# Olga Kiseleva

(Updated: November 2021)

Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Madison 1180 Observatory Drive, Rm 7226 Madison, WI 53706 Phone: +1 (608) 515-0170 Email: kiseleva@wisc.edu

Website: kiselevaolga.wordpress.com

Citizenship: Russia Permanent Resident: US

#### **EXPERTISE**

Empirical Industrial Organization, Causal Inference, Economics of Digitization, Applied Microeconomics

## **EDUCATION**

University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, WI Expected 2022

Candidate for PhD in Economics Master of Science in Economics

2018

Major: Industrial Organization, Minor: Econometrics

New Economic School, Moscow, Russia

2016

Master of Arts with Honors in Economics

Major: Industrial Organization

Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

2014

Bachelor of Science with Honors in Economics

#### **REFERENCES**

Professor Lorenzo Magnolfi Professor Alan Sorensen

Professor Jean-François Houde

Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Madison 1180 Observatory Drive Madison, WI 53706-1393 (608)262-8789 magnolfi@wisc.edu

Department of Economics University of Wisconsin-Madison 1180 Observatory Drive Madison, WI 53706-1393 (608)263-3867 sorensen@ssc.wisc.edu Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin-Madison
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706-1393
(608)262-7927
houde@wisc.edu

## **JOB MARKET PAPER**

## Why do High-Quality Sellers Buy More Fake Reviews? The Role of Reputation on Online Platforms

Abstract: Review manipulation is a critical issue in online marketplaces. This paper aims to study sellers' incentives to participate in this fraudulent activity. I develop a theoretical model where consumers use product ratings to make demand choices and sellers manipulate these ratings. In the model, sellers can buy positive fake reviews to boost their product ratings and negative ones -- to worsen the ratings of their rivals. Thus, sellers have a trade-off between gains from increased demand and potential reputation damage. Depending on reputation costs, the model generates different predictions about which sellers engage in review fraud to a greater extent. I test these predictions using data on the reviews of bestselling Amazon products in 15 product categories, scraped for 25 consecutive weeks. A novel measure of product quality is an adjusted product rating calculated by a review analyzer ReviewMeta.com, which excludes untrustworthy reviews from its calculations. Surprisingly, I find sellers of higher quality products buy more positive fake reviews and receive fewer negative fake reviews from rivals. These differences are higher for the product categories in which consumer experience is less predictable. Using the

theoretical framework, I discuss their implications for pricing and consumer welfare.

Full Academic Scholarship, Higher School of Economics

## **WORK IN PROGRESS**

## "Impact of Product Placement in Movies on Demand for Cars"

## **FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS**

2021	Campus-wide Teaching Assistant Award, Nomination: Continuity of Instruction, University of Wisconsin-Madison
2021	Juli Plant Grainger Teaching Excellence Scholarship, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
2018	Juli Plant Grainger Summer Research Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
2014-2016	Merit-based Scholarship, New Economic, School

## **CONFERENCES**

2010-2014

NBER Digitization Tutorial, NBER Economics of Digitization, Stanford Graduate School of Business

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

## **University of Wisconsin - Madison**

Research Mentor 2021

Masters Student Summer IO Group

Head Teaching Assistant

Principles of Macroeconomics: 2019, 2020, 2021
Principles of Microeconomics: 2017, 2018

Teaching Assistant

Money and Banking: 2019, 2020 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory: 2018, 2019 Principles of Microeconomics: 2016, 2017

**New Economic School** 

Research Assistant, Prof. Hosny Zoabi 2015-2016

## **TECHNICAL SKILLS**

Python, STATA, LaTeX, MATLAB, Tableau

## **LANGUAGES**

English (Fluent), Russian (Native), German (Basic)