

# KIRILL S. EVDOKIMOV

[www.kirillsevdokimov.com](http://www.kirillsevdokimov.com)  
[kirill.evdokimov@rice.edu](mailto:kirill.evdokimov@rice.edu)  
+1 (346) 218-0823

Rice University  
Kraft Hall 444  
Department of Economics  
Houston, TX

## RESEARCH FIELDS

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Microeconomic Theory, Political Economics, Corporate Governance

## EDUCATION

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Ph.D. in Economics, Rice University	(anticipated) 2022
Graduate Certificate in Teaching and Learning, Rice University	(anticipated) 2022
M.A. in Economics, New Economic School	2012
B.A. in International Economics, Moscow State Technical University (MADI)	2010

## PUBLICATIONS

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“[Dynamic Legislative Bargaining](#)” (with Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zápál) *Bargaining: Current Research and Future Direction*, Emin Karagözoğlu and Kyle Hyndman (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan (2022)

“[Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining](#)” *Economics Letters*, 188 (2020)

“[Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining](#)” (with Hülya Eraslan) *Annual Review of Economics*, 11 (2019)

## WORKING PAPERS

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“[The Coase Conjecture and Agreement Rules in Policy Bargaining](#)” (*Job market paper*)

An agenda-setter proposes a spatial policy to voters and can revise the initial proposal if it gets rejected. Voters can communicate with each other and have distinct but correlated preferences, which the agenda-setter is uncertain about. I investigate whether the ability to make a revised proposal is valuable to the agenda-setter. When a single acceptance is required to pass a policy, the equilibrium outcome is unique and has a screening structure. Because the preferences of voters are single-peaked, the Coase conjecture is violated and the ability to make a revised proposal is valuable. When two or more acceptances are required to pass a policy, there is an interval of the agenda-setter’s equilibrium expected payoffs. The endpoints have a screening structure, leading to the same conclusions as in the case of a single acceptance. Interestingly, an increase in the required quota  $q$  may allow the agenda-setter to extract more surplus from voters. An application to spending referenda suggests that the expected budget may increase in response to allowing the bureaucrat to make a revised proposal and/or an increase in the number of voters whose acceptance is required.

“[Equality in Legislative Bargaining](#)” (*Submitted*)

I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surpluses generated by coalitions equal the sums of productivities of coalition members. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players are recruited more often by other players despite having higher expected payoffs; however, the players who are recruited in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite having different productivity. I show that an increase in the required quota raises equality as measured by the Gini coefficient.

## RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

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“Multilateral Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: A Search Perspective”

“Single-Subject Rule in Policy Bargaining with Asymmetric Information”

“Information Aggregation with Monopoly Agenda Control”

“Passive Compliance in Reputational Bargaining” (with Hülya Eraslan and Mingzi Niu)

## AWARDS

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Lodieska Stockbridge Vaughn Fellowship	2020
John R. Kelly Graduate Student Teaching Award	2020
Timothy and Katharine Gunning Award for Best Third-Year Paper	2019
Robin Sickles Award for Best Performance in Econometrics Qualifying Exam	2017
Maria Esther and Carlos Linares Award for Best Performance in Economics First-Year Courses	2016

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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INSTRUCTOR: Math Camp for PhD in Economics (Graduate, 2019–2021)

TEACHING ASSISTANT: Microeconomics (Graduate, 2016–2021), Game Theory (Graduate, 2017–2021), Industrial Organization (Undergraduate, 2016), Principles of Economics (Undergraduate, 2015)

## PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

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### CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

2021: European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, University of Barcelona (scheduled); Southern Economic Association 91th Annual Conference, Houston (scheduled); Midwest Economic Theory Fall Conference, Michigan State University; 20th Annual SAET Conference

2020: Southern Economic Association 90th Annual Conference

2019: Midwest Economic Theory Fall Conference, Washington University in St. Louis; 14th Economics Graduate Student Conference, Washington University in St. Louis; 30th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University

REFeree SERVICE: American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, Econometrica, Economics Letters, European Political Science Review, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Public Choice, Review of Economic Design, Social Choice and Welfare, Quarterly Journal of Economics

RICE COMMUNITY SERVICE: Treasurer at Rice University Cycling and Triathlon Club (2019 – 2020), Sponsorship Chair at Rice University Cycling and Triathlon Club (2018), Department Representative at Graduate Student Association Council (2017)

## OTHER

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CITIZENSHIP: Russia (U.S. Employment Authorization Document)

LANGUAGES: Russian (native), English (fluent), French (beginner)

## REFERENCES

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Professor Hülya Eraslan  
(*Advisor*)  
Department of Economics  
Rice University  
(713) 348-3453  
[eraslan@rice.edu](mailto:eraslan@rice.edu)

Professor Mallesh M. Pai  
Department of Economics  
Rice University  
(713) 348-2289  
[mallesh.pai@rice.edu](mailto:mallesh.pai@rice.edu)

Professor Nina Bobkova  
Department of Economics  
Rice University  
[nina.bobkova@rice.edu](mailto:nina.bobkova@rice.edu)