



# Lecture 2

Conventional  
morality  
Conflicts of interest



# 第2讲

传统道德观 利益  
冲突



## Examples of conflicts of interest – be loyal to the company or serve your own interest?

1. Offering paid services on the side to a client of your company
2. Accepting a favour from another company for information about your employer
3. Failing to investigate a subordinate's wrongdoing because they are a friend
4. Working for your company, you purchase software to boost another business that you have a stake in
5. Accepting consulting fees and providing advice to a competitor of your company
6. Sharing information in a job interview about your current employer's market strategy
7. Taking advantage of confidential information learned on the job for your own benefit
8. Taking advantage of a business opportunity learn while at work that your company may have pursued
9. Starting a competitor company that provides services similar to your employer
10. Making arrangements to work for a client at a future date while your company continues to do business with them

## 利益冲突示例——忠于公司，还是服务于个人利益？

1. 私下向本公司客户有偿提供服务
2. 为获取有关雇主的信息而接受其他公司的恩惠
3. 因下属是朋友而未对其不当行为展开调查
4. 就职于本公司期间，采购软件以提升自己持有股份的另一家业务
5. 接受咨询费并向本公司竞争对手提供咨询建议
6. 在求职面试中透露现任雇主的市场战略信息
7. 利用工作中获知的保密信息谋取个人利益
8. 利用在职期间获悉的、本公司本可能开展的商业机会
9. 创办一家与现任雇主提供类似服务的竞争性公司
10. 在本公司仍持续为某客户开展业务的同时，提前安排未来为该客户工作

## Ethics and convention



What is best to solve the moral dilemma?



1. Ask your co-workers what they usually do



2. Figure out what your boss does. It should be OK to do the same



3. What is more likely to get you in trouble, considering past situations in the company (who got in trouble for what)



4. ?

## 伦理与惯例



解决道德困境的最佳方式是什么？



1. 向同事询问他们通常如何处理



2. 弄清楚你的上司会怎么做。照着做应该没问题



3. 考虑公司过往情况（谁因何事而惹上麻烦），哪种做法更可能让你陷入麻烦



4. ?

# Today

Now we know there is genuine moral action.  
But how do we know how to act morally?

Convention? Do existing social norms define what's moral? Is learning ethics the *memorization* of current rules?

Maybe not - Kohlberg's levels of moral development  
(suggests moral knowledge requires cognitive development, not complying with convention)

All animals are equal (and machines will have rights, too!) – Singer rejects convention

# 今天

如今我们已知，确实存在真正的道德行为。但  
如何才能知道该怎样以符合道德的方式行事呢？

社会惯例？既有的社会规范是否界定了何为道德？学习伦理学是否就是对现行规则的死记硬背？

或许并非如此——科尔伯格的道德发展阶段理论  
(表明道德认知需要认知发展，而非简单遵从社会惯例)

所有动物生而平等（机器也将拥有权利！）——辛格拒绝传统观念

First, some quick revisions  
before we proceed

- A quick point about philosophy and definitions
- Revisions – genuine moral action and related concepts (Q&A)
- Revisions – validity and soundness of arguments



首先，进行一些快速修订  
在继续之前

- 关于哲学与定义的一个简要说明
- 修订——真正的道德行为及相关概念（问答）
- 修订——论证的有效性与可靠性



## Definitions

- 1. Googling/using AI for definitions often fails
- 2. using the dictionary typically not a good starting point to solve philosophical problems

- 1. In the sciences, terms often have a single well-defined definition (e.g. sequoia - *Sequoiadendron giganteum*, or prime number)
- Not the case in philosophy
- Example - Google “objectivism” and you’ll likely get Ayn Rand
- 2. Look up “happiness” in the dictionary to write an essay on happiness
- The dictionary isn’t meant to solve philosophical problems but just tell us about common usage of the word

## 定义

- 1. 通过谷歌搜索或借助人工智能查询定义，往往难以奏效
- 2. 使用词典通常并非

解决哲学问题的良好起点

- 1. 在自然科学领域，术语通常具有唯一且明确的定义（例如：红杉——巨杉（*Sequoiadendron giganteum*），或质数）
- 哲学领域并非如此
- 示例——在谷歌中搜索“客观主义”，你很可能得到的是安·兰德的相关内容
- 2. 查阅字典中“幸福”一词的释义，以此撰写一篇关于幸福的议论文
- 字典的目的并非解决哲学问题，而只是向我们说明……关于该词的常见用法

# Revisions

- What's **Psychological** egoism?
- The (radical) descriptive/motivational **theory** that states that *everyone* **is** an egoist (i.e. everyone is *exclusively* concerned with their self-interest)
- Psychological/Motivational theories are **descriptive**. They describe our psychology/motivation – make claims about what IS the case
- What's **Normative** egoism?
- The (even more radical) prescriptive/normative **theory** that says that everyone **ought to be** an egoist.
- Normative theories are **prescriptive**. They prescribe norms – make claims about what OUGHT to be *done*



# 修订版本


- 什么是**心理利己主义**?  
(激进的) 描述性/动机性理论 y that 认为所有人 **都是** 利己主义者 (即所有人都只关注自身利益)
- 心理/动机理论属于**描述性**理论。它们描述我们的心理/动机状况——即对“实际如此”的状态作出断言。
- 什么是**规范性**利己主义?
- (更为激进的) 规定性/规范性**理论**, 主张每个人都**应当成为**利己主义者。
- 规范性理论属于**规定性**理论, 旨在提出行为准则。规范——主张什么行为是应当被采取的行动






## What's self-interest and selfishness?

- **Is it wrong to care for one's self-interest?**
- It depends, as self-interest includes both justified and unjustified actions to serve oneself.
- A) Eating is caring for one's self-interest
- B) Eating someone else's lunch is also self-interested
- So being self-interested is not always wrong. Everyone is self-interested at least some of the time, and that can be justified depending on what they are doing and why.
- **What is selfishness?**
- Selfishness is not a mere concern with self-interest. Selfishness is *excessive* concern with self-interest.



## 什么是自利与自私?

- **关心自身利益是否错误?**
- 这取决于具体情况，因为自利既包括为满足自身需求而采取的正当行为，也包括不正当的行为。
- A) 进食是关心自身利益
- B) 吃别人的午餐同样出于自利动机
- 因此，利己并不总是错误的。每个人在某些时候至都会表现出利己倾向，而这种倾向是否正当，取决于他们所做的事情及其动机。
- **什么是自私?**
- 自私并非仅仅关注自身利益。自私过度关注自身利益。





## Revisions

- **Is a person self-interested when they satisfy their *own* desires?**
- Williams: Don't assume this. We inevitably satisfy our own desires, sure. What makes that *self-interested or not* is whether they always serve ourselves or *sometimes* also others.
- **If an action looks moral but the actor actually *enjoys it*, isn't the action then self-interested (done out of pleasure)?**
- Aristotle: Isn't that what we should hope for? The truly virtuous enjoys moral action! That's evidence of *greater* virtue, not less.
- If *the primary or single reason for acting is the enjoyment*, however, then this may not be a genuinely moral action, but that's a specific case, and not all cases.

## 修订记录

- **当一个人满足自己的欲望时，是否就属于自我关注？**
- 威廉姆斯：切勿想当然。我们确实不可避免地会满足自身欲望。但决定该行为是否属于利己主义的关键在于：这些欲望是否始终只服务于自身，抑或有时也惠及他人。
- **倘若某项行为看似合乎道德，而行为者实际上乐在其中，那么该行为是否便属于利己主义（即出于愉悦感而做出）？**
- 亚里士多德：这难道不正是我们所期望的吗？真正有德性之人，理应乐于践行道德！这恰恰是德性更为深厚的明证，而非德性薄弱的表现。
- 然而，如果行动的首要或唯一原因在于享受本身，那么这一行为或许并非真正意义上的道德行为；但这是个特例，并非所有情况都如此。

# Revisions

- “Altruistic motivations are the result of evolutionary adaptations, so kindness is just programmed in us rather than a real choice. There is no real moral action”
- It would follow from this:
- Love is an illusion, hatred is an illusion
- Sunsets have no beauty (our animal brains evolved to like warmth)
- Careful not to conflate:
- 1. the origin of motivations (the history of how moral emotions came to be)
- 2. the genuineness of motivations (the psychology)
- In order to avoid the loss of such useful values due to this **reductive** perspective, separate the genuineness of the motivations (e.g. is it really a concern for the welfare of others?) *from the reasons why the human species is capable of such emotions.*



