every unit was given the opportunity to conduct at least one predeployment site survey (PDSS); however, all units were limited on the number of personnel that could go on the PDSS. Most commands usually sent the battalion commander, executive officer/S3, and the command sergeants major (CSM), with little coverage focusing at company or section levels. If the unit had been able to send leaders from each element of the battalion during the PDSS, coordination with the personnel actually conducting the missions would have greatly enhanced the unit's preparation for deployment.

A battalion commander and portions of the battalion staff conducted numerous PDSS. Each unit leader discussed the site survey in great detail to include what it was lacking. Sending a representative of every element in the battalion would have greatly enhanced the unit training conducted at home station. It would have also contributed to the selection of materials packed prior to deployment. Upon completion of the last site survey, it was determined that additional equipment was needed. However, the unit had already shipped its equipment.

Information flow during the PDSS between incoming and outgoing units was inconsistent and dependent upon the emphasis put on it by both commands. Unfortunately, incoming units did not always assume the same mission as the unit they were replacing, and this made gathering mission critical information difficult. PDSSs were a valuable tool; however, several units conducted a reverse PDSS (the unit in theater sent a representative to update the incoming unit), and these proved to be exceptionally beneficial.

Units also need to conduct mission analysis before, during, and after their PDSS. In-depth mission analysis needs to include more than a study of operations orders. It should include a recon of the area of operation. Units have at least three excellent sources to find information for their mission analysis. These sources are the unit's mission essential task list (METL), guidance from higher headquarters, and departing units. Units which did well in OEF maximized information available in these three sources. Unit METL is a good source because it looks at the doctrinal mission of unit, the equipment available, and the MOS training of the Soldiers.

Information from the higher headquarters under which the unit is going to serve is another valuable source. Information from headquarters varied depending on how long they had been in country. Those headquarters which had more time in country tended to communicate commanders' visions and intent better.

Units that were more aggressive in gathering information tended to be better prepared once they arrived in country.

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**Insight/Lesson Learned:** PDSSs need to have additional skilled personnel on the visit to communicate more specific requirements for equipment and better identify predeployment training requirements.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
MRE vs. MCO Training OIF	21100-51083
Mission Analysis Before Deployment OEF	36229-28391

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic A: Predeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 5: Relief in Place (RIP)**

One of the most vulnerable times for any operation is during a relief in place (RIP). A RIP is a command responsibility to ensure the new unit can properly perform its new mission, and a good RIP should provide a seamless transition during mission handover.

In the RIP observed, the outbound unit was required to identify each task requirement for each element, section, or platoon. These tasks were then evaluated by the company commander and first sergeant (1SG). The command team then took the list of tasks for each element and had them validated by the battalion commander.

When the new unit arrived to conduct the RIP, a left-seat/right-seat ride was conducted. The left-seat ride consisted of the new unit performing over-the-shoulder training for each task. Once the inbound element understood the task that was trained, the officer in charge/noncommissioned officer in charge (OIC/NCOIC) of the in-bound unit would initial off that task. Once the new unit was trained on all of the tasks, they would then conduct each task with oversight from the out-bound unit. Once the out-bound element felt that the new unit could conduct that task without further supervision or assistance, they would initial the right-seat task. This ensured both commands that the Soldiers witnessed, trained, and could execute each task.

During the RIP, the outbound unit handed over information on the local area of operations (AO), including identification (and introduction to) local civic and religious leaders, TTP and standing operating procedures (SOPs) the unit developed for their AO, and a continuity book capturing the lessons learned during the outbound unit's deployment. The outbound unit provided training on all the communication or battle management systems being used that the incoming unit was not familiar with.

Upon arrival in theater of operations, the unit was not trained on technological advances being currently used. The unit had trained on Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) at home station, but that system was not being used in theater by the unit they were replacing. The home station training in itself was not useless, but did not specifically meet the requirements the incoming unit needed for successful RIP. Upon arrival, the unit needed a train-up on Information Workstation and Maneuver Control System (MCS)-Light. The battalion S3 NCOIC coordinated with the local contractor in theater to conduct unit specific training on current systems being used. This train-up was conducted over a two day training period. The training included all possible users for the battalion S3 shop. However, no prior coordination between the unit in country and the incoming unit had been made to discuss systems being used. Prior coordination would have alleviated the need for most of the in-country training the battalion staff had to receive.

After four years of deployments to the Central Command area of responsibility (CENTCOMAOR), there are now a number of Soldiers who have been to one or both OEF and OIF multiple times. One NCO noted that Soldiers needed to be cautious assuming that they knew everything they needed to know since they were in theater during a previous deployment. The

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

operational environment in theaters evolves rapidly, with anti-coalition forces regularly changing their tactics. Incoming units, regardless of their prior experience in OEF or OIF, paid close attention to lessons learned by the outbound unit.

A platoon sergeant in an inbound unit stated that he had been there for OIF 1; however, he quickly acknowledged that with the insurgency and IEDs that it was a totally new situation. A sister platoon sergeant stated that he had “been there and done that” during OIF 1 and knew what he needed to know already. During the RIP, he was warned not to drive into potholes because insurgents had taken to placing IEDs in potholes. He ignored the lesson learned from the prior unit and did not pass the lesson on to his platoon. One of his vehicles drove through a pothole and struck an IED. The platoon sergeant quickly converted and collected current TTP and SOPs from the outbound unit to help his platoon.

These lessons or changes were easily identified during the RIP. A well-crafted coordination and orientation program between the incoming and outgoing unit was critical for mission success.

One unit used its computer network to allow Soldiers and leaders to document lessons. These lessons could be submitted by any Soldier assigned to the facility. Each Soldier could read the lessons off the server. The computers allowed for quick dissemination of information. It also made a permanent record of new observations the unit had from day to day and how they overcame many things when dealing with base defense. This lesson learned database was handed over to the unit relieving them.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Having a clearly identified RIP plan provided a seamless transition for units during combat operations and reduced confusion during a very vulnerable time of transition.
- Higher headquarters must give specific guidance and supervise RIP operations.
- Extensive coordination during PDSS and RIP between the outgoing and incoming unit is critical for mission success.
- Lessons learned need to be maintained in a unit’s continuity book or a lessons learned database so they can be used by unit Soldiers and follow-on units.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Relief in Place during OEF	21597-08173
Technological Advancement Training OEF/OIF	28038-38529
Relief in Place OIF	20456-18813
Brigade-Level Key Soldier Lessons Learned OEF	18500-01286
Mission Analysis Before Deployment OEF	36229-28391
Lessons Learned OIF	27411-05478

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic B: In-Theater Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 1: On-The-Job Training (OJT)**

A great deal of training during OIF and OEF is OJT and, as such, it is often not labeled “training.” This training was implicit and came from leaders mentoring subordinates and subordinates observing leaders.

In some units, after each mission, an after action review (AAR) was conducted to determine what went well and what needed to be improved upon. This information was passed along to sister units and thus all benefitted from the collective experiences. For new units in theater, this process created a steep learning curve and dramatically increased their mission effectiveness. The AAR process typically focused on a detailed examination of what happened during the execution of a mission and identified areas that could be further strengthened. Units used the AAR process as a training tool to differing degrees. When junior leaders were assigned a mission or a task, it was important to review the actions executed during the mission (i.e., the “what”) as well as the decision-making process and decisions reached by the junior leader in executing the mission (the “why”). It was quite possible for a mission to be entirely successful with less than optimal decision-making by the junior leaders. Likewise, it was entirely possible for a mission to be only partially successful even with optimal decision-making by the junior leader. Assuring that junior leaders examined their own decision-making process as well as the course of action chosen provides multiple avenues for training and development of the junior leader. This better enabled leader flexibility and adaptability in future missions.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- AARs should focus both on the actions executed during a mission as well as the decision-making processes used and the decisions reached by the mission commander to better enable leader development.
- Leaders must capitalize on the diversity of experiences for training by involving junior leaders during all phases of the operation.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Developing Flexibility in Junior Leaders	28890-30823
Relearning or Refining Lessons Learned OEF	51515-48437
Use of Communities of Practice During Deployment	54417-08340
AAR of Decision-Making Process	26825-05524
Developing Subordinates While Deployed to OEF	26735-84581
PLT SGT Mentoring of New PLT Leaders	29141-50296

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic B: In-Theater Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 2: Task-Specific Training**

In-theater task specific training usually took place for one of four reasons: safety, mission change/new, different equipment, or replacement Soldiers. Some units had too many vehicle accidents or negligent discharges which demanded extra training. Other units were assigned a mission different than their habitual mission or for one it had not trained. Many units were assigned equipment other than that which they were trained on. Units constantly had replacement Soldiers arriving that they must bring up to speed on the unit's TTP, weapons, and the local environment.

There are two main safety concerns in OIF/OEF: weapons and driving. Both were managed by specific training of Soldiers as well as training replacement Soldiers as part of their initial in-theater training.

Two schools of thought described the reasons for accidental discharges: lack of training and personal complacency - accidental versus negligent. Two specific units will serve as examples. Both units had at least two "negligent discharges." However, the commander of each unit believed they occurred for different reasons. The first unit had its negligent discharges occur within the first two months of deployment and attributed it to the fact that Soldiers were not used to carrying, handling, loading, or clearing their weapons. The commander believed that if a negligent discharge occurs because of a lack of training, it is a leader issue. After the second discharge, the following SOP was put into place: a) no one could clear their own weapon, and then a team leader or NCO verified that the weapon was clear, and b) Soldiers were given quarterly refresher training on functions check and the clearing of a weapon. The Soldiers became proficient over time, and with the SOPs in place, no further accidental discharges were experienced. It was also noted and more strictly enforced that the base policy was to clear all weapons before a Soldier entered the base, so clearing barrels around the dining facilities and most other places were removed. Negligent discharges were reduced base wide. The commander of the second unit believed that any discharge was a negligent discharge. The commander stated that the unit went through such an extensive multiple weapons familiarization, qualification, and live fire training that his Soldiers were proficient and must maintain their vigilance when clearing their weapons. Therefore, he considered negligent discharges a result of complacency.

Driving was an often mentioned safety concern. One safety office distributed mandatory annual safety training requirements and provided monthly safety advisories. Before winter began, the safety office mandated all units conduct winterization training, to include: winter safety, cold weather injuries, cold weather vehicle operations, and heater training. The safety office also provided monthly safety messages depicting an accident or safety issue warranting attention. Units found the driving conditions and practices (e.g., aggressive driving tactics, advanced driving techniques) found in theater were not being adequately trained prior to deployment. Drivers in theater are required to use more aggressive driving tactics than they are permitted in predeployment training and exercises. To address this, units are conducting ad hoc training as time and mission requirements permit to develop these driving skills in their Soldiers. In some cases, mission requirements are such that drivers are beginning operations without receiving

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

training and must develop these skills as operations are being conducted. This significantly increases the risks associated with conducting convoy operations in theater until drivers have had adequate time to develop more aggressive driving skills.

Many units developed in-theater training because they were transformed into another type of unit altogether. In one instance, the mission directed one in-theater unit to convert some sub-units from armor, cavalry, or artillery to motorized infantry. These new infantry units did not meet modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) requirements and had to be issued new equipment and then train themselves on the newly issued equipment. For example, one weapons system not authorized on the artillery or the cavalry MTOE was sniper rifles and related equipment. Also, the unit did not have any trained snipers. A special forces operational detachment located on the same forward operating base (FOB) provided sniper instruction to the unit. The artillery commander selected the forward observers to act as the sniper element. The Soldiers in all units did not routinely train with close combat optics and night vision sights. Weapons qualification and proficiency increased over time. The armor and cavalry Soldiers had to learn slightly different skills for dismounted and mounted operations in a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The artillery Soldiers had a steeper learning curve. Normally the NCOs would have had the most tactical expertise, but in this case the lieutenants, recently graduated from the basic course, had more experience in infantry skills than the NCOs. The lieutenants provided team- and squad-level training to the units.

Some units also provide in-theater training by way of Internet resources. Communities of Practice, such as <<http://squadleader.com>>, <<http://platoonleader.army.mil>>, and <<http://companycommand.army.mil>>, were useful to gain access to a broad set of knowledge and experience. This assisted in developing TTP and SOPs to address unanticipated mission and situational requirements. For example, the S3 for a hospital stated that the unit had a high percentage of local national child burn victims they were not prepared for. Approximately two years before, another unit at the same hospital noted that a specific bandage could be used on burn victims and only needed to be changed once a week. Fortunately, someone in the unit canvassed a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) product and made this discovery. This reduced their work load while still providing exceptional burn care. The S3 also noted in the same AAR/lessons learned that the hospital required additional pediatric ventilators for child care. Again, this requirement (lesson) was lost and could have better prepared the unit for proper manning requirements.

Another use of the Internet was the posting of information regarding new or unfamiliar equipment. For example, upon one unit's arrival at a FOB, it needed additional training on Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). The only additional training facility was at the main base. The unit sent one individual back to the base for additional training. Upon completion of training and return to the FOB, additional unit training was conducted using train the trainer concept and the contractor at the main base set up an additional Web site resembling an Internet site. It was referred to as "MCS-Light for Dummies." The unit found this additional training useful to complement the train the trainer program already initiated. It provided the unit with a tool to troubleshoot the systems for problems they encountered. Upon arrival in theater, another unit found it was not trained on the available technology. The unit had trained on FBCB2 at home station, but that system was not being used in theater by the unit they were replacing. The unit

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

needed a train up on Information Workstation and MCS-Light. The battalion S3 NCOIC coordinated with a local contractor to conduct unit specific training on current systems being used. This train up was conducted over a two day training period. The training conducted included all possible users for the battalion S3 shop. Prior coordination would have alleviated the need for most of the in-country training the battalion staff had to receive.

As progress has been made in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus of operations has shifted from major combat to stability and support operations. One critical aspect of stability operations and support operations for which Soldiers did not receive adequate preparation was civil-military operations (CMO). Examples of these types of missions in Afghanistan included medical assistance, humanitarian assistance, and information operations. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) also were a significant CMO. PRTs were composed of personnel from military organizations, other government agencies (OGA) (e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Agency for International Development), and had advisors or liaisons with local national and regional governmental agencies (e.g., Afghanistan Ministry of Interior and Pahrwan Governor's office) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., American Red Cross). Combat medics from the military hospital were often requested by the PRTs to assist in providing emergent and preventative medical care to local nationals in their villages. Maneuver elements were regularly called on to provide force protection, village assessments, or otherwise coordinate actions with PRTs and OGAs. Even when not coordinating with non-DOD agencies and organizations, Soldiers were being regularly called upon to interact with local nationals to support the mission of enhancing the presence of the local national government. One unit headquarters published monthly cultural awareness newsletters. The newsletter identified and reminded Soldiers of cultural events, holidays, seasons, and basic principles that were specific to the region or were time sensitive (an upcoming holiday). Cultural tips included noting when different hunting seasons were occurring, thus reducing anxiety when a patrol passed men carrying weapons in open fields. It reminded Soldiers not to eat in front of the locals during periods of fasting. The newsletters were distributed and posted in high density areas to facilitate widest dissemination.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- There are two main safety concerns in OIF/OEF: weapons and driving.
- In-theater training by way of Internet resources was successful.
- The Internet was useful in the posting of information regarding new or unfamiliar equipment.
- During the predeployment site survey or communications between the incoming and outgoing units, leaders must discuss the ABCS used and required for command and control.
- Soldiers did not receive adequate preparation for CMO.

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**Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mandatory Annual Safety Training and Monthly Advisories OEF	78000-39845
Training while Deployed	40055-28406
Integration of New Soldiers OEF	25165-67804
Integration of Individual Replacement Soldiers into Deployed Units	54005-01509
Training while Deployed	40055-28406
Cultural Awareness OEF	15254-86348
Preparation and Training for Civil Military Missions	33722-82637
Technological Advancement Training OEF/OIF	28038-38529
MCS-Light for Dummies OEF	40774-22448
Different Weapons Required Due to Mission Change	18878-05028
Mechanics on Patrol OEF	34767-57148
Tactical Driving Safety	42428-38888
Training vs. Negligence with Accidental Discharges	32337-25812

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic C: Redeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 1: Redeployment for Junior Leaders**

For junior leaders in combat, the transition back to garrison can be difficult. During deployment, leaders are around their Soldiers constantly and are more aware of issues with any particular Soldier. During OIF/OEF, the primary focus was on the mission; decisions and issues that were not directly relevant to mission accomplishment received less focus. Junior leaders were often in a position that required them to make life-and-death decisions regarding their Soldiers.

Once redeployed to garrison, the leaders faced a difficult transition. They faced a situation where they had less day-to-day contact with their Soldiers. The lessened contact made it harder for leaders to detect issues with their Soldiers and they only faced issues when they had become a serious problem. The decisions made by junior leaders in garrison were often significantly less important than the decisions made during deployment. They were responsible and held accountable for issues in garrison that were perceived as being non-mission relevant in combat (e.g., uniform cleanliness and unauthorized equipment).

For most units, operational tempo in garrison was not nearly as high as during deployment. In combat, tasks/missions and the associated responsibility was pushed down to junior leaders due to the shear number of mission requirements. In garrison, the lessened operational tempo did not require pushing responsibilities down to the lower levels, and junior leaders often found they were not given the responsibilities to which they were accustomed during deployment.

Senior leaders were aware of this situation with their junior leaders, particularly those who had been promoted to a leadership position for the first time during deployment. Senior leaders took steps to prepare their junior leaders for this transition by highlighting the expectations and responsibilities of junior leaders in a garrison environment.

The general consensus among senior NCO leadership was that what constituted standards in garrison was not what constituted standards during deployment. Things that were issues in garrison, such as making the bed in the barracks, having a pressed uniform, or wearing unauthorized sunglasses, became less important to leaders as they became more focused on mission-related issues, such as weapons' safety, vehicle maintenance, and the correct wearing of Interceptor body armor (IBA) and Kevlar. Junior leaders were responsible for enforcing discipline with their Soldiers, but with the transition back to garrison the issues needing to be enforced changed significantly. Assuring that junior leaders had an adequate understanding of expectations and their responsibilities helped alleviate potential problems upon return to a garrison environment.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Senior leaders realize that there is a difference between discipline and accountability in garrison and in combat.
- Senior leaders took steps to prepare their junior leaders for the transition from combat to garrison.

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### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Enforcing Discipline when in Garrison and During Deployment	21733-16118
Junior Leader Challenges Transitioning from Deployment Back to Garrison Duties	37674-25103

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 5: Training**

### **Topic C: Redeployment Training**

#### **Sub-Topic 2: Reintegration**

Upon redeployment back to home station, all units conduct some form of reintegration training to help Soldiers transition from being deployed. The schedule and practices adopted to conduct this training had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the training and the reaction of the Soldiers in the unit.

One unit scheduled reintegration training to occur in half-day blocks over seven days with the remainder of the time on those days dedicated to allowing Soldiers and families to adjust to the Soldier coming home. This seven day training period began immediately on arrival back to home station. Moreover, spouses were invited to attend most training sessions with their Soldiers. Following the seven days of training, Soldiers continued on with a normal work schedule for a few days and then were permitted to go on block leave. This approach was effective in reintegrating Soldiers with their families and allowed for a relatively smooth transition back to garrison. Soldiers from this unit, who had been on multiple deployments in the last five years commented that this approach was significantly better than reintegration from previous deployments.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Reintegration training should provide instruction to Soldier's spouses, families, and significant others.
- Reintegration training should program days for training with time reserved for Soldiers to spend with their families.
- Reintegration training should include Soldier's spouses and significant others when feasible to assure that families are fully aware of steps that can be taken to smooth this process.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Family Readiness Group	21067-95495
Reintegration Training Schedule - Redeployment	28704-18208



# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 6**

### **Army Reserve and National Guard**

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Topic A: Reserve and National Guard Predeployment Training	88
Topic B: Reserve Unit Performance	92

#### **Summary**

The active and reserve components combine their capabilities to make one Army. Title 10 and Title 32 determine the federal and state responsibilities for the armed forces. There are inherent differences between the active and reserve components (National Guard and Reserves). Mobilization of the reserve components for federal service highlights these differences which present challenges to overcome. Key differences are property accountability, promotions, finance, and legal affairs. The challenge is greater with the National Guard because they are still controlled by each state's regulations while federalized.

Prior to deployment, reserve component units had several months to train for their mission. They conducted a mission analysis to determine the current level of training compared to the required in-theater mission. The identified shortfall made up the core of the predeployment training. Two conditions frequently found in mobilizing units need special attention. Reserve units frequently were assigned missions outside their functional area and most reserve units had personnel shortages that had to be made up at the last minute. These two conditions made the mission analysis key to predeployment training and operational readiness in theater.

One significant benefit that reserve units brought to the theater of operation was their civilian occupation skills. These additional skills made these units more flexible and capable than traditional active duty units. Most commonly utilized skills were those associated with public safety (e.g., police, state troopers, and fire fighters) and construction and engineers (e.g., electricians, carpenters, welders, plumbers, concrete workers, civil and electrical engineers). These inherent skills broadened a unit's mission capability.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 6: Army Reserve and National Guard**

### **Topic A: Reserve and National Guard Predeployment Training**

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requires the mobilization, integration, and synchronization of active and reserve component forces. There are inherent differences between Title 32 (National Guard) and Title 10 (Federal Reserve) responsibilities. The integration of Federal Reservists into active duty is not near as complicated as that of the National Guard. Property accountability, promotions, finance, and legal issues face the National Guard when federalized. Frequently, reserve units are cross attached with active units, and these active units have no idea how to address the difference in the two systems.

National Guard units assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were confronted with perceptions of inequality in personnel services available to them. Active finance detachments assigned to OEF could not adequately deal with finance-related problems for National Guard units. These national guardsmen were required to call back to their home state's finance office to resolve any problems. Once the home state was notified, forms and other needed documents would either have to be sent through the mail (7-10 day minimum one way) or by e-mail. This caused numerous problems for units. Many units had Soldiers supporting operations away from main support bases. Many of these remote locations had no access to Internet or phones. The chain of command from the unit would try to help by getting the correct forms for the Soldiers, but the forms had to be signed by the individual for the action to take place. This problem was only compounded by geography. Many of the remote locations were only visited on a weekly basis by rotary wing aircraft. Time spent to fix a problem could be up to 60 days or longer. The same problem for an active duty Soldier could be fixed within a few days. The leaders of these units stressed the "one team, one fight" concept but the concept did not include them for personnel or finance issues.

