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HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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Assistant Director: Brenda Piquet

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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A. in Economics, Cornell University, 2016

magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa

Dissertation: “The Pass-through of Minimum Wages”

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2016 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Thesis Title: “Essays in Industrial Organization and Labor Economics”

Expected Completion Date: May 2022

References: (all Harvard University)

Professor Edward Glaeser

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Professor Raj Chetty

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Professor Ariel Pakes

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Professor Elie Tamer

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Professor Eric Maskin

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Teaching and Research Fields:

Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Labor Economics, Urban Economics, Real Estate

Teaching Experience: (all Harvard University)

Fall 2018, 2019, 2020 *Quantitative Methods in Economics*

Undergraduate

Teaching Fellow for Professor Elie Tamer

Fall 2018 *Industrial Organization*

Second-year Ph.D.

Teaching Fellow for Professors Ariel Pakes and Robin Lee

Spring 2021 *Intermediate Macroeconomics*

Undergraduate

Teaching Fellow for Professor Chris Foote

Spring 2019 *Economics of Cities*

Undergraduate
Course Assistant for Professor Edward Glaeser

Research Experience:

2017	Research Assistant for Professor Myrto Kalouptsi Harvard University
2017	Research Assistant for Professor Panle Jia Barwick Cornell University
2015-2016	Research Assistant for Professor Ronald G. Ehrenberg Cornell University
2015	Research Assistant for Professor Christian Dippel University of California, Los Angeles

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2019-present	The Lab for Economic Applications and Policy Grant (x2)
2020-2021	Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard Bok Center
2019-2021	Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Fellowship
2019	Harvard Professional Development Fund
2018	Harvard Summer Travel and Research Grant
2016	Merrill Presidential Scholar
2016	Tapan Mitra Economics Prize

Professional Activities:

Referee	Journal of Urban Economics
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Summer School and Invited Workshop Participant

2019	Seventeenth Annual IO Day, NYU Stern
2019	Quantitative Marketing and Structural Econometrics Workshop
2019	Price Theory Summer Camp at Becker Friedman Institute
2018	NBER Economics of Artificial Intelligence Conference
2018	Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory

Community Engagement

2021	International Community Conversations Leader Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
2019-2021	Mental Health Counselor Harvard Economics Department Peer Support Network
2019-2020	Peer Host for International Students Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
2017-2018	Peer Mentor Harvard Economics Graduate Student Peer Mentorship Program

Research Papers:

The Political Roots of China's Housing Vacancies

Job Market Paper

China has a vast number of unsold and unoccupied homes. Can incentives faced by local politicians explain this puzzle? In China, local governments are monopolists in selling land use-rights, which is a key input for the housing market. City managers, the leader of local governments, are promoted based on the performance of the local economy. They also use land revenues to fund local government expenditures. I develop and estimate a dynamic, infinite-horizon model of land supply. In this model, forward-looking city managers choose how much land to make available for the private sector, in order to both boost local economic growth and generate local government revenues. Due to political concerns such as achieving GDP growth rate targets, city managers tend to allocate more land to the private sector than the revenue-maximizing level. By estimating the structural model of equilibrium land supply with manager-city-year level data, I infer city managers' weights on career advancement relative to land revenues. Using the parameter estimates from the model, I then estimate the impact of political incentives on land allocation. Overall, city managers sell 7.4% more land between 2003 and 2012 relative to the counterfactual in which city managers have no GDP growth incentives. This land oversupply is 12.5% in smaller cities and 3.7% in larger cities. Finally, converting land to housing construction, the estimated impacts explain 23.2% to 27.7% of unsold homes.

Do Judge-Lawyer Relationships Influence Case Outcomes?

with David H. Zhang

We examine whether law school alumni relationships between the lawyers and judges affect case outcomes. We show that in the context of medical malpractice lawsuits in Florida, the plaintiff lawyer sharing the same law school as the judge increases the chances of recovery by 2%. Furthermore, the effect is confined to younger lawyers who see a 4% increase in the likelihood of recovery from having been to the same law school as the judge, and is absent in older lawyers. We interpret our results as evidence that lawyers gain school-specific human capital from their law schools which helps in their interactions with judges that graduated from the same school, and that this school-specific human capital become less important further on in the lawyers' careers.

Research in Progress:

Millionaire or Tiger Parents

with Chao Fu and Yang You

Children in China enroll in elite schools if their parents are homeowners in the school district, or they achieve academic excellence. In 2014, the China Education Ministry permanently terminated primary school admissions by talent screening to enforce a pure neighborhood schooling system. Exploiting the fact that renters are not eligible for neighborhood schooling, we first document elite school housing premiums and price changes due to the admission regime shift. Then, we propose a simple general equilibrium model of the pre-reform hybrid admission system to connect housing premiums to household characteristics. On the empirical side, we conducted a retrospective survey and assembled unique data on the joint decisions of housing, schooling, and education spending. Finally, we estimate a structural model of households' residential and school preferences. Based on immediate reduced-form housing price responses, we simulate the counterfactual school matching outcomes and infer the reduction in transportation cost and mitigation of admission arms race.

Miscellaneous:

Data: Python, Matlab, Stata, Microsoft Suite

Languages: English (fluent), Mandarin Chinese (native)

Citizenship: China

Gender: Female

Last Updated: November 12, 2021