Review.

broker

monoply broker

cost per transaction (k)

fixed fee γ

flexiable pairing P

$\curvearrowright$ society $P(i,j)=1 \Rightarrow v_i - v_j \geq k$.

broker $v_i - v_j \geq \gamma$

$$Q(P) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{i=1}^{n} P(i,j)$$

set off all foxible pairing

$$\max_{P=\emptyset} \underbrace{(\gamma - k)}_{\text{fixed.}} Q(P)$$

$\Leftarrow$ monopoly $\Rightarrow$ interested maximal

prop 1: if there exists a foxible pairing P that reduces the transaction volume Q, there exists a foxible pearing such that P enduces the transaction column Q,

$P(\gamma)=1 \quad (\in \{1-, 2-\}$

$Q=\{1, 2-, 3\}$

Prop2. if there exists a foxible pairing p that under the transaction volume Q, then there exists a P' that underees Q. at buyer q transacts with seller $Q-q+1$, for all $q \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}$

$Q=1$. $Q=2$. $Q=3$.

↳ opposite type of matching.
+ check if feasible.



↳ x feasible if $k > V_i - S_i$.

上一节课

	1	2	3
B	10	6	4
S	1	3	5

$k=y=2$.

$Q^0 = 2$

$Q = 3$ + check. ↑ $10-5=5>2$. $6-3=3>2$ $4-1=3>2$. ⇒ feasible.

↳ social surplus ↓ broker ↑