An in-depth mission analysis was performed prior to mobilization. This analysis was critical for reserve units because their total training for a year was usually 48 days. Due to these limited training days, the reserve's training readiness was often less than their active duty counterpart's. During the mission analysis, there were three key sources that were examined to determine training requirements for predeployment training: the unit's mission essential task list (METL), command guidance from the gaining higher headquarters, and the outgoing unit. The outgoing units were particularly helpful since they had been on station for awhile.

Some reserve units did not deploy and operate in their functional area, making their METL irrelevant. Due to the shortages in theater of military police (MP), air defense and artillery units were sometimes called upon to assume this mission.

A National Guard air defense artillery (ADA) battalion was notified for an upcoming deployment to OEF. They were also notified they would be deploying as MP instead of air defenders. This was due to a shortage of MP units Army wide; the unit would conduct a train-up for MP operations for approximately 5 1/2 weeks. The training was centered on MP operations. Most of the training received was not utilized in theater. The noncommissioned officers (NCOs) did not receive their equivalent training of their MP NCO counterparts.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Many reserve units did not have the necessary end-strength to deploy without plus-ups from other units or the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program. This made their mission analysis and predeployment training even more critical.

One of the best things reserve units did for their mission analysis was to coordinate with the outgoing unit through a predeployment site survey (PDSS). This survey included a visit to the site by a combination of staff officers, company commanders, and the battalion commander or executive officer. This visit occurred after the initial unit had been in theater for at least six months. A visit from the unit in theater to the unit's predeployment training site was useful in gaining last minute insights into the mission. It was also helpful if the unit in theater forwarded their after action reviews (AARs) to the follow-on unit.

To the extent possible, leaders ascertained what types of missions were required in the area of operations (AO) to which they were to be deployed. Once identified, these missions were trained to the point of task proficiency for the Soldiers who would execute them. Although many units were training on theater-specific operations prior to deployment, often this training was not sufficient to achieve task proficiency.

One former battalion commander stated:

"Before your unit is mobilized, get Soldiers that have just returned from theater to visit your unit. When my battalion mobilized for OIF, the most valuable training during home station was when two sergeants major (SGMs) that had just returned from Iraq spent two days with us. We had a formal four hour briefing followed by a question and answer session. The rest of the time, they were available one-on-one. As fast as things are changing, find someone who has been in theater within the last few months (or weeks). Find Soldiers that deployed with the same type of unit as yours. If you can get a Soldier that is back on R&R [rest & relaxation] from the unit you will replace, that would give you some valuable information even further out. TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] for convoy operations, for example, have changed significantly in the past few months due to uparmoring and new enemy tactics."

He further stated that in preparation for deployment, units should "aggressively seek out intelligence from theater and get the information to their Soldiers."

"Everyone knows battles are won by the unit that does the best reconnaissance. As it applies to this war, that means unit leaders must aggressively seek out intelligence from theater and relay that information to your troops. Visit the CALL Web site frequently <<http://call.army.mil>> (click on DoD Users Sign In). Company commanders must also visit <<http://companycommand.army.mil>> regularly. I have a challenge for reserve component unit leaders. There is a Web site that has everything you would ever want to know to prepare your unit for combat. But – and this is a big but – you have to get on a SIPR [secure internet protocol router] computer to access it. It is <<http://call.army.smil.mil>>. This Web site is the bible – a compilation of everything that is going on in theater – from MNF-I [Multinational Force – Iraq] down to squad level. Ask your S2 how you can get access. You may have to travel a few miles to get on a SIPR computer – but even if you only do it a few times before you deploy, it is well

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

worth the trip. The information you will get on this Web site will help you plan training and will save lives in Iraq."

Prior to deployment to either OEF or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), units spent several months training for deployment. Both active and reserve units from both theaters reported that the majority of training had been good preparation for deployment. However, several areas were consistently identified as requiring additional training upon arrival in theater. These areas were convoy operations, weapons proficiency on multiple weapons systems, first aid, and realistic and practical cultural awareness training.

A former battalion commander offered the following insights on some of the training issues:

"Once you get to theater, it is more difficult to get on a weapons firing range, more difficult to get ammunition, and more difficult to test fire your weapons. Bring all your crew-served weapons and night sights. If you don't have crew-served night sights, try to hand receipt them from combat arms units in your AO. You will not be issued them in Iraq. Imagine trying to fire a .50cal at night with PVS-7s. That is what many convoy escorts in theater have to do. Have everyone in your unit fire all crew-served weapons – at least familiarization fire. You never know who might be designated to provide convoy escort gun truck duty. Get your hands on all the ammo you can; do day and night fire (with those night sights you just obtained). Make sure there is headspace and timing gauges. Another critical reason for firing as many rounds stateside as possible is that range availability in Iraq is very limited. Also, at many locations you do not get to test fire your weapons before you leave the wire. The more confidence you have before you get to Iraq, the better. Recommend practicing assembly and disassembly until you can do it blindfolded – during battle assemblies or home station train-up, take your weapons into a dark room and practice.

"Everyone in your unit should go through combat lifesaver training. I did this with my CAV Troop before Desert Storm – there is no reason we can't do it in the reserves now. Especially with all the medical assets available in the reserve component – be aggressive and set up the training. I can't tell you how many unit commanders in Iraq told me they wish their entire unit was combat lifesaver qualified. Don't wait until you arrive in theater to try and do it – units are having a hard time just getting a few Soldiers to the training (and getting recertification done in Iraq is a challenge, as well). If you can get a number of your Soldiers to higher level medical training, that is a huge bonus. For example, if you know you will be mobilized in six months, arrange for a group of your Soldiers to get first responder/EMS training with your local fire department or technical college. You probably have someone in your unit that can do the training already. Remember, this is a different war –CSS [combat service support] convoys, for example, roll down the road without any medics anywhere nearby – combat lifesavers only. Do you want to bet your troops' lives on a newly schooled combat lifesaver trying to put an IV in for only the second time in his/her life? That brings up another great point – Soldiers in theater say to practice IVs more than once during combat lifesaver training.

"All commanders stressed physical fitness. If you've been there, you know how rough the conditions are. If you haven't, it's hard to describe. The best way to make it through your deployment is to be physically fit before you leave home station. Once you arrive in Iraq is not

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

the time to diet or try to increase PT [physical training] time. The dining facilities will serve cookies and cake to your heart's content – and many Soldiers will take them up on their generosity. It is very easy to gain 5-10 pounds per month in Iraq. With the heat, however, dieting is an activity better left to home station. PT will be a challenge – if you even have time to do it. And when you make time, you may have to do it in [Interceptor] body armor (IBA) and helmet (advanced combat helmet [ACH] or Kevlar). Try to arrive in theater in the best possible shape you can – it will make your Iraq experience much easier.”

Units new to Iraq suffered most of their casualties in the first 90 days they were in country. After that initial period, units became much better at performing their mission. A reserve unit studied the AARs collected during that first 90 days and developed a unit training plan which was sent to their home station for all replacement Soldiers to go through before coming into the theater. They developed a two-week training plan which all new Soldiers had to complete upon arriving in country. This two week plan was built upon the latest lessons learned by the unit. By carefully utilizing lessons learned, these reserve units were better able to train replacement Soldiers.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- There are still substantial differences in promotions, finance, property accountability, and legal issues between the reserves and the active units.
- Deploying units must perform a detailed mission analysis.
- Temporary changes from the unit's functional area to another decreases unit readiness.
- AARs can be used to better train Soldiers in theater and should form the foundation of home station training of replacement Soldiers.
- Soldier shortages that are made up from outside the unit just prior to or during mobilization affect the mission capability of reserve units.

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Personnel: Minimize the difference in promotions, finance, property accountability, and legal issues between reserve and active units.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Mission Analysis before Deployment	36229-28391
Military Police in Lieu of OEF	46210-44853
Mobilization of National Guard Units	17456-83771
Reserve/National Guard Finance	36280-02688
Predeployment Training OIF/OEF	34711-90521
Training of New RC Soldiers	24370-15911
Reserve Leadership Challenges	32289-13266

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 6: Army Reserve and National Guard**

### **Topic B: Reserve Unit Performance**

Because the National Guard and Army Reserve are composed of “part-time” Soldiers who also have civilian occupations, these units had access to a variety of skill sets that were not typically associated with their type of unit or the military occupational specialty (MOS) of their Soldiers. This variety of skill sets represented within a unit gave them significant flexibility and capability to perform missions for which their military training was not adequate. Most commonly mentioned among the skill sets were those associated with public safety officers (e.g., police, state trooper, and prison guards) and construction and engineers (e.g., electricians, carpenters, plumbers, welders, concrete workers, civil engineers, and electrical engineers). Units used these personnel to assist in training local national police forces, diagnosing infrastructure issues within the forward operating bases (FOBs) as well as in local communities, and identifying maximum payoff projects for building infrastructure within local communities.

A National Guard platoon sergeant was given the mission of building a runway in OEF. He was an experienced civilian construction worker. Instead of using military planning techniques, he utilized the Critical Path Method for planning his projects. His method took into account all available resources and also resources needed from outside his unit’s capacity (sub-contracting). The planning process also took into account environmental factors, such as weather, allowing him to be flexible in his end date for the project. He took basic mathematical measurements of his project and factored in the daily capabilities of the concrete trucks to deliver the concrete. The environmental factors could easily push the completion date one day at a time to the right. The method took into account the work force he had available from within his unit to build the concrete forms, pour the concrete, smooth, and cure. Knowing these resources allowed him to better schedule his Soldiers’ work schedules, allowing for better dissemination of information and managing of Soldiers’ time on the job.

Frequently, reserve Soldiers with these additional skills were junior enlisted. Leaders needed to look past their rank and use these valuable skills. Often, specialists were sent to supervise major projects based upon their civilian expertise. They were also called upon to perform missions which were above the level of their military training.

The civilian specialties the reserve unit possessed enabled even the lowest ranking private to have influence over those of a much higher rank. There are many examples. First, the unit had their own maintenance section for working on wheeled vehicles. Most of these mechanics were basic military light wheeled vehicle mechanics. Many of the mechanics had civilian jobs directly related to what needed to be done. For example, one mechanic worked as an overhaul mechanic for the Caterpillar Corporation that specifically worked on equipment common to the battalion. Because of his training, he was able assist the direct support (DS) maintenance with trouble shooting and quality assurance on the repair of the equipment.

Leaders were aware of the value of these skill sets and their availability within National Guard and Army Reserve units. Leaders were able to use these Soldiers to better accomplish their missions supporting local governments and building infrastructure of local communities.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

Some Army Reserve and National Guard units faced a significant leadership problem in retaining quality Soldiers because of frequent mobilizations. Units organized and staffed to perform psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil military operations (CMO) missions dealt with this issue regularly. Some of these units have been mobilized three to four times in the last 10 years. Frequent mobilization places a real strain on their civilian jobs and families. Many of the skills necessary to perform in these units were taught in MOS schools, but were refined through civilian employment.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Army Reserve and National Guard units often have Soldiers with valuable civilian skills not normally associated with their unit type or the MOS structure of their unit.
- Junior enlisted members of the Army Reserve and National Guard can be called upon and placed in positions of responsibility above their rank because of the civilian skills they possess.
- PSYOP and CMO units get much of their training through their civilian employment.
- Frequent mobilization of Army Reserve and National Guard forces has resulted in reduced retention rates.
- Frequent mobilization of PSYOP and CMO units causes conflict with civilian employment and families.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Accessing Civilian-Based Skill Sets in Reserve Units	37278-69494
Expert Influence vs. Rank	38177-49998
Critical Path Method	27767-48327
PSYOP in OEF	14972-64449



# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 7**

### **Operations Security (OPSEC)**

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Topic A: Training	96
Topic B: Communications Security (COMSEC)	97
Topic C: Accountability	98

#### **Summary**

Prior to deployment, units conducted basic overview briefings to every Soldier on operations security (OPSEC). Numerous Soldiers worked outside their military occupational specialty (MOS) while deployed, and their leaders were unfamiliar with OPSEC issues related to that MOS.

Numerous units operating at bases in Afghanistan and Iraq purchased Motorola hand held radios to make up for a shortage of tactical radio sets. These radios were originally purchased for use by base security personnel for guard and gate operations. As Motorola use expanded, so did communications security (COMSEC) issues.

The enemy continually attempted to gather information from any sources available. Laborers, delivery personnel, and interpreters are examples of just a few of the people who attempted to enter sensitive areas or listen in on radio transmissions. Units had security badges, sign-in rosters, and procedures posted; however, active measures must accompany passive measures to maintain OPSEC and COMSEC.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 7: OPSEC**

### **Topic A: Training**

Prior to deployment, units provided briefings to every Soldier on OPSEC. The briefings were basic overviews of OPSEC.

Numerous Soldiers worked outside their MOS while deployed. One group of mechanics were crosstrained as detention facility guards and their leaders only had administrative control (ADCON). Their job in the detention facility required the mechanics to report for duty with the military police detachment assigned to the facility. Their unit leaders only provided the Soldiers with housing and resolved any administrative issues. The unit leaders did not conduct the crosstraining and did not coordinate work schedules at the detention facility. When the Soldiers were not on shift and would reference their work at the facility, their unit leaders had no knowledge of what the guards could or could not discuss in relation to the facility. The leaders had not received any briefing on OPSEC as it related to their Soldiers duties. Leaders referred to their chain of command for guidance on what the Soldiers could discuss about their duties as detention facility guards. The leaders would have preferred to have received the cross training with their Soldiers and been briefed by the military police detachment on OPSEC issues.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Leaders need to be briefed on their Soldiers' job activities when Soldiers are ADCON to another unit.
- Crosstrain leaders for the job skills their Soldiers will be doing outside of an MOS so they understand job-related restrictions.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Detention Facility OEF	77238-00569

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 7: OPSEC**

### **Topic B: Communications Security (COMSEC)**

Numerous units operating at bases in Afghanistan and Iraq purchased Motorola hand-held radios to make up for a shortage of tactical radios. These radios were originally purchased for use by base security personnel for guard and gate operations. As operations expanded, additional units needed the radios for ongoing operations. These additional units requested the radios and their fill sets. These radios are secure communication devices that have a fill set to load frequencies and communications security (COMSEC) data. Several COMSEC issues arose once units had access to these additional radios. Frequencies and channels were not managed which infringed on security operations. Once COMSEC problems arose, commanders at all levels began a coordination process. This process allowed units to use their own channels and ensured the proper COMSEC procedures were being used while continuing to allow priority missions, such as base defense, to operate without interruption. Problems surfaced with accountability of the Motorola radio sets. They were not accounted for the same as standard tactical radio sets. Commanders were forced to establish procedures to ensure the Motorola radio sets were in the proper hands and being used for proper purposes.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Fill sets for the Motorola radios need to be controlled as any other COMSEC device.
- Frequencies and unit fill sets for radios should be coordinated to ensure each unit has correct COMSEC.
- Account for hand-held Motorola radios the same as any other COMSEC device.

#### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Motorola Control OIF	18675-84251
TOC and Sensitive Area Access	34023-60128

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 7: OPSEC**

### **Topic C: Accountability**

The war on terrorism is a combined, joint, interagency, multinational fight including contractors, local national civilians, and host nation forces within the midst of coalition forces. The enemy continually attempts to gather information from any source available.

Units practiced strict access control to sensitive areas to include tactical operations centers (TOCs), intelligence, and communication centers. Many units in theater physically covered Army Battle Command System (ABCs) screens to prevent inadvertent access. This proved valuable, especially with mounted patrols that had Blue Force Tracker systems and had interpreters or local police forces riding inside the vehicle.

Commanders throughout Afghanistan were required to conduct a base self-assessment. A checklist allowed commanders of forward operating bases (FOBs) to assess base vulnerability. Less experienced commanders in the field found this self-assessment helpful in planning for worst case scenarios for their bases. This vulnerability assessment resulted in standardized physical security and force protection measures throughout the country.

Everyday activities conducted at numerous bases throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) led to OPSEC deficiencies. Sensitive material was found several times in laundry turned in for cleaning, violating OPSEC procedures. Most of these facilities had local national civilians working at them. The material found ranged from military ID cards to full written operations orders. There were no procedures in place to ensure Soldiers checked clothing prior to laundry turn-in. Soldiers filled out a basic form to get their laundry cleaned, but there were no reminders on the paperwork for Soldiers to check their laundry prior to turn in. After each incident, commanders would reiterate the importance of OPSEC in everyday activities. No active measures were taken to preclude the laundry problem.

Holding leaders accountable for OPSEC violations of their Soldiers was a daunting task. Leaders had numerous Soldiers who were working outside their job skills. These Soldiers were crosstrained to do additional jobs. Their unit leaders were unaware of the specifics of their jobs and what OPSEC issues the Soldiers would face. Many leaders consulted with their commanders for specific information on what their Soldiers could discuss. No crosstraining existed to prepare leaders to deal with Soldiers working outside their unit MOS or for when they have only ADCON of those personnel.

To ensure accountability of OPSEC, one battalion S2 recommended that all personnel assigned fill out an SF 312 (non-disclosure statement) prior to redeploying from OEF. This was to ensure that all personnel were aware of the OPSEC requirements and the reprisal for OPSEC violations upon return to home station.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Conduct leader training to inform leaders who have only administrative control (ADCON) over subordinates of the OPSEC requirements of the duties being performed.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

- Employ active measures as well as passive measures to secure sensitive material.
- Develop preventative measures for OPSEC in common functions such as laundry activities.
- Fill out SF 312 (non-disclosure statement) for all personnel prior to redeployment.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Detention Facility OEF	77238-00569
Laundry OPSEC OEF	28402-99813
Vulnerability Assessments in OEF	27521-05752
Security Clearances in OEF	46390-83894
TOC and Sensitive Area Access	34023-60128



# OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

## Chapter 8 Safety

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### **Summary**

Predeployment risk management training was conducted only down to the junior leader level. The program was designed to be implemented down to the individual Soldier level. To properly impact unit operations, the program must be trained to the individual Soldier level, and this did not happen. The younger inexperienced Soldiers are not trained to understand and implement the proper decision-making process to allow for safer operations. Leaders have the responsibility to eliminate unnecessary risk to save lives. Soldiers were, however, trained on issues such as weapon safety and orientation.

Training conducted at the combat training centers prior to deployment is providing opportunities for convoy operations training. However, during these training opportunities the driving conditions and practices (e.g., aggressive driving tactics and advanced driving techniques) found in theater are not adequately being trained. Drivers in theater are required to use much more aggressive driving tactics than is permitted in predeployment training and exercises. To address this issue, units are conducting ad hoc training as time and mission requirements permit to develop driving skills. In some cases, mission requirements are such that drivers are beginning operations without receiving training and must develop these skills as operations are being conducted. This significantly increases the risks associated with convoy operations.

Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76) safety office distributes mandatory annual safety training requirements and monthly safety advisories. The office also provides monthly safety messages depicting an accident or relevant safety issue that needs attention, such as mine awareness. Subordinate commands appreciate hip-pocket training opportunities resourced by higher headquarters. Units were able to implement the safety messages into their risk management process.

Several junior leaders commented on driving safety measures that have been established as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as well as standing operating procedures (SOPs). The individual safety issues for security or combat logistics patrols were eye protection, hearing protection, and seat belts. Another safety issue was vehicle rollovers. Units began to conduct rollover drills because canal driving was challenging, especially at night or after it had rained. Commanders also enforced Soldiers wearing additional individual protective gear such as knee and elbow pads for each mission.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 8: Safety**

### **Topic A: Risk Management**

Predeployment risk management training was conducted only down to the junior leader level. The program was designed to be implemented down to the individual Soldier level. To properly impact unit operations, the program must be trained to the individual level, and this did not happen. Unfortunately, this is the level at which most accidents happen. The younger, inexperienced Soldiers were not trained to understand and implement the proper decision-making process to allow for safer operations. Leaders had the responsibility to eliminate unnecessary risk to save lives. To assist them in achieving this goal, all Soldiers should know how to conduct risk assessments.

Soldiers were trained on issues such as weapon safety and orientation. Junior leaders were trained on such things as risk management worksheets for tactical operations. Numerous interviews with different levels of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) showed that the risk management process or operational risk management (ORM) was trained, but at varying levels of the NCO channel. No interview conducted revealed that the risk management process training was conducted at the individual Soldier level.

Some units only trained the risk management process at the senior NCO level (E7-E9). The Marine Corps trained their ORM at platoon sergeant and gunnery sergeant level (E6-E7). Junior leaders had heard of the process but had no formal training. Every interview related the risk management process to the risk management worksheet. The worksheet itself did not cover all areas of risk mitigation. The interviewees all said younger, inexperienced Soldiers were finding themselves in charge of everyday activities. These everyday activities were where most accidents occurred. Risk mitigation did not fall on leaders alone. The decision-making process is for all Soldiers (“every Soldier a safety officer”).

Soldier complacency was an ongoing issue for leaders. Complacency is described as satisfaction accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies. It has also been described as “too big for one's boots.” Safety was hard to measure. When nothing bad happened, Soldiers became content with how they operated. When no adverse actions happened, shortcuts began. The extra steps to ensure safety occurred less and less. For example, leaders who stressed safety were willing to follow through with actions of spot checking these activities. If a leader talked about safety issues and checked on something else, neither was done well by the Soldiers. As one leader put it, “Soldiers do what they know will be checked on.” It was up to all Soldiers, regardless of rank, to ensure the safety of their fellow Soldiers. One leader stated, “For every negligent discharge or other accident, there was an NCO just as culpable.”

The CJTF-76 safety office distributed mandatory annual safety training requirements and provided monthly safety advisories. Before winter began, CJTF-76 mandated all units conduct winterization training to include winter safety, cold weather injuries, cold weather vehicle preparation, and heater training. The office also provided monthly safety messages depicting an accident or relevant safety issue that needed attention. A recent safety message came out on mine awareness stating that recent rains might wash away sand covering mines or that mines may rise to the surface due to the amount of water. Subordinate units appreciated hip-pocket training

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

opportunities resourced by higher headquarters. Units were able to implement the safety messages into their risk management process.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Mitigating risk falls on all Soldiers regardless of rank.
- Implement training on risk management decision-making process to the individual Soldier level.
- Leaders should ensure that their words and actions are consistent.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Individual Risk Management OEF	27620-57417
Predeployment Risk Management	28500-56034
Mandatory Annual Safety Training and Monthly Advisories OEF	78000-39845
Leadership Consistency and Soldier Complacency	36000-87314

# OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)

## Chapter 8: Safety Topic B: Driving

Predeployment training, including mission rehearsal exercises (MRE), at the combat training centers provided opportunities for convoy operations training for deploying Soldiers. However, during these training opportunities, the driving conditions and practices (e.g., aggressive driving tactics and advanced driving techniques) found in theater were not adequately trained. Drivers in theater were required to use much more aggressive driving tactics than are permitted in predeployment training and exercises. To address this issue, units were required to conduct ad hoc training as time and mission requirements permitted to develop Soldiers' driving skills. In some cases, mission requirements were such that drivers began operations without receiving training and were forced to develop these skills during operations. This significantly increased the risks associated with conducting convoy operations in theater until drivers had adequate time to develop more aggressive driving skills. Units should train aggressive driving techniques and advanced driving techniques that reflect the realities of convoy operations in theater. This training is well-suited for combat training center rotations prior to deployment.

Several junior leaders commented on driving safety measures that were established as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as well as standing operating procedures (SOPs). The individual safety issues for security patrols or combat logistics patrols were eye protection, hearing protection, and seat belts. Accounts of Soldiers hitting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) wearing only one ear plug, resulting in deafness in the other ear, validated the use of hearing protection. Another safety issue was vehicle rollovers. Platoons conducted rollover drills because canal driving was challenging, especially at night or after it rained. Soldiers were required to wear elbow and knee pads every time they went out on a mission. Soldiers did not like it during the heat, but appreciated the protective gear when they had to use it.

**Insight/Lesson Learned:** Predeployment training should include training on aggressive driving tactics and advanced driving techniques that reflect the realities of convoy operations in theater.

### Table of Supporting Observations:

Observation Title	CALLCOMS File Number
Safety Measures OIF	41708-03782
Tactical Driving Safety	42428-38888

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 8: Safety**

### **Topic C: Weapons Safety**

Safety and weapons qualification were issues during predeployment weapons training. Increasing predeployment weapons training would have alleviated problems in both areas. Insufficient marksmanship training and unfamiliarity with a loaded weapon resulted in several accidental or negligent discharges in theater.

There were not enough personnel qualified on certain weapon systems. This reduced the leader's flexibility when planning missions. Often, only one person per vehicle was qualified for the weapon systems mounted on the vehicle. Some leaders stated that missions could be longer and safer if drivers and those manning the weapons could be swapped to give the driver or gunner a break from the rough terrain in Afghanistan. If both were qualified, then this was possible. In other circumstances, personnel who should have not been on a mission for health or personal reasons were obligated to go because they were the only one qualified on the weapon system or as a driver for the vehicle. Increasing the amount of time allotted to weapons training and time spent handling weapons increased proficiency and decreased negligent discharges while allowing leaders more flexibility in completing their mission. Clearing procedures were retrained quarterly to ensure standards were maintained. Many units made it mandatory for an NCO to be present at all times when weapons were being cleared. Soldiers qualified on different weapon systems organic to the unit to maximize proficiency, increase awareness, and increase mission flexibility.

Leaders assessed whether incidents were accidental due to a lack of training or Soldier negligence. During the interview process, two schools of thought described the reason for accidental discharges: lack of training and personal complacency. The issue was accidental versus negligent. Both units observed had at least two negligent discharges. However, the commander of each unit believed they occurred for different reasons. If a negligent discharge occurred because of a lack of training, then it was a leader issue. The unit interviewed had its negligent discharges occur within the first two months of deployment and attributed it to the fact that Soldiers were not used to carrying, handling, loading, or clearing their weapons. The commander believed that the issue was a lack of training. Qualification versus proficiency became a theme for the unit. After the second discharge, the following SOP was put into place: Soldiers were not allowed to clear their own weapon. They traded with a buddy and then an NCO verified the weapons were clear. Soldiers were given quarterly refresher training on functions check and the clearing of a weapon. Soldiers became proficient over time. They more strictly enforced the base policy which was to clear all weapons before a Soldier entered the base. With this policy, clearing barrels around the dining facilities and most other places (except the passenger terminal) were removed. Negligent discharges were reduced base wide. The commander of the second unit believed that any discharge was negligence. The commander stated that the unit went through such an extensive weapons familiarization, qualification, and live fire training that his Soldiers were proficient and must maintain vigilance when clearing their weapons. Therefore, he considers negligent discharges as complacent acts.

One unit interviewed had zero negligent discharges during their deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Company leaders devised a pre deployment weapons training

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

program for all assigned personnel to familiarize with all weapon systems common to their company. This training program complemented the training already being conducted as part of individual readiness training (IRT). Each assigned Soldier was tested above IRT standards on every weapon to include M16, M9, M249, M2 HB, MK19, and all night devices assigned to the unit. The training was conducted over a three week period and covered use, maintenance, and safety. Each weapon was tested, not just the Soldier's assigned weapon. Additional training was provided to those not meeting the standard. Written and practical exercises were included in the training, including weapon status (amber, green, red), proper clearing, proper forward operating base (FOB) procedures, reducing stoppages, loading, firing, unloading. A weapon safety check exam was also devised to allow junior leaders to supervise their Soldiers with loaded weapons. The unit attributed its zero negligent discharges during deployment to their training program conducted during predeployment training.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- A negligent discharge must be handled properly to emphasize the danger and to ensure the safety of all.
- Increase the amount of weapons training and time spent handling the weapon and accidental discharges will decrease.
- There were not enough personnel qualified on certain weapon systems.

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Weapon Safety Training OEF	22161-61196
Predeployment Training/Weapons	27928-30577
Training vs. Negligence with Accidental Discharges	32337-25812

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 9**

### **Synchronization of Information Operations (IO)**

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#### **Summary**

A shortage exists in the Army for qualified IO personnel. The majority of officers filling IO positions in OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are not qualified FA 30. The demand for IO in future operations as well as in the current war will increase. IO officers must be able to operate in a joint, interagency, multinational (JIM) environment. Cultural awareness, regional orientation, and interpersonal skills are important for technical and tactical proficiency. Developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) with a cause and effect relationship provided the commander with a more accurate assessment to determine the success of an operation. The field was not clear on the difference between the core, supporting, and related elements of IO.

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 9: Synchronization of IO**

### **Topic A: PSYOP in OEF**

For OEF, the joint PSYOP task force (JPOTF) is located in Qatar. It has a JPOTF Forward located in Kandahar. The PSYOP company that supports Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 is located in Kandahar. The PSYOP company does not have the ability to rapidly make PSYOP products for customers in CJTF-76 area of operations (AO). PSYOP products are approved in Afghanistan, but must be sent to the JPOTF at Qatar for printing. The average time to get a product printed and packaged for shipment back to Afghanistan takes between 2-4 weeks. Customers felt that PSYOP was not responsive. The JPOTF Forward may consider relocating near vicinity of CJTF-76 and maintain a liaison officer (LNO) in Kandahar to make PSYOP more responsive to the customers in Afghanistan.

The Modular Print System consists of two Heidelberg presses and one cutter. There are two or three unused and available Modular Print Systems located in continental United States (CONUS). A Modular Print System collocated near the PSYOP company would cut PSYOP product production time to eight hours.

Reserve component (RC) PSYOP units were habitually faced with individual mobilization and not unit deployments. Noncommissioned officer (NCO) professional development schools were available, but the Soldiers did not have time to attend. Challenges were developing with unit cohesion and retention (civilian jobs versus multiple deployments). The greatest leadership challenge for leaders in PSYOP units was recruitment, deployment, and retention of Soldiers. A critical factor for unit success was that the leadership had deployed PSYOP experience.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Provide Modular Print Systems to Afghanistan to improve responsiveness to PSYOP customers.
- Ensure PSYOP Soldiers receive MOS-specific training during pre-mobilization training.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

##### **Training and Organization:**

- Review the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of the RC PSYOP units to determine if the size of the force matches the requirements placed upon them.
- Conduct an assessment of PSYOP to determine recruitment, training, deployment, and retention challenges.

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
PSYOP in OEF	14972-64449
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 9: Synchronization of IO**

### **Topic B: Determine Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)**

Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are easier to determine in offense and defense operations than in stability and support operations. There is a clearly defined cause and effect relationship. The last step in the joint targeting cycle is combat assessments (CAs). CAs have a clearly defined and easily identified method to determine the results of lethal (kinetic) means. MOEs in military operations are defined as tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks. For CA, the results measured are based on years of study and scientific research. In stability operations and support operations, MOE do not have the same scientific and research foundation. The feedback (result) from an action taken in stability operations and support operations is not immediate and it is harder to measure. Sometimes it is based on perception.

An MOE that has a close cause (military action) and effect (desired result) relationship provides the commander with more accurate assessments to determine the success of an operation. IO used lethal and nonlethal means to achieve results. Many IO officers had a combat arms background and had not had any formal training in IO. They fell back on that familiar background and used lethal means to accomplish the mission. In stability operations and support operations, the focus changed for most units from major combat operations (MCO) against the Taliban/Al-Qaeda or Iraqi Army/Fedayeen-Saddam to counterinsurgency and rebuilding the political, economic, and social infrastructure. It was more effective to have an Afghani working to help an Afghani than an American helping an Afghani. The same holds true for Iraq.

In OIF and OEF, MOE were based on items easily counted, or quantifiable. Some examples were the number of enemy killed, convoys attacked, improvised explosive device (IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, pot holes covered, weapons turned in, projects started, money spent, policeman trained, Soldiers trained, governors elected, etc. A number count alone did not indicate the effectiveness of the action taken. A project that built schools coupled with the Afghan Ministry of Education project to train teachers was an example of an MOE that had a close cause and effect relationship.

It was important to decide from whose viewpoint the MOE was developed. Was it an American or host nation (HN) perspective? The number of policemen trained may indicate the HN had functioning civil law enforcement from a U.S. perspective. However, the numbers of policemen who stayed at their post and fought back during an attack demonstrated the HN did have functioning civil law enforcement from an Iraqi or Afghani perspective.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Identify close cause and effect relationships for development of MOE
- Identify from whose viewpoint to assess the MOE.
- Many officers serving in the position of an IO officer have not had formal IO training.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Doctrine: Develop doctrine and TTP for MOE for full spectrum operations.

Training: Develop simulations that can display the consequences of IO in the common operating picture (COP) for battle command systems.

Leadership and Education: Incorporate IO and MOE development and assessment training into Officer Education System (OES) and Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Determine Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)	29692-28283
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 9: Synchronization of IO**

### **Topic C: National Guard Information Operations Group**

A shortage exists in the Army of qualified IO personnel. The majority of officers filling IO positions in OEF and OIF were not trained FA 30 officers. The demand for IO in future operations as well as in the current war exacerbates the need for a regionally focused, culturally aware, and mission-tailored force to support the warfighter. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has set aside 900 positions in their force structure to establish two IO groups. Their objective is to provide a deployable unit to meet the warfighter's IO requirements across the range of military operations. The IO groups will have the capability to support military organizations from the brigade combat team to the Joint Task Force.

The ARNG provides 50 percent of the field support assets to support the Army IO mission. However, there appears to be a challenge over a unified approach to growing, training, and assigning the IO force. National Guard IO units need to be mobilized and deployed in the same manner as all other National Guard units in the Army. Deploy units to a warfighter and not to another active component force provider. Maintain unit integrity and cohesion of trained ARNG IO units. All active and reserve component IO units should have a training standard validated by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and 5th Army have responsibility for training assessments and mobilization. Establish a system similar to the way special operations units are trained and mobilized.

#### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- A shortage exists of trained IO personnel in the Army.
- Deploy ARNG IO units to a warfighter not a force provider.
- Increase IO training and education for Army leaders.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications:**

Doctrine: Incorporate IO lessons learned from OEF and OIF into joint and Army publications.

#### **Leadership and Education:**

- Incorporate IO leader training through interagency integration, case studies, and vignettes in OES and NCOES.
- Develop an IO elective within intermediate level education (ILE) for U.S. students only that analyzes IO for an actual war planning.
- Incorporate IO case studies into stability operations for Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Training and Organization: Determine IO training standards, validation requirements, and mobilization responsibilities.

Personnel: Provide more qualified FA 30 to the field.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation of Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
National Guard Information Operations Group	16142-76095

# **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

## **Chapter 9: Synchronization of IO**

### **Topic D: Initiative with Civil Military Operations (CMO) in OEF**

Civil military operations (CMO) in OEF met four of the six objectives from CJTF-76. Staffs, S5, IO cells, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) continuously worked CMO projects. It became apparent that PRTs were resourced for CMO projects; however, some of the various S5 and IO cells were somewhat out of the mainstream of guidance and resources. It was at this level where junior leaders, not formally trained in IO or S5 operations, started to take initiative and developed strategies to support the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

A transportation captain became the self-appointed IO officer. He took the initiative and tried to learn what he could about IO and CMO. He created a network to include the PRT and CJ9 to vent his ideas and aid in resourcing his projects. His area of responsibility was the 10 kilometer ring around Bagram Airbase. He noted that the local PRT was focused in the four provinces neighboring Bagram, and CJTF-76 was focused on the regional commands and the borders, so it was up to him to make it happen within the 10K ring.

This captain was very positive and really enjoyed his job; he felt that he was making a difference. Earlier in the month he started an Afghan Education Extension Program on the topic of grape farming. The lecture was given by an Afghani from an Afghani university who discussed techniques to increase grape cultivation. The program was supported by the local governor and maintained the flavor of Afghanis supporting Afghanis with the U.S. in the background. He stated that the open-air lecture was filled to capacity and the locals really enjoyed and benefitted from it.

The captain also started a video production team. A ministry representative, the governor, or a local mayor provided the introduction on video followed by a 30-minute presentation on certain topics requested by the Afghanis. The IO cell ensured the seminar was videotaped and they reproduced for distribution. Local officials or mullahs would distribute the material to the population or televise it as appropriate. The first video production worked on was a presentation for midwives.

This IO captain was working with consulting firms (with support from the United States Agency for International Development [USAID]) to identify economic development opportunities for the Afghanis. These opportunities included carpet/rug production, raisins (from their delicious grapes), drying apricots, nuts, cattle production, rose oil, and creating a marble industry. His hopes were that these industries would spur packing and shipping industries. One of the main issues was trying to get industry to support a final product and not rely on exporting raw products.

This captain recommended that inbound officers have experience or an education in economics and be open-minded. It was his open-mindedness that made his one-man cell successful. He was meeting the CJTF-76 commander's intent without even knowing it.

## **OEF and OIF Leader Challenges Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **Insights/Lessons Learned:**

- Every staff section and unit should understand the CJTF-76 objectives to ensure the commander's intent is understood.
- Initiative at the junior leader level is aiding the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- S5 and leaders dealing with the reconstruction of Afghanistan should have some economic background (education or experience).

### **Table of Supporting Observations:**

<b>Observation Title</b>	<b>CALLCOMS File Number</b>
Initiative with Civil Military Operations (CMO) in OEF	31208-18449
Cultural Awareness Training OEF	29908-50953



# Center for Army Lessons Learned



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