www.niwangecon.com niwang@sas.upenn.edu

Personal Information

Gender: Female

Citizenship: China

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Placement Director: Iourii Manovskii

Placement Director: Holger Sieg

HOLGERS@ECON.UPENN.EDU

215-898-6880

HOLGERS@ECON.UPENN.EDU

215-898-7194

Graduate Student Coordinator: Gina Conway

GNC@SAS.UPENN.EDU

215-898-6880

215-898-6880

Contact Information

Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Suite 535 Philadelphia, PA 19104

Phone: 267-608-0335

Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics, Fudan University, 2015

Graduate Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2015 to present

Thesis Title: "Essays on Inequality and Frictions in the Labor Market"

Expected Completion Date: May 2022

<u>Thesis Committee and References</u>:

José-Víctor Ríos-Rull (Advisor) Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Suite 516 Philadelphia, PA 19104 vr0j@econ.upenn.edu 215-898-7701

Benjamin R. Lester Research Department Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 10 Independence Mall Philadelphia, PA 19106 benjamin.lester@phil.frb.org 215-574-6272

Research Fields:

Macroeconomics, Labor Economics

Harold L. Cole
Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
133 South 36th Street, Suite 517
Philadelphia, PA 19104
colehl@sas.upenn.edu
215-898-7788

Teaching Experience:

| Recitation Instructor or Teaching Assistant, University of Pennsylvania | |
|---|---|
| Fall 2016 – Spring 2017 | Econometrics, Professor Xu Cheng |
| Fall 2017 – Spring 2018 | Econometrics, Professor Francis Diebold |
| Fall 2018 | Money and Banking, Professor Harold Cole |
| Fall 2020 | Statistics for Economists, Professor Karun Adusumilli |
| Spring 2021 | Econometrics, Professor John Lazarev |

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

| 2016 - 2017 | Xingmei Zhang & Yongge Dai Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania |
|-------------|---|
| 2015 - 2018 | Huameng Scholarship, Fudan University Alumni Association |

Research Papers:

"Job Attachment and Life Cycle Gender Wage Differences" (Job Market Paper)

Employment interruptions are more common among women than men, with substantial individual-level heterogeneity. Employers value job attachment but job attachment is not directly observed. I show that the information problem of female job attachment is detrimental to female labor market outcomes. I propose a model where there is information asymmetry about female job attachment but not about male job attachment in a frictional labor market. To screen female job attachment, employers offer separating wage contracts that distort the wage profiles of high-attachment women. The distortions suppress female job-to-job mobility, resulting in worse labor market outcomes than comparable men. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I document supporting evidence on the gender differences in mobility patterns and wage growth. I then calibrate the model and quantify the contributing factors to the gender wage gap. The calibrated model captures the gender differences in the data. The gender difference in job-to-job mobility explains a majority of the life cycle gender wage gap.

"Employee or Contractor: Work Arrangements under Hidden Actions and Unobserved Ability"

This paper studies the endogenous formation of employment arrangements. Firms create production opportunities that need workers, whose effort and ability are not observed. Firms use incentive pay to induce effort from risk-averse workers and screen workers' ability levels. Incentive contracts insure workers against output risks but subject workers to noisy monitoring. Firms spin off jobs to contractors when monitoring is too noisy or when effort is crucial. I

characterize all equilibrium outcomes of employment arrangements for workers of different abilities. Only high-ability workers may work as contractors out of all outcomes.

Languages:

English (Fluent), Chinese (Mandarin and Gan, Native)

Computing Skills:

Proficient in R, Julia, MATLAB, and Git