§ 3 §

ETHNICITY

Including the "Four Barbarians" in "China"?

How Early Modern China Became a "Nation"

In his *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (1958), the American scholar Joseph Levenson made a sweeping conclusion about China's transition into the early modern world: "In large part the intellectual history of modern China has been the process of making a *guojia* [nation] of *Tianxia* [All-under-Heaven]." This argument, which was later summarized as "from All-under-Heaven to nation," demonstrated that China was forced out of its traditional imperial order of All-under-Heaven and the tribute system (which took China as the center of the world) and into a new, modern international order in which the myriad states had parity with one another.[1] According to this argument, China was also forced to leave behind its Confucian civilizational ideals in favor of the universal standards of the early modern West. There is no question that the so-called arrival of the West was the most important factor in these changes. From the cultural influence of Western missionaries to the Western gunboats of the late Qing era, the early modern West's political institutions, science and technology, and ideas about culture gradually wrought vast changes on China and China's sense of itself.[2]

These changes resulting from "(Western) stimulus" and "(Chinese) response," however, are just one part of China's early modern transition. Indeed, China was a vast, traditional empire, but its transition to an early modern nation-state, which itself was fated by history, was different from all other countries, including its neighbors, such as Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. I believe that what sets China apart most clearly from other countries in its transition is not just the process of moving from All-under-Heaven to nation-state but also "bringing the Four Barbarians into China" (*na si Yi ru Zhonghua*), a process that in itself is worthy of discussion. In other words, with the territory inherited from the Qing Empire and the ethnic groups that lived there, modern China attempted to bring the many ethnic groups on its periphery into a single "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*) and eventually became a (multi)national modern empire or nation-state.

If we do not pay adequate attention to the interrelatedness of the processes of "moving from All-under-Heaven to the myriad states" and "bringing the Four Barbarians into China," then we have no way to understand what this "China" is now. In this chapter, then, what I want to explain further is how that very complicated process by which modern China was simultaneously forced to move "from All-under-Heaven to the myriad states" and attempted to "bring the Four Barbarians into China" has a close relation to other important historical factors.

First, the sensibility concerning "unification" (*yi tong*) and the concept of "China" that came from the world of traditional Chinese thought unquestionably bore a great influence on how Chinese politicians and educated people attempted to rebuild "China."

Second, even if this sensibility concerning unification and the concept of "China" was influential, what is more important is that the expansion of the Great Qing Empire out toward the "Four Barbarians" was the key factor that later led to a host of problems. Because the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China inherited the Qing's national groups and domains, any discussion of "China's" territory, peoples, or identity must take into account the history of the Qing dynasty.

Third, in any discussion of "China's" nations, territories, or similar questions, the international background is crucial. The Japan factor may

be more important than the West, however, because the challenges that came from Japan beginning in 1894 always served as the most important backdrop against which people came to understand questions related to "China's" territory, peoples, and identity.

Because of limited space in this chapter I can only attempt to look at modern China from the perspective of history, especially the history of scholarship. I examine how politicians, historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists from the late Qing period to the Republican period attempted to "bring the Four Barbarians into China" and establish discourses concerning "China" (*Zhongguo*) and the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) at the same time as they faced the question of the transition from All-under-Heaven to the myriad states.[3]

"Five Nations under One Union" and "Driving Out the Barbarians": Debates about Rebuilding "China" in the Late Qing

Some of the events concerning the reconstruction of "China" during the late Qing and early Republic that I discuss here were already treated briefly in the Introduction. Some readers may be familiar with these events, but I will review them once more.[4]

After a series of upheavals that included the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860), the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Hundred Days' Reform (1898), and the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901), by the beginning of the twentieth century the Great Qing Empire was battered by storm winds from all directions, as the great Western powers and Japan applied pressure from outside that would dismember the Qing state, and, in the domestic sphere, revolutionaries began to question the legitimacy of the Qing dynasty itself. Beginning in 1901, Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) and others repeatedly made the point that China originally belonged to the descendants of the mythical Flame Emperor and Yellow Emperor. The "Eastern Hu," they argued, had "invaded the lands inside of the Great Wall, stolen the emperor's seal, and cast their poison throughout China (*Zhonghua*)."[5] The "Eastern Hu" that Zhang referred to were the Manchus. He argued that the Manchus and the Han were not of the same race, and that the Manchus' "lan-

guage, political beliefs, food, drink, and dwellings were all different from those of China."[6] In his view, then, the overthrow of the Ming dynasty had made China a "lost state" (*wang guo*).[7] His views were an important line of thought at the time, as revolutionaries who were Zhang's contemporaries understood Han nationalism to be a key force for overthrowing the Qing dynasty. Examples of this thinking can be found in *The Revolutionary Army* (*Geming jun,* 1903) by Zou Rong (1885–1905) and *An Alarm to Awaken the World* (*Jing shi zhong*) by Chen Tianhua (1875–1905),[8] both of which promoted this type of nationalism.

Looking back across history, we see that this nationalism was a new form of thinking about distinctions between Chinese and foreigners that had been gradually taking shape since the Song dynasty. Unlike the Tang dynasty, which "mixed together all in one country, containing both Chinese and foreign," the people of the Song dynasty came to believe that Chinese and foreigners need not be involved with one another. According to the Song-dynasty scholar Fan Zuyu (1041–1098), the Tang dynasty's pursuit of a "massive and boundless" empire that "wished to make Chinese and foreign into one" could only "gain empty renown while encountering very real problems."[9] From this time on, aside from the Mongol Yuan dynasty and the Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese empires from the Song through the Ming all followed the strategy of limiting China to a Han-ethnic dynasty. In the late Qing, this strategy transformed into Han nationalism. Following the global trends of their era, those anti-Qing revolutionaries who supported Han nationalism were certain that "today is undoubtedly the era of nationalism."[10] In establishing a new Republic of China, therefore, they believed that it was necessary to drive out foreign races. According to "The Meaning of the Republic of China" (*Zhonghua minguo jie*), an essay by Zhang Taiyan, that which is called "China" must stand apart from the "Four Barbarians,"[11] by which Zhang meant not only Manchuria but also Tibet, Mongolia, and Muslim-majority areas in the west (*Hui bu*)—he believed there was no need to include these places in the Republic of China. Following this line of thought, then, the Republic of China established after the revolution would be like the Song and Ming dynasties, a nation-state based on the Han ethnicity, while its territories would return to roughly that of the fifteen provinces of the Ming dynasty.