# 修订记录

- “利他动机源于进化适应，因此善良不过是刻入我们基因的程序，而非真正的自主选择——根本不存在真正意义上的道德行为。”
- 由此可得出以下结论：
- 爱是一种幻觉，恨也是一种幻觉
- 日落本身并无美感（我们动物性的大脑在进化过程中形成了对温暖的偏好）
- 请注意勿将以下二者混淆：
- 1. 动机的起源（道德情感形成的历史过程）
- 2. 动机的真实性（心理学层面）
- 为避免因这种简化论视角而丧失此类宝贵价值，需将  
动机的真实性（例如：这是否真正源于  
对他人福祉的关切？与人类物种何以具备此类情感的原因。






## Revisions

---

- Suppose that an argument is valid. Are the premises true?
- Suppose that an argument is valid but not sound. Is the conclusion true?
- Suppose that an argument is valid and the conclusion is true. Are the premises true?
- Suppose that an argument is sound but not valid. Are the premises true?
- Provide an example of a valid premise
- Provide an example of a true argument.



## 修订记录

---

- 假设一个论证是有效的，那么其前提是否为真？
- 假设一个论证是有效的但并非健全的，那么其结论是否为真？
- 假设一个论证是有效的且其结论为真，那么其前提是否为真？
- 假设一个论证是健全的但并非有效的，那么其前提是否为真？
- 请举出一个有效前提的例子
- 请提供一个真实论点的示例。



## Piaget's 2 stages of moral development inspired Kohlberg

- Children younger than 10/11 – rules are fixed and absolute, handed down by parents or God. Judgment **based on consequences** of actions.
- Children older than 10/11 – rules can be changed if everyone agrees, and are tools for getting along. Judgment **based on intentions** behind actions.
- “When, for example, the young child hears about one boy who broke 15 cups trying to help his mother and another boy who broke only one cup trying to steal cookies, the young child thinks that the first boy did worse.” (Piaget, 1932, p. 137).



## 皮亚杰的道德发展两阶段理论启发了科尔伯格

- 10/11岁以下的儿童——规则是固定且绝对的，由父母或上帝制定。判断依据是行为的`后果`。
- 10/11岁以上的儿童——若所有人达成一致，规则便可修改；规则是促进人际和谐的工具。判断依据是行为背后的`意图`。
- “例如，当年幼的儿童听说一个男孩为帮母亲而打碎了15只杯子，另一个男孩则为偷饼干而打碎了1只杯子时，年幼的儿童会认为前者做得更糟。”（皮亚杰，1932年，第137页）

Moral maturity seems to be about acquiring cognitive abilities, not memorizing conventions



- Saying there are stages of moral development suggests that the ability of being moral is not the ability of memorizing certain claims (e.g. “lying is wrong”)
- This suggests: moral knowledge could be **know-how/a skill** rather than **knowing-that**
- Capuchin monkeys, for instance, seem to be able to acquire a sense of fairness – a know-how

道德成熟似乎关乎认知能力的获得，而非对规范的死记硬背




- 指出道德发展存在不同阶段，意味着具备道德能力并不等同于记住某些命题（例如“说谎是错误的”）
- 这表明：道德知识可能是一种**实践性知识／技能**，而非**命题性知识**
- 例如，卷尾猴似乎能够习得一种公平感——这是一种实践性知识

## A moral dilemma used by Kohlberg


### Heinz Steals the Drug

- In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.
- The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$ 1,000 which is half of what it cost.
- He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug-for his wife. Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19)




## 科尔伯格所用的道德两难困境海因茨偷药

- 在欧洲，一名妇女因一种特殊的癌症而命悬一线。医生认为只有一种药物或许能挽救她的生命。这种药物是一种镭制剂，由同镇的一位药剂师最近研制成功。
- 该药物制作成本虽高，但药剂师索价却是其成本的十倍：他仅以200美元购得镭原料，却对一小剂药物开价2000美元。病妇的丈夫海因茨四处向亲友筹款，却仅凑得约1000美元，仅为药价的一半。
- 他告诉药剂师，自己的妻子正濒临死亡，请求对方降价出售该药品，或允许他日后付款。但药剂师却回答：“不行，这药是我研发出来的，我要靠它赚钱。”于是，海因茨陷入绝望，闯入那人药店偷取了这种药，以救治他的妻子。丈夫这样做对吗？（科尔伯格，1963年，第19页）








## Kohlberg

- Kohlberg found 6 stages of moral development – how morality is perceived at each stage (grouped in 3 main levels):
- 1. Premoral/Preconventional a) (obedience and punishment)
- 2. Premoral/Preconventional b) (individualism and exchange)
- 3. Conventional role conformity a) (good boy/ good girl)
- 4. Conventional role conformity b) (law and order)
- 4.5 The cynic – questions the conventional, no belief in the postconventional – everything's relative
- 5. Postconventional a) (social contract and individual rights)
- 6. Postconventional b) (universal moral principles)



## 科尔伯格

- 科尔伯格提出了道德发展的六个阶段——即个体在每个阶段对道德的理解方式（这六个阶段被划分为三个主要水平）：
- 1. 前道德/前习俗水平 a)（服从与惩罚定向）
- 2. 前道德/前习俗水平 b)（个体主义与交换定向）
- 3. 习俗水平的角色遵从 a)（好孩子/好女孩定向）
- 4. 习俗水平的角色遵从 b)（法律与顺序）
- 4.5 愤世嫉俗者——质疑传统观念，不认同后习俗水平——一切皆为相对。
- 5. 后习俗水平 a)（社会契约与个人权利）
- 6. 后习俗水平 b)（普遍道德原则）





## 1. Preconventional - obedience and punishment

- Similar to Piaget's stage 1. Moral norms are handed down from figures of power. Stealing is bad "because you'll get punished" (Kohlberg, 1958b).
- Toddlers react to punishment. They don't have their own sense of right or wrong. They just know they get punished if they do certain things. They behave simply to avoid being punished.
- Punishment is seen as *proving* the action is bad - "Might makes right"
- If there is punishment, the action is seen as wrong. The action being wrong means to them simply that if you try it you get punished.
- **For each stage, can you think of an everyday example of how it would be unfortunate to be caught thinking like this?**



## 1. 前习俗水平——服从与惩罚导向

- 类似于皮亚杰的第1阶段。道德规范由权威人物自上而下施加。偷窃是错误的，因为“你会受到惩罚”（科尔伯格，1958b）。
- 幼儿会对惩罚作出反应。他们尚未形成自身的是非观念，仅知道若做出某些行为便会受到惩罚。其行为纯粹是为了避免受罚。
- 惩罚被视为证明该行为是错误的——“强权即公理”
- 若有惩罚，则该行为即被视为错误；而所谓“错误”，在他们看来，仅仅意味着：一旦尝试该行为，就会招致惩罚。
- **针对每个阶段，您能否举出一个日常生活中常见的例子，说明若以这种思维方式思考会带来怎样的不利后果？**

## 2. Preconventional – instrumental exchange (normative egoism + mutually beneficial exchange)

- Children realize there are many views on what is right and wrong, so they become relativists, thinking that it's right *whatever* suits one's interests - **normative egoism**
- Example: One boy said that Heinz might steal the drug if he wanted his wife to live, but that he doesn't have to if he wants to marry someone younger and better-looking (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 24)
- Despite the individualism, there is a sense of **fair exchange**: To the Heinz story, subjects often say that Heinz was right to steal the drug "because the druggist was unwilling to make a fair deal"

## 2. 前习俗水平—— 工具性导向

交换  
(规范性  
利己主  
义 + 互惠互  
利的交换)

- 儿童意识到关于是非对错存在多种观点，因而成为相对主义者
- 符合个人利益——<sup>思考</sup>这是正确的g——<sup>无论何种情况</sup>规范性利己主义  
示例：一名男孩表示，如果亨茨希望妻子活下去，他可以偷取该药物；但如果他想另娶一位更年轻、更漂亮的妻子，则不必这么做（科尔伯格，1963 年，第 24 页）
- 尽管强调个人主义，但仍存在一种**公平交换**的观念：在谈及海因茨的故事时，受试者常表示海因茨偷药是正当的，“因为药剂师拒绝达成公平的交易”

### 3. Conventional morality, tribal morality, “Good Boy/Nice Girl morality”

- In both stages of conventional role conformity, individuals react to rewards. They want to be **praised**.
- Children learn how a good boy or girl are supposed to act.
- Older individuals seek to fulfill the expectations of peers to be admired by them. We want to live up to expectations of others, typically family members and close friends.
- We no longer just want to avoid punishment and seek rewards, we want to be **worthy** of the praise we get, and not be blamed for doing wrong things.
- Can you think of an example of how it could go wrong?

