

# Introduction to Information Security

— Digital Signature, One-Way Hash & MAC

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# Outlines

- Digital Signature
- One-way hash function
- Message Authentication Code, MAC
- PGP

# Concepts of Digital Signature

# What does Cryptography do and not do?

- Cryptography solved the issue :
  - The communication of A and B can't be seen by others!
- However, encryption/decryption can't prevent deceiving :
  - If Alice has sent Bob a message, the dispute between them may be :
    - Bob fabricate a different message and declare that he has received for Alice ;
    - Alice can deny sending the message and Bob can't prove Alice has sent the message.
- How do we solve this problem in daily life ?
  - How a contract can be accepted by the court?
  - Doing something which needs the approval of the supervisor or the organization, how can we prove that we have got the approval?
- **The Signature**

# Characters and Requirements of Digital Signature

- Handwritten signature's features?
  - Signature is credible, the recipient believe that the signer signed the document carefully
  - Signature can't be fabricated
  - Signature can't be reusable
  - Signed document can't be changed
  - Signature is an undeniable
  - In some cases, the signature and time are bound
  - Signature can be legal evidence , and can be proved
- Similar: the seal, fingerprint

# Characters and Requirements of Digital Signature

- Obviously, we can't use handwritten signature on digital documents. So, we need the **digital signature**.
- Requirements of a digital signature system:
  - Can be bound with the signed document
  - Recipient can verify the signature, and any other person can not forge signature
  - Signer can not deny his signature
  - Signature must be confirmed by a third-party for settlement of disputes
  - Verify the author, date and time, content of the signature

# The requirements of digital signatures

- Digital signatures must rely on the signed message
  - Relate to the contents to prevent modify.
- Digital signature must use the unique information for the sender to prevent fabrication and denial
  - Only known by the sender, so it can't be faked and the sender can't deny.
- Digital signature's generation, identification and authentication must be relatively simple
  - The signature must be able to generated and verified in a short time.
- Fabricate a digital signature is not feasible in the calculation
  - Can't be faked.
- Keep a backup of digital signatures is feasible
  - Can be stored(e.g. can't be larger than the original documents)



# Digital Signature Algorithm


- Public key cryptography support the “Digital Signature” natively.
- **DSS/DSA, Digital Signature Standard**
  - American National Standard, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), standardized in 1991
  - utilizing the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms
  - strongly promoted by the U.S. government
- **RSA**
  - RSA , widely supported by the industry, is actually the industry standard
- **Elliptic curve**



# Digital Signature Workflow

## Attention:

- During encryption:
  - Sender **encrypts** using the **receiver's public key**
  - Receiver **decrypts** using **his private key**
- During signature
  - Sender **signs** using **his private key**
  - Receiver **verifies** the signature using the **sender's public key**



# RSA signature example

- Key generation :
  - Bob:
    - Choose two prime numbers:  $p = 5, q = 11, n = p \cdot q = 55, (p-1) \cdot (q-1) = 40$
    - Find  $e=3$  and  $d=27$ , so:  $3 \times 27 \equiv 1 \pmod{40}$
    - Bob's key: public key:  $(3, 55)$ , private key:  $27$
  - Bob is going to sign on a document where  $m = 19$ 
    - He uses his private key  $d = 27$  to calculate the digital signature of  $m = 19$ :  $s = m^d \bmod n = 19^{27} \bmod 55 = 24$ .
    - Attached  $24$  to the document, then :  $(m, s) = (19, 24)$  Representing that the document is  $19$  and Bob's signature to it is  $24$ .
    - Bob sent this document to Alice
  - Alice or a third-party, to verify the signature :
    - Receiving a plaintext and the signature  $(m, s) = (19, 24)$
    - Check book to find Bob's public key  $(e, n) = (3, 55)$
    - Computing :  $t = s^e \bmod n = 24^3 \bmod 55 = 19$
    - Compare  $t$  and  $m$  whether they are equal, If equal, then  $(19, 24)$  must be the document signed by Bob.

# Any problems?

- In the previous example, the document  $m$  must be an integer of  $[0 .. n-1]$ 
  - If the document is very long, how to sign?
- For a very long document, signing requires the use of **one-way hash algorithm**
  - We do not sign the document. Instead we get the hash value of documents, and then we sign hash value.

# One-Way Hash Algorithm

*Also called Cryptographic hash function*

# One-way hash algorithm

- A one-way hash algorithm hash an input document to about 100 bit output
- Given a one-way hash algorithm  $H(.)$  we have:
  - Input:  $m$  — Binary string of arbitrary length
  - Output:  $H(m)$  — Binary string of size  $L$
  - Given  $H(.)$ ,  $L$  is fixed:
    - In MD5,  $L=128$
    - In SHA-1,  $L=160$

# One-way hash algorithm

- A good one-way hash algorithm  $H(.)$  needs the following characteristics:
  - **Easy to compute**: Given any document  $m$ ,  $H(m)$  can be computed quickly;
  - **Difficult to reverse computing**
    - Namely given any hash value  $h$ , find any document  $m$ , making  $H(m) = h$ , is not feasible in computing.
  - Any algorithm, meeting above 2 requirements, can be considered "**one-way**";
  - **Difficult to find collision**
    - Finding any two documents,  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ , to make  $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$  is computationally infeasible

# Common one-way hash algorithm

- MD4、MD5 (R. Rivest, 1992)
- SHS (secure hashing standard, USA, 1992, modified in 1995):
- SHS(SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2)
- HAVAL (Y. Zheng, 1992)
- RIPEMD (D. Hans, 1996)
- More info:  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic\\_hash\\_function](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function)





# MD5 Algorithm


Two steps: Padding and Hashing

## Padding :

- MD5 handles segments of length 512, so the input string should be padded to multiple-512 sized segments(16 32-bits little-endian integers).
- Padding procedure :
  - Pad a bit '1'
  - Pad "0" until a multiple of 512 minus 64 bits
  - Pad the bit length of the original string to the last 64 bits

## Hashing :

- MD5 handles a 128 bit string recursively, the initial value is the fixed constant, dividing the 128 bit string to 4 32-bit-length integers(A,B,C,D)
- Using four different non-linear functions F (downright) loop 16 times each.
-  : Addition ( mod  $2^{32}$  )
-  : Shift left s bit
- M<sub>i</sub>: 32-bit substring in the 512-bit string
- K<sub>i</sub>: variant constant in each loop



$$F(X, Y, Z) = (X \wedge Y) \vee (\neg X \wedge Z)$$

$$G(X, Y, Z) = (X \wedge Z) \vee (Y \wedge \neg Z)$$

$$H(X, Y, Z) = X \oplus Y \oplus Z$$

$$I(X, Y, Z) = Y \oplus (X \vee \neg Z)$$

$\oplus$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ ,  $\neg$  denote the XOR, AND, OR and NOT operations respectively.

# Security of One-way Hash Algorithms

- Security evaluation of one-way hash algorithm:
  - **Preimage attack:** tries to find a message that has a specific hash value
    - **preimage resistance:** for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input that hashes to that output; i.e., given  $y$ , it is difficult to find an  $x$  such that  $h(x) = y$ .
    - **second-preimage resistance:** it is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as that of a specified input; i.e., given  $x$ , it is difficult to find a second preimage  $x' \neq x$  such that  $h(x) = h(x')$ .
  - **Collision attack:** tries to find two inputs producing the same hash value
    - Find two different messages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  such that  $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$ .
    - More generally, **chosen-prefix collision attack:** Given two different prefixes  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , find two appendages  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  such that  $\text{hash}(p_1 \parallel m_1) = \text{hash}(p_2 \parallel m_2)$ , where  $\parallel$  denotes the concatenation operation.

# Attack of One-Way Hash Algorithm

- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash\\_function\\_security\\_summary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_function_security_summary)
- 王小云 (2004/2005) find the collide algorithm of MD5、HAVAL—128、MD4、RIPEMD、SHA-1

## Preimage resistance [edit]

Main article: [Preimage attack](#)

Hash function	Security claim	Best attack	Publish date
MD5	$2^{128}$	$2^{123.4}$	2009-04-27
SHA-1	$2^{160}$	45 of 80 rounds	2008-08-17
SHA256	$2^{256}$	43 of 64 rounds ( $2^{254.9}$ time, $2^6$ memory)	2009-12-10
SHA512	$2^{512}$	46 of 80 rounds ( $2^{511.5}$ time, $2^6$ memory)	2008-11-25
SHA-3	Up to $2^{512}$		
BLAKE2s	$2^{256}$	2.5 of 10 rounds ( $2^{241}$ )	2009-05-26
BLAKE2b	$2^{256}$	2.5 of 12 rounds ( $2^{481}$ )	2009-05-26

# Attack of One-Way Hash Algorithm

MD5 and SHA-1 were the most widely used one-way hash algorithm before 2009, and they were used in a lot of security related computer product. The “cryptographic break” of them led to many severe security issues:


- In 2008, MD5 collision is used to attack SSL
  - <http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>
  - Attackers aimed at the security infrastructure, PKI and CA, of SSL, and they can forge SSL certificate.
  - Any services, including E-commerce, E-Bank, E-trading and so on, using HTTPS/SSH protocol will be affected by the vulnerabilities.
- In 2009, US-CERT considered that MD5 “should be considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use”
- The US government are mandated to using SHA-2 from 2010

# NIST hash function competition

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST\\_hash\\_function\\_competition](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_hash_function_competition)

- Started @2007.11.2
- During 2008: 64 algorithms were submitted before 2008.10, and 51 of them were selected as the 1<sup>st</sup> round candidates.
- During 2009: 14 algorithms were selected as the 2<sup>nd</sup> round candidates, and those algorithm had been public reviewed for 1 years
- During 2010: 5 algorithms were selected into the 3<sup>rd</sup>, i.e. the last round in 2010.12
- On 2012.10.2, Keccak algorithm was selected as the winner of the competition.
- On 2015.8.5, A version of this algorithm became a FIPS standard under the name SHA-3.

# The procedure of signature for long plain text






# MAC



# Message Authentication Code

- MAC, Message authentication code, also called “keyed hash function”
- Message Integrity Service
- Normal MAC algorithms:
  - HMAC
  - CBC-MAC
  - UMAC
  - CMAC
  - VMAC
  - Poly1305-AES
  - MMH-Badger MAC




More info: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message\\_authentication\\_code](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code)

# HMAC

- Hash-based message authentication code
- Definition (RFC 2014) :
  - $H()$ : one-way hash function
  - $K$ : Pad "0" until the key with the size of  $H()$  input block
  - $m$ : message want to be authenticated
  - $\parallel$ : connect,  $\oplus$ : XOR
  - $opad$ : outer padding (0x5c5c5c...5c5c, const in a block size)
  - $ipad$ : inner padding (0x363636...3636, const in a block size)
  - So :  $HMAC(K, m) = H((K \oplus opad) \parallel H((K \oplus ipad) \parallel m))$ .
- Use different one-way hash function to construct different HMAC algorithm :
  - HMAC-MD5
  - HMAC-SHA1
  - HMAC-SHA256
- HMAC is more difficult to occur a collision than one-way hash function, so HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 doesn't have security problems due to the vulnerability of MD5 and SHA1.
  - Until now, HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 are safe enough, and they are the core components of IPSec and TLS.

# CBC-MAC

- cipher block chaining message authentication code




- CBC-MAC computing :
  - Encryption algorithm  $E()$ , use key  $k$  to encrypt plaintext  $m_i$ ;
  - Divide plaintext  $m$  into  $x$  parts  $(m_1, \dots, m_x)$ , the length of every part is equals to the input size of  $E()$
  - $O_0 = 0x00000000 \dots 00$
  - For  $i = 1 \dots x$ :
    - $O_i = E_k(O_{i-1} \text{ XOR } m_i)$
  - $O_x$  is the final authentication code MAC

# Difference of MAC & Digital Signature

- MAC: the sender and receiver need to share a “secret” key
  - MAC can only be verified by special receiver.
  - MAC doesn't provide service of “Undeniable”: all the person who can verify the confidentiality of message can also generate a MAC.
- Digital Signature: needn't to share any “secret” information
  - Digital Signature can be verified by all the receiver who have the sender's public key;
  - Digital Signature provide service of “ Undeniable”
- Why not always DS? When do we use MAC?
  - MAC is much faster than DS
  - Undeniability is not always required

# Combination of MAC & Cryptography



# Introduction of PGP

# PGP — Pretty Good Privacy

- Widely used in e-mail and file storage security applications, provide the following services:
  - digital signature; integrity verification; information encryption
  - data compression; email format compatibility; data striping
- Support multiple platforms (DOS/Windows、 Unix、 Macintosh etc.)
  - Used to be free in early versions, but need to pay for use now
  - The source code is free ...
- Based on proven security-related algorithms
  - RSA、 DSS、 Diffie-Hellman、 CAST-128、 IDEA、 3DES、 SHA—1、 MD5
  - PGP integrates these algorithms together and forms a common applications independent from the OS and hardware.
- Father of PGP — Phil Zimmermann
- Reference :
  - <http://www.philzimmermann.com/ZH/faq/index.html>
  - <http://www.symantec.com/pgp>
  - <https://www.gnupg.org>






# History of PGP

- In 1991, Phil Zimmermann wrote the first PGP encryption software, providing the commercial version, free non-commercial version, and contains all the source code.
- In February 1993, PGP encryption software was investigated by the U.S. government with violations of export control laws --At that time United States export control laws does not allow software key more than 40 bit to be exported -- PGP never use encryption whose key less than 128 bit
- In 1995, "PGP Source Code and Internals", MIT Press
- In July 1997, Zimmermann and the company PGP Inc. Submitted OpenPGP standard to the IETF. In December 1997, PGP Inc. is purchased by NAI (Network Associates, Inc.) , and NAI refuse to continue opening the source code
- In February 2002, NAI stopped technical support for PGP products; NAI is now McAfee
- In August 2002, the early members of PGP development team formed a new company, PGP Corporation, and the purchase intellectual property rights of PGP from NAI
- In April 2010, PGP Corporation was acquired by Symantec for a price of U.S. \$ 370 million. PGP no longer provide separate software. Its functionality is integrated into Symantec's security software.

# PGP Secure Mode



# Reviews

- The concepts, characteristics and method of digital signatures
- Concepts of one-way hash algorithm
  - MD5 Algorithm
  - Attack of One-way hash algorithm
- Concepts of MAC
  - CBC-MAC
  - HMAC
- PGP