Another line of thought emerged, however, from people who were later called the Protect the Emperor group (*Baohuang pai*) or the conservative camp. Also in 1901, Liang Qichao published his "Overview of Chinese History" (*Zhongguo shi xulun*), which argued that the Miao, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Tungusic races should be included in Chinese history along with the Han, and thus should also be a part of "China." To keep readers from questioning the unique phenomenon of a multinational state, Liang Qichao was keen to point out that nations across history were constantly changing and merging with one another, and that the Han people were never originally a single unit. He also asked a rhetorical question: Although the Han people claim that they are the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, does this mean that "they are all from the same family lineage?"[12] In fact, it was not that Liang Qichao disapproved of nationalism, but that, unlike Zhang Taiyan, he did not see nationalism as a force for domestic, race-based revolution. Instead, he saw it as a comprehensive program that could be used to resist imperialist forces from outside.[13] In 1903, Jiang Zhiyou (1866–1929) published an essay titled "A History of Nations in Chinese Antiquity" (*Zhongguo shanggu jiu minzu zhi shiying*) in the thirty-first issue of *The New People's Miscellany* (*Xin min cong bao*), a journal edited by Liang Qichao. Jiang's essay drew from work by Japanese scholars and agreed with them that the Miao peoples were the earliest inhabitants of China, and that the Han were a foreign people who arrived later. Jiang Zhiyou was not really giving full support to this idea that the Miao came before the Han. He was more interested in supporting the idea of historical evolution and a model of survival of the fittest. He also implied that there was no need to cling stubbornly to the traditional idea of a Han-ethnic "China." Finally, he was trying to push people in modern China to summon up the rough-and-ready spirit of the ancient Han people and wash away the many humiliations that had befallen China.[14] In 1905, Liang Qichao also published "An Investigation of the Chinese Nation across History," which emphasized that the Han-ethnic group, which was commonly referred to as the "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*), was not an individual national group with a single bloodline, but rather had been formed through the intermingling of many national groups. "From the beginning," Liang argued, "the Chinese nation that we see today was in fact formed through the intermingling of a great

number of nations."[15] In the same year as Liang Qichao's essay, Jiang Zhiyou published another piece, "An Investigation of the Chinese Race," which praised the thesis put forward by the French scholar Terrien de Lacouperie (1844–1894) that the Chinese race had "come from the West." Jiang used this Western origins thesis to pick apart stubborn ideas held by Han Chinese and to call on them to bring back broad-minded thinking and restore an atmosphere of tolerance.[16] The version of "China" that Liang Qichao imagined would include both the original lands of the eighteen provinces as well as its dependent territories, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Muslim-majority areas, and Tibet. Liang argued that "China is by nature a state made through grand unification, with the unification of races, languages, literatures, and morals and ethics."[17]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, these two ways of thinking that had emerged from the revolutionary camp and the conservative camp were locked in constant battle. It is of great significance that, less than ten years later, although the extreme Han nationalism of the revolutionary camp had to a certain degree helped the revolutionaries to overturn the Qing dynasty, no one who took the reins of political power in China was willing to risk being blamed for allowing the country to be broken up or have territories cut away. Even revolutionaries had no way to rely completely on military force to resolve the question of the transfer of political power, and therefore they could accept only certain compromises. For these reasons, the establishment of a new nation under the banner of the Republic of China adopted strategies put forward by the conservative camp. The abdication edict from the last Qing emperor in 1911 called for preserving the model of "Five Nations under One Republic" that "continued to preserve the complete territory of the five nations of Manchus, Han, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans." When the Republic of China was established in January of 1912, and Sun Yat-sen assumed the role of provisional president, Sun declared that he accepted the program of "Five Nations under One Republic." In his inaugural speech he assumed responsibility for unifying Chinese territory, "combining the lands of the Han, Manchus, Mongolians, Hui, and Tibetans into one state." Thus the stance taken by the revolutionary camp had transformed from exclusion to inclusion.[18]

This debate finally came to an end. Why, however, did this state of affairs come to be? Here we have to mention the stimulus and influence that came from Japan.

In the Introduction I mentioned that Japan defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894, which, in turn, resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. As a result of this treaty, China ceded Taiwan and other territories to Japan. These events provoked an upheaval in Chinese thinking that had not been seen in thousands of years, leading a China that had sought to transform within tradition to turn toward transforming *without* tradition. In Japan, however, this victory led to debates about whether China really should remain whole or be split apart. Some of the writings from this debate that had the deepest influence on China were "A Plan for Dealing with China" (*Shina shobun'an*) by Ozaki Yukio and "Preserving the Integrity of China" by Ariga Nagao.[19] During the Hundred Days' Reform of 1898, the Chinese-language newspaper *The Reformer* (*Zhi xin bao*) published an article titled "On Preserving China" (*Cun Zhongguo shuo*), which had been translated from the Japanese newspaper *Chūgai jiron.* After the failure of these reforms, another translation, this one titled "Strategies to Carve Up China" (originally published in a Japanese newspaper), was printed in the November 1898 issue of the *East Asian Times* (*Yadong shibao*). These articles forced educated readers to recognize the extremely difficult questions that China was facing. This was especially true in the translation of an article by Ariga Nagao, "On the Preservation of China," printed on January 31, 1899, in the *East Asian Times,* which began by asking the following question: Should China be "kept whole" or "carved up"?[20]

This question was debated widely in political and scholarly fields in Japan since 1895. Japan at the time wanted to imagine itself as Asia's savior, expanding Japanese territory from Korea, of which it had already taken possession, into neighboring Manchuria and Mongolia. It also attempted to contain China within the Han-ethnic regions to the south of the Great Wall, turning China into a Han-ethnic state. At that time, the East Asia Society (Tō-A-kai) and the Common Culture Society (Dobunkai), with the support of Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), used the notion of "civilizational survival of the fittest" to explain Japan's dominance in Asia. They

also discussed the close relationship between China and Japan as one of "the same writing and same race" (J. *dōbun dōshu,* Ch. *tongwen tongzhong*).[21] This notion gave rise to the idea that China should see Japan as a leader with ambitions to rescue East Asia; but it also gave rise the argument that China should abandon its relationships with the so-called Four Barbarians. As Japanese scholars have noted, this trend developed "after war broke out between Japan and the Qing, as (Japanese) citizens showed ever greater interest in the Asian mainland. It also developed against the backdrop of Japan's dramatic rise among modern nation-states during the second decade of the Meiji era, as Japan's consciousness of its status as an Asian nation steadily grew and it worked to put on display a unique East Asian culture that stood in contrast Western culture."[22] These developments led them to see Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, and even Xinjiang and Tibet as part of "their own" territory.[23]

Ariga Nagao, who supported "keeping China whole," argued that if China were in fact kept whole, "then two goals would be achieved: first, it would stay whole all on its own, and second, those people who depend on it would remain whole." Looking at the situation at that time, however, he believed that China was unable to remain whole on its own, because the great Western powers were looming around it, and because China was so weak and poor that it lacked the power to resist them. If those who depended on China remained whole, then what other strong states could they depend on? Ariga's analysis offered two possible solutions. The first was called "assistance from one source," in which China simply threw its lot in with one other powerful country; the other solution was "assistance from multiple sources," which would mean that "two or three strong countries would establish a confederation to support China in its areas of weakness."[24] Ozaki Yukio's *A Plan for Dealing with China,* however, called for Japan to completely absorb China, "just as the Yuan dynasty did to the Song dynasty, as the Qing dynasty did to the Ming dynasty, and as England did to India." Why? Because he believed that, for Chinese people, "outside of the Imperial court, there is no awareness of the state," and that "if the people do not have an understanding of ideas about the state, then even if their military is powerful, their state is certain to be lost," and therefore it made more sense to take the opportunity to carve

up China immediately.[25] Both arguments for keeping China whole or for carving up China, then, in fact were already focusing on breaking up China from its then-current status as a multinational empire.

