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Curriculum Vitae
Fall 2021

PETER PUSZTAI

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Citizenship: Hungary, (J-1 visa)

Major Fields of Concentration

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Network Economics

Education

Degree	*Field*	*Institution*	*Year*
PhD	Economics	University of Minnesota (expected)	2022
MSc	Economics	Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna	2016
MSc	Quantitative Economic Analysis	Corvinus University of Budapest	2015
BA	Applied Economics	Corvinus University of Budapest	2011

Dissertation

Title: "Essays in Bargaining in Networks"
Dissertation Advisor: Professor Jan Werner
Expected Completion: Summer 2022

References

Professor Jan Werner	(612) 625-0708 jwerner@umn.edu	Department of Economics University of Minnesota 4-101 Hanson Hall
Professor David Rahman	(612) 625-3525 dmr@umn.edu	1925 Fourth Street South Minneapolis, MN 55455
Professor Also Rustichini	(612) 625-4186 rusti001@umn.edu	

Honors and Awards

2017 *Silverman Fellowship,* University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Minnesota

Teaching Experience

2018 - present *Instructor,* Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Minnesota**.** Taught *Principles of Macroeconomics* and Labor Economics.

2017 - 2018 *Teaching Assistant,* Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Minnesota**.** Led recitation sections for doctoral level sequence of *Microeconomic Theory*

2016 - *Teaching Assistant,* Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna*,* Austria*.* Led recitation sections for *Mathematics II,* and *Macroeconomics II*.

Papers

"Bargaining in Non--Stationary Networks**,"** job market paper

Computer Skills

Python, R, LaTex

Languages

English (fluent), Hungarian (native), German (advanced)

Abstracts

"Bargaining in Non--Stationary Networks**,"** job market paper

Dealers in over--the--counter markets bargain over the profit from executing an investor's order with other dealers to whom they are connected via the inter--dealer network. Investor's orders arrive randomly. I study a model of bargaining in continuous time in networks where profitable opportunities arise randomly to agents who contact a neighbor to split the surplus. If a pair of agents fail to reach an agreement, their link is eliminated from the network. This leads to non--stationarity of the network. I prove the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria using an inductive argument. Agents' bargaining power in an equilibrium depends on their continuation values in sub--networks reached when some of their links are eliminated. In particular, the relative bargaining power between a pair of connected agents depends on the difference in the change in their continuation values in the current network and the sub--network without their link. Under certain conditions, agreement in all bargaining meetings is an equilibrium. These cases are important because the network remains unchanged despite the threat of severance. I prove that agreement in all meetings is an equilibrium if and only if the cost of maintaining a connection is lower than a network specific threshold. Comparison of thresholds across different networks provides insight to their relative stability. I show that star networks are more stable than lines and polygons. Inter--dealer networks in OTC markets exhibit a core--periphery structure which include star networks.