

# *Algorithm Design and Analysis*

CS  
330

## LECTURE 1

### Analysis of Algorithms

- Course information
- Why study algorithms?
- Stable matching problem

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# Algorithm Design and Analysis

*Theoretical study of how to solve computational problems*

- sorting a list of numbers
- finding a shortest route on a map
- scheduling when to work on homework
- answering web search queries

(*Computational problem*: precisely defined set of **inputs** and, for each input, **acceptable outputs**)

# Algorithms

- Definition: Finite set of unambiguous instructions for solving a problem.
  - An algorithm is **correct** if on all legitimate inputs, it outputs the right answer in a finite amount of time
- Can be expressed as
  - pseudocode
  - flow charts
  - text in a natural language (e.g. English)
  - computer code

# Etymology of “Algorithm”

*Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Musa  
al-Khwarizmi (c. 780 -- 850 AD)*

- Persian (?) astronomer and mathematician
- “On calculating with hindu numerals”  
a treatise in Arabic, 825
- “Agoritmi de numero Indorum”  
translation into Latin, 12th century

Author’s name, mistaken for a plural noun, came to mean  
“calculation methods”



# Data Structures

- **Data structures** are ways to store information for which there are **algorithms** for performing particular operations (retrieving/manipulating information),
- e.g.
  - linked lists
  - hash tables
  - arrays
  - trees
  - heaps

# Course information

- 1. Staff**
- 2. Lectures vs  
labs**
- 3. Textbook**
- 4. Piazza & Gradescope**
- 5. Grading scheme**
- 6. Homework**
- 7. Programming exercises**
- 8. Name plate**
- 9. Collaboration policy**

# Collaboration Policy

- You may discuss homework problems with up to 5 other students in the class
  - No outside help (including web sources)
  - **Write your own solution**
  - You must **acknowledge collaborators**
    - Or write “Collaborators: None”
  - Discussion is fun!
- You may spur discussion on Piazza by posting questions
  - The more specific your question, the better.
  - If in doubt, post to instructors.
- Absolutely no collaboration on exams.

# Collaboration Tips

- Give everyone a chance to speak
  - If you're shy, speak up!
  - If you're outgoing, give others the floor.
- Listen
- Ask each other questions
- Be aware of your own biases, *e.g.*
  - Men have a tendency to talk over women
  - Nonnative speakers have it harder

# Important Dates

- Wednesday, September 11: Homework 1 due
  - Weekly thereafter
- Thursday, October 24, 2019: Midterm
- Thursday, November 28: No class ☺
- Tuesday, December 9: Last class ☹
- Tuesday, December 17 (tentative): Final exam

# Course Objectives

- classical algorithms and data structures
- analysis of algorithms
- standard design techniques

# Why study algorithms?

- a *language* for talking about program behavior
- standard set of algorithms and design techniques
- feasibility (what can and cannot be done)
  - halting problem, NP-completeness
- analyzing correctness and resource usage
- successful companies (Google, Mapquest, Akamai)
- computation is fundamental to understanding the world
  - cells, brains, social networks, physical systems all can be viewed as computational devices
- IT IS **FUN!!!**

# Example: Integer Addition

- Input: Positive integers  $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$
- Output:  $a + b$

Preschool-age children often use the following algorithm

```
Fingers( $a, b$ ):  
     $i \leftarrow 0$   
    while( $i \leq b$ ):  
         $a \leftarrow a + 1$   
         $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
```



Running time scales with  $b$ .

If  $b$  has 100 digits, this could take as many as  $10^{100} - 1$  executions of the while loop!

(The sun will die out in about  $10^{27}$  cycles of a typical PC's processor)

But there is a much better algorithm!

# Better Integer Addition

- You learned a better algorithm in grade school!
- Write  $a, b$  in decimal form
  - Suppose  $a$  has  $m$  digits and  $b$  has  $n$  digits
- Write one over the other and add columns from right to left, taking the carry with you as you go

$$\begin{array}{r} a_1 a_2 a_3 a_4 \cdots a_m \\ + b_1 b_2 b_3 \cdots b_n \\ \hline a + b \end{array}$$

- Can we analyze the running time?
  - Suppose operations on digits take one unit of time.
  - The algorithm will take something like  $3(m + n)$  time units
    - (It depends on how exactly you handle carries.)
  - Adding two 100-digits numbers only takes humans a few minutes
    - You'll be done well before the sun dies out
  - Total time scales with  $\log_{10} a + \log_{10} b$ 
    - It is exponentially faster than the fingers algorithm!

# Performance isn't everything

- Typical goal: Find most space- and time-efficient algorithm for given problem.
- What else is important?
  - modularity
  - maintainability
  - functionality
  - robustness
  - user-friendliness
  - programmer time
  - simplicity
  - extensibility
  - reliability

# Course Objectives

## Material

- Classical algorithms
- Analysis of algorithms
- Design techniques

## Skills

- Algorithmic Thinking
- Problem-solving & mathematical skills
- Technical writing

# Prerequisites

- CS 112 (basic programming, data structures, sorting algorithms, “big O” notation)
- CS 131, MA 293 or equivalent (proofs, proofs, proofs, counting, and probability)

CS majors usually complete Group B coursework (any two of CS 132, CS 235 and CS 237) before taking this class

- (You may need to fill in some material if you haven’t.)

# A first problem: Stable Matching

# Matching Residents to Hospitals

- **Goal:** Given a set of preferences among hospitals and medical school students, design a **self-reinforcing** admissions process.
- **Unstable pair:** applicant  $x$  and hospital  $y$  are **unstable** if
  - $x$  prefers  $y$  to its assigned hospital, and
  - $y$  prefers  $x$  to one of its admitted students
- **Stable assignment:** no unstable pairs.
  - Individual self-interest will prevent any applicant/hospital deal from being made.
- 2012 Nobel prize in economics for work on matching algorithms (“mechanisms”)

# Stable Matching Problem

- **Goal:** Given  $n$  men and  $n$  women, find a "suitable" matching.
  - Participants rate members of opposite sex.\*
  - Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
  - Each woman lists men in order of preference from best to worst.

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

\* NOT a faithful model of real life relationships.

# Stable Matching Problem

- **Unstable pair:** man  $m$  and woman  $w$  are **unstable** if
  - $m$  prefers  $w$  to his assigned match, and
  - $w$  prefers  $m$  to her assigned match
- Unstable pairs have an incentive to elope
- **Stable matching:** no unstable pairs.

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Stable Matching Problem

- **Input:** preference lists of  $n$  men and  $n$  women
- **Goal:** find a stable matching if one exists

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Stable Matching Problem

- Q. Is assignment X-C, Y-B, Z-A stable?

	favorite ↓	least favorite ↓	
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

	favorite ↓	least favorite ↓	
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Stable Matching Problem

- Q. Is assignment X-C, Y-B, Z-A stable?
- A. No. Bertha and Xavier will hook up.

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

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Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Stable Matching Problem

- Q. Is assignment X-A, Y-B, Z-C stable?

favorite  
↓

least favorite  
↓

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Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

favorite  
↓

least favorite  
↓

	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Stable Matching Problem

- Q. Is assignment X-A, Y-B, Z-C stable?
- A. Yes. X and Y got their first choice; Z is the last choice for every woman. No man can participate in an unstable pair.

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

*Men's Preference Profile*

	favorite ↓		least favorite ↓
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

*Women's Preference Profile*

# Existence of Stable Matching

- Q. Do stable matchings always exist?
- A. Not obvious a priori.

# Stable Roommate Problem

- **Stable roommate problem**

- **2n** people; each person ranks others from **1** to **2n-1**.
- Assign roommate pairs so that no unstable pairs.

	<i>1<sup>st</sup></i>	<i>2<sup>nd</sup></i>	<i>3<sup>rd</sup></i>
<i>Adam</i>	B	C	D
<i>Bob</i>	C	A	D
<i>Chris</i>	A	B	D
<i>Doofus</i>	A	B	C

*A-B, C-D*  $\Rightarrow$  B-C unstable  
*A-C, B-D*  $\Rightarrow$  A-B unstable  
*A-D, B-C*  $\Rightarrow$  A-C unstable

- **Observation.** Stable matchings do not always exist for stable roommate problem.

# An Algorithm for Stable Matching

- Propose-and-reject algorithm. [Gale-Shapley 1962]

```
Initialize each person to be free.  
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {  
    Choose such a man m  
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed  
    if (w is free)  
        assign m and w to be engaged  
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')  
        assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free  
    else  
        w rejects m  
}
```

*Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

*Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Victor proposes to Bertha.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Victor proposes to Bertha.

- Bertha accepts since previously unmatched.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Diane.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

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Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

Wyatt proposes to Diane.

- Diane accepts since previously unmatched.

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Xavier proposes to Bertha.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
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Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Xavier proposes to Bertha.

- Bertha dumps Victor and accepts Xavier.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Victor proposes to Amy.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Victor proposes to Amy.

- Amy accepts since previously unmatched.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Amy.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Amy.

- Amy rejects since she prefers Victor.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

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Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Diane.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

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Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

Yancey proposes to Diane.

- Diane dumps Wyatt and accepts Yancey.

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Bertha.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Bertha.

- Bertha rejects since she prefers Xavier.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Amy.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Amy.

- Amy rejects since she prefers Victor.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Wyatt proposes to Clare.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

Wyatt proposes to Clare.

- Clare accepts since previously unmatched.

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Zeus proposes to Bertha.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Zeus proposes to Bertha.

- Bertha rejects since she prefers Xavier.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Zeus proposes to Diane.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Zeus proposes to Diane.

- Diane rejects Yancey and accepts Zeus.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Clare.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Victor	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

Yancey proposes to Clare.

- Clare rejects since she prefers Wyatt.

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Bertha.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Bertha.

- Bertha rejects since she prefers Xavier.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Victor	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Victor	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

Yancey proposes to Erika.

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Victor	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

Yancey proposes to Erika.

- Erika accepts since previously unmatched.

### *Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

### *Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

STOP

- Everyone matched.
- Stable matching!

# Propose-and-Reject Algorithm

- Propose-and-reject algorithm. [Gale-Shapley 1962]

```
Initialize each person to be free.  
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {  
    Choose such a man m  
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed  
    if (w is free)  
        assign m and w to be engaged  
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')  
        assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free  
    else  
        w rejects m  
}
```

# Proving correctness of the algorithm

What do we need to prove?

For all correctly-formed inputs,

- Algorithm terminates and outputs a matching
- Matching is perfect
- Matching is stable

# Proof of Correctness: Termination

- **Claim 1:** Algorithm terminates after at most  $n^2$  iterations of while loop.

## Proof:

- *Invariant:* Each time through the loop a man proposes to a new woman.
- There are only  $n^2$  possible proposals. ▀

	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	A	B	C	D	E
Wyatt	B	C	D	A	E
Xavier	C	D	A	B	E
Yancey	D	A	B	C	E
Zeus	A	B	C	D	E

	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	W	X	Y	Z	V
Bertha	X	Y	Z	V	W
Clare	Y	Z	V	W	X
Diane	Z	V	W	X	Y
Erika	V	W	X	Y	Z

An instance where  $n(n-1) + 1$  proposals required

# Propose-and-Reject Algorithm

- **Claim 2.** Men propose to women in decreasing order of preference.
- **Claim 3.** Once a woman is matched, she never becomes unmatched; she only "trades up."

*Men's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Victor	Bertha	Amy	Diane	Erika	Clare
Wyatt	Diane	Bertha	Amy	Clare	Erika
Xavier	Bertha	Erika	Clare	Diane	Amy
Yancey	Amy	Diane	Clare	Bertha	Erika
Zeus	Bertha	Diane	Amy	Erika	Clare

*Women's Preference Profile*

	0 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>
Amy	Zeus	Victor	Wyatt	Yancey	Xavier
Bertha	Xavier	Wyatt	Yancey	Victor	Zeus
Clare	Wyatt	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus	Victor
Diane	Victor	Zeus	Yancey	Xavier	Wyatt
Erika	Yancey	Wyatt	Zeus	Xavier	Victor

# Proof of Correctness: Perfection

- **Claim 4:** All men and women get matched.
- **Proof:** (by contradiction)
  - Suppose, for sake of contradiction, some guy, say Zeus, is not matched upon termination of algorithm.
  - Then some woman, say Amy, is not matched upon termination because the algorithm maintains a partial matching (one-to-one correspondence) at all times.
  - By Claim 3, Amy was never proposed to.
  - But Zeus proposes to everyone, since he ends up unmatched.
  - Thus, there cannot exist unmatched people. ▀

# Proof of Correctness: Stability

- **Claim 5:** No unstable pairs.

- **Proof: (by contradiction)**

- Suppose A-Z is an unstable pair: they prefer each other to their partners in Gale-Shapley matching  $S^*$ .

- *Case 1:* Z never proposed to A.

- Z prefers his GS partner to A. ← men propose in decreasing order of preference

- A-Z is stable.

- *Case 2:* Z proposed to A.

- A rejected Z (right away or later)

- A prefers her GS partner to Z. ← women only trade up

- A-Z is stable.

- In either case A-Z is stable, a contradiction. ▀

# Stable Roommate Problem

- **Stable roommate problem**

- **2n** people; each person ranks others from **1** to **2n-1**.
- Assign roommate pairs so that no unstable pairs.

	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Adam	B	C	D
Bob	C	A	D
Chris	A	B	D
Doofus	A	B	C

$A-B, C-D \Rightarrow B-C$  unstable  
 $A-C, B-D \Rightarrow A-B$  unstable  
 $A-D, B-C \Rightarrow A-C$  unstable

- **Exercise.** Where does the correctness proof break down for the roommates version?

## Two more exercises

- Does the order in which unmatched men are selected change the final matching?
- If women propose (instead of men), what changes?  
Is it better to propose or to receive proposals?

# *Algorithm Design and Analysis*

CS  
330

## **LECTURES 2 & 3** **Analysis of Algorithms**

- Asymptotic notation
- Basic data structures

**Dora Erdos  
Adam Smith**

# **Useful Functions and Asymptotics**

# Permutations and combinations

- Factorial: “ $n$  factorial”

$$n! = n \cdot (n - 1) \cdot \dots \cdot 2 \cdot 1$$

= number of permutations of  $\{1, \dots, n\}$

- Combinations: “ $n$  choose  $k$ ”

$$\binom{n}{k} = \frac{n \times (n - 1) \times \dots \times (n - k + 1)}{k \times (k - 1) \times \dots \times 2 \times 1} = \frac{n!}{k!(n - k)!}$$

= number of ways of choosing an unordered subset of  $k$  items in  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  without repetition

# Review Question

- In how many ways can we select two disjoint subsets of  $\{1, \dots, n\}$ , of size  $k$  and  $m$ , respectively?
- **Answer:**

$$\binom{n}{k} \binom{n-k}{m} = \binom{n}{m} \binom{n-m}{k} = \binom{n}{m+k} \binom{m+k}{k}$$

# Asymptotic notation

$O$ -notation (upper bounds):

$f(n) = O(g(n))$  means

there exist constants  $c > 0$ ,  $n_0 > 0$  such that  $0 \leq f(n) \leq cg(n)$  for all  $n \geq n_0$ .

**EXAMPLE:**  $2n^2 = O(n^3)$   $(c = 1, n_0 = 2)$



*functions,  
not values*

# Asymptotic Notation

- **One-sided equality:**  $T(n) = O(f(n))$ .

➤ Not transitive:

- $f(n) = 5n^3; g(n) = 3n^2$
- $f(n) = O(n^3) = g(n)$
- but  $f(n) \neq g(n)$ .

➤ Alternative notation:  $T(n) \in O(f(n))$ .

# Set Definition

$O(g(n)) = \{ f(n) : \text{there exist constants } c > 0, n_0 > 0 \text{ such that } 0 \leq f(n) \leq cg(n) \text{ for all } n \geq n_0 \}$

**EXAMPLE:**  $2n^2 \in O(n^3)$

(*Logicians:*  $\lambda n.2n^2 \in O(\lambda n.n^3)$ , but it's convenient to be sloppy, as long as we understand what's *really* going on.)

# Examples

- $10^6 n^3 + 2n^2 - n + 10 = O(n^3)$
- $n^{1/2} + \log n = O(n^{1/2})$
- $n (\log n + \sqrt{n}) = O(n^{3/2})$
- $n = O(n^2)$

# $\Omega$ -notation (lower bounds)

$O$ -notation is an *upper-bound* notation. It makes no sense to say  $f(n)$  is at least  $O(n^2)$ .

$\Omega(g(n)) = \{f(n) : \text{there exist constants } c > 0, n_0 > 0 \text{ such that } 0 \leq cg(n) \leq f(n) \text{ for all } n \geq n_0\}$

**EXAMPLE:**  $\sqrt{n} = \Omega(\log n)$  ( $c = 1, n_0 = 16$ )

# $\Omega$ -notation (lower bounds)

- **Be careful:** “Any comparison-based sorting algorithm requires at least  $O(n \log n)$  comparisons.”
  - Meaningless!
  - Use  $\Omega$  for lower bounds.

# $\Theta$ -notation (tight bounds)

$$\Theta(g(n)) = O(g(n)) \cap \Omega(g(n))$$

**EXAMPLE:**  $\frac{1}{2}n^2 - 2n = \Theta(n^2)$

Polynomials are simple:

$$a_d n^d + a_{d-1} n^{d-1} + \dots + a_1 n + a_0 = \Theta(n^d)$$

# $\mathbf{o}$ -notation and $\omega$ -notation

$O$ -notation and  $\Omega$ -notation are like  $\leq$  and  $\geq$ .  
 $o$ -notation and  $\omega$ -notation are like  $<$  and  $>$ .

$o(g(n)) = \{ f(n) : \text{for every constant } c > 0, \text{ there is a constant } n_0 > 0 \text{ such that } 0 \leq f(n) < cg(n) \text{ for all } n \geq n_0 \}$

**EXAMPLE:**  $2n^2 = o(n^3)$  ( $n_0 = 2/c$ )

# Overview of Asymptotic Notation

Notation	... means ...	Think...	E.g.	$\lim f(n)/g(n)$
$f(n)=O(g(n))$	$\exists c > 0, n_0 > 0$ $\forall n > n_0 :$ $0 \leq f(n) < cg(n)$	Upper bound	$100n^2 = O(n^3)$	If it exists, it is $< \infty$
$f(n)=\Omega(g(n))$	$\exists c > 0, n_0 > 0, \forall n > n_0 :$ $0 \leq cg(n) < f(n)$	Lower bound	$2^n = \Omega(n^{100})$	If it exists, it is $> 0$
$f(n)=\Theta(g(n))$	both of the above: $f=\Omega(g)$ and $f=O(g)$	Tight bound	$\log(n!) = \Theta(n \log n)$	If it exists, it is $> 0$ and $< \infty$
$f(n)=o(g(n))$	$\forall c > 0, \exists n_0 > 0, \forall n > n_0 :$ $0 \leq f(n) < cg(n)$	Strict upper bound	$n^2 = o(2^n)$	Limit exists, $= 0$
$f(n)=\omega(g(n))$	$\forall c > 0, \exists n_0 > 0, \forall n > n_0 :$ $0 \leq cg(n) < f(n)$	Strict lower bound	$n^2 = \omega(\log n)$	Limit exists, $= \infty$

# Common Functions: Asymptotic Bounds

- **Polynomials.**  $a_0 + a_1n + \dots + a_dn^d$  is  $\Theta(n^d)$  if  $a_d > 0$ .
- **Polynomial time.** Running time is  $O(n^d)$  for some constant  $d$  independent of the input size  $n$ .
- **Logarithms.**  $\log_a n = \Theta(\log_b n)$  for all constants  $a, b > 0$ .

$$\text{For every } x > 0, \log n = o(n^x).$$

↑  
can avoid specifying the base      ↓  
log grows slower than every polynomial

- **Exponentials.** For all  $r > 1$  and all  $d > 0$ ,  $n^d = o(r^n)$ .
- **Factorial.** By Sterling's formula,

$$n! = (\sqrt{2\pi n}) \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^n (1 + o(1)) = 2^{\Theta(n \log n)}$$

↑  
Every polynomial grows slower than every exponential  
grows faster than every exponential