### 3. 传统道德、部族道德、“好孩子/乖女孩”道德

- 在传统角色遵从的两个阶段中，个体均会对奖励作出反应。他们渴望得到**赞扬**。
- 儿童学习一个好男孩或好女孩应有的行为方式。
- 年长者则力求履行其期望获得同龄人的钦佩。我们希望不辜负他人——通常是家人和密友——对我们的期望。
- 我们不再仅仅满足于避免惩罚、追求奖励；我们更希望配得上所获得的赞扬，并因做错事而免受责备。
- 您能举一个它可能出错的例子吗？

#### 4. Conventional morality, “law and order” - the good citizen

- Concern with society as a whole
- Some subjects now worry about the consequences of theft for society, and say Heinz is wrong to steal.
- Preconventional morality: something is wrong because it breaks the law/rules
- Conventional morality: same as above but adds justification - laws are useful for social order
- Example: “Crime requires punishment. Must pay debt to society.”
- Authority figures are seldom questioned. Many adults never reach the third level (stages 5 and 6) of moral development.
- Example of how it could go wrong?

#### 4. 传统 道德观：“法 治与秩序”—— 合格公民

- 关注整个社会
- 一些受试者如今开始担忧盗窃行为对社会所造成的后果，并认为海因茨偷药是错误的。
- 前习俗道德：某事之所以错误，是因为它违反了法律或规则。
- 习俗道德：与上述相同，但进一步补充了正当性理由——法律对于维护社会秩序具有重要作用。
- 例如：“犯罪必须受到惩罚，必须向社会偿还所欠之债。”
- 权威人物极少遭到质疑；许多成年人终其一生也未能达到道德发展的第三层次（即第5和第6阶段）。
- 一个可能出错的示例？

#### 4.5 The cynic, stuck between conventional and postconventional

- Conventional morality seen as socially constructed, relative and arbitrary. Conventions and tradition are questioned. But no alternative is known.
- May drop into a hedonistic ethics of "do your own thing."
- Example: Hippies were against the "law and order" type of thinking.
- Contemporary example: Uncritical cynicism – "all politicians are liars" (blanket generalization, repeated because others say it – ironically both rebellious and conventional).
- "Why should I believe anything?"
- Wise enough to question it all, not wise enough to find answers....

#### 4.5 持怀疑态 度者：困于习俗水 平与后习俗水平之 间

- 传统道德观被视为社会建构的产物，具有相对性和任意性；习俗与传统受到质疑，但尚无公认的替代方案。
- 可能退回到“随心所欲”的享乐主义伦理观。
- 例如：嬉皮士反对那种强调“法律与秩序”的思维方式。
- 当代实例：不加批判的犬儒主义——“所有政客都是骗子”（以偏概全式的笼统断言，因他人反复提及而人云亦云——讽刺的是，这种态度既具反叛性，又流于常规化）。
- “我凭什么要相信任何事？”
- 聪慧到足以质疑一切，却尚未聪慧到能找到答案……



5.  
Postconventional  
/ autonomous /  
principled –  
social contract  
and individual  
rights  
(democracy,  
human rights,  
questioning law)

- We can **question justifications**, even if they are widespread/popular. Why should I blindly accept what my parents/teachers/bosses/the law says? What is a good society?
- Laws are not good simply because they are laws. Laws can be improved, if necessary. **There is a commitment to the social contract and to** changing laws through **democratic** agreements.
- Example of stage 5: beyond “Justice demands punishment”, these individuals think about **human rights**, and deterrence. For instance: “Is any point served by punishing?”
- A stage 5 subject on the Heinz thought experiment: “It is the husband's duty to save his wife. The fact that her life is in danger transcends every other standard you might use to judge his action. Life is more important than property. [...] Usually the moral and legal standpoints coincide. Here they conflict. The judge should weigh the moral standpoint more heavily but preserve the legal law in punishing Heinz lightly.” (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 38)
- **Example of how it could go wrong?**
- **Why do we need another level beyond this?**

5. 后习俗阶段  
自主的 / 有原则  
的 — 社会契约  
与个人权利  
(民主、人权、  
对法律的质疑)

- 我们可以 **质疑各种理由依据**，即便它们广为流传或深受欢迎。我为何要盲目接受父母/老师/上司/法律所言？何谓良善的社会？
- 法律之所以正当，并非仅仅因为其是法律；必要时，法律亦可被完善。 **人们致力于维护社会契约，并通过民主方式达成共识以修改法律。**
- 第五阶段的典型表现：超越“正义要求惩罚”这一观点，此类个体会思考 **人权** 与威慑效应。例如：“惩罚是否真能实现任何积极目的？”
- 第五阶段受试者在海因茨两难实验中的回答：“丈夫有责任拯救妻子的生命。妻子生命垂危这一事实，凌驾于一切其他用以评判其行为的标准之上。生命比财产更为重要。[……] 通常情况下，道德立场与法律立场是一致的；但在此情境中二者发生冲突。法官应更侧重权衡道德立场，同时在对海因茨的处罚上予以从轻处理，以维系法律的权威。”（科尔伯格，1976年，第38页）
- **可能出现问题的示例？**
- **我们为何需要在此基础之上再增设一个层级？**