People in China had different ideas. Even though politicians such as Sun Yat-sen had once believed that China should exclude Manchuria and Mongolia, it was nonetheless the case that, as I mentioned earlier, no one was willing to assume responsibility for giving up territory, losing sovereignty, and shaming the nation. Political leaders of the Republic of China, then, whether it was Sun Yat-sen or Yuan Shikai, could only work to maintain a multinational state with vast territories. Even though scholars have agreed with theories about the nation-state that come from Europe, the traditional notion of the empire made by "grand unification" continued to exert a deep influence over them, and the Chinese scholarly world continued to use traditional ideas about "China" to which they were accustomed. It would be fair to say that it was Japan's imperialist political ambitions that gave Chinese scholars the impulse to reexamine their ideas about the nation and state and to develop new perspectives from which to work toward keeping China whole.

From the establishment of the Republic of China down to the time of the May Fourth movement, the idea of the "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*) was widely accepted during these times of domestic turmoil and foreign interference.[26] By the 1920s and 1930s, new ways of thinking about how to "bring the Four Barbarians into China" were developed in the face of new emergencies, as scholars began to argue that "the Chinese nation encompasses all" not only in legal terms but also in terms of scholarship and thought.

"The Chinese Nation Encompasses All": New Directions in Scholarship in the 1920s and 1930s

In the 1920s serious differences lay beneath the surface of two the most important trends in scholarly thought and their attempts to define "China" and to establish a Chinese identity.

The first major scholarly trend was critical of theories that arrived in China via Japanese interpretations of Lacouperie that held that Chinese

culture came from the West, as well as arguments derived from this theory that held that the Miao people were the original inhabitants of China prior to the Han.[27] Scholars who disagreed with these interpretations of Lacouperie were also critical of Johann Gunnar Anderson's argument, derived from his archaeological research, that Neolithic pottery culture came to China via the West. Lacouperie's "Western origins thesis" was relatively popular during the late Qing, while Anderson's archaeological discoveries from the early 1920s, which he discussed in his 1923 book, *Early Chinese Culture,* used comparisons of Yangshao and Central Asia to argue that Neolithic pottery culture was transmitted from West to East. This argument seemed to prove the accuracy of Lacouperie's Western origins thesis.

The great majority of Chinese scholars believed that the Western origins thesis amounted to a challenge to the uniqueness and autonomy of Chinese culture. Even if scholars in the late Qing were receptive to these arguments, Chinese scholars such as Fu Sinian (1896–1950), Li Chi, and He Bingsong (1890–1946) tried continuously to use historical arguments and archaeological discoveries to prove both the local origins and diverse nature of Chinese culture. This project reveals a highly "nationalist" historical perspective and agenda for archaeology. They clearly intended to cultivate a new basis for the Chinese nation and its historical identity.

The second major scholarly trend was the "debating antiquity" (*gu shi bian*) movement, which will be familiar to many readers. In the 1920s Gu Jiegang and others called for new investigations into the Three Dynasties of Antiquity, the classical canon, and ancient legends. At a basic level, this movement modernized and remade traditional historiography and philology. Working with the modern standards of scientific inquiry, objectivity, and neutrality, these scholars reexamined ancient documents related to China's early history in a way that assumed they were guilty until proven innocent: if a verdict could not be reached, then they were suspended from the historical record until legends (and myths) were gradually driven from historical inquiry. Those figures who once had served as symbols of the Chinese nation, such as the Flame Emperor, the Yellow Emperor, and Emperors Yao, Shun, and Yu, as well as ancient documents related to China's revered classical canon were all treated with thoroughgoing suspicion. Gu Jiegang's plan for debating antiquity was to "overturn unreliable histories." This project included (1) "dispelling the idea

that the nation has one origin," (2) "dispelling the idea that [China's] territory has always been unified," (3) "dispelling ideas that focus on individuals in ancient history," and (4) "dispelling the idea that antiquity was a golden era."[28] It was precisely because of this agenda that this scholarly movement was accused by people such as Cong Lianzhu and Dai Jitao (1898–1949) of "attacking the roots of the nation."[29] Why? Because the oft-repeated idea that the nation has one origin implies that the Chinese nation has a shared ancestry, just as the idea that China's territory has always been unified means that Chinese territory has been the same since ancient times; the legendary figures from ancient history symbolize the shared origins of the Chinese nation; and the idea that antiquity represents a golden age implies that culture should return to its traditions. Symbols have the power to bolster identity and cohesion, and thus casting any suspicion on these symbols meant casting suspicion on the roots of history itself and attacking the basis of Chinese identity.

In the 1920s these two seemingly opposed scholarly orientations achieved few new breakthroughs. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, crises at the level of the nation and the state led to subtle changes in the perspectives of these two scholarly orientations, or at least the perspective of scholars who were positioned within these scholarly orientations. Let us take a look at the threats that China was facing during this time: as early as 1921, Gong Debai had translated "A Letter Concerning Absorbing China," an essay by Kawashima Naniwa (1865–1949) that provoked a strong reaction among Chinese students who were studying in Japan.[30] In 1927, the infamous Tanaka Memorial, which called for Japan to conquer China, was exposed. Regardless of its authenticity, the document was quickly translated and published in China,[31] where it elicited outrage across the country. From 1928 onward, public opinion in China was ever more influenced by Japan's ambitions to invade China and by its actual behavior. Readers in China saw the publication of works such as *Japan's Annexation of Manchuria and Mongolia* (*Riben bingtun Man Meng lun*), a translation of work by Hosono Shigekatsu; *Looking at China in Turmoil* (*Guan dongluande Zhongguo*) by Tsurumi Yūsuke; *The Situation in Manchuria* (*Manzhou xianzhuang*) by Nozawa Gennojō; and *Japan's Fundamental Views on China* (*Riben dui Hua zhi jichu guannian*) by Tada Shun,[32] as well as the translation and publication of studies on

the history and geography of Manchuria and Mongolia by Shiratori Kurakichi, Asano Risaburō, Inaba Iwakichi, Satō Yoshio, and Yanai Watari. There was also a steady stream of reports from magazines and newspapers that exposed information about Japanese scholars' and students' visits to Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.[33] People were completely shocked by the way Japanese people were repeatedly traveling to Manchuria and Mongolia to excavate artifacts from northeastern China and using archaeology and studies of ancient documents to discuss the fate of Manchuria.

Even more shocking were the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931; the conquering of the northeastern provinces by Japan and the establishment of the Manchurian puppet state (Manchukuo) in 1932; the establishment of the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in 1933; and the appearance of a so-called autonomy movement for northeastern China. All of these events brought China into an unprecedented crisis over the integrity of its territory. As a result, Chinese scholars could not avoid turning their attention to research on the "Four Barbarians" (or China's "border areas") to refute Japanese scholars' discussions of the relationship between Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and China with evidence from historical, geographical, and ethnographic research. As Gu Jiegang stated in his "Letter Concerning the Yu Gong Scholarly Society's Plans for Research on Border Areas":

> We face enslavement, and our state may be lost at any moment, and thus we unite under the banner of nationalism. Moreover, because our enemies are swallowing up our lands, and our border regions are taking the brunt of these attacks, we are turning our efforts toward research on the history and geography of China's border regions. Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Southeast Asia (Nanyang), and Central Asia—people are working on all of these areas.[34]

In 1932, Hua Qiyun published *China's Border Regions* (*Zhongguode bianjiang*), the first such study of the modern era; in 1933, Fu Sinian and his colleagues published *Outline of the History of Northeast China* (*Huabei shi gang*); in 1934, Gu Jiegang and his colleague, Tan Qixiang (1911–1992), founded a bimonthly magazine, *Yu Gong.* As Gu Jiegang said, in times of

peace, there is no harm in scholars practicing "scholarship for the sake of scholarship," but in times when "the country is in decline and fear reigns," then they can only "pursue scholarship for practical ends."[35]

Against this political, intellectual, scholarly backdrop, Fu Sinian published "The Chinese Nation Is All-Encompassing" in the 181st volume of *Independent Critic* (*Duli pinglun*) on December 15, 1935. In this essay, Fu argued that China had been under "strong political control" since the time of the Yin and Zhou dynasties, and that during the Spring and Autumn period "ideas concerning a grand unification [of China] were deep in people's hearts." It was these conditions, he argued, that made the unification of the Qin and Han possible. "Our Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) speaks one language, writes one script, and carries out the same set of ethics based on the same culture. We are one great family."[36]

The "Local" and "Diversity": Trends in Chinese Scholarly Research on the Chinese Nation and Chinese Culture before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

Let us turn our attention to new developments that occurred in Chinese scholarship before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937.

Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, literally the "central research institute"), was established in 1928. According to Ding Wenjiang (1887–1936), who played an important role in establishing the institution, the founders of Academia Sinica and the Institute of History and Philology were motivated by a desire to seek out the foundations of Chinese identity.[37] Under Fu Sinian's leadership, therefore, the Institute of History and Philology was undoubtedly the scholarly force that represented the intellectual mainstream at that time. Despite the fact that Fu Sinian maintained a certain amount of Han nationalism, however, he still largely agreed with the view of history that included the "Four Barbarians" and assimilated them into China. For these reasons, then, when the Institute for History and Philology was established in 1928, he consciously advocated scholarly research in two areas: first, the history and languages of the peoples on the periphery of the Han, and, second, the study of the

historical remnants and traces of a variety of national groups within China's borders.

The motivations behind these scholarly trends can be attributed in part to a desire to compete with and overcome European and Japanese Orientalist scholarship, and in part to a desire to gain a complete understanding and the peoples and regions that made up "China." Strictly speaking, these scholarly orientations could not yet really be called nationalist. Chinese scholars of this era consciously made efforts to use so-called scientific scholarly perspectives to seek out the local origins of Chinese culture, to rewrite Chinese history in terms of indigenous or autochthonous development (instead of foreign influence), to investigate the current situation faced by Chinese people at that time, and to survey the customs and habits of peripheral areas. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, a number of projects had in fact developed because of the impetus provided by Western and Japanese scholars. They include the trend toward gaining a new understanding of China's non-Han nationalities, efforts such as those promoted by Fu Sinian to master research materials on the economies, politics, and ways of life in China's peripheral areas, and work to understand the great variety of dialects and other languages that were not part of the standard National Language (*Guoyu*). These efforts were driven both by scholarly motivations to compete with the West and Japan and—unquestionably—also by political motivations surrounding efforts to resist discourses from the West and Japan concerning "China's" territorial domains and peoples.

In this era, then, scholarship and politics were inseparable.

1. Let us look at the field of historical studies. During these years, many of the topics covered by archaeology, anthropology, and historical studies were in dialogue with one another. Scholars attempted to explain the diverse elements of the formation of the ancient Chinese race and culture across history, as well as the historical origins of the various national groups within modern China. As I mentioned earlier, after the challenges put forward by the "debating antiquity" group led by Gu Jiegang, it was no longer possible to maintain an understanding of the Chinese nation or culture that was based on arguments that the Chinese nation emerged from one source or that Chinese territory had always been unified; as a

result, after discussions by a number of scholars, people gradually set aside ideas about the Western origins thesis as it related to the Chinese race or culture. The question remained, however: What cultural terrain eventually combined to form ancient China? Can all of these pieces of cultural terrain be considered "Chinese"? Some scholars put forth bold new analyses of historical documents. For example, Xu Zhongshu's "Conjectures, Based on Ancient Books, about the Yin and Zhou Nationalities" (1927), which was published in the very first issue of Tsinghua University's *Chinese Classical Review* (*Guoxue lun cong*), argued against the traditional notion that the Three Dynasties of Antiquity all came from the same cultural source, suggesting instead that the Yin and Zhou peoples were from different national groups. In the same year, Meng Wentong (1894–1968) published *The Subtleties of Ancient History* (*Gu shi zhen wei*), which argued that the peoples of ancient China could be divided into three national groups: the Jiang Han, which included contemporary Hubei and Hunan; the Hai Dai, which included modern Shandong; and the He Luo, which refers to the area centered around modern Henan Province. Not long after Meng's book, Fu Sinian published "The Hypothesis of the Yi in the East and the Xia in the West" (*Yi Xia dong xi shuo*), an essay that argued that ancient China was formed by the gradual melding of the Yi people in the eastern areas and the Xia in the western regions. His conclusion states clearly that his goal was to explain "the overall pattern [in ancient China] in which east and west had stood opposite from one another during the process by which tribal states transformed into kingdoms (and later an empire)."[38]

This idea was not limited to histories of ancient times; it also ran through the entire history of national groups in historical writings. It was during the 1930s, in fact, that the greatest number of monographs devoted to the history of the Chinese nation or *minzu* appeared. In 1930, Mou Fenglin's "Preface to a History of the Chinese Nation" was published in two parts in number 3 and 4 of the journal *History* (*Shixue zazhi*), and over the next few years a series of books with the exact same title, *History of the Chinese Nation* (*Zhongguo minzu shi*), were published by different authors: one each by Wang Tongling and Lü Simian in 1934, and another by Song Wenbing in 1935. Regardless of the differences and similarities between these national histories, for the most part they all de-

fended the idea of the local origins and diversity of the "Chinese nation," working to describe the histories of the various national groups within China's borders as a process by which many different rivers converged and flowed together out into the sea. For example, the earliest *History of the Chinese Nation,* written by Wang Tongling, divided the yellow race into different groups according to the directions in which they moved geographically. He divided them into three southern groups (the Miao, the Han, and the Tibetans) and three northern groups (the Manchus, Mongolians, and the Hui [that is, Muslim groups, mainly Uighurs]). According to the contemporary historian Ma Rong, "Other than the addition of the Miao people," Wang's "division of the Chinese nation into the 'Three Southern Groups' and 'Three Northern Groups' basically coincides with the framework of 'Five Nations under One Republic' that people spoke of in the early years of the Republic of China."[39] For the most part, other histories of the Chinese nation made the same arguments, never departing from the basic categorization of the five nations or six nations that made up China. The script behind these histories of the Chinese nation was to call for incorporating the "Four Barbarians" into China so that China could truly become a great country of Five Nations under One Republic.

2. Let us take another look at the field of archaeology. Since the founding of this field, archaeology in China has been assigned the heavy burden of seeking out the sources of Chinese civilization and defining the boundaries of the Chinese nation. For example, while he was studying archaeology at Harvard University, Li Chi, who is known as the "father of Chinese archaeology," had a strong interest in describing the origins of the Chinese people. In his doctoral dissertation, "The Formation of the Chinese People" (Harvard, 1923), Li classified the Chinese people as six core groups: the descendants of the Yellow Emperor (that is, the Han); the Tungusic peoples; peoples who speak Tibeto-Burman languages; the Hmong-Khmer peoples; the Shan group; and three subgroups made up of the Xiongnu, Mongolians, and the Zhuru group. He argued that the source of the modern Chinese race could be traced to two areas: first, the area that was occupied by the Tungusic people after they invaded the territory of the descendants of the Yellow Emperor; and second, the area of the last three groups (the Xiongnu, Mongolians, and Zhuru) that had been

subsequently invaded and occupied by the descendants of the Yellow Emperor. The overlap of these two areas led to the formation of modern "Chinese people" (*Zhongguo ren*).[40] Even if it is true that, as some scholars have argued, Li Chi's views were "the response of a twentieth-century Chinese intellectual to the Chinese national movement and the international situation in both the ideological and intellectual sense,"[41] it is also fair to say that the intellectual motivations behind Li Chi's research in the 1920s were still focused on refuting the Western origins thesis. At this time, the use of physical anthropology and studies of language to seek the roots of the "Chinese nation" had not yet acquired a particularly nationalist significance.[42]

But even if archaeology were not seeking out a national perspective, the national perspective was seeking out archaeology. As Zhang Guangzhi has pointed out, the main characteristic of Chinese archaeology before the 1950s was its nationalism.[43] Looking back at the archaeology of this formative period we see that there were always certain questions to be resolved (mainly arguments about the local origins of Chinese culture and about the amalgamation of many peoples into one Chinese nation) that served as the basis for understanding archaeological materials that had been unearthed. This was true for discussions of the prehistoric Stone Age or the excavation of the ruins of Yin. When He Bingsong published "A New Myth of the Origin of the Chinese Nation" (*Zhonghua minzu qiyuan zhi xin shenhua,* 1929), which argued against the Western origins thesis, he placed his hopes on new archaeological findings. The writings described above all show that many people were looking to the work of archaeologists to see how they might use materials buried beneath the earth to refute Western and Japanese archaeology and to demonstrate that, first, the Chinese race and Chinese culture had independent origins; second, that the Chinese race and Chinese culture were indeed able to incorporate diverse elements; and, third, that the various national groups within China could be written about in terms of one history and one country.

This general mood served as the backdrop to the discovery made in 1929 of the cranium of "Peking Man" in Zhoukoudian, near Beijing. This discovery was an important symbol, as was the discovery of Longshan culture at the Chengziya archaeological site near modern Jinan, the

capital of Shandong Province. The publication of the first report on archaeological finds at Anyang (in modern Henan Province) not only served to a certain degree as the declaration of the establishment of Chinese archaeology but also established an autochthonous or independent genealogy of the Chinese race and of Chinese culture. Alongside the writings of Xu Zhongshu (1927), Meng Wentong (1933), Fu Sinian (1933), and others discussed above, these archaeological findings worked together to offer theories and ways to frame the location of early Chinese culture as the place of mutual interactions between Chinese and foreign groups, thereby offering a larger historical context for understanding early China.

It is fair to say that Chinese archaeology, which has just been established as a field, was faced with questions that were not about archaeology but in fact were about history, or even nationalist history. The series of archaeological discoveries at Zhoukoudian, Yangshao, Longshan, and Anyang provided a context for a Chinese race and culture and irrefutable evidence to demolish arguments about the Western origins thesis. It was for these reasons that, in an essay on the Chengziya archaeological site, therefore, Fu Sinian would declare that that most important events in Chinese history were "entirely Han" Chinese, and that questions about the origin of ancient Chinese civilization and the Chinese race "were greater in significance, greater in number, and of greater importance for establishing a framework for the knowledge that makes up Chinese historiography."[44]

3. Finally, let us look at the field of anthropology.[45] At Academia Sinica in 1930, Ling Chunsheng, Shang Chengzu, and others undertook a survey of the Nanai (or Hezhe) people in the lower reaches of the Songhua (or Sungari) River, and published a report titled *The Hezhe People of the Lower Songhua River.* In 1933, Ling Chunsheng and Rui Yifu undertook a survey that they used as the basis for their "Report on a Survey of the Miao in Western Hunan." These surveys were followed by others: a survey of the She people in Lishui in Zhejiang Province conducted by Ling Chunsheng and Rui Yifu in 1934; a survey of the Yi people in Yunnan conducted by Ling Chunsheng, Rui Yifu, Tao Yunda, and others in 1935; and another survey by Ling Chunsheng and Rui Yifu in 1936–1937 of the Kawa people of Western Yunnan, the Lahu people, the Jingpo (Kachu) people, and the Baiyi people. It is clear that the scholarly mainstream was more and more interested in the national question and was moving toward

including ethnic groups on the periphery in the larger history of China. In April 1934, then, the ethnology research group that had been part of the Institute of Social Sciences (Shehui kexue yanjiusuo) at Academia Sinica was moved into the Institute of History and Philology, becoming the fourth group within that institute. As a result, ethnographic work and survey research became a part of the mainstream of historical studies, archaeology, and anthropology. At the Institute of Language and History at Sun Yat-sen University, in 1930, Pang Xinmin accompanied a collection team from the university on an expedition to the Bei River, after which he wrote "Notes on the Bei River and Yao Mountains." The same year, Jiang Zhefu, who also conducted a survey of the Bei River with Pang, published essays on the Yao people of their region and their rituals. In 1931, Pang Xinmin traveled to the Yao Mountains in Guangxi, publishing "Notes on a Trip to the Yao Mountains in Guangdong." In addition to these works, in the 1930s Shi Luguo and Yang Chengzhi conducted a survey of the Lolo people in Yunnan. In Yang Chengzhi's book from 1932, *Studies on Nationalities of the Southwest* (*Xinan minzu yanjiu*), their work focused on customs and cultures of people in the border regions.

It is worth pointing out that these "anthropologically" flavored surveys also revealed other intentions. Just as in the fields of history and archaeology, they sought to demonstrate a Chinese scholarly sensibility that was in dialogue with foreign scholarship and to realize in their various surveys of ethnic groups the goal of "including the Four Barbarians in China."

As for demonstrating a Chinese scholarly sensibility, the earliest example of this kind of work can be seen in a speech given by Yang Chengzhi of Sun Yat-sen University in 1929. Yang argued that the Yellow Emperor and Chi You were the ancestors of the Miao and Han national groups, and pointed out that those nationalities that had gradually spread out toward the border regions and mountains had received too little attention from Chinese scholars—so little, in fact, that foreigners had begun to see these groups as "non-Chinese." Although foreigners had written many books about these nationalities, none had been written in China, a fact that Yang thought was a "national humiliation."[46] The next year, Ling Chunsheng wrote in a preface to *The Hezhe People of the Lower Songhua*

