ERLING SKANCKE

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EDUCATION

PhD in Economics, Stanford University — June 2022 (expected)
Thesis: Essays on Matching with Interviews, Advisors: Alvin E. Roth (primary), B. Douglas Bernheim

Master in Economic Theory and Econometrics, University of Oslo — 2012-2016
Visiting student at the University of Mannheim, 2014 — 2014

PUBLICATIONS

Explaining a Potential Interview Match for Graduate Medical Education with I. Wapnir, I. Ashlagi, A.E. Roth, A. Vohra, and M.L. Melcher, *Forthcoming in* Journal of Graduate Medical Education

Competitiveness and regulation of Norwegian banks, 2013, Ulltveit-Moe, K.H., Vale, B., Grindaker, M.H. and Skancke, E., *Norges Bank Staff Memo (No. 18/2013).*

RESEARCH

Welfare and Strategic Externalities in Matching Markets with Interviews - Job Market Paper (link)

- I study the welfare effects and strategic externalities of firms' interview decisions in a game-theoretic model, and show that both firms and workers may be worse off by increased interview activity, leading to inefficient equilibria.
- Construct an algorithm for finding the welfare-maximizing symmetric equilibrium. Prove that the algorithm converges.
- Numerically solve the model in Python to illustrate how the equilibrium inefficiency is exacerbated as the market thickens.

A Decade of Signaling at the AEA, What have we learned? with M. Niederle and A. E. Roth

- We study the use of the preference signalling mechanism provided by the American Economic Association. The use of the signals has grown steadily over the past decade, with a growing fraction of signals sent to non-academic jobs. Students who signal to institutions ranked higher than their PhD granting institutions are less likely to be hired by the institution to which they signaled.
- We also designed surveys whose responses were collected by the AEA: Among responding institutions, more than 20% indicate they interviewed a candidate who signaled them, and whom they otherwise wouldn't have interviewed.

On Ordinal Interview Assignment Mechanisms

- Prove that no stable interview assignment mechanism is strategy-proof for either side, unless all agents' interview capacities are 1.
- Simulations show that the incentives to misreport preferences vanish in unbalanced markets.
- Stable interview assignment mechanisms may fail to achieve a high match rate in balanced markets, but the number of unemployed firms and workers becomes small with even minor levels of market imbalance, a result which is connected to interview overlap.

Experience and the Skin-in-the-Game Effect with D. Zuckerman

- We design an experiment in which subjects experience realizations of a random variable, before they have to make a wager based on this variable. How does subjects' risk-taking behavior depend on whether or not their initial experience involved skin-in-the-game? Unlike related field studies, our design allows us to control subjects' information and income effects, and elicit subjects' beliefs.

Green Grass or Sour Grapes? An Experiment on Chosen Preferences with B. D. Bernheim and G. Charness

Welfare Economics with Endogenous Preferences with B. D. Bernheim and L. Nagel

EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Prof. Alvin Roth at Stanford University, 2017-21:

Research Assistant for Prof. Paul Milgrom at Stanford University, 2016-17:

Junior Researcher at the Norwegian Central Bank, 2014-2015:

Research Assistant at the Norwegian Central Bank, 2011-2013:

Research Assistant at Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, 2011-2012:

Teaching Assistant at Stanford University, the University of Mannheim and the University of Oslo:

- Taught TA sections and office hours for the PhD level course *Microeconomics I* at Stanford University (2017), for an undergraduate course on *Calculus for CS majors* at the University of Mannheim (2014), and undergraduate and master's level courses on *Statistics 1, Statistics 2, Introductory Econometrics, Macroeconomics 2, Economics for Math majors* at the University of Oslo (2011-2014).

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

ML methods: OLS, Logistic regression, Lasso, Ridge, Elastic Net, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, PCA, K-means
Languages: Python, MATLAB, STATA

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Leonard W. Ely and Shirley R. Ely Graduate Student Fellowship — Stanford University, 2021
Graduate Research Opportunities Research Grant (joint with D. Zuckerman) — Stanford University, 2018
Norges Bank PhD Scholarship — Norwegian Central Bank, 2016
Faculty of Social Sciences Master's Thesis Award — University of Oslo, 2014
ESOP Master's Thesis Scholarship — University of Oslo, 2014
E.ON Ruhrgas Personal Mobility Grant — Norwegian Research Council, 2013