6.  
Postconventional  
morality –  
universal ethical  
principles  
(beyond  
democracy, civil  
disobedience,  
creating/rewritin  
g constitution)

- Few reach this stage. The “prophet” stage.
- Lists of moral rules may be abandoned in favour of deeper wisdom. Example: realization that **even democratic processes may fail** (e.g. Trump, Brexit, rising popularity of far right leaders) – suppose that a majority decides to elect someone who hurts a minority, the so-called “tyranny of the majority” (John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson)
- The Aristotelian question is: does the **majority** rule for its own advantage, or for the common advantage?
- One distinguishing issue - **Possibility of justification of civil disobedience**. If a law cannot be changed by democratic processes, disobedience can be morally justified.
- Martin Luther King, for example, argued that laws are only valid insofar as they are grounded in justice, and that a commitment to justice carries with it an obligation to disobey unjust laws. (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 43).


6. 后习俗水平  
道德——普  
世伦理原则（超  
越民主、公民不  
服从以及宪法的  
制定或修订）

- 极少有人能达到这一阶段，即所谓“先知”阶段。
- 道德规范清单可能被舍弃，转而诉诸更深层的智慧。例如：认识到**即使民主程序也可能失灵**（如特朗普当选、英国脱欧、极右翼领导人支持率不断攀升）——假设多数人决定选举一位会损害少数群体利益的领导人，这便构成了所谓“多数人的暴政”（约翰·斯图尔特·密尔、托马斯·杰斐逊）
- 亚里士多德式的问题是：**多数人的统治**究竟是为了自身利益，还是为了共同利益？
- 一个关键区别在于：**公民不服从是否具有正当性**。倘若一项法律无法通过民主程序予以修正，则不服从该法律在道德上可能是正当的。
- 例如，马丁·路德·金曾指出，法律唯有植根于正义才具有效性；而对正义的承诺，本身就蕴含着不服从不义之法的义务。  
(科尔伯格，1981年，第43页)




## Peter Singer – “all animals are equal” Challenging convention/tradition

- Utilitarian - Argued for equal rights for animals based on “equal consideration of interests”
- What is relevant for this course is his rejection of convention.
- Example: Conventions in computing in the 90s - hacking is exciting/getting pirated software is cheaper/getting copyrighted movies is smart/“it’s not illegal if you don’t get caught”. **Has anything changed since then?**
- Recently Singer has argued that machines may one day also deserve equal rights, if conscious
- **Do you agree?**
- **Equal consideration of interests** is a central feature of utilitarianism, as we will see in two weeks



## 彼得·辛格——‘所有动物皆平等’： 挑战成规与传统

- 功利主义立场——基于‘利益的同等考量’，主张动物应享有平等权利
- 本课程关注的重点在于他对成规的拒斥。
- 示例：20世纪90年代计算机领域的成规——黑客行为令人兴奋/获取盗版软件更便宜/下载受版权保护的电影很聪明/‘只要不被抓住就不算违法’。**自那以来，情况是否已有所改变？**
- 近期，辛格进一步提出：倘若机器具备意识，未来某一天它们或许也应享有平等权利。
  - **您是否认同这一观点？**
- **利益的同等考量** 是……的核心特征  
功利主义，我们将在两周后看到





## Peter Singer

- Singer: It can sound ridiculous to argue for the rights of a group that, by **convention**, has no (recognized) rights.
- When Mary Wollstonecraft (18<sup>th</sup> century, mother of Mary Shelley - Frankenstein) argued for the rights of women, philosopher Thomas Taylor joked: “Then why don’t we also argue for the rights of brutes!” (animals)
- Singer:
- Equality extends to both women AND animals because in both cases empirical **fact is not the basis for equality** (we shouldn’t evaluate facts about individuals to determine whether they are equal in rights) – note his “no ought from is” argument



## 彼得·辛格

- 辛格：主张一个按惯例本无（公认）权利的群体拥有权利，听起来可能显得荒谬。
- 当玛丽·沃斯通克拉夫特（18世纪思想家，玛丽·雪莱——《弗兰肯斯坦》作者——之母）为女性的权利发声时，  
g女性的权利，p哲学家p托马斯泰勒开玩笑道：“那我们为何不也同样为……”  
野兽的权利（即动物）而争辩呢！”
- 辛格：
- 平等既适用于女性，也适用于动物，因为在这两种情况下，经验性的**事实均非平等的基础**（我们不应依据对个体的事实性评估来判定其权利是否平等）——请注意他提出的“无法从‘是’推出‘应当’”这一论点。

Rights equality doesn't mean everyone should have exactly the *same* rights, just *equal* rights.