River that "modern Chinese scholars who research the history of nationalities (*minzu shi*) have been duped by Western Sinologists for some time and believe without a doubt that Tungusic peoples of today are the Eastern Hu of ancient times."[47] He pointed out that progress in historical studies had already demolished the idea of a single origin to the Chinese nation and included a variety of then contemporary ethnic groups as part of the origins of Chinese culture and the Chinese race; one such example, he argued, was the inclusion of the Yi (or Shang) culture as one source of Chinese civilization. Ling's work, which has been called "a groundbreaking document in China's scientific study of nationalities,"[48] was produced in the context of a number of dialogues with foreign scholarship. Ling's discussion of the history of the Hezhe people conformed to Fu Sinian's thesis concerning "the Yi in the East and the Xia in the West" and to Fu's *Outline of the History of Northeast China,* arguing that in prehistoric times the northeastern areas of China had connections to central China; this argument worked to refute theories put forward by Yano Jin'ichi (1872–1970) and Torii Ryūzō (1870–1953).[49] Research on southwestern China sounded much like these discussions of northeastern China. Fang Guoyu, for example, published an article in 1936 in the newspaper *Social Welfare* (*Yi shi bao*) titled "The Bo People and Bai zi," which attacked arguments made by Western scholars such as the French Sinologist Paul Pelliot that the Thai people were from the kingdom of Nanzhao and argued that Nanzhao was not founded by Thai peoples. The significance of this article, then, was to show that Yunnan Province was still a part of China.[50]

We already see this tendency to "bring the Four Barbarians into China" in Ling Chunsheng's *The Hezhe People of the Lower Songhua River.* As one scholar has noted, the book's "use of ancient Chinese texts and documents to tease out the history of the Heishui Mohe people during the Sui and Tang dynasties and the many changes that took place through the Liao, Jin, Ming, and Qing dynasties is clearly tinted by 'nationalist' views, as many later scholars have pointed out. The book brings the Hezhe people into the genealogy of the Chinese nation and defines this people according to those terms."[51] In his "Report on a Survey of the Miao in Western Hunan," which was based on fieldwork from 1933, Ling Chunsheng was responding to Torii Ryūzō's surveys of the Miao, and his

discussions of their origins, distribution, names, and historical changes all hinted at his views about the shared origins of the Miao and Han peoples.[52] Ling's assistant, a Miao named Shi Qigui, went even further. His "Report on Field Surveys of the Miao of Western Hunan" used evidence from history, geography, crafts and production techniques, song, and language to fill in the gaps in work done by Ling Chunsheng and others. His arguments about similarities between the Miao and Han in terms of language, ethnic origins, names, and customs lent additional support to the argument that the Miao and Han had shared origins.[53] To a certain degree, these conclusions drawn by Han and Miao scholars served to bring the Miao peoples of the southwest into the whole of the Chinese nation. Tao Yunda's essay, "On the Distribution and Dispersal of Names of the Mexie People," which was based on fieldwork Tao conducted among the Mexie people of Yunnan, argued that, in the area around Lijiang:

> From the beginning of the Tang dynasty through the end of the Song dynasty, it was the tribal peoples of Yunnan who were the real holders of political power. Official positions created by Han people existed in name only, while business was conducted as if the area were a vassal state [and not fully a part of the empire]. When the founders of the Yuan dynasty subdued Yunnan, the clans' power was gradually wiped out. The Yuan did the most to open up and develop Yunnan. Without their tremendous energy, it is open to question whether Yunnan would be a part of China today.

To phrase Tao's conclusions another way, it was from the Yuan dynasty on that the power of local clans was swept away, which led to the inclusion of these border peoples into China.[54] Here we see anthropologists demonstrating their independent sensibility as Chinese scholars as they criticize ideas put forward by Western and Japanese scholars. At the same time, we also see them demonstrate a national perspective that "brings the Four Barbarians into China" and proves the existence of "the great family of the Chinese nation."

It may be the case that although the field of archaeology made great achievements with regard to projects such as Peking Man, Longshan cul-

ture, and the ruins at Anyang, these projects still only contributed to understanding the core regions of Yin and Zhou culture. It is also the case, however, that many historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists made even stronger efforts in the border regions outside of China proper to look for cultural remnants and relics that would demonstrate that this "China" of today may have previously been divided into different cultural systems that influenced one another and eventually merged with one another. In his afterword to *Newly Discovered Divination Texts* (*Xin huo buci xieben hou*), Fu Sinian made an interesting comment when discussing the ancient peoples of Jing and Chu. According to Fu, the early peoples of the ancient southern state of Chu

> were originally divided into many ethnic groups, depending on where they lived and their degree of civilization. The early descendants of the ancestors of the peoples of Jing and Chu may have [as a result of wars] become slaves [of the victors], with many remaining as slaves, and a few fleeing to distant places. The eventual prosperity of the state of Chu can probably be credited to the descendants of the ancestors of Jing and Chu who were there at the time, and not the work of those descendants of the ancestors of the peoples of Jing and Chu who had fled their captors [from the central plains]. This is much the same as the way that both incursions by the Jurchens into China were the result of the revival of local national groups, and were not led by Jurchens who had returned from China.[55]

Li Chi also made an equally interesting comment: he argued that scholars of ancient China should "demolish the view that Chinese culture is sealed within the Great Wall and use our eyes and legs to go north of the Great Wall to find materials on the history of ancient China, because an even older 'old home' of ours is there."[56] Li paid even greater attention to the links between the Chinese culture and race and the peripheral regions. In an essay titled "The Work and Challenges of Rebuilding the History of Ancient China," he argued that Chinese culture was not a world unto itself, and that its origins could be found "from the Black Sea, through the grasslands of Central Asia, to Dzungaria in Xinjiang, to the Gobi Desert in Mongolia, all the way to Manchuria."[57] Another young scholar, Liang Siyong, who had just returned from America to join Li Chi's archaeology

team (and who was encouraged by his famous father, Liang Qichao), worked both to refute Western scholars' arguments about the non-Chinese origins of the Chinese race and culture and to refute Japanese scholars' arguments that "China" was limited only to the territory of the central plains region. He turned his sights to northeastern China,[58] which not only had been the place where Torii Ryūzō and others had repeatedly undertaken archaeological expeditions but also was the region (that is, Manchuria and Mongolia) that Japan had continuously attempted to say was a territory outside of "China."

We see, then, two important tasks undertaken by Chinese scholarship of the 1920s and 1930s: First, to maintain the local, autochthonous origins of the Chinese race and culture when, competing with Western and Japanese scholarship, they faced the question of who gets to explain China. Second, they addressed the question of how to explain China by gradually developing ways to "include the Four Barbarians within China."

"When the Chinese Nation Faced Its Greatest Crisis": The Changing Mood of Chinese Scholarship during the Japanese Invasions

Previously I mentioned the Mukden Incident of 1931, the establishment of the Manchurian puppet state in 1932, the founding of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933, and the "North China autonomy movement" of 1935. Prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, a tremendous sense of emergency had already taken hold in the Chinese scholarly world. If we look closely, it is not hard to see complex changes in the outlook of Chinese scholars of that era. As described by the phrase "national salvation crushing enlightenment" (*jiuwang yadao qimeng*), when faced with the emergency presented by the enemy, Chinese scholars always chose "national salvation," and it was against this backdrop of national salvation that a variety of writings about China's borders and nationalities came into print.[59]

It may help to begin by observing the changes in Liu Yizheng's (1880–1956) thinking through the prefaces that he wrote in honor of the founding

of three scholarly journals. Liu Yizheng was a leading scholar who strongly advocated for what he called local perspectives on Chinese culture. The outlines of his thinking, therefore, are a good barometer for the transformation of scholarly ideas and sentiments that took place at that time. In 1921, Liu and some of his friends founded the *Journal of Historical and Geographical Society* (*Shi di xuebao*). In his preface to the inaugural issue, Liu emphasized that the Chinese scholarly world should expand its range of knowledge; he put special emphasis on the need to compete with foreign scholarship. He argued that scholars absolutely could not "look up at the sky from the bottom of a well" and should not blindly follow foreign scholars when it came to issues concerning Chinese history and geography. Otherwise, he argued, "We will be unable both to compete with our contemporaries and to hold on to the knowledge gained by our predecessors."[60] In another foreword, which Liu wrote for the first issue of *History and Geography* (*Shixue yu dixue*) in 1926, he again argued for placing equal emphasis on history and geography, arguing that traditional Chinese learning had suffered from the eight-legged essay and the examination system, from poor instructional materials in schools, and from commercialized publishing, all of which caused Chinese scholars to be overly cautious about foreign learning. This foreword stressed the importance of historical and geographical knowledge while maintaining the local identity of Chinese scholarship as a perspective that could compete with and balance out foreign Orientalist scholarship. In September 1932, however, after the Mukden Incident, in an essay for the inaugural issue of the bimonthly journal *Airs of the States* (*Guo feng banyuekan*), although he maintained a cultured and scholarly outlook, readers easily see the deep influence of the "national salvation movement" and a larger sense of crisis. Liu Yizheng used the word *wuhu* (alas!), an interjection that, in classical Chinese, expresses sadness or pain. He worried that China was about to suffer the same fate as the Song and Ming dynasties, or perhaps a fate even worse than that of the Song and the Ming. Liu raised a cry of warning not to "surrender our cultural relics and follow the barbarians," and called for scholarship to "put the nation above the individual" in this extraordinary time.[61]

"In the spirit tower is no plan to elude divine arrows."[62] Scholars in southeast China felt this way, as did scholars who formed the mainstream

of Chinese scholarship. Many scholars of history and literature transformed in the face of a massive national emergency. One of the central figures in Chinese scholarship of that time, Gu Jiegang, did not originally believe that "the eighteen provinces where the Han people live have been as unified as they are now since ancient times." "To do so," he argued, "would be to apply the perspective that arose after the Qin and Han dynasties to understand [Chinese] domains from before the Qin and Han." He repeatedly stressed that arguments about "continuous unity" were "absurd understandings of history."[63] Just a few years later, however, he took a new view of the story of Chinese history, going from an argument that China did not have a continuous unity to an emphasis on the legitimacy of China's borders. After the publication of *Yu Gong Bimonthly* began in 1936, Gu Jiegang, Shi Nianhai, and others published *A History of the Transformation of China's Territories* (*Zhongguo jiangyu yange shi*); Gu argued in the first chapter, "In ancient times, the Han people lived in the central plains, while foreign peoples lay in wait all around them. The ancients spilled their heart's blood, spent all their energy, and worked tirelessly to reach the present situation [that is, modern China]." In his discussion of "glorious ancient times" (*huang gu*) he argued, "As for the drawing of borders, it seems that in ancient times were already traces to be found. From the time of *The Tribute of Yu* on, there were what were called the Nine Provinces, the Twelve Provinces, and the Greater Nine Provinces (*Da jiu zhou*). Each was prominent in its own time and could represent the ancients' ideals concerning the system of borders." It is clear that these ideas are quite different from the image put forward by the leaders of "debating antiquity" scholarship in the 1920s. Gu Jiegang uses the term *huang gu* (glorious ancient times), which subtly links to arguments about "glorious Han emperors of antiquity" (*huang Han*) made by Zhang Taiyan and others and implies a certain Han nationalism. Gu Jiegang also emphasized "the difficulty with which ancient people expanded their territory," thus including arguments made by Liang Qichao and others about "Five Nations under One Republic."[64] Gu seems to have abandoned the arguments from his "debating antiquity" perspective that the ancient Chinese did not descend from a single lineage and that the territory of China was not historically unitary. By this point, he had turned toward "bringing the Four Barbarians

into China" and was working to show that there was one "China" and one "Chinese people."

Owing to space limitations, we cannot discuss all of the details of the transformation of the Chinese intellectual sphere. One aspect deserves attention, however. From 1930 on, public opinion in China was sensitive to Japan's interest in Manchuria. In addition to scholarly works such as "Looking at the Dawn of East Asia from the Standpoint of Archaeology" (1931) by Hamada Kōsaku (1881–1938) and "Researches on the Ancient Peoples of China" (1931) by Ogawa Takuji (1870–1941), many other writings from Japan about Manchuria drew the interest of Chinese scholars. In the political realm, discussions about the establishment of a separate Manchurian state or Mongolian independence, as well as works such as "The Japanese Colonization of Manchuria and Mongolia" (1932) by Sō Mitsuhiko, provoked even greater outrage. This mood had a strong effect on the world of scholarship, as in the following episode involving Gu Jiegang, the most important modern-style historian of the first half of the twentieth century and promoter of the "debating antiquity" (*gu shi bian*) movement. Gu, who upheld the use of scientific methods in the study of ancient China and took a skeptical approach toward ancient documents and origin myths in Chinese history, certainly would not have agreed with the idea that the history of ancient "China" was homogenous and unified. In 1933, however, the Japanese met with the nobility of Inner Mongolia and encouraged the Mongolians to split from China in favor of independence. At this time, Tan Muyu, a female scholar Gu Jiegang had always admired, personally went to Mongolia to survey the situation, after which she delivered a series of lectures at Yenching University in December of 1933 on the theme "Experiences at the Bailingmiao Conference and Impressions of Inner Mongolia," exposing Japan's role in the movement for Inner Mongolia's independence. Gu Jiegang's diary makes note of the lecture over many days, and says that, after hearing her speak, Gu "began to take an interest in researching questions of borders and territory." It's very clear that Ms. Tan's research and lectures had an influence on the transformation in Gu Jiegang's thinking, and may have led him to work with Tan Qixiang the next year to found the famous scholarly magazine, *Yu Gong Bimonthly,* a publication that argued for the historical continuity and unity of ancient China and modern China.[65]

"The Chinese People Are One": From a 1939 Debate in *Social Welfare* to Chiang Kai-shek's Theory of the Chinese People in *China's Destiny*

In 1937, violence finally broke out during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was quickly followed by the capture of Beiping (Beijing). The Japanese armies continued southward in their invasion, routing the Chinese forces repeatedly. The capital eventually had to be moved south away from Nanjing, and the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi became the last base of power for the government of the Republic of China. Research institutes, colleges, and scholars also moved to the southeast. Places that had once been the margin of China became the center, and borderlands that had not been the focus of attention became an important topic of discussion for scholars.

One symbolic event is found in an inaugural essay that Gu Jiegang wrote in December 1938 for the "Borderlands Weekly" (*Bianjiang zhoukan*) supplement, which he had created for the newspaper *Social Welfare* (*Yi shi bao*). He exhorted readers to remember "the history of the nation and the history of the borderlands" as a way to "resist invasion from wildly ambitious countries."[66] Shortly after this essay, on January 1, 1939, Gu Jiegang published another essay in the year's first edition of *Social Welfare,* which he titled "We Need to Dispense with the Phrase 'China Proper'" (*"Zhongguo benbu" yiming ji ying fangqi*). Gu argued that the phrase "China proper" "was fabricated by the Japanese to distort history and provide justification to seize our country's territory." In February he published another piece titled "The Chinese Nation Is One" (*Zhonghua minzu shi yige*), which stated categorically that "all Chinese people are part of the Chinese nation" and declared solemnly that from that day forward no national group—the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, or Miao—should be seen as outside the Chinese nation. This essay, which appeared on February 13, drew a strong response from the intellectual sphere. It not only was reprinted in many other newspapers but also received replies in print from scholars such as Zhang Weihua, Bai Shouyi (1909–2000), and Ma Yi.[67] Even in a time of national crisis, Fu Sinian, who was not on the best terms Gu Jiegang, wrote to Gu to plead with him not to speak so casually about "volatile words like the nation and

territory" and not to publish the "Borderlands Weekly" supplement in *Social Welfare.* Fu Sinian did, however, praise Gu Jiegang's argument that "the Chinese nation is one." He wrote that Gu Jiegang's "original approach was excellent, and was the only possible position to take now in relation to the national question." In a letter to Zhu Jiahua and Hang Liwu, Fu Sinian bitterly criticized some ethnologists for following the tenets of imperialist science: "In places where assimilation is occurring, this group of scholars arrives and uses these ideas to attack assimilation and push for breaking up the nation (*guozu*)."[68]

According to Gu Jiegang, Fu Sinian objected to "Borderlands Weekly" because he believed that it "published too many writings that analyzed the various nationalities that were part of the Chinese nation, which might cause catastrophic divisions within the nation." In fact, Gu Jiegang had written "The Chinese Nation Is One" to allay the concerns of Fu Sinian and other scholars.[69] Those "ethnologists" Fu Sinian mentioned largely referred to Wu Wenzao and Fei Xiaotong. After receiving their academic training abroad, Wu Wenzao and Fei Xiaotong returned to China. It is said that they drew the opprobrium of Fu Sinian, Gu Jiegang, and others because they were still working to distinguish between different national or ethnic groups during the Second Sino-Japanese War and even accepted the definition of "China proper" as the traditionally recognized eighteen provinces of China within the Great Wall.

Looking back today with a less partisan perspective, it would seem that the ideas of anthropologists and ethnologists like Wu Wenzao and Fei Xiaotong were simply the work of specialized ethnologists who accepted Western definitions of national groups (*minzu*) and wanted to undertake the classification of different national groups in China on the basis of such characteristics as body constitution, language, and culture. These ethnologists' understanding of the nation and the state were clearly different from how the historians described in this chapter understood the same questions. For example, in his response to Gu Jiegang's essays, Fei Xiaotong argued that the nation and the state were not one and the same. Fei argued that the state, as established in the political sense, largely worked to guarantee equality for all people, but state identity could not wipe out the differences between different national groups that existed on the basis of characteristics such as body constitution, language, and culture. Within

one China, then, differences could still exist between Manchu, Han, Mongolian, Uighur, Tibetan, and Miao groups.[70] It probably did not occur to Fei Xiaotong, however, that historians would see the classification of different nationalities as "promoting the breakup of the nation." He probably also did not understand mainstream thinking in the scholarly world about the state, the nation, and its territory during the Second Sino-Japanese War. After a couple of rounds in this debate, then, Fei Xiaotong fell silent. As Fei remembered many years later:

> Later I understood that Mr. Gu [Jiegang] was filled with patriotic concern and deeply enraged that Japanese imperialism had managed to establish [an independent] "Manchuria" (*Manchukuo*) and was promoting efforts to break Mongolia away from China. For these reasons, he strongly opposed actions that used ideas about "national groups" to break apart China. I completely supported his political position. Nonetheless, I did not agree with his argument that acknowledging that the Manchus and Mongolians were [distinct] national groups amounted to binding oneself hand and foot or to giving the enemy a reason to act, or that this question had become a factor in the way imperialist forces had split apart our country. Moreover, he believed that if one did not recognize these different national groups, then one could avoid inviting the wolf into the house. [I believed that] the excuse [for imperialism] was not the cause, and setting aside what had been used as an excuse would not prevent the same people from taking violent action. These politically charged debates were of no benefit at the time, however, so I did not continue to debate the matter in print.[71]

Fei Xiaotong's silence captures the way that, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese scholarly world had already reached a consensus to set aside "Five Nations under One Republic" (*Wu zu gonghe*) in favor of "the Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*). We also see that the debates in scholarly circles and pressure from public opinion influenced political parties and the government. From this time on, we see not only the Republican government establishing a variety of committees on southwest China but also both the Nationalist and Communist Parties beginning to offer ideas and opinions related to the Miao and Yi peoples

of the southwest. Even the Committee on Historical and Geographical Education (Shi di jiaoyu weiyuanhui) and the Committee on Border Education (Bianjiang jiaoyu weiyuanhui) in the Republican government's Ministry of Education took a role in ensuring that educational materials had a "national perspective" and a clear "historical narrative." These ideas won unanimous praise from the political and scholarly worlds. Fu Sinian called for "bringing together the Three People's Principles, Chinese history and geography, the history and geography of border regions, and the relationship between China and neighboring states into a clear and simple text that would be translated into the languages of various groups," including Tibeto-Burman languages, the Shan language, the Miao and Yao languages, Vietnamese, and Puxian Min.[72] Gu Jiegang and Ma Yi also advocated rewriting history textbooks and educational materials to "make a new historical context" and "critique the fragmentation and destruction of scholarship that has occurred since the late Qing due to imperialist pollution."[73]

Coda: "Large and Small Branches of the Same Bloodline": Establishing Greater China

At the time "when the Chinese nation faced its greatest crisis," mainstream scholarship returned completely to Liang Qichao's use of culture to define the nation and set the limits of the national question. These ideas can be summarized as follows: First, the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) includes the Han and was formed over time through the amalgamation of different national groups. Second, national groups such as the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Uighur, and Miao are all part of the Chinese nation. Third, "nation" is not "race"; the primary meaning of nation is defined in terms of culture, not bloodlines or physical constitution. Fourth, China is a nation-state called *Zhonghua,* and in times of emergency it must support its people uniting because they all "grew from the same roots." During these years, Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny,* published in 1942, became the most important voice on these matters. This document, which Chiang drafted himself and was edited by Tao Xisheng (1899–1988), begins with a chapter titled "Growth and Development of the Chinese

Nation," in which Chiang called the various ethnic groups within China's borders "large and small branches of the same bloodline." Chiang was keen to point out that China's history could be traced back three thousand years, and that its territories included the Yellow River, the Yangtze River, the Amur River (Ch. Heilongjiang), and the Pearl River, and that the peoples within China included the Khitan, Jurchen, Mongolian, and Manchu, and they had all been assimilated into the Chinese nation, "blended into one body, without the slightest trace of any difference between them." He also said: "According to its historical development, our Chinese nation was formed by the blending of numerous clans."[74]

For people who were in the scholarly world at that time, which was filled with deep feelings about the nation and strong consciousness of the importance of the state, Chiang's words undoubtedly worked to put the strategy of "bringing the Four Barbarians into China" into practice. Although there may have been some noises of disagreement in the background, these ideas became the key in which all songs were sung in this era of crisis.[75]