

## Employment

**Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel**  
Assistant Professor (tenure track), Department of Economics

TBD

**University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada**  
Postdoctoral Fellow mentored by Avi Goldfarb , Rotman School of Management

2026

## Education

**Boston College, Boston, MA, USA**  
*Ph.D. Economics*  
Fields: Industrial Organization, Experimental Economics

2025

**Monash University, Melbourne, Australia**  
*Master of Economics*  
Summa Cum Laude, Dean's Honors Award

2017

**University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel**  
*B.A. Economics and Psychology*

2014

## Work in Progress

["Cross-Product Compatibility, Lock-In, and Market Power: The Case of Smartphones and Laptops"](#) (JMP).  
Winner of the "Young Economists' Essay Award" (YEEA), EARIE.

This paper examines the role of compatibility across *standalone* technology products in anchoring consumers to brands. Through a novel experimental design, I identify the causal impact of compatibility, showing that participants' willingness to pay for smartphones increases by 9% of their retail price when compatible with a laptop. I combine the experimental results with a smartphone demand model that incorporates compatibility with laptops to assess the welfare effects of (i) regulations mandating cross-brand compatibility ("open ecosystems") and (ii) cross-market mergers. I find that in 2018-2019, closed ecosystems benefit Samsung by locking non-Apple laptop owners into lower-quality Samsung smartphones, while the switch to open ecosystems boosts Apple's smartphone market share. However, in 2020-2023, closed ecosystems benefit Apple, as Samsung's top smartphones are superior, prompting Apple laptop owners to switch to Samsung smartphones in open ecosystems. In both periods, consumer surplus rises due to lower prices and greater product variety in open ecosystems. A counterfactual merger between Samsung and HP, Apple's main smartphone and laptop competitors, respectively, results in lower smartphone market concentration but raises Samsung smartphone prices, disadvantaging consumers who value compatibility less.

["Closed Ecosystems and Firms' Investments."](#)

Regulations mandating open ecosystems reduce product differentiation. In response, firms producing standalone products may increase hardware investment to distinguish themselves but reduce compatibility to limit competitor use. This paper examines how ecosystems shape firms' investment decisions in the smartphone market. I find that open ecosystem regulation leads firms to adopt uniform compatibility without altering hardware investment.

["The Effect of Closed Ecosystems on Consumers' Consideration Sets,"](#) with Lucas Coffman.

Traditional discrete choice models identify product variety and advertisements as key factors shaping consumers' consideration sets. This paper introduces a new determinant: compatibility between standalone products. Using a novel experiment, I identify consumers' consideration sets by examining how laptop compatibility influences smartphone consideration sets. I then develop a smartphone demand model incorporating the consideration set to analyze the impact of cross-product compatibility on market power.

["AI as a GPT: Implications for Competition,"](#) with Avi Goldfarb.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is emerging as a general-purpose technology with the potential to reshape production, innovation, and competition across the economy. Whether this potential yields widespread prosperity depends on the competitive environment for AI products. This article identifies four economic forces that will shape competition in AI: complementarities between products, endogenous sunk costs, diminishing returns to scale in data, and the burden of consumer protection regulation. Complementarities create both opportunities for modular systems and risks of tying or foreclosure. Endogenous sunk costs, particularly escalating investments in compute, models, and talent, may sustain concentration even as markets grow. While data exhibits diminishing returns, feedback loops can reinforce incumbency advantages. Consumer protection rules address privacy, bias, and safety but may impose compliance costs that disadvantage entrants. Together, these forces suggest that AI's trajectory will reflect underlying economics, as well as legal enforcement choices with respect to tying and modularity.

### ["The Welfare Impact of AI-Driven Flood Damage Prediction,"](#) with Charlie Murry.

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies that predict flood damages from rainfall. By providing highly granular flood mapping and damage cost assessments that are independent of historical claims data, AI enables insurers to price risk more accurately, mitigating adverse selection and improving resource allocation toward prevention and resilience. These advances can expand insurance coverage and reduce overall welfare losses from flooding. However, greater precision may also heighten distributional concerns and moral hazard if consumers adjust behavior in response to individualized premiums. I analyze policies designed to preserve AI's efficiency gains while promoting equity, including regulatory mechanisms and transfers that ensure all consumers share in the welfare improvements generated by predictive AI.

### ["The Illusion of Competition and Consumer Search,"](#) with Michael Grubb and Ryan Westphal.

This project examines how perceptions of competition influence consumers' search and purchase behavior in markets for durable goods; we analyze how firms can strategically create an illusion of competition—through multiple brand names, pricing patterns, product differentiation, or framing—that reduces consumers' incentives to search. Using a combination of experimental evidence and structural modeling, the project investigates when consumers mistakenly perceive markets as competitive and how such misperceptions distort welfare and policy evaluations. The project informs antitrust enforcement and consumer protection policy by identifying environments in which apparent competition conceals underlying market power.

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## Policy Papers

"Measuring Willingness to Pay for Compatibility Between Smartphones and Laptops," August 2024.

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## Teaching

Guest Lecture, Boston College

*Experimental Economics in Industrial Organizations, Professor Lucas Coffman*

2024

Teaching Assistant, Boston College

*Principles of Economics, Professor Can Erbil*

2022- 2024

Teaching Assistant, Monash University

*Principles of Economics, Professor Stephen King*

2016

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## Presentations

**2026:** University of St. Gallen (scheduled), Bar-Ilan University (scheduled).

**2025:** IIOC, NBER Digital Economics and Artificial Intelligence Summer Institute, EARIE, AFE, University of Virginia (scheduled), Dynamic Structural Econometrics Conference (scheduled).

**2024:** The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Michigan, Yeshiva University (Syms School of Business).

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## Honors and Fellowships

Young Economists' Essay Award (YEEA), EARIE

"*Cross-Product Compatibility, Lock-In, and Market Power: The Case of Smartphones and Laptops.*"

2025

Dissertation fellowship, Boston College

"*Cross-Product Compatibility, Lock-In, and Market Power: The Case of Smartphones and Laptops.*"

2024

Summa Cum Laude and Dean's Award, Monash University

*Monash university*

2016

Research excellence award, Monash University

"*Fine signaling and piracy deterrence.*"

2016

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