- Singer: Equality extends to women **not because men and women are the same in every physical respect**. They are not
- And because men and women are not the same, we don't need to have the *same* rights, just **equal rights**. (for instance: men cannot have children, so we don't need to defend their right to have an abortion)
- Pigs cannot vote, so it's meaningless to speak of their right to vote. No, we're not asking for the *same* rights.
- **Singer's conclusion:**
  - a. Sure, there is an obvious difference between animals and humans (as there is also a difference between men and women)
  - b. It doesn't follow from a. that we should reject equality in either case!
- So where does equality comes from? What should it be based on?

权利平等并不意味着每个人都应享有完全相同的权利，而仅需享有平等的权利。

- 辛格指出：平等适用于女性**并非因为男女在所有生理特征上都完全相同**，而事实并非如此。
- 而且，由于男性与女性并不相同，我们无需拥有相同的权利，只需享有**平等的权利**。（例如：男性无法生育，因此我们无需捍卫其堕胎权）
- 猪不能投票，因此谈论其投票权毫无意义。不，我们并非在要求获得相同的权利。
- **辛格的结论：**
  - a. 毫无疑问，动物与人类之间存在明显差异（正如男性与女性之间也存在差异）。
  - b. 但由a项并不能推出：我们在任一情况下都应否定平等！
- 那么，平等源自何处？它又应以什么为基础？





What is equality? Equality as equal consideration of interests.  
Not a statement of fact (we are obviously not the same!)

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- “Equality is a moral ideal, not a statement of a fact” Singer
- The ideal is impartiality (utilitarianism’s “equal consideration of interests”): “**The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.**” utilitarian Henry Sidgwick
- But why should we hold this ideal? (how can we justify it?)




什么是平等？平等即对各方利益给予同等的考量。  
这并非一个事实性陈述（我们显然并不相同！）

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- “平等是一种道德理想，而非对事实的陈述”——辛格
- 这一理想即公正无私（功利主义所主张的“利益的同等考量”）：“**从宇宙的角度（倘若可以如此表述）来看，任何个体之福祉，其重要性并不高于其他任何个体之福祉。**”功利主义者亨利·西季威克
- 但为何我们要秉持这一理想？（我们该如何为其辩护？）


## Justifying equality not on merit but on ability to suffer

- Equality should **not be grounded on any kind of merit**.
- Possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends. It should also not entitle humans to exploit nonhumans.
- **But if not merit, then what?** Singer quotes Bentham: The question is not: can they talk or reason, but... “Can they suffer?” Bentham
- “In this passage Bentham points to the **capacity for suffering** as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration.” Singer



## 为平等辩护的依据并非功绩，而是感受痛苦的能力

- 平等不应**建立在任何……基础之上某种功绩**。
- 拥有更高层次的智力，并不能使某个人有权将他人用作实现自身目的之工具；同样，这也不能使人类有权剥削非人类生命。
- **但如果不是基于功绩，那又该基于什么？** 辛格援引边沁的观点：“问题不在于它们能否说话或推理，而在于……‘它们能否感受痛苦？’” 边沁
- “在本段中，边沁指出，**感受痛苦的能力**是赋予一个生命体获得平等考量权利的关键特征。” ——辛格







## Speciesism



## 物种歧视



- Look at how we treat animals: the way we rear them, we eat them, we experiment on them
- The experimenter shows a bias towards his own species when he refuses to test on an infant, but will test on a guinea pig.
- Singer: we should **question the assumptions of our age** (i.e. we mustn't allow mere convention to dictate our ethics)
- Left: Engineered Arts humanoid robot factory
- Top: Kicking Big Dog (Boston Dynamics)



- 看看我们如何对待动物：我们如何饲养它们、食用它们、以及对它们进行实验。
- 实验者拒绝在婴儿身上进行实验，却愿意在豚鼠身上开展实验，这体现出其对自身所属物种的偏袒。
- 辛格指出：我们应当 **质疑我们这个时代的固有假设**（即绝不能让单纯的习俗来左右我们的伦理判断）
- 左侧：Engineered Arts 人形机器人制造工厂
- 顶部：踢踹大型机器狗（波士顿动力公司）

## Response to Frankena's "good life" counter-argument



- Frankena: basing social justice on merit leads to inequalitarian results. So humans are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal, in any respect, but **because they are human**.
- Frankena: They are human because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and **hence are capable of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other animals are not**
- Note this is Frankena's way of justifying an anthropocentric morality – it's because we are humans + humans are special and uniquely deserving of rights!

