

Flattening the Curve? On-Demand Delivery Platforms and Demand Dispersion

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
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POMS 2025

Global Online Food Delivery Market

Size, by Product type, 2022-2032 (USD Billion)

■ Grocery Delivery ■ Meal Delivery



The Market will Grow
At the CAGR of:

12%

The forecasted market
size for 2032 in USD:

\$483.9B



market.us
ONE STOP SHOP FOR THE REPORTS

Do on-demand delivery platforms benefit restaurants?

McDonald's and UberEATS Have a Happy Deal



Theron Mohamed Mar 5, 2018 · 3 min read ★

Medium

Benefits:

- Flexible access to delivery service
- An internet channel to serve customers

Li and Wang (2024), *ISR*

Li and Wang (2024), *MS*

Mayya and Li (2024), *ISR*

May 4, 2020, 07:00am EDT | 3,014 views

Why Food Delivery Companies May Be Doing More Harm Than Good, And How Restaurants Can Fix It



Paul Hadfield Forbes Councils Member

Forbes Finance Council COUNCIL POST | Membership (fee-based)

Money

Costs:

- Cannibalizing restaurants' own channels (takeout/dine-in)
- Extra costs (delivery/commission fees)



Bucciferro Family McDonald's

3.5 ★★★★★ (854) · \$1-10

Fast food restaurant ·

Overview

Reviews

About



Directions



Save



Nearby



Send to
phone




Share

ORDER ONLINE


✓ Dine-in · ✓ Drive-through
✓ Delivery




4500 University Ave, Madison, WI 53705



Popular times Fridays




"Flattening the curve" as a public health strategy




Questions

- How does adding an on-demand delivery option shape customer arrival patterns?
 - Flattening the curve, or the opposite?
 - Under what conditions?



A Bottleneck Model

Arnott et al. (1988)



Base Model

Total market size of M homogenous customers

Two channels $j \in \{I, O\}$

- Channel I : dine in
- Channel O : ordering delivery

Assumptions:

- All customers have the same desired dining time t^*
- First-come, first-served. No discrimination based on arrival channels

Customer Cost Function

Total cost for a customer joining the queue at time t via channel $j \in \{I, O\}$ is

$$C_j(t) = \alpha_j W(t) + \beta |deviation\ from\ t^*| + \gamma_j \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{Delivery less sensitive to waiting} \\ \alpha_I \geq \alpha_O \end{array}$$

- $W(t)$: Waiting time in queue $W(t) = Q(t)/s$, i.e., queue length divided by capacity
- γ_I : fixed cost associated with dine in (e.g., cost to get to the restaurant)
- γ_O : fixed cost associated with delivery (e.g., delivery fee)

Decision variables:


- $j \in \{I, O\}$: dine in or delivery
- t : time to join the queue. For dine in, time of arriving at the restaurant; For delivery, time of placing the order

Case I: Dine-In Only

$$C_I(t) = \alpha_I W(t) + \beta |deviation\ from\ t^*| + \gamma_I$$

$$W(t) = Q(t)/s$$

Trade-off between waiting costs and deviation costs




Case O: Delivery Only

$$C_j(t) = \alpha_j W(t) + \beta |\text{deviation from } t^*| + \gamma_j$$

$$W(t) = Q(t)/s \quad \alpha_I > \alpha_O$$

Compared to “Dine-In Only”:

1. More orders arrive earlier



Empirical Analysis

Panel Data

30,565 restaurants in California from Jan 2018 to Dec 2019

Restaurant characteristics from Yelp

- Price level, rating, cuisines, location, etc.

Restaurant partnership with major food delivery platforms

- DoorDash, Grubhub & Uber Eats, combined mkt share >95%

Restaurant visits from a mobile tracking company

- 35+ million unique devices, good representative of US population
- # hourly visits to each restaurant location
- Duration of stay
 - 0~20 minutes
 - 20~120 minutes
 - > 4 hours

Category	Number of Restaurants	Number (Percentage) on Platforms	Average Price Level (0-4)	Average Rating
Full-Service	15,164	6,893 (45.5%)	1.76	4.04
Limited-Service	12,104	6,000 (49.6%)	1.22	3.95
Snack & Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars	3,297	888 (26.9%)	1.02	3.90

Empirical Measures of Dispersion

- For a restaurant on day d , the density of order arrivals at time h is

$$p_{d,h} \triangleq \frac{N_{d,h}}{\sum_{h=\underline{T}}^{\overline{T}} N_{d,h}}$$

- Shannon index of dispersion is

$$ShannonIndex_d = - \sum_{h=\underline{T}}^{\overline{T}} p_{d,h} \ln(p_{d,h})$$

- Larger *ShannonIndex* means a more dispersed (i.e., flatter) distribution

More Empirical Measures of Demand Dispersion


- Simpson's index of dispersion (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)

$$SimpsonIndex_d = 1 - \sum_{h=\underline{T}}^{\overline{T}} p_{d,h}^2$$

Larger *SimpsonIndex* means a more dispersed (i.e., flatter) distribution

- Ripley's K and L functions
 - Detect whether points have a random, dispersed or clustered distribution pattern
 - Take into account the temporal sequence of customer orders
 - KS statistics on Ripley's K function

Model-Free Evidence



Overall Effects on Dispersion and Total Demand

	Dispersion			Total Demand
	<i>ShannonIndex</i>	<i>SimpsonIndex</i>	<i>KS Ripley</i>	<i>Visits</i>
<i>OnPlatform</i>	0.025*** (0.0021)	0.0043*** (0.00057)	-0.0073*** (0.00053)	0.018*** (0.0021)
Restaurant Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	2,485,960	2,485,960	2,485,960	2,485,960
adj. R-sq	0.894	0.592	0.899	0.637

Impact on Different Types of Restaurants

	<i>ShannonIndex</i>
<i>OnPlatform</i>	0.012*** (0.0033)
<i>OnPlatform</i> × <i>Limited-ServiceRestaurants</i>	0.025*** (0.0042)
<i>OnPlatform</i> × <i>SnackNonalcoholicBeverageBars</i>	0.0066 (0.0090)
Restaurant Fixed Effects	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes
<i>N</i>	2,485,960
adj. R-sq	0.894

Moderating Role of Residential and Job Density

- The increase in visits is weaker in higher-density areas. Similarly, the effect of flattening the demand curve is also less predominant for restaurants operating in denser areas.

	<i>Total Demand</i>		<i>ShannonIndex</i>		<i>KSRipley</i>	
<i>OnPlatform</i>	0.017*** (0.0021)	0.018*** (0.0022)	0.024*** (0.0021)	0.024*** (0.0021)	-0.0069*** (0.00052)	-0.0069*** (0.00053)
<i>OnPlatform</i> × <i>RAC</i>	-0.020*** (0.0018)		-0.033*** (0.0030)		0.0092*** (0.00077)	
<i>OnPlatform</i> × <i>WAC</i>		-0.015*** (0.0033)		-0.030*** (0.0042)		0.0077*** (0.0011)
Restaurant Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2,485,650	2,485,650	2,485,650	2,485,650	2,485,650	2,485,650
adj. R-sq	0.638	0.638	0.894	0.894	0.899	0.899

Changes in Employee Count

- Platform-driven demand smoothing occurs primarily through the utilization of existing spare capacity rather than through expansion of capacity.

	<i>Workers</i> ^{120~240}	<i>Workers</i> ^{>240}
<i>OnPlatform</i>	-0.0022 (0.031)	0.069 (0.050)
Restaurant Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
<i>N</i>	2,290,234	2,290,234
adj. R-sq	0.697	0.500

Summary

- Flatten the curve
- Theoretical lens: bottleneck model
- Empirical evidence:
 - the demand curves at limited-service restaurants are more evened
 - the effect of flattening the demand curve is also less predominant for restaurants operating in denser areas
 - no change in employee count

Thank you

Q&A