# Yingkai Li

CONTACT INFORMATION	AS2 05-21 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117568	yk.li@nus.edu.sg https://yingkai-li.github.io Last updated: Jul 2025	
RESEARCH INTERESTS	mechanism design, information design, microeconomic theory, algorithmic game theory		
EMPLOYMENT	Assistant Professor (Presidential Young National University of Singapore	Professor) in Economics, $2024 \ -$	
	Postdoc Associates, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics and Department of Computer Science, Yale University 2022 - 20		
	Research Intern, Microsoft Research	Jun to Aug 2020, 2021	
EDUCATION	Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, Ph.D., Computer Science Advisor: Jason D. Hartline	USA June 2022	
	Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, N M.S., Computer Science	IY, USA May 2018	
	Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai B.S., Computer Science	, China June 2015	
Awards	Northwestern Terminal Year Fellowship 202		
Working Papers	1. Information Disclosure Makes Simple Mechanisms Competitive.  with Yang Cai and Jinzhao Wu		
	2. Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice.  with Jonathan Libgober		
	3. Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules.  with Dirk Bergemann and Tan Gan		
	4. Screening Signal-Manipulating Agents via Contests. $with\ Xiaoyun\ Qiu$		
	5. Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities.  with Yiding Feng and Jason Hartline		
	6. Mechanism Design with Endogeno with Daniel Clark	ous Principal Learning.	
	7. Scale-robust Auctions.  with Jason Hartline and Aleck Jo	hnsen	
	8. Information Acquisition Towards Unanimous Consent. $ \textit{with Boli Xu} $		
	9. Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs.		

with Argyris Oikonomou

- Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Randomized Trials.
   with Alex Slivkins
- 11. Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags.  $with\ Harry\ Pei$

# JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS

- 1. Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Bayesian Auctions.

  with Jing Chen and Bo Li, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2025
- 2. Nearly Minimax-Optimal Regret for Linearly Parameterized Bandits.

  with Yining Wang and Yuan Zhou, Transactions on Information Theory 2024
- 3. Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities.

  with Jiarui Gan and Bo Li,

  Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 2023
- 4. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.

  with Jing Chen, Bo Li and Pinyan Lu,

  Artificial Intelligence 2022
- Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games.
   with Harry Pei,
   Journal of Economic Theory 2021
- 6. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem.

  with Jing Chen and Bo Li,

  SIAM Journal on Computing 2019

## Conference Publications

- 1. Multi-Project Contracts.
  - with Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Tomer Ezra and Inbal Talgam-Cohen, EC 2025
- 2. Competition Complexity in Multi-item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity. with Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng and Matthew Weinberg, EC 2025
- Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions.
   with Yang Cai and Jinzhao Wu,
   EC 2024
- 4. Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition.

  with Jonathan Libgober, EC 2024
- Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation.
   with Yannai Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier, SODA<sup>1</sup> 2024
- 6. Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort.

  with Jason Hartline, Liren Shan and Yifan Wu,

  COLT<sup>2</sup> 2023
- 7. Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts.

  with Tal Alon, Paul Dütting and Inbal Talgam-Cohen, EC<sup>3</sup> 2023
- 8. Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets.

  with Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier, ITCS<sup>4</sup> 2023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Conference on Learning Theory

 $<sup>^3\</sup>mathrm{ACM}$  Conference on Economics and Computation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

9. Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence. with Jason Gaitonde, Bar Light, Brendan Lucier and Alex Slivkins, ITCS 2023 10. Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents. with Yiding Feng and Jason Hartline, **SODA 2023** 11. Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information. EC 2022 12. Optimization of Scoring Rules. with Jason Hartline, Liren Shan and Yifan Wu, EC 2022 13. Almost Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores. WebConf<sup>5</sup> 2022 with Bo Li and Xiaowei Wu, 14. Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples.  $STOC^{6} 2021$ with Yiding Feng and Jason Hartline, 15. Tight Regret Bounds for Infinite-armed Linear Contextual Bandits.  $AISTATS^7$  2021 with Yining Wang, Xi Chen and Yuan Zhou, 16. Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization.  $FOCS^8$  2020 with Jason Hartline and Aleck Johnsen, 17. Multinomial Logit Bandit with Low Switching Cost.  $ICML^{9} 2020$ with Kefan Dong, Qin Zhang and Yuan Zhou, 18. Fair Resource Sharing and Dorm Assignments. with Bo Li,  $AAMAS^{10} 2020$ 19. Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market.  $IJCAI^{11}$  2019 with Jing Chen and Bo Li, 20. Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility. with Yiding Feng and Jason Hartline, EC 2019 21. Nearly Minimax-Optimal Regret for Linearly Parameterized Bandits. with Yining Wang and Yuan Zhou, COLT 2019 22. Revenue Maximization with Imprecise Distribution. AAMAS 2019 with Pinyan Lu and Haoran Ye,

23. Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions.

with Jing Chen and Bo Li,

 $SAGT^{12} 2018$ 

24. Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations. with Bo Li and Wenyang Li,

IJCAI 2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The Web Conference

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>International Conference on Machine Learning

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$ International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

25. Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Brief Announcement).  $ICALP^{13}$  2018

with Jing Chen, Bo Li and Pinyan Lu,

26. Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem.

with Jing Chen and Bo Li,

**ICALP 2017** 

# ACADEMIC SERVICE

Workflow Chair: EC 2024 Senior Program Committee

• WINE<sup>14</sup> 2025

Program Committee

• EC 2025, WINE 2024, EAAMO 2024<sup>15</sup>, EC 2024, WINE 2023, EC 2023, WebConf 2023, WINE 2022

#### Journal Reviewer

• American Economic Review, American Economic Review: Insight, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of the ACM, SIAM Journal on Computing, Operations Research, Mathematics of Operations Research, Games and Economic Behavior, Transactions on Information Theory, Transactions on Economics and Computation, Economic Theory, Artificial Intelligence, Theory and Decision.

#### Conference Reviewer

• STOC, SODA, EC, ICALP, ICML, ITCS, KDD, AISTATS, ESA, WebConf, WINE, COCOA

## Current STUDENTS

- Zeyu Wang (PhD)
- Junjie Chen (Postdoc)
- Yiyao Zhu (Postdoc)

# FORMER Students

- Naman Agrawal (Undergrad), then Predoc at NUS.
- Jiao Hanyang (Undergrad), then Master at NUS.

# Teaching EXPERIENCE

# Instructor - National University of Singapore

EC4501/EC4501HM Economics and Computation	Spring 2025
EC5881/EC5881R - Topics in Microeconomics	Fall 2024

# Teaching Assistant - Northwestern University

COMP_SCI 396 - Online Markets	Spring 2020
COMP_SCI 336 - Design & Analysis of Algorithms	Fall 2019
COMP_SCI 212 - Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science	Spring 2019

#### Teaching Assistant - Stony Brook University

CSE 215 - Foundations of Computer Science	Fall 2015, Spring 2016
CSE 114 - Computer Science I	Spring 2016
CSE 540 - Theory of Computation	Fall 2016

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>EATCS International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Conference on Web and Internet Economics

 $<sup>^{15}\</sup>mathrm{ACM}$  Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization