txternality "Restaurant" game n. students i=1,2 x = price (quality) of a meal measure by. m = money  $Ui(x,m) = \sqrt{x} + m$ (assume) yi = student's budget o share the bill  $m_i = y_i - \frac{1}{n_{j=1}} x_j$   $(\sqrt{i}(x_1, x_2 - x_n) = \sqrt{x_i} + y_i - \frac{1}{n_{j=1}} x_j$ negative externality Nash Equilibrium => 3/1 = 0  $\frac{1}{2} \chi_i^{-\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{1}{n} = 0$  $\frac{1}{2\sqrt{x_i}} = \frac{1}{n}$ overspending  $W(x_1, x_2, x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sqrt{x_i}$ welfare (total swylus) socially optimal => 300 = 0  $2\sqrt{2}$  - 1 = 0  $\Rightarrow$  go by oneself

pay to of actural cost -> when n' pay less for each dich

do take into audunt that (n-1) pay for it > over consumption Congestion 2 model chouse î e Io, j continuneous individules going to work  $Si = \{0, 1\}$ t: So ziis di Traction of people on public transpotation (bus)  $U_i = \begin{cases} a(t) \\ b(t) \end{cases}$  $S(\bar{r}) = 0$  can 5(r) = 1 bus a(t) = t(assume)  $b(t) = 4 + \pm t$  $t^*$  (equilibrium number people taking the bus) curlous)

(alt) = b(t)  $t^* = \frac{1}{2}$   $\Rightarrow$  at this time putting more people

to the car, I time to nork. Nash Equilibrium choose car > regotive ext Social Optimum W(t)= (1-t) a(t) + tbt)  $= t - t^2 + \frac{1}{2}t + \frac{1}{2}t^2$ 

$$= \frac{5}{4}t - \frac{t^2}{2}$$

$$\frac{3wt}{3t} = \frac{5}{4} - t > 0 \quad \text{for } t \in [0,1]$$

$$t^0 = 1 \quad (\text{optimum})$$

Possible solutions to externality pos lower bound)

1. Quantity based solution (quota neg upper bound)

2. Price based solution (taxes)

3. Market for property right

E.x. Restaurant game  $\chi_i^* = \frac{n^2}{4} > \chi_i^o = \frac{1}{4}$ 

(1) Set upper bound of  $x_i$  to a quarter. (2)  $\sqrt{x_i} - \frac{1}{n} \stackrel{\triangle}{>} x_j$   $(2x_i)$  manglinal tax.

negative ext =  $\frac{n-1}{n} \times i$  = Set lxi > take into amount the ext

 $\forall x$ . Congertion  $t^* = \frac{1}{2} < t^6 = 1$ 

I don't allow anybody to use the car > may not achieve good ending (2 tax / subsidy (marginal)

Individual set marginal property > 0.

Ex. the property right: the right to pollute