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**CURRENT POSITION** Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)  
Postdoctoral fellow at Blueprint Labs, July 2021 – June 2022

**DOCTORAL STUDIES** Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)  
PhD, Economics, Completed June 2021  
DISSERTATION: “Essays on the Economics of Education”

## DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Joshua Angrist  
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<b>PRIOR EDUCATION</b>	Bocconi University	2015
	Msc. in Economics and Social Sciences, <i>110/110 with honors</i>	
	Sciences Po Paris	2013
	Bachelor in Social Sciences, <i>with honors</i>	
	Universite Paris IV Sorbonne	2013
	Bachelor in Philosophy, <i>with honors</i>	

**CITIZENSHIP** French

**GENDER:** Female

**LANGUAGES** French, Italian, English

<b>FIELDS</b>	Primary Fields: Labor Economics	
	Secondary Fields: Education Economics, Applied Econometrics, Market Design	
<b>TEACHING EXPERIENCE</b>	Econometric Data Science (14.32/14.320)	2020
	Teaching Assistant to Prof. Josh Angrist	
	Graduate Labor Economics I (14.661)	2018-19
	Teaching Assistant to Profs. Josh Angrist and Daron Acemoglu	
<b>RELEVANT POSITIONS</b>	MIT, Research Assistant to Profs. Parag Pathak and Josh Angrist (Blueprint Labs)	2018-19
	MIT, Research Assistant to Prof. Esther Duflo	2017 (summer)
	Bocconi, Research Assistant to Prof. Chiara Fumagalli	2016
	Bocconi, Research Assistant to Prof. Guido Tabellini	2015-16
<b>FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS</b>	William T. Grant Foundation Research Grant “ <i>Understanding the Impact of Integration Policies in New York City Public Schools</i> ”	2020-23
	Spencer Foundation Research Grant “ <i>Understanding the Impact of Integration Policies in New York City Public Schools</i> ”	2020-22
	MITili Research Grant “ <i>Understanding the Impact of Integration Policies in New York City Public Schools</i> ”	2019-20
	“Bonaldo Stringher” Scholarship from the Bank of Italy	2016-18
<b>PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES</b>	Referee for <i>American Economic Review: Insights</i>	
<b>RESEARCH PAPERS</b>	<p><b>“Integrating New York City Schools: The Role of Admission Criteria and Family Preferences” (Job Market Paper)</b></p> <p>Almost 70 years after <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>, most urban school districts remain segregated by race and income. School admission criteria could perpetuate segregation by limiting access. This paper uses recent screened-school admission reforms and a structural model to gauge the contribution of school admission criteria to segregation in New York City middle schools. Two admission reforms that reduced academic screening decreased economic and racial segregation, while prompting some White and high-income students to leave the traditional public school sector. These admission reforms also appear to have changed application behavior in a manner reinforcing their desegregating effects. I use a model of school demand that allows for strategic application behavior to predict the consequences of hypothetical city-wide admission reforms. The resulting estimates suggest that removing academic screening only modestly reduces school segregation. In contrast, dropping admission criteria based on geographic proximity reduces segregation markedly. On balance, only about half of NYC middle school segregation is due to school admission criteria, with the rest due to family preferences and residential sorting.</p>	

**“Who Benefits from Selective School Attendance?”**

The question of who benefits from selective school enrollment remains controversial. I show that Boston exam schools have heterogeneous effects on achievement. Impact differences are driven primarily by the quality of an applicant's non-exam-school alternative rather than by student demographic characteristics like race. Admission policies prioritizing students with the weakest schooling alternatives have the potential to increase the impact of exam schools on academic achievement. In particular, simulations of alternative admissions criteria suggest schemes that reserve seats for students with lower-quality middle schools are likely to yield the largest gains.

**“Is Busing Worth the Trip? School Travel Effects in Boston and New York”**

(joint with Joshua Angrist, Guthrie Gray-Lobe and Parag Pathak)

School assignment in Boston and New York City came to national attention in the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of court-mandated desegregation. Today, district-wide choice allows Boston and New York students to enroll far from home, perhaps enhancing integration. Urban school transportation is costly, however, and the integration and education consequences of this expenditure unclear. Motivated by high transportation costs, we estimate the causal effects of school distance and travel time on integration and human capital using an identification strategy that exploits the Boston and New York City school matches. Simulations of alternative assignment schemes suggest that a return to neighborhood schools is likely to increase same-race exposure in Boston by only a few percentage points. Instrumental variables estimates show larger integration effects for those who currently choose to travel, but longer travel times have little or no effect on test scores and college attendance. On balance, therefore, our results show little downside to school assignment policies that favor neighborhood enrollment.

**RESEARCH IN  
PROGRESS**

**“The Effect of Exposure to Diverse Peers on School Preferences”** (joint with Viola Corradini and Guthrie Gray-Lobe)

Families' choice of school is first order in shaping school segregation, but most policies focus on changing school admission rules on the assumption that preferences are hard to change. In this project, we aim to better understand how preferences over school diversity are shaped by past experience. Specifically, we evaluate whether intergroup contact in earlier grades influences a student and her family's preference to enroll in a more diverse school in the future. This informs us about the scope for school districts to support positive social interactions between groups through assignment policy in earlier grades. Our preliminary results suggest that interaction with White classmates changes minority students' school preferences while the opposite is not true for White students.

**“Student assignment with need-based scholarships under budget constraints”**

I am collaborating with an international network of schools to develop a student assignment mechanism corresponding to their needs. This network of schools

wants to guarantee the diversity of their student body and to assign scholarships based on need under some budget constraints. These two conditions create a setting where common mechanisms do not produce a stable match. To tackle these issues, I am working on a matching algorithm with slot-specific priorities that generates a weakly-fair match while breaking each school budget constraint by at most one full scholarship. We are currently planning to pilot the new algorithm to assess its benefits with respect to the current decentralized process.

**OTHER  
ACTIVITIES**

Co-president of the Graduate Economic Association (GEA)

2018-19