## 对弗兰克纳 ‘美好生活’ 反驳论 点的回应



- 弗兰肯纳：以功绩为基础构建社会正义，将导致不平等的结果。因此，人类应被平等地对待，并非因为他们本身在任何方面都相等，而是因为**他们是人**。
- 弗兰克纳：人类之所以为人，在于他们拥有情感与欲望，并具备思考能力，**因而能在其他动物所不具备的意义上享受一种美好生活**
- 请注意，这是弗兰肯纳为人类中心主义道德观所作的辩护方式——正因为我们是人类，+ 人类才具有特殊性，并且 uniquely 享有权利！



Singer - *Every* being is capable of having a good life!

- Singer: Frankena's wrong! **Every** being is capable of having a good life
- We cannot simply say that all and only humans have some intrinsic dignity. We are different from one another, and some humans – say humans with severe cognitive impairments (he uses the expression “permanently retarded” – not meant as an insult as it was technically accurate at the time) – are below the intelligence, sentience, etc. of many non human animals.
- Singer: intellectually disabled humans do have the same rights
- We cannot simply fall into the speciesism trap – we simply prefer animals of our species. Most of us are speciesists.

辛格——每个生命都有能力过上美好的生活！

- 辛格：弗兰肯纳错了！ 每一个生命体都有可能拥有美好的生活。
- 我们不能简单地断言，唯有且全部人类才拥有某种内在尊严。人与人之间各不相同，而某些人类——例如患有严重认知障碍的人类（他使用了“永久性智力迟滞”这一表述——此说法在当时属技术性准确，并非意在侮辱）——其智力、感知能力等，甚至低于许多非人类动物。
- 辛格：智力障碍人士同样享有同等权利
- 我们不能简单地陷入物种歧视的陷阱——即仅仅因为我们自身属于该物种，就更偏爱本物种的动物。我们中的大多数人都是物种主义者。

## Discussion

### Singer, convention

- 1. Is Singer right? Are we speciesists in the empirical sense - Do we rank ourselves as more deserving than animals?
- 2. Are we speciesists in the moral sense that we are making a moral *mistake* (akin to racism)? Is it wrong to have that hierarchy and should we strive to change?
- 3. What are the most problematic moral conventions in computing today? Among your co-workers/students... How hard is it to resist those conventions?
- 4. From your reading: “**duty of loyalty... requires that an employee refrain from acting in a manner contrary to the employer’s interest.**” Do you agree now that what should be done can’t just depend on what is usually done (the convention) in our industry/country/company? Why/why not?
- Conclusion – aren’t we all speciesists, even the ones who said things could change? (rat vs person) We go on and do this without asking ourselves why, and perhaps in part because the idea is so dominant

31

## 讨论 Singer

### (辛格) 与道德惯例

- 1. 辛格的观点是否正确？我们在经验意义上是否属于物种主义者——即我们是否将自身视为比动物更应享有道德地位的物种？
- 2. 我们在道德意义上是否属于物种主义者，即我们所持的立场是否构成一种道德 错误（类似于种族主义）？维持这种等级秩序是否本身即为不道德？我们是否应当努力改变它？
- 3. 当前计算机领域中最成问题的道德惯例有哪些？在您的同事或学生中……抵制这些惯例的难度有多大？
- 4. 根据您所阅读的内容：“**忠诚义务……要求雇员不得从事有悖于雇主利益的行为。**”您现在是否认同：我们应采取的行动，不能仅仅取决于本行业/本国/本公司通常的做法（即惯例）？请说明理由。
- 结论——难道我们所有人不都是物种主义者吗？即便那些声称现状可以改变的人也不例外。（例如：老鼠 vs. 人类）我们继续如此行事，却从未就此反躬自问。之所以如此，或许部分原因在于这一观念已根深蒂固<sup>31</sup>