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Education

PhD In Economics, New York University, 2016-2022 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays in Microeconomic Theory*.
BA in Economics and BS in Statistics, University of California Santa Barbara, 2012-2016

References

Professor Ariel Rubinstein
19 West Fourth St., 5th Floor
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Professor David Pearce
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
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Clinical Professor Anna Caterina Musatti
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Fields

Research: Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics
Other Teaching: Statistics/Econometrics, Math for Economists, Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience

Summer 2019, 2020, 2021	Statistics, NYU, Instructor
Spring 2019, 2020, 2021	MA Microeconomics, NYU, teaching fellow for Professor Anna Caterina Musatti
Fall 2019, 2020	Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, teaching fellow for Professors David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Fall 2021	Microeconomics with Calculus, NYU Stern Business School, teaching fellow for Professor Gian Luca Clementi
Spring 2018, Summer 2021	Industrial Organization, NYU, teaching fellow for Professors Maharukh Bhiladwalla and Viplav Saini

Fall 2018

Introduction to Microeconomics, NYU, teaching fellow for
Professor Andrew Paizis

Research Experience and Other Employment

Summer 2014-Spring 2016	Campus Learning Assistance Services at USCB, section leader for Microeconomics, Statistics, and Linear Algebra
Spring 2018	NYU, Research Assistant for Professor Andrew Schotter
Summer 2015	Institute of Pure and Applied Mathematics at UCLA, Research in Industrial Projects for Students

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2016	UCSB Economics Department: Departmental Achievement Award, Scholastic Achievement Award, and Distinction in the Major
2016	UCSB Emeriti Association Research Award in Social Sciences
2016	UCSB Statistics Department Rama Thogarati Award
2015	UCSB Economics Department K. Wardy Scholarship

Research Papers

Seemingly Rational Choice

I propose a model of choice (seemingly rational choice) over a sparse collection of menus, in which choices from a given menu are maximal according to a given preference relation, but only amongst the alternatives that have been chosen themselves in some menu. Choices are not restricted to outrank any alternatives that have never been sampled by the decision-maker. This model is observationally equivalent to rational choice. For an exogenously given strict welfare relation, I investigate the multiplicity and sub-optimality of seemingly rational choices in general finite choice spaces. I then consider competitive models of sampling in which two senders reveal alternatives to a receiver, which generates seemingly rational choices learned from this sampling procedure.

Misleading Facts

A sender wishes to persuade a receiver who holds point-prediction beliefs. The sender reveals a sequence of evidence that evokes a belief that is consistent with the evidence presented. The evocability of beliefs are characterized under particular functional forms of belief formation inspired by the heuristics literature: likelihood heuristics, and distinctiveness heuristics. When the sender is uncertain of the true state, speeches that maximize the probability of implementing their preferred state are characterized by a maximally-agreeable revelation of evidence. A dynamic version of the model, in which the receiver sequentially replies to the evidence, is included to capture the phenomenon of “phishing”.

Research In Progress

Sequential Choice Functions (with Mauricio Ribeiro)
Preference Manipulation in Pie-Splitting Problems