Northwestern Kellogg

Sanket Patil

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Evanston, IL 60208 Citizenship: India

Fields Research: Behavioral Theory, Organizational Economics

Teaching: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Competitive Strategy

Education Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Ph.D. in Managerial Economics and Strategy Anticipated (2022)

Committee: Yuval Salant (Chair), Niko Matouschek, Alvaro Sandroni

Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

M.S. in Quantitative Economics 2013-15

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kharagpur

B.Tech. (Hons) + M.Tech. in Metallurgical and Materials Engineering 2007-12

Working Papers "Strategic Justifications", Job Market Paper

Abstract: A self-interested expert obtains evidence and takes actions on behalf of many clients. Afterward, the expert justifies these actions to an auditor with limited expertise. The auditor verifies that the expert's justification is consistent with the evidence and that the actions were in the clients' best interest. We explore how this ex-post scrutiny disciplines the expert. The constraint of justifying actions to an auditor, even an auditor with little expertise, can force the expert to act in the best interest of all clients under certain conditions. When these conditions do not hold, the expert devises a justification that makes the expert's selfish actions appear client-optimal. In this justification, the expert inflates the strength of weak evidence and deflates the strength of strong evidence. Surprisingly, an increase in the auditor's expertise can harm clients on average.

"Choosing Sample Sizes" with Yuval Salant, R&R in Theoretical Economics

Abstract: How much data about an unknown parameter would a designer provide to a decision maker (DM) in order to convince the DM that the parameter value is sufficiently high? We study this question for DMs who are unbiased or Bayesian statisticians and for data which are Bernoulli experiments governed by the parameter value. We establish that in many environments the designer's optimal sample size is the largest one satisfying that one or more — or a simple majority of — favorable data realizations would convince the DM that the parameter value is sufficiently high.

Work in Progress "Communicating to Strategic Listeners"

"Auctions with Sampling"

Conference Econometric Society World Congress 2020
Presentations Western Economic Association International (WEAI) Conference 2021

Graduate Fellowship, Kellogg School of Managen M.S. QE Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute	nent	2015-22 2013-15
All India Rank 2745 in IIT Entrance Examination (to	op 2% of examinees)	2007
	•	2004
Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Manageme	nt	
Competitive Strategy & Industrial Structur	e (MBA, Undergraduate)	2017-22
Business Analytics II (MBA, MSMS)		2017-19
Game Theory (Executive MBA)		2018
Microeconomic Analysis (MBA)		2017
Static Optimization in Economics (PhD)		2016-18
Research Assistant, Yuval Salant		2017-19
Research Assistant, Michael Powell		2018
Research Assistant, Alvaro Sandroni and Willemier	n Kets	2017
Associate Engineer, Airbus Engineering Centre Inc	dia	2012-13
English (fluent), Hindi (fluent), Marathi (fluent)		
Professor Yuval Salant	Professor Niko Matouschek	
MEDS, Kellogg SOM	Strategy, Kellogg SOM	
Northwestern University	Northwestern University	
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	M.S. QE Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute All India Rank 2745 in IIT Entrance Examination (to Ranked 13th in the S.S.C Examination (top 1% of a Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Manageme Competitive Strategy & Industrial Structur Business Analytics II (MBA, MSMS) Game Theory (Executive MBA) Microeconomic Analysis (MBA) Static Optimization in Economics (PhD) Research Assistant, Yuval Salant Research Assistant, Michael Powell Research Assistant, Alvaro Sandroni and Willemier Associate Engineer, Airbus Engineering Centre Inc English (fluent), Hindi (fluent), Marathi (fluent) Professor Yuval Salant MEDS, Kellogg SOM Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive	All India Rank 2745 in IIT Entrance Examination (top 2% of examinees) Ranked 13th in the S.S.C Examination (top 1% of examinees), Mumbai Board Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management

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