

Shuya He
Department of Economics
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Education

Ph.D in Economics, The University of Arizona	2017 - 2022 (expected)
Dissertation Advisor: Charles Noussair	
MSc. in Economics , Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	2015 - 2017
BSc. in Public Administration, Minor in Economics, Shanghai Jiaotong University	2011 - 2015

Fields of Interests

Primary Fields: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics
Secondary Fields: Labor Economics

Research In Progress

Don't tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance (with Charles Noussair, R&R at *Experimental Economics*, Job Market Paper)

It has been asserted that males incur a psychological cost when they are outperformed by a female competitor. We conduct a laboratory experiment that allows us to measure this cost, for performance in a mathematical task. The experiment is conducted in both the US and China. We find that in our Chinese sample, males are willing to pay more to hide the fact that they have performed worse than another individual than women are, while there is no gender difference in the US. In China, females are willing to pay more to hide poor performance when losing to another female than to a male. In the US, the opposite pattern is observed; women have a greater cost of revealing that they have lost to a man than to another woman. The gender of the counterpart is not a determinant of males' willingness to hide poor performance. An incentivized questionnaire reveals that a stereotype that males would outperform females exists in the Chinese sample, but not among our American participants.

The Effect of Unrealized Wages in a Gift Exchange Experiment

Whether employees work harder in response to compensation which might have been, but is not actually, realized. For example, do workers work harder, even in bad times, to repay a firm that pays generous bonuses in good times? To study this question, I extend the classical experimental gift-exchange game framework to study the effect of unrealized but intended kindness on employees' effort. I investigate a gift-exchange game where firms (employers) make wage offers contingent on two randomly realized states, good or bad, and workers choose an effort level after knowing which state is realized. I manipulate the visibility of wages under the unrealized state. By applying the model in Sebald (2010), unrealized wages are predicted to make a difference because they affect the worker's perception of the employer's kindness, and thus workers have a tendency to reciprocate high unrealized wages in addition to high realized wages. My main finding is that being aware of the unrealized wage affects workers' effort choice and employers' profits if current states are good. The positive marginal effect of current wages is greater if wages in the unrealized bad state are higher. However, unrealized wages do not have an effect if current states are bad.

Understanding the role of social norms in couples' labor division decisions

How social norms predict couples' decisions to exit the labor force? When there is an exogenous shock, such as an economic crisis or the birth of a child, who will be the main breadwinner and who will stay at home? In this paper, we investigate the relationship between social norms regarding gender roles and couples' behaviors in deciding who stays in the labor force and who quits. We also study whether peer

pressure intensifies the effect. We conduct two separate experiments. One experiment is used to elicit the social norm about gender roles using a Krupka and Weber (2013) procedure. We recruit real-life college couples as subjects in the second experiment to perform a stylized task that is based on the labor force quitting decision. The task involves both parties initially performing a real effort task for payment, and at a point in the session, one member of the couple is required to quit the task. Data have already been gathered in China. The data reveal that choosing husbands to work and wives to quit the labor force is considered as the most socially appropriate choice. Accordingly, real-life college couples are more likely to choose the boyfriend to continue the real-effort task for money and the girlfriend to quit the task. Whether their choices are revealed to their peers or not does not play a role in couples' decisions. I also plan to run sessions in the US. From the comparison between the Chinese and US data, we can infer how the social environment makes a difference in couples' decisions

Presentations

2021: IAREP-SABE Virtual Conference, the 2021 China Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2021 ESA Global Online Around-the-Clock Meetings, International Conference RExCon21 on 'Social Preferences and Social Norms', TIBER symposium 2021, Young Economists Meeting, ESA Continuing Education Course, 2021 ESA North American Regional Meeting, ESA Job Market Seminar Series 2021

2020: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China Center of Behavioral Economics and Finance

2019: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Department of Economics

Grants, Honors and Awards

Graduate and Professional Student Council REAP Grant (\$2,000)	2021
The only recipient of "Ed Zajac Prize" (The Best Third-Year Paper Prize)	2020
Honorable Mention to "Steve Manos Prize" (The Best Second-Year Paper Prize)	2019
Scholarship for Research Preparation Concentration	2017
Student Merit Scholarship	2016

Teaching Experiences

Sole Instructor of Record: (Econ 406) Introduction to Experimental Economics, (Econ 361) Intermediate Microeconomics, (Econ 200) Basic Economic Issues (Online)

Teaching Assistant: (Econ 481) Economics of Wage Determination, (Econ 407) Economics of Strategy, (Econ 418) Introduction to Econometrics, (Econ 361) Intermediate Microeconomics, (Econ 330) Macroeconomic and Global Institutions and Policy, (Econ 340) International Economics and Policy, (Econ 200) Basic Economic Issues, (Econ 150) An Economic Perspective

Research Assistantships

Dr. Ronald Oaxaca and Eva Sierminska	Jun 2019 - Dec 2020
Dr. Xiaojian Zhao and Roberta Dessi	Dec 2016 - Jun 2017
Dr. Yuk-Fai Fong	Dec 2016 - Jun 2017

Technical Skills

Programming Languages: Python, R, Stata, ztree, otree

Others: L^AT_EX, Natural Language Processing

Languages

English (fluent), Chinese (native)

References

Charles Noussair (Chair)

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