

Review

Pareto optimal allocation

(competitive equilibrium)

Connection between Pareto optimal and CE.

New.

Brokerage buyer/sellers together.
(vage)

M buyers $v_1 \geq \dots \geq v_n$ (valuation)

N sellers $s_1 \leq \dots \leq s_n$ nobody know else.

broker is omniscient (know \uparrow) \leftarrow necessary. \neq ?

a cost of a transaction to broker = $k > 0$ (bring buyer/seller together)
 \uparrow revenue.

fixed fee paid per transaction = $\gamma \geq k$ (earn)
broker max profits.

optimal amount of feasible pairing

$P: \{1, \dots, m\} \times \{1, \dots, n\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ (ranges)

$\begin{matrix} (i, j) \\ 1 \leq i \leq m \\ \text{buyers} \end{matrix}$ $\begin{matrix} 1 \leq j \leq n \\ \text{sellers} \end{matrix}$

no matching matching

eg. $P(1, 3) = 0$ not match.

$P(1, 5) = 1$ match.

domain: pairing

error: buyer can be matched to different sellers.

\times possible.
require

$$P(i, j) = 1 \Rightarrow P(i, j') = 0 \quad \forall j' \neq j$$

$$P(i, j) = 1 \Rightarrow P(i', j) = 0 \quad \forall i' \neq i$$

$$P(i, j) = 1 \Rightarrow V_b - V_c \geq k$$


$$Q = \sum_{i=1}^M \sum_{j=1}^N P(i, j)$$

(socially optimal volume of trade)

$Q^0(k)$?

$$V(Q) = \sum_{i=1}^Q v_i \text{ (earn)} - C(Q) = \sum_{i=1}^Q c_i \text{ (give up)}$$

(TS) Total Surplus: $V(Q) - C(Q) - kQ$



$Q^*(k)$ = monopolist transaction volume

eg. $M=N=3$

	1	2	3
buyer	10	6	4
seller	1	3	5

① $\delta = k=2$

$$Q^0(k) = 2$$

$$Q^*(k) \geq 2 \Rightarrow (1, 3) (2, 2) (3, 1) \quad Q^*(k) = 3$$

↑ monopolist $Q \geq k \Leftarrow$ broken $\Rightarrow \uparrow Q$
 against.

$$Q^* = 10 + 6 + 4 = 20 \Leftarrow \text{gain}$$

$$1 + 3 + 5 = 9 \Leftarrow \text{give up}$$

$$k \times 3 = 6 \Leftarrow \text{transaction cost}$$

\hookrightarrow total surplus $\neq 3$

social optimal Q^0 : gain: $10 + 6 = 16$

give up = $1 + 3 = 4$

transaction cost = $2 \times k = 4$.

\rightarrow total surplus \Rightarrow (8)

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deadweight lost,
due to mismatching.