OIOS

Office of Internal Oversight Services

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

RISK ASSESSMENT

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

10 September 2008
Assignment No. AP2008/600/02

TO: Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General
A: for Peacekeeping Operations

DATE: 10 September 2008

REFERENCE: IAD: 08- *01 730*

FROM: Dagfinn Knutsen, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS

SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AP2008/600/02 - Risk Assessment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations**
OBJET:

1.   I am pleased to present OIOS' risk assessment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for your information. While we do not require a formal response to this report, you are welcome to discuss any of the issues raised further.

2.   OIOS encourages the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to use the results of this risk assessment to put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures. OIOS will update the risk assessment periodically, based on subsequent audits or additional information obtained.

3.   I take this opportunity to thank the management and staff involved in the risk assessment for the assistance and cooperation provided to the project team in connection with this assignment.

cc: Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support
 Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Operations, DPKO
 Lt. Gen. Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Military Affairs, DPKO
 Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
 Mr. Anis Bajwa, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, DPKO
 Ms. Denise Wilman, Senior Programme Management Officer, OUSG, DPKO
 Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors
 Ms. Maria Gomez Troncoso, Officer-in-Charge, Joint Inspection Unit Secretariat
 Mr. Seth Adza, Operations Review Officer, DFS
 Ms. Christina Post, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management
 Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Programme Officer, OIOS

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

FUNCTION

"The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization" (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

CONTACT INFORMATION

DIRECTOR:
Dagfinn Knutsen, Tel: +1.212.963.5650, Fax: +1.212.963.2185, e-mail: knutsen2@un.org

DEPUTY DIRECTOR:
Fatoumata Ndiaye, Tel: +1.212.963.5648, Fax: +1.212.963.3388, e-mail: ndiaye@un.org

CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING AUDIT SERVICE:
Eleanor T. Burns, Tel: +1.917.367.2792, Fax: +1.212.963.3388, e-mail: burnse@un.org

PARTICIPANTS

The OIOS risk assessment team conducted workshops and interviews with the following staff members of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to gain an understanding of existing organizational relationships, risks, controls and process issues.

Table 1: List of participants

Focus Area	Name and Functional Title
Strategic Management and Governance	• Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping • Mr. Per Arne Five, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Military Affairs • Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions • Mr. David Haeri, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General, OUSG • Ms. Denise Wilman, Senior Programme Management Officer, OUSG • Mr. Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, Director, Asia and Middle East Division, Office of Operations • Mr. Raisedon Zenenga, Officer-in-Charge, Africa Division, Office of Operations
Human Resource Management	• Mr. Patrick Carey, Executive Officer, Executive Office, OUSG • Ms. Annie Tanmizi, Senior Personnel Officer, Executive Office, OUSG
Programme and Project Management	• Mr. Nicholas Birnback, Chief of the Public Affairs Unit, OUSG • Ms. Christina Goodness, Officer-in-Charge of the Information Management Unit, OUSG • Ms. Margaret Carey, IOT Leader, Africa I Division, Office of Operations • Mr. Michael Gaouette, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations • Mr. Ingemar Modig Björnfot, Administrative Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations • Mr. Kevin Kennedy, IOT Leader, Africa II Division, Office of Operations • Mr. Sergey Toropov, Senior Support Officer, Africa

Focus Area	Name and Functional Title
	II Division, Office of Operations
	• Ms. Mary Eliza Kimball, IOT Leader, Asia and Middle East Division, Office of Operations
	• Mr. Mike Dora, Senior Support Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, Office of Operations
	• Ms. Radha Day, Political Affairs Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, Office of Operations
	• Ms. Judy Hylton, Political Affairs Officer, Asia and Middle East Division, Office of Operations
	• Mr. Peter Due, IOT Leader, Europe and Latin America Division, Office of Operations
	• Ms. Patricia Marchisio, Senior Support Officer, Europe and Latin America Division, Office of Operations
	• Mr. Akylbai Eleusizov, Political Affairs Officer, Europe and Latin America Division, Office of Operations
	• Col. Ian Sinclair, Chief of Staff, Office of the Military Adviser, Office of Military Affairs
	• Col. Willem van Dullemen, Chief, Current Military Operations Service, Office of Military Affairs
	• Lt. Col. Orisi Rabukawaqa, Military Planning Officer, Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs
	• Col. Bishnu Rudra Sharma, Acting Chief, Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs
	• Mr. Robert Pulver, Chief, Criminal Law & Judiciary Advisory Section
	• Ms. Ilene Cohn, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Mr. Ata Yenigun, Special Assistant to the Police Adviser, Office of the Police Adviser, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Mr. Justin Brady, Planning Officer, UN Mine Action Service, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Ms. Ann-Marie Orler, Deputy Police Adviser, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security

Focus Area	Name and Functional Title
	Institutions
	• Ms. Kristiana Powell, Programme Officer, Security Sector Reform, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Mr. Walter Wolf, Chief, Standing Police Capacity, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Mr. Andrew Carpenter, Chief, Strategic Policy & Development Section, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Ms. Lotta Hagman, Coordination Officer, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
	• Ms. Sunaina Lowe, Senior Programme Management Officer, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
	• Mr. Reginald Lambert, Officer, Best Practices Section, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
	• Mr. Ian Parker, Training Officer, Integrated Training Service, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
Safety and Security	• Mr. Tom Hojbjerg, Officer-in-Charge, Situation Centre, OUSG

SUMMARY OF RISK RATINGS

The risk assessment identified the following areas as Higher, Moderate and Lower Risk. A summary of the identified risks is shown below. Full details of the identified risks are listed in the attached risk register.

The overall risks have been rated as "higher risk", "moderate risk", or "lower risk" based on OIOS' assessment of the likelihood and impact of the occurrence of events or actions that might adversely affect the Organization's ability to successfully achieve its objectives and execute its strategies, after taking into account the representations made by programme managers concerning actions they have taken to prevent or mitigate the identified risks.

Table 2: Summary of identified risks

Focus Area	Overall Risk
i. Strategic Management and Governance ii. Human Resource Management iii. Programme and Project Management iv. Safety and Security	**Higher Risk**

Risk Assessment of : DPKO

Focus Area: Strategic Management and Governance

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
1				Possible	High	Higher Risk
I	**Mandates**			Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(i) The Security Council may decide to deploy missions to places where the minimum conditions essential for a peacekeeping operation to succeed are not present, resulting in failure to achieve mandates and reputation risk to the Organization.	The Secretary-General (SG) and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG-PKO) advise the Security Council on the conditions that must exist for peacekeeping operations to succeed and the actual conditions on the ground.	Strategy	Possible	High	
	A(ii) The Security Council may decide to terminate missions prematurely, or thinking that mandates have already been achieved, resulting in countries or parties (to conflicts) reverting to conflict.	The SG and the USG-PKO advise the Security Council of the need for follow-on peace-building or political missions, as applicable, to safeguard the gains made by peacekeeping missions and to ensure long-term sustainability of these gains.				
	A(iii) High local population expectations when peacekeeping missions are deployed may result in public frustration when expectations are not met.	The DPKO Public Affairs Unit (PAU) and the Department of Public Information work with the public information units in the field at start-up and throughout the cycle of the mission to ensure that a public communication plan is in place as the mission deploys. Missions carry out Quick Impact Projects that may directly, tangibly and quickly impact the local population in areas where missions operate.				

No	Focus Area: Strategic Management and Governance		Risk Category	Possible Likeli-hood	High Impact	Higher Risk Overall Risk
1	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**				
	A(iv) The deployment or presence of a UN peacekeeping mission may lessen the urgency for the parties (involved in conflicts) to resolve their issues. A(v) Spoilers/opportunists may take advantage of the vacuum created during transitions before/after the deployment of missions, increasing challenges in implementing mandates or negating progress made.	Missions, through the USG-PKO and the SG, report spoilers/opportunists to the Security Council. Also, DPKO encourages the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) or heads of missions to engage all local stakeholders in the peace process, even those perceived as spoilers.				

No	Focus Area:	Strategic Management and Governance		Possible	High	Higher Risk
1	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
	B(i) The level of Member State commitment to support peacekeeping missions (e.g. financially/politically) may not be consistent, resulting in the reduced ability to achieve mandates.		Governance	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
	B(ii) The level of consent of host governments or parties (involved in conflicts) to peacekeeping operations may not be consistent, resulting in operational and/or logistical challenges that could ultimately affect the achievement of mandates.	Host governments sign a Status of Mission or Forces Agreement (SOMA/SOFA) with the United Nations, enumerating the responsibilities of the host government as regards the mission and the Organization's status and privileges relating to the mission's operations. Missions, through the USG-PKO and the SG, report violations of the SOMA/SOFA and other incidents indicating waning levels of consent.				
		At times, the Security Council requests the host government to establish a mechanism to ensure high-level coordination on all matters related to the peacekeeping mandate. For example, Security Council Resolution 1704, establishing UNMIT, called for the establishment of a High-Level Coordination Committee comprised of the national leadership and UNMIT that was further expanded to include the leaders of the opposition.				
	B(iii) Host governments may lack capacity to meet their obligations in supporting the mission and the implementation of the mandate.					

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
Focus Area:	**Strategic Management and Governance**			Possible	High	Higher Risk
1	E(i) Decisions especially pertaining to complex, multi-dimensional missions made without consideration of the logistical, administrative and operational capacity of the Organization may result in its inability to achieve mandates.		Operational	Possible	High	Higher Risk
II	**Strategic planning and monitoring**			Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(i) Ineffective strategic management and governance may result in DPKO/DFS activities leaning more heavily on day-to-day operations.

A(ii) The composition of pre-deployment technical assessment teams, their assessments and/or their recommendations to the SG may not be adequate, resulting in a recommendation to the Security Council for a mandate that may not be suitable for the situation on the ground.

A(iii) Issues relating to the rule of law, police, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), and other areas, may not be given adequate consideration when negotiating peace agreements, resulting in these critical peacekeeping components not being embedded into the peace process or in peacekeeping mandates.

A(iv) The lack of or slow progress in certain peacekeeping operations or in certain peace processes may result in the loss of necessary political, financial and/or operational support from Member States, the Security Council and/or donors. | Technical assessment teams are usually comprised of representatives from all DPKO offices and DFS (especially, but not limited to the Logistics Support Division and Field Personnel Division), as well as other departments and generally most of the UN partners concerned (e.g. DPA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCR, etc.).

The DDR Section has increased its capacity to monitor situations where peace agreements and peacekeeping mandates are being negotiated that might include DDR components and is better resourced to ensure that adequate advice can be provided. | Strategy | | | |

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
1	**Focus Area:**	**Strategic Management and Governance**		Possible	High	Higher Risk
	B(i) The integrated mission concept of operations requiring partnerships with various UN agencies, especially for multi-dimensional operations, may not be effectively implemented, leading to wasted resources and missed opportunities to sustain peacekeeping gains and enable the long-term, development growth of host governments.	The Partnerships Team of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) provides strategic frameworks and modalities for improved cooperation between DPKO/DFS and peacekeeping partners such as regional organizations, UNDP, the World Bank, and other UN and non-UN entities.	Governance	Possible	High	Higher Risk
	D(i) The lack of or slow progress in certain peacekeeping operations or in certain peace processes may result in the suboptimal use of resources (i.e., funds could be better used for other high-priority areas or other missions).		Financial	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk
	E(i) The Organization's capacity to deploy and maintain peacekeeping operations may be overstretched, resulting in logistical and administrative difficulties in deploying and managing missions, and in providing the required direction, guidance and support to operations.	DPKO/DFS plan for potential new operations and communicate with the Security Council and the Fifth Committee, accordingly, to get required resources.	Operational	Possible	High	Higher Risk
III	**Start-up/planning**			Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(i) Planning for new missions may be based on many unclear or frequently changing assumptions or on unrealistic goals, resulting in inappropriate strategic and mandate implementation plans.	The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) has been developed as a framework to address the need for integrated planning. It includes an initial comprehensive assessment and builds on the probable deployment of a technical assessment team prior to mandate determination and mission deployment. It serves as the basis for the mission and mandate plans.	Strategy	Possible	High	Higher Risk

10/09/2008

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	Focus Area:	**Strategic Management and Governance**		Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
1						**Higher Risk**
	E(i) Planning for new missions may be based on many unclear or frequently changing assumptions or on unrealistic goals, resulting in inappropriate operational plans and in failure to acquire and deploy the right capacities at the right time. E(ii) The slow speed of deployment of missions after the Security Council's approval of mandates increases the likelihood of public disappointment toward the UN.	The IMPP has been developed as a framework to address the need for integrated planning. It includes an initial comprehensive assessment and builds on the probable deployment of a technical assessment team prior to mandate determination and mission deployment. It serves as the basis for the mission and mandate plans.	Operational	Possible	High	
IV	Organizational structure and functions			Possible	High	**Higher Risk**

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	Focus Area: Strategic Management and Governance OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
				Possible	High	Higher Risk
1	B(i) The level of DPKO/DFS integration may not be maintained or the new organizational structure and reporting relationships may not be effective, resulting in ineffective/inefficient operations and unclear accountability (e.g., challenges relating to chain of command and coordination, complicating the management of peacekeeping operations).	To ensure unity of command, direction and response to events affecting peacekeeping operations, DPKO and DFS have put in place various joint management forums such as the Senior Management Team, the Expanded Senior Management Team and Directors' meetings. Additionally, shared resources (i.e., the support of the Chief of Staff, PAU, Situation Centre, Executive Office, DPET, Integrated Operational Teams, Conduct and Discipline Unit, Senior Leadership Appointments Section, and the Communications and Information Technology Division) and standing meetings and coordination mechanisms further strengthen the integration between the two departments.	Governance	Possible	High	Higher Risk
	B(ii) The inability to implement significant reforms and restructuring while deploying and managing missions under inherently adverse conditions may affect the ability of DPKO/DFS to carry out their functions optimally.	The DPKO/DFS Chief of Staff and the DFS Director lead and coordinate the restructuring.				
	B(iii) Missions' receipt of information and direction from various departments (e.g., DPKO, DFS, DSS, etc.) may create confusion and prevent missions from efficiently and effectively carrying out their mandates.	Mechanisms are in place to keep close integration of common or related DPKO, DFS and DSS functions (e.g., co-location of USGs, common functions shared and IOTs).				
	B(iv) Silos within the Organization (i.e., between DPKO, DFS and other relevant departments, and within divisions/offices/sections in these departments) may result in miscommunication and ineffective and inefficient operations.					

	Focus Area:	Strategic Management and Governance		Possible	High	Higher Risk
1						
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
				Possible	High	Higher Risk
	G(i) Lack of a structured mechanism for inter-mission communication or sharing operational information may hamper DPKO/DFS' regional approach to peacekeeping.	Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) analyze activities and events that may affect neighbouring missions. Additionally, the strengthening of the Current Military Operations Service's (CMOS) situational awareness function allows forewarning on such regional developments for military guidance and advice to senior management. Missions operating in neighbouring countries are encouraged to develop information-sharing and operation-planning mechanisms. Regular meetings of SRSGs and Force Commanders of adjacent missions take place in West Africa and in the Middle East. Joint Mission Analysis Centres and Joint Operations Centres are also encouraged to cooperate. Liaison officers are sometimes exchanged between missions, and contingents or military observers coordinate patrols on their respective sides of the border. Also, the concept of inter-mission cooperation, whereby troops assigned to a peacekeeping operation could operate, under certain conditions in another mission area, was also developed to ensure an optimal use of resources in the West African region.	Information Resources	Possible	High	Higher Risk
V	Risk management			Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk

				Possible	High	Higher Risk
1	**Focus Area:**	**Strategic Management and Governance**				
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
	A(i) Adverse events not directly related to peacekeeping operations, e.g., global increase in prices of fuel and grains, may result in domestic disturbance and increased public frustration with the UN. A(ii) A crisis in one mission may become a regional crisis, exposing missions to increased failure and safety and security risks.	Other UN agencies, e.g., WFP, FAO and OCHA, address concerns relating to food crises. Strengthening of CMOS situational awareness function allows forewarning for military guidance and advice to senior management. The C34 still to meet and decide on the Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities (ERDC); however, capacities of troop-contributing countries (TCC) with major stakeholders in troop deployment should be pursued. Concept of ERDC with key TCCs (with capabilities) will provide the mission with a regionally based response in extreme circumstances; however, the concept is not a mandate for peacekeeping operations to function on a regional basis.	Strategy	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
VI	**Policies and procedures**			**Possible**	**High**	**Higher Risk**
	E(i) Stringent and complex UN regulations and rules on procurement, human resources, finance, etc. that are geared more for stable, regular operations (e.g., UNHQ, OAHs) may not be suitable to the dynamic environments in which peacekeeping missions operate. This situation could result in inefficient operations, delayed deployment of missions, untimely response to crises, and/or hinder effective support to and functioning of peacekeeping operations.	The SG may exceptionally authorize extraordinary measures, where appropriate, to allow flexibility in administrative policies and procedures in the start-up phase of the mission.	Operational	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**

Risk Assessment of : DPKO

No	Focus Area:	Human Resource Management			Possible	High	Higher Risk
3	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
I	**Recruitment**			**Possible**	**High**	**Higher Risk**
	B(i) Failure to effectively balance the roles of the Executive Office in facilitating the decisions and actions of programme managers of DPKO and DFS on human resource matters, while ensuring compliance with applicable rules and regulations, may lead to ineffective support provided to DPKO and/or non-compliance with said rules and regulations.		Governance	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	E(i) Difficulties in recruiting qualified staff on time and retaining them may result in the improper performance of tasks, especially during start-up/surge period, and the inability to achieve mandates. E(ii) Slow recruitment and placement of staff in missions at the start-up phase may result in the missions' inability to handle the heavy workload during such phase. Additionally, as expectations are high during this period, slow placement of staff may cause the public to be disappointed. E(iii) System limitations with regard to recruiting (e.g., no logical search tool in Galaxy to shortlist candidates), with the volume of applicants (approximately half a million applicants), may delay the recruitment process.	DPKO and DFS are implementing a number of measures to address the risk, e.g., the creation of Senior Leadership Appointments Section, the deployment of Tiger (recruitment) teams to missions to help them speed up recruitment, head-hunting, etc.	Operational	Likely	High	**Higher Risk**

	Higher Risk	Possible	High		

3	**Focus Area:**	**Human Resource Management**				
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
	F(i) High turnover among staff and managers in DPKO and DFS, including staff going back and forth to the field, decreases the level of knowledge of rules and procedures, particularly with regard to the use of Galaxy, and can create delays in the completion of recruitment cases.	The Executive Office provides training and guidance to managers through a combination of direct support and workshops on the various elements of the staff selection process for Headquarters.	Human Resources	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	G(i) The lack of a standard staffing table module in the Integrated Information Management System (IMIS) may hamper the generation of reports for information and decision-making purposes.		Information Resources	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
II	**Training**			**Possible**	**Medium**	**Moderate Risk**
	F(i) Urgency of mission deployment may result in civilian personnel being deployed without pre-deployment training, which may adversely affect their ability to perform tasks effectively.	DPET conducts pre-deployment training for civilian personnel at the United Nations Logistics Base. This is sometimes strengthened, as the need arises, by support for in-mission training. All missions have training personnel that conduct mission-specific training. Integrated Training Service in DPET provides support to mission training personnel as needed.	Human Resources	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**

Risk Assessment of: DPKO

Focus Area: Programme and Project Management

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
7				Possible	High	Higher Risk
I	**Operational integration**			Possible	High	Higher Risk
	B(i) Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (vs. traditional operations) may present more operational challenges to Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), e.g., coordinating with relevant UN agencies and outside partners on responses to missions' or host government needs/requests, which may result in ineffective functioning or performance.		Governance	Possible	High	
	B(ii) Unclear and/or inconsistent definition of the relationship between the IOTs, other pre-existing working groups, and the members' respective parent offices, including with regard to authority and accountability, may result in confusion and the inability of the teams to operate effectively.	The IOT terms of reference are in draft.				
	B(iii) Unclear definition of tasks and authorities given to IOT leaders/members, as well as the Regional Directors, may result in confusion, redundancy, lack of accountability and the inability of the teams to operate effectively.	The IOT terms of reference are in draft.				

No	Focus Area: Programme and Project Management					
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	E(i) Slow reaction time by IOTs to address missions' concerns may result in missions and/or parent offices moving ahead without the IOTs' consensus or the benefit of the IOTs' collective knowledge. E(ii) The management of administrative functions, e.g., recruitment, budgeting, etc., by the Regional Directors and/or IOT leaders may negatively impact their substantive work (e.g., less time to focus on their substantive work).		Operational	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk
	F(i) Slow recruitment of specialists for the IOTs may delay the immediate functioning of the IOTs and may place undue pressure on the existing members who are performing multiple tasks (e.g., logistics officers covering for administrative officers not yet recruited). F(ii) Specialists recruited to IOTs who do not have the proper qualifications (e.g., language skills appropriate to the missions being supported) may result in the IOTs' ineffectiveness.		Human Resources	Likely	Medium	Higher Risk

05/09/2008

	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk

7 — Higher Risk

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	G(i) Lack of a formal mechanism to get and share information on missions operations may negatively affect the ability of the IOT to provide advice to and support missions and address their concerns. G(ii) Inadequate capacity to gather critical information relating to the local political environment affecting the peace processes that missions are supporting may result in the failure of the Office of Operations to give the appropriate advice to peacekeeping leaders, e.g., SRSGs, USG-PKO, SG, the Security Council.	DPKO has established a common e-mail account for each IOT. Collaboration websites/tools for on-line authoring of documents have been established for the Darfur IOT and are in-process for others. Teams are co-located and teambuilding and training are ongoing.	Information Resources	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk
II	**Public affairs**			**Possible**	**High**	**Higher Risk**
	B(i) Differing stances and/or tones of messages given by a mission's PIU and the Public Affairs Unit at HQ may result in inconsistent or potentially contradictory messages to the general public and the Member States.	The Public Affairs Unit and DPI are expanding their liaison with the missions' PIUs to ensure appropriate guidance is given and that all UN offices speak with one voice.	Governance	Possible	High	Higher Risk

No	Focus Area: Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
7	G(i) A late, incoherent, incomplete or inconsistent response to an event or media communication reflecting negatively on peacekeeping operations may result in unfavourable image of the UN among the general public and Member States.	A Public Information Working Group (PIWG) co-chaired by DPI and DPKO was established to coordinate consistent response to various media groups.	Information Resources	Possible	High	Higher Risk
	G(ii) Not adequately explaining key HQ initiatives to staff in the field (e.g., DPKO/DFS restructuring) may result in the non-alignment of strategic and operational objectives between HQ and missions.	The peacekeeping intranet has been expanded and provides the primary vehicle for internal communications and departmental messaging.				
	G(iii) Insufficient coordination of mission start-up activities between mission public information units (PIUs) and the responsible UNHQ department, e.g., DFS, may result in delays in deploying media equipment required for PIUs to become functional.	An officer in DFS with public information experience has been tasked with providing advice and guidance for public information components of missions starting up.				
	G(iv) Inadequate capacity of the Public Affairs Unit to capture, synthesize and communicate information about UN peacekeeping operations may result in an insufficient and/or untimely communication of information to the general public and Member States.	The Public Affairs Unit leverages existing capacity, such as field missions' PIUs, to monitor local press coverage of issues affecting missions.				
	G(v) Inability of the Public Affairs Unit to obtain timely, accurate and complete information, as information is not always made available or is difficult to obtain, may result in inappropriate responses and/or dissemination of inaccurate information which may affect the security of UN staff/premises and civilians as well as the image of the Organization.	The Public Affairs Unit works closely with their counterparts in the field, i.e., mission PIUs.				
III	Military affairs			Possible	High	Higher Risk

Focus Area: Programme and Project Management

05/09/2008

No 7	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
				Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(i) Insufficient direction or lack of strategic objectives from the Security Council (e.g., facilitate distribution of aid, provide security for camps for internally-displaced persons, etc.) may result in the military's inability to identify operational requirements for a peacekeeping operation. A(ii) The Security Council may authorize missions that are beyond the capability of military troops (including the deadline for the start-up of a mission) or deployment to places where there is no peace to keep, leading to unsuccessful missions.	During technical assessments, military viewpoints are raised to the appropriate level to provide necessary input. Military advice to senior management (Military Adviser to USG) is constantly provided at every opportunity. During technical assessments and briefings, military viewpoints are raised to the appropriate level to provide necessary input. Military advice is provided to the Security Council at every opportunity.	Strategy	Possible	High	Higher Risk

No	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
7	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	B(i) UN peacekeeping operations with other partners such as the European Union, African Union, NATO, etc., may complicate the command and control structure, blurring accountability and negatively affecting the performance and effectiveness of military troops. B(ii) Lack of structured measurement of TCC performance may result in accountability and governance issues, leading to ineffective and inefficient mission operations. B(iii) DPKO may not embrace the requirement to issue direction and guidance to peacekeeping operations, hampering the improvement of military guidance to Heads of the Military Component. Also, without such a requirement, missions may ignore guidance offered by OMA. B(iv) OMA may not have sufficient capacity to conduct military monitoring, information analysis for planning, threat/risk assessments, and crisis response, resulting in a lack of situational awareness that may affect OMAs ability to provide military advice and may affect the safety and security of deployed troops.	Participation in technical assessment missions (TAMs) and the provision of military advice to senior management helps to clearly define the command and control structure. Regular Mission Evaluations are performed, based on prior experience and through battalion comparisons. The Military Adviser and the USG visits the major missions approximately three times per year. Missions conduct theatre-based operational training and validation of unit and individual competencies is performed. Individuals and units who do not perform are repatriated. OMA strengthening has identified posts to bolster current capacities. The current restructuring and capacities allow for appropriate strategic military guidance to be provided to missions. OMA strengthening has identified posts to bolster current capacities. More military inspections and technical evaluations are performed.	Governance	Possible	High	Higher Risk

No	7					Possible	High	Higher Risk
	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management						
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	D(i) Fair market value of COE may be inflated or not be consistent between TCCs, resulting in financial losses to the Organization. D(ii) Slow repatriation of COE may result in the equipment being idle and in an added cost to the Organization for such equipment.	Training is performed to increase awareness and understanding of COE. Additionally, the training is emphasized to regional PKO Centres. PDVs are conducted with expertise to deploy appropriate capability. OMA continuously coordinates plans with missions to allow repatriation/rotation of COE. Regional based IOTs are used to increase overall situational awareness and to plan ahead.	Financial	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk

	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
7	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
No	E(i) Insufficient planning capacity and/or insufficient expertise (e.g., on maritime or aviation matters) may lead to the production of an ineffective military plan for a peacekeeping operation.	OMA uses the following capacities/ mechanisms, as needed: Strategic Military Cell (SMC) of UNIFIL; Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG); and Military and Police Advisers Community (MPAC) in NY drawn from missions.	Operational	Possible	High	Higher Risk
		OMA strengthening has identified posts to bolster current capacities.				
	E(ii) DFS or missions may not have military officers embedded in the UN integrated support services to plan, implement and monitor the use of military units, resulting in ineffective basing (e.g., the necessary preparations for the military to set-up their camps) and logistical support for the quick deployment of troops.					
	E(iii) TCCs may not be willing or able to contribute required military capability (personnel and equipment), resulting in missions' inability to fulfil requirements and mandates.	Military advice is provided to senior management and TCCs on DPKO requirements. Talking points are provided to the SG/USG highlighting the shortfalls to key member states. TCC briefings are provided to "friends" of the affected state.				
	E(iv) TCCs may apply caveats, terms and/or conditions (e.g., certain level of security and accommodation requirements) before agreeing to the deployment of their contingents or they may experience practical difficulties once they fully exploit their operational capability in the field, limiting the pool of TCCs and potentially preventing missions from deploying troops timely to all areas of missions' operations.	It is DPKO's policy not to accept TCC caveats. Additionally, for TCCs already deployed with caveats, DPKO will seek to have the caveats removed. If this fails, DPKO will replace them with another TCC.				

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	Focus Area: Programme and Project Management — OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
				Possible	High	Higher Risk
7	E(v) TCCs may not provide the required logistical data to the UN in a timely manner (e.g., load lists), resulting in the delayed deployment of military forces.	Early and detailed Pre-Deployment Visits (PDV) are performed. Training package is emphasized to regional PKO Centres. Assistance is provided to regional capacity building exercises such as PKO North & South conducted by US South Command and those run by the US Pacific Command.				
	E(vi) Contingent-owned equipment (COE) may not be deployed on time or wrong/unsuitable COE may be deployed, resulting in the failure or reduced ability of the military troops to perform their duties.					
	E(vii) Political constraints (e.g., host government preferences) may reduce the available TCCs from which to select, resulting in the generation of an ineffective force (including the selection of commanders in a timely manner) to implement the military plan.	Political constraints are usually not accepted. In the case where there is no other option but to accept, action is taken accordingly e.g., talking points (TPs) are provided to the SG/USG for high level diplomatic meetings with key TCCs.				
	E(viii) Demand for peacekeeping troops may be in excess of the available supply, hampering the Office of Military Affairs' (OMA) ability to generate an effective force to implement the military plan.	Military advice is provided to senior management and TCCs on DPKO requirements and member states capacities to meet these requirements. TPs are provided to the SG/USG which highlight the shortfalls to key member states. TCC briefings are provided to "friends" of the affected state.				

No	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
7	F(i) Slow or inefficient recruitment procedures may result in gaps in filling OMA posts and the failure to deliver the OMA mission.	Mission posts or augmented posts for stop-gap posts are used, at times, to bridge the gaps.	Human Resources	Possible	High	Higher Risk
	F(ii) Insufficient resources or backup for managing the force generation, rotation and repatriation processes may result in the Force Generation Service's (FGS) inability to meet its objectives.	The ongoing OMA's strengthening has identified the requirement for a number of posts to bolster current capacities.				
	F(iii) TCCs may not provide high quality personnel for secondment to the UNHQ, resulting in OMA's inability to maintain the right number and quality of OMA personnel.	Clear military standards of competencies for officers seconded to UNHQ and Services are included in vacancy announcements (VA) and are used to apply Competency Based Interview Skills techniques which aid in the assessment of officers. Selections are based on the competency of the candidate, as the critical priority.				
	F(iv) Candidates for contingent commander posts presented by the TCCs may not be the most qualified or best suited for the position, resulting in the selection of commanders who are unable to effectively lead the troops to meet the missions' objectives.	OMA interviews candidates and makes a selection. FGS performs an early vetting of candidates identified for interviews. To attract a wider base of candidates for interviews, the appropriate UN grade for appointment of senior military leadership is used.				

7	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	F(v) TCCs and senior military leaders may not be properly trained and up to date with peacekeeping development, resulting in poor quality troops and leaders which affect the performance and effectiveness of military components.	OMA adheres to the competency-based interviewing techniques to help ensure DPKO attracts the right personnel. Member states are invited to select more than one candidate for interviewing. Selection is based on the competency of the candidate. Selection process and appointment take place early, to enable the selected senior military leader to prepare for the post.				
	F(vi) Urgency of mission deployment may result in troops being deployed without pre-deployment training, which may adversely affect their ability to perform tasks effectively.	DPET provides training material, guidance and standards to TCCs. Generic and specialized training materials have been provided to Member States. DPET organizes training-of-trainers for Member States to enhance their capacity to conduct pre-deployment training. DPET also assists with matching more experienced TCCs with newer and emerging TCCs that may not have this capacity, so that the latter can benefit from available training of the former.				
	F(vii) Lack of a mechanism to assess troops to verify their qualification may result in the deployment and use of troops that cannot successfully meet the objectives of the mission.	PDVs and Technical Evaluation Visits (TEVs) are used to make sure capabilities can achieve the minimum standards prior to deployment. Member states are informally and formally approached to request that they provide capacity building to TCCs on a bilateral basis. Advice and assistance is provided to regional PKO Training Centres. Member states' assistance is sought in bilateral capacity building programmes such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI).				

Focus Area: Programme and Project Management

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
7				Possible	High	Higher Risk
	G(i) Lack of or inaccurate and untimely information, including the restricted information-sharing between signatories of peace agreements and UN contingents, may cause CMOS to prepare and use an invalid analysis of a situation, resulting in CMOS providing inappropriate advice, endangering the lives of the TCCs and/or UN personnel. G(ii) Insufficient information and analysis in support of military planning may result in the inability to identify the right military operational requirements for a peacekeeping operation.	Information analysis capacity exists within DPKO/OMA. Information analysis or Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield (IPB) capacities exist within OMA/DPKO. Information analysis or IPB capacities exist within OMA/DPKO.	Information Resources	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
IV	**Police operations**			Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
	A(i) Missions' police components may leave without appropriate long-term plans and/or before adequate structures are put in place, resulting in a vacuum which spoilers/opportunists may abuse to undo police reforms previously accomplished. A(ii) The Police Division may not be able to expand its sources/pool of police-contributing countries (PCCs), resulting in the Organization not being able to meet the increasing demand for police capacity in certain missions. A(iii) Competition with other international agencies, e.g., EU, NATO, etc., in recruiting senior officers may result in the lack of qualified police officers to carry out the missions' policing mandate.	Meetings are held with police contributing countries regularly and as needed. The USG and SG are engaged to discuss the issues during their meetings with the national authorities.	Strategy	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**

No	7	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management			Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**		**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**	
	D(i) Funding for state building capacity for police reforms, may not be available or adequate to execute programme objectives/tasks. D(ii) PCCs may not have financial resources to deploy Formed Police Units (FPUs) with necessary equipment, resulting in their inability to perform their duties.			Financial	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**	
	E(i) PCCs may not be willing or able to contribute required police capability (personnel and equipment), resulting in missions' inability to fulfil requirements and mandates. E(ii) Administrative tasks relating to drawing up or renewing the contract for individual police officers may be cumbersome and inefficient, resulting in delays in the recruitment of police officers. E(iii) FPUs may not be adequately trained in the use of weapons, resulting in safety and security risks.		The Police Division endeavours to complete the selection and recruitment of candidates as quickly as possible.	Operational	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**	

No	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
7	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
	E(iv) Urgency of mission deployment may result in police officers being deployed without pre-deployment training, which may adversely affect their ability to perform tasks effectively. E(v) Difficulties (e.g., there is a disincentive for police officers as UN service is not recognized in their national career path, shortage of national police, etc.) in recruiting and retaining qualified police officers may result in the inadequate performance of critical policing functions/mandates.	PCCs conduct pre-deployment training for their police personnel in national and regional training centres prior to deploying them to a peacekeeping operation. DPET provides training material, guidance and standards to PCCs. Generic and specialized training materials have been provided to Member States. DPET organizes training-of-trainers for Member States to enhance their capacity to conduct pre-deployment training. Additionally, a specific pre-deployment training package for police has been distributed to PCCs in the context of the UNAMID mission, but which can be used for other missions as well. DPET also assists with matching more experiences PCCs with newer and emerging PCCs that may not have this capacity, so that the latter can benefit from available training of the former. Efforts are made to identify qualified personnel and to establish a database of qualified police personnel. DPKO engages PCCs on a regular basis to discuss challenges such as this.				
	G(i) Inadequate capacity to gather critical information relating to the local political environment affecting the peace processes that missions are supporting may result in the failure of the Police Division to give the appropriate advice to peacekeeping leaders, e.g., SRSGs, USGs-DPKO/DFS, the Secretary-General, the Security Council.		Information Resources	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
V	**Conduct and discipline**			Possible	High	**Higher Risk**

No	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management					
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk	
	E(i) Practical challenges in addressing conduct and discipline issues involving military, police and civilian personnel may negatively affect the UN's reputation, which could also result in strained relations with host governments.	A working group comprised of DFS, the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) and PAU has been established to address communications challenges surrounding conduct and discipline. The CDU and the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of DPET have developed generic training modules on standards of conduct and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, to which all categories of peacekeeping personnel are orientated on arrival in a mission. CDUs in the missions complement these initiatives at the mission-level with a wide range of awareness-raising measures including poster campaigns, induction briefings, intranet websites, newsletters, radio broadcasts and mission-specific codes of conduct. In-mission training and other important issues, such as cultural sensitivity, child protection and gender equality, is also provided.	Operational	Possible	High	Higher Risk	
	E(ii) The poor handling of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by all entities involved (e.g., the force commanders, the missions, OMA, the TCCs, the contingent commanders, etc.) may contribute to the negative public perception of the Organization.	The subject of conduct and discipline is emphasized during the Heads of Military Components Conference & the Senior Leadership Induction Programme (SLIP). Individuals and units who misbehave or do not perform are repatriated, sending a clear message to T/PCCs.					

7	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	F(i) T/PCCs may not sufficiently educate their troops on the UN standards of conduct required of peacekeepers, e.g., zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), leading to increased SEA incidents that may negatively affect the reputation of the Organization.	Input is given to member state PKO Centres to help ensure the use of the appropriate training curriculum. Additionally, ITS provides standardized training materials and guidance to all T/PCCs on standards of conduct and measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse to assist them in preparing their personnel appropriately on how they are expected to behave once they are deployed in a UN field operation. OMA raises these issues during meetings and visits to TCCs.	Human Resources	Possible	High	Higher Risk
VI	Criminal law and judiciary advisory			Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk
	A(i) The Criminal Law & Judiciary Advisory Section's capacity, including technical expertise, may not be sufficient to provide support and guidance to peacekeeping missions for their national capacity-building programme. A(ii) Criminal law and judiciary activities may not be given high priority by the Member States and/or Security Council which may prevent them from being addressed/included in the mandate, as appropriate. A(iii) Lack of national capacity, e.g., technical capacity of judges, inadequate judicial infrastructure (court systems, prisons), etc., may adversely affect the ability of the Criminal Law & Judiciary Advisory Section to support missions in carrying out this aspect of their mandates.		Strategy	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk

	Higher Risk
	Possible	High

7	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management				Higher Risk
No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	B(i) The Criminal Law & Judiciary Advisory Section may not be adequately represented in IOTs, potentially leading to criminal law and judiciary advisory issues not being given adequate attention. B(ii) Lack of an integrated and coordinated approach at the mission level with UN system and external partners could lead to piecemeal approaches and gaps in fulfilling the criminal law and judiciary advisory aspects of peacekeeping mandates.		Governance	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	C(i) Lack of written policy, guidance and training materials in some criminal law and judiciary advisory areas may hamper the efficient and effective fulfilment of SC mandates.		Compliance	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	D(i) Funding for the state building capacity for criminal law and judiciary programmes may not be available or adequate to execute programme objectives/tasks.		Financial	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	E(i) Delays in deploying justice and corrections staff (against the backdrop of a successful, rapidly deployable UN standing police capacity) may prevent assistance efforts from commencing after mandate approval and can lead to imbalanced development of rule of law institutions (i.e., strong police without courts and prisons can be a real problem). E(ii) Deployment of experts and advisors without programmatic resources to address the basic needs of the host-country criminal law and judiciary institutions can be ineffective and can lead to resentment by national partners.	An inter-agency working group is studying the development of a standing rule of law capacity to cover justice, corrections and possibly other areas. DPKO includes some basic programmatic funding in assessed budgets for peacekeeping operations, is developing a rule of law and security institutions trust fund, and is increasing engagement with potential donors.	Operational	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**

No	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
7						
	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
VII	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)			Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(i) The DDR Section's capacity, including technical expertise, may not be sufficient to provide support and guidance to peacekeeping missions for their national capacity-building programme.	The DDR team has been expanded to ensure it is better able to support programmes. The team is working with the Interagency Working Group on DDR and with the Integrated DDR Training Group to establish training courses aimed at improving technical expertise in DDR. Joint rosters of staff are also envisaged.	Strategy	Possible	High	Higher Risk
	A(ii) The lack of political will, often resulting in insufficient cooperation and support from national partners, may adversely affect missions' ability to execute DDR programmes, which can result in ongoing threats to security, impede the cohesion of civil society, and undermine the sustainability of the peace process.	Some guidance on working with national partners has been provided in the Integrated DDR Standards.				
	A(iii) Lack of national capacity to carry out DDR programmes may adversely affect the ability of the DDR Section to support missions in carrying out this aspect of their mandates.	In-country training for staff/partners and capacity building programmes have been instigated in some countries where DPKO is supporting national DDR programmes. The requirement for such programmes has been highlighted by the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR and is to be addressed through their work plan 2008-2010.				

	Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
7	B(i) The DDR Section may not be adequately represented in IOTs, potentially leading to DDR issues not being given adequate attention. B(ii) Lack of an integrated and coordinated approach at the mission level with UN system and external partners could lead to piecemeal approaches and gaps in fulfilling the DDR aspect of peacekeeping mandates. B(iii) Difficulties in estimating the number of ex-combatants and the number and type of combatant weapons may make measuring success impossible.	The establishment of functioning Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC) in missions help to ensure that information on numbers of ex-combatants can be gathered, analyzed and that a more accurate picture can be rendered. The importance of pre-programme assessments which would look at gathering accurate information on the size and weaponry of armed groups has been highlighted in the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS).	Governance	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
	D(i) Funding for the reintegration aspect of DDR programmes may not be available or adequate to execute programme objectives/tasks.	The DDR Section has ensured that assessed contributions, which are used to fund disarmament and demobilization, also cover reinsertion programmes lasting up to 12 months. Increased coordination and joint planning with partners responsible for reintegration components ensure better linkages with reintegration programmes that are funded by voluntary contributions, including by assisting in fundraising for such programmes.	Financial	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**

7	Focus Area: Programme and Project Management			Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
	E(i) Difficulties in estimating the number of ex-combatants and the number and type of combatant weapons may result in not getting the right resources to implement DDR programmes.	The establishment of functioning JMAC in missions help to ensure that information on numbers of ex-combatants can be gathered, analyzed and that a more accurate picture can be rendered. The importance of pre-programme assessments which would look at gathering accurate information on the size and weaponry of armed groups has been highlighted in the IDDRS.	Operational	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
VIII	**Mine action**				Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	B(i) Lack of cooperation from national authorities with respect to access to potential sites for demining may hinder the United Nations Mine Action Service's (UNMAS) ability to carry out its mandate effectively. B(ii) DPKO/DFS' risk-averse mentality and lack of information on mine-cleared/uncleared areas, resulting in trying to clear vast areas, may lead to the sub-optimal use of resources.		Governance	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
	D(i) Funding for the state-building capacity for de-mining may not be available or adequate to execute programme objectives/tasks.		Financial	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
	F(i) The limited pool of qualified mine action specialists globally may limit UNMAS' ability to provide sufficient technical expertise to missions. F(ii) Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified de-mining staff with sufficient experience, expertise and language skills may result in the inadequate performance of critical functions/mandates.		Human Resources	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**
IX	**National security sector reform**			Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**

		Focus Area:	Programme and Project Management		Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**	
7	B(i) The execution of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme may not be adequately coordinated with other UN agencies, resulting in inefficiencies.	Various United Nations departments, offices, funds and programmes have provided diverse support in SSR, at the request of national governments and/or the Security Council. Also, the inter-agency SSR Task Force, co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP and comprised of members from DPA, OHCHR, Peace building Support Office, UNICEF, UNIFEM and UNODC, will continue to provide guidance to the SSR team. Furthermore, the many outputs of the inter-agency SSR programme plan (to be managed by the SSR team in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions but implemented by all SSR Task Force members) will serve the entire UN system in the area of SSR.	Governance	Remote	Low	Lower Risk	
	D(i) Funding for the state-building capacity for security sector reform may not be available or adequate to execute programme objectives/tasks.		Financial	Possible	Medium	**Moderate Risk**	
X	**Information management**			**Possible**	**Low**	**Lower Risk**	
	G(i) Improper marking, transmittal and storage of sensitive information may lead to security violations and breaches. G(ii) Information may not be handled or managed consistently across DPKO/DFS (e.g., different report structures/templates, making it difficult to consolidate information), resulting in inefficient and potentially ineffective support to decision-making processes.	Joint Archives and Records Management Section-DPKO development of the Peacekeeping Information Sensitivity Toolkit and related training sessions (slated for completion Q1 2009).	Information Resources	Possible	Low	Lower Risk	
XI	**Institutional strengthening**			**Possible**	**Medium**	**Moderate Risk**	

				Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
Focus Area:	**Programme and Project Management**					
7	B(i) Inadequate capacity may result in DPET's inability to conduct its core business of gathering and disseminating best practices and lessons learned, developing policy and other guidance for peacekeeping, conducting evaluations of peacekeeping programmes and sub-programmes, developing predictable frameworks for cooperating with peacekeeping partners and providing integrated training for peacekeeping.	Resources are provided by Member States through the intergovernmental financial bodies as well as directly through extra-budgetary funding while assessed contributions are the primary source of funding. DPET also solicits voluntary funding from donors to cover resource shortfalls. DPET works closely with Member States to ensure appropriate resource allocation for its programmes and sub-programmes.	Governance	Possible	Medium	Moderate Risk

Risk Assessment of : DPKO

No	Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)	OIOS Assessment	Risk Category	Likeli-hood	Impact	Overall Risk
10	**Focus Area:**	**Safety and Security**		**Possible**	**High**	**Higher Risk**
I	**Information/threat analysis**			**Possible**	**High**	**Higher Risk**
	B(i) Unclear division of responsibility between the SitCen and DSS with regard to handling security related events or threats may create confusion and may result in inefficient communication and response by the UN to events or threats.	DSS covers security threats to the UN while the SitCen covers the bigger, political picture. DSS and the SitCen work closely with one another, each having a desk officer that resides in the office of the other. Information is exchanged 24/7. Security focal point officers are resident in the OUSG DPKO and OUSG DFS to provide direct security advice to senior leadership in concert with dedicated DSS staff.	Governance	Possible	High	**Higher Risk**
	E(i) Inadequate backup systems in case of power outages may result in the SitCen's inability to function, especially during crises.	SitCen employs three levels of backup in New York. An emergency generator provides SitCen with power, which is bridged to emergency IT systems, allowing for normal operations if city-grid power fails in the Secretariat. A second-level redundancy requires SitCen's relocation to the DSS HQ in FF-1 (a practiced, procedural arrangement), which is powered by a city circuit separate from the Secretariat and accesses a different IT network. A redundant SitCen office arrangement exists at FF-1 in case of emergency. If required, the SitCen can operate at a reduced capacity through the use of cell phones, SAT-phones, and commercial IT arrangements.	Operational	Remote	High	**Moderate Risk**

	Focus Area:	Safety and Security		Possible	High	Higher Risk
No	**Interview/Review Summary (Description of risk)**	**OIOS Assessment**	**Risk Category**	**Likeli-hood**	**Impact**	**Overall Risk**
10	G(i) Inability of the Situation Centre (SitCen) to obtain timely, accurate and complete information, as information is not always made available or is difficult to obtain, may result in inappropriate responses and/or dissemination of inaccurate information which may affect the security of UN staff/premises and civilians and the image of the Organization. G(ii) Unclear security information requirements of DFS, as a result of the DPKO/DFS restructuring, may result in the SitCen not properly supporting DFS in its decision-making process during crises.	The SitCen works closely with their counterparts in the field, i.e., Joint Operation Centres. Although, at times, the SitCen may bypass the Joint Operations Centres to obtain information directly from the source, creating situations where the Centres may not be on the same page at times of urgency. In such cases, every effort is made to inform (back-brief) responsible offices on outcomes and re-establish appropriate lines of communication without delay. SitCen has developed further arrangements to accommodate the expanded requirements posed by DPKO/DFS restructuring. SitCen provides the same functions and services equally to both departments.	Information Resources	Likely	High	Higher Risk

Focus Areas

Focus areas are the key standard processes that are typically found in United Nations operations. These are categories established by the risk assessment framework to facilitate understanding and communicating common processes or functions within the Organization (common language). They are based on a categorization of objectives, using a hierarchy that begins with high-level objectives and then cascades down to objectives relevant to organizational units, functions, or business processes. The IAD risk assessment framework has identified eleven focus areas as follows:

1. Strategic Management and Governance
2. Financial Management
3. Human Resources Management
4. Procurement and Contract Administration
5. Logistics Management
6. Information Technology Management
7. Programme and Project Management
8. Conference and Documents Management
9. Property and Facilities Management
10. Safety and Security
11. Other areas (for areas not included in 1 to 10)

Each focus area may be broken down into sub-focus areas. Examples of sub-focus areas are listed below.

No.	Focus Areas	Examples of Sub Focus areas relating to principal focus
1	Strategic Management and Governance	Strategic planning and monitoring, Mandate and mission, Organizational structure and functions, Start up planning, Liquidation planning, Risk management, Policies and procedures, Governing/Legislative bodies, High level committees, Top level offices.
2	Financial Management	Accounting and financial reporting, Results-based Budgeting, Cash management, Treasury, Contributions, Fund raising, Payroll
3	Human Resources Management	Recruitment, Training, Conduct and discipline, Entitlements and allowances, Performance appraisal system and Medical Services, Use of short term staff (consultants, gratis personnel etc
4	Procurement and Contract Administration	Procurement planning, Procurement process, Local contracts committee, Administration of major contracts such as for fuel, rations, airfield services, medical supplies etc.
5	Logistics Management	Travel services, Transport operations, Air operations, Movement control, Fleet Management and Maintenance
6	Information Technology Management	Management of ICT infrastructure, software development, Communications services, ICT operations, Business continuity and disaster recovery, IT Security
7	Programme and Project Management	Management of programmes such as Rule of Law, Human Rights, Child Protection, Public Information, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Mine action, Protection of Civilians, Military and Civilian Police operations, and Logistics; Management of projects such as technical cooperation and quick impact projects
8	Conference and Documents Management	Records management, Publications, Editorial services, Conference management, Translation and interpretation services, Web sites
9	Property and Facilities Management	Management of office premises and facilities, Contingent-owned equipment, Expendable and non-expendable property, Building Services, Inventory management, Local Property Service Board
10	Safety and Security	Security of UN staff and installations, Contingency planning, Evacuation procedures and drills, Occupational safety
11	Other areas	This is for illustration purposes only and is not a comprehensive audit and is included for any other focus areas not specified in 1-10. This may include general office administration, executive offices and common services etc.

Risk Categories

Risk categories are common concerns or events, grouped together by the type of risk that will result.
The seven (7) risks used in OIOS Risk Assessment methodology are as follows:

A. Strategy
B. Governance
C. Compliance
D. Financial
E. Operational
F. Human Resources
G. Information Resources

| No.	Risk Category	Description
A	Strategy	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation arising from inadequate strategic planning, adverse business decisions, improper implementation of decisions, a lack of responsiveness to changes to the external environment, or exposure to economic or other considerations that affect the Organization's mandates and objectives.
B	Governance	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation as a result of failure to establish appropriate processes and structures to inform, direct, manage and monitor the activities of the Organization toward the achievement of its objectives. Includes attributes such as leadership, tone at the top, and promotion of an ethical culture in the Organization.
C	Compliance	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation from violations or non-conformance with, or inability to comply with laws, rules, regulations, prescribed practices, policies and procedures, or ethical standards.
D	Financial	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation resulting from: failure to obtain sufficient funding, funds being inappropriately used, financial performance being not managed according to expectations, or financial results being inappropriately reported or disclosed.
E	Operational	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation resulting from inadequate, inefficient or failed internal processes that do not allow operations to be carried out economically, efficiently or effectively.
F	Human Resources	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation resulting from a failure to develop and implement appropriate human resources policies, procedures and practices to meet the Organization's needs.
G	Information Resources	Impact on mandate, operations or reputation resulting from failure to establish appropriate information and communication systems and infrastructure so as to efficiently and effectively carry out the Organization's operations..

Risk Assessment Ratings

The OIOS Risk Assessment Framework evaluates the likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it will have if it occurs.
Based on the assessment of the two factors an overall risk rating is derived indicating whether the risk of a focus area is High, Moderate or Low. The ratings used are shown below:

Risk Likelihood

Likely	Conditions within our environment indicate that an event is expected to occur in most circumstances
Possible	Conditions within our environment indicate that an event will probably occur in many circumstances
Remote	Conditions within our environment indicate that an event may occur at some time

Risk Impact

High	Serious impact on operations, reputation, or funding status
Medium	Significant impact on operations, reputation, or funding status
Low	Less significant impact on operations, reputation, or funding status

Overall Risk Combinations Impact and Likelihood

Higher Risk	The identified issue represents the following likelihood and impact combinations: • Likely and high • Likely and medium • Possible and high
Moderate Risk	The identified issue represents the following likelihood and impact combinations • Likely and low • Possible and medium • Remote and high
Lower Risk	The identified issue represents the following likelihood and impact combinations • Possible and low • Remote and low • Remote and medium

05/09/2008

RISK SUMMARY PROFILE (Focus Area)

Risk matrix with Impact (Low, Medium, High) on the horizontal axis and Likelihood (Remote, Possible, Likely) on the vertical axis. Items plotted in the High Impact / Possible Likelihood cell:

- Strategic Management and Governance
- Human Resource Management
- Programme and Project Management
- Safety and Security

Axis labels: Impact, Likelihood

RISK SUMMARY PROFILE (Sub Focus Area)

05/09/2008

Likelihood (vertical axis): Likely, Possible, Remote

Impact (horizontal axis): Low, Medium, High

Labels in the Possible / High (red) cell:
- Strategic: Mandates
- Strategic: Strategic planning and monitoring
- Strategic: Organizational structure and functions
- Strategic: Start-up/planning
- Strategic: Policies and procedures
- HR: Recruitment
- Prog: Public affairs
- Prog: Military affairs
- Prog: Police operations
- Prog: Operational integration
- Prog: Conduct and discipline
- Prog: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Safety: Information/threat analysis

Labels in the Possible / Medium (yellow) cell:
- Strategic: Risk management
- HR: Training
- Prog: Criminal law and judiciary advisory
- Prog: Mine action
- Prog: National security sector reform
- Prog: Institutional strengthening

Labels in the Possible / Low (green) cell:
- Prog: Information management