

# Attacks on Implementations of Secure Systems

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# Foreword

This document contains the collected scribe notes created by the students of my course titled ”Attacks on Secure Implementations”, given in Ben-Gurion University during Spring 2019.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Motivation

The following story is a true story about the NSA - the US intelligence agency and their classified internal journal named "Cryptologic Spectrum". In the US, there is a law called "The Freedom of Information Act" (FOIA). This law states that in general, any person can ask for an access to government documents. So, in 2007, a lawyer named Michael Ravnitzky, went ahead and asked for the table of contents of all the articles in the NSA journal. The NSA tried postponing his request for several years, but finally granted him what he asked, along with a censorship on some classified titles. Then, after receiving that, he simply continued asking for the other classified titles!

One article that was published in the journal, named "Tempest: A Signal Problem", tells us about something that happened in the years of World War II. In those years, there were some significant scientific developments, one of them being digital wireless communication. People were able to send messages from one side of the world to the other, using digital signals. However, the US army that actually used this way of communication was not willing to be intercepted by the enemy so in order to protect those transmissions, it had to encrypt them.

At the end of the encryption process, we get a ciphertext, which can be transmitted without any concern. The obstacle which prevents attackers from decrypting the ciphertext and discover the key is the algorithm which has been implemented very well. Let us assume we have a weak computer to perform the encryption, given that in the years of World War II there were no resistors, no iterative circuits - what can the adversary do to find the key?

The adversary can build a machine which does the decryption - insert the ciphertext into the machine and try all the keys (brute force). But... how do you know which key is the correct one? Simple, there is a logic to the plaintext. It could be a chat in English, a weather broadcast, even an executable - in general, it is something you can check the syntax for, so with a very high probability, if you get an output that starts with "Heil Hitler" - the key you used to decrypt the ciphertext is the correct key. We need to remember that the encryption machine was not very complex in those years, and to keep the secure messages safe, they had to find a way to protect their ciphertexts. The solution to that issue is a one-time pad.

One-time pad, also called Vernam Cipher, is a simple and powerful encryption system. The idea behind this technique is that the length of the key is the same length as the plain text, and to encrypt you just add them together - if we use digital bits we use XOR, and if we use letters we define an addition operation. It's called a one-time pad because you can use your pre-shared key only once.

Why does this one-time pad protect from brute force attacks? Because  $\text{plaintext} \oplus \text{key} = \text{ciphertext}$  and  $\text{ciphertext} \oplus \text{key} = \text{plaintext}$ , meaning we can take the ciphertext and any plaintext we want, XOR them together, and get the corresponding random key. In a very secure encryption technique, like AES-256, there are  $2^{256}$  possible keys and with a ciphertext which is 1MB, we have  $2^{8000000}$  possible keys, but if we don't know the key there are  $2^{256}$  random plaintext, and maybe just one of them is the real one. The one-time pad has been proven

to be completely secure by Claude Shannon, and there is no way to break it.

Back to the years of World War II, to use one-time pad those days, they used machine which called **AN/FGQ-1 mixer** [1] as can be seen in Figure 1.1.



Figure 1.1: **AN/FGQ-1 Mixer**. Two-way teletypewriter repeater and mixer equipment enclosed in a wooden Table-type cabinet.

This machine is a kind of a box, and next to the box, was seated a wireless operator with a typewriter. The tape that came out from the typewriter was with holes that spooled into the box together with another piece of tape, which was the key. Inside the box there were little lights that lit through the holes, and little punches which would punch holes in the third piece of tape. The XOR result of the plain text and the key was the output of one operation of the machine. Then, the wireless operator fed the ciphertext into the digital radio

to transmit.

Is the machine classified? If the system is designed right - you can tell the adversary whatever you want except for the secret key, and the system will remain secure.

So, these machines were used during the war, until they broke down, and at the time that happened, they have been sent to the Bell Labs (which produced the machines). The engineers who tried to repair one of the machines that sat in a room, and on the other side of the room, there was an **Oscilloscope**.

An Oscilloscope is like babies monitor - just for signals. You connect the Oscilloscope to an electric circuit, and there is a line that rising every time there is a difference in voltage. Figure 1.2 demonstrates such a setup. This Oscilloscope was not connected to the mixer, it was just laying at the other side of the room, connected to some other test equipment. The engineers discovered that every time this mixer entered the digit into the tape, they would get a pulse at the Oscilloscope. This is because that when you send a current into an electric monitor, the current is moving through the conductor and electromagnetic current is being generated. The Oscilloscope has little wires, and the electromagnetic waves can travel through those wires. As a result, we have a transmit antenna and a receive antenna, so the Oscilloscope measures the holes (the ciphertext) in the tape. Another possible explanation is that when the punches punch a hole in the tape, it consumes so much current that the voltage in the room drops a little, and then the lines in the Oscilloscope, without being connected to anything, just “jump”.

The engineers discovered [2] that the top-secret information inside this machine was being transmitted over the air. The process the engineers were supposed to do is called responsible disclosure, meaning to report a bug. Like good engineers, they told the Secret Service people about this bug, but they did not take their diagnosis seriously. So what did they do? The Bell labs were located next to the US Secret Service of-




Figure 1.2: **Oscilloscope.** An electronic test instrument which graphically displays varying signal voltages as a function of time.

fice, so they set up an antenna and they listened for an hour for radio transmissions that the Secret Service got in their office, and they gave the Secret Service their “top-secrets” analyzed messages.

Obviously, the US Secret Service realized that the reported attack was not esoteric, and they asked for a solution from the engineers. The solution of Bell labs was to modify the mixers - to surround them in a wire cage which will absorb the radiation coming out from the machine, to put a shield on the machine (to make sure the power consumption is not affecting the outside), and to make sure that people are not getting close to the machine more than 30 meters. The Secret Service people decided to accept just the distance solution and not the filtering/shielding/isolation solutions, because of the high expenses and time that would cost to modify all the machines during wartime.

In 1954, the Soviet Union published a tender to build military phones. They were very specific about protecting the phones by shielding them and making sure they do not generate too much radiation. In addition, they were also publishing

strict tenders for other things like engines, turbines, etc. In fact, this is an evidence that in those years, the Soviet Union actually knew about the “bug” in the machine. In conclusion, a one-time pad is the most secure cipher known, but from the story above, we can see it was broken. So, what was broken? **The implementation.**



Figure 1.3: **Modern Systems.** A few modern systems that are vulnerable to implementation attacks.

Here are a couple of **Modern Systems** which will break using attacks on their implementation:

- **Xbox 360:** Xbox is a PC that plays nothing but games, it is very cheap and you pay for the games. Attackers, obviously, want to crack the Xbox - to play games for free, to watch movies on the device or to run Linux. In Xbox there are some integrity checks, and one of the checks was done by a command called “memory compare” [3], so you would calculate the integrity check over whatever software it supposes to run and you would have it stored in the secure memory, and then you would try to compare using these 2 values. This command leaks the length of the number of

correct bytes before the first incorrect byte, so if you compare 2 blocks and the first bit is different - the response will be fast, and if the blocks identical until the very last bit - it would take a longer. This is one of the things that was enough to break the machine.

- **Oyster Card:** it is a computer without power supply and inside this computer there are stored values. Attackers could attack this card to take the train for free. There are a lot of ways to attack the implantation of that card [4, 5].
- **Car Keys :** Car hacking has become more commonplace in recent years, due to the increased integration with electronic systems that include the car's own lock system. With keyless entry systems, it uses wireless or radio signals to unlock the car. These signals can in turn be intercepted and used to break into the car and even start it. One such technique is called SARA or Signal Amplification Relay Attack. [6]
- **FPGA** [7]: a piece of hardware which is a very versatile, meaning we can find it many kinds of hardware - routers, audio equipment, spaceships, etc. the FPGA has a firmware installed inside, and if you want to copy some designs you need to find the firmware. The firmware is encrypted, but a bunch of Germans researches discovered [8] that if you measure the power consumption of the FPGA while it is encrypting the firmware - you can find out what is the key.

When we implement an algorithm without being careful, we can be exposed to implementation attacks. To protect ourselves against those attacks, we must protect the implementation, but as we saw at World War II, this countermeasure has a price. It makes the system more expensive, and heavier.

## 1.2 System Implementation

The simplest form of a computational system is a device which gets input, makes a computation and finally produces an output as can be seen in Figure 1.4. We assume that our system contains a secret, which is not revealed to anyone before, during and after the computation process.



Figure 1.4: **Simplest Model.** The device make a computation using the secret and the input, and outputs the result.

But, if that all what the “system” has, it is not a system, it is just an algorithm. What turns an algorithm to be a system? It is the implementation!

Think about ATM - very simple device without cryptography. The input is our credit card and a 4-digits PIN code, the output is money. If we do not know the PIN code we can go over the all possible combinations of 4-digits code (brute force), and finally find the correct PIN. Unfortunately, we have a limit of 3 trials until the card is being shredded. What an attacker can do?

As an output, and besides the money, we have also some additional outputs which have been produced by the implementation of the physical system. Those additional outputs are called “Side Channels” and they are in fact outputs that the system designer did not intend to produce. Those outputs are demonstrated in Figure 1.5

For example, we can measure the time it takes to complete an operation, measure electromagnetic radiation, listen to the sound of the device while an operation is being completed, measure power, etc. These are **Passive Attacks** - meaning




Figure 1.5: **Side Channels of the System.** Caused by the implementation of the system

that we are letting the device do its “stuff” while we are just listening.

There are also **Active Attacks** - also called fault attacks which try to break the device under test in a way that it will be “just a little bit broken”. It can be done by turning it off in the middle of a calculation, changing its clock, etc. As a result, we might not get the actual secret, but we will get some kind of errors that can tell us a lot about the secret.




Figure 1.6: **Fault Attacks.** Manipulating the device through side channels

## 1.3 Security of a System

When we can say that a system is secured? Usually, we define a system as a “secured system” if the system maintains three aspects of information security, known as the CIA [9] triad:

- **Confidentiality** - when you are interacting with a system, you only get what you wanted to get. For instance, when I check my test grade, I will get my grade and not my friend’s grade. If I eavesdropped a conversation for example, it will no longer be confidential.
- **Integrity** - all the data in the system is correct. A possible attack could be that one side of the communication will accept a message they are not supposed to accept. If I managed to manipulate a bank withdrawal, or jailbreak a device, its integrity would be compromised.
- **Availability** - the system must work in a reasonable time. A possible attack could be a Denial of Service (DOS).

In Figure 1.7 the relation between those aspects is demonstrated as the Triangle of Information Security.

We do not have to use cryptography to secure our system. For example, if someone goes to some event without invitation, there is a security to prevent him from getting in.

An **Algorithm** is a process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations. An example of an algorithm is GCD/Extended GCD. An algorithm is secure when it is implementing the CIA triad mentioned above. A **Protocol** is when you need to get something done, for example, AES - the input is a 128-bit key and a 16-bytes plaintext (in case of different amount of bytes we can use block cipher like CBC), and the output is a ciphertext.

The millionaire problem [10] is a classic problem by Yao and which introduce the question of whether two millionaires can




Figure 1.7: **CIA Triangle**. The classic model for information security. Defines three objectives of security: maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Each objective addresses a different aspect of providing protection for information.

learn who is richer, without revealing to one another how much money they each have. One possible solution, they could invite a poor man, tell him the secret of how much money each one has, and the poor man will announce who is richer.

Cryptographically Secure Algorithms and Protocols:

- **Encryption and Decryption** - Public key-RSA, Symmetric key-AES
- **Signing and verification** - must be an asymmetric key. There are 2 parties - signing party and verifying party, who gets the public key. The difference between signing and decryption is when one side sends a signed message it comes with a signature, and when one side decrypts a message it is sending only the ciphertext.
- **Key Exchange** - Diffie Hellman algorithm.
- **Hashing and HMACs** - a hash is a function that gets a long input (of arbitrary length) and outputs a

fixed size output. A hash function is secure when it is difficult to find collisions in it, i.e 2 messages with the same hash. HMAC is a hash with a key - when you change the key, the hash is also changed.

- **Multiparty Computation** - secure protocols for auctions, voting, etc.
- **Cryptocurrency** - Bitcoin for example.

Secure Architectures without cryptography:

- **Secure Policies** - like access control to a military base, for instance.
- **User Separation and Sandboxing** - a program is divided into parts which are limited to the specific privileges they require in order to perform a specific task.
- **Virtual Memory** - an application has a view of the memory, and we can take to pointer and point to some parts of the memory. We will get our old memory (which we are allowed) or the app will crash due to access to invalid memory space. In theory, we cannot get another user's memory.

## 1.4 Constructing and Using a Threat Model

What is the main advantage we have as attackers which allows us to break implementations that are secure in theory? The main advantage is that we have more inputs and outputs which translates into side channels and leakage, so together it means that we can break a completely secure algorithm. But when is an algorithm's implementation secure? CIA triad holds, but the thing that is missing here is the **story**, i.e. what are we allowing the attacker to do with the system?

The more power we give the attacker, the less impressive the attack becomes.

Let us have a look at a little system where the assumptions were broken:



Figure 1.8: **ATM theft.** The thieves simply ripped the machine out of the wall.

Figure 1.8 presents a wall of a bank in Ireland, on which an ATM was constructed. As we know, the ATMs are very secure systems - they have encryption, they check our ID very carefully and if we make any mistake they shred the card. What just happened, is that the ATM was stolen from the wall of a bank by thieves which took a vehicle and smashed it through the wall. They then loaded the ATM on their track, and left the vehicle to prevent the police from chasing them. We can learn from this story, that although the ATM was secure, the threat model was wrong.

The most important thing about the threat model is the story. Once we have the story, we can find out what are the different properties. We specify them as follows:

- **Victim Assets** - what does the victim have that I can steal?

- **Cryptographic secretes (keys)** - the keys are short, and when one key is stolen, - the attack has succeeded. There are two kinds of keys, long term, and short term.
  - \* **Long Term Key** - the private key that identifies a server. If the key is stolen, it will be possible to sign malware as a software update.
  - \* **Short Term Key** - a key that is generated during a session and is initialized from the long-term key. If this key gets stolen it is possible to decode all the messages in the current session and modify/inject them.

Notice that if the long-term key is stolen, it does not mean the short-term key is stolen.

- **State secrets** - for example, ASLR or configuration of a system. If someone can find out the addresses of functions in the memory of a victim, he can write exploits.
- **Human secrets** - things which the users do not want to reveal like passwords, medical condition, etc.

- **Attacker Capabilities** - what can the attacker do?

- **Off-path** - the attacker is sitting somewhere in the world - cannot observe or communicate with you, but he can attack you somehow.
- **Passive Man in the Middle** - attacker who can see the victim communication with the server, but cannot communicate with the victim directly.
- **Active Man in the Middle** - an attacker who can interact with the server and can do replay attacks.
- **Physical Access** - an attacker who has physical access to the victim. For example, removing or unplugging or melting stuff in the system.

An important thing we need to consider when we are talking about attacker capabilities is the other defenses we must protect our system with, like guards or cameras. Another thing is the scale of the attack, meaning how many systems we can attack at once. If the attack is physical, it is probably just one system. If the attacker attacks from an android application, he might attack all the phones in the world.

- **Attacker Objectives** - who are the attackers? What do they want?
  - **Stealing stuff** - the attacker might want to steal your secrets.
  - **Duplicating stuff** - for example, the attacker can buy one smart TV card, and generate a thousand duplicates from this card to sell them.
  - **Forging stuff** - the attacker creates something new, driver licenses for instance.
  - **Corrupting stuff** - the attacker breaks something and decommissioned the system.

Of course, the more limits we put on the attacker, the more and more impressive the attack becomes.

## 1.5 Related Work

The whole topic of Attacks on implementation has been widely researched, and side channels attacks have been found on many various types of implantation. Here are a few interesting such types of side channels attacks and examples for actual attacks on those topics:

- **Audio-based attacks** - for example, ultrasonic beacons and acoustic cryptanalysis. a type of side-channel attack that exploits sounds emitted by computers or other devices. Most of the modern acoustic audio-based

attacks focus on the sounds produced by computer keyboards and internal computer components, but historically it has also been applied to impact printers and electromechanical deciphering machines. here are a few examples of real-life acoustic attacks:

- **1** In 2004, Dmitri Asonov and Rakesh Agrawal of the IBM Almaden Research Center announced that computer keyboards and keypads used on telephones and automated teller machines (ATMs) are vulnerable to attacks based on the sounds produced by different keys. Their attack employed a neural network to recognize the key being pressed. By analyzing recorded sounds, they were able to recover the text of data being entered. These techniques allow an attacker using covert listening devices to obtain passwords, passphrases, personal identification numbers (PINs), and other information entered via keyboards. In 2005, a group of UC Berkeley researchers performed a number of practical experiments demonstrating the validity of this kind of threat.
- **2** A new technique discovered by a research team at **Israel’s Ben-Gurion University Cybersecurity Research Center** allows data to be extracted using a computer’s speakers and headphones. Forbes published a report stating that researchers found a way to see information being displayed, by using a microphone, with 96.5 percent accuracy.
- **Differential fault analysis** those attacks take multiple traces of two sets of data, then computes the difference of the average of these traces. If the difference is close to zero, then the two sets are not correlated, and if the p-value (typically  $\geq 0.05$ ) is higher, correlation can be assumed to be possible. An example of an attack that was achieved by this is cracking the

difficult-to-solve 128-bit AES. Using differential fault analysis it was shown that the key can be broken into 16 bytes, where each byte can be solved individually. Testing each byte requires only 28, or 256 attempts, which means it would only take  $16 \times 256$  or 4,096 attempts to be able to decipher the entire encryption key.

- **Data remanence** Data remanence is the residual representation of digital data that remains even after attempts have been made to remove or erase the data. This residue may result from data being left intact by a nominal file deletion operation, by reformatting of storage media that does not remove data previously written to the media, or through physical properties of the storage media that allow previously written data to be recovered. Data remanence may make inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information possible should the storage media be released into an uncontrolled environment (e.g., thrown in the trash or lost) an example of an attack that is using data romance is cold boots which steal sensitive cryptographic materials like cryptographic keys by Keeping DRAMs at lower room temperature, say -50 degrees C, and making it hard for the Dram to preserve his data properly. more details on this attack can be found here [cold-boot-attack](#).
- **Optical attacks** these attacks range from the relatively simple (eavesdropping on a monitor via reflections) through to complex (communicating with an infected device via LED blinks). An article of optical attack utilizing the photonic side-channel against a public-key of common implementations of RSA [optical side-channel against a public-key of RSA](#).

In addition to those attacks, there are even more side channels attacks research and new weaknesses are discovered every time. More of such attacks like Specter, RowHammer, and many more will be described widely in this course.

## **Research Highlights**

# A Note on the Confinement Problem

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The paper[11] discusses the meaning and implications of confining a problem during its execution. Multiple examples are presented to describe the problem and necessary conditions are stated and justified.

We are already familiar with the need of protection systems to safeguard the data from unauthorized access or modification and programs from unauthorized execution. This requires creating a controlled environment where another, perhaps untrustworthy program could be run safely and was solved prior.

Terminology - The customer wants to ensure that the service cannot read or modify any data which he did not explicitly grant access to.

Even after we prevented all unauthorized access the service may be still able to injure the customer, this can be achieved by leaking the input data that the customer gives it. The service might leak data which the customer regards as confidential and generally there will be no indication that the security of data has been compromised. From now, the problem of constraining a service will be called the confinement

problem. We would like to characterize this problem precisely and describe methods to block some of the possible escape paths for data from confinement.

Our main goal is to confine an arbitrary program. The program may not be able to work as usual when it is under confinement, but it will be unable to leak data.

Some of the possible leaks might be (1) collecting data and returning it to the owner when called, (2) writing to a permanent file in its owner's directory, (3) creating a temporary file for the owner to read before the service to complete its work, (4) Using the system's interprocess communication facility. After presenting these types of leaks, the paper continues to elaborate about more advanced leaks through covert channels, i.e. channels which are not intended for information transfer.

The first method is done by exploiting interlocks which prevent files from being open for writing and reading at the same time. The service and its owner can use this to simulate a shared Boolean variable which one program can set and the other can read, for transmitting a single bit. The second method is created by varying the ratio of computing to input/output or paging rate. A concurrently running process can observe the performance of the system and receive this information.

The channels described above fall into three categories: storage of various kinds, Legitimate communication channels and covert channels.

The paper then continues to discuss rules for confinement. The first observation is that a confined program must be memoryless. We can now state a rule of total isolation, forcing a confined program to not make any calls to any other programs. However, this rule is impractical. We need to improve this situation. A new confinement rule that we can

formulate is transitivity, meaning that if a confined program calls another untrusted program, the called program must also be confined.

Then, two simple principles are presented. The first one is called masking. This rule states that a confined program must allow the caller to determine its input into the different channels. However, in the case of covert channels, one further point must be made. We need to ensure that the input of a confined program to covert channels conforms to the caller's specifications. This might require slowing the program down, generating spurious disk references etc.

# Chapter 2

## Temporal Side Channels I

### 2.1 History

In 1995, at the age of 22, Paul Kocher released a paper called Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Helman, RSA, DSS and other systems [12].

Before it was published, he wrote about it in a mailing list of Cypherpunks<sup>1</sup> which included all sorts of people like mathematicians, photographers, artists anarchists and more. The attack was first demonstrated in 1997 at a cryptography conference. And later, in 1998 an academic paper was published describing how to perform the attack. In 2003 and 2007 this kind of attack was used to break SSL.

### 2.2 The Threat Model

The objective of the attacker is to discover the password. The attacker goes about this by sending unlimited queries

---

<sup>1</sup>A cypherpunk is any activist advocating widespread use of strong cryptography and privacy-enhancing technologies as a route to social and political change. Originally communicating through the Cypherpunks electronic mailing list, informal groups aimed to achieve privacy and security through proactive use of cryptography

and measures their time. Unlimited queries are not always possible. Some devices are disabled after three to five tries. The same applies to time measurements. However the assumption is that these are possible according to Kerckhoffs's principle(law), that states that everything except the key is public knowledge.

Figure 2.1 describes the Threat Model on an implementation of a secure system. It is important to mention that we're talking about attacking an implementation, and not the algorithm itself as we consider the algorithm or protocol being examined as completely secure.




Figure 2.1: The Threat Model. Image from JF Dhem1998. The attacker can send a message to the implementation and get an answer from it. Also - the attacker is able to measure the time it takes for the implementation to compute the output

## When is a timing attack even possible?

1. Physical access to the device. (for example: Smart card, Crypto wallet, Electronic voting machines)
2. Sharing a virtual machine with the service (for example: Swiping a credit card)
3. Remote access to a device (access to a device over the network, which may be very noisy and may be rather difficult to implement)

## 2.3 Timing attack

A timing attack is based on the time it takes to complete an algorithm.

```

1 var secretPassword = "HASODSHELI";
2
3 function verifyPassword(inPassword) {
4     if (inPassword.length != secretPassword.length) {
5         return false;
6     }
7
8     for (i = 0; i < secretPassword.length; i++) {
9         if inPassword[i] != secretPassword[i] {
10             return false;
11         } // if
12     } // for
13
14     return true;
15 }
```

Figure 2.2: A simple and efficient password checking algorithm. In line 4 there's a check if there length of the password is the same as the length of the input. In line 8 there's an iteration over all of the characters in the password

Consider the algorithm for password checking as described in figure 2.2

In a scenario where a timing attack is not possible, breaking the password requires the attacker to bruteforce the password, checking every possible string for one successful attempt.

Let's assume the password is the length of 16 characters, and if the password only contains english upper-case characters we have 26 possible values for each of the 16 characters in the password. The first character has 26 possiblites, the second has 26 possiblites and so on. So bruteforcing a password like this requires  $26^{16}$  different attempts, which cannot be completed by any computer in a decent amount of time. In general, for a password of length  $n$  and character range of size  $k$ , breaking the password will take  $O(k^n)$  attempts.

Now let's consider the scenario where a **timing attack is possible**. To perform a timing attack, the attacker takes advantage of the fact that when the program checks for strings equality, the comparison will finish as soon as it finds one character that doesn't match. Consider the following example where the attacker tries the 3 following attempts and measures the time it takes for the machine to respond. The attacker tries "AAAA" and measures 0.2ms, then tries "BAAA" and measures 0.5ms lastly tries "CAAA" and measures 0.2ms again. The attack can be pretty sure that the first character is "B". Now, checking the whole password does not require iterating of all possible combinations of strings of size  $n$ . All it takes is to iterate over all possible values of each character, say  $k$ , and repeat that  $n$  times. This results in a total runtime of  $k + k + k + \dots = nk = O(n)$

We can now break the password in a reasonable amount of time, even without knowing the length of the password we're trying to crack.

## 2.4 Timing Attack Defenses

After discussing the potential of such attack, we now consider the possible mitigations we can implement on our system to prevent such attacks.

### Mitigation

We can consider adding a random wait time after checking each one of the characters. The problem of course is that the whole process of checking for a valid password becomes slower. And of course, if the attacker can perform a lot of measurements on our system, since the noise is random, the attacker would be able to ignore it.

## Prevention

The second type of countermeasure is prevention, making sure that our system is completely resistant to timing attacks.

### Prevention Method 1: Padding

```

1 var secretPassword = "HASODSHELI";
2
3 function verifyPassword(inPassword) {
4     var result = true;
5
6     // pad secret password and input password to same length
7     var longPadding = '                                     ';
8     var paddedInPassword =
9         (longPadding + inPassword).slice(-longPadding.length);
10    var paddedSecretPassword =
11        (longPadding + secretPassword).slice(-longPadding.length);
12
13    for (i = 0; i < paddedSecretPassword.length; i++) {
14        if paddedInPassword[i] != paddedSecretPassword[i] {
15            result = false;
16        } // if
17    } // for
18
19    return result;
20 }
```

Figure 2.3: Prevention method 1, padding the user guess and the secret password to the same length and check all characters even if there's a mismatch in the first character.

The first method we examine is to pad the secret password and the user's guess to the same length. Also - the function doesn't exit as soon as we see a character mismatch. The code is described in figure 2.3

The problem with this implementation is that every time there's a character mismatch we execute additional code, which is loading the variable `result` and writing the value `false` to it. This may seem insignificant in the beginning but actually, this makes our code **much more vulnerable than it was before**. As now the time it takes for the entire function to complete is linearly dependant on the amount of characters mismatches we have, this allows an attacker to perform the same attack from before with no significant changes to his original timing attack.

One might think of a fix which is adding another branch to the `if` statement that will do some garbage operation like `foo = false` just so that the attacker might not be able to distinguish between a match and a mismatch. The problem with this fix might be that the access time to one variable may be different than the access time to another variable, and the attacker will be able to tell the difference between them.

## Prevention Method 2: Hashing

```

1 var secretPassword = "HASODSHELI";
2
3 function verifyPassword(inPassword) {
4     var result = true;
5
6     var hashedInPassword = CryptoJS.SHA3(inPassword);
7     var hashedSecretPassword = CryptoJS.SHA3(secretPassword);
8
9     for (i = 0; i < hashedSecretPassword.length; i++) {
10         if hashedInPassword[i] != hashedSecretPassword[i] {
11             result = false;
12         } // if
13     } // for
14
15     return result;
16 }
```

Figure 2.4: Secure password checking using a secure hash function

The right way to store passwords is with hashing (storing the hash of the password rather than the password in plain text). A hash is a cryptographic function which has the property called ”The Avalanche Property” which means if even 1 bit is flipped in the input, at least half of the bits of the output are flipped as a result. This means that even if my guess is really close to the password (1 bit away from the real password) I cannot really know which bits are correct and which are not due to the Avalanche property.

Using hashes to perform a secure password check is described in the algorithm in figure 2.4 A guess is being hashed before it is compared against the hash of the true password. An attacker might use the same methods as described previously to try to leak the hash of the true password, but that would

be very difficult as the attacker does not input the hash, the attacker only controls a string that is later being hashed by the algorithm. So trying the previous methods to leak the password would not work assuming the hash function is properly implemented.

A possible leak occurring from this method is the length of the true password. In line 7 of the algorithm in figure 2.4 the hash of the true password is computed. Line 7 makes the total run time of the program dependent upon the length of the true password. While this might be risky, this is easy to fix - we can just precompute the hash of the true password and use it whenever the algorithm runs. This is done for example in Linux where the hashes of user's passwords are stored in a file in `/etc/shadow`.

## 2.5 The Algebra Behind RSA

The next thing we're going to perform is a timing attack on the RSA crypto system. But before we dive into how we break RSA (next chapter) we're going to discuss the algebraic foundation of RSA [13].

The RSA cryptosystem lives in something called a multiplicative group. The group that is  $Z_n^*$ .

We take 2 random prime numbers;  $p, q$  and assign  $n = pq$ . The group  $Z_n^*$  contains all the numbers from 1 to  $n - 1$  which do not divide  $n$  (that is, do not divide  $p$  or  $q$ ). For example: for  $p = 3$  and  $q = 5$ ,  $n = 3 * 5 = 15$  so  $Z_n^* = \{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}$ .

Like all groups, this group has the associative operation which in our case is the modular multiplication, that is because, as we mentioned before, this group is a multiplicative group. The group is also closed under that operation.

The group also has an identity element, 1. Which when multiplied by another element from the group - does not change it.

The last property this group has is that every element  $r$  in the group has an inverse element  $r^{-1} \in Z_n^*$  so that  $r * r^{-1} = 1$ .

Since the exponentiation is just repeated multiplication - we consider exponentiation to also be a closed operation under that group. Each element has an order, the order always divides  $(p - 1)(q - 1)$  (Fermat's little theorem). When the element is raised to the power of the order, the result of the exponentiation (under the modulu of course) is 1, the identity element in the group.

It also important to note that we cannot compute  $(p - 1)(q - 1)$  from knowing  $n$

## Elementary Operations of RSA

To use the RSA crypto system to encrypt and decrypt messages you first have to generate the infrastructure, that means deciding on  $p$  and  $q$ , both large prime numbers and computing  $n = pq$  and  $(p - 1)(q - 1)$  denoted as  $\phi(n)$

- **Choosing a public and private key pairs** Choose  $e \in Z_{\phi(n)}^*$ ,  $d \in Z_{\phi(n)}^*$  such that  $ed = 1 \bmod \phi(n)$ . The public key is the pair  $\langle n, e \rangle$  and the private key pair is  $\langle n, d \rangle$ .
- **To encrypt a message** Choose  $m \in Z_n^*$  as your message. The cipher is  $m^e \bmod n = c$
- **To decrypt a message** Since  $c = m^e \bmod n$ , perform  $c^d = m^{ed} = m^1 = m \bmod n$

Example: Consider  $p = 3$ ,  $q = 5$ . So we can compute  $n = 3 * 5 = 15$  and  $\phi(15) = 2 * 4 = 8$  Let's assume we choose  $e = 3$  and  $d = 11$ . We consider the message 2.

To encrypt, we compute  $2^3 = 8 \bmod 11$ , Which is the cipher. To decrypt, we're using the private key 11 as follows:  $8^{11} = 2 \bmod 15$ . Now we have our message back, 2.

Since this is not a crypto course, we will not go into any more details about the algebra behind RSA. However it is important for us to familiarize ourselves with the basics of RSA in order to understand later how it was optimized and how can we break it.

## Research Highlights

Timing and side channel attacks are well-known concepts in computer security and have been used to attack many kinds of systems, among those systems are cryptographic implementations, OpenSSL, SSH sessions, web applications and virtual machine environments. The following subsection will be devoted to showcase inspired works on some of the susceptible systems mentioned above. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, one of the pioneers to introduce these of attacks is Paul C Kocher in his paper [12]. He described the ability of an adversary to find the private key of a cryptosystem by carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations. Another interesting work was done by D. Brumley et. al. [14] who expanded the concept of timing attacks to apply for general software systems. Specifically, he and his colleagues devised a timing attack against OpenSSL. Through experiments they showed that they can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. D. X. Song et. al. [15] showed that using statistical techniques on timing information received through exploitation of two relatively minor weaknesses in SSH can lead to exfiltration of users typing in SSH session. In recent years, a wide variety of defense methods to protect both user space and kernel space code have been developed. As such, the attack surface of conventional exploitation strategies has been reducing significantly. Thus, both user space and kernel space code have become a target of timing side channels attacks. Hund et. al. [16] presented that an adversary can implement a timing attack against the memory management system to deduce information about the privileged address space layout.

**See also**

1. John Wiley and Sons Chichester , "Overview about Attacks on Smart Cards by Wolfgang Rankl, Munich", 3rd edition at John Wiley and Sons in September 2003.
2. Thomas Popp, "An Introduction to Implementation Attacks and Countermeasures", Graz University of Technology, Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) Graz, Austria.

# Chapter 3

## Temporal Side Channels Part 2

### recap

In the previous chapter we discussed about RSA cryptosystem [17]. In this chapter, we presented the most expensive operation in the RSA algorithm which is when we need to take the message ( $m$ ) and raise it to the power of the key.

$$C = m^e \pmod{n}$$

The simplest algorithm for raising a number to a power uses modular multiplication which is an expensive operation.

Modular multiplication is pretty straightforward. It works just like modular addition. You just multiply the two numbers and then calculate the standard name. Examples for Modulo 7 and 15 can be found in Figure 3.1. Why modular multiplication is so expensive? Because we have to take the modulo many times which is as expensive as division<sup>1</sup>. So, one way to do this is by keep multiplying and doing the modular reduction only at the end. The problem with that approach is that the runtime of multiplication grows exponentially with the number of the multiplicands. Another way

---

<sup>1</sup>Division is the most expensive integer operation exists, and therefore we don't want to do many divisions

**Modular Multiplication:**

$$5 * 6 = 30 \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$$

$$3 * 2 = 6 \equiv 6 \pmod{7}$$

$$4 * 7 = 28 \equiv 13 \pmod{15}$$

$$10 * 6 = 60 \equiv 0 \pmod{15}$$

Credit: (<http://cs.brown.edu/courses/cs007/modmult/node1.html>)

Figure 3.1: Modular multiplication

is to do a  $modn$  with each multiplication, but the numbers keep growing and the runtime keep raising, so we can't do that either.




Figure 3.2: Visualization of powers of 10 from one to 1 billion.

As we discussed in the last chapter, the slowest and most trivial way of implementing modular multiplication  $g^e mod n$  is to take  $g$  and multiply it by itself  $e$  times, and every once in a while do modulo  $n$ , (either every multiplication or just in the end). The problem with this is that if  $e$  is a number that consists of 1024 bits, then in the worst case we might need to multiply  $g$  in itself  $2^{1024}$  which is a huge number.

## 3.1 Efficiently Implementing Modular Exponentiations

There are two ways for efficiently implementing modular exponentiations:

1. performing fewer modular multiplications (instead of  $2^{1000}$  we would like to do 1000).
2. Make each modular multiplication to be less expensive.

The best case would be same as regular multiplication over integer. These two ways will reduce the cost of modular multiplication and modular exponentiations, and this is something we really want to do in order to make RSA work on a device.

So, assuming we are engineers, we want to implement modular exponentiations very cheaply. The right thing to do is obviously use some crypto library, but let's assume that's not possible, and we are inventing a new CPU. There is a very famous book online called the handbook of applied cryptography (Figure 3.3) [18]. The book is like a recipe book, and is filled with algorithms, proofs and equations you need for cryptography. Chapter 14 deals with efficient algorithms for multiplicative proofs. The book contains several ways to do modular exponentiation.

The following approach is called the left to right binary exponentiation, also known as square multiply.

The inputs are  $g$  (we want to raise  $g$  to the power of  $e$ ,  $g^e$ ) and  $e$  which is a bit string of  $t$  ( $t$  bits), (see Figure 3.4). The most significant bit is always 1, because there is no logic behind raising something to the power of zero. In the end of this algorithm  $A$  will be the result of  $g$  raised to the power of  $e$ .

In the beginning we set  $A$  to be equal to 1, and go over the bits from left to right (from the most significant to the least). Each time we square  $A$  ( $A = A * A$ ), but we only multiply




Figure 3.3: Cover of the handbook of applied cryptography

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**Algorithm** Left-to-right binary exponentiation

---

INPUT:  $g \in G$  and a positive integer  $e = (e_t e_{t-1} \cdots e_1 e_0)_2$ .  
 OUTPUT:  $g^e$ .

1.  $A \leftarrow 1$ .
  2. For  $i$  from  $t$  down to 0 do the following:
    - 2.1  $A \leftarrow A \cdot A$ .
    - 2.2 If  $e_i = 1$ , then  $A \leftarrow A \cdot g$ .
  3. Return( $A$ ).
- 

Figure 3.4: The pseudo-code was taken from the handbook of applied cryptography, page 615.

by  $g$  ( $A = A * g$ ) if the current bit is 1 (the  $i^{th}$  bit). Now, what happens when we do a squaring operation downstairs? What happens to the exponent upstairs? Its multiplied by 2. So  $g^{e2} = g^{2e}$  and  $g * g^e = g^{e+1}$ . Now, we can think of a binary string, you can write down the bits using shifting (multiplying by 2 is shifting) and adding 1 is just putting one in the place.

So how many modular multiplications will be performed in order to raise  $g$  to the power of  $e$ ? The answer is  $O(t)$ . In the best case - what is the lowest amount of multiplications that will be performed? the answer is  $t + 1$  as the first bit is 1 (most significant) so we do step 2.2 one time and all the rest of the bits are zeros, and so we will only do step 2.1 in

these cases. In the worst cast - what is the highest amount of multiplications that will be performed? Answer:  $2t$ , if all the bits equal to 1 we will do 2 multiplications for each bit (step 2.1 and step 2.2). In any case, this is equal to  $O(t)$ , so instead of  $2^t$  as in the old algorithm we perform at most  $2t$  multiplications.

Lets review an example. Lets calculate  $7^6 = 7^{(110)}$  in the group  $\mathbb{Z}_{15} = 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14$ .

1.  $A = 1 = 7^{(0)}$
2.  $A = A * A = 1 = 7^{(0<<1)} = 7^{(0)}$
3.  $A = A * 7 = 7 = 7^{(0+1)} = 7^{(1)}$
4.  $A = A * A = 4 = 7^{(1<<1)} = 7^{(10)}$
5.  $A = A * 7 = 13 = 7^{(10+1)} = 7^{(11)}$
6.  $A = A * A = 4 = 7^{(11<<1)} = 7^{(110)}$

Are there any ways doing this even faster? The answer is yes as we can see in the handbook of applied cryptography. The general idea of these algorithms is that we do some pre-computation. The idea of RSA algorithm is that there is a public key  $g$  that is a known number. So if we know what  $g$  is we can prepare all sort of lookup tables. One method for doing that is called the window method, where we take three bits at a time, and instead of doing  $A * g$  we do  $A * g * g$  or  $A * g * g * g \dots$  (8 values we can use), and instead of  $A = A * A$  we do  $A = A * A * A$  and so on, this is the sliding window. Another method is called the binary method, which is well described in the handbook of applied cryptography (page 616 algorithm 14.83). We can assume that any reasonable crypto implementation is not doing the naive method. It will use the left to right or the right to left binary exponentiation which is basically the same idea as one of the window methods.

But what if we want the modular multiplication to be cheaper? A way to achieve this is called the Chinese remainder theorem

(CRT) [19], named after Sun Tzu Suan that was a teacher from the 5th century and wrote a book that contained all sorts of riddles and questions.

The Chinese remainder theorem addresses the following type of problem. One is asked to find a number that leaves a remainder of 0 when divided by 5, remainder 6 when divided by 7, and remainder 10 when divided by 12. The simplest solution is 370. Note that this solution is not unique, since any multiple of  $5 \times 7 \times 12 (= 420)$  can be added to it and the result will still solve the problem. The theorem can be expressed in modern general terms using congruence notation. Let  $n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k$  be integers that are greater than one and pairwise relatively prime (that is, the only common factor between any two of them is 1), and let  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k$  be any integers. Then there exists an integer solution  $a$  such that  $a \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$  for each  $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$ . Furthermore, for any other integer  $b$  that satisfies all the congruences,  $b \equiv a \pmod{N}$  where  $N = n_1 n_2 \cdots n_k$ . The theorem also gives a formula for finding a solution. Note that in the example above, 5, 7, and 12 ( $n_1$ ,  $n_2$ , and  $n_3$  in congruence notation) are relatively prime. There is not necessarily any solution to such a system of equations when the moduli are not pairwise relatively prime.

Why does this help us? Allegedly, we have to do 2 operations instead of one. The way to do exponentiations in CRT is that we take our big number and do modulo  $p$  and then modulo  $q$  and then there is a CRT step. So what is the size of the operand used by these two modular exponentiations? Assuming that  $p$  and  $q$  are of the same size? Let's say  $p$  and  $q$  are 1000 bits so the size of  $n$  is 2000 bits (we add the number of bits of each number in the multiplication). So each number in the multiplicative group is about 2000 bitw because it's mod  $N$ , so multiplying two numbers is going to be multiplying two numbers which are 2000 bits. If we reduce it to modulo  $p$  and modulo  $q$  the numbers are going to be half the size (1000 bits). So if we take a multiplication and now we will multiply two numbers that are half the bit length

what will be the speed improvement? It's times 4. Instead of one big modular exponentiation we have one small modular exponentiation which costs quarter of the time and another one which cost quarter of the time followed by a CRT step which is a modular multiplication of the two. How much we spent in total? Answer: a bit more than half the time, twice speedup. Why can't we do that further? Divide  $p$  and do it again? Answer: because  $p$  and  $q$  are prime numbers and that's the whole point.

On top of that, there is a very nice trick, in order to make modular multiplications very cheap and this actually makes modular multiplications to be as cheap as regular multiplication. Multiply two numbers is pretty easy but the problem is reducing after multiplying. So what if there is a way of doing modular multiplications without the reduction step? So in 1985 a genius mathematician called peter Montgomery published a paper called “modular multiplication without a reduction step” [20]<sup>2</sup>. The idea behind the paper is that we enter into a magical world called the Montgomery representation. When you step into the Montgomery world, modular multiplications do not require a reducing step and when you finish you just step out of this world and you are back with your result. It's still cost you like a multiplication but it doesn't cost you the extra reduction step. So, what is the idea of the Montgomery reduction? We want to calculate  $g^e \text{mod } n$  and to do that we need to pay a lot for modular reduction. So, the first thing we do is enter the Montgomery representation and do the  $\text{Mont}(g^e)$  and each one of this multiplication steps is going to be about as difficult as regular multiplication (Figure Figure 3.5). After we finished with that we exit the Montgomery representation and then we have our result. Entering and leaving the Montgomery representation costs as much as modular multiplication but in the middle it's as cheap as regular representation.

Now lets review how the Montgomery Exponentiation works inside

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<sup>2</sup><https://www.hackersdelight.org/MontgomeryMultiplication.pdf>




Figure 3.5: General sketch of Montgomery Exponentiation

1. Choose a value  $R$ ,  $R > n$ , which is easy to use (usually a large power of 2)
2.  $\text{Mont}(a) = a * R \pmod n =^{\text{def}} a \pmod n$
3.  $\text{Mont}(ab) = a * b * R \pmod n = \underline{a} * \underline{b} * R^{-1} \pmod n$
4.  $= (\underline{a} * \underline{b} + (\underline{a} * \underline{b} * n' \pmod R) * n) / R \pmod n$   
 // if this is more than  $n$ , subtract  $n$
5.  $A = A * A = 4 = 7^{(11<<1)} = 7^{(110)}$
6. Result: Instead of modular reduction, we only (sometimes) subtract

The first thing to do is to choose a very large value  $R$  which is larger than  $n$  and should be easy to use ( $a$  large power of 2) for instance 1 and 1000 bits of zero. What does it mean easy to use? To multiply and divide by a power of 2 you just shift left and right. To calculate the modulo of a very large number that is a power of 2 you do bitwise and with this large power of 2. If  $R = 100000$  and  $x = 10101010101110$  so to do a modular reduction we just take the lower bits which are 01110 in this case. So we see it's very cheap operation with  $R$ , but  $R$  is not useful outside the situation. So to enter the Montgomery representation we are going to multiply by  $R$ . This multiplication is modulo  $n$ , and this is a bit

expensive. But how do we know that  $R$  is inside the multiplicative group? How do we know that multiplying by  $R$  doesn't throw me outside of  $\text{mod}n$ ? The answer is: how do we know that 2 is inside the group? Because what is this group? This group is a multiple of two prime numbers, and they are odd. Thus 2 doesn't divide either one of them so 2 is in the group and  $2 * 2 * 2...2$  is in the group. We call the new number  $\underline{a}$ . The idea is that the numbers in the Montgomery representation is cheap so how is it cheap with  $\underline{a}$  If we multiply  $a$  and  $b$  in the Montgomery's representation It will be:  $a * b * R \text{mod}n$ . but if I want to do that using  $\underline{a}$  and  $\underline{b}$  we get:  $\underline{a} * \underline{b} * R^{-1} \text{mod} n$  because of the extra  $R$ . So every time we multiply two numbers we need to take out the extra  $R$ . Inverting  $R$  is simple using GCD and can be done before we start the computation. There are much more derivations made to get to  $(\underline{a} * \underline{b} + (\underline{a} * \underline{b} * n'(\text{mod}R) * n)) / R(\text{mod}n)$ .  $\underline{a} * \underline{b}$  is just a single multiplication.  $\underline{a} * \underline{b} * n'(\text{mod} R)$  - Notice that  $\text{mod}R$  is a cheap operation because  $R$  is 1 with lot of zeroes. ( $n$  prime ( $n'$ ) is just precomputed number that doesn't really matter to us). Then we multiply it by  $n$  (another multiplication) and then we divide it by  $R$  which is also a simple operation. So, we have 4 multiplications and we need a modular reduction which is the main problem. Montgomery proofed that this sum is no more than  $2^n$ . So how do you do a reduction if the number is between 0 to  $2^n$ ? You put an if statement. If  $x$  is less than  $n$  you do nothing, if  $x$  is larger than  $n$  you subtract it from the number  $n$ . So now, instead of division we do a couple of multiplications over integers which is not that expensive and then we sometimes subtract. This is a lot cheaper than the basic option and it is widely used. Notice that the if statement in the algorithm, which is influencing the execution time and might enable a timing attack.

## 3.2 Temporal Side Channel on RSA

Let's review how to do a temporal side channel attack on RSA. Kocher described this attack on his paper in 1995 among other things. If the RSA runs slower than there are more subtractions and by timing the execution we can recover the key. So how this can be done? How to recover the key by timing the execution? There was a fantastic paper "A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack" [21] which the remainder of this section is based on. So what is the game here? Assume you are an attacker who wants to commit a timing attack on the secure implementation of RSA. If we have some device (e.g. a smart card) that we can send him requests, for instance "please allow to pay 1000 dollars to Alon" (see Figure 3.6). The smart card check that I have 1000 dollars in the bank account and then it replies "I approve this transaction and sign it". So this card has stored a value inside which means he has money inside. On the other hand, we want that if we request "pay Alon 1 million dollars" the smart card will say "I don't have enough funds! I am going to refuse". As an attacker we would like to be able to sign any message we want, mainly messages like "please send Yosi 1 billion dollars". The smart card will not allow it but if we got the private key (signing key) we can sign whatever message we want. So we send the smart card a message that is unsigned and he in return sends back a signature which is the response signed with the private key:  $m^s \text{mod } n$  where s is the secret key. We assume that as an attacker we can send as many queries as we want and we can recover the responses (the signatures). The goal is to extract the secret key.

So, let's look a bit closer on the attack model - what messages we can send to the smart card? Can we send any message we want? The answer is that we can only send valid messages - if the message is not valid then the smart card will just throw an exception. This is somewhere in the scale between the weakest model and the most powerful model. In this




Figure 3.6: The timing attack principle

scenario the most permissive attack model is a known plain text. Known plain text means that we can see the messages as they are go in to the smart card but cannot change them. So the next thing is choosing the plain text. We can't just choose any plain text, it has to follow a certain rule. The next thing is completely chosen plain text which doesn't enforce any rules, and the last thing is adaptive plain text which means we can look at the response and we can choose the next query that we will send. So, what is the attack model, we send requests, the smart card is signing them, and we get the responses and also assuming that the smart card is using Montgomery RSA . So how can we use it to extract the key? We are going to use a method called “Vaizata” method which can be found in the DPA handbook. This is a general way of performing a side channel attack using statistics.

### The “Vaizata” Method

- Make a simple assumption about the implementation
- Guess a little part of the key
- Make hypothesis about the effect of the guess on the execution
- Classify the measurements according to the hypothesis
- If we guessed right, the classification will be statistically meaningful

How does it work? First, we make a simple assumption on the implementation, an assumption could be: We assume that the implementation run on software (the other possibility is hardware) what does it gives us? Software is executed serially and in the hardware it's not the case. We can assume for example that the key is stored in a flash memory on the device, and every time we need to use the key then we need to read the flash memory. How can we find that this is the case? How can we find first of all that a device is on using the hardware or the software? One way is to look at it - we can open the screws and look with a microscope, or we can go to this wonderful website called "I fixed it". They disassemble all sorts of devices and share this information. What is the sign that the device is using software? If there is an update on the firmware, because when it wakes up it needs to find out what software to run. We can say that this device uses memory, and we can also say things about when the device is doing the encryption. Let's assume the device under test is a remote controller. Inside the controller there is a secret key stored and also a counter. Whenever the button is pressed the remote controller constructs a package containing the serial number of the controller, the counter and a boolean state of the button (which ever button was pressed). Then, it sends it to a car and the car decrypts it. Why do we need a serial number? Each ECU in the car has a program to accept remote controls. So why do we need the counter? Without the counter, an attacker can repeat a message sent from the remote controller to the car only by reading the messages and sending them again. What happens when you press the button and the car is in the train station? The counter in the remote controller is out of sync with the counter in the car and there is a window of counter values the car will accept. If its closed, the car will open without complaining. If it's a little closed we will need to press the remote control twice and when the car will see consecutive values and it will open, but if it is too far it won't open. Let's assume we can find out when the controller is transmitting (it is a very intensive operation that takes battery life and also radiates). So we

know the moment in time when it is transmitting, did the encryption happened before or after the transmission? The answer is before. Let's assume that the counter stored in the memory and let's say we found the moment in time when the chip is reading from memory. Did it happen before or after the encryption? The answer is after, since we need the counter to be included in the message that will be sent. We can also make more assumptions such as "the AES uses an 8 bit data pack or 16 bit or 32 bit". Some of these assumptions might be wrong but the "viziata" method will help us to find out if they are wrong.

So first of all we make a simple assumption, that the smart card is using left to right binary exponentiation using Montgomery and this is a very reasonable assumption because most implementations are using this method. The next thing to do is recursively (or inductively) guess a little part of the key. If we guessed the whole password it would take us exponential time but if we could guess a small part of the key each time it would take a linear time. So, we will try to guess small parts of the key first, and maybe the simplest thing to explain is guessing one bit or a single character, but let's say we are guessing a small part of the key. So now we know the beginning of the key and there is a little part we don't know. The next step is that we need to make a guess about what kind of effect our guess is going to have on the computation. We can say, for example, that if we will guess the bit correctly then something will happen to the computation, and if we will guess this key bit correctly it will take more power/take longer time/connect to the network more often or some kind of other phenomena we can measure. So, in our case what is the only thing we can measure? Answer: The answer is time. We assume that if there is a Montgomery reduction in the calculation of this bit then the entire computation is going to take a little more time.

SO what is going on here? There is a very large computation here and we were able to guess the beginning of it but not the end of it. Now we are going to classify the measurements

according to our hypothesis, in this case two groups (with or without Montgomery computation). If we guessed correctly then it will take longer to the group we said it will take longer. If not, it might take less or more, we can't determine. If we guessed correctly, the groups will have meaning, means will be able to statistically tell apart the set of the measurements that will take a longer time and the set of measurements that will take less time. We are going to guess the left bit of the key, and there is only one option. The next bit can be 1 or 0. Now, we can simulate the running of this algorithm with our guess, not for the whole key but only to the part we know, and if there is going to be Montgomery reduction. So assuming we have  $g$ ,  $e$  and  $N$ . The device under test is calculating  $g^e \text{mod} n$ , but where  $g$  came from? It is supplied by the attacker. What about  $e$ ? Secret we want to discover  $(e_t, e_{t-1}, \dots, e_0)$  What about  $N$ ? public variable (known). The first thing it does, it enters the Montgomery representation. This information of how to enter the Montgomery representation is known to the attacker. It starts with  $g$ , and then  $g$  becomes  $\text{Mont}(g)$ , but the attacker can also do it. First  $A = 1$ , then  $A = A * A$  the next thing is  $A = A * g$  because we know that the most significant bit is 1. The next step is  $A = A * A$ , now what is next? It depends, if  $e_{t-1} = 0$  then  $A = A * A$  (skipping to next bit). Else if  $e_{t-1} = 1$  then  $A = A * g$ . What happens next now we can't know. We can run both calculations, in particular we can find out if there was a reduction step in two optional operations. There are 4 options: Only one of them containing a reduction step, two of them containing a reduction step or neither of them. We can know exactly, assuming we make a guess on  $e_{t-1}$ , if there is going to be an extra reduction step. We know enough to guess - if we guess correctly, we can know if there will be a reduction step because we can calculate all the alternative options completely. So, let's do this now, we have many different  $g$ 's, and we have repeated this step many times, and for each of these  $g$ 's we know if there is going to be an extra reduction step. So, now let's see how we can do an attack using this information. So, there is private key  $s$ , a public

key  $v$  and a signing operation  $m^s \text{mod} n$ .

We begin the attack with a bag of messages, all of them are valid, and we send them to the device under test (DUT). The DUT signs these messages ( $k$  messages), and for each one of the messages we get a trace, which is the data we collected using the side channel attack in this case it is only the time. Now we have a vector of size  $k$  and each element in the vector is the time it took to sign the message. Now, we are going to try and guess  $s_t, s_{t-1}$  ( $s = s_t, s_{t-1}, s_{t-2}, \dots, s_0$ ) and try to discover  $s_{t-2}$ .

So for each of the messages and each key guess we are going to simulate the computation as far as we already know and in addition for the parts of the key that we don't know we are going to simulate twice - one with a 0 and one with a 1. We are going to find out where the extra reduction step happens. If the next bit is 0, then some of the messages have extra reduction and we classify the message into two bins, those who got extra reduction and those who didn't. But maybe the key is not 0? maybe its 1. So we can simulate the same thing with the next bit as 1, and find out different set of messages with an extra reduction step. We can't find what the bits are but we can make a guess and simulate on both 0 and 1. So, now we divide our traces into two groups in 2 different ways, if the next key bit is 0 then  $m_1, m_2, m_4, m_5, m_7$  got extra reduction and  $m_3, m_6, m_8, m_9$  didn't. If the next key bit is 1 then  $m_2, m_3, m_5, m_8$  got extra reduction and  $m_1, m_4, m_6, m_7, m_9$  didn't (see Figure 3.7).

If the next key bit is 0	If the next key bit is 1
These messages get an extra reduction: $m_1, m_2, m_4, m_5, m_7$	These messages get an extra reduction: $m_2, m_3, m_5, m_8$
These messages don't get an extra reduction: $m_3, m_6, m_8, m_9$	These messages don't get an extra reduction: $m_1, m_4, m_6, m_7, m_9$

Figure 3.7: Key bit guess simulation

If we guessed correctly what can we tell about the messages that got an extra reduction? Their runtime will be a little longer if we guessed the key bit correctly and If we guessed incorrectly it means we divided into two random groups which

means the runtime will be similar in both groups. So if we guessed correctly the difference in runtime between the groups will be measurably different. So now we are going to change the discussion about the messages into the traces.

If the next key bit is 0	If the next key bit is 1
The statistics of the set of running times $t_1, t_2, t_4, t_5, t_7$ Should be <u>measurably different</u> than the statistics of the set $t_3, t_6, t_8, t_9$	The statistics of the set of running times $t_2, t_3, t_5, t_8$ Should be <u>measurably different</u> than the statistics of the set $t_1, t_4, t_6, t_7, t_9$

Figure 3.8: Guessing correctly the key bit makes the statics measurably different

if the next key bit is 0 then the statistics of the runtimes of 0 bit with extra reduction are going to be different from the runtimes of 0 bit without extra reduction. If we were wrong then the runtimes of 1 bit with extra reduction will be different from 1 bit without the extra reduction. Notice that we are not saying average or mean anywhere, because they are not required, it could be the variance changes or something else. The point is that there is some kind of difference that we can measure. So, how can we find out which of these two divisions is the correct one? Answer: we have two divisions of k traces and we measure the distance of the means. We are going to calculate the mean runtime of each part (0 bit with or without the extra reduction and 1 bit with or without the extra reduction) and subtract between with-/without extra reduction in each bit guess. If there is a large distance of means of the 0 bit guess as oppose to the 1 bit guess then probably the splitting of traces in the 0 bit guess is more meaningful than the 1 bit guess. If we are able to split meaningfully then we guessed the key correctly. Now, let's go back into statistics and talk about the T-test [22]. The T-test was invented by William Sealy Gosset [23] who was a chemist who worked for a very famous brewery in Ireland (Guinness). So, what is the idea? We have two populations that are different in some way. There are two kinds of t-tests, pair T-test and unpaired T-test. what is the paired T-test? lets assume we are going to a tree and we taking the leaves

that fall off the tree. We notice that the leaves that fall on the south side have less mold than the leaves that fall on the north side. Why is that? Because there is more sun on the south side that is drying the leaves.

How do we prove our theory? We send our undergrad research assistant to collect a bag of leaves from the north side and a bag of leaves from the south side and tell the undergrad to count the percentage of mold in the southern and northern leaves. When the undergrad comes back, very exhausted, he provides us with an excel file that has 1000 leaves from the north side and 1500 from the south side. Now we want to prove our theory, each one of the leaves has a mold. We want to prove that there is a statistical difference between the two groups - this is the unpaired T-test. What is the paired T-test? It is when we are talking about something which we can identify as pairs. For example, we are developing a cancer medicine and we want to test it. Now, we don't take any undergrads but only very sick mice with cancer. We measure the weight of the tumor in order to have a list of 100 mice and tumors. Then we divide them into two groups, one we treat with a medicine and the other we don't. In the end of the experiment, we measure the tumors again, but now each measurement is a pair, one before the treatment and one is after. We want to say that the size of the tumor is smaller after the treatment. Now let's review the student's unpaired T-test demo in Matlab. The mat in Matlab is for matrix, we can define matrix like this:

```
>> x=1:10
x =
    1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9    10
```

Figure 3.9: Defining a matrix of size 1x10 with increasing numbers from 1 [1,2,3,...,10]

The function `randn(1)` which creates normally distributed random variable which follows a Gaussian distribution which

```
>> x+2
ans =
3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10    11    12
```

Figure 3.10: Adding the matrix with 2 increases all the numbers in the matrix by 2 (Same with multiplication and log)

```
>> x>5
ans =
1x10 logical array
0   0   0   0   0   1   1   1   1   1
```

Figure 3.11:  $x > 5$  will result with logical array [0, 0, 0, 0..., 1, 1, 1, 1]

means the variance is 1 and the mean of 0. What is the minimum value this function will output? Answer: None, but statistically the value is closer to 0. How can we create a random variable with mean different from 0? Answer: add a constant to the mean, if we want mean N. we will do  $N + \text{randn}(1)$ . We can even create a vector of randomly chosen numbers using  $\text{randn}(1, 5) + 5$  : [4.9369, 5.7147, 4.7950, 4.8759, 6.4897] and if we will do  $\text{randn}(1, 5)*1 + 5$  the numbers will be even closer to 5. So, now we are ready to try the student T-test.

Looking only on the graphs - can we say they are from the same distribution? Answer: we can't be sure. We want to run the T-test to find out if they are statistically significant. There is a hypothesis and we need to either reject or accept the hypothesis. If  $H_0$  then they are from the same distribution and if  $H_1$  than they are from different distributions. If we run the code, the result will be that they are from different distributions with 0.959 certainty. Each time we run we can get different results, if the certainty is smaller than 0.95, the hypothesis is rejected. How can we make it more difficult for the ttest2? Answer: if we change  $\mu_2$  to 11, then they

```

mu_1 = 10;
mu_2 = 20;

sigma2_1 = 4;
sigma2_2 = 4;

vector_length = 400;

x = randn(1, vector_length) * sigma2_1 + mu_1;
y = randn(1, vector_length) * sigma2_2 + mu_2;

plot(x,zeros(1,400),'*', y, ones(1,400),'*');ylim([-2,3]);figure(gcf);

```

Figure 3.12: In the code, 2 vectors are created -  $x$  and  $y$  in the same size (which is not obligatory),  $x$  will be randomly distributed with a mean of  $\mu_1$  and variance of  $\sigma^2_1$  and vector  $x$  is going to be random distributed with a mean of  $\mu_2$  and variance of  $\sigma^2_2$ . Then there is a code for plotting both vectors (in different colors).




Figure 3.13: Plotting of the vectors for  $\mu_1 = 10, \mu_2 = 20$

will be very close distributions.

How we as attackers can handle this situation? Answer: run many times. So we change the vector length (for example to 50000). There is something called power analysis, which means given these parameters ( $\mu$  and  $\sigma$ ) how many measurements you need to run to be sure with 95 percent. As engineers we don't really care about T-tests, we have a




Figure 3.14: Plotting of the vectors for  $mu_1 = 10, mu_2 = 11$

budget of measurements and we just take the one with the larger mean distance, but what if we are wrong (guessed 1 instead of 0)? After we guessed one bit wrong all the bits afterwards are wrong because they are simulated wrongly. So, how can we simulate a full attack? If we guessed 1 bit using the differences of means then we continue to the next bit in linear time. Let's review a figure from " A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack" which you are encouraged to read.

Now let's talk about counter measurements. When Kocher announced the attack to the cipherpunks mailing list there was kind of discussion about it. Here is a message (see Figure 3.16) from there that was sent by Ron Riverst. He was replying to William Simpson, who was the author of Photuris which is related to the IPsec protocol and was used for kits change in the IP protocol.

When he read that this attack can attack Photuris, Bill replied: don't worry this will be fixed in Photuris. How to do this? By dithering the return time of identification message a few extra milliseconds. Which means he is doing mitigation, as he is not adding a random delay because random is very expensive, he is going to finish the calculations and is going




Figure 3.15: x axis – is the bit index from right to left (the left most bit is known to be 1) and y axis – is the distance of means we chose (some times its 500 or 100 but after 151 the distance of means is a lot smaller which means we guessed a bit wrong). How to solve it? Answer: go backwards and backtrack.

## Paul Kocher's timing attack

- 
- *To:* [insec@ans.net](mailto:insec@ans.net)
  - *Subject:* Paul Kocher's timing attack
  - *From:* [rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu](mailto:rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu) (Ron Rivest)
  - *Date:* Mon, 11 Dec 95 13:29:32 EST
- 

Bill Simpson says, regarding Kocher's timing attack:

This will be fixed in Photuris by dithering the return time of the Identification Message. A few extra milliseconds on top of a second won't be a problem. ...

This helps to reduce the leakage of key information, but does not eliminate it. The best thing to do is to ensure that the public-key computation time is CONSTANT, independent of the message being encrypted (or signed).

[...] (As a side note, I suspect that this sort of attack is probably extremely difficult to mount in an Internet environment, due to packet-routing timing variabilities. However, it's wise to be careful...)

Ron Rivest

Figure 3.16: The message.

to look at the clock and exactly when the millisecond changes (or second) send the package. What does it mean? It means that since the beginning is random then he is going to add a random delay. So, what Ron Rivest replied? It will reduce the data leakage but will not eliminate it. Why so? How the attacker will overcome this? He will need to measure more, this is network-based protocol, the attacker can measure as many times as he wants. He says, in addition, the public key computation time should be constant and independent from the message being sent. Ron Rivest suggest prevention as a countermeasure. So, what time it is going to be? Answer: the worst-case time. he adds a side note that this kind of attack is very difficult to mount in an internet environment due to packet-routing timing variabilities, however it is wise to be careful. Few years later a demonstration was presented over the internet, there were more measurements to counter the routing problem. Adding noise is sometimes the only thing that works, if you add enough noise to delay the attack time up to a year the message might not be relevant by the time the attack succeeds.

So, let's talk about two more counter measurements, which are preventions. The first one is called RSA blinding. RSA blinding is a prevention counter measure which actually works on average time and not on worst-case time. if we have a secret key  $S$  and want to calculate  $m^s \text{mod} n$ , and the attacker gives us  $m$  and we don't want to leak  $s$ . We showed that with enough attempts from the attacker he will eventually retrieve  $s$ .

So, how do we do blinding? First of all, we can do this even before the attacker arrives, we generate random  $r$  and calculate  $r^v \text{mod} n$  and  $r^{-1} \text{mod} n$ . These calculations are not reviling any secrets because  $v$  is the public key. The attacker gives us  $m$ , so we calculate:

$$X = (r^v * m) \text{mod} n$$

$$Y = X^s = (r^v * m)^s = r^{vs} * m^s = r * m^s \text{mod} n$$

$$//v * smodn = 1modn)$$

Now,  $Y$  is leaking information because we raise a number to the power of the secret key, but  $r$  is a random number which the attacker doesn't know so he can't simulate the execution. How we remove  $r$ ? We just calculate

$$S = Y * r^{-1} = r * m^s * r^{-1} = m^s mod n$$

Why doesn't everybody use it? Answer: because it's expensive, 2 modular exponentiations instead of 1. Another problem is the random number generation, its hard to find random number generator. You can see RSA blinding in openPGP.

Now let's review another countermeasure. It called square and always multiply (see Figure 3.17). It is very similar to the square and multiply, just instead of only when  $d_i$  is 1 we will always calculate the multiply but the assignment will be only when  $d_i$  is 1. The problem with this is not the extra computation that came from turning sometimes to always. Speculative execution is always looking for instruction to execute, how does it decide if it will execute an instruction? If all it's dependencies are met. If I say  $a = b * c$  and  $e = b * c$  they can run both in the same time. What happens is when the instruction brought to the CPU there is actually nobody is waiting for  $t$ , so as soon as it finishes to run the  $s = s * smodn$  and  $d_i$  is equal to 0 it will just return  $s$ . Moreover, the compilers are also capable of detecting such cases and optimize them by dismissing the else statement. So if we have a very simple CPU with no speculative execution no compiler and we wrote it in assembly we won't be able to attack it, but we could use power analysis.

If we run this algorithm as is, we have two places in memory for  $s$  and for  $t$ , every action we load  $s$  then multiply and then edit the memory of  $s$ . Same goes in the multiply section. We load  $s$  and  $m$  and then multiply and store it in  $s$ . It's always loading and storing  $s$ , but what happens when it goes

**Algorithm 2** Multiply-always binary exponentiation algorithm

---

```

s := 1 // set signature to initial value
for i from |d|-1 down to 0 do: // left-to-right
    s := s * s mod n // square
    if (di = 1), then
        s := s * m mod n // multiply
    else
        t := s * m mod n // multiply, discard result
return s

```

---

Figure 3.17: Square and always multiple algorithm

to the else statement: it loads  $s$  and  $m$  and then store this into something other then  $s$ . So the power consumption is different between the store and the load. You can read more in the paper (“defeating RSA multiply-always and message binding” by Marc F. Witteman et al. [24])

Side channel attacks can get not only computer secrets but human secrets too. What exactly is a human secret? Browsing history for example. How does the website figure out our browsing history? Theoretically, we can delete the history in the browser. But what happens when we click on a hyper link (blue link)? It turns purple after the click. So, there was a nice trick that websites used to do, they attached the link to an HTML element and added JavaScript code that at the change of the color can now update that you have visited the site. The world wide web consortium decided that it was a privacy leak and you are not allowed to read the color of an HTML element anymore. Now we can set the color but can't read it. One of the speakers in the black hat 2013 used timing attacks to find out if a web site was visited or not<sup>3</sup>. He also demonstrated how he can also use timing attack to read the user's stream.

### 3.3 Research highlights

- **Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA -**  
This paper describes an attack utilizing the photonic

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<sup>3</sup><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcOQfYlyIqw>

side channel against a public-key crypto-system. They evaluated three common implementations of RSA modular exponentiation, all using the Karatsuba multiplication method. It was discovered that the key length had marginal impact on resilience to the attack. They noticed that the most dominant parameter impacting the attacker's effort is the minimal block size at which the Karatsuba method reverts to naive multiplication. They also discovered that Montgomery's Ladder was actually the most susceptible to the attack. [Photonic Side Channel Attacks Against RSA](#).

- **Thermal Covert Channels on Multi-core Platforms** - This paper demonstrates a way to leak information between 2 applications which are running on the same machine but with complete CPU core isolation or timing separation. The paper is presenting a way to bypass the first tactic by utilizing the heat factor and describing an attack where one CPU core is generating heat because of running a CPU intensive task (such as RSA decryption looped for 100 milliseconds) and the nearby CPU core picking up the heat as it propagates from the original core to its neighbors (by the laws of physics). The way to bypass the second type of isolation is just like the first one, but in this example the applications are not running at the same time. Still, the second application can track the remnant heat generated from the first application. The paper then offers a future work where an application can use these methods in combination with machine learning techniques to be able to learn the purpose of other applications running on the same machine without having the permissions to do so. [Thermal Covert Channels on Multi-core Platforms](#).
- **Summarize of Drones' Cryptanalysis - Smashing Cryptography with a Flicker Paper**  
This paper [25] addresses the question how we can tell whether a passing drone is being used by its operator

for a legitimate purpose (e.g., delivering pizza) or an illegitimate purpose (e.g., taking a peek at a person showering in his/her own house).

Over the years, many methods have been suggested to detect the presence of a drone in a specific location, however since populated areas are no longer off limits for drone flights, the previously suggested methods for detecting a privacy invasion attack are irrelevant.

In this paper, By applying a periodic physical stimulus on a target/victim being video streamed by a drone, a new method that can detect whether a specific POI (point of interest) is being video streamed by a drone is presented. Based on this method, an algorithm for detecting a privacy invasion attack is presented.

The paper analyse the performance of the algorithm using four commercial drones.

It show how the method that been suggested can be used to determine whether a detected FPV (first-person view) channel is being used to video stream a POI by a drone, and locate a spying drone in space.

The evaluation on algorithm that presented in the paper shows that a privacy invasion attack can be detected by the system in about 2-3 seconds.

- **Summarize of Whispers in the Hyper-space:  
High-speed Covert Channel Attacks in the Clouds**  
In the paper [26] the authors are presenting the usage of two covert channels to communicate between two virtualized x86 systems that run on the same physical machine, they develop a robust communication protocol to deal with high noise in the covert channel and achieve information transfer of more than 100 bps with 0.75The researchers went over the different x86 processors' generations and showed that they can create a covert chan-

nel with each one, whether it contains a memory bus (new) or not (old). The first covert channel type they showed is based on using the bus lock mechanism. According to the implementation of an atomic instruction, the sender can lock the bus when using the instruction. locking the bus has effects over the whole system and the receiver can measure the latency when getting some variables and determine if 1 or 0 was sent by the receiver. The second covert channel type is using atomic instruction over two cache lines when no bus lock mechanism exists. The atomicity is achieved by flushing all inflight memory transactions from all cores which will result in observable latency. This work had shown how to solve three obstacles when creating a covert channel in the cloud, first memory addressing uncertainty- the sender and the receiver cannot know the exact cache locations of each other because they are located in different virtual environments with different memory mappings. Second process scheduling uncertainty - in classic cache covert channel the receiver runs after the sender (round-robin scheduling), but when the two processes located in different VMS, this scheduling is not guaranteed. Third physical limitation - processes of the receiver and sender may run on different cores and may not share caches L1 and L2.

- **Cross-Origin Pixel Stealing: Timing Attacks Using CSS Filters** - In the paper [27], the authros present the following threat model: the attacker runs a malicious domain. His purpose is to tempt his victim to use the malicious domain. He either creates an interesting website to attract the victim to use it for a while, or he is able to open another window in front of the window being attacked.

Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is the standard markup language for documents designed to be displayed in a web browser. The Document Object Model

(DOM) is a cross-platform and language-independent interface that treats an XML or HTML document as a tree structure wherein each node is an object representing a part of the document. It is shown in the paper, how the rendering process of DOM content makes timing attacks possible: CSS filters allow styling of HTML components, CSS Custom filters (a.k.a shaders) have access to the rendering content, which can hold sensitive information, so an attack on shaders could lead to information leaks. But even without this access, different type of code parts in shaders could enable timing attacks.

1. **Expand a single pixel** - We need to choose which pixels we want to steal, and in each iteration of the attack we need to take only one pixel from the image and enlarge it, to be at the size of the whole screen in order to cancel the noise of all the other pixels and distinguish between only one black and white pixel. Worth mentioning that a method has been found to be able to find the exact character out of 16 digits by measuring the value of only 4 bytes, and in general character set of size  $N$  can be read by testing only  $\log_2(N)$  pixels.
2. **Framing a page** - The attacker frames a website that has neglected to use X-Frame-Options.
3. **The victim visits a malicious page** - The victim visits the attacker's malicious web page and is tricked into remaining on the page for the duration of the attack, e.g. by an interesting advertisement.
4. **Traversing the page** - Activate a combination of CSS filters over the page to convert each value to be RGB(0,0,0) - black, or RGB(255,255,255) - white.
5. **Average framerate is captured** - Using requestAnimationFrame [28] to determine the average

framerate on the browser window for each target pixel.

6. **Interpreting the captured data** - An array of pixel measurements are sent to the attacker's server to be interpreted, The attacker can even build a classifier to determine the exact results based on the measurements.

As a result of this attack, and several similar attacks [29] [30] discovered at the same time, all web browsers had changed their filters implementation to be without color-related optimization and all calculations are supposed to take the exact same time. Despite that, people are always finding new ways to steal pixels through other, creative, ways e.g. floating-point or hardware implementation of the CPU. And so, the fight for security is still ongoing to this day.

# Chapter 4

# Power/EM I

In this chapter, we're going to learn about:

- Electric Engineering basics
- When & Where in an electronic circuit is power consumed
- How can we measure power & EM consumption?

## 4.1 Electronic Circuits 101

### A basic electronic circuit

The most basic electronic circuit (Figure 4.1) consists of a power supply ( $V_{dd}$ ) and some sort of electrical load (a component consuming electric power) connected to the power supply on the one hand and to the “ground” (the reference point from which electric potential or voltage is measured) on the other hand. As the electric current - a targeted flow of free electrons - flows through the load, the load does some kind of a “work”. We can think of electric current as behaving like water - going from the hill ( $V_{dd}$ ) to the valley (Ground) with rivers and obstacles (Loads/Resistors) trying to prevent it from flowing. The higher the resistance of the load, the less current will be able to flow through it.




Figure 4.1: Basic electronic circuit.

There are two different ways to wire different loads on an electric circuit - "in series" and "in parallel":

- **In series** - electricity has to pass through one load to reach the other.
- **In parallel** - the loads are connected side by side and the electric current passes through them in parallel.

The electric potential difference between the power supply and the ground creates an electric current which flows through the load toward the ground. The difference in electric potential between two points is measured in Volts (usually denoted by  $V$ ). The magnitude of the current flowing through the circuit at a given time is measured in Amperes (denoted by  $A$ ). The electrical resistance of the load is a measure of its opposition to the flow of electric current through it. It is measured in Ohms (and denoted by  $R$ ).

## Resistors

As the name implies, a resistor resists the flow of electrical current. The amount of resistance is measured in Ohms. A resistor is considered a passive component that consumes power that is dissipated as heat. The power rating of a resistor determines how much power it can consume without overheating.



Figure 4.2: Resistor Symbol in Circuit Diagrams.

## Ohm's law




Figure 4.3: Ohm's Law.

Ohm's law defines the relationship between the Voltage, Current and Resistance in a circuit: The voltage is equal to the current multiplied by the resistance of the load.

$$V = I \cdot R$$

Since in most of the circuits we are using, the voltage is fixed (defined by the characteristics of the power supply), a change in the resistance of the circuit will cause an inverse change

in the current. A useful analogy for the relations between V, I and R is to imagine a fountain springing from a high mountain with water flowing down through a river to the sea. The difference in height between the fountain and the sea is the Voltage, the width of the river can be thought of as the resistance, and the flow of the water is the current.

## Power

Power is the rate at which work is done by the circuit and is measured in Watts. Electricity bills are measured in units of Kilo-Watt x hour, i.e. 1 KWH is 1,000 watts used for an hour, and this is the energy that we used and we need to pay for.

$$\text{Power} = \frac{\text{Work}}{\text{Time}}$$

As an example we can consider a smartphone: the battery's capacity is measured in milli-Ampere hour (mAh). So, if a battery has 3000 mAh of capacity, and the phone's basline power consumption is 1A then we can use it for 3 hours without recharging. Of course, if we overload the phone by watching videos on youtube (requires cpu/gpu for decoding, wifi/mobile for downloading content, etc.) turning the flash-light on and so forth - then the power consumption would be higher and the battery will run out quicker.

Different types of work can be done using electricity

- Electromagnetic work (light a bulb, transmit a Wi-Fi signal)
- Thermal work (heating)
- Mechanical work (spin a motor, vibrate a speaker's diaphragm to play sounds)
- Chemical work (charging a battery)

- Computational work (store or load from memory, compute a value)

## Power Consumption

When the current leaves the circuit to the ground then we consume it as power, but sometimes we need to be careful as there are cases where the current is not really leaving the circuit, like battery charging. In order to measure the power consumption we will connect our measurement device between the load and the ground. The power consumption of a device is the work it does divided by time. It is measured in Watts ( $W$ ). The power consumption can also be calculated as current ( $I$ ) multiplied by Voltage ( $V$ ):  $P = I \cdot V$

## Current and Voltage dividers

Before we take a look at two simple electronic circuits, we need to introduce two additional terms: A **short (closed) circuit** is a piece of wire with (almost) zero resistance. The circuit is in a closed state and there is electric current flowing through the circuit, simply stated - it "works" as normal. An **open circuit** is a circuit which doesn't allow any current to pass through it. The circuit is in an open state and there is no current in the circuit. That's to say - it doesn't "work".




Figure 4.4: Open and closed circuits.

## Connecting in serial

If we connect a short circuit between the load and the ground (Figure 4.5), it will have no influence on it since we basically just cut a cable and put another one instead.




Figure 4.5: short(low resistance) circuit between the load and the ground.

If we connect an open circuit after the load (See Figure 4.6), it will increase the resistance to a very high value, causing the current to become effectively zero. And if the current is zero - the voltage is also zero (Ohm's Law).

## Connecting in parallel

If we connect an open circuit in parallel to the load (See Figure 4.7), the current will flow only through the load's path, so the current on the open circuit will be 0. However, the voltage drop between both points of the open circuit will be the same as the drop between the load sides.

If we connect a short circuit in parallel to the load (See Figure 4.8), the current will “prefer” flowing through it rather than through the load, so the current through the load will be equal to zero, while the current through the short circuit will be very high - by Ohm's law, since the voltage stays the same as before.




Figure 4.6: open circuit after the load.




Figure 4.7: A close circuit in parallel to the load.

Since the cable is not a perfect conductor, some of the energy will be consumed in the form of thermal work, so the cable will heat up.




Figure 4.8: A short circuit in parallel to the load.

## 4.2 Measuring Power Consumption

As an attacker, we want to measure the power consumption of the load in order to deduce interesting insights about it. For this, we are going to use an Amperemeter.

### Amperemeter

An Amperemeter is a device capable of measuring the amount of electric current going through it. It has a very low resistance, so it doesn't affect the circuit it connects to - since it is basically equivalent to an extra piece of conducting wire.



Figure 4.9: Amperemeter Symbol in Circuit Diagrams.

### Using an Amperemeter to measure power consumption

To use an Amperemeter - we “cut” the wire connected to the load and connect both sides to the Amperemeter.(See

Figure 4.10)

Doing so causes all current flowing through the load to pass through the Amperemeter as well, so we are able to read the current at any given time. The resistance of the Amperemeter is very low so it doesn't affect the circuit's voltage.




Figure 4.10: an Amperemeter connected in serial.

To measure the power consumption, we measure the current ( $I$ ) and since the voltage ( $V$ ) hasn't changed, we can compute the power consumption as  $P = I \cdot V$ . One major shortcoming of this method is that sometimes we don't want (or can't) cut the circuit to connect an Amperemeter. A potential alternative would be to connect the Amperemeter in parallel (See Figure 4.11)

However, connecting the Amperemeter in parallel would actually burn the Amperemeter as it has no resistance and so, all of the current will flow through it. So, instead of an Amperemeter we can use a Voltmeter as in Figure 4.12.

## Voltmeter

The Voltmeter's resistance is very very high so the current will not go through it. The Voltmeter is measuring the voltage drop between one side of the load and the other side of




Figure 4.11: An Amperemeter connected in parallel to the load




Figure 4.12: a Voltmeter connected in parallel to the load

it. To measure the current using a Voltmeter we take a load with a very small resistance and connect it as in Figure 4.13. By connecting a Voltmeter in parallel with a very small and accurate resistor, we can measure the electric current using Ohm's law:  $I = V/R$




Figure 4.13: Voltmeter connected in parallel

## Power consumption - what's next?

We saw what power consumption means and how we can measure it. It is very important to note that for every interesting enough circuit - **the power consumption varies with time!** Our goal, as an attacker, is to find a relationship between the secret information we want to extract and the power consumption. Then, we can exploit this relationship by measuring the device's/circuit's power consumption over time and using this information to extract secret info.

## Types of electronic components

Generally speaking, there are two types of components in an electric circuit:

- Passive devices:

- Resistor
- Inductor
- Capacitor
- Diode

- Active devices:

- Transistor
- Amplifier
- Integrated circuit (IC)

For us, active devices are much more interesting as their power consumption characteristics change as a function of the state of the circuit.




Figure 4.14: Examples of electronic components.

Specifically, of outmost interest for us is the transistor. In integrated circuits, there are lots transistors. Analyzing their power consumption behaviour can shed a lot of light on the data they're processing. There are various kinds of transistors and we will concentrate on understanding a specific type - namely the "Field-Effect Transistor" (FET).

## Field-Effect Transistor

The Field-Effect Transistor (FET) is an electronic device which uses an electric field to control the flow of current. FETs are 3-terminalled devices, having a source, gate, and

drain terminals. FETs control the flow of current by the application of a voltage to the gate terminal, which in turn alters the conductivity between the drain and source terminals. In order to understand FETs, we first need to gain some understanding of semiconductors.

## Semiconductors

We know that some materials, like copper or gold are good conductors, and others - like plastic or glass are very bad conductors or insulators.

A **semiconductor** is a substance, usually a solid chemical element or compound, that can conduct electricity under some conditions but not others, making it a good medium for the control of electrical current. Its conductance varies depending on the current or voltage applied to a control electrode, or on the intensity of irradiation by infrared (IR), visible light, ultraviolet (UV), or X rays.

Generally, an atom is built from three sub-particles:

- Neutrons - irrelevant for this discussion as they carry no electric charge
- Protons - heavy, positively charged particles forming the nucleus of the atom (together with the neutrons).
- Electrons - light and negatively charged particles orbiting the atom's nucleus in predefined orbits (this is basically Bohr's model of the atom which isn't quite accurate from the point of view of quantum mechanics, but is a good approximation in our context and in chemistry)

The **Silicon** atom has four electrons in its outer orbit (also known as *valence electrons*). In Silicon crystals, all of those outer orbit electrons are involved in the covalent bonds between the Silicon atoms. This implies that pure Silicon is a pretty bad conductor, since conductance relies on the flow of

free electros, which are very hard to find in Silicon crystals as all outer-orbit electrons are busy forming covalent bonds and aren't free to move around between atoms.

We can change the behavior of the silicon and turn it into a conductor by doping it - i.e. mixing a small amount of an impurity into the silicon crystal.

There are two types of such useful impurities we can introduce:

- N-type – where phosphorus or arsenic is added to the silicon in small quantities. They both have five outer orbit electrons, so one of them is out of place when they get into the silicon lattice. While having nothing to bond to, the fifth electron is free to move around. As electrons have a negative charge, this kind of impurity is called N-type (N = Negative).
- P-type - where boron or gallium is added to the silicon. They both have only three outer electrons. So, when we mix them into the silicon lattice, there will be “holes” in the lattice where a silicon electron has nothing to bond to. The hole is looking for an electron from a neighbor atom and when that happens the hole is “moving”. As the absence of an electron creates the effect of a positive charge, this kind of impurity is called P-type (P = Positive).

## How does the Field-Effect Transistor work?

In the Field-Effect Transistor there are two “n+” areas with N-type doping and a “p” area with P-type doping (see Figure 4.15). The “n+” areas contain a lot of free electrons and the “p” area contains a lot of “holes”. Initially, the free electrons from the “n+” areas are moving into the holes in the “p” area and the transistor as a whole is not conducting any current form the Source to the Drain (i.e. is an open circuit) as there are no free electrons that can move around. When an electrical field is applied to the Gate it gets charged with




Figure 4.15: Field-Effect Transistor.

lots of free electrons. These electrons in the Gate can't move to the Silicon itself as there is an insulating oxide layer between them, but the repulsive force between the negatively charged electrons pushes the electrons in the part of the "p" area between the "n+" areas to the bottom creating a "channel" allowing the flow of electrons from Source to the Drain through the holes left by the electrons the were pushed away - thus turning the transistor into a conductor (i.e. closed/short circuit).

## Buliding an Amplifier using a FET

We can easily construct an Amplifier using a FET by connecting the input signal to the FET's Gate terminal and the power supply to the Source terminal. Then, the Drain terminal's output current will be an amplification of the input signal going into the Gate.

## CMOS

Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) is a method for creating logical gates. Its core concept is based on using a "pull up network" (Vdd) denoting a logical 1 and a "pull down network" (Vss) denoting a logical 0. Then, a set of connections and transistors create a closed circuit of

either the pull up or the pull down network with the output terminal “Q”, depending on the value of the input terminal(s). It is very important to design the circuit in such a way that for every input, exactly one of the networks will be close-circuited to the output, since if none of them is close-circuited the output will be undefined and if both of them are close-circuited to the output they will short circuit each other, potentially causing damage to the circuit.

Now, let's see a few examples for implementing logical gates using CMOS.

## NOT Gate CMOS




Figure 4.16: Logical NOT Gate




Figure 4.17: CMOS NOT gate

When the voltage of input A is low ( $A=0$ ), the upper transistor's channel is closed (since this is a PMOS transistor that closes the circuit when it gets a 0 input signal) and we have a connection between  $Vdd(1)$  and Q, so  $Q = 1$ . When the voltage of input A is high ( $A=1$ ), the lower transistor's circuit is closed (since it is an NMOS transistor) and we have a connection between  $Vss(0)$  and Q, so  $Q = 0$ . It is trivial to see that we've implemented a logical NOT operation with A being the input and Q being the output.

Table 4.1: NOT gate truth table.

input	A	0	1
output	Not A	1	0

## When does a CMOS circuit consume power?

There is an interesting question though – when does this circuit consume power? As mentioned previously, power is consumed when electric current from the power source ( $V_{dd}$ ) reaches the ground ( $V_{ss}$ ). In our case there is never a connection between  $V_{dd}$  and  $V_{ss}$  so it appears power is never consumed, thus defying the energy conservation principle. The answer to this is that a bit of power is actually consumed when transistors switch between their two possible outputs - i.e. connections with either  $V_{dd}$  or  $V_{ss}$ . We will see later on, how these minor power consumptions can be used for our purposes.

## AND Gate CMOS

Figure 4.18 is a logical AND gate.



Figure 4.18: AND Gate

We will create a CMOS AND gate using 4 transistors:

Table 4.2: AND gate truth table.

input a	0	0	1	1
input b	0	1	0	1
output	0	0	0	1

First we want to build the Pull Up Network, so for input A and B, for  $A=B=1$  then the output Q is 1. Then we will build the Pull Down Network to support the other combinations of inputs from the truth table to deliver 0 as the output Q.

## Storage circuits

Now, let's see how we can use CMOS circuits to store data - i.e. create memory components. A flip-flop is a circuit, comprised of two latches that has two stable states and can be used to store a single bit of data.




Figure 4.19: Flipflop




Figure 4.20: A series of flip-flops

The circuit can be made to change state by signals applied to one or more control inputs and will have one or two outputs. It is the basic storage element in sequential logic. Flip-flops and latches are fundamental building blocks of digital electronics systems used in computers, communications, and many other types of systems.

A flip-flop is a device which stores a single bit of data; one of its two states represents a “one” and the other represents a “zero”. Such data storage can be used for storage of state, and such a circuit is described as sequential logic in electronics. When used in a finite-state machine, the output and next state depend not only on its current input, but also on its current state (and hence, previous inputs). It can also be used for counting of pulses, and for synchronizing variably-timed input signals to some reference timing signal.

Flip-flops can be either level-triggered (asynchronous, transparent or opaque) or edge-triggered (synchronous, or clocked). The term flip-flop has historically referred generically to both level-triggered and edge-triggered circuits that store a single bit of data using gates. We will refer to Flip-Flop as edge-triggered i.e. clock-synchronized.

It is both interesting and important to note that for each storage element in a circuit the data/output changes at the same time orchestrated by the clock signal and so we have a combined, amplified signal that we, as attackers, can monitor to extract secret information.

## Core i7 chip

To demonstrate how combinations of CMOS gates scale up to form real-world chips, Figure 4.21 is an image of a modern Intel core i7 CPU, which is fundamentally a CMOS chip.

We can see a multitude of different components, most notably:

- The integrated GPU containing multiple repeating patterns denoting the GPU processing units
- The identically looking 4 CPU cores with the repeating yellow patterns of CPU cache memory




Figure 1: Architecture components layout for an Intel® Core™ i7 processor 6700K for desktop systems. This SoC contains 4 CPU cores, outlined in blue dashed boxes. Outlined in the red dashed box, is an Intel® HD Graphics 530. It is a one-slice instantiation of Intel processor graphics gen9 architecture.

Figure 4.21: Intel i7 CPU




Figure 4.22: Not gate connected to an oscilloscope.

## Power Consumption Variability

In Figure 4.22 we have a CMOS NOT gate, like the one we saw before, with an Amperemeter connected to it to measure the power consumption, and a plot of both the gate's output ( $q$ ) and power consumption as would've been captured by an oscilloscope connected to the Amperemeter.  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are capacitors that are required due to low-level electrical

characteristics which we won't describe in detail.

In the plot we see a few interesting phenomena:

- The power consumption is zero when the output ( $Q$ ) is constant.
- There is a spike in power consumption each time the output ( $Q$ ) changes.
- The power consumption spike goes higher when  $Q$  changes from 0 to 1 compared to when  $Q$  changes from 1 to 0.

More generally, power consumption is the sum of the static and the dynamic power consumption which changes with time:

$$P(t) = P_{stat} + P_{dyn}(t)$$

As an attacker, we don't really care about the static power consumption that depends on the device's supply voltage, transistor manufacturing technology, etc. The dynamic power consumption, on the other hand, depends on the clock rate, the circuit activity and input data. It can reveal a lot about the data flowing through the circuit, which could be very beneficial.

Theoretically, we can accurately measure the full power consumption of the device on the one hand and compute a full power consumption simulation on the other hand and then try to extract the interesting data by comparing the results and solving the resulting equations to find the data manipulated during the measurement. However, making this accurate computation isn't feasible and we'll, instead, compromise for an approximate model of the device's power consumption that will allow us to achieve practical results subject to a set of assumptions we'll make about the device.

## Hamming distance model

We'll assume the following about the device we wish to attack:

- This is a CMOS device.
- When it's static in terms of the outputs of its transistors - the static power is very low, and when it switches, there is a relatively high power consumption.
- This is synchronous circuit, which means it has a lot of transistors that all change at the same time.
- The power consumption is proportional to the amount of changes and the outputs of these transistors.

Count the number of changes in the output bits of the device's transistors brings us to the so called “Hamming distance model”.

The *Hamming distance* between two vectors is the number of differing bits between the vectors. For example, the Hamming distance between the vectors 01101010 and 11011011 is 4, since they differ in exactly 4 indices, namely: 0,2,3,7.

Formally, assuming we have a vector:

$$X = x_n, x_{n-1}, \dots, x_1, x_0$$

We'll first define the “Hamming weight” operator:

$$HW(X) = \sum x_i$$

Then, we'll define the “Hamming distance”:

$$HD(X, Y) = HW(V_1 \bigoplus V_2)$$

For CMOS devices, we'll approximate the power consumption as proportional to the amount of bit transitions from one to zero or from zero to one - i.e. the hamming distance between the state vectors (the set of all CMOS transistor outputs) of the device across a time interval.

## Power Consumption Noise

This is all good in a “perfectly spherical” world, but in the real world we still need to account for noise. There are a number different types of noise that affect our power consumption measurements:

- **Switching noise** - computations or some other power consumption occurring in the device except for the computation we want to monitor, that also affect the power consumption. This can be either correlated (i.e. happens every time our target computation is performed) or uncorrelated (i.e. happens in random relative to our target computation and so can be easily reduced by repeating the measurement a few times).
- **Measurement noise** - caused by mild inaccuracies in our measurement equipment and setup.
- **Thermal noise** - noise caused by electrons jumping around, appearing, disappearing and creating radiation along the way. This noise is higher when the temperature of the device/circuit is higher.

To summarize, the actual measured power consumption can be modeled as:

$$P_{meas}(t) = P_{stat} + P_{dyn}(t) + N(t)$$

(N(t) - Noise)

A number of approaches exist to minimize the amount of noise, depending on its nature:

- Repeat the measurement to average out uncorrelated noise.
- Control the amount of thermal noise by running the experiment in very low temperatures.
- Prevent radiation originating noise by putting the device in a Faraday cage.

- Modify the device in a way that either increases the signal or decreases the noise. For example - remove a noise generating module.

Another thing we can do is move from measuring power consumption to measuring electromagnetic radiation.

## From Power to EM




Figure 4.23: electromagnetic emission.

A fundamental law of physics states that moving charged particles create magnetic fields. Specifically, a directed electric current creates a magnetic field with magnitude and orientation described by the Biot-Savart law. The direction of the magnetic field can be found using the “left hand rule” (Figure 4.23). This is very good news for us, as this means that instead of measuring the power consumption, we can simply measure the magnetic field and from it deduce the magnitude of the electric current that is its source. One disadvantage of this method is that it is very localized, so we need to get VERY close to the device or alternatively point a very sensitive directional antenna to it to make measurements.

## Measurement setups

We'll now take a look at a few examples of attacker setups.

### Power measurement setup




Figure 4.24: Power measurement setup

In Figure 4.24 we have:

- A Pico scope - a small oscilloscope that measures voltage over time.
- A Voltmeter probe that is connected to the battery of the phone under test using a bunch of small resistors connected in parallel - this is a way to measure the current, as we explained above.

### EM measurement setup

In Figure 4.25 we want to measure the EM field of a micro controller chip. We place the whole setup on a computer-controlled XYZ stage that allow placing the board very close to the Magnetic field probe with very high (micron level) precision - this is crucial since electromagnetic emanations




Figure 4.25: EM measurement setup

can only be recorded from a very close distance. Another important thing to note is the pair of gray cables connected to I/O pins on the board, used for triggering the beginning and end of the measurement - this is very beneficial because it allows us to accurately measure the EM field for a very short time interval during which the computations we'd like to track occur. A short time interval allows us recording with a higher resolution, gaining more valuable info that will help analyse the signal to extract the secret data we want.

### Generic attack setup schematic

Figure 4.26 describes a generic power-analysis attack setup schematic. We have the Device Under Test (DUT) connected to a very clean power supply (preferably a battery that gives a much cleaner supply of power than a standard AC/DC power supply). The “Stimulus Generator” is either a piece of software or hardware that allows us to automatically trigger the device’s operation(s) we want to monitor. Then, we have the measurement front-end which is either a “Baseband Front End” i.e. a detour in the wiring connected to a cur-




Figure 4.26: Generic attack setup schematic

rent/voltage probe or an “RF Front End” and a Wideband receiver for measuring the Electromagnetic field with good accuracy. The “Deep Memory Scope” is basically our oscilloscope that is capable of capturing lots of data very fast and transfer the digitized data to the “Capture Workstation” which is a very strong server or workstation that can handle the burden of thoroughly analysing the data to get the results we need. This is quite a costly setup with cost in the

range of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but once we have it in our lab - we can perform some very cool attacks!

## Research Highlights

- A nice paper provides a short biographical sketch of Ohm and a discussion of his experimental and theoretical work in general and ohm's law in specific [31].
- Stefan Mangard on his paper [32] presents a simple power analysis attack on AES Implementation of the key expension. The attack, which performed on smart cards, exploit the information leaking during the AES key expansion, and utilizes it to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key.
- W. Shan [33] presented a countermeasure to AES attack. the Algorithm proposed, based on machine learning, wishes to find out the best hamming distance redistribution mapping to compensate the probability of hamming distance of the intermediate data directly, thus, make it unable to be distinguished from correct and incorrect sub-key.
- Another Paper posted on 2015 [34] shows the weaknesses of a very important component for running deep learning Algorithms, the GPU. The paper results, tested on NVIDIA TESLA GPU, shows that parallel computing hardware systems such as a GPU are highly vulnerable targets to power-based side-channel attacks, and survey some of the weaknesses.

# Chapter 5

## Low Data Complexity Power/EM 2

We want to see what is power analysis all about and see a very simple power analysis attack that we can actually perform. Then we will dive into AES and its implementation.

All the things that we will see today are very optimistic and they assume that we have really good measurements, very good understanding and very good luck, but it's actually quite a little bit harder in practice.

### 5.1 The New York Times, Take 2

The hero for this article is Mister Kocher. He discovered something that can attack smart cards with what's called power analysis. Probably it was discovered before, but he has discovered it academically.

What did he do? He went to a conference and took people's smart cards and found out their secret private keys. We saw last week that if we have to sign something and we have the private key you can sign a thing that's not supposed to be signed and steal money, this was a big deal.

The 1995 timing attack went to the front page of the New York Times and there was a lot of discussion about the dis-

covery. The 1998 result about power analysis only goes to the bottom of page two in one of the supplements and actually nobody has discussed about it a lot.

Why didn't he get a lot of attention for this power analysis attack? Could be because timing is one thing and power analysis is a little more complicated but in the bottom line we can see all the secrets. To do a timing attack you need a stopwatch, while to power analysis attack you need more sophisticated equipment.

## 5.2 Power Analysis Attacks

What we need to make timing attack? We just need to be able to send request and gets responses to measured how much it took, while the target can be at the other side of the internet (can Amazon Cloud very far away).

What we need to make Power analysis attack? We need to be physically. How do we connect to the device? We need to cut the power supply and connect to it directly to measure the power consumption. This is a very invasive attack, we need to be very very close. in 1995 let's assume that it's true. so if we go to the system architect." listen there is an a power analysis attack that's can completely compromised the device. Attacker needs to come to the device end cuts the power supply...." by the time you already lost the system architect because this is not practical. The threat model has to make sense.

nevertheless, the threat model does make sense in a lot of scenarios and we discovered that thing that we was not supposed existing these power analysis and side Channel attack. today we can attack this device and tomorrow we can attack another device.

To learn about power analysis attack you can go and search in the library the "Power Analysis Attacks" book. "Cryptanalytic attacks that allow extraction of secret information from cryptographic devices by exploding their power consumption char-

acteristics" let's see what can we discover from this definition. First, What we are attacking here? Cryptographic devices. what we are not attacking? cryptographic algorithms. If I told you that I was able to break RSA on my phone by doing power analysis did I break RSA? No we didn't break RSA, we break the implementation of RSA. What else we are not attacking? The user is not under attack, we are not doing any key logging or human engineering attack or social engineering we are only attacking the device. What's the cryptographic device? Some kind of crypto, signing or encrypting. What a secret information we wants to extract? Probably we extract the key. And what's nice about the key? That he has lots of bits. At the start you don't know anything about the key, If you get half of the key you halfway, if you get the whole key You win. If I want to make the device more secure what do I need to do to key? we make a longer key.

This is very easy to say, but if I'm talking instead of secret information we cracked from the device, like medical information, it's a little harder to understand what we can do with half of it. How do we make the medical information more secure? What it's actually means?

Let's take credit cards, the companies say that you are more secure with credit card. Why do we think that we have a privacy with credit cards? We are giving the credit card number and our name... Looks like we're giving everything, the saying that we are actually have privacy, a lot of people have in the US have the same name, but you also get a zip code. Every time you pay with the credit card it generate a new credit card number automatically and doesn't have any digits on him. It is very hard to talk about privacy if it's not a cryptographic. What's left from the definition? we are exploiting the power conceptions characteristic.

What are we not exploiting? We're not doing math and we are not doing something that you can do by algorithms. It's important to know that exploiting the power at conception characteristics does not have to be actually measuring the power. We saw last week that we can actually measure

the power consumption with other methods. When Kotcher wrote his paper he announced three types of power analysis. One of them called Simple power analysis, the other one called differential power analysis. Let's see the simple power analysis today.

### 5.3 Simple Power Analysis

The simple power analysis means that I'm going to take the measurement of the device, making one measurement or two. With that we are going to get the key from those measurement. What's nice about this attack that it's very reasonable attack model. We need to get the power consumption trace (this is a vector overtime of the power consumption of the device), and we need only one or two traces. This is actually durable in a lot of scenarios even if I have the device for a little time or even if someone is looking at me. We will see the setup that can be used for simple analysis.

When you go to a store in Europe, you can't give the credit card for the cashier, they give you this terminal and then you need take your credit card insert it and put the pin number. And what is going over here, there is something like a cryptographic computer between your card and terminal. Let's assume that we want to attack the card, and it is in my possession. This model is very permissive to me and I can do whatever I want, I can do a lot of transactions I can do radiate, I can twist it and even melt it. so attacking the card is very easy.

But if I don't want to attack the card? I want to attack the terminal using power analysis. Maybe the terminal has an SSL private key which is used to connect to the Central Center, and this can make a lot of damage and we can be very rich.

We want to do a power analysis on the terminal. This is a nice setup, this is something that looks like a credit card, but it has are wired connected to this fpga and connect to a

computer. I will be in a very cold country and I will take this card out from the jacket to my palm. Insert this chip into the terminal, while doing a power analysis on a this terminal. The idea is that I can do it about 1 or two times, but not making it for a thousand times or melt it. I can attack maybe this terminal or a gas station. The fact that we don't need a lot of traces is actually good.

What are the disadvantages? The problem here is that when I look at this power trace I need to be very very well prepared, and understand what's really going on in the power trace. Because we get a vector with a hundred thousand points and we need to understand where is the encryption starting? Where it is ending? What it means that there is a lack of power here a little power there? We need to have a very good understanding of the device processes.

Not only that we need also to have a very good measurements, because I only have one or two measurements. They're a lot of external Influence on the device, there can be noise, may be related to the device may be related to the environment, and if I have only one measurement I am going to get all of this noise at once and cannot do anything to reduce it. Statistically I'am not going to be able to get clean measurements to perform the attack.

Another problem is that I will need to work very hard to find the key. Let see an example: Yossi did a power analysis measurements and he got a Trace and there was a noise, he did his analysis and got the key. Now he want to check if this is the right key. How can we check the key? Try to decrypt and encrypt the private key. Is this the right key? no it's not :( .. Why? We have only one Trace. Maybe there was noise? Maybe one measurement was wrong? How do we recover from this? We can try a similar key and not there exact key, maybe to change you on bit here or there. This search might be so intensive that we getting basically the same effect like a Brute Force. This makes simple power analysis are not very effective because of all of those reasons.

## 5.4 Other Types of Power Attacks

So in general in power analysis there are two classes:

**Low data complexity attacks** where I get line trace or two traces (a very small amount of traces). Then I do a lot of post-processing and think really really hard and maybe do a reverse engineering before.

**High data complexity attacks** I will talk to you about it next week. These attacks require a lot of traces, maybe thousands or Millions traces, a Terabyte of data.

## 5.5 Tuning the power model

The first thing that you need to do for a simple power analysis attack is to understand what device you are attacking. We attack two general types of devices with simple power analysis, first is a microcontroller or a CPU and the other thing is ASIC.

Microcontroller is basically a regular computer, it gets commands and runs it one after another, if you want to write a new software for this computer you can write it in C or Java, they're cheap and commonly used.



Figure 5.1: Bitcoin Wallet

This is a Bitcoin wallet. The Bitcoin is basically numbers and if someone steals these numbers he steals your money, so you don't want these numbers to be on your computers. These do all the calculation when you connect to the network, we

want it to be very secure because if someone steal the secret key he can take all of your money.

Inside this device it has an orange Square and this is the microcontroller. Her some storage and you can write some code for it.

The other kind of a device is called ASIC, this device is manufactured only for a specific purpose. Let's say I want to have a sprinkler that starting the morning and ends in the evening, I will use a programming language that called HDL, once I compiled these software I am not getting an executable program that I can run on a device. These chips can only do one thing, I can't programming them and I can't upgrade them, if there is a bug I am in a big problem, but they have only one purpose. The power consumption of this devices are going to be smaller and sometimes they even be faster. Microcontrollers have programs that runs one line after another, an ASIC can do a parallel operation. ASIC is very cheap to manufacture, but there is a big wrap up before you produced this.

In this course we are going to talk only about microcontrollers, because we are going to see them more often than ASICs. But you will know enough to open the book attacking ASIC.




Figure 5.2: Arduino

So what is the line between microcontroller and an ASIC? On one of the student table there is a chip that he will show

us, this is a FPGA field programmable this chip. If I want to identify a particular face I can program this ASIC to do patterning for this face and doing it very very cheaply. I can do also audio compression maybe I don't know what exactly I want to do but I know that I need to do some kind of compression while I don't know exactly the algorithm by using this ASIC. So you will find an ASIC if you have a piece of equipment 10000 pieces, maybe a router ,oscilloscope, submarine and things like that. Best to make sure what is an Arduino? Microcontroller.

## 5.6 8-bit microcontroller

This is an 8-bit microcontroller from the 80s, you see the center of this microcontroller , this pair of trousers the red that named ALU, this is where the magic happens, this piece of silicone can actually do logic like multiply, add, shift or compare.




Figure 5.3: 8-bit microcontroller

The entire process of life is to get a line of code which represent an instruction, he has to understand what this instruction is trying to do. It can be multiply, read or write. And then you get the operator you need to do from the memory

and fed it to the ALU. Then we'll get the next instruction and we'll do it again and again. what's important for me to show you that there are two long in lines from the top and the bottom they are called the buses. the top called the data bus and the bottom call address bus. What is data bus mean? Any sort of data you need to computation has to fetch from this bus. If something come from the memory it going from this bus. If I want to write to external input output, it also going on this bus. The width of this bus is 8 Bits and it means all of the operation that this microcontroller do our eight bits.

On the bottom there is another big bus which is the address bus. If I want to write to memory, I'm going to put their address in the address bus and then I'm going to put the data in the data bus. I will set the control bus to write, and then the memory which is somewhere else is it going to rise to this address. If I want to do a read, I will put the address I want to read in the address bus, and read in the control. What I will do in the data bus? I don't want to put something in there because I want to read, this is actually important and I will elaborate about it more later.

## 5.7 Power Model for Microcontrollers

What's interesting about microcontroller that there are in many cases the power model don't have Hamming distance and actually have Hamming Weight. What does that mean? That if I think that there are going to be a value going over the bus I don't need to know what was the previous value on the bus, because it's going to be exact humming weight for this value.


When you have the best that is shared with several components the idea is that all of the components that are not using the bus are going to set how to put them, so all are ones, So if I want for example to read advice from memory the CPU is

going to set everything to one and then he is going to extract the memory from the address, then the memory is going to lower all the relevant bits until what sitting on the memory bus and the data bus what I wanted.

Let's say I want the memory 4, at first I'm going to see on the data bus 0xFF, then I will see 4 and then going to see agaoxin FF because the memory is finished. what was the power-consumption here to go from FF to 4, how many beats has to change? 7, and again it goes back to FF.

## 5.8 Simple Power Analysis of RSA

Let's see the power module this device under test, which does RSA decryption or signing. While it's doing it we are getting the power measures. Why it is doing an RSA decryption? Because it needs it. We can do it by sending encrypted emails from the phone, so you really have to decrypt the message.



---

**Algorithm 1** Binary exponentiation algorithm

---

```
s := 1 // set signature to initial value
for i from |d|-1 down to 0 do: // left-to-right
    s := s * s mod n // square
    if (di = 1), then s := s * m mod n // multiply
return s
```

---

Figure 5.4: RSA Power Analysis

The axis are vector of power measurements, x is time, y are the power consumption,(how did we measure the power consumption? i put a probe, measer the voltege so on.. What is the private key? What is missing? You need to do some reverse engineering first. If this is the only chance to get

the key, I need to tell you a little bit more about the device so you will understand what is going on here. This device is microcontroller, it's doing RSA decryption using right to left binary exponentiation using square and multiply. Is it helping you finding the key? Yes. Let me show you the source code.

Binary exponentiation, it starts from the top most bit, off the secret and privates decryption key, and then for each bit we do Square and multiply. If the bit is zero we do Square, if this bit is one we do square and multiply. This help you now finding the key, let's look at that Power Trace.

We see two types of things here, this little thing and the big thing. We have some little thing, big thing, little thing, big thing, and then little little little, and then big thing.

All we need to do is to be able tell about were is the square and were is multiply, and then I can read the key, from top to bottom. So telling about square and the multiply to get to the key is the general method. We see square is take a little power and multiply more power.

What is square? square is multiply. So why is the power consumption of square using multiply is different? this is a microcontroller and his bus width is 8 bit. He's doing a convolution between numbers, so it's multiply thousands of time in frame. so why this is different? So what is consuming power, the ALU is consumer power, the data bus and the address bus consuming power. In this case the power consumption module of the address bus is hemming distance, because it's not setting to 1 between accesses it's always containing what CPU is writing. So did you and multiplication, you are going to see a lot of difference values written into memory to the address bus because this microcontroller have very small component ALU always fetching addresses from memory so ding s\*s it's fetching thousands of thousands of memory, but the address is fetching is very similar to each other, because they are all s. les say s is 1k bits in memory all the above are the same but the bathroom are different. But here we are




Figure 5.5: AES Setup

doing s time m, so it's fetching s and m, and you doing convolution. so the address bus when it's doing S and M it's changing a lot, because he needs to do not only the bottom bits but also the top bits.

## 5.9 Simple Power Analysis of AES

I am going to attack an 8 bit microcontroller. Let's look on the setup. This microcontroller has a secret key, and it uses an AES encryption. We can ask him to encrypt and decrypt, we send the command in the serial line.

While he's doing this operation it is going to consume different amount of power and we would like to measure that. How do we going to measure them? We going to connect to the microcontroller power supply. But were do we need to cut and connect? The power is not going straight to the device it is going from this white box (small resistor). How much power is going to go through the resistor? Because he's

small it's going to take very small power consumption. The voltage drops across this device is going to be measured by this Probe, and I'm going to measure the voltage over time. We know the voltage of the power supplies is 5 volt, so from this we can find out what is the current going through the microcontroller and from the current we can find out what is the power consumption. Do we need the code of the microcontroller? Yes. The only thing I don't know is what? The secret, but I know everything else.

## 5.10 Advanced Encryption Standard

What is the story about AES the encryption standard.

In Death Valley Days encryption was in military standards it was considered like a weapon you weren't supposed to have encryption, not by buy, export or sale. but in the seventies the US government what is it might be a good idea to have civilian encryption to protect civilian identities or health. they went to IBM and ask them to write civilian encryption standard. IBM gave them an algorithm called "Lucifer", which was based on civilian Knowledge from the World War II, the NSA I analyzed it and they say they don't actually like what you wrote and change it. they changed the key change one of the internal tables and say this was the standard. and the DES actually announced. the changes that NSA made was making it difficult to implement it in software, and to make it Brute Force about using the computing power that has the NSA but to protect it against some kind of attack which was known to the NSA but not known in the Differential cryptography (not going to teach you).

The time passed and the computer got more and more powerful, there was something called Deep cracking the electronic something, which was able to crack DES at least. I'm not sure if they built it. This was too weak, so introduce something called triple DES, it was twice as secure. Triple DES

only used two keys, but we're not going to study in this course. This wasn't so very efficient and it was very slow. The US National standard unit, we want to create a new Cipher which was at least as secure as Triple DES but much more efficient. Efficient on software and hardware and slow computers. Anybody could submit candidates, the winner of this competition was AES, which was a PhD work Raymond and Diamond.

It has some very good properties that we are going to talk about them.

## 5.11 The Advanced Encryption Standard

How would you say AES is?, it is an operation which take 2 input, a key and plain text. And his output is ciphertext. How big is the plain text? 128 bit, The input of the key is not always 16 bits, 16, 64,128 bits. Can go to AES 256 key. No one can break the 256 AES key. What if I wants to decrypt? AES can be a reverse you can put the ciphertext the key and you get the plain text?. Can we get the plain text and ciphertext so we can get the key? In theory we can do it but the idea is that you cannot get the key. When you feed the key it has to work a little bit, has to extend the key, create around key, this is done in very secure facility. What if my input is more than 16 bytes? What if I need to encrypt a file? I need to use a protocol and a mode, I can't just use AES, only works on 16 bytes. If I have a larger data I need to use AES with a particular way. Something called AES mode, the famous one called ECB, and CBC, the fashionable called GCM. Not in this course and we don't really care, don't use ECB. What if we want to encrypt just one byte? we need to do padding, there is a trick and we need to do something. Let's talk about the design of a AES, it was designed to resist all of source of the attacks, the attacks which were known in the days of DES. And all sorts of attacks which

were discovered using the competition. AES was billed to be resistant for those attacks, script analysis attack but no power analysis attack. They are basically expose the cipher if you have enough plaintext and ciphertext.

AES won the competition because it was very fast or efficient. You have three optimization goals when you're building a crypto implementation. You wanted to be fast and to be able to encrypt as many bits. Maybe you want to encrypt all the data in the router? You need to be fast and you want it to be power efficient. You don't want to change your battery, and to be cheap so using as little transistors as possible. Take at least area in the Silicon using a smaller cheep. These three goals are conflict with each other, but if you want go hardcore which AES is very very fast, if you want AES be larger. Particular the AES submission the real-time paper head implementation of a s 8 bit 16 and 32 beats microcontroller which be being used till this day. One thing about a s which is very nice is that if you remember the things that people were very very suspicious about this AES that IBM present and a bunch of tables which values that IBM didn't explain and then the NSA came back sage no so use these different values and they also didn't explain why. I know that the NSA did something good and what's nice about AES that he use a single lookup table for all Xbox and this Lucas table is actually derived from mathematical relationship some kind of a multiplication are over algebra field so it's not so hard there. The design is so simple that you not be able to crypto even if you try.

## 5.12 AES Internals

AES is an iterated cipher Which means eats has a very bASIC algorithm call drafts and he does them all over and over again, AES has 10 Rounds, if you wants to do it more complicated you as more and more rounds. How does as operated, you begin with 16 bytes and put them in a cyber that's called stage register and then you're on the round operations

on these state bytes, every time you operate operations the plaintext gets mixed with the key and every time you do it it gets more and more. When you finish these 10 Rounds senior stage register you have the ciphertext.

If you want to do it in a reverse you put the ciphertext and the stage register and run the operation run after another and you get the plain text.

Each round consists of 4 basic operations, sub bytes, shift rows, mix columns, and add around key.

Every operation was chosen by the creator Rijndael to achieve a different objective. One of the objectives was to confusion, to make the aisle to put not linear a dependent on the input, and I don't think they wanted to do what is diffusion so all the output will depend on the input. We are mixing the plaintext with the key with each one of the operation.

## SubBytes

First one of the AES is sub bytes. Let's talk about this while thinking about attacks.

How do you implement on 8-bit microcontroller? The state is stored in memory so I have 16 bytes of state, you read the first byte of state and the Sbox. Is a table that stored in memory and the size of the table?  $2^{**}8$ .

So I have this stage registered which is 16 bytes, and the sub box table 256 bytes. A full loop and I took the first byte, first you read it and then I needed to read from the table who is the address that I just read and then I get the value the Sbox, (we know inside the microcontroller) who does right component units the value of the states and the value of the Xbox table, no XOR them, no store that value in the stage register. Bridge from the state go to the table, reading from the sub byte table and xor, and write. This operation is very very leaky.




Figure 5.6: SubBytes

## ShiftRows

Then I need to do shift rows. The first row you don't need to do anything, the other rows you need to shift them, how do you shift with 8-bit microcontroller? using a temporary value, I read the state into the temporal value and I'm right it into here. this is also a leaky operation, because I'm leaking all the bytes in the state, well digging the Hemming Weights of the byte. another way to implement it, just by imagination, it doesn't change the data so there are actually operations that don't do shift row.




Figure 5.7: ShiftRows

## MixColumns

Next operation mix columns, is the Matrix a complication, perform over algebra algorithm, it's takes as input 32 bits

columns and his output is 32 bytes value what are all of the bytes in the output depend of input. How do you do it on a microcontroller? One of the reasons that rhino run the competition that it was very efficient way was doing mix column 8-bit microcontroller, using 13 operations which are shifts and exor. This is the most leaky part of AES this mixed columns.




Figure 5.8: MixColumns

## AddRoundKey

Then do a add round key, just xor, read xor write. This doesn't leak so much because it is inside the ALU, but the reading and writing is the leaking here. Each round of AES is 84 leaking actions. You take the key and you use the same you used to do in creation but you don't have the plane text yet so you use sub bytes or shift, then you end with the round, and this key expansion is very sensitive for power analysis, you can really attack as very efficiently. We can assume that this expansion is very secure.

## 5.13 AES Power Analysis

I told you about AES and what is our motivation and what is the structure, and I want to spend the time that has left to show you a little about internal of AES and very very very briefly talk about the reaction of doing simple power analysis of AES.




Figure 5.9: AddKey

```
% Make sure the matlab AES scripts are in the path
addpath('matlab_aes_scripts');

%%
% Create two 128-bit plaintexts (exactly 16 byte)
plaintext_1 = uint8('Attack at 12:56!');
plaintext_2 = uint8('Attack at 12:57!');

% how many bits are different between the two?
disp(hamming_weight(bitxor(plaintext_1, plaintext_2)));
%%

% Create a key
key = uint8('1234512345123456');

ENCRYPT = 1;
DECRYPT = 0;
%%

% Encrypt the two plaintexts
ciphertext_1 = aes_crypt_8bit(plaintext_1, key, ENCRYPT);
ciphertext_2 = aes_crypt_8bit(plaintext_2, key, ENCRYPT);
% even though the plaintexts were very similar...
disp([plaintext_1;plaintext_2]);
% ... the ciphertexts are very different
disp([ciphertext_1;ciphertext_2]);
%%

% how many bits are different between the two?
disp(hamming_weight(bitxor(ciphertext_1, ciphertext_2)));
%%
```

```
% Decrypt the two ciphertexts
decrypted_1 = aes_crypt_8bit(ciphertext_1, key, DECRYPT);
decrypted_2 = aes_crypt_8bit(ciphertext_2, key, DECRYPT);

% Did we get the plaintext again?
disp([plaintext_1;plaintext_2]);
disp([decrypted_1;decrypted_2]);
%%

% Look at the internals of AES now
[ciphertext_1, leak_1] = aes_crypt_8bit_and_leak(plaintext_1);
[ciphertext_2, leak_2] = aes_crypt_8bit_and_leak(plaintext_2);

% Show an image showing the two leaks side by size
subplot(1,3,1)
image(squeeze(leak_1)); colormap(hsv(256));
subplot(1,3,3)
image(squeeze(leak_2)); colormap(hsv(256));
figure(gcf)
%%

% Show the difference in the middle
subplot(1,3,2)
image(squeeze(bitxor(leak_1,leak_2))); colormap(hsv(256));
figure(gcf)
%%

% plot the HW of the difference
subplot(1,1,1)
bar(hamming_weight(bitxor(leak_1,leak_2))');
```

What you see here is Matlab, I wrote this lab environment to do AES implementations, There is code that dose AES, and there i code that simulates the power leakages of AES as it was implemented on 8-bit microcontroller, all of the operations are 8 bits operations and each time operation happens I'm going to leak it's Hamming Weight .Let's see what's going on.

The first thing I'm going to do is to load some libraries and you can find them in the middle, now going to create 216

bytes plain text. I am going to take these string, to make it binary string Unit8, and I'm going to measure the Hamming distance between these two strings. What is the time distance between these two strings? One, the difference is 6 become 7.  $110 - 111$ .

How do we do it, I have function called bitxor, and this is a vector of size 16, and then waiting Hamming weight. How many possibles Hamming weight are they for 8 bits value? What can the Hamming weight to be? zero, 1, 2 ... 8. So that Hamming weight here is going to be one. now I'm going to set up a AES I am going to choose a key. And now I'm going to encrypt AES, and then I'm going to use my to plain text and the key. The Hamming distance between the two was one. What will be the Hamming distance with the cipher text? Will it be one? no! what's possible values it can be, between 0 to 128, because the output. Would you like me to be 128? NO, I would like it to be 64. Why do I don't need it to be 100 or 2 or 3. Because that means that I don't have a very important property crypto assistance in the Avalanche property means that each bit in each bit affect all of the input. So if I change one bit in the input and I get only one change in the output it means that I don't have the ability point. But if I change one bit in the input and I get 100 bit change in the output what it is mean? It's means that I don't have the average property and just to make things fun I'm flipping all the bits. What I want the Hamming distance to be is around 64, It's that exactly half of the bits changing. So you can see I'm doing the Hamming and measuring and show the ciphertext, at the end I'm doing the Hamming weight.

These two strings are very very similar until the end, the 6 and 7 change. But if you see the ciphertext you can see a lot of difference. And this humming weight is 52. sometimes he's more sometimes is less than 64 but this is okay. Now let's decrypt, How do I decrypt? I take my AES 8-bit function and I give it decrypt. The ciphertext and the key. and see if the plain text into ciphertext are the same. We can see that there are the same and so far so good. Now I want to

show you the internal structure of AES. to do that I have a function that's called 8-bit and leak. Let's open the function. Here is the function. Let's go over the structure

```
function [result state rkeys mixcolumn_leak]=  
aes_crypt_8bit_and_leak(input_data, secret_key, encrypt)  
  
% performs AES-128 encryptions or decryptions like an 8-bit  
% and leaks internal state  
%  
% DESCRIPTION:  
%  
% [result state rkeys mixcolumn_leak] = aes_crypt(input_data,  
%  
% This function performs an AES-128 encryption or decryption  
% data with the given secret key.  
%  
% PARAMETERS:  
%  
% - input_data:  
%   A matrix of bytes, where each line consists of a 16 byte  
%   data input value of the AES-128 en/decryption.  
% - secret_key:  
%   A vector of 16 bytes that represents the secret key.  
% - encrypt:  
%   Paramter indicating whether an encryption or a decryption  
%   (1=encryption, 0=decryption).  
%  
% RETURNVALUES:  
%  
% - result:  
%   A matrix of bytes of the same size as the byte matrix 'i  
%   Each line of this matrix consists of 16 bytes that repre  
%   128-bit output of an AES-128 en/decryption of the corres  
%   'input_data'.  
% - state:  
%   A matrix of byte of size '|input_data| x 41, containins  
%   progression of the encryption process.
```

```

% Legend of the state progression:
% (P= plaintext, C=Ciphertext, K=after AddKey, B=after Sub
% ShiftRows, M=after MixColumns)
% P K BRMK BRMK BRMK BRMK BRMK BRMK BRMK BRMK BRK(=C)
% - mixcolumn_leak:
% A matrix of size |'input_data'| x 9 x 4 x 9 (for encrypt
% |'input_data'| x 9 x 4 x 18 (for decryp
% where mixcolumn_leak(line, subround, col, :) is the
% intermediate valutes generated by the 8-bit MC opera
% [col] columns of line [line] in the input data durin
% subroun [subround]
% EXAMPLE:
%
% result = aes_crypt([1:16; 17:32], 1:16, 1)

% AUTHORS: Stefan Mangard, Mario Kirschbaum, Yossi Oren
%
% CREATION_DATE: 31 July 2001
% LAST_REVISION: 28 October 2008

state = zeros([41 size(input_data)], 'uint8');
rkeys = zeros([10 16], 'uint8');
if (encrypt == 0) % decryption
    mixcolumn_leak = zeros([9 4 size(input_data,1) 18]);
else % encryption
    mixcolumn_leak = zeros([9 4 size(input_data,1) 9]);
end

for round = 1:10
    rkeys(round,:) = aes_round_key(secret_key,round);
end

% expand the keys

if encrypt == 0 %decryption
    state(41,:) = input_data;

```

```
for i=10:-1:1
    if i ~= 10
        input_data = aes_add_round_key( aes_round_key(secret_key));
        state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 2,:) = input_data;

        [input_data leak] = aes_mix_columns_8bit_and_leak();
        mixcolumn_leak(i, :, :, :) = leak;
        state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 1,:) = input_data;
    else
        input_data = aes_add_round_key( aes_round_key(secret_key));
        state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 1,:) = input_data;
    end

    input_data = aes_shift_rows(input_data,0);
    state(3 + (i-1)*4,: ) = input_data;

    input_data = uint8(aes_sbox(input_data,0));
    state(3 + (i-1)*4 - 1,:) = input_data;
end

input_data = aes_add_round_key(secret_key, input_data);
state(1,:) = input_data;

else % encryption

    state(1,:) = input_data;
    input_data = aes_add_round_key(secret_key, input_data);
    state(2,:) = input_data;

    for i=1:10
        input_data = uint8(aes_sbox(input_data,1));
        state(3 + (i-1)*4,: ) = input_data;

        input_data = aes_shift_rows(input_data,1);
        state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 1,:) = input_data;

        if i ~= 10
            [input_data leak] = aes_mix_columns_8bit_and_leak();
            mixcolumn_leak(i, :, :, :) = leak;
            state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 2,:) = input_data;
        else
            input_data = aes_add_round_key( aes_round_key(secret_key));
            state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 1,:) = input_data;
        end
    end
end
```

```
mixcolumn_leak(i, :, :, :) = leak;
state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 2,:) = input_data;

input_data = aes_add_round_key( aes_round_key(state));
state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 3,:) = input_data;
else
    input_data = aes_add_round_key( aes_round_key(state));
    state(3 + (i-1)*4 + 2,:) = input_data;
end
end

result = input_data;
```

First of all I expand the key, so I do the AES key expansion and I don't leak the key expansion. This is the assumption. Let's disregard that description for a moment and this is the encryption. First of all I took the state and the input data in the state, and then I do a add round key, then do SUB bytes, shift rows, mix column. In the last round I done did you mixed columns, and every time I do this I don't replace the state and I saved the state. at the end I output the cipher text, but also the output to the state, so you can see the state is always changing. Now let's see how does it looks, I'm going to run AES twice, and then do some little figure.

The x-axis is the index of the byte in the state. I read the bytes not as a matrix I read it as a row. So there are 16 bites in the state. and the y-axis is the index of the rounds and round 40 is the final round ciphertext. So in between there is the stages. You can see that in the beginning it is very very similar.

If you go down it's become much different and in the bottom it's completely different. This is very easy to analyze. And what we are going to do now show the difference between




Figure 5.10: Diagram

state. What do you see in the middle is the Hamming distance between the right and the left where red is 0 and blue is 256.

In stage 0 what is the difference between two plain texts? 1 bit, you can see one beat is changed to 0. The first round is a add key, we xor the 15 bytes of the key who is 16 bytes of the state, the key is the same in both sides, if the Hamming distance between the two sides was one before I sold the key what is it going to be after? 1. The differential doesn't change at all, I think a distance of 1 and likes or a constant of both sides and The Outpost is still the same. so in the first row I can't see differences. look wild sheep will do, one by the interstate here, one byte is in the same place and one byte There and one byte here. Now there are 4 bytes different between the states, but this bytes are all of the column.What is the next operation? mixed columns. See what's mix column did, mixed this change and now all of the bytes of the states are different.We can't stop AES after 2

rounds, it still can break with crypto analysis, but you can see that this is very nice.

I want to plug the Hamming weight of the distance, The x-axis here he's there around, and the y-axis is the Hamming distance between the two stay. you can see state with the one then one stays one, after sub byte becomes 4, Shift columns doesn't change the 4, then mix columns make it grow a little bit. And then you see the distance stays around 64 until the end of the encryption. I want to show you how do we attack AES using simple power analysis.

There is a lot to talk about in very little time. in very very briefly I will give you the ideal way did you it and then I'll show you how it's actually done. I have connected a probe to my device, I have measured the power consumption over time. so now I have a vector of size that lets say a hundred thousand, and I know that AES is there. Now I want to find the key out of my measurements from my trace.




Figure 5.11: Traces

I have a trace, which was recorded in the same device we saw here. I have a vector called 200 of traces of AES encryption,

lets plot one of the traces. this is actually only one of the rounds of AES. Here is a trace. This is very very clean trace and I would like it to be in my lab. You can see some of them are high and some of them are low, how do I find the key out of this? let's start from the beginning then jump to the middle and the end I don't have time to teach you. the best thing I can hope for is not to get the bytes of the key because the bytes are not function of the bytes, what is the function of? The Hamming weight. So the best hope is the get the Hamming weight, so are you home we will get a vector like the state vector. is this enough to get the key? so you have to believe me that's yes. how do you do it? You will use algebraic the solver and you will have to read the paper. if you have the vector off all the time in Hamming weight you can get the key. But how do I get the vector Hamming weight from distance? Obviously somewhere in this trace, let's look at very very leaky operation like sub bytes, or add around key; it read the states you leave the key and xor them together and then you write the state again. Somewhere in this vector there is a peak where we know that exactly in this moment there was a read of the key. The key was read from memory and was travel in the data bus in this exact peak. And how do I find this particular moment in time I will show you in the next lecture.

So I need to write a function that gets an input about 20 points and what is its out puts? the Hamming weight. maybe it will output of Hamming weight. how do I do it? we need to write a decoder that's as single processing.

Here is a figure showing the move operation they did the same move operation in the microcontroller over and over again this is the average of thousands of measurements where are they moving 0 or 1, until moving 255 ff. Can anybody, you see how Hamming Weight zero have big change, why Hamming weight 0 is more power consumption of Hamming weight 8? Between moves it settings old ones, so moving to zero take more effort from changing.

Here is like a longer trace, let's assume I hate this data how

do I build the decoder. I want the function that can take an array of values and output Hamming weight. Let's start simple, what if I had just one point? I have an input and function that gets one point and give me the Hamming weight of this point. I can calculate the mean each one, the mean for 0 the mean for 1, for 2. if I get it right what we will do, so do you like a nearest neighbor. if I know that the mean of 4 Hamming weight for is 7 and the mean of Hamming weight five is 8 and I got 7.9, what am I going to chose 4 or 5? 5.nearest neighbor.

This is a nice idea, but I have to give them a little extra dangerous. the problem is here that's the Hamming weight are not identically distributed. how many possible values of bytes I get? 256. how many bytes are there with Hamming weight zero? 1. how many bytes Hamming weight 8? 1. how many Hamming weight 1? 8. Hamming weight of 1 is 8 times more likely than Hamming weight of 0. So why do we need to do?we need to do Bayes. The idea is are you going to favor the output more likely. I will found out what are the odds that its five, 6?, 7? then look on my decoder and then I'm going to look and give a bonus for more common Hamming weight. The idea is I need to learn How likely bytes based on the trace decoding and then I'm going to go and look at the distribution of this and then multiply The probability I got. this is for one point. I calculated the odds and then I multiply the probability. what if I have more than one point? watch we actually wants to do here he's actually called multivariate normal distribution. each one of these points, let's say four points, the dimension, and I have a like a cloud In this distribution space, how do you do this? that is the very very fundamental paper called "template power analysis attack" which explain this.

So if you want to do a simple power analysis on AES the steps you do first of all you profiled the device, you understand where all this stuff is happening, you need to build Template that will help you to recognize different Hamming Weight, then you're play the same place in the trace and you get

guesses for Hamming weight for each States and you hope you get the right guesses, and then you take this Hamming weight and you take a few equation solver we'll take the Hamming weight and output the key, or something that we don't know? I don't know because noise. If we can correlate the Hamming weight to wrong then the equation solver will fail. what can we do in this case? We try again.

## 5.14 Template Attacks

### Introduction

Devices performing cryptographic operations can be analyzed by various means. Traditional cryptanalysis looks at the relations between input and output data and the used keys. However, even if the implemented algorithms are secure from a cryptanalysis point of view, side-channel attacks pose a serious threat. Sidechannel attacks are a subgroup of implementation attacks. Examples thereof are timing attacks, power attacks like DPA or SPA. Traditional DPA style attacks assume the following threat model: The secret key stored in the device is used to perform some cryptographic operations. The attacker monitors these operations using captured side-channel information like power consumption or electromagnetic emanation. The attack is successful if the used secret key can be reconstructed after a certain number of operations. **If the number of operations is limited by the protocol used to initiate these operations**, the attacker has an upper bound on the number of operations he can observe. If the operation, which leaks usable side-channel information, is executed just once, the threat model is different: The attacker has to reconstruct the secret key using a single trace of side-channel information. Besides protocol limitations, ephemeral keys can be the reason for such a constraint. Techniques like SPA are a general way to tackle this problem. These techniques use easily distinguishable features of operations like double and add, or add and multiply, to infer key-bits. The majority of the available literature deals with these two types of scenarios. **If the observed signal-to-noise ratio is not high enough, or the implementation is done in a way that ensures the used operations being independent of the key(i. e. no key-dependent jumps), SPA style attacks are not possible anymore.** The attacker has to think of other ways to get hold of the secret key: One way to do this is to use a similar device and build a model of it. Using this model, an attacker

might now be able to recover the secret key.

## Algorithm

Template attacks are a powerful type of side-channel attack. These attacks are a subset of profiling attacks, where an attacker creates a “profile” of a sensitive device and applies this profile to quickly find a victim’s secret key.

Template attacks require more setup than CPA attacks. To perform a template attack, the attacker must have access to another copy of the protected device that they can fully control. Then, they must perform a great deal of pre-processing to create the template - in practice, this may take dozens of thousands of power traces. However, the advantages are that template attacks require a very small number of traces from the victim to complete the attack. With enough pre-processing, **the key may be able to be recovered from just a single trace**.


There are four steps to a template attack:

- Using a copy of the protected device, record a large number of power traces using many different inputs (plaintexts and keys). Ensure that enough traces are recorded to give us information about each subkey value.
- Create a template of the device’s operation. This template notes a few “points of interest” in the power traces and a multivariate distribution of the power traces at each point.
- the victim device, record a small number of power traces. Use multiple plaintexts. (We have no control over the secret key, which is fixed.)
- Apply the template to the attack traces. For each subkey, track which value is most likely to be the correct subkey. Continue until the key has been recovered.

## Signals, Noise, and Statistics

Before looking at the details of the template attack, it is important to understand the statistics concepts that are involved. A template is effectively a multivariate distribution that describes several key samples in the power traces. This section will describe what a multivariate distribution is and how it can be used in this context.

**Noise Distributions**  
 Electrical signals are inherently noisy. Any time we take a voltage measurement, we don't expect to see a perfect, constant level. For example, if we attached a multi-meter to a 5 V source and took 4 measurements, we might expect to see a data set like (4.95, 5.01, 5.06, 4.98). One way of modelling this voltage source is:  $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{X} + \mathbf{N}$  where  $\mathbf{X}$  is the noise-free level and  $\mathbf{N}$  is the additional noise. In our example,  $\mathbf{X}$  would be exactly 5 V. Then,  $\mathbf{N}$  is a random variable: every time we take a measurement, we can expect to see a different value. Note that  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{N}$  are bolded to show that they are random variables. A simple model for these random variables uses a Gaussian distribution (read: a bell curve). The probability density function (PDF) of a Gaussian distribution is  $f(x) = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{-(x-\mu)^2/2\sigma^2}$  where  $\mu$  is the mean and  $\sigma$  is the standard deviation. For instance, our voltage source might have a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 0.5, making the PDF look like:



We can use the PDF to calculate how likely a certain measurement is. Using this distribution,  $f(5.1) \approx 0.7821$   $f(7.0) \approx$

0.0003 so we're very unlikely to see a reading of 7 V. We'll use this to our advantage in this attack: if  $f(x)$  is very small for one of our subkey guesses, it's probably a wrong guess.

Multivariate Statistics The 1-variable Gaussian distribution works well for one measurement. What if we're working with more than one random variable? Suppose we're measuring two voltages that have some amount of noise on them. We'll call them  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Y}$ . As a first attempt, we could write down a model for  $\mathbf{X}$  using a normal distribution and a separate model for  $\mathbf{Y}$  using a different distribution. However, this might not always make sense. If we write two separate distributions, what we're saying is that the two variables are independent: when  $\mathbf{X}$  goes up, there's no guarantee that  $\mathbf{Y}$  will follow it. Multivariate distributions let us model multiple random variables that may or may not be correlated. In a multivariate distribution, instead of writing down a single variance  $\sigma$ , we keep track of a whole matrix of covariances. For example, to model three random variables  $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z})$ , this matrix would be

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma} = \begin{bmatrix} Var(\mathbf{X}) & Cov(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}) & Cov(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Z}) \\ Cov(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{X}) & Var(\mathbf{Y}) & Cov(\mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z}) \\ Cov(\mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{X}) & Cov(\mathbf{Z}, \mathbf{Y}) & Var(\mathbf{Z}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Also, note that this distribution needs to have a mean for each random variable:

$$\boldsymbol{\mu} = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_X \\ \mu_Y \\ \mu_Z \end{bmatrix}$$

The PDF of this distribution is more complicated: The equation for  $k$  random variables is:

$$f(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^k |\boldsymbol{\Sigma}|}} e^{-((\mathbf{x}-\boldsymbol{\mu})^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} (\mathbf{x}-\boldsymbol{\mu})) / 2}$$

## Creating the Template

A template is a set of probability distributions that describe what the power traces look like for many different keys. Effectively, a template says: “If you’re going to use key  $k$ , your power trace will look like the distribution  $f_k(\mathbf{x})$ ”

. We can use this information to find subtle differences between power traces and to make very good key guesses for a single power trace.

### Number of Traces

One of the downsides of template attacks is that they require a great number of traces to be preprocessed before the attack can begin. This is mainly for statistical reasons. In order to come up with a good distribution to model the power traces for every key, we need a large number of traces for every key. For example, if we’re going to attack a single subkey of AES-128, then we need to create 256 power consumption models (one for every number from 0 to 255). In order to get enough data to make good models, we need tens of thousands of traces.

Note that we don’t have to model every single key. One good alternative is to model a sensitive part of the algorithm, like the substitution box in AES. We can get away with a much smaller number of traces here; if we make a model for every possible Hamming weight, then we would end up with 9 models, which is an order of magnitude smaller. However, then we can’t recover the key from a single attack trace - we need more information to recover the secret key.

### Points of Interest

Our goal is to create a multivariate probability describing the power traces for every possible key. If we modeled the entire power trace this way (with, say, 3000 samples), then we would need a 3000-dimension distribution. This is insane, so we’ll find an alternative.

Thankfully, not every point on the power trace is important

to us. There are two main reasons for this:

- We might be taking more than one sample per clock cycle. There's no real reason to use all of these samples - we can get just as much information from a single sample at the right time.
- Our choice of key doesn't affect the entire power trace. It's likely that the subkeys only influence the power consumption at a few critical times. If we can pick these important times, then we can ignore most of the samples.

These two points mean that we can usually live with a handful (3-5) of points of interest. If we can pick out good points and write down a model using these samples, then we can use a 3D or 5D distribution - a great improvement over the original 3000D model.

## Analyzing the Data

Suppose that we've picked  $I$  points of interest, which are at samples  $s_i (0 \leq i < I)$ . Then, our goal is to find a mean and covariance matrix for every operation (every choice of subkey or intermediate Hamming weight). Let's say that there are  $K$  of these operations (maybe 256 subkeys or 9 possible Hamming weights).

For now, we'll look at a single operation  $k (0 \leq k < K)$ . The steps are:

- Find every power trace  $t$  that falls under the category of "operation  $k$ ". (ex: find every power trace where we used a subkey of 0x01.) We'll say that there are  $T_k$  of these, so  $t_{j,s_i}$  means the value at trace  $j$  and POI  $i$ .
- Find the average power  $\mu_i$  at every point of interest. This calculation will look like:

$$\mu_i = \frac{1}{T_k} \sum_{j=1}^{T_k} t_{j,s_i}$$

- Find the variance  $v_i$  of the power at each point of interest. One way of calculating this is:

$$v_i = \frac{1}{T_k} \sum_{j=1}^{T_k} (t_{j,s_i} - \mu_i)^2$$

- Find the covariance  $c_{i,i^*}$  between the power at every pair of POIs ( $i$  and  $i^*$ ). One way of calculating this is:

$$c_{i,i^*} = \frac{1}{T_k} \sum_{j=1}^{T_k} (t_{j,s_i} - \mu_i)(t_{j,s_{i^*}} - \mu_{i^*})$$

- Put together the mean and covariance matrices as:

$$\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & c_{1,2} & c_{1,3} & \dots \\ c_{2,1} & v_2 & c_{2,3} & \dots \\ c_{3,1} & c_{3,2} & v_3 & \dots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mu = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_1 \\ \mu_2 \\ \mu_3 \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

These steps must be done for every operation  $k$ . At the end of this preprocessing, we'll have  $K$  mean and covariance matrices, modelling each of the  $K$  different operations that the target can do.

## Attack Time

With a template in hand, we can finish our attack. For the attack, we need a smaller number of traces - we'll say that we have  $A$  traces. The sample values will be labeled  $a_{j,s_i}$  ( $1 \leq j \leq A$ ). First, let's apply the template to a single trace. Our

job is to decide how likely all of our key guesses are. We need to do the following:

- Put our trace values at the POIs into a vector. This vector will be:

$$\mathbf{a}_j = \begin{bmatrix} a_{j,1} \\ a_{j,2} \\ a_{j,3} \\ \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

- Calculate the PDF for every key guess and save these for later. This might look like:  $p_{k,j} = f_k(\mathbf{a}_j)$
- Repeat these two steps for all of the attack traces

This process gives us an array of  $p_{k,j}$ , which says: “Looking at trace  $j$ , how likely is it that key  $k$  is the correct one?”

### Combining the Results

The very last step is to combine our  $p_{k,j}$  values to decide which key is the best fit. The easiest way to do this is to combine them as:

$$P_k = \prod_{j=1}^A p_{k,j}$$

## practical template attacks

In this section we will show a different ways to select the most important point of a power trace, that will lead us to improved computation time and make template attack more practical.

### sum of difference


- For every operation  $k$  and every sample  $i$ , find the average power  $M_{k,i}$ . For instance, if there are  $T_k$  traces where we performed operation  $k$ , then this average is

$$M_{k,i} = \frac{1}{T_k} \sum_{j=1}^{T_k} t_{j,i}$$

- After finding all of the means, calculate all of their absolute pairwise differences. Add these up. This will give one “trace” which has peaks where the samples are usually different. The calculation looks like

$$D_i = \sum_{k_1, k_2} |M_{k_1, i} - M_{k_2, i}|$$

An example of this sum of differences is:



## Preprocessing

In practical side-channel analysis, the raw input data is often preprocessed. Sometimes this is just due to simplicity or efficiency reasons, e. g. summarizing sampled points. There are however cases where the preprocessing step heavily affects the results. Even if no thinkable transformation can add additional information to a signal, information extraction procedures do improve. The template attack under consideration is such a case and a lucrative preprocessing transformation is described subsequently. It turns out that the transformation of the input traces from the time domain into the frequency domain is such a lucrative transformation. In our practical work, an FFT algorithm was used to accomplish this transformation (a fast algorithm to calculate the discrete Fourier transform, for background information refer to [BP85]). In order to show the impact of this preprocessing step a number of experiments were carried out. First some characteristic differences between time domain analysis and frequency domain analysis are illustrated. Afterwards, to highlight the influence of the number of selected points

on the classification performance in the frequency domain, a number of experiments were carried out. After preprocessing, the resulting traces can be used to perform a template attack in exact the same way as without preprocessing. There is however a difference in the number of points to consider. Figure 6 shows the classifications results as a function of the number of selected points after preprocessing. The considered numbers of points are ranging between 1 and 40. Additionally three different minimum distances where chosen. Results show that much less points are sufficient in comparison to a template attack without the preprocessing step. At the price of performing an FFT on every input trace (those used to build up the templates as well as those to classify) we get a major advantage

### Amplified Template Attack

Even if the aim of a template attack is to recover the secret key using a single trace, in many real world settings implementations allow for several iterations of the same operation with the same secret key. The application of template attacks is not restricted to stream ciphers like RC4 and can be applied to block ciphers as well. Since every symmetric cipher contains some sort of key scheduling mechanism which processes the secret key, this generalization is possible. Smartcards often use block ciphers for encryption or authentication, hence let us consider the following example: A malicious petrol station tenant, named Eve, is using a modified smartcard based payment terminal. Everytime a customer uses this terminal, Eve captures one trace of side-channel information. This single trace could already be used by Eve to carry out a template attack. However, some customers are coming again and Eve gets hold of another trace. The template attack can easily be extended to take advantage of such situations, e.g. by adding up noise-probabilities  $p(N_i)$  of every captured trace and applying the maximum-likelihood approach on these sums. As a consequence, the power of the attacker is amplified. Using this approach, if n

is the number of iterations, the error probability of template classification is reduced by the factor  $\sqrt{n}$ .

## 5.15 Related work

- **Power analysis attacks on the AES**[35] - This paper describes an attack attack on the AES algorithm using the Difference of Means technique was carried out on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board. The work of Coron et al. described the idea of using the Weight Power Model and experimentation was conducted on a smart card chip. Brier et al. expanded the work on CPA by proposing the use of a Hamming distance power model in place of Hamming weight while results were presented from data gathered from attacking an 8-bit chip against AES. Alioto et al. proposed a novel CPA attack named Leakage Power Attack which is derived from the theory behind the Hamming Weight Power Model and results were conducted against a MC74ACT273N chip. Lastly, Mestiri et al. describes an attack on a SASEBO-GII board against the AES algorithm with the goal of comparing the Hamming distance model against another derivative of the CPA called the Switching Distance model **power analysis (DPA)** and **correlation power analysis (CPA)**.
- **Differential Power Analysis in AES: A Crypto Anatomy**[36] - The initial papers on DPA are abstract, and recent papers propose countermeasures rather than describe the attack methodology itself. None of the previous papers considered the pipeline effects in a processor, and almost all current processors contain pipelines. And most of the papers do not clearly describe the method to locate the necessary power magnitudes (corresponding to the actual instructions which are executed during the SBOX lookup) from a long power profile. This journal describes the attack in a

step by step manner, so that effective countermeasures can be proposed by a larger number of researchers. Even the recent papers in DPA approach tend to assume that the reader understands the anatomy of DPA well. Yet, a number of researchers have asked us about how it is done, and this is an effort to make the steps clear. We also look at the effect the pipeline has on the attack, and methods to identify which instructions are most vulnerable to attack.

- **Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attack[37]** - Work related to circuit level hardware countermeasures are very few. Sprunk in his invention uses a clock that outputs a stream of random clock pulses. When the clock is unpredictable, the moment at which a certain instruction would run is also unpredictable. Therefore the obtained power traces would be misaligned. The misalignment of power traces makes it necessary to collect and analyse large number of power traces which makes the attack more time consuming. But many communication protocols such as USB and RS232 need a stable clock and therefore usage of an unpredictable clock is a disadvantage in such situations [Power analysis and Testbeds](#).
- **One trace is all it takes: Machine Learning-based Side-channel Attack on EdDSA[38]** - The paper proposes a Convolutional Neural Network based profiling attack on the implementation of the Ed25519 Digital Signature Algorithm in the WolfSSL library on a 32 bit STM32F4 microcontroller. The attack focuses on the optimized implementation of Elliptic Curve scalar multiplication by Bernstein et al[39] that splits the computation to work on a single nibble of the ephemeral key at a time and uses a lookup table with all possible partial multiplication results. The lookup table access is vulnerable to side channel data leakage via power analysis, similarly to the way an SBOX lookup is exploited for side channel at-

tacks on AES. The authors evaluate the standard template attack method as well as SVM and RandomForest based attack and finally - a CNN based attack that uses a CNN architecture similar to the well-known VGG model used for computer vision tasks, modified to work with 1D instead of 2D convolutions and fine tuned for SCA in terms of the number of layers and layer sizes. To evaluate the attacks, the authors construct a dataset mapping power traces to the respective ephemeral key nibbles processed when the power trace was recorded. Around 5K profiling (training) traces and 1K attack (test) traces are recorded and used for the evaluation. The results show that the CNN based method has a 100% accuracy of identifying the correct ephemeral key nibble given a trace from the attack set, whereas the SVM and Random Forest methods show a slightly lower accuracy and the template attack lags behind them all. As a consequence, the CNN based method is able to iteratively recover the entire 256bit ephemeral key using just a single guess of each of its 64 nibbles and the private scalar can be computed from the ephemeral key and the respective signed message using a straightforward mathematical formula, thus giving an attack the ability to forge message signatures. Another important result is that as few as 500 training traces are sufficient to reach the 100% accuracy with the CNN based attack.

- **Current Events: Identifying Webpages by Tapping the Electrical Outlet[40] -**

Computers plugged into power outlets leak information by drawing variable amounts of power when performing different tasks. This work examines the extent to which this side channel leaks private information about web browsing. Characterizing the AC power side channel may help lead to practical countermeasures that protect user privacy from untrusted power infrastructure.

Web browsers increasingly take advantage of hardware acceleration to implement rich user interfaces. In practice, several challenges complicate the task of identifying webpages:

- Competing websites often imitate one another, resulting in similar resource-use patterns.
- Most websites optimize for load time, so many popular webpages load in approximately the same amount of time.
- A complex software stack sits between a webpage and the power supply, introducing layers of indirection that may buffer or hide fine-grained events.
- Many websites change frequently, often presenting different content (e.g., ads) to different users.

This paper experimentally demonstrates that, despite the above challenges, different webpages do induce different power-consumption patterns that can be used to identify them.

To do so, they used a Fourier transform of the power traces to represent the entire trace in the frequency domain. Then, they built an SVM classifier to distinguish between 50 different webpages and showed it can achieve 87% precision and 74% recall.

# Chapter 6

## Introduction to micro-architectural attacks

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### 6.1 Background & Primitives

Micro-architectural side-channel attacks refer to a side-channel attack that exploit information leakage from the hardware infrastructure itself. The attacks can be found in a large scope of devices - servers, workstations, laptops, smart-phones, etc.

Normally, we assume a safe software infrastructure, meaning that no software bugs, such as buffer overflow, is present. Nevertheless, such assumption does not imply safe execution, due to the fact that the information leaks because of the implementation, which is often driven by complex optimizations and design. Such leakages are not considered as 'mistakes' or 'bugs', but rather a trade-off decision between optimizing some aspects of the execution and potential information leakage.

Potential outcomes of such attacks as described can be crypto

primitives, which is common with other side-channel attacks, but also other sensitive information such as keystrokes and mouse movements.

In terms of sources of leakage, we saw in previous chapters sources such as power consumption or electromagnetic leaks. However it's harder for an attacker to come across such sources because they require physical proximity and access to the device, which are more typical to embedded devices. In this case the requirement is that the attacker will have somewhat remote access to the device, meaning that the attacker can run code on the hardware infrastructure of the machine. Such scenarios can be found in cloud providers renting computational resources to a customer, Java-Script code running in a browser and others.

## Example: Cache attack on RSA Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation

**Input** : base  $b$ , exponent  $e$ , modulus  $n$

**Output:**  $b^e \bmod n$

```
X ← 1
for i ← bitlen(e) downto 0 do
    X ← multiply(X, X)
    if  $e_i == 1$  then
        | X ← multiply(X, b)
    end
end
```

**return** X

**Algorithm 1:** Square-and-multiply exponentiation

Consider the binary exponentiation algorithm presented in Algorithm 1. Notice that the execution flow of the algorithm relies heavily on the value of the bit  $e_i$  of the private key. Now consider a scenario in which an attacker has information on the changes regarding the buffer holding the multiplier  $b$ . Such information can be considered as a query to the buffer and receiving as a result the latency of the query. If the




Figure 6.1: Querying the buffer holding the multiplier  $b$ . The y axis is a latency scale, and the x axis represent the query index. The dotted plot is a scatter plot while the solid line is the normalized moving average.

buffer is in use, the query will be longer than if the buffer is unused.

In Figure 6.1, the graph of the querying result, the actual bits of the exponent can be clearly detected.

## Attack Model

We assume that the attacker has no physical access to the device. Moreover, the attacker can only execute unprivileged code on the same machine as the victim. Such scenarios in which this happens can be found, for example, when the victim installs some malicious program on his machine/smartphone. Other examples can be found in cloud computing where an attacker has a virtual machine on the same physical machine as the victim, or in a web environment in which the attacker runs unprivileged JavaScript code.

In the scope of this chapter we will focus on shared hardware in the form of data/instructions that are stored in the cache. While other shared hardware components can also include the DRAM and the memory bus (memory shared hardware) or the branch prediction unit and the arithmetic logic unit

(CPU shared hardware), they are not in the scope of this chapter.

## Today's CPU Complexity

From 2012 Intel has released a new family of microprocessors every year. Each comes with its own new microarchitectural schemes with new characteristics. To gain performance upgrade in each new installment (on average 5% increase in performance depending on the feature), minor optimizations, such as caches and branch prediction units are added. Such optimizations are the main reason that side-channel information leakage exists. Unfortunately, these optimizations often come with no documentation since this is Intel intellectual property. Lack of documentation can make it harder for an attacker to perform said side-channel attacks.

To emphasize today's CPU complexity, it is said that "Intel x86 documentation has more pages than the 6502 has transistors" [41], with 6502 being a reference to a 8-bit microprocessor, used in Apple II, Commodore 64, Atari 800 and more. It had, in the year 1975, roughly 3510 transistors, while the Intel Software Developer's Manuals is 4844 pages (may. 2018). In a more advance microprocessor, such as the 22-core Intel Xeon Broadwell-E5, more than 7 billion transistors can be found.

## Background on Caches

When designing a cache side-channel attack, a proper understanding of how caches work, in detail, is required. First, we need to acknowledge that the requirements for an 'ideal memory' oppose each other. Such requirements are zero latency, infinite capacity, zero cost and infinite bandwidth. The trade-offs are interconnect: **Bigger is Slower** - Bigger memory often comes with higher latency, due to the fact that it would take longer to determine the location to retrieve. **Faster is Expensive** - A reduction in latency often means that a more expensive technology is needed. For example,



Figure 6.2: Memory Hierarchy of a common CPU.

SRAM is faster than DRAM, which in turn is faster than Disk memory. However, their cost ratio is the other way around. **Bandwidth is Expensive** - A wider bandwidth needs to come with additional banks, ports, higher frequency or faster technology.

In our need to understand the use of cache, we need to examine the different memory technologies and why they are used in the way they are used. **DRAM** - Dynamic Random Access Memory is the technology that is often used as the main memory (or RAM), while **SRAM** - Static Random Access Memory is the technology used in cache memory. The DRAM latency is higher than the SRAM latency, but is cheaper to make. The main difference in cost arises from the fact that DRAM consists only of one transistor and one capacitor per cell, while the SRAM consists of six transistors per cell. These differences also mean that the DRAM is more dense. Finally, the DRAM cell layout and technology requires to periodically refresh each cell.

Since having Both a large and fast, single level of memory is unlikely, CPU's today are made with multiple levels of storage. The main idea is that progressively bigger and slower storage units are located in higher levels of memory, which are farther from the processor. The motivation for such design is to ensure that most of the data the processor needs is kept in the closer and faster levels.

The memory hierarchy can be seen in Figure 6.2, where data can reside in, at a given point in time, in the following storage units - in CPU registers, the different levels of the CPU cache, main memory or disk memory.

## Caching Basics

The two main ideas of caching are to exploit temporal and spatial locality. **Temporal Locality** is the notion that a program tends to reference the same memory location many times within a small window of time (for example, loops). The anticipation of such thinking is that recently accessed data will be accessed again soon. Therefor, a good strategy will be to store recently accessed data in automatically managed fast memory. **Spatial Locality** is the notion that a program tends to reference a cluster of memory locations at a time (for example, sequential instruction access or array traversal). The anticipation will be that surrounding of some accessed data will be accessed soon. A good strategy will consider storing addresses adjacent to the recently accessed one in an automatically managed fast memory. In detail, we want to logically divide memory into equal size blocks (lines) and fetch to cache the accessed block in its entirety.

Moreover, there are two approaches to the management scheme, manual and automatic. **Manual Management** means that the programmer manages data movement across levels, which is not scalable for substantial programs. However, it is sometimes used in some embedded systems. **Automatic management** refer to a scheme in which the hardware itself manages data movement across the different levels in a way that is transparent to the programmer. Meaning that the average programmer does not need to know anything related to the memory hierarchy levels to write a program. On the down side, which begs the question on how to write a fast program if the management is automatic, in addition to what kind of side-channels could arise from such scenario.

The basic unit of storage in the cache is called a block or a line. The main memory is logically divided into cache blocks that map to locations in the cache. And when data is referenced, two outcomes can come of such action - a cache hit or a cache miss. A **Cache Hit** occurs when a line is referenced and is in the cache. The cached data will be retrieved instead

of accessing main memory. A **Cache Miss** occurs when a line is referenced and is not in the cache. The data will be fetched from main memory, passing through the cache, possibly evict other line to ensure enough storage.

When designing a cache, we are faced with a number of design decisions to handle. **Placement** - Essentially the location in which we will place or find a block in the cache. **Replacement** - We need often to remove data from the cache to make room for newer data. Which begs the question of what data to evict. **Granularity of Management** - The basic units of storage in different levels. Do we store the same amount of blocks across different levels or do we uniformly store the same size of blocks. **Write Policy** - When a write operation is being made, we need to decide whether to preform the write operation in all levels or pass the write data to a lower level only upon eviction from that level. **Instruction/Data** - When a program is executing, the instructions that are in need to be executed are required to be fetched from memory as well. The designer needs to decide whether to treat instructions and data memory as two separate types or as the same.

## Set-Associative Caches

We will be focusing on a cache design that is often used in today's CPUs, which is set-associative caches. Which means that the cache will be logically divided into **Cache Sets**, which will be divided into **Cache Ways**. Each way will store a cache line worth of data. The division of the memory into different cache sets will be a direct mapping from the memory address. Namely, each address will be associated with a cache set according to a group of bits in the address which will represent the cache set index. The specific way in which the line is fetched will be determine according to the cache replacement policy, since the cache set is expected to be full. An abstraction can be seen in Figure 6.3

Consider the following example: The cache has 8B cache



Figure 6.3: Set-Associative Cache - The set index of a line derives from the set index bits of the address. The cache way is determined according to the cache replacement policy.

lines, 16 cache sets each consisting of 2 ways. We can compute the set index of the address  $(1011111110)_b$  by only looking at bits  $b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6$ , since we have 16 cache sets (4 bits) and 8 different cache line offset (bits  $b_0, b_1, b_2$ ). Hence the cache set will be  $(1111)_b$ . We can also compute the size of the whole cache by multiplying the cache dimensions  $8 \times 16 \times 2 = 256B$ .

## Virtual Addresses or Physical Addresses

Since we need the bits of address to determine its cache set, we are face with a problem due to the fact that programs running are only aware to the virtual addresses while the hardware side is aware to the physical addresses. The translation between virtual addresses and physical addresses is the responsibility of the MMU (Memory Management Unit).

There are four major ways of implementing such cache mapping according to the addresses. **VIVT** - Virtually-Indexed, virtually-Tagged. Meaning that there is no need to translate the addresses in order to know the mapping of the addresses into the cache, which is faster. On the other hand, such implementation causes aliasing issues as same virtual address maps to several different physical addresses. This aliasing is

due to the tag not being unique, and will force a flush action to the entire cache on context switching. **VIPT** - Virtually-Indexed, Physically-Tagged. Meaning that there will be a need for TLB translation for the tag, but can be looked up in parallel. Such mapping can be quite fast. Moreover, if the set index bits are derived from the page offset, there is no aliasing, but the cache size is limited to the page size multiplied by the number of cache sets. VIPT is used in Intel's L1 caches, with the default page size being 4K and each cache line is 64B, resulting in no larger than  $2^6 = 64$  sets. **PIPT** - Physically-Indexed, Physically-Tagged. Meaning that the translation between virtual and physical addresses will have to be performed, taking up time. On the other hand, no aliasing issues occurs and no required limitation on the number of sets is present. Typically used in the larger Intel caches - L2 and L3. **PIVT** - Physically-Indexed, Virtually-Tagged. Meaning that all the limitations of previous ways apply, and is rarely used in practice.

## Replacement Policy

We need to decide on a policy according to which a cache line will be evicted in order to make room for incoming data. Many replacement policies exist, namely FIFO (first in, first out), LRU (least recently used), LFU (least frequently used), random, a hybrid and more.

Intel commonly applies a LRU policy or a pseudo-LRU policy (since pure LRU is complex to implement). Which determines that the oldest cache line to be referenced will be evicted. As if each cache line is attached with a time-stamp that is updated on access. An example can be thought of by having  $n$  way cache set and  $n + 1$  different lines of memory that are mapped into the same cache set and are accessed in order. The first  $1, \dots, n$  lines will fill the cache ways, while the  $n + 1$  access will evict the first memory line from the set, since all the set ways are full.

A potential issue arises with LRU policy when a program

needs to access cyclically  $n+1$  memory lines (“program working set”) that are mapped to the same  $n$  way cache set. This is referenced as a ‘set thrashing’ and will result in 0% hit rate. If we compare LRU policy to a random policy, depending on the workload, some studies have shown that LRU and random replacement policies have the same hit rate on average.

Recent studies have tried to predict intel’s CPU eviction policy for the LLC. The researchers suggest the following policy; Each cache set has an array in the same size of ways, that holds 3 bits per cell (a number between 0 to 3). When a new line is loaded into a L3 cache set, the suitable cell in the array is updated to the value 3. The array values are referred as the “age” of each line in the set. Each time a line in the cache is being accessed, the CPU searches for it in L1, if it doesn’t find it there it will search for it in L2, if both of them will result as miss, the CPU will search in L3. In case the line is found for the first time in L3 cache, it will decrease the age of this line by 1. When a new line (not in the cache) is accessed, and an eviction needs to be made, the CPU checks the age array (in the suitable cache set), and evicts the first line that it’s age is 3, if no line has the age 3, it evicts the first highest age that was found. Moreover, the researchers suggest that the processor has another policy, which enters the lines with the age of 2.

When implementing a cache side-channel attack, we will normally want to evict some special memory location from the cache. Considering a non-LRU replacement policy will mean that evicting a memory line from the cache will not necessarily be practical, since there is no guaranty that if the attacker accesses memory locations in a specific pattern we will evict the whole set from the cache.

## Caches on Intel CPUs

In Figure 6.4 we can see an abstraction of an Intel CPU architecture, on which every core has its own dedicated L1




Figure 6.4: Basic Intel CPU - each core has its own L1 and L2 caches, while all connected to a larger sliced L3 cache which can be accessed from all cores.

instruction and data cache, in addition to a slightly bigger L2. All cores are connected via an interconnected bus to the last level cache (LLC/L3). The LLC is often sliced into the number of cores, having a dedicated slice to each core, while having all cores being able to access all slices. The common practice is that the different levels of caches are inclusive, meaning that a lower level cache is a super-set of the higher ones.

In order to perform a cache side-channel attack, an attacker can optimize its cache usage, among other things, using the following command: `prefetch` - A suggestion to the CPU that some memory line will be accessed soon, can trigger fetching that line into the cache by the CPU. `clflush` - Cache line flush, instructs the CPU to flush a memory line from all levels of the cache. The two instructions are based on virtual address.

The different latencies of the different cache levels, as well as the timing difference between a cache miss and a cache hit (as can be seen in Figure 6.5), are the main primitives

of most cache side-channel attacks that will be discussed by the end of this chapter.

## 6.2 Cache Attacks Techniques

Microarchitectural attacks exploit hardware properties that allow inferring information on other processes running on the same system. In particular, cache attacks exploit the measurable timing difference between the CPU cache and the main memory. They have been the most studied microarchitectural attacks for the past 20 years, and were found to be powerful to derive cryptographic secrets [42]. In such attacks, the attacker monitors which memory lines are accessed, not the content of a certain memory line.

Cache attacks are being used in one of the two following common scenarios:

- **Covert channel:** two processes communicating with each other when they are not allowed to do so, e.g., across VMs.
- **Side channel attack:** one malicious process spies on benign processes, e.g., steals crypto keys, spies on keystrokes etc.

We will focus on side-channel attacks.

### Cache Side-Channel Timing Attacks

Every timing attack works by the following steps:

1. Learning timing of different *corner cases*.
2. Recognizing these corner cases by timing only.

Here, our corner cases are *hits* and *misses*.

## Building the Histogram

The first step towards the attack is to build the histogram of the corner cases, cache hits and cache misses. We measure the time for each case many times in order to get rid of noise. Thus, we have a histogram and we can find a threshold to distinguish the two cases.

Building the histogram for cache hits is done by the following loop:

1. Measure time.
2. Access variable (always cache hit).
3. Measure time again.
4. Update histogram with delta.

Building the histogram for cache misses is done by the following loop:

1. Flush variable (`clflush` instruction).
2. Measure time.
3. Access variable (always cache miss).
4. Measure time again.
5. Update histogram with delta.

Having the two histograms, as in Figure 6.5, we determine the threshold to be as high as possible such that there will be no cache misses below.

## How to Measure Time Accurately

Consider the fact that the time intervals of our cases are (relatively) very short timings, we ask how to measure time accurately. For such short timings, it is common to use the




Figure 6.5: Timing differences histogram of cache hits and cache misses.

Time Stamp Counter (TSC) via the unprivileged `rdtsc` instruction as following:

```
[...] → rstsc → function() → rstsc → [...]
```

By using this instruction, due to out-of-order execution, the actual execution order could be different, resulting with wrong measurements. The solution is to use the pseudo-serializing instruction `rdtscp` or to insert a serializing instruction like `cpuid` or use fence instructions like `mfence` [43].

We will now introduce two main cache attack techniques: Flush+Reload [44, 45, 46] and Prime+Probe [42, 45, 47]. Both of them are exploitable on x86 and ARM and can be used for both covert channels and side-channel attacks.

## Flush+Reload

The attack is made of four basic steps and it goes as following:

1. **Map.** The attacker maps a shared library (Illustration in Figure 6.6), by doing that he will have a shared cache line with the victim.
2. **Flush.** The attacker *flushes* the shared cache line, it can be done via unprivileged instruction like `clflush`.

3. **Victim.** The attacker lets the victim load (or not load) the shared line, depending on the victim's behaviour.
4. **Reload.** The attacker reloads the shared cache line. If the cache line has a *hit* the attacker infers that the victim loaded the data on the previous step, if the cache line has a *miss* the attacker infers that the victim did not load the data on the previous step.




Figure 6.6: Attacker maps shared library (shared memory, in cache), the shared cache line is marked in red




Figure 6.7: Flush+Reload attack flow. Between the first flush and the first reload the victim did not access the shared cache line, so the first reload resulted with a cache hit. Then, after the second flush the victim accessed the shared cache line and hence, the second reload resulted with a miss.

The first step (Mapping a shared library) can be done once, while steps 2-4 are repeatable as much as the attacker wants.

The main advantage of this attack technique is the fine granularity, which is 1 memory line (usually 64B). On the other hand, this technique is somewhat restrictive, it needs `clflush` instruction, which is not always available e.g., on ARM-v7 and it needs a shared memory. Illustration of the attack flow in Figure 6.7.

## Shared Memory

A common method to achieve a shared memory is by a feature called *page-deduplication*. When two different independent processes are loading the same system library, some of their memory pages will be identical, when the operating system (in a cloud scenario - the hypervisor) identify separate identical physical memory pages, if page-deduplication is enabled, it will merge the physical pages in order to save physical memory, and two different virtual memory pages, one of each process, will be mapped into the same physical memory page. As of today, no serious cloud service company is using memory deduplication, e.g., Amazon EC2.

## Evicts+Reload

[48] demonstrated a substitution attack for Flush+Reload that does not require using a `clflush` instruction. This attack access physically congruent addresses in a large array, which is placed in large pages by the operating system. In order to compute physically congruent addresses, we need to determine the lowest 18 bits of the physical address to attack, which can then be used to evict specific cache sets.

## Prime+Probe

First, for the Prime+Probe attack to work, the Last-Level-Cache (LLC) should be inclusive, i.e., the LLC is a superset of the L1 cache and the L2 cache. Thus, data evicted from the LLC is also evicted from L1 and L2. In inclusive caches, a core can evict lines in the private L1 of another core. The attack is made of the three following steps:

1. **Prime.** The attacker primes the cache by reading memory lines from its own exclusive memory (no shared memory).
2. **Victim.** The attacker lets the victim evict (or not evict) lines while running, depending on the victim's behavior.
3. **Probe.** The attacker probes data in a similar way of the prime step but with the measurement of how much time it takes to load the lines (Hit / Miss), for each cache set, the attacker determines if the cache set has been accessed.




Figure 6.8: Prime+Probe flow.

In comparison to Flush+Reload, this attack technique is less restrictive: it does not require `clflush`, does not assume shared memory and possible from JavaScript. On the other hand, the granularity is coarser: 1 set. Illustration of the attack flow in Figure 6.8.

In practice, we need to evict cache lines without `clflush` or shared memory, so the following questions arise:

- Which addresses do we access to have congruent cache lines?
- How do we do that without any privilege?
- In which order do we need to access them?

To achieve that, we need an *eviction set*: addresses in the same set, in the same slice and an *eviction strategy*.

## Eviction Set

<sup>1</sup> We want to target the L3 for cross-core attacks and we need addresses that have the same set index. Consider the following cache settings, L3 for a 2-core CPU: 4096 sets, 64B-lines, 12 or 16 ways. Since each memory address indicates one memory byte, the 6 least significant bits of the physical address indicates the line offset. For simplicity, we assume that the cache is not sliced, since there are  $4096 = 2^{12}$  cache sets, and the next 12 bits indicate the cache set. The L3 is physically indexed, so we need to choose addresses with fixed physical address bits. Unfortunately, address translation from virtual to physical is privileged. One of the virtual addresses' properties is that a page offset stays the same from virtual to physical address. Thus, some of the least significant bits of the virtual address can be used as a sneak peek to the physical address. Typical page size is 4KB, which means just 12 bits of page offset, i.e., 6 bits of line offset and 6 least significant bits of the cache set out of 12. To overcome this limitation, we can use a special type of enlarged pages called *Huge Pages*, which are 2MB size each, that is - 21 bits of page offset. This way, the set index bits are included in the 21 LSB of the address.

We now have another issue; in practice, the L3 is divided into slices, as many slices as cores. We usually have 2048 sets per slice, that is, actually 11 bits for the set index. We cannot

---

<sup>1</sup>From now on, most of the details are correct for a common Intel CPU architecture.

infer the slice number directly from the address, neither from the virtual or the physical. The slice number of each memory line is determined by a hash function, which takes all the address bits as input, including physical page number bits (outside the known bits from page offset). The Illustration below shows the address bit indication for both typical pages and huge pages.




Figure 6.9: Sliced cache.

Also, the mentioned hash function is undocumented; it designed for performance. But, it does not mean that it is impossible to target the same set in the same slice. Previous work [49] showed that the hash function could be reverse engineered, for example, in Figure 6.10.

		Address bit																																
		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0				
		7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	9	8	7	6	
2 cores		$o_0$								⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕		⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕
4 cores		$o_0$								⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕		⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕
8 cores		$o_0$								⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕		⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕
		$o_1$	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	
		$o_2$	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	

Figure 6.10: Three reversed engineered hash functions, depending on the number of cores. Function valid for Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, Haswell, Broadwell

If the function is unknown, the process will be somewhat slower. But an eviction set can still be achieved via the following algorithm:

1. Construct  $S$ , set of addresses with the same set index.
2. Access reference address  $x \in S$  (to load it in cache).
3. Iteratively access all elements of  $S$ .
4. Measure  $t_1$ , the time it takes to access  $x$ . It should be evicted.
5. Select a random address  $s$  from  $S$  and remove it.
6. Iteratively access all elements of  $S \setminus s$ .
7. Measure  $t_2$ , the time it takes to access  $x$  - is it evicted?
  - If not,  $s$  is part of the same set as  $x$ , place it back into  $S$ .
  - If it was evicted,  $s$  is not part of the same set as  $x$ , discard  $s$ .

Note that for a CPU with  $c$  cores:  $16/c$  addresses in the same set and slice per 2MB page, we can apply the same algorithm with groups of addresses instead of single addresses and speed up the eviction set building process by up to three orders of magnitude.

## Eviction Strategy

In the Prime or the Probe step, the attacker evicts a cache set by filling it with  $n$  addresses for a  $n$ -way cache. If the replacement policy is LRU, it access addresses from eviction set 1 by 1. If the replacement policy is not LRU, the eviction rate is lesser than 100%, e.g. 75% on Haswell. For non-LRU caches, we can use some heuristics, as in Figure 6.11, that will result in a higher eviction rate.

## Conclusion

To sum it up, in practice, for Prime+Probe on recent processors we need:




Figure 6.11:  $a_1 \dots a_9$  are in the same cache set. Fast and effective on Haswell: eviction rate > 99.97%

- An eviction set, i.e., addresses in the same slice and with the same set index. Depends on the addressing.
- An eviction strategy, i.e., the order with which we access the eviction set. Depends on the replacement policy

## Hardware vs. implementations

To perform a cache side-channel attack on some software, you need two things: First, shared and vulnerable hardware. Note that there will be no side-channel if every memory access takes the same time or if you cannot share the hardware component. Second, a vulnerable implementation. Note that a vulnerable implementation does not mean that the algorithm is vulnerable. For example, we can take the specific implementation of AES and RSA, this does not imply that AES and RSA are defective. Not all implementations are created equal.

To sum up, hardware will most likely stay vulnerable, so patch implementations when you can. And remember, constant time is not enough - because an attacker can modify the internal state of the micro-architecture.

## 6.3 Step by Step Attack Demo

The target of the attack in this demonstration is to get the timestamp of the keystrokes pressed by a user in a gedit pro-

gram. We only target the timestamps and not the keystrokes themselves, as we cannot fully recover the pressed keys.

The demonstration is performed on a non-virtualized Linux environment. A requirement to perform the attack is having an Intel CPU, as we need the inclusive property of the L3 cache. The code for performing the attack can be cloned from the git repository [50]. It is based on the Flush+Reload cache attack that we mentioned in section 6.2 presented in [46] and [48].

The attack is performed in 3 steps: calibration, profiling and exploit. For each of these steps, a folder exists in the repository.

## Step 1: Calibration

In this step, we want to create the histogram, which depicts the cache misses and hits as a function of the number of CPU cycles. Then we will be able to extract the threshold that will match the CPU on which we perform the attack. In order to perform the calibration, we run the following commands:

```
1      $ cd calibration
2      $ make
3      $ ./calibration
```

The calibration works by generating multiple cache misses and cache hits and measuring the number of CPU cycles it takes to access a variable. Each of these cases is being performed multiple times in order to get rid of the noise.

We build a histogram of cache hits and cache misses as described in previous section 6.2. The output of the calibration program is a histogram of the cache misses and hits as shown in Figure 6.5.

We can then find the threshold so it satisfies the following requirements:

1. As high as possible

2. Most cache hits are below it
  3. No cache miss below (we may see one exception due to the way the calibration is coded)

For example, in Figure 6.5, we can see that there is a clear line in approximately 220 CPU cycles.

## Step 2: Profiling

After finding the threshold, we can now profile in order to find the cache lines that are useful to get information about the target program. Choosing gedit as the target program, we first need to find the shared library that it uses so that we can give it as an input to the profiler. We then need to find this shared library file location and size. In order to do that, we can use the following one-liner:

```
1 $ cat /proc/`ps -A | grep gedit | grep ↵
-oE "^[0-9]+"/maps | grep r-x | ↵
grep libgedit
```

This is equivalent to first finding the pid with

```
1      $ ps -A | grep gedit
```

and then using this pid in

```
1      $ cat /proc/<pid>/maps | grep ↵
          libgedit
```

then copying the line with r-xp permissions (x stands for executable).

Doing that gives the following line (memory range, access rights, offset, -, -, file name):

```
1 7f2d83197000-7f2d8326d000 r-xp 00000000<--  
          08:02 1080575                      /usr/lib/<--  
          gedit/libgedit.so
```

We need to update the threshold to the value we found in the calibration step before we can feed the above line to the profiler. We can do this by editing the profiler source file (under the profiling directory) and updating the line with the constant

```
1 #define MIN_CACHE_MISS_CYCLES
```

to the threshold we have.

After updating the threshold, we can run `make` to compile the profiler. We then use `sleep 3` so we can have time to trigger the event before the profiler starts, and run the profiler with the line we found above:

```
1 sleep 3; ./profiling 200 7f2d83197000-7←  
      f2d8326d000 r-xp 00000000 08:02 ←  
      1080575           /usr/lib/←  
      gedit/libgedit.so
```

The profiler does its job by loading the shared library to its address space, and then doing flushes and reloads for each address in the address range given by the offset argument (0 in the above case), and the library size (1080575 bytes) for some given time (200  $\mu$ sec for every address in the above command). The output is the number of hits that happened in every address.

The idea is that if a 0 is shown for a given address while triggering the event, then it means that the line in this address was never accessed for this event. Eventually, we will get lines with some cache hits, and we want the ones that have at least a non zero value when profiling.

Running the profiler with offset 0 while jamming a key, doesn't seem to generate cache hits, and we may only see 0. The reason for that, is that the code that handles keystrokes in the library is probably just not in the beginning of the library. Instead (and this is a cheat), we change the starting offset to 20000, and this is approximately where the code that handles keystrokes in the library is found. In real life we will have to

/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20e40,	15
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20e80,	27
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20ec0,	7
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20f00,	10
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20f40,	16
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20f80,	13
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x20fc0,	10
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x21000,	18
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x21040,	15
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x21080,	3
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/gedit/libgedit.so, 0x210c0,	1

Figure 6.12: Addresses with cache hits.

wait until we get to something by running the template attack on the whole library. Running the profiler with this new offset, we can see in Figure 6.12 some addresses that have a non-zero value quite fast. The addresses with the high numbers are the ones we should further investigate in the exploit phase.

### Step 3: Exploitation

Equipped with the addresses from the previous step, we can now go to the exploitation dir, change the threshold constant (MIN\_CACHE\_MISS\_CYCLES) as we did for the profiler, and run `make`. Then we can run the program by

```
1 ./spy <library-file> <offset>
```

giving one of the addresses we found as the offset argument. Starting from the address with the most hits, we can see that even if we are not pressing any key, we are still getting events. The reason for that is that this address is related to the blinking cursor. This is, of course, not really interesting information, and we can understand that it is not always the address that has the most hits that is the most valuable. Trying the next interesting address indeed gives us information about the pressed keys, which is what we wanted to achieve. However, moving the mouse also gives us a lot of

hits, which is not perfect. We will need to inspect the addresses one by one until we find an address that will only work for keystrokes.

We can even further improve the attack by finding the complete matrix of the keystrokes for each of the keys as shown in Figure 6.13. We can see that for different keys, there is a different “signature” of the accessed addresses. Although we may not be able to precisely identify each keystroke, we can try to group the keystrokes to different addresses and eliminate some guesses if we can spy on more than one address at a time.

Finally, as it may be annoying to perform the above process manually, we can automate the event triggering and other stuff as shown in [51].

## 6.4 Cache Template Attacks Paper

- **Cache Template Attacks Paper** - The article is called “Cache Template Attacks: Automating Attacks on Inclusive Last-Level Caches” by Daniel Gruss et el. Cache Template Attacks consist of two phases. In the profiling phase, they determine dependencies between the processing of secret information and specific cache accesses. In the exploitation phase, they derive the secret values based on observed cache accesses. Among the presented attacks is the application of Cache Template Attacks to infer keystrokes and—even more severe—the identification of specific keys on Linux and Windows user interfaces. Furthermore, they perform an automated attack on the Ttable-based AES implementation of OpenSSL that is as efficient as state-of-the-art manual cache attacks.

[Cache Template Attacks Paper](#).




Figure 6.13: Complete matrix for each keystroke.

# Chapter 7

## High Data Complexity Power/EM 1

So far, we have attacked two cryptographic systems in the course:

- **RSA:** using Montgomery reduction with time as a side-channel.
- **AES:** using simple power analysis

We attacked AES using simple power analysis. We had a power trace as an input, consist of hundreds of thousands of points. We created a classifier or dozen classifiers. The classifier input is the power traces and the output is a list of the hamming weights of each byte of the state.

**Firstly, lets understand what hamming weights are.** The Hamming weight of a string is the number of symbols that are different from the zero-symbol of the alphabet used. For example the hamming weight of 11101 is 4, as seen in the chart below. It is thus equivalent to the Hamming distance from the all-zero string of the same length. The chart below is brought in order to show the hamming weight of different types of strings.

Table 7.1: Hamming weights of different bit strings [52]

String	Hamming Weight
<b>11101</b>	4
<b>11101000</b>	4
00000000	0
<b>789012340567</b>	10

The picture below is a nice visualization of how the hamming weight of binary numbers fluctuates when the binary number is growing.




Figure 7.1: Hamming weight for binary numbers (0-256)

For AES, we have 84 classifiers that we did not care about how these classifiers were created. These classifiers can be created with every reasonable way to create a classifier. We assume they take as input that power trace and output the hamming weight.

A question arises: does the classifier look at the entire power trace? Assume that the classifier wants to find the hamming weight of the first sub-bytes operation of AES. In order to

do this operation, we have to take the first byte of the plain text and the first byte of the key. The sub-byte operation: look at the sub bytes table and replace the state with sub bytes of the state.

Does the classifier need to look at the entire 1000 or 100,000 points of the trace? Or maybe it needs to look at a certain limited amount of points in the trace? The given power trace contains much redundant information. The redundancy created because we started our measurement a while before the first sub-byte operation happens, these measurements are irrelevant for us. The early measurement is just an arbitrary operation that happened before the encryption started.

**What is the required trace size** - Assume we have an army of classifiers, each classifier is going to look at a certain number of points from the trace, ten, 15 or hundred points. How to separate the points in the trace to the classifiers? We will go into that a little bit during this chapter.

We want to combine two attack methods: timing and simple power analysis, to take the best part of each one of these methods. Combining them will improve the results. This method is called differential power analysis.

In the timing attack, what is the threat model? What was the adversary allowed to do? The adversary allowed to send inputs to the device, get the outputs from the device, and measure how long it took. The adversary was not necessary for controlling the inputs, he just had to know when the input was provided without knowing what the input value was. He needed to know when was the input was when the output to find the time difference. The adversary had to measure many times and have many inputs, then he did some statistics to analyze it. The various scenarios when we can justify a timing attack – when the device is available, or it is accessible across the web and so on.

What about simple power analysis? What was the threat model there? What did we allow to do with the device? First of all, we had to open the device, cut its power supply, and

connect a power probe, the meter that measures the power consumption. The attack is an invasive attack, and maybe it is considered less probable that we allowed doing that as attackers. If we are doing an electromagnetic probe, it would be less invasive, but we will still have to get very close to the device, but it would be less detectable.

In the previous sections, we mentioned that to perform simple power analysis, we have an army of classifiers. However, we did not mention how to train them and where their data came from. Before we start the simple power analysis, we have an offline phase. In this phase, we use a device which we can do reverse engineering and get really into its internals. Maybe look at it with a microscope, or we can understand completely how it works, and then this device is similar to the DUT. The only thing we are not allowed to know as an adversary is the secret key.

What is the difference between the two devices? According to Kirchhoff's principles, the difference between our DUT to what we use to learn is the *current*.

How do we get this copy of the device in the real world? Well, we can buy it, we can steal it, maybe buy it online. We have to have a very involve offline phase before we can do a simple power analysis. We have to get close to the device that we want to attack and do reverse engineering. If we justify it by buying stuff on eBay, we can go to the trash, and we can look at the datasheets.

The next phase in our attack is the *online phase*. In simple power analysis, we can perform one or two simple measurements. The problem with these measurements is that these measurements are our only chance to measure the device, and we have one trace that has to be very clean with very little noise. We cannot control this noise. For example, if we take the measurements outside the lab, there will be some noise that we can not control. However, if we are using measurement equipment, the measurement equipment is going to add noise, and the DUT is introducing noise by itself. Un-

fortunately, we cannot do so much about the noise in the simple power analysis scenario, because we only have the on-line phase.

### What can we do if we had a little noise and we don't have the exact key?

*That's exactly our problem with simple power analysis*

A problem that can arise from this noise is that we get one incorrect byte. Can we find the right key by searching it around the guess? Assume that we got AES key, which is 16 bytes long, and it is 8-bit implementation, and we tried the key and it is wrong. Now, we try to check which byte is the wrong byte, by changing its value to every possible value. How many attempts would we have to perform? We start our search from the first byte, and we check all its possible values, if we did not find the right key, we are going to the second byte until we find the right key. We have 256 options per position times and 16 bytes of the key. That means that we have to perform  $256 \times 16$  decryption operations. However, how many decryption operations we have to do if we have more than one wrong bytes? It is 16 choose 2 – to choose which 2 bytes to change, which is more or less 16 squared, so it is two to the power of  $4 \times 2$ . We chose to byte, and then what we do is that we go over all the possible combinations of these bytes, which is two to the power of 16, so it is two to the power of  $8+8 = 16$ . It grows up fast and it is going to be as bad as brute force pretty quickly. We have to work very hard if we do not get the key right, it blows up exponentially. The analysis here is by using byte and not bits because if we are looking at an 8-bit8-bit micro-controller, a lot of the operations will be byte-oriented, so it is going to be more likely to get the entire byte wrong.

**The solution to this problem is to have a more complex offline phase which prepare us for the online phase.**

Simple power-analysis will work fine if it is reasonable to

conduct thousands of measurements on the same device in order to eliminate noise with statistics, however, it is not always practical.

## 7.1 High Data Complexity Attacks

(AKA: *DPA* and *CPA*)

The main idea is to capture many traces and use statistics to recover the key. The advantages of these methods are:

- Does not require detailed information about DUT (save us the cost of doing reverse engineering to the device).
- Succeeds even under extreme noise.

On the other hand, the drawback is that the attack model is different now, we need to own the device. That may cause some people to think that this attack model is irrelevant because it is not practical. In truth, it might be practical in quite a wide range of situations.

### Why would we want someones secret?

A good example of this is how TV suppliers calculate your bill. You use your secret to identify yourself to the supplier. The suppliers can then decide which programs you are given access to, and how to charge you for accessing purchasable items (a movie, vod, etc ...). Consequently if someone were to obtain your secret somehow they would be able to watch anything at any cost. In the end you would be the one paying for it

### How complex power analysis works

Until now, we knew about 2 ways of attacking with side channel:

1. *Timing Attack*

## 2. Simple power analysis

When we used the timing attack, we tried many inputs, and the measurement for each input contained one output: for one input, we had the time it took. On the other hand, when we did Simple Power Analysis, for each input, we had a huge power trace (vector of points which indicates the power consumption over time for a given input). In other words, the data complexity was simple in both of these methods - we had a  $1d$  input. Now we will try to take it a step further, combine these methods, and create a new method with  $2d$  input, which means now we have high data complexity. Instead of giving just the power trace, we will give as input the traces for various data at fixated points in time. We have a set of data  $D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n$  and we have the power trace of the system for each one of these inputs, at the time, i.e., the first point in the power trace for all these inputs, was taken at the same relative time. So now our output is not a vector but rather a Matrix  $M_{D \times T}$ .




Figure 7.2: many measurements over time

The suspicious reader should ask: how is it possible that we measure the power-traces of all the different data inputs all at the same time? That is indeed a challenge to align all the measurements along the time-line, and some of the counter-measures to the attack we present here will insert randomized operations or will change the clock speed so that we will

have trouble aligning the power-traces along the time-line. If you are curious about that, you might find it interesting to look at the DPA book (the coursebook) and read about the countermeasures and how to overcome them.

## Using Vaizata method

The next thing we are going to do is to use the Vaizata similarly to how we did it with timing attacks. When we did a timing attack, we guessed a bit of the key, and then we measured how much time it took. We are going to assume that sometimes the algorithm depends on the key; therefore, the power consumption will be depended on the key. Finally, we are going to check the measurements using some statistics tests.

Unlike the timing attack where we knew that we measure the relevant data, when we used power analysis, we have a very long power trace where only a few points relevant to us and all the other points represent data that is not related to the key.

### Reminder:

- Make a simple assumption about the implementation
- Guess a small part of the key
- Make an hypothesis about the effect of the guess on the execution
- Classify the measurements according to the hypothesis
- If we guessed right, the classification will be statistically meaningful

Now, we are looking for a stage during the AES algorithm, where a small number of bits of the key, affect a large amount of the bits in the state. The intuition here is that we want to find a stage in the algorithm, where the power consumption depends on the key value.




Figure 7.3: Vaizata method stages




Figure 7.4: AES stages

We might consider measuring the power consumption just before the start of the algorithm, but in this case, the key does not affect the state. Next, we have the add round key. After this operation, each bit of the key affects precisely one bit of the state. Why is that? Because we essentially “XOR” the key with the state, which so the first bit of the key affects the first bit of the state.

Our second operation will be **subbytes**. The **subbytes** operation is a value-based substitution, where each possible state value is mapped to a different value as defined by the substitution matrix. In this stage, every bit of the key affects 8 bits of the state! Why is that? If only one bit in the key were different, our add-around key would cause another bit of the state to change, and that would lead the **subbytes** look-up to bring an entirely different byte to the resulting state.

Next, we have **shiftRows**, where still every bit of the key affects 8 bits of the state. Why is that? Because we just moved the data, we did not diffused it.

And now we have the **MixColumns** operation. How many bits of the state now is affected by every bit of the key? In the **MixColumns** operation, each byte depends upon 4 bytes, and each byte is 8 bits that depend on the key. So we now have 32 bits of the state, which depends upon a single bit of the key.

As an attackers, we are going to focus on the point immediately after the **subbytes** and right before the **shiftRows**.

So based on this information, what should be our Vaizata assumption? The assumption is that is the power consumption of the device is the function of the data, so if we change the data, the power consumption changes. (A counter-measure for that will be to build a machine that consumes the maximum power all the time).

Similarly to our attack on the RSA algorithm, where we guessed a bit of the key, we are going now to guess a byte of the key (since AES is byte-oriented). When we attacked RSA, we have split our data into two groups and then conducted  $t - test$ , but since we guess a byte, now we have 256 groups.

We know the value of the plaintext (it is given), and we are making a guess about the key, but how will we know the value of the **subbytes**? By Kerckhoffs's principle, which means that everything regarding the algorithm but the key is shared publicly.

So for each data point, and each byte guesses, we have 256 options. 255 out of them will be meaningless, and only one is the correct guess, which should have statistical significance.

- Input:  $D \times T$  matrix of traces,  $D$  vector of plaintext inputs, 256 guesses for the key byte
- Calculate:  $D \times 256$  matrix of 1-bit hypotheses
- Output:  $256 \times T \times 2$  means  $\Rightarrow 256 \times T$  difference-of-means




Figure 7.5: The way we separate the data to groups based on the guess

The problem is that we have many different points each time, and we shall see a difference only at a certain point. Therefore our actions are as follows: for each guess, we split the measurements into two sets, and we measure the difference between the means of their power traces on every point of time. At most of the points, the difference will not be significant, except to the point where the guess was made correctly. We illustrate it at Figure 7.6.

On the  $X-axis$  we have the time, and on the  $Y-axis$ , there is the difference of means. In Gray, we can see the noise, and even if we guessed the correct key, we have a lot of similar points, because not all the times depend on the key. But we can see in the figure the moments of the peaks in the means differences, these moments are also called “the right times”. These essentially should be the moments of the sub-bytes. If we incorrectly picked a peak, which is a ghost noise, like in a point when we xor the plain the with the key, then we will not be able to find meaningful separation later on.




Figure 7.6: the difference of means as a function of time

## 7.2 DPA Lab

In the class example, we attacked AES algorithm with 200 traces with size 30,000 using an example data from the *Power Analysis Attacks* book, and we visualized the process. First, we load the data and plot it in Figure 7.7 with the following axes: *X – Axis* will be the time and *Y – Axis* will be the trace number. In addition, we had a dimension of color intensity, which will depend on the power consumption.

In plot 7.7, there are very aligned columns which indicate that the traces are appropriately aligned. Our goal is to separate the power traces of the correct key from all the other traces. To do that, we start by showing in Figure 7.8 by comparing the power consumption of two traces based on time.

We can see that both of them overlap, but if we had a difference, we would be able to find a separation on this graph. Therefore, in Figure 7.9, we test for each key guess and input, what was the power consumption, whereas yellow represents less power and blue more power.




Figure 7.7: the traces' power consumption by time




Figure 7.8: 2 groups of traces by times

Now we calculate the mean of power consumption for each guess, and we plot it over time.

If we did the split correctly, this power trace average would be different from all the other 255 graphs. The problem with this chart is that we need to check many graphs, so we need something that shows the distance of means for all




Figure 7.9: power consumption by guess and input




Figure 7.10: mean of each guess across the different inputs by time

the guesses. A better graph will be to plot the distance of means of each key guess by time and then to search for the moment with the maximum difference (“the right time”) like in Figure 7.11.

While it might be hard to spot it on this chart, there is a




Figure 7.11: distance of means by time and key guess, color intensity represents the distance

certain point of time where the difference is 8.91, and at all the other points, it is somewhere near zero, as we can see on the charts.

What if we focus on the correct time across the different key guesses? We should be able to spot the correct guess, as shown in Figure 7.12.




Figure 7.12: means distance at the correct time

We finish by plotting the distance of means across time for

all the keys, we can see in green the distance of means for the correct key, and we can see that at the right time, it is separated from the other keys as shown in Figure 7.13.




Figure 7.13: distance of means for all key guesses across time

## Research Highlights

- This paper [53] by Paul Kocher examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices.

The paper presents the Differential Power Analysis subject comprehensively, its background, Simple power analysis, demonstration of DES algorithm attack, attacks on additional encryption algorithms using DPA and counter measures for DPA. It's also discussed approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

- Another article published in 2005 [54] presents an attack on masked AES Hardware implementations. During the last years, several masking schemes for AES

have been proposed to secure hardware implementations against DPA attacks. In order to investigate the effectiveness of these countermeasures in practice, the researchers responsible for the article designed and manufactured an ASIC. The chip features an unmasked and two masked AES-128 encryption engines that can be attacked independently. In addition to conventional DPA attacks on the output of registers, they have also mounted attacks on the output of logic gates. Based on simulations and physical measurements they show that the unmasked and masked implementations leak side-channel information due to glitches at the output of logic gates. It turns out that masking the AES S-Boxes does not prevent DPA attacks, if glitches occur in the circuit. However, an attacker usually does not have easy access to the back-annotated netlist of a product.

- This Article posted by Stefan Mangard [55] maintain that Many hardware countermeasures against differential power analysis (DPA) attacks have been developed during the last years. Designers of cryptographic devices using such countermeasures to protect their devices have the challenging task to select and implement a suitable combination of countermeasures. Every device has different requirements, and so there is no universal solution to protect devices against DPA attacks.

In this article, a statistical approach is pursued to determine the effect of hardware countermeasures on the number of samples needed in DPA attacks. This approach results in a calculation method that enables designers to assess the resistance of their devices against DPA attacks throughout the design process. This way, different combinations of countermeasures can be easily compared and costly design iterations can be avoided.

- This article [56] presents a countermeasure to Power Analysis attack on AES. The article describes an efficient AES software implementation that is well suited

for 8-bit smart cards and resistant against power analysis attacks. Our implementation masks the intermediate results and randomizes the sequence of operations at the beginning and the end of the AES execution. Because of the masking, it is secure against simple power analysis attacks, template attacks and first-order DPA attacks. Due to the combination of masking and randomization, it is resistant against higher-order DPA attacks. Resistant means that many measurements are required for a successful attack.

The implementation shown in the article compares well with other protected and unprotected AES software implementations for smart cards. The practical attacks that we have performed support our theoretical estimates about the security of the countermeasures. This article also includes a practical evaluation of the countermeasures. The results prove the theoretical assessment of the countermeasures to be correct.

# Chapter 8

## Correlation Power Analysis

this lecture is the last technical lecture of the course about High Data Complexity Power Analysis, CPA.

### 8.1 Previous lectures recap

We are interested in laying a side-channel attack. We have a device performing a secret operation, AES operation. The device works as follows: we give input to the device (plain text), and then it works on the input to produce an output (ciphertext) using a secret key. We want to recover the key. So, if we collect many pairs of plain text and ciphertext, what can we do with that? Lots of things. In addition to plain text and ciphertext, we have a side channel [57]. What is a side-channel? A side-channel is an artifact of the computation, and what is careful about the channel is that it depends on the intermediate values of the computation and not its output. We talked about the multiple side channels throughout the course.

## Timing side channel

First, we used the time it took the computer to check for the correct password in order to find the password. Later, we used a timing attack [58] to attack RSA [59]. We did not attack RSA; we attacked an implementation of RSA, which was left to right multiplication exponentiation that uses a unique representation which is called Montgomery (the Montgomery basis). The Montgomery basis [60] the representation which is very easy to do multiplications in this implementation, almost as easy as doing regular multiplications, but there is a step called Montgomery reduction, which the computer sometimes does. Not a very expensive operation, but the computer only does it sometimes, and because it does that sometimes, in each encryption operation, each exponentiation takes different time. The time is a function of the plain text, and the secret (in the case of RSA is the private key). So how can we perform a timing attack on RSA? We had a device, the device got an input or message to sign and output the signed message, and it also outputted the time it took for the calculation. Our data structure had plain text, signature(ciphertext), and time. The first step of the attack is to take all the signatures and to throw them away. In the next step, we tried to guess one bit of the key. This guess helped us simulate a tiny little bit of the secret operation, just one step and this step, which we simulated. Since we guessed the key, we could also guess this tiny step included a Montgomery reduction. We hypothesize that if there is an extra Montgomery reduction, the run time will be longer, and if there is no Montgomery reduction, the run time will be shorter. Now we have a data structure: message and a bit if the bit is One, it means we think this was taking more extended, and if it zeroes, it means shorter. So, we divided our set of traces into two groups, each one gave a bit, 1 or 0.

Now, how do we know that we guessed this bit correctly? We have in each row a bit, which says if we think it is longer or shorter and the time it took. The hypothesis that we are trying to prove is that the messages that we marked with

One is going to take a longer time to compute than the ones that we marked with 0. We have two sets of traces: the one marked as 0 and the one marked as 1. We hypothesize that they take different time to execute. We test this hypothesis by using statistics. We can use the student's T-test, or we can compare the average. So we guessed a crucial bit, how many ways are there of guessing this crucial bit? Two ways. So we have two hypothesizes, two proposed ways of splitting our traces into two sets. In such a way, we can crack the key.

## Differential Power Analysis (DPA)

In DPA [53, 61], the output of our device under test (DUT) is the ciphertext. AES is a very structured cipher, it has a fixed structure, and it is going to be very rare that we have a different run time. So, usually, there is a program running on a CPU that has a clock, and in each tick execute the operation. AES is straightforward: it shifts, xor, and so on. Luckily, we have other side channels, such as current. The attacker took the device and measured the instantaneous power consumption of the device. There are two ways for the attacker to do this. The first way is to do this directly: take the current that is exiting the circuit to the ground, and instead of letting it go directly to the ground, we send it through a little probe that will measure the power consumption on the circuit. The advantage is that we get a clean signal, and the disadvantage is that we will have quite aggressively to manipulate the device, and maybe it is not a reasonable assumption to make. The second way is the electromagnetic (EM). What does Does EM mean?

Current ( $I$ ) flowing through a wire and the change in the current generates EM wave, so if we put an antenna next to the wire we will be able to pick up the current on this wire next to the antenna and to do this we only need to get close (do not need to cut anything open), which makes it more reasonable attack model. The disadvantage is that we have much noise going on, and we will have a lot of RF signal processing




Figure 8.1: Right hand rule

to do so it is not trivial to get from there to the key. Let us assume we are doing PA without EM. So, our output now is a data structure. This data structure has plain text, ciphertext, and power consumption, but power consumption is not a fixed value, it is a trace vector. Now, if we think about the device under test (DUT), most of the time, when we are performing a measurement of the power consumption, it is not handling the secret, it is doing something else. So if we look at the first byte of the key of AES, it is processed at the beginning of the encryption where there is adding the critical operation. The idea of AES is that every bit of the key will be mixed into the whole ciphertext, so it is not easy to track it. At the beginning of the encryption, the key is not being processed at all, and in the end, its affected so dilute into the ciphertext. So there is going to be a particular time when this trace is interesting. There are only a few interesting points for an attacker from a very long trace with millions of points. In DPA, we had one number, the time, and we knew that the signal was decoded in this number. We have a significant vector, and we know the signal is somewhere in there, but it is not in all of the points. However, we did the same thing here, we guessed a little part of the key, and then we gave each one of the rows in the data structure a bit, one or zero. So, we looked at some intermediate value, we have the AES state, and we took a little bit of the state, and we gave each one of the rows in the data structure again,

a one-bit value and the one-bit value was precisely the value of this bit of the state. We have a way of splitting our group of traces into two, the same thing as the timing attack. We claim that if we guessed the bit correctly, we just made a meaningful split of the traces. Now we divide our traces into two sets, and we want to test if there are different distributions. We hope that at some point (the correct time), there will be a proper distribution. An important thing to understand is how many ways we have to split the traces into two in the timing attack. If we guess one bit of the key, there are two ways of splitting. Each time we decided we guessed a crucial bit, we simulate it a bit, and then we gave each entry in the data structure value of 1 or 0. However, AES is a byte-oriented algorithm, so there are 256 ways of splitting, i.e., We have 256 different competing ways of splitting the traces into two. However, again, we split the traces into two. So, once we decide on a split, we go over the data structure, and each row, we assign a value of 1 or 0. Then we perform difference of means, i.e., we take the mean of the right, the mean of the left, and 256 different ways of splitting into two and look at the difference of mean where we get the most significant difference between the two means.

## 8.2 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)

### Hamming weight

The hamming weight [52] of a number is the number of bits, which are set to 1 in its binary representation. Hamming weight can refer to a hamming weight of the state, or to hamming distance, which means how many bits change from one state to the next. Let us assume we are looking at the hamming weight of a byte. This hamming weight has values varying between 0 and 8. A number with hamming weight 0 will be 0, and a number with hamming weight one will be a power of 2. For  $m$  independent and uniformly distributed

bits, the whole word has an average Hamming weight  $\mu_h = m/2$ .

## CPA background

We need to find a way to know when the traces are different. In DPA [53, 61] we guessed one byte of the key so we have 256 ways of splitting, but still, based on this guess we only guess one bit of side-channel. So now we have 256 different ways of splitting the ciphertext into two groups and if we guessed right, the two groups will be different, but only at the correct time. At previous lessons, we learned that most computers these days are based on a technology called CMOS. CMOS's idea is that if nothing much is happening if it is in a static state, the power consumption is shallow. However, if it is dynamic, if it switches between 1 and 0, there are bursts of power consumption. So, in a CMOS device, the power instantaneous power consumption is correlated with the number of bits that are flipping in this period. This fact was completely ignored when we did DPA. We just said the power consumption was different. As opposed to DPA, CPA does not ignore that fact.

In CPA [62, 63, 64, 65], we are going to guess one byte of the key, but we are not going to look at one bit of the state. Instead, we are going to look at the hamming weight of the state. Assume that if we guessed a byte correctly, the CPU is going to have to handle a byte with its hamming weight. For example, if we guessed that the state was 3, then the CPU will have to handle a byte with a hamming weight of 2. Our data structure is plain text, and instead of a division to 0 or 1, we will have a number between 0 and 8. This number is the hamming weight of the byte we expect the device to handle. Instead of splitting the traces into two groups, we are going to use correlation. Due to CMOS, we can add a very reasonable claim that when more bits are changing, the power consumption rises.

## CPA on AES motivation

AES [66] is byte-oriented, so we have 256 different guesses. Now, we are trying to give a label to each one of the inputs. We start with a guess, and then we give it a label. The first step of AES is to take the bytes of the plain text and XOR them with the secret key (bit-wise operation). The next step is to apply the sub-byte transformation, which is a look-up table. After applying the sub-byte, we have a byte, which is a mixture of the plain text that we know and the secret key. So if we guess a key, we can completely simulate the value. After sub-byte, we apply shift-rows. However, shift-rows is just reading and writing the same value from memory. It is reading this value ( $\text{HW}(\text{S}[P \text{ xor } K])$ ) and makes it even stronger. Next, there is Mix columns operation. The mix-Columns operation uses 32 bits, so we will have  $2^{32}$  different guesses to do mixColumns. Since  $2^{32}$  is large number we will need many traces, and we will need to measure the DUT many times. Then we classify the measurements. There is going to be a statistically meaningful classification for correct guesses. We refer readers to [67] for a further detailed explanation of the AES algorithm.




Figure 8.2: AES illustration

In the timing attack days, we achieved a meaningful conclusion by running the students t-test. Moreover, getting a division into two sets and in DPA, we applied difference of means. To find meaningful classification in CPA, we will need the statistical Pearson Correlation Coefficient [68]. The Correlation Coefficient is simply the covariance normalized

to a value between -1 and 1. The intuition is that if the correlation coefficient is zero, it means we are not guessing the key correctly, and if we are guessing the key correctly, we are getting a correlation coefficient, which has a high value, notably better than what we get on the other key guesses.

## CPA's data structures

When we were looking at a timing attack, we had a data structure of size D; we had D inputs; each input was a message we are trying to sign. For each of these inputs, we had a trace, our side-channel trace which was a single number. Our data structure was D times one. When we perform High Data Complexity power analysis, we are going to do D different inputs, and each one of these lines represents a single trace, i.e., long vector, and not a single point like the timing attack. The vector with size T represents the power consumption of the device running with the input in T different points of time. So we have a matrix data structure of size D times T. D different inputs and T different times. Each line of the matrix can be thought of as if we fix the plain text and ask the power consumption over time of this plain text.

Each column of the matrix can be thought of as if we fix the time and ask what is the power consumption of the device in that particular time. One of these times called the correct time, and we will get the statistical meaning at that time. In other incorrect times, we won't get any statistical meaning because the DUT is not processing the data we are looking at.

Note that in order for the CPA attack to succeed, we have to align the traces to the same time. Together with this matrix, we have another data structure, which contains the inputs, so each one of these lines says, "this is the encryption of plain text A, this is the encryption of plain text B," and so on. There are all sorts of ways of getting it, depending on the attack model. One way is that the attacker has a signing oracle, and the attacker chooses the plain texts and sends

them to the device. This is the most straightforward model of the attack. Another way which is a little more confusing is that the attacker has to commit ahead of time all the plain texts, and then the device encrypts them all at once, so he can't adapt to whatever input he gives.

## CPA on AES step by step

We want to do a CPA on the AES encryption. We want to guess one byte of the key, and we want to get this byte mixed with the plain text, which we know. In addition, we do not want too many bits of the key to getting mixed in because then we will have many guesses. So, the plain text comes in here, and we know the plain text. We mix it with the unknown key. The key is a guess. How many guesses are there for the key?  $2^{128}$  ways of guessing the key. However, to not guess the entire key at once, we can guess only one byte at a time, so there are actually 256 guesses at each time.

For a critical guess, We can simulate the key bit XOR plain text. Then, we can simulate sub-byte of (key XOR plain text), and then we can also simulate shift-rows on that result. This is where our simulation stops, because to simulate mix-columns we need to guess 32 bits of the key, and we do not want to guess 32 bits. The trick is that when the DUT is manipulating this value (the the value we got after the simulation stopped), it will have some power consumption, and that power consumption will be correlated to the hamming weight of that value (according to the assumption we have on the CPA attack).

Example: Let us assume we guessed the key byte as 5. So, if we know the guess of the key byte is five, we can look at the plain text, and we know the first byte of the plain text so that we can do key XOR plain text. We can do subByte of key XOR plain text, and we can calculate the hamming weight of it. So, we have a vector of size D, which is the hamming weight that we guessed for each one of the inputs. We have a function that receives as the plain text and our

guess as its input and outputs the hamming weight. We have D different inputs, so we will call this function D times and get an output of vector of size D.

If we guessed the key correctly, at some point in time, which is called the correct time, the power consumption would indeed be correlated (close to +1) with this vector that we guessed and all of the other times will not be correlated (since the DUT is not only processing this byte of the key, but it is processing other bytes of the key, other things, and more). However, at the correct time, there is going to be a correlation. If we did not guess the right key, there would be no time, which will correlate, meaning the correlation is close to zero. If I say that there is a correlation, meaning the correlation is close to +1.

## CPA warm up example

We have a DUT, we have a matrix of traces, we know the plain text, we know the ciphertext, we know the power traces, and we know the key. So we have the power trace, and we want to find where exactly inside the power trace is this bit being processed. Our objective now is to find out when the DUT is processing the first byte of the key. It could be interesting for us if we want to perform a fault attack [69] Alternatively, a template attack [70] or if we want to make sure that we know how to do CPA. As we saw earlier, the hamming weight of the sub-byte output is a good hypothesis.

Now, let us look at our data structure. We have a matrix of traces, D time T. Lets assume we have 1000 traces. Each one of these traces covers an extended period, several milliseconds, so it has 1 million points. Each one of these values is not Boolean. Usually, it is one byte if we are using a regular source code. We also have the inputs; we know for each of these traces what was the plain text being processed. The size of the plain text in AES is 16 bytes (128 bits). So we have another data structure, which is 128 bit by 1000 rows, so each input is 128 bit and has 1 Megabyte of a trace attached

to it. We also know the key, so we do not have to guess it. So now, we are trying to find out what is the correct time. We want to find out, for example, when is the DUT processing the first byte of the key. So we go over each one of our plain texts. We can do plain text XOR key, we can also do sub-byte of that, and we can calculate the hamming weight of the output of sub-byte. To each of the input plain texts, we associate the output hamming weight. We hypothesize that the hamming weight the device will have to manipulate is the output hamming weight we calculated. We created 1000 such numbers. Each of the rows will now have plain text, trace, and hypothesis.




Figure 8.3: Graphic way of CPA warm up example

The next step is to take the hypothesis and to sweep it across all moments. Assume we have a fixed specific moment in time, i.e., a vector of size 1 time 1000. This vector is the instantaneous power consumption of the device at a fixed particular time. Recall that the hypothesis is also a vector of size 1 time 1000. For two vectors of size 1000, we calculate the Pearson Correlation Coefficient. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient function receives as an input 2 vectors of 1 by 1000 and outputs a single value between -1 and 1. If this value is very high or low, it means that there is a correlation between the input vectors, but if it is close to zero, it means there is no correlation between the vectors. We will execute this process for each fixed moment in time; in our example,

we will run in 1 million times. So the output of this step is a vector of size of 1 million by 1. So 1 million different times, for each of these times, we have a single value between -1 and 1. Now we can look at this and see where the maximum absolute valued point is, and it is probably the correct time.

## CPA example

However, in the warm-up example, we had one assumption that not always correct - we assumed we know the key. In the following example, we want to do CPA in case we do not know the key. We still have a matrix of traces. To each trace, we have the associated input plain text. In order to solve the critical problem, we will run the warm-up CPA 256 times. Each time we guess the key. If we are guessing the key as 0, we will have a hypothesis vector, and we can sweep it and get a vector of a million times one. We can also try a key one and sweep it again and get another vector. For key 2, key three are all going to key 0xff, i.e., 256 different key guesses, which gives us 256 times a million possible correlations. In this case, we have 256 guesses and not a single hypothesis vector but a hypothesis matrix. 256 different hypotheses each column in the hypothesizes matrix is like the warm-up. Then we take this matrix and sweep it across this matrix. In the end, we get a million different time by 256 different key guesses, and each one of the points in this matrix represents the correlation between our hypothesis and the instantaneous power consumption of all of the devices at one particular moment in time. So this is a two-dimensional matrix, and each row corresponds to a key, and each column corresponds to a time. So, most of the time, 99.9%, this matrix is going to be more or less 0. However, there are going to be some points where there is a good correlation, and this point is at the correct time and the correct key!

Let us do this in pictures. So, when we had a single hypothesis, we would take this red row and sweep it across this red line, this was the warm-up. However, now we do not know

the key if it is red or blue or green, so we take this blue vector and sweep it across, and we will take this green vector and sweep it across. So this is the output here, it has the same number of rows as the number of key guesses and the same number of columns as we have times. This is full CPA, and hopefully, in one of these rows, we will have a peak, and we will be happy.




Figure 8.4: Graphic way of full CPA example

## CPA in Matlab examples

We will show a Matlab example, which includes CPA, warm-up CPA, and the full CPA, as seen in this section. We are working on a data set called WS2 [71], which is part of the DPA toolkit. It has 200 traces, each one of size 30,000. These are power traces of the first round of AES on an 8-bit microcontroller, which is deficient in clock speed and is very vulnerable to DPA. Also, that test setup is a lab setup, so this is the best we can hope for in terms of DPA. For each one of the traces, the plain text is known. Figure 8.5 de-

scribes the 200 traces of power consumption as a function of the sample number.




Figure 8.5: Power consumption as a function of sample number

The density of the colors indicates the instantaneous power consumption at a particular moment at the DUT. The traces are very well aligned. Aligning is not a simple task, but this device was aligned. It was a lab setup, so it is easy to align. We can see that the device is doing the same thing at the same time for all of these devices. If we zoom in, we will see a variation between the traces. If we zoom in to two different traces, we will get figure 8.6.

The X-axis represents the time (in samples), and the Y-axis represents power. The power consumption is between  $\pm 80$ . These two traces are very similar, but there are some differences. The differences could be measurement noise or some other signal processing.

For explanation, let us do the warm-up example. At this example, we know that the first byte of the key is 120. Now




Figure 8.6: Zoom-in on two different traces

that we know the key and the plain text, we could say that when we are at the correct time, the DUT will be processing a hamming weight of the correct key. In a DPA, first of all, we find the plain text XOR the key, at first, we are looking only at the first byte, a result is a number in the range of 0-255. Then we apply the AES subByte operation. Then we are calculating the hamming weight of the outcome. The values of the results are between 0 to 8. By doing this, we get the hypothesis\_vector for each particular input.

Figure 8.7 presents the hypothesis\_vector values (the X-axis is not important). For each trace (Y-axis) we calculate the hamming distance (presented by different colors). Now that we have figure 8.5 and figure 8.7 we are going to sweep the later figure over the former, and for each time we are going to calculate the Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Thus, for each position, we are going to get a number, and this number will be between -1 and 1. Figure 8.8 describes the results.

The X-axis is the time in samples, and the Y-axis is the Cor-




Figure 8.7: Hypothesis vector values

relation Coefficient between the hypothesis and the actual power consumption. Most of the time, it is around  $\pm 1$ , but there is a peak described by the red circle. This peak describes the time the AES is making the sub byte operation on the first byte of the key.

However, this was the warm-up example. In a real attack scenario, we do not know the key. A real attack is very similar to the warm-up example, expect that we are padding the key guessing by a loop and at this loop, we are checking all the 256 available for the key. A real attack is described at Figure 8.9.

The X-axis is time, and the Y-axis is the key guesses. The color is the correlation. Figure 8.10 is the trace classification matrix. The X-axis is time, and the Y-axis is the key guess. The color is the correlation. From first glance, the correlation is more or less 0. However, there is on this matrix one high value. If we print out the maximum of this matrix, we will get 0.9168, which is very far from zero.




Figure 8.8: Pearson correlation graph




Figure 8.9: Real attack scenario




Figure 8.10: Real attack scenario classification matrix

Now, we are going to find the correct time. The correct time is where there is a maximum correlation, and the correct key is the row number of this value.

In Figure 8.11 we are taking the classification matrix shown in Figure 8.10 and we are looking at the correct time. It has 256 different key guesses. The X-axis is the key guess, and the Y-axis is the correlation at the correct time. Most of the time, the correlation is around 0.3, but at the correct key guess the correlation is 0.9.

In Figure 8.12 we can see the correlation around the correct time. The green line is the correlation between the correct key guesses, while the other lines indicate the wrong key guesses at the correct time.

In addition, we can see in Figure 8.13 the real power consumption of the DUT vs. the hypothesis. The blue line is the power consumption of the DUT at the correct time. The Y-axis is traced. The red line is the hypothesis that we




Figure 8.11: Correct time graph

tested. These two lines look correlated even to the naked eye, and it is a negative correlation.

## Guest Lecture - Stjepan Picek

We begin with an overview on the paper by Batina et al. [72], which was presented at USENIX and co-authored by our guest lecturer.

### Introduction

Machine learning has become quite mainstream in many industries of various domains, including security. Organizations invest significantly in their artificial intelligence products, namely machine learning models which may even be the core intellectual property of a company. The main research question of this study is the safety of machine learning applications and their susceptibility to physical attacks. In




Figure 8.12: Correlation around the correct time

this paper, the security of such models is studied from the point of view of a side-channel attacker, who seeks to reverse-engineer machine learning models and obtain information on it. Using relatively simple side-channel analysis, it is shown that entire architectures of neural networks are leaked, including activation functions, number of layers and neurons, output classes and even weights. Motivation for such attack can vary from wanting to build a surrogate model for an adversarial attack [73], to privacy leakage of data in cases of sensitive medical or security applications. Previous works investigated the leakage of sensitive information from machine learning models on individual data records or the entire training set. More studies focused on reverse-engineering convolutional neural networks via timing and memory leakage, or exploiting line buffers in a convolution operation. In this work, the focus is on commonly used neural network architectures, multilayer perceptron and convolutional neural networks, for their popularity and consisting of diverse types




Figure 8.13: Power consumption correlation around the correct time

of layers. Briefly, a neural network is composed of a number of layers, and each layer includes several neurons and parameters (weights), which process certain information and finally make a prediction according to some task.

### Threat Model

The threat model in this paper includes the main goal of recovering the neural network architecture using only side-channel information. There are no further assumptions on the data that is being processed, only that the target model does not include any side-channel countermeasures. The attacker in consideration is passive, meaning she can only listen and acquire measurements of the normal operations of the device, without interfering at all. No information on the model is assumed, but the attacker is able to query it using random inputs. More capabilities include measuring side-channel information leaked from the implementation of the




Figure 8.14: An illustration of the analysis process.

target architecture (Atmel ATmega328P and ARM Cortex-M3).

### Side-channel Analysis (SCA)

DPA is a more advanced analysis, which uses statistical techniques to recover secret information from physical signatures. The attack tests for statistically-significant dependencies between actual physical measurements (i.e., of power or electromagnetics) and hypothetical physical signatures (i.e., predictions on intermediate data). The hypothetical signature is based on a leakage model and key hypothesis. A more detailed illustration can be found in Figure 8.14. The statistical analysis performed can be either difference of means or Pearson correlation, which will make it a differential analysis or correlation analysis, respectively. The authors of this work used Pearson correlation, and therefore perform a correlation power analysis (CPA).

### Experimental Setup

The experiment was conducted using electromagnetics To gain a cleaner signal, the target microcontroller needed to be mechanically decapsulated, as shown in Figure 8.15 along with the electromagnetic probe in Figure 8.16 and the complete setup in Figure 8.17. The exploited leakage model of




Figure 8.15: 8-bit microcontroller decomposed.

the target device is the Hamming Weight (HW) model:

$$HW(x) = \sum x_i$$

A microcontroller loads sensitive data to a data bus in order to perform indicated instructions. Note that the actual training phase is executed offline, and the final model is implemented in the C language and compiled on the microcontroller. As discussed earlier, the goal is to obtain information on the neural network-based model, namely its layers, neurons, activation functions and weights. The attack is therefore decomposed to four sub-goals, according to the type of target information.

### **Reverse-Engineering Activation Functions**

Recall that an activation function of some node is a function  $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , as in:

$$f(x) = Activation(\sum(Weights * inputs) + bias)$$

There are many popular activation functions, with the most common ones being Sigmoid, Softmax, and ReLU. The timing behavior of the various functions was observed directly



Figure 8.16: Probe.




Figure 8.17: Complete experimental setup and tools.




Figure 8.18: ReLU




Figure 8.19: Sigmoid

on the electromagnetic (EM) trace, with a total of 2000 EM measurements captured. By plotting the measurements, the difference in timings between the function can be easily observed (Figures 8.18 8.19 8.20 8.21), as well as statistically analyzed using maximum, minimum and mean values.

## Reverse-Engineering Weights

In this section, the CPA, i.e., Pearson correlation is used to extract parameters, or the weights of a layer. CPA targets the multiplication operation  $m = x * w$  where  $x$  is a known input and  $w$  a secret parameter. Using the HW model, the adversary correlates the activity of the predicted output  $m$  for all hypothesis of the weight. Thus, the attack computes  $p(t, w)$  for all hypothesis of the weight  $w$ , where  $p$  is the Pear-



Figure 8.20:  $\tanh$ 

Figure 8.21: Softmax

son correlation coefficient and  $t$  is the side-channel measurement. The correct value of the weight will result in a higher correlation, standing out from all other wrong hypothesis  $w^*$ , given we capture enough measurements. We first need to understand the way the compiler is handling floating-point operations in our target device. By analyzing the generated assembly, it can be confirmed that the device uses IEEE 754 compatible representation, with 32-bit consisting of: 1 sign bit, 8 biased exponent bits, and 23 mantissa bits, from  $b_{31}$  to  $b_0$  respectively. The target device is an 8-bit microcontroller, so the 32-bit floating-point is stored in 4 registers. Recall that we target the resulting multiplication of a known input and unknown weights, where for every input we assume different probabilities for weight values. We then perform the

multiplication accordingly and estimate the binary representation of the output, where the 23-bit mantissa is recovered first, and then the sign and exponent can be recovered separately. Note that we need to recover the weight for every neuron separately, which may require a substantial amount of effort, while it is still feasible.

## Reverse-Engineering Layers and Neurons

Simple observations of Figures 8.22,8.23,8.24 would show repeating patterns in each graph, which actually reveal the number of neurons. As for the number of layers, or where the computation of each layer begins or ends (the red lines in the figures), we use CPA. To determine if the targeted neuron is in the same layer as previously attacked neurons, or in the next layer, we perform a weight recovery using two sets of data. Let us assume that we are targeting the first hidden layer (the same approach can be done on different layers as well). Assume that the input is a vector of length  $N_0$ , so the input  $x$  can be represented  $x = x_1, \dots, x_{N_0}$ . For the targeted neuron  $y_n$  in the hidden layer, perform the weight recovery on 2 different hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, assume that the  $y_n$  is in the first hidden layer. Perform weight recovery individually using  $x_i$ , for  $1 \leq i \leq N_0$ . For the second hypothesis, assume that  $y_n$  is in the next hidden layer (the second hidden layer). Perform weight recovery individually using  $y_i$ , for  $1 \leq i \leq (n - i)$ . For each hypothesis, record the maximum (absolute) correlation value, and compare both. Since the correlation depends on both inputs to the multiplication operation, the incorrect hypothesis will result in a lower correlation value.

## Recovery of the Full Network Layout

The combination of previously developed individual techniques can thereafter result in full reverse engineering of the network. The full network recovery is performed layer by layer, and for each layer, the weights for each neuron have to




Figure 8.22: One hidden layer with 6 neurons.




Figure 8.23: Two hidden layers with 5 and 6 neurons respectively.




Figure 8.24: Three hidden layers (6, 5, 5).




Figure 8.25: Methodology to reverse engineer the target neural network

be recovered one at a time. The first step is to recover the weight  $w_{L_0}$  of each connection from the input layer  $L_0$  and the first hidden layer  $L_1$ . In order to determine the output of the sum of the multiplications, the number of neurons in the layer must be known. Using the same set of traces, timing patterns for different inputs to the activation function can be built. The same steps are repeated in the subsequent layers  $L_1, \dots, L_{N-1}$

## Results

In this experiment we used ARM Cortex M-3 processor. The first experiment done with MLP model and The databases MNIST and DPAv4. For DPAv4 database the original accuracy equals 60.9% and the accuracy of the reverse engineered network is 60.87%. For MNIST database the accuracy of the original network is equal to 98.16% and the accuracy of the reverse engineered network equals 98.15%, with an average weight error converging to 0.0025.

The second experiment done with CNN model and CIFAR-10 dataset. We choose as target the multiplication operation from the input with the weight, similar as in previous experiments. Differing from previous experiments, the operations on real values are here performed using fixed-point arithmetic. The numbers are stored using 8-bit data type – int8 (q7). The resulting multiplication is stored in temporary int variable. The original accuracy of the CNN equals 78.47% and the accuracy of the recovered CNN is 78.11%.




Figure 8.26: The correlation of correct and wrong weight hypotheses on different number of traces targeting the result of multiplication operation stored as different variable type: (a) int, (b) int8

## Recovering the Input of Neural Networks

The underlying neural network architecture of the used network is public and all the weights are known. Attacker is capable of measuring side-channel information leaked from the implementation of the targeted architecture. The crucial information for this work are the weights of the first layer. Indeed, when MLP reads the input, it propagates it to all the nodes, performing basic arithmetic operations. This arithmetic operation with different weights and common unknown input leads to input recovery attack via side-channel. The power consumption of loading data  $x$  is:

$$HW(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$$

where  $x_i$  represents the  $i^{th}$  bit of  $x$ . In our case, it is the product of secret input and known weight which is regularly stored to the memory after computation and results in the HW leakage.

The training phase is conducted offline, and the trained network is then implemented in C language and compiled on the microcontroller. In our experiments, we consider MLP architectures consisting of a different number of layers and nodes in those layers. Note, we are only interested in the input layer where a higher number of neurons is beneficial for the attacker. It can be extremely complex to recover




Figure 8.27: One measurement with 4 multiplications aligned horizontally

the input by observing outputs from a known network. The proposed attack targets the multiplication operation in the first hidden layer. The main target for CPA is the multiplication  $m = x \cdot w$  of a known weight  $w$  with a secret input  $x$ . As  $x$  changes from one measurement (input) to another, information learned from one measurement cannot be used with another measurement, preventing any statistical analysis over a set of different inputs.

To perform information exploitation over a single measurement, we perform a horizontal attack. The weights in the first hidden layer are all multiplied with the same input  $x$ , one after the other.  $M$  multiplications, corresponding to  $M$  different weights (or neurons) in the first hidden layer are isolated. A single trace is cut into  $M$  smaller traces, each one corresponding to one multiplication with a known associated weight. Next, the value of the input is statistically inferred by applying a standard CPA as explained before on the  $M$  smaller traces.

The attack needs around 20 or more multiplications to reliably recover the input. In general, 70 multiplications are enough to recover all the bytes of the input, up to the desired precision of 2 decimal digits. This means that in the current setting, the proposed attack works very well on medium to large-sized networks, with at least 70 neurons in the first




Figure 8.28: Results on ATMega, The first byte recovery (sign and 7-bit exponent).




Figure 8.29: Results on ARM Cortex M3, Correlation comparison between correct and incorrect inputs for target value 2.453.



Figure 8.30: Attack on MNIST Database, Original images (top) and recovered images with precision error (bottom).

hidden layer, which is no issue in modern architectures used today.

### Deep Learning and Side Channel Attacks

Throughout history, many deep learning models have been built as described in Figure 8.31.




Figure 8.31: The history of the deep learning models




Figure 8.32: Multilayer Perceptron - “Many” Hidden Layers

Deep learning is part of a broader family of machine learning methods based on artificial neural networks with representation learning. Learning can be supervised, semi-supervised or unsupervised.

A multilayer perceptron (MLP) is a class of feedforward artificial neural network (ANN). An MLP consists of at least three layers of nodes: an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. Except for the input nodes, each node is a neuron that uses a nonlinear activation function. MLP utilizes a supervised learning technique called backpropagation for training. Its multiple layers and non-linear activation distinguish MLP from a linear perceptron. It can distinguish data that is not linearly separable.

The Universal Approximation Theorem states that a feed-forward network with a single hidden layer containing a finite number of neurons can approximate continuous functions on compact subsets of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . Given enough hidden units and enough data, multilayer perceptrons can approximate virtually any function to any desired accuracy. Valid results if and only if there is a sufficiently large number of training



Figure 8.33: Multilayer Perceptron - One Hidden Layers




Figure 8.34: Convolutional Neural Networks - Convolution Layer

data in the series.

Convolutional Neural Networks represent a type of neural networks which were first designed for 2-dimensional convolutions. They are primarily used for image classification but lately, they have proven to be powerful classifiers in other domains. From the operational perspective, CNNs are similar to ordinary neural networks: they consist of a number of layers where each layer is made up of neurons. CNNs use three main types of layers: convolutional layers, pooling layers, and fully-connected layers as described in Figure 8.34 .

The description of Convolutional Neural Network in SCA is described in Figure 8.35 .

In our experiment we used 4 datasets as described in Figure




Figure 8.35: Convolutional Neural Network in SCA




Figure 8.36: Databases used for our experiment




Figure 8.37: Results for DPAv4 database

### 8.36 .

The results described in Figures 8.37 8.38 8.39 .

There are two devices: one for training and the second one for attack. Two devices means there are two different keys. Usually, we make our lives simpler and assume only one de-




Figure 8.38: Results for AES\_RD database




Figure 8.39: Results for ASCAD database




Figure 8.40: Experiment setup

vice and the same key, but this is not the same. The setup for our experiment described in Figure 8.40 .

We tried multiple models. Same key and device as in 8.41 , Different key and same device as in 8.43 , same key and different device as in 8.42 , and different key and device as in 8.44 . The validation for our models describe in figure 8.45 .

Regarding multiple device model, instead of validating on the same device as training, we need one more device. Separate




Figure 8.41: Same key same device results




Figure 8.42: Same key different device results




Figure 8.43: Different key same device results




Figure 8.44: Different key different device results




Figure 8.45: Validation for our experiment




Figure 8.46: Multidevice model results

devices for train, validation, attack. If we do not have a third device, we can use artificial noise. The multiple model describe in Figure 8.46 .

## Guest Lecture - Jiska Classen

The thesis Jiska Classen supervised focused on finding errors in random number generators for bluetooth devices, as the bluetooth specifications just states that the random number generator needs to be secure but not specifies how. In general, if some RNG does not pass statistical tests, it can be obviously broken. But even if it does pass those tests it could still be broken.

The thesis focused on RNG variants 2 and 3:

Table 8.1: RNG variants 2 and 3

Device	Chip Date	Variant	HRNG Location	Prng	Cache
Google Nexus 5	Dec 11 2012	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
MacBook 2016	Oct 22 2015	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
CYW20735B1	Jan 18 2018	3	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (rgb-ger-psrng) 8 registers	Yes, breaks after 32 elements
CYW20819A1	May 22 2018	3	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (rgb-ger-psrng) 5 registers	Yes (with minor fixes)

Using IDA, it was found that the HRNG (Hardware Random Number Generator) is mapped to a specific register, which is used to access it by the software (the address of this register varies between different chips). HRNG are mostly secure. Different constants mark the state of the PRNG, one of them ("RBG\_CONST\_READY") is kind of a standard, so it can be also used to find the relevant disassembled code in a binary. If the HRNG is not available, there is a RNG fallback, looking at the RNG Variant 2 implementation it was found that it is computed using the system and bluetooth clocks, frequencies and error streams, and uses not-random functions, as crc32. Also, the input data is shown to not distribute equally. As a good thing, it does not use cache.




Figure 8.47: PRNG measurements taken on a Google Nexus 5 (BCM4335C0)

After finding that, CVE-2020-6616 was assigned to this discovery, which was later related by some companies, including Apple, in their fixes of the vulnerability. Investigating 20 more devices and firmwares had trouble as some devices are slow(4 byte packages) and 1GB of data is needed to test the output quality of the random devices.

Table 8.2: Chips challenged with Dieharder test

Chip	Device	Samples	Dieharder
BCM4335C0	Google Nexus 5	2.7GB	Passed
BCM4358A3	Samsung Galaxy S6, Google Nexus 6P	2.1GB	Passed
BCM4340A1	Raspberry Pi 3/Zero W	1.3GB	Passed
BCM4345C0	Raspberry Pi 3+/4	1.4GB	Passed
BCM4345B0	iPhone 6	1.8GB	Passed
BCM4355C0	iPhone 7	1.0GB	Passed
CYW20719B1	Evaluation Board	1.4GB	Passed
CYW20735B1	Evaluation Board	1.6GB	Passed
CYW20819A1	Evaluation Board	1.2GB	Passed
BCM2046A2	iMac Late 2009	-	HRNG
BCM4375B1	Samsung Galaxy S10/S20	-	HRNG
BCM4378B1	iPhone 11	-	HRNG

Many devices passed the Dieharder tests, for sample sizes of 1GB+, so they look ok.

Other RNG variants, such as Variant 1, used by 2009 iMac or a 2010 Asus Dongle, which is the Fallback of the HRNG, used the basic rbg\_rand function which is only using the system clock and a static value and a register as an input for it's PRNG, which is really bad.

Table 8.3: Variant 1

Device	Chip Date	Variant	HRNG Location	PRNG	Cache
iMac Late 2009	2007	1	0xE9A00, 3 regs	Minimal (inline)	No
Asus USB Dongle	Feb 2010	1	0xEA204, 3 regs	Minimal (inline)	No

More investigation found that RNG Variants 2 and 3 is used by many more devices, from 2012 till 2018, and also being used by some ciphers chips:

Table 8.4: Variant 2,3

Device	Chip Date	Variant	HRNG Location	PRNG	Cache
Google Nexus 5	Dec 11 2012	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
iPhone 6	Jul 15 2013	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
Raspberry Pi 3/Zero W	Jun 2 2014	2	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
Raspberry Pi 3+/4	Aug 19 2014	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
Samsung Galaxy S6, Google Nexus 6P	Oct 23 2014	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
iPhone SE	Jan 27 2015	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
iPhone 7	Sep 14 2015	2	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
MacBook 2016/2017, iMac 2017	Oct 22 2015	2	0x314004, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
CYW20719B1	Jan 17 2017	2	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (inline)	No
CYW20735B1	Jan 18 2018	3	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (rbg_get_psrng), 8 registers	Yes, breaks after 32 elements
CYW20819A1	May 22 2018	3	0x352600, 3 regs	Yes (rbg_get_psrng), 5 registers	Yes (with minor fixes)

Variant 5 is used by much newer devices, iPhone 8 from 2016 till iPhone 11 and Samsung Galaxy S10 from 2018, where PRNG is gone and it has a cache for random numbers, which is a really bad idea.

Table 8.5: Variant 5

Device	Chip Date	Variant	HRNG Location	PRNG	Cache
iPhone 8/X/XR	Oct 11 2016	Variant #3 Complete rework of rbg_* library, but still using sha128 wrapper	0x352600, 4 regs	None	Asynchronous 32x cache
Samsung Galaxy S10/S20	Apr 13 2018	Variant #3	0x352600, 4 regs	None	Asynchronous 32x cache
iPhone 11	Oct 25 2018	Variant #3	0x352600, 4 regs	None	Asynchronous 32x cache

Variant 4 has only PRNG, and was used by the Samsung Galaxy 8 since 2016. It uses the previous random string, hardware clock and some bitchanges, and even some constant values, all of these are bad habits for defining a PRNG. Inspecting Variant 4 inputs shows that they are not so random:

Table 8.6: Variant 4 inputs

Address	Register	Entropy
-	Rand	Previous 4 B random value (leaks over-the-air)
0x3180088	dc_nbtc.clk	Bluetooth clock, publicly available over-the-air
0x32A004	timer1value	Hardware clock, 4 B "random" before first leak, unpatched attacks for clock reset available
0x3186A0	dc_fhout	Changes a bit (0x02-0x50)
0x410434	ageStatus	Changes a bit (0xc00 during whole measurement, slight changes within 0xcnn after reboot)
0x41079C	rxInitAngle	Changes a bit but within similar range
0X410548	spurFreqErr1	Constant 2B value (0x04ed, also after reboot)
0x410548	rxPskPhErr5	Always 0

In addition, looking at IDA's disassembly, the random function is used by a lot of other functions, which are, in their turn, also used by many more functions.

The effects of this work is that the new iOS mentioned those findings in it's firmware release. The results were also sent to Qualcomm and broadcom, where they unveiled the clear results and effects. Separately, self controlled PRNG can be used to find out the random numbers used while connecting between 2 devices (Man in the middle). An ETA patch was sent on February and May 1. Broadcom didn't give an ETA or any clarification about the found vulnerability or solution.

The main conclusions are:

- Don't trust embedded RNG.
- Collect a lot of data (+1GB) and verify the RNG quality.
- Each Broadcom firmware version has bugs.

The scripts used in this work can be found at [github](#)

# Chapter 9

## Fault Attacks

### Topics

1. Introduction to Fault Attacks
2. Fault Attack on RSA-CRT
3. DRAM and Rowhammer
4. Flip-Feng-Shui: Rowhammer attack on RSA

# Introduction to Fault Attacks

Up until now in the course we learned about *passive* attacks – i.e. attacks which measure *leakage* such as timing information and power traces. The advantage of these attacks is that they allow an attacker to acquire information in the process of an ongoing computation e.g. an AES key *before* it was fully mixed with the input – this fact can help the attacker extract secrets.

In fault attacks we will become *active* in the sense that we will give the device-under-test (DUT) additional inputs such as heat or radiation.

One problem with Fault attacks is that they use the strongest attack model, meaning – we assume most power on the attacker's part.

## 9.1 Active Attacks

### Definition:

*“A fault attack is an active attack that allows extraction of secret information from cryptographic devices by breaking those devices.”*

In fault attacks we, the attackers, are *active* – we give additional inputs beside the main input such as:

- Fuzzing (garbage or bad input)
- Radiation
- Heat
- Vibration
- Power spikes etc.

This way, we receive other (usually erroneous) outputs which might give us additional information about the computation and/or the secret. This process is described in Figure 9.1.




Figure 9.1: A schematic diagram of fault attacks and leakage types

Like with passive attacks, some of these outputs can be acquired at different stages of the computation process.

Many fault attacks are inspired by studies in the field of *reliability*: a study in reliability will research a device's physical boundaries e.g. the maximum or minimum temperature under which it performs reliably. Other examples of reliability studies are aimed at improving device performance under extreme conditions such as:

- Space and X-Rays
- Dense CPU Layouts
- Data Center Recovery (ECC-RAM)

A security researcher implementing fault attacks will, on the other hand, purposefully subject the DUT to extreme conditions in order to inject errors in the device's functionality to achieve their goal. In that sense, a reliability study of a given device can lay the ground-work for the fault attacks to come.

*“In the reliability community things happen by mistake. In the security community – things happen on purpose.”*

## Breaking a device-under-test

How can *breaking* a device help an attacker?

1. BORE – “*Break Once, Run Everywhere*”: Some device families share a single secret among all instances.
2. Repairable Devices: Temporary breakage is fine. Sometimes restarting the device is enough to “repair” the damage.
3. Partial breakage: Sometimes it’s convenient to break *part* of a device, for example – destroy the subsystem responsible for DRM verification.

## 9.2 Fault Attack Taxonomy

The three ways we can examine a Fault Attack in order to understand it are:

1. Method - “*How to inject the fault?*”
2. Properties - “*What class of fault to create?*”
3. Target - “*Which part of the system to break?*”

## Fault Methods

### Power Supply Attacks

What happens if the device is underpowered? As we have previously seen, power in electronic devices is used to drive the CMOS transistors. If the device is slightly underpowered it might fail to switch some of the transistors and thus produce false calculations, and with even less power it might

struggle with getting into operational state (boot loop) or even transition to an entirely faulty state. Another attack method involving the power supply is injecting power spikes (to a similar effect).

Some parts of a device are typically more sensitive to the power supply than others, and thus under-powering or over-powering the device will de-stabilize it and inject faults.

The obvious scenario for such an attack is when the DUT belongs to or is being controlled by the attacker – for example if they’re examining their own set-top box etc. In that case, the attacker can supply the device with as much/little power as they wish.

Another example of such attack scenarios is in the field of RFID readers – the device powering an RFID chip is the reader, so a *malicious* RFID reader can over/under-power the chip to achieve various faulty results. For instance, if the RNG is connected to the power supply, we can make its generated numbers deterministic.

## Clock/Timing Attacks

The clock is typically a bus shared by many of the system’s components which synchronizes the propagation of calculations through the system – i.e. at the beginning all inputs are ready, and when there is a rising edge on the clock bus they start propagating throughout the various computational components. When all computations are finished they all wait for the next rising edge on the clock bus in order to proceed to the next stage. In a clock glitching attack the attacker would inject a rising edge on the clock bus at an arbitrary time. This way only *some* of the computations will have finished by that time while others are still being processed, and thus the device will be in a faulty (unstable) state.

A notable example is the attack on Mifare Classic RFID chips we talked about in the beginning of the course [74] – the RNG in the chip is dependent only on the time between power-

ing up the RFID tag and challenging it. An RFID reader operated by the attacker can control both parameters, thus making the generated challenges deterministic.

## Temperature attacks

This attack method relies on the physical property of electrons (current). Electrons “jump”, and the higher the temperature – they will jump more frequently and to longer distances. If a device gets *too hot* – enough electrons can “jump” over the insulation layer in a transistor, for instance, to flip it from logical 1 to 0. This results in a fault.

Because of the ubiquity of devices failures due to temperature, nowadays temperature sensors are integrated into most devices, so when it overheats – the device will shut down.

An attacker can bypass the temperature sensor by disconnecting it. Another method would be to quickly alternate the temperature of the device from extremely high to extremely low, so that *on average* the temperature is reasonable, but it will still experience faults during the extreme phases of the cycles.

In an interesting research paper [75] a type-confusion attack on the Java virtual-machine was demonstrated: at first, the entire memory was filled with small arrays (say of size one). The Java VM is type-safe, so it is normally impossible to access one of the memory regions using a pointer to a different region. To inject a type-confusion fault the researchers used a 50W light bulb to heat the memory chip of the device enough to flip some of the bits (for illustration see Figure 9.2). As a result, a small portion of the data-structures describing the arrays in memory now held wrong values (e.g. changed their value from *size = 1* to *size = 20*). At this point, some affected data-structures *contain* a header of a different data-structure, to which the attackers now have read and write access. Changing the header of the second data structure to an arbitrary value gave the attackers access to the entirety of the device’s memory.




Figure 9.2: A light bulb flipping memory bits filled with safe Java structures

### Optical, Electromagnetic

When a laser hits a transistor it changes the energy level of the silicon inside, and sometimes it can change the transistor's state. Notably different wavelengths are absorbed by different materials, so in a typical silicon chip different lasers will hit different layers of the device etc. Magnetic/Electromagnetic radiation and pulses have similar effects.

The underlying principle of those attacks is that the attacker forcefully injects charge (energy) into the device. Once it's stored inside it will have to dissipate one way or another, so as a result it injects a random faulty state into the device.

### Reading from RAM

All of the attacks described above require very high engagement with the DUT – in order for the attacker to control the power/clock sources, for example, they sometimes would need to drill, cut or otherwise tamper with the device. Shining a laser on a device requires at the very least having it at a visible distance.

The final attack method involves only *reading* from memory, and thus is very practical and requires very little physical

engagement. This attack method is called *Rowhammer* and is discussed later in the lecture.

## Fault Properties

In this section we discuss:

1. How controllable is the fault's location/size? Precise?  
Loose? None?
2. How controllable is the fault timing?
3. What's the fault's duration? Transient? Permanent?  
Destructive?

### Destructive fault attacks on cryptographic devices

What can be done with fault attacks to symmetric ciphers?

**Easy example:** Imagine that we have a pile of cipher devices with a 64bit key length, which work the following way: we can give the device a key and it tells us whether it's the right key.

What if we have a *destructive* fault attack that resets the top 32 bits of a device's key? We can brute force the key in  $2 \cdot 2^{31}$  instead of  $2^{63}$  (on average):

First we inject the fault into one of the devices and brute-force the lower 32 bits of the key ( $O(2^{31})$ ), then we pick another device from the pile and brute-force only the higher 32 bits (another  $O(2^{31})$ ).

**A less trivial example:** We have a public-key device which we can ZAP and one bit of the key flips to zero.

We can save all of the plaintexts-cipher pairs until we reach the one matching an all zero key – which we can pre-calculate. This gives us the Hamming weight of the key. Now we go back one plaintext-cipher pair – we know that pair's key's Hamming Weight to be exactly one – meaning we need to

brute-force only  $N$  keys ( $N$  is the key bit-length). Now we have the position of a single bit of the key.

If we iterate all the way backwards to the original plaintext-cipher pair, we can acquire the key in  $O(N^2)$  time!

## Fault Target

What could be targeted by a fault attack?

1. Input parameters (fuzzing, power and clock glitching)
2. Storage (volatile/non-volatile)
  - a) HDD – Destructive (persists after reset)
  - b) RAM – Permanent
  - c) Cache – Transient
3. Data processing: injecting a fault mid-computation and the device gives a different answer.
4. Instruction Processing/Control Flow: inject a fault in the IP register and change the instruction flow. There are various examples that demonstrate the usefulness of this type of target
  - change the program counter to compromise control flow
  - ARM32 instructions are very densely packed, thus there is a very high probability of hitting a valid instruction after flipping a single bit. For example, `jnz` and `jmp` are only one bit apart.
  - Change for loop condition in programs such as one that reads from a buffer, if the loop is infinite, it would dump RAM contents including source code.

**Two examples of Fault Attacks targeting Control Flow:**

1. The CHDK hacking community, used to dump the firmwares of Canon cameras via blinking one of their LEDs [76, 77].
2. The “Unlooper”: Back in the 90’s pay-tv devices started cryptographically signing the content, and if the cryptographic checksum did not check out – the device would enter an endless loop. The hacking community invented “unloopers” – a gadget that would inject a power spike and fault the IP register, so that the pay-tv device would jump to some other section of the code, from which point it would function normally.

## 9.3 Fault attack on RSA-CRT

### RSA decryption

$$n = p \cdot q, M \equiv C^d \equiv M^{ed} \pmod{\phi(n)} \equiv M^1 \equiv M \pmod{n}$$

RSA decryption is hard!

Let’s speed it up using CRT (the Chinese Remainder Theorem): Multiplication operations are  $O(|n|^2)$ . If we can do operations  $(\text{mod } p)$  and then  $(\text{mod } q)$  instead of  $(\text{mod } n)$ , we will reduce computation time by half.

**Explanation:** The bit-lengths of  $p$  and  $q$  are each half that of  $n$

$$|p| = |q| = \frac{1}{2}|n|$$

The computational complexity of multiplying by a number of length  $x$  is (roughly)  $O(x^2)$ . Thus:

$$O(|p|^2) = O(|q|^2) = \frac{1}{4}O(|n|^2) \Rightarrow (O(|p|^2) + O(|q|^2)) = \frac{1}{2}O(|n|^2)$$

So if we could multiply by  $p$  and  $q$  instead of by  $n$ , we would cut *each* multiplication operation’s time complexity in half!




Figure 9.3: Chinese Remainder Theorem (Source: <https://russinoff.com/papers/crt.html>)

### Chinese Remainder Theorem

The idea is that if we know both  $x \pmod{p}$  and  $x \pmod{q}$  then we can easily calculate  $x \pmod{n}$ .

So, given a message  $M$ , calculate  $M_p$  and  $M_q$ :  $M_p \equiv C^d \pmod{n} \equiv C^d \pmod{p}$ ,  $M_q \equiv C^d \pmod{n} \equiv C^d \pmod{q}$

To combine the values, we do:

$$M^* = CRT(M_p, M_q) =$$

$$M_p \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) + M_q \cdot p \cdot (p^{-1} \pmod{q})$$

It is easily provable that  $M^* \pmod{p} = M_q$  and  $M^* \pmod{q} = M_p$ , so by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, this value *must* be equal to  $M$ .

### The Boneh, DeMillo & Lipton Fault Attack on RSA-CRT [78]

The attacker has a decryption box (known plaintext scenario) with public key  $n$  and would like to recover  $d$  (the private key). Additionally, the attacker knows that the decryption box is decrypting using CRT. Finally, let us assume that the attacker can inject a fault (any fault) in the decryption process.

The attacker first gets  $M = M_p \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) + M_q \cdot p \cdot (p^{-1} \pmod{q})$  through the regular decryption process.

Then, the attacker primes the device to re-calculate the message from the same cipher, this time injecting a *transient fault* during the calculation of  $M_p$ , resulting in the device erroneously producing  $M'_p$  instead:  $M'_p \neq C^d \pmod{p}$ . The device will then proceed to combine  $M'_p$  with the correct result of  $M_q$ , resulting in:

$$M' = M'_p \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) + M_q \cdot p \cdot (p^{-1} \pmod{q})$$

Now the attacker can calculate the value of  $M - M'$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & [M_p \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) + M_q \cdot p \cdot (p^{-1} \pmod{q})] - \\ & [M'_p \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) + M_q \cdot p \cdot (p^{-1} \pmod{q})] = \\ & (M_p - M'_p) \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, calculating the gcd of  $n$  and  $M - M'$  yields:

$$\gcd(n, M - M') = \gcd(p \cdot q, (M_p - M'_p) \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p})) = q$$

**Why does this work?** The greatest common divisor of  $n$  and anything can be only  $p$ ,  $q$ ,  $n$  or 1. On the other hand,  $M_p$  and  $M'_p$  can never be multiples of  $p$ , otherwise both would equal 0. So, by that reasoning,  $\gcd(p \cdot q, (M_p - M'_p) \cdot q \cdot (q^{-1} \pmod{p}))$  must equal  $q$ , and thus we have cracked the cipher using a single fault attack.

A later paper co-written by Arjen Lenstra [79] further improved upon this attack to not require knowledge of  $M$ .

**BML in practice:** A paper [80] showed how ZAPPING a device with an electric spark from a lighter during computation can achieve the described effect.

## 9.4 Rowhammer

In the final section, we will describe the Rowhammer attack.

## Rowhammer attack taxonomy

- Target: DRAM on modern computers
- Properties: Permanent, controlled location
- Method: Memory accesses




Figure 9.4: High Level Illustration of DRAM Organization  
(Source: Wikipedia: Row hammer)

## Double-sided Rowhammer

DRAM is the most common type of volatile memory. It is slow, dense and cheap relatively to SRAM. Every bit of RAM is stored in a single capacitor. Capacitors lose charge and they need to be periodically refreshed. The bits are selected using the *row buffer*.

The attack [81] utilizes the physical structure of RAM chips in order to induce faults: Due to parasitic leakage in DRAM capacitors, if enough consecutive reads are performed on the immediately adjacent rows eventually a bit will flip in the target row.

The fault attack exploit code is as follows:

```
while (true) {
```

```
x = memory[address1];
y = memory[address2];
}
```

**What happens here?** We infinitely read from adjacent rows, so eventually, we can cause a bit confusion.

## Challenges

**The challenge of CPU caching** The CPU cache prevents the same memory address to be read consecutively from main memory, for performance reasons. To circumvent this limitation, several techniques can be employed:

1. Intel CPUs provide non-temporal read/write opcodes – special instructions that read from memory and don’t get cached.
2. The special `clflush` instruction can be used to explicitly flush the cache after each read operation (privileged operation).
3. Finally, cache-population algorithms had been extensively studied and reverse-engineered, so it is possible to arrange for *arbitrary* cache misses.

**Address findings:** The attacker needs to find addresses that are on the same chip, and are in adjacent rows for the attack to work.

## Countermeasures

**Refresh-rate increase:** In order to overcome parasitic leakage, DRAM chips already have a mechanism in place to read and then re-write the values stored in each row periodically. One method of overcoming Rowhammer could be to significantly increase the refresh-rate of the chip. This obviously results in both performance degradation and increased power consumption.

**ECC-RAM:** High-end DRAM chips (typically meant for data center environments) contain error-correction coding (ECC) logic which can typically *correct* one erroneous bit and *detect* two (at which point it will crash the program/system). Those chips are immune to the basic form of Rowhammer described above, but as discussed later, are not bullet-proof.

## Rowhammer variations

### Flip Feng-Shui

**Page de-duplication:** On modern systems, typically much memory is shared among many processes running on the system. This is even more true of virtualized environments where the guest and the host, for example, could run the same OS. A common optimization is for the system to detect and de-duplicate pages containing the same data, thus freeing up memory.

**Rowhammer + page de-duplication:** In a paper [82] researchers from VUA demonstrated how they can utilize page-deduplication in a virtualized environment to weaken cryptographic keys, resulting in unauthorized access via OpenSSH, and breach of trust via forging GPG signatures. The attack relies on the fact that the attacker can *read* a de-duplicated page as much as they want. The attacker has to wait (or arrange) for a page containing sensitive information to be de-duped, then hammer on it until a bit in the key flips, making it much easier to factor.

### ECCPloit

In another paper [83] researchers from VUA showed how they can use Rowhammer to quickly flip *enough* (typically three) bits on an ECC-RAM chip that error correction will not be able to detect it, thus defeating the ECC mitigation. The attack relies on the fact that error-correction takes time to compute, and this gives the attacker a window of opportunity.




Figure 9.5: The attacker maps the same page as the victim, then utilizes Rowhammer to change the victim’s memory without causing page duplication

## Rowhammer-based attacks

### RAMBleed

We will describe here Rowhammer based attack called RAMBleed which was presented in [84]. While Rowhammer breaks data integrity, RAMBleed breaks also data confidentiality by allowing the attacker read unauthorized memory areas. RAMBleed attack was implemented against OpenSSH server allowing the attacker read RSA secret private keys.




Figure 9.6: RAMBleed memory layout

In order to perform this attack, the attacker need to get

to specific memory layout, as described in Figure 9.6. The attacker owns A0, A1 and A2 blocks. Then the attacker forces the OpenSSH server to put its private RSA key in orange blocks by exploiting the Linux buddy allocator which works in deterministic way. Then the attacker repeatedly accesses A0 and A2 blocks - this will access orange blocks as well because when DRAM access a part of the row, it access the whole row as well. This will hammer the red block and cause bit flips over there. The attacker can then read the red block - because he owns it, and gets the RSA secret key.

The performance from this paper shows accuracy of 82% when reading OpenSSH host key. Reading the victim's secret in 0.31 bits/seconds.

Suggested mitigations may be memory encryption, flushing keys from memory, probabilistic memory allocator and Hardware mitigations such as targeted row refresh and increasing refresh intervals.

### **Throwhammer : Rowhammer Attack over the Internet [85]**

There are some sophisticated Rowhammer exploits which allow an attacker, that can execute code on a vulnerable system, to escalate privileges and compromise browsers, clouds, and mobile systems. In all these attacks, the common assumption is that attackers first need to obtain code execution on the victim machine to be able to exploit Rowhammer, either by having (unprivileged) code execution on the victim machine or by luring the victim to a website that employs a malicious JavaScript application.

In contrast to those attacks, in the Throwhammer attack, the attacker can trigger and exploit Rowhammer bit flips directly from a remote machine by only sending network packets.

While it is true that millions of DRAM accesses per second is harder to accomplish from across the network than from code executing locally, today's networks are becoming

very fast. To achieve high-performance networking, some systems entirely remove the interruptions and expensive privilege switching, and instead deliver network packets directly to the applications. This approach might create large load on the CPU, so to reduce that load, some networking equipment include the possibility for Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA). With RDMA, there is no need to involve the CPU on both client and server for packet transfer. The server and client applications both configure DMA buffers to the NIC (Network interface controller) through interfaces that are provided by the operating system. When the client application wants to send a packet to a server application, it directly writes it to its buffer as shown in Figure 9.7.




Figure 9.7: RDMA vs non-RDMA (standard TCP connection)

In the Throwhammer attack, the attacker is assumed to be able to generate and send legitimate traffic through a high-speed network to a target server (A common example is a client that sends requests to a cloud or data center machine that runs a server application), and that the target machine is vulnerable to Rowhammer bit flips. The end goal of the attacker is to bypass RDMA’s security model by modifying bits outside of memory areas that are registered for DMA in order to compromise the system.

The attack is executed by repeatedly asking the server’s NIC

to send the client packets with data from various offsets within the shared buffer used by the RDMA protocol. This allows the attacker to perform double-sided Rowhammer similar to Flip Feng Shui [82].




Figure 9.8: Number of unique Rowhammer bit flips over time using two sets of DIMMs over a 40 Gbps Ethernet network [85]

## 9.5 Related Work

Additional related work on the topic of fault attacks includes:

- **DVFS** - Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling attacks make use of voltage and frequency combinations which are considered unstable.
- **CLKScrew** - a paper by Tang et al. [86] that describes a technique that takes advantage of security vulnerabilities caused by the constant strive to improve energy efficiency, more specifically energy management mechanisms used in state-of-the-art mobile SoCs. The attack is based on over-clocking CPU frequency to inject faults into the victim process and breach the isolated Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
- **VoltJockey** - a paper by Qiu et al. [87] that describes a hardware fault-based attack on the TrustZone - a TEE security approach deployed in

ARM processors. This attack, as opposed to the frequency manipulation in CLKscrew, uses software-controlled voltage manipulation. It is demonstrated on an ARM-based multi-core processor and manages to achieve several malicious goals: (1) acquire an AES key by cryptanalysis, (2) induce misbehavior in RSA decryption method to fake signatures and load unauthorized applications into TrustZone. More on VoltJockey in the next section.

- **Plundervolt** - a paper by Murdock et al. [88], the first one that describes the use of voltage scaling for corruption of integrity and confidentiality of Intel SGX enclaved computations. The authors demonstrate full key recovery PoC attacks against RSA-CRT and AES-NI.
- **Speculative Fault Attacks** - Such attacks make use of the behavior of modern processors and their attempt to predict and speculate the next instructions to be executed for maximum performance. CPUs will try to execute instructions ahead of time.
  - **Spectre - Exploiting Speculative Execution** - a paper by Kocher et al that describes a speculative fault attack that involves inducing a victim to speculatively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side-channel to the adversary.

## VoltJockey

As mentioned above, VoltJockey [87] is a fault-injection attack, targeting the TrustZone execution environment of ARM processors. VoltJockey was deployed on the Krait multi-core processor, whose frequencies for each core can be different. However, the processor voltage is controlled with a shared

hardware regulator, which introduces the main vulnerability that is exploited in this attack. VoltJockey uses software-controlled core frequency manipulation that is based on the susceptibility of DVFS. The attack was demonstrated in two use-cases that breach the system-wide secure technology in billions of ARM-based devices - TrustZone; (1) obtaining AES key, and (2) forge RSA signatures of unauthorized and possibly malicious applications. VoltJockey proved to be successful in a commercial device, the Google Nexus 6, and has demonstrated its dangerous implications in the secure execution environment TrustZone.

An illustration of the VoltJockey attack process can be found in Figure ??.




Figure 9.9: VoltJockey attack process.

# Chapter 10

## Ethics and Responsible Disclosure

### Layout

1. Computer Laws
2. Cyber-ethical dilemmas
3. Responsible disclosure

#### 10.1 Computer Laws

Israel's computer laws<sup>1</sup> are *case-laws* – meaning there are a few written laws, and a judge would use those along with precedents and personal judgment to determine whether a person is guilty. This is opposed to *continental-law*, in which everything is written and proceedings are executed literally by the book.

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<sup>1</sup>Published in *Sefer Hachukkim* 5755 No. 1534, 25 July 1995 p. 366 (P.L. 5754 No. 2278 p. 478).

## Definitions

1. "computer material" - software or computer information
2. "computer" - A device that works with a software to perform arithmetic or logical processing of data and peripherals, with exception to auxiliary computer
3. "auxiliary computer" - A device that is only able to perform arithmetic processing
4. "information" - or computer information, is signs, instructions, data or concepts, except for software. the information is expressed via computer language and stored in the computer or any other media or volume.
5. "output" - any information that is produced or derived via the computer
6. "computer language" - appropriate expressive form for interpretation, delivery or processing by computer
7. "software" - A group of instructions expressed in the computer language that can cause a computer to function or to perform an action, and is either embedded or marked with a device or by means of electronic, electro-magnetic, electro-optics or any other means, or either united with the computer in some way or separated from it

The laws state which cyber-activities are considered illegal, as follows:

1. Unlawfully disrupting or interfering with a computer system
2. Unlawfully modifying or deleting any material or files from the computer system
3. Providing false information or false output

4. Unlawful access, invade or penetrate to a computer system
5. Unlawful eavesdrop, according to the Wiretap Act 1979 rule
6. As the above, but in order to commit another offence
7. Creating, distributing or offering to another person a computer virus (a virus can perform variety of malicious actions, such as removing/changing files, ransomware, backdoor, etc.)

*The computer as a tool in the commission of crime*

Access to and dissemination of contents	Malicious disruption or modification of data	Use of communications
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secrets</li> <li>• Knowledge/data</li> <li>• Harmful contents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identity theft</li> <li>• Fraud</li> <li>• Sabotage</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Harassment</li> <li>• Trade in forbidden materials</li> <li>• Spam</li> </ul>

*The computer as a target of crime*

Unauthorized access	Inserting malicious code	Disruption of operation	Theft of service
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hacking</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Malware, spyware, viruses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distributed denial of service (DDoS)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unauthorized use</li> </ul>

Figure 10.1: The computer in cybercrime [89]

From this we learn that not any crime committed with the aid of a computer constitutes a cyber-crime; if a computer was used in the process of the crime, but none of the above computer laws were broken – for example while profiteering<sup>2</sup> off an online ticket sale – the action, while illegal, is not a cyber crime.

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<sup>2</sup>The activity of taking unfair advantage of a situation to make a large profit, often by selling goods that are difficult to get at a very high price (Cambridge Business English Dictionary).

## Unlawful Disruption or Interfering with a Computer System

**Definition.** Disrupting the normal operation of a computer, interfering with the use of a computer or deleting of materials saved on a computer.

Let's observe some examples:

- Performing a DDoS attack on a server
- Infecting a computer with a virus preventing access to information saved on it
- Recruiting a computer into a botnet, thus draining its resources
- Infecting a computer with a program that sends information from it to a remote server
- Cheating at a single player video game
- Installing an unlicensed program

All of the above actions are illegal. The first three are violations of the first section of Israel's computer laws, while the latter three are illegal for other reasons, since they do not directly prevent/interfere with the victim's system's functions.

## False Information or Output

**Definition.** Misinformation; generating, or changing the code of a program such that it would generate information that is forged or misleading. Let's observe some examples:

- Sending an email on behalf of someone else without their consent
- Changing the code of a grade-calculating program in order to change the output grades

- ☒ Cheating in an online game to gain an unfair advantage
- ☒ Using a *key generator*: a program that forges fake software licenses
- ☐ Recruiting a computer into a botnet
- ☐ Accessing an email inbox of another user

All of the above actions are illegal, but only the first four violate the second section of Israel's computer laws.

## Unlawful Access

**Definition.** Virtual trespassing; any action which results in the perpetrator accessing information to which they do not have access, such as images, text files, code, etc.

Let's observe some examples:

- ☒ Viewing personal information of coffee shop patrons by using the same Wi-Fi
- ☒ Penetration testing (attempting to find weaknesses) on a company's server without its consent
- ☒ Using some else's password to access their inbox without their consent
- ☐ Using a program to forge credit card numbers

Forging credit card numbers, while illegal, does not fall under this section of the law; it is constitutes as false information. Note that penetration testing is a violation of this section of the law even if it is unsuccessful.

## 10.2 Cyber Ethics

We first present two case studies, then proceed to discuss them and cyber ethics in general.

## Case Studies

**Stresser.** Two people from Israel ran a DDoS service, known as Stresser, which performed DDoS attacks on websites for money. They made a large profit, but were eventually caught, and claimed they were ethical, and there are occasions where they refused to attack Israeli websites. What were their motives?

**Eternal Blue.** In 2013, the NSA found a vulnerability in Windows [90] and secretly built a tool called Eternal Blue to exploit it. At some point, a group of hackers known as the Shadow Brokers stole security tools from the NSA and offered to sell them on the Dark Net. When nobody paid, the Shadow Brokers leaked the tools. Microsoft released a patch to fix the bug a short time later; the patch was prepared in advance after Microsoft was tipped off by the NSA.

In 2017, a piece of malware known as “WannaCry” first appeared; it utilized Eternal Blue to spread quickly through computers on which the security patch wasn’t yet installed, and encrypt the victim’s files, then asking for money to decrypt them<sup>3</sup>.

WannaCry was finally beaten when a malware researcher found it made requests to an unused control domain, and purchased the domain.<sup>4</sup> As it turned out, purchasing the domain triggered the destruction of WannaCry, whether by mistake or by design (the domain could have been designed as a kill-switch).

While WannaCry did not make a lot of money, it had a nasty side-effect on healthcare systems; medical equipment that got infected could not function normally, with dangerous, possibly lethal, repercussions.

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<sup>3</sup>This is known as ransomware. Recall that this falls under the first section of the computer laws.

<sup>4</sup>Malware researchers often try to purchase control domains in order to gain information on the behavior of the malware.




Figure 10.2: EthernalBlue-WannaCry Timeline

Suppose a man was killed due to a failure induced by WannaCry; let John be such a casualty. There are many parties in this story, each holding part of the blame for John's death:

- WannaCry's writers, whose malware caused John's death
- Microsoft, whose software was used and trusted by the hospital
- The hospital, which relied solely on Microsoft's software without providing safety measures of their own
- The NSA, who knew about the bug well in advance, but did not perform responsible disclosure
- The Shadow Brokers, who leaked the NSA's tools to the public, which lead to the development of WannaCry

## Discussion

**Ethics.** Ethical behavior is deciding how to act according to one's moral system. It is mostly instinctive, or composed of a personally devised code, rather than conforming to a set of rigid universal rules.

**The Trolley Problem[91].** Imagine a trolley approaching a fork in the railway. On the first path lie five people, and on the second only a single person. The trolley, if its course remains unchanged, will head for the first path, resulting in the deaths of the five people there. However, you as a bystander have the option to pull a lever to change the direction of the trolley to the second path, resulting in the single death of the man there.




Figure 10.3: The Trolley Problem

According to the numbers, you should pull the switch to save the five. But in that case, by sending the trolley toward the single person on the other path, you are *directly* responsible for his death! So should you avoid getting involved, thus allowing the deaths of five people instead?

What if one of the people is a close friend? Would that change your answer?

There is another version to this problem, in which there is only a single road with five people on it. You, along with a very large man, are standing on a bridge above the road, and you have the option of *pushing* the large man beside you off the bridge to block the approaching trolley. The stakes are

the same, but in the scenario, in order to save the five you need to actually commit murder!




Figure 10.4: The Trolley Problem (Fat Man)

Our “closeness” to a situation affects on how we judge it by our moral standards.

**How to decide.** There are two main theories by which the morality of an action is judged:

- Deontological ethics (Kant<sup>5</sup>) – what do my rules/morals say about this action? (i.e. judge by motives)
- Utilitarian ethics (Bentham<sup>6</sup>) – what are the consequences of this action? (i.e. judge by consequences)

Consider the cyber setting. If we were to program ethics into an AI (say, an autonomous car), we would have to use Utilitarian Ethics – a score system by which the algorithm could

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<sup>5</sup>Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher during the Enlightenment era. His contributions have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him.

<sup>6</sup>Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher during the Enlightenment era and a social reformer regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism.

judge what would be the least terrible outcome according to our moral system.

This presents complications; for example, let's consider a practical implementation of the Trolley Problem in autonomous cars: Assume a car is driving on a bridge containing five pedestrians in the middle of the road. If the car continues on its path, they will all die. However, the car can choose to veer off the bridge, saving five lives but killing the driver. By utilitarian considerations, this is the best approach – but who will purchase a car which is programmed to kill him on certain circumstances?




Figure 10.5: Autonomous car dilemmas [92]

**Cyber crime.** Our brain is “programmed” to feel distressed when confronted with an unethical scene; i.e. when we see a scene of a person committing an unethical act, we feel bad in sympathy with the victim. This is why it is easier to commit a cyber crime – we do not see the victim, and do not sympathize with them. Upholding cyber ethics would mean artificially causing users to use their judgment when their brains would not.

## 10.3 Responsible Disclosure

Disclosure is the act of alerting a product vendor to a vulnerability in their product so that they could patch it. Disclosure is performed by an honest party (i.e. not a hacker who wishes to exploit the vulnerability) with the intention of increasing the security of the product. There is a question of exactly when and how to perform this disclosure.

An exploit is considered as *zero day* when the vendor is unaware of the vulnerability it exploits (meaning it is known only to a few, and unknown to the general public - i.e. it has not been disclosed).

Figure 10.6 describes a timeline of a vulnerability from the moment it is found to the moment its patch is deployed.




Figure 10.6: Timeline of a vulnerability

Symantec, the company founding Norton<sup>7</sup>, had a lot of data regarding vulnerabilities and exploits, and used it to research the matter. Figure 10.7 shows their results.

From Symantec's results, we conclude the following:

- Zero days exist

---

<sup>7</sup>Norton is an anti-virus.

Table 1: Summary of findings.

Findings	Implications
Zero-day attacks are more frequent than previously thought: 11 out of 18 vulnerabilities identified were not known zero-day vulnerabilities.	Zero-day attacks are serious threats that may have a significant impact on the organizations affected.
Zero-day attacks last between 19 days and 30 months, with a median of 8 months and an average of approximately 10 months.	Zero-day attacks are not detected in a timely manner using current policies and technologies.
Most zero-day attacks affect few hosts, with the exception of a few high-profile attacks (e.g., Stuxnet).	Most zero-day vulnerabilities are employed in targeted attacks.
58% of the anti-virus signatures are still active at the time of writing.	Data covering 4 years is not sufficient for observing all the phases in the vulnerability lifecycle.
After zero-day vulnerabilities are disclosed, the number of malware variants exploiting them increases 183–85,000 times and the number of attacks increases 2–100,000 times.	The public disclosure of vulnerabilities is followed by an increase of up to five orders of magnitude in the volume of attacks.
Exploits for 42% of all vulnerabilities employed in host-based threats are detected in field data within 30 days after the disclosure date.	Cyber criminals watch closely the disclosure of new vulnerabilities, in order to start exploiting them.

Figure 10.7: Symantec’s disclosure research findings

- Usually zero days are targeted, and not highly used so that they would remain secret.
- Disclosure is terrible for security; after a patch is released, attackers use it to find the vulnerabilities and exploit them. Attackers go through public responsible disclosure and attack even before a patch is released. Between the point where the disclosure was made publicly and the patch deployment was completed, the scale of attacks rose by 5 orders of magnitude, making public disclosure a bad idea.

**Responsible disclosure.** There is a government operated website called CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. Disclosure could be performed by uploading a vulnerability to the site such that only the owner of the software can see it, and publish the details only when a patch is released (between points  $t_p$  and  $t_a$  in fig. 10.6), to avoid the window when the vulnerability is public and unpatched (between  $t_0$  and  $t_p$  in fig. 10.6). Microsoft called this practice of disclosing privately Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, and claim it significantly reduces the amount of exploits on new vulnerabilities[93].

Google introduced a system[94] where the vulnerability remains private for 90 days, after which it goes public, with or without a patch. The strict deadline is meant to make sure

the vulnerable vendor does not dismiss fixing the bug due to it being unknown, and thus security is improved.

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	<a href="#">CVE-2018-4169</a>	<a href="#">125</a>			2019-01-11	2019-01-17	<b>10.0</b>	None	Remote	Low	Not required	Complete	Complete	Complete

In macOS High Sierra before 10.13.3, Security Update 2018-001 Sierra, and Security Update 2018-001 El Capitan, an out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation.

Figure 10.8: Example to a cve entry of a vulnerability found in macOS

Over the years using machine learning with CVEs was used for detecting and classifying vulnerabilities in code[95], as well as making automatic predictions for unseen vulnerabilities[96].

On the other hand, CVEs can be used to find unpatched exploits – for example, there was a bug in Linux which hasn't yet gone public, but someone needed to commit the changes, which contained the CVE-ID. Thus hackers could see the fix and exploit the vulnerability before a patch was posted.

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# Appendix A

## Writing L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X

This document shows how you can get ePub-like formatting in L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X with the `memoir` document class. You can't yet export directly to ePub from writeLaTeX, but you can download the source and run it through a format conversion tool, such as `htlatex` to get HTML, and then go from HTML to ePub with a tool like Sigil or Calibre. See <http://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/16569> for more advice. And they lived happily ever after.

### A.1 Basic Formatting

**Comments.** If you want to just add a comment to a file without it being printed, add a `%` (percentage) sign in front of it. In the template files, you will find a number of such comments as well as deactivated commands.

**Bold formatting.** You can make your text bold by surrounding it with the command `\textbf{}`.

**Italics formatting.** You can make your text italic by surrounding it with the command `\textit{}`.

**Small caps.** You can change your text into small capitals by surrounding it with the command `\textsc{}`.

**Text em dashes.** Em dashes are used to connect two related sentences. There is no space before or after the em dash. Within the template, use the command `\textemdash` instead of using the dash you copied over from your text file. This will also take care of issues relating to line breaks.

**Paragraphs.** Paragraphs are handled automatically by leaving an empty line between each paragraph. Adding more than one empty line will not change anything—remember it is not a “what you see is what you get” editor.

**Empty line.** If you want to force an empty line (recommended only in special cases), you can use `\~\\` (tilde followed by two backslashes).

**New page.** Pages are handled automatically by L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X. It tries to be smart in terms of positioning paragraphs and pictures. Sometimes it is necessary to add a page break, though (ideally, at the very end when polishing the final text). For that, simply add a `\newpage`.

**Quotation marks.** In the normal computer character set, there are more than one type of quotation marks. It is required to change all quotation marks into “`\dots`” (two back ticks at the beginning and two single ticks at the end) and refrain from using “...” (or “...”) altogether. This is because Word’s “...” uses special characters, and “...” do not mark the beginning and end of the quotation.

**Horizontal line.** For a horizontal line, simply write `\toprule`, `\midrule`, or `\bottomrule` from booktabs. You can also use the less recommend `\hline`.

**Underlined text.** It is generally not recommended to use underlined text.

**URLs.** For URLs you need a special monospaced font. Also, for URLs in e-books, you want to make them clickable. Both can be accomplished by putting the URL in the `\url{}` environment, for example `\url{https://www.lode.de}`.

**Special characters.** If you need special characters or mathematical formulas, there is a whole body of work on that subject. It is not in the scope of this book to provide you a comprehensive list.

## A.2 Lists

**Itemized list.** To create a bullet point list (like the list in this section), use the following construct:

```
1 \begin{itemize}
2     \item Your first item.
3     \item Your second item.
4     \item Your third item.
5     \% \item Your commented item.
6 \end{itemize}
```

The result will look like this:

- Your first item.
- Your second item.
- Your third item.

**Numbered list.** To create a numbered list, replace `itemize` with `enumerate`:

```
1 \begin{enumerate}
2     \item Your first item.
3     \item Your second item.
4     \item Your third item.
5 \end{enumerate}
```

The result will look like this:

1. Your first item.
2. Your second item.
3. Your third item.

## A.3 Verbatim text

Sometimes, you do want to simply use text in a verbatim way (including special characters and L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X commands). For this, simply use the `\lstlisting` environment: `\begin{lstlisting}... \end{lstlisting}` I put the itemize and enumerate listings above into a `\lstlisting` block. If I did not, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X would have displayed the list as a list, instead of displaying the code.

## A.4 Chapters and Sections

L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X uses a hierarchy of chapters, sections, and subsections. There are also sub-subsections, but for the sake of the reader, it is best to not go that deep. If you come across a situation where it looks like you need it anyway, I recommend thinking over the structure of your book rather than using sub-subsections.

In terms of their use in the code, they are all similar:

- `\chapter{Title of the Chapter}\label{cha:c1_chaptername}`
- `\section{Title of the Section}\label{sec:c1_sectionname}`
- `\subsection{Title of the Subsection}\label{subsec:c1_subsectionname}`
- `\paragraph{Title of the Paragraph}\label{par:c1_paragraph}`

When using these commands, obviously replace the title, but also the label. For the label, I recommend to have it start with either “cha:”, “sec:”, “subsec:”, etc. to specify what kind of label it is, followed with c and the current chapter number, an underscore, and the chapter, section, or subsection in one word and lowercase. These labels can then be used for references like we used previously for the images. For example, if you have defined a section \section{Chapters and Sections}\label{sec:c1\_chaptersandsections}, you could write “We will discuss chapters and sections in section \ref{sec:c1\_chaptersandsections} ” which results in the document in “We will discuss chapters and sections in appendix [A.4](#)”.

## A.5 Tables

In L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, tables are like images and put into the figure environment. As such, they have a caption, label, and a positioning like we discussed above with the images. Drawing a table requires a bit of coding:

```
1  \begin{table}[!ht]
2      \centering
3      \begin{tabular}{p{2.5cm}|p{3.5cm}|p{3.5cm}}
4          \hline
5          & \textbf{Word} & \textbf{\LaTeX{}} \\
6          \hline
7          Editor & ‘‘what you see is what you get’’ & source file is compiled \\
8          \hline
9
10         Compatibility & dependent on editor & independent of editor \\
11         \hline
12
13
```

```
14      Graphics & simple inbuilt editor & ←
15          powerful but complex editor \\
16          \hline
17
18      Typography & optimized for speed & ←
19          optimized for quality \\
20          \hline
21
22
23      Style & inbuilt style & separate ←
24          style document \\
25          \hline
26
27
28      Multi-platform & only via export & ←
29          possible with scripting \\
30          \hline
31
32
33      Refresh & some elements need, ←
34          manual refresh & everything is ←
35          refreshed with each compile \\
36          \hline
37
38
39      Formulas & basic support needs ←
40          external tools & complete ←
41          support \\
42          \hline
43
44
45      \end{tabular}
46      \caption{Comparison of Word and \leftarrow
47          LaTeX{} } \label{tab:c1_←
48          comparisonwordlatex}
49
50      \end{table}
```

This table from the beginning of the book has the familiar figure, label, caption, and centering commands. The actual table is configured with the `\tabular{}` environment. Following the `\tabular` command, you configure the columns in curly braces. Each column is separated with a vertical line and the `p{...}` specifies the width of the column. With `{p{2.5cm}←
} | p{3.5cm} | p{3.5cm}}`, you would have three columns with 2.5cm width for the first column and 3.5cm width for the two

others. Alternatively, you can use `c` instead of `p` and leave out the curly braces with the width. Then, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X simply calculates the required widths automatically. Then, for each line of the table, simply write: `content of the first cell & ← content of the second cell & content of the third cell ← \\midrule.`

	<b>Word</b>	<b>L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X</b>
Editor	“what you see is what you get”	source file is compiled
Compatibility	dependent on editor	independent of editor
Graphics	simple inbuilt editor	powerful but complex editor
Typography	optimized for speed	optimized for quality
Style	inbuilt style	separate style document
Multi-platform	only via export	possible with scripting
Refresh	some elements need, manual refresh	everything is refreshed with each compile
Formulas	basic support needs external tools	complete support

Table A.1: Comparison of Word and L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X

## A.6 Footnotes

Finally, for footnotes, there is the command `\footnote{ }{ }`. You can place it anywhere you like, L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X will then automatically add the number of the footnote at that place,

and put the footnote text into the footer area. It looks like this.<sup>1</sup> The challenge here relates to grammar: footnotes start with capital letters, parentheses with lower case, and the footnote comes after the period, the parentheses have to start before the period.

## A.7 Inserting Images

As in Word, in L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X, images are separate from the text. Images are usually packaged together with a caption and a label to reference it from the text. These three entities are packaged together into a figure. The figure itself configures the size of the image as well as where it should be put. Let us look at a code sample:

```
1 \begin{figure}[!ht]
2   \centering
3   \includegraphics{images/ebookLatex_←
4     Cover.jpg}
5   \caption{The cover of this book.} ←
       label{fig:c1_cover}
6 \end{figure}
```

Let us go through this line by line. At the core is the image, included with `\includegraphics{path to file}`. It inserts the image specified by the “path to file.” With the `\adjustbox{}` command, we can adjust the image size according to the page width (`\columnwidth`) and page height (`\textheight`).

Below there is the caption and the label. L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X automatically numbers each figure, so in the text, we can later refer to it with `\ref{c1_cover:fig}` which prints out the number of the figure. Finally, all these commands are centered with the `\centering` command and surrounded with the figure environment. The `[ht]!` instructs L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X to try to place the image exactly where it is in the L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X code.

---

<sup>1</sup>This is a footnote.



Figure A.1: The cover of this book.

In Figure A.1, you can see the result of the command. Instead of graphics, you can also include other TEX files that contain graphics (or commands to draw graphics, see Appendix A.8).

## A.8 TikZ Graphics

For graphics, you can use the inbuilt TikZ graphics generator. Due to its flexibility, I even recommend images you already have for a number of reasons:

- TikZ graphics can very easily changed (especially for for example translations or making corrections).
- TikZ graphics are small and flexible. They can be eas-

ily scaled to any size and are directly integrated into your project (no time-consuming editing in an external graphics program necessary).

- TikZ graphics look better. As vector graphics are sent directly to the printer, we need not to worry about readability.

If you want to create a TikZ graphic, simply create a new TEX file in the *tex-images* folder and include it with `\begin{input}{...} \includegraphics{...}` where you want to.

Then, do a “recompile from scratch” by clicking on the top right corner of the preview window (showing Warning or Error) to regenerate the TikZ file. If “up-to-date and saved” is shown, delete the *tikz-cache* directory and recreate it.

For the format of the file itself, it is a series of commands surrounded by the `\begin{tikzpicture}{...} \end{tikzpicture}`. Discussing all the commands is beyond the scope of this book, so I recommend three options:

- Check out the PGF manual at <https://www.ctan.org/pkg/pgf>. It is more than 1100 pages full with documentation of each command and corresponding examples.
- Check out the few example TikZ pictures from my two books [97, 98] in the *tex-images* directory.




Figure A.2: TikZ drawings will be output as SVG, which should be rendered by most modern browsers.




Figure A.3: Comparing complexity of *Word* and  $\text{\LaTeX}$  depending on the application.




Figure A.4: Example of a drawing made in TikZ.




Figure A.5: Example 2 of a drawing made in TikZ.