

# Internet of Things (IoT) Security: Current Status, Challenges and Prospective Measures

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**Abstract**—The paper presents a survey and analysis on the current status and concerns of Internet of things (IoT) security. The IoT framework aspires to connect anyone with anything at anywhere. IoT typically has a three layers architecture consisting of Perception, Network, and Application layers. A number of security principles should be enforced at each layer to achieve a secure IoT realization. The future of IoT framework can only be ensured if the security issues associated with it are addressed and resolved. Many researchers have attempted to address the security concerns specific to IoT layers and devices by implementing corresponding countermeasures. This paper presents an overview of security principles, technological and security challenges, proposed countermeasures, and the future directions for securing the IoT.

**Keywords**—Internet of things; IoT; Security

## I. INTRODUCTION

Internet of things (IoT) is a collection of many interconnected objects, services, humans, and devices that can communicate, share data, and information to achieve a common goal in different areas and applications. IoT has many implementation domains like transportation, agriculture, healthcare, energy production and distribution. Devices in IoT follow an Identity Management approach to be identified in a collection of similar and heterogeneous devices. Similarly, a region in IoT can be defined by an IP address but within each region each entity has a unique.

The purpose of IoT is to transform the way we live today by making intelligent devices around us perform daily tasks and chores. Smart homes, smart cities, smart transportation and infrastructure etc. are the terms which are used in relevance with IoT. There are many application domains of IoT, ranging from personal to enterprise environments [1]. The applications in *personal* and *social* domain enable the IoT users to interact with their surrounding environment, and human users to maintain and build social relationships. Another application of IoT is in *transportation* domain, in which various smart cars, smart roads, and smart traffic signals serve the purpose of safe and convenient transportation facilities. The *enterprises* and *industries* domain encompass the applications used in finance, banking, marketing etc. to enable different inter- and intra-activities in organizations. The last application domain is the *service* and *utility monitoring* sector which includes agriculture, breeding, energy management, recycling operations, etc.

The IoT applications have seen rapid development in recent years due to the technologies of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).

The RFID enables the tagging or labeling of every single device, so as to serve as the basic identification mechanism in IoT. Due to WSN, each “thing” i.e. people, devices etc. becomes a wireless identifiable object and can communicate among the physical, cyber, and digital world [1].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the three-layer IoT framework and architecture. In Section III, the security issues corresponding to different security principles and the nature of IoT devices are presented. The section also contains the security issues that are associated with each layer of IoT. Section IV discusses recent research that attempt to address the security issues in IoT by some countermeasures. Section V gives the big picture of all the examined work done in IoT. Section VI addresses the future directions that can be taken in light of the current status of IoT security. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.

## II. IOT ARCHITECTURE

In IoT, each layer is defined by its functions and the devices that are used in that layer. There are different opinions regarding the number of layers in IoT. However, according to many researchers [2-4], the IoT mainly operates on three layers termed as Perception, Network, and Application layers. Each layer of IoT has inherent security issues associated with it. Fig. 1 shows the basic three layer architectural framework of IoT with respect to the devices and technologies that encompass each layer.

### A. Perception Layer

The perception layer is also known as the “Sensors” layer in IoT. The purpose of this layer is to acquire the data from the environment with the help of sensors and actuators. This layer detects, collects, and processes information and then transmits it to the network layer. This layer also performs the IoT node collaboration in local and short range networks [3].

### B. Network Layer

The network layer of IoT serves the function of data routing and transmission to different IoT hubs and devices over the Internet. At this layer, cloud computing platforms, Internet gateways, switching, and routing devices etc. operate by using some of the very recent technologies such as WiFi, LTE, Bluetooth, 3G, Zigbee etc. The network gateways serve as the mediator between different IoT nodes by aggregating, filtering, and transmitting data to and from different sensors [4].




Figure 1. Three-layer IoT architecture.

### C. Application Layer

The application layer guarantees the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the data. At this layer, the purpose of IoT or the creation of a smart environment is achieved.

## III. IOT SECURITY ISSUES

Typical security goals of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) also apply to IoT. However, the IoT has many restrictions and limitations in terms of the components and devices, computational and power resources, and even the heterogeneous and ubiquitous nature of IoT that introduce additional concerns. This section consists of two parts: the general security features that the IoT must have, and the security issues specific to each layer of the IoT.

### A. The Security Features of IoT

The security challenges of IoT can be broadly divided into two classes; Technological challenges and Security challenges [5]. The technological challenges arise due to the heterogeneous and ubiquitous nature of IoT devices, while the security challenges are related to the principles and functionalities that should be enforced to achieve a secure network. Technological challenges are typically related to wireless technologies, scalability, energy, and distributed nature, while security challenges require the ability to ensure security by authentication, confidentiality, end-to-end security, integrity etc. Security should be enforced in IoT throughout the development and operational lifecycle of all IoT devices and hubs [4]. There are different mechanisms to ensure security including:

- The software running on all IoT devices should be authorized.
- When an IoT device is turned on, it should first authenticate itself into the network before collecting or sending data.
- Since the IoT devices have limited computation and memory capabilities, firewalling is necessary in IoT network to filter packets directed to the devices.
- The updates and patches on the device should be installed in a way that additional bandwidth is not consumed.

Given below are the security principles that should be enforced to achieve a secure communication framework for the people, software, processes, and things.

#### 1) Confidentiality:

It is very important to ensure that the data is secure and only available to authorized users. In IoT a user can be human, machines and services, and internal objects (devices that are part of the network) and external objects (devices that are not part of the network). For example, it is crucial to make sure that sensors don't reveal the collected data to neighboring nodes [6]. One more confidentiality issue that must be addressed is how the data will be managed. It is important for the users of IoT to be aware of the data management mechanisms that will be applied, the process or person responsible for the management, and to ensure that the data is protected throughout the process [7].

#### 2) Integrity

The IoT is based on exchanging data between many different devices, which is why it is very important to ensure the accuracy of the data; that it is coming from the right sender as well as to ensure that the data is not tampered during the process of transmission due to intended or unintended interference. The integrity feature can be imposed by maintaining end-to-end security in IoT communication. The data traffic is managed by the use of firewalls and protocols, but it does not guarantee the security at endpoints because of the characteristic nature of low computational power at IoT nodes.

#### 3) Availability

The vision of IoT is to connect as many smart devices as possible. The users of the IoT should have all the data available whenever they need it. However data is not the only component that is used in the IoT; devices and services must also be reachable and available when needed in a timely fashion in order to achieve the expectations of IoT.

#### 4) Authentication

Each object in the IoT must be able to clearly identify and authenticate other objects. However, this process can be very challenging because of the nature of the IoT; many entities are involved (devices, people, services, service providers and processing units) and one other thing is that sometimes objects may need to interact with others for the first time (objects they do not know) [8]. Because of all this, a mechanism to mutually authenticate entities in every interaction in the IoT is needed.

#### 5) Lightweight Solutions

Lightweight solutions are a unique security feature that is introduced because of the limitations in the computational and power capabilities of the devices involved in the IoT. It is not a goal in itself rather a restriction that must be considered while designing and implementing protocols either in encryption or authentication of data and devices in IoT. Since these algorithms are meant to be run on IoT devices with limited capabilities, so they ought to be compatible with the device capabilities.

#### 6) Heterogeneity

The IoT connects different entities with different capabilities, complexity, and different vendors. The devices even have different dates and release versions, use different technical interfaces and bitrates, and are designed for an altogether different functions, therefore protocols must be designed to work in all different devices as well as in different situations [2, 4, 8]. The IoT aims at connecting device to

device, human to device, and human to human, thus it provides connection between heterogeneous things and networks [5]. One more challenge that must be considered in IoT is that the environment is always changing (dynamics), at one time a device might be connected to a completely different set of devices than in another time. And to ensure security optimal cryptography system is needed with an adequate key management and security protocols.

#### 7) Policies

There must be policies and standards to ensure that data will be managed, protected, and transmitted in an efficient way, but more importantly a mechanism to enforce such policies is needed to ensure that every entity is applying the standards. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) must be clearly identified in every service involved. Current policies that are used in computer and networks security may not be applicable for IoT, due to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature. The enforcement of such policies will introduce trust by human users in the IoT paradigm which will eventually result in its growth and scalability.

#### 8) Key Management Systems

In IoT, the devices and IoT sensors need to exchange some encryption materials to ensure confidentiality of the data. For this purpose, there needs to be a lightweight key management system for all frameworks that can enable trust between different things, and can distribute keys by consuming devices' minimum capabilities.

### B. Security Challenges in Each Layer of IoT

Each IoT layer is susceptible to security threats and attacks. These can be active, or passive, and can originate from external sources or internal network owing to an attack by the Insider [1]. An *active* attack directly stops the service while the *passive* kind monitors IoT network information without hindering its service. At each layer, IoT devices and services are susceptible to Denial of Service attacks (DoS), which make the device, resource or network unavailable to authorized users. The following sections present a detailed analysis of the security issues with respect to each layer.

#### 1) Perception Layer

There are three security issues in IoT perception layer. First is the strength of wireless signals. Mostly the signals are transmitted between sensor nodes of IoT using wireless technologies whose efficiency can be compromised by disturbing waves. Secondly, the sensor node in IoT devices can be intercepted not only by the owner but also by the attackers because the IoT nodes usually operate in external and outdoor environments, leading to physical attacks on IoT sensors and devices in which an attacker can tamper the hardware components of the device. Third is the inherent nature of network topology which is dynamic as the IoT nodes are often moved around different places. The IoT perception layer mostly consists of sensors and RFIDs, due to which their storage capacity, power consumption, and computation capability are very limited making them susceptible to many kinds of threats and attacks [1, 9].

The confidentiality of this layer can easily be exploited by *Replay Attack* [9] which can be made by spoofing, altering or replaying the identity information of one of the devices in IoT. Or the attacker might gain the encryption key by analyzing the

required time to perform the encryption what is known as *Timing Attack*. Another confidentiality threatening attack is when the attacker takes over the node and captures all information and data which is basically *Node Capture attack*. Attacker can add another node to the network that threatens the integrity of the data in this layer by sending *Malicious Data*. This can also lead to a DoS attack, by consuming the energy of the nodes in the system and depriving it from the sleep mode that the nodes use to save the energy [6].

The above listed security issues at perception layer can be addressed by using encryption (which can be point-to-point or end-to-end), authentication (to verify true identity of sender) and access control [9]. Further security measures and protocols are given in Section IV.

#### 2) Network Layer

As mentioned before, the network layer of IoT is also susceptible to DoS attacks. Apart from the DoS attacks, the adversary can also attack the confidentiality and privacy at network layer by traffic analysis, eavesdropping, and passive monitoring [1]. These attacks have a high likelihood of occurrence because of the remote access mechanisms and data exchange of devices. The network layer is highly susceptible to *Man-in-the-Middle* attack [1], which can be followed by eavesdropping. If the keying material of the devices is eavesdropped, the secure communication channel will be completely compromised. The key exchange mechanism in IoT must be secure enough to prevent any intruder from eavesdropping, and then committing identity theft.

The communication in the IoT is different than that of the internet because it is not restricted to machine to human. However, the feature of machine-to-machine communication that the IoT introduces has a security issue of *Compatibility*. The heterogeneity of the network components makes it difficult to use the current network protocols as is, and still produce efficient protection mechanisms. Attackers can also take advantage of the fact that everything is connected in order to gain more information about the users and use this information for future criminal activities [2]. Protecting the network is important in the IoT, but also protecting the objects in the network is equally important. Objects must have the ability to know the state of the network and the ability to protect themselves from any attacks against the network. This can be achieved by having good protocols as well as software that enable objects to respond to any situations and behaviors that can be considered abnormal or may affect their security [7].

#### 3) Application Layer

Since the IoT still does not have global policies and standards that govern the interaction and the development of applications, there are many issues related to application security. Different applications have different authentication mechanisms, which makes integration of all of them very difficult to ensure data privacy and identity authentication. The large amounts of connected devices that share data will cause large overhead on applications that analyze the data, which can have big impact on the availability of the services.

Another issue that must be considered when designing the applications in IoT is how different users will interact with them, the amount of data that will be revealed, and who will be responsible for managing these applications. The users must



have tools to control what data they want to disclose and must be aware of how the data will be used, by whom and when.

#### IV. IOT SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES

IoT requires security measures at all three layers; at physical layer for data gathering, at network layer for routing and transmission, and at application layer to maintain confidentiality, authentication, and integrity [4]. In this section the state-of-art security measures that address the specific features and security goals of IoT are discussed.

##### A. Authentication Measures

In 2011, Zhao et al. in [10] presented a mutual authentication scheme for IoT between platforms and terminal nodes. The scheme is based on hashing and feature extraction. The feature extraction was combined with the hash function to avoid any collision attacks. This scheme actually provides a good solution for authentication in IoT. The feature extraction process has the properties of irreversibility which is needed to ensure security and it is light weight which is desirable in IoT. The scheme focuses on authentication process when the platform is trying to send data to terminal nodes and not the opposite. Although the scheme will improve the security while keeping the amount of information sent reduced, it works only on theory and there is no practical proof to support it.

Another method for ID authentication at sensor nodes of IoT is presented by Wen et al. in [9]. It is a one-time one cipher method based on request-reply mechanism. This dynamic variable cipher is implemented by using a pre-shared matrix between the communicating parties. The parties can generate a random coordinate which will serve as the key coordinate. Key coordinate is the thing which actually gets transferred between two parties, not the key itself. The key, i.e. password, is then generated from this coordinate. All the messages are sent by encrypting them with the key, along with key coordinate, device ID, and time stamp. The two devices communicate by validating timestamps, and thus they can cancel the session based on it. This cipher can be used where securing IoT is not very sensitive and crucial because key can be repeated for different coordinates. If key coordinate is changed regularly, security can be optimized for that particular IoT framework. The installation of pre-shared matrix needs to be secure for this work to be implemented for a large number of IoT devices.

Creating correct access controls is as important as authentication for security, and these two functionalities go hand in hand in securing IoT. To address these functionalities, Mahalle et al. [5] presented an Identity Authentication and Capability based Access Control (IACAC) for the IoT. This research attempts to fill the gap for an integrated protocol with both authentication and access control capabilities to achieve mutual identity establishment in IoT. The proposed model uses a public key approach and is compatible with the lightweight, mobile, distributed, and computationally limited nature of IoT devices plus existing access technologies like Bluetooth, 4G, WiMax, and Wi-Fi. It prevents man-in-the-middle attacks by using a timestamp in the authentication message between the devices, which serves as the Message Authentication Code (MAC). The scheme works in three stages; first a secret key is generated based on Elliptical Curve Cryptography-Diffie Hellman algorithm (ECDH) [11], then identity establishment

is made by one-way and mutual authentication protocols, and lastly access control is implemented. The shared secret key is formed by the combination of public key and a private parameter, and has small size and low computational overhead due to the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The access is granted by storing a capability with access rights, device identifier, and a random number in each IoT device. This random number is the result of hashing device ID with access rights. The IACAC model does not completely prevent DoS attacks. However, it minimizes it since access of resource is granted to only one ID at a time.

Most of the devices involved in the perception layer of the IoT are RFID and sensors. Such devices have extremely limited computational capability, which makes it difficult to apply any cryptography algorithms to ensure the security of the network. However, researchers in [12] introduced a light weight authentication protocol to secure RFID tags. In unsecured RFID the attacker can gain access to the network by sniffing the Electronic Product Key (EPC) of the victim tag and program it to another tag. By applying the authentication protocol such attacks can be prevented. The protocol ensures mutual authentication between RFID readers and tagged items without introducing large overhead on these devices.

##### B. Trust Establishment

Since, devices in IoT can physically move from one owner to another, trust should be established between both owners to enable a smooth transition of the IoT device with respect to access control and permissions. The work in [13] presents the concept of mutual trust for inter-system security in IoT by creating an item-level access-control framework. It establishes trust from the creation to operation and transmission phase of IoT. This trust is established by two mechanisms; the creation key and the token. Any new device which is created is assigned a creation key by an entitlement system. This key is to be applied for by the manufacturer of the device. The token are created by the manufacturer, or current owner, and this token is combined with the RFID identification of the device. This mechanism ensures the change of permissions by the device itself if it is assigned a new owner, or it is going to be operated in a different department of the same company, thus reducing the overhead of the new owner. These tokens can be changed by the owners, provided that old token is provided, so as to supersede the permissions and access control of the previous one. This mechanism is similar to changing the old key when a new home is bought.

##### C. Federated Architecture

Not having universal policies and standards to control the design and the implementation of algorithms in IoT makes it difficult to control the security. It is important for IoT architecture to have a federated architecture that has an internal autonomy or centralized unit to overcome the heterogeneity of various devices, softwares and protocols. The work presented in [14] suggested a definition for federated IoT, and based on that definition an access control delegation model is presented. The presented model takes into consideration the flexibility and scalability that are key features in IoT systems. Another such attempt was made in [15] to propose a framework called Secure Mediation GateWay (SMGW) for critical infrastructures. This approach is an abstraction of IoT as it is

relevant for any kind of distributed infrastructures that are completely different in their nature and operation. SMGW can discover all the relevant distributed information from different nodes, and can overcome the heterogeneity of heterogeneous nodes whether it is a telecommunication, electrical, water distribution node, and can exchange all the messages and information over the untrusted network of Internet. This work enabled the follow-up of another federated approach, presented in [4] to provide the framework of Smart Home based on the SMGW.

It is not enough to have policies and standards to ensure security, mechanisms to enforce such policies are also needed. The research by Neisse et al. in [16] addresses this issue by integrating a security toolkit named SecKit with the MQ Telemetry Transport protocol. The current policies may not be efficient in IoT because of its dynamic nature. The proposed policy mechanism can have good impact in ensuring the security of the IoT, however it introduced additional delay in the process.

#### *D. Security Awareness*

Another important security measure for the success and growth of IoT framework is the awareness among human users which are a part of the IoT network. In [17] the authors explained the consequences of not securing the IoT using actual numbers. They accessed IoT devices (SCADA devices, web cameras, traffic control devices, and printers) that were publicly available using either no-password or the default password. The recorded results were very interesting and showed that many of these devices were actually accessible. If people continued with the same unawareness towards security, and used the minimum amount of security like default password that comes with the product, this would make the IoT to cause more harm than good. Hackers can conduct attacks against the whole network if one of its devices is not secured.

### V. CURRENT STATUS OF RESEARCH

IoT security is determined by the many factors and security principles discussed earlier, and the challenges that are faced by IoT security has been the focus of many researchers. In this section, an analysis of some related work is presented and the contribution of this paper is given.

In the survey paper presented by Roman et al. in [7], a detailed introduction about the IoT and security issues along with the need to have IoT standards are addressed. However, no countermeasures are provided for the given security challenges. This work was followed by the survey analysis in [8] in which countermeasures are provided for all security challenges. However, global policies for securing IoT and computational resources of security solutions w.r.t. devices are not provided. The work in [2] attempts to describe the security issues at each layer with certain security measures. But no solution is given except for encryption in the perception layer. The analysis in [1] addresses the security threats, challenges, and requirements in detail, but presents state-of-art countermeasures for only one security feature of access control. In [6], IoT security in terms of the main principles of security like confidentiality, integrity, and availability are addressed only. The authors suggested two-step authorization

using biometrics which is not applicable in case of machine-to-machine communication. The suggested measures are not detailed and do not address the specific nature of IoT with low power heterogeneous devices and huge network traffic. A very good survey for IoT, Web of Things (WoT), Social Web of Things (SWoT) is presented in [18], in which security issues, measures and potential research directions are given. In this survey paper, the security challenges, requirements, and state-of-art measures and research are presented with emphasis on using the latest network protocols like IPv6 and 5G to further secure the IoT paradigm.

The survey of state of art technologies to secure IoT shows that while many provide countermeasures to cope up with different security challenges, most of them are limited to authentication, identity establishment, and access control functionalities.

Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISPr) roaming and RADIUS are existing solutions to provide authentication and authorization in IoT by means of Wi-Fi over the Internet. Today, many smart devices support IPv6 communications, but the existing deployments in IoT might not support it, and thus requires ad hoc gateways and middlewares [19]. The survey shows that open research challenges are present to achieve centralized autonomy in IoT devices by having a Management Hub which manages the identification management issues in IoT.

### VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

IoT has seen rapid development in recent years in the areas of Telemedicine platforms, Intelligent Transportation systems, Logistics Monitoring, and Pollution Monitoring Systems etc. Some analysts even believe that the number of things connected will increase up to 26 billion units by 2020 [4]. However, the security challenges related to the IoT must be dealt with to achieve its growth and maturation. Given below are future directions for research in order to make the IoT paradigm more secure.

#### *A. Architecture Standards*

IoT currently employs different devices, services, and protocols to achieve a common goal. However, to integrate a network of IoT frameworks to achieve a bigger framework, for example, to form a smart town by the integration of many smart homes, there needs to be a set of standards that should be followed from the micro to macro levels of IoT realization. The present day requirement of IoT is to have well defined architecture standards comprising of data models, interfaces, and protocols which can support a wide range of humans, devices, languages, and operating systems.

#### *B. Identity Management*

Identity management in IoT is performed by exchanging identifying information between the things for first time connection. This process is susceptible to eavesdropping which can lead to man-in-the-middle attack, and thus can jeopardize the whole IoT framework. Hence, there needs to be some pre-defined identity management entity or hub which can monitor the connection process of devices by applying cryptography and other techniques to prevent identity theft.

### C. Session layer

As per most of the researchers, the three-layer architecture of IoT does not accommodate the opening, closing, and managing a session between two things. So, there is a need for protocols which can address these issues and can ease the communication between devices. An abstract session layer should be accommodated as an additional layer in IoT architecture which can specifically manage the connections, protocols, and sessions between communicating heterogeneous devices.

### D. 5G Protocol

To realize the implementation of IoT, IPv4 will definitely fall short in accommodating the huge numbers of IP-identifiable objects. That is the reason why people are now heading to IPv6, which is able to support  $3.4 \times 10^{38}$  devices. However, such number will create huge amount of traffic, which can lead to more delay and thus more bandwidth is needed. The expectation of the new generation of communication (5G) is to provide speed between 10-800Gbps, comparing this number with the current technology (4G) with speed of 2-1000 Mbps, 5G should be able to handle the traffic produced by IoT devices. 5G technology is also expected to accommodate both IPv4 and IPv6; by having IPv4/IPv6 framework translation. The implementation of 5G will be defined by many current and developing technologies such as: Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets), Software Defined Networks (SDNs), Massive MIMO, and Multiple Radio Access etc [20]. However, all these technologies come with their own security challenges. For example, HetNets will have frequent handover which directly affects the authentication process in the network, especially with the small latency requirement of 5G. Also, cloud computing and SDNs will increase the numbers of DDoS attacks due to the On-Demand Self-Service characteristic of cloud computing. Although [21] addressed the authentication and security of SDN by having a decentralized control of authentication using user-dependent security context, the security of 5G and all the emerging technologies involved in 5G must be extensively addressed, in order to ensure IoT security.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The IoT framework is susceptible to attacks at each layer; hence there are many security challenges and requirements that need to be addressed. Current state of research in IoT is mainly focused on authentication and access control protocols, but with the rapid advancement of technology it is essential to incorporate new networking protocols like IPv6 and 5G to achieve the dynamic mashup of IoT topology.

The major developments witnessed in IoT are mainly on small scale i.e. within companies, some industries etc. To scale the IoT framework from one company to a group of different companies and systems, various security concerns need to be overcome. The IoT has great potential to transform the way we live today. But, the foremost concern in realization of completely smart frameworks is security. If security concerns like privacy, confidentiality, authentication, access control, end-to-end security, trust management, global policies and standards are addressed completely, we can witness the transformation of everything by IoT in the near future. There is

need for new identification, wireless, software, and hardware technologies to resolve the currently open research challenges in IoT like the standards for heterogeneous devices, implementation of key management and identity establishment systems, and trust management hubs.

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