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DOCTORAL STUDIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
PhD, Economics, Expected completion June 2022
DISSERTATION: "Essays on Labor Market Institutions"

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE AND REFERENCES

Professor Daron Acemoglu
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Professor David Autor
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Professor Simon Jäger
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PRIOR EDUCATION Harvard University
A.B. in Applied Mathematics *Magna Cum Laude with Highest Honors*

2015

CITIZENSHIP United States

GENDER Male

FIELDS Primary Fields: Labor Economics

Secondary Fields: Public Economics, Macro/Labor

RELEVANT POSITIONS	Student Coordinator MIT Application Assistance Program	2020-2021
	U.S. Census Bureau: Special Sworn Status	2018-2021
	Research Assistant to David Autor and Daron Acemoglu	2017-2020
	Research Economist at Council of Economic Advisers	2015-2016
	Intern at Citadel Global Fixed Income	2014
	Intern at The Hamilton Project at Brookings	2013
FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS	George & Obie Schulz Fund Grant	2019
	Washington Center for Equitable Growth Doctoral Grant	2019
	NSF Graduate Research Fellowship	2016
	Thomas T. Hoopes Senior Thesis Prize	2015
FUTURE TEACHING	14.03 Undergraduate Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy	2022
	14.662 Graduate Labor Economics II	2022
CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS	U.S. Census Bureau	2021
	CESifo - EconPol Europe Workshop, Equitable Growth 2021	2020
	IAB Perspectives on (Un-) Employment, EEA Annual Meeting,	2019
	Society of Labor Economists Annual Meeting	
	IZA/CREST/OECD Conference on Labor Market Policy	2018
REFEREING	<i>American Economic Review Insights, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics</i>	
PUBLICATIONS	<p>“Wages and the Value of Nonemployment” (with Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer, and Josef Zweimüller) <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>, 2020</p> <p>Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than \$0.01 per \$1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than \$0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of \$0.24–\$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.</p>	

**RESEARCH
PAPERS****“Unionization, Employer Opposition, and Establishment Closure”
(with Sean Wang) -- Job Market Paper**

We study the effect of private-sector unionization on establishment employment and survival. Specifically, we analyze National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) union elections from 1981 to 2005 using administrative Census data on the universe of establishments in the U.S. Our research design combines difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity extrapolation methods to estimate treatment effects including elections that win by larger margins of support. We show that unionization decreases an establishment's employment and likelihood of survival. We hypothesize that two reasons for these effects are firms' ability to avoid dealing with new unions and managers' opposition to unions. We test this hypothesis for unionization in manufacturing, the largest sector where we find substantial negative effects. There, the negative effects are significantly larger for elections at multi-establishment firms, especially those with no other unionized establishments. We provide direct evidence suggesting that some of these differences are driven by multi-establishment firms shifting employment from newly unionized establishments to other establishments. Finally, we use the length of delays during the election process as a proxy for managers' opposition to the union and find substantially larger effects of successful elections with longer delays. Taken together, our results are consistent with firms' union avoidance tactics playing a role in explaining the overall negative effects of unionization.

**“Noncompete Clauses, Job Mobility, and Job Quality: Evidence from a
Low-Earner Noncompete Ban in Austria”**

I study the effect of noncompete agreements on low-earning workers using a noncompete ban in Austria. The ban increased treated workers' annual job-to-job transition rate by 0.3 percentage points (a two percent increase). This effect was driven by within-industry job transitions. The reform also disproportionately increased transitions to higher-quality firms and transitions accompanied by earnings gains. However, I do not find that the ban increased treated workers' overall earnings growth rates. This evidence shows that noncompetes in Austria restricted low-earning workers' job mobility, but their impact was not large enough to affect overall mobility or earnings trends.