

Review Articles

THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION: How Who Gets What and When

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Alan Coddington, *Theories of the Bargaining Process*. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1968, 106 pp., \$4.95.

John G. Cross, *The Economics of Bargaining*. New York, Basic Books, 1969, 247 pp., \$8.95.

Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict*. New York, Academic Press, 1970, 305 pp., \$12.50.

NEGOTIATION is one of the basic political or decision-making processes, but if processes in general have been sorely neglected in political analysis, negotiation has been neglected more than most. Legislation as an institutional function has a respectable literature; as a process wherein goal values are constant and decisions are made by aggregating a sufficient number of parties to constitute a numerically superior side, it has become the subject of coalition theory.¹ Adjudication has also given rise to a large quantity of institutional literature, although a theory explaining the process wherein a single party combines events and values to produce a decision is less well established.² Similarly, diplomacy—and more recently, collective bargaining—has

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¹ See William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962); S. Groennings, W. E. Kelley, and M. Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970); Cornelius Cotter, J. H. Kessel, W. C. Mitchell, and R. Tanter, eds., *Conflict, Competition, and Coalitions* (Indianapolis 1973).

² See, however, Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill. 1957); Alexander Bickel, *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957); Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill. 1959), chap. 4, and "Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," *Stanford Law Review*, xiv (March 1962), 284; Walter F. Murphy, *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (Chicago 1964), esp. chap. 3; Richard E. Warton, *Legal Justice, Power Bargaining and Social Science Intervention: Mechanisms for Settling Disputes*, Purdue University Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Paper No. 194 (1968); David N. Atkinson and Dale E. Neuman, "Toward a Cost Theory of Judicial Alignments," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, xiii (May 1969), 271-84; and Theodore Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics* (Chicago 1970), chap. 2.

been thoroughly described, and economists and mathematicians using game and utility theories have developed some complex models of bargaining.³ But negotiation as a political process, specifically explained in terms of power, is an underdeveloped area of theory.

In this review article I will examine a number of recent studies in mathematics, economics, psychology, and politics which have all had something significant to add to the study of the process, and then will focus (as few of them do) on their contribution to the political study of negotiation. In the meanwhile many of their contributions to other disciplines will be acknowledged only in passing. Although some of the work reviewed utilizes mathematical formulations, this review will remain on the verbal level. I should note at the outset that, were it not for the significant contributions which these books have already made to the understanding of negotiation as a process and of the exercise of power, it would be impossible even to raise the questions linking power and process.

I

Negotiation may be called the process of combining divergent viewpoints to reach a common agreement,⁴ but none of the studies here reviewed spends much time in the essentialistic exercise of definition. Indeed, essential definitions are most useful for probing boundaries, and the problem of analyzing negotiation is not primarily one of distinguishing the phenomenon from its neighbors. Rather it is a matter of explaining or understanding particular outcomes of a process. Thus, the parameters of the explanation must be expressed through a set of assumptions, rather than through essential elements.

These assumptions refer to a condition which economists have often called "bilateral monopoly." The first assumption is that the process involves two parties (Coddington, 6); *N*-person situations, although frequently encountered in reality, are more complex extensions of the

³ See F. Y. Edgeworth, *Mathematical Physics* (London 1881), esp. 20-30; Frederick Zeuthen, *Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare* (London 1930), esp. 104-50; G. L. S. Shackle, "The Nature of the Bargaining Process," in John Dunlop, ed., *The Theory of Wage Determination* (New York 1957), 292-314; Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960); Carl M. Stevens, *Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations* (New York 1963); John von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (New York 1964); Martin Shubik, ed., *Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior* (New York 1964); Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York 1965); and Anatole Rapoport, *Two-Person Game Theory* (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1966).

⁴ From Zartman, *The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community* (Princeton 1971), 202.

two-person case. The second assumption concerns the positive-sum nature of the encounter (Cross, 4, 19, 120; Coddington, 7).⁵ An agreement by its very existence is a good or has value in and of itself; this good or value may be merely satisfaction over the end of conflict, but it is more likely to comprise additional payoffs or side-payments. Although it is agreed that fixed-sum outcomes are characteristic of a very different set of circumstances than that of most negotiations, and are thus subject to a different type of analysis, the nature of the negotiation curve (or frontier or set) is not at all clear. The general assumption that it is a single-function curve with a clear Pareto-optimal point is probably overly simplistic for theorizing and unrealistic for application. Coddington (pp. 33-34, 36) and others have raised this point without providing a full solution.⁶

If negotiation were merely the means of arriving at an acceptable reallocation of a set of goods or values between their owners, two simple utility scales would show a clear, determinate result.⁷ Furthermore, the only decision involved would be on how far down the two lists to go in the exchange of equivalent goods. The image already begins to suggest the complexity of reality, for one of the aspects of negotiation (assuming that two known utility scales are available) is to induce the other party to go a bit further down his list than I want to go down mine, in order for me to get more for my money. But the other party has the same sort of motives, and as long as it is possible to entertain such hopes, it is in both our hoped-for interests to control each other's knowledge of our utility lists. Thus, a third assumption is that of imperfect information (i.e., neither perfect information nor total non-communication), with the amount of information and its veracity under the control of each party (Cross, 5; Otomar Bartos in Swingle, 46).⁸ Unlike models of other decision-making processes which can assume perfect information and then be tested against reality by relaxing the assumption, a model of negotiation must include imperfect information as one of its operative elements.

⁵ See also Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises* (Princeton 1968), 28.

⁶ See also Stefan Valavanis, "The Resolution of Conflict when Utilities Interact," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (June 1958), 156-69. On "negotiation set," see Rapoport (fn. 3), 101-2; on "utility frontiers" see Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in Herbert Kelman, ed., *International Behavior* (New York 1965), esp. 476-77. The Sawyer-Guetzkow chapter is still the single best work on the subject of negotiation.

⁷ Steven Brams has reminded me that even this would not be true in a Prisoners' Dilemma or non-cooperative game without a saddlepoint.

⁸ See also Young (fn. 5), 29.

The sliding-scale example also brings out another assumption, however: that of mixed motives (Charles Gruder in Swingle, 111). Although the sum of goods or values brought into being by agreement on their reallocation is assumed to be larger than the amount of goods available beforehand, it is also assumed that the positive sum is not large enough to cover the wants of both parties. There is therefore a need for cooperation (to bring about the agreement, on the best terms mutually) but also an occasion of conflict.⁹ Indeed, negotiation is often defined in terms of component conflicting and common interests: "Negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of common interest where conflicting interests are present."¹⁰ Bartos (in Swingle, 46, 64), defines negotiation as "a process whereby positions that are originally highly divergent become identical. Or, if you wish, it is a process whereby parties who disagree to start with reach an agreement. . . . To negotiate *means* to pursue twin (and usually contradictory) goals of maximizing one's own (individual) payoff and reaching an (group) agreement. . . . To put it somewhat differently, negotiation should be viewed as a process through which *the various individual interests* (maximization of own payoff) *are gradually transformed into one group interest* (the agreement)" [Emphasis in original]. According to Gruder (in Swingle, 111), "the goal of the participants in a mixed-motive or bargaining situation is to reach some agreement as to how to divide between themselves the total outcome available from their relationship." It is assumed that parties do not want merely to split the difference in their search for a just and lasting piece.

Mixed motives alone do not exhaust this complex of assumptions however, as Bartos' last definition suggests. Parties are not merely pursuing contradictory goals, any more than they are aggregating fixed preferences. To analyze negotiation, it must be assumed that values are alterable as well as partially unknown.¹¹ Agreement is brought about by the parties' changing the value of the goods in each other's

⁹ Cross, 42, and Young (fn. 5), 26, appropriately posit pure cooperation and pure conflict (termed pure bluffing and pure intransigence) as the limits of negotiation. See also Nicolson's "shopkeepers" and "warriors": Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford 1964), 25f. What are process limits to Cross and normative styles to Nicolson become personality types to Harold Lasswell in *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago 1930), esp. 124f and 151f, on "agitators" and "administrators," respectively.

¹⁰ Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York 1964), 3f. Iklé's most useful article, incorporating many of the above assumptions, is (with Nathan Leites), "Political Negotiations as a Process of Modifying Utilities," in Shubik (fn. 3), 243-59, originally appearing in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vi (March 1962), 19-28.

¹¹ See also Young (fn. 5), 25-27, 29.

eyes.¹² Recognition of this aspect of negotiation is the strength of the studies at hand, and they thereby unveil the challenge of explaining *how* values are changed.

Finally, it should be noted that these studies do not pay much attention to probabilities, and wisely so. While probabilities are not uninteresting as a subject of theory, they are not very useful for understanding the process of negotiation. Since matters under negotiation are generally important to one or more parties, and since a probability refers not to a percentage gain (as it might appear), but to a chance of something either happening or not happening at all, it is relevant to rational behavior only in its upper limits. The notion that bargainers balance payoff against chance of occurrence is an exceptional one, not a reference to a general characteristic. It would make a poor public defense for failure. (Indeed, Kennedy was criticized for it in the Cuban missile crisis, even when he succeeded—suggesting how unreal the analytic concept is.)¹³ In addition, consideration of probabilities less than unity only makes sense when a large number of reruns can be made, and is therefore of only limited help or validity for understanding historic cases, each with its own characteristics. Probability is an indication of a partial explanation, with the rest of the cause unknown;¹⁴ the studies under review seek a process model that is determinate in terms of its parameters.

II

The static aspects of the conditions discussed here, and the outcome which they determine theoretically, are best summarized in the significant model of Nash, which provides the base line for any theory of negotiation (as many of the books here reviewed explicitly recog-

¹² See Young, *ibid.*, chap. 16, on the proposition, "Conditions of crisis generate strong incentives for decision-makers to manipulate the perceptions of various parties concerning critical aspects of the clash," 394. Similar formulations are offered by Arthur Lall, *Modern International Negotiation* (New York 1966), 54 and 311. Indeed, many of Young's propositions ("hypotheses" is too precise a word for them) are similar to some of Lall's concluding principles; unfortunately, Young does not seem to have been aware of Lall's work. See also Iklé and Leites (fn. 10).

¹³ See Richard J. Barnett's review of Ralph Lapp, *The Weapons Culture* (New York 1968) in *Science*, CLX (April 19, 1968), 293. It is true nevertheless that Kennedy did take chances in the Cuban negotiations, notably in regard to the first Khrushchev letter. "There was some debate among the experts in Hilsman's office as they tried to decide whether this extraordinary unofficial approach could be taken seriously. . . . The essence of the final approach to Moscow was to gamble that Khrushchev had not been overruled since sending off the secret letter. The President, in effect, accepted a set of terms Khrushchev had never formally offered." Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York 1966), 157 and 176.

¹⁴ For a similar use of the term, see Lawrence Mayer, *Comparative Political Inquiry* (Homewood, Ill. 1972), 23.

nize [Cross, 18-23; Coddington, 35-36; Anatole Rