
A rigorous, closed-form characterisation of adversarial generalisation errors.



A High Dimensional Statistical Model for Adversarial Training: Geometry and Trade-Offs

Problem Setup

Binary Classification Setting:

• Training data $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \{-1, +1\}$ • Probit model with noise parameter $\tau > 0$

High-dimensional limit: d, n → ∞ with fixed α = n/d
Structured data with block features: covariance matrices Σ_x, Σ_δ, Σ_v, Σ_θ are

block diagonal with k blocks of sizes d_1, \ldots, d_k **Metrics of Interest:**

• Generalisation Error:

 $E_{\text{gen}} = \mathbb{E}_{y, x} \big[\mathbb{1}(y \neq \hat{y}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}, x)) \big]$ • Adversarial Generalisation Error:

$$E_{\text{adv}} = \mathbb{E}_{y,x} \left[\max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_{\Sigma_{\boldsymbol{v}}^{-1}} \leq \varepsilon_g} \mathbb{1}(y \neq \hat{y}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}, \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta})) \right]$$
• Boundary Error:

 $E_{\rm adv} = E_{\rm gen} + E_{\rm bnd}$

where
$$E_{\rm bnd}$$
 are the attackable samples.
• Usefulness and Robustness:
$$\mathcal{U}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_0} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}}[\mathbf{y}\boldsymbol{\theta}_0^\top \mathbf{x}]$$

 $\mathcal{R}_{m{ heta}_0} = rac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \mathbb{E}_{m{x},m{y}} \Bigg[\inf_{\|m{\delta}\|_{m{\Sigma}_{m{z}}^{-1}} \leq m{arepsilon}_g} m{y} m{ heta}_0^ op (m{x} + m{\delta}) \Bigg]$

$$\mathcal{R}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{0}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}, y} \left[\inf_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_{\Sigma_{v}^{-1}} \leq \varepsilon_{g}} y \boldsymbol{\theta}_{0}^{\top} (\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) \right]$$
Adversarial ERM:
$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} g \left(y_{i} \frac{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}}{\sqrt{i}} - \varepsilon_{t} \frac{\sqrt{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\delta} \boldsymbol{\theta}}}{\sqrt{i}} \right) + r(\boldsymbol{\theta})$$
(6)

Main Result

Theorem: Adversarial generalization errors are provably characterized by a system of 8 order parameters $(m, q, V, P, \hat{m}, \hat{q}, \hat{V}, \hat{P})$ and an additional parameter

$$E_{\text{gen}} = \frac{1}{\pi} \arccos\left(m/\sqrt{(\rho + \tau^2)q}\right)$$

$$E_{\text{bnd}} = \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_g \frac{\sqrt{A}}{\sqrt{q}}} \operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{-\frac{m}{\sqrt{q}}\nu}{\sqrt{2(\rho + \tau^2 - m^2/q)}}\right) \frac{e^{-\frac{\nu^2}{2}}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} d\nu$$
(8)

Implications

Trade-off between Usefulness Robustness

• Usefulness relates to generalisation error Robustness relates to boundary error


• Trade-off emerges when protecting useful but non-robust features **Key Bounds:**

$$E_{\text{gen}} \geq \frac{1}{\pi} \arccos\left(\sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2\rho}} \mathcal{U}_{\theta_0}\right)$$

$$E_{\text{bnd}} \leq 2\mathsf{T}\left(\varepsilon_g \mathcal{A} \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{A}^{-1}\right) - \frac{1}{\pi} \arctan\left(\mathcal{A}^{-1}\right) - \frac{1}{\pi} \operatorname{erf}\left(\frac{\varepsilon_g \mathcal{B}}{\sqrt{2}}\right) \operatorname{erfc}\left(\frac{\varepsilon_g \mathcal{A} \mathcal{B}}{\sqrt{2}}\right)$$
(10)

Directional Defences and structured data

Key Finding: The choice of defense strategy significantly impacts adversarial performance:



Impact of different defense strategies on generalization (E_{gen}) and boundary (E_{bnd}) errors


- Defending robust features: Low E_{gen} but high E_{bnd}
 Uniform defense: Better balance, improves overall E_{adv}
- **Defending non-robust features**: Increases E_{gen} while decreasing E_{bnd}

Analytical Result: For structured data with two feature blocks, we prove that protecting non-robust features:

- Always increases E_{gen} and decreases E_{bnd}
- Can improve E_{adv} when attack size is small enough

Tradeoff directions and innocuous directions

Key Insight: The geometry of features determines whether adversarial training leads to a trade-off:




Impact of adversarial training on features with different geometries

Two Distinct Cases:


- Innocuous Features (orthogonal to teacher):
 - Attack can be completely neutralized - E_{adv} → E_{gen} as $ε_t$ increases
 - $E_{bnd} \rightarrow 0$ with sufficient training
- Trade-off Features (aligned with teacher): - Fundamental trade-off between E_{gen} and E_{bnd}
- Optimal performance at specific ε_t - Requires careful hyperparameter tuning

Data Dependent Regularisation

Key Finding: Adversarial training can be approximated as a data-dependent regularisation:



Adversarial training is not just an ℓ_2 regularisation



Learning curves for adversarial training (top) and its regularisation approximation (bottom)

Approximate Loss:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} g\left(y_{i} \frac{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \boldsymbol{x}_{i}}{\sqrt{d}}\right) + \tilde{\lambda}_{1} \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\delta} \boldsymbol{\theta}} + \tilde{\lambda}_{2} \boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\delta} \boldsymbol{\theta}$$

$$(11)$$

Key Properties:

- Not just ℓ_2 : Performance depends on ε_t even with optimal λ
- Non-sparse: $\sqrt{\ell_2}$ term provides linear scaling in the norm of the student

• Effective Regularisation: is a directional $\sqrt{\ell_2} + \ell_2$ regularisation vector without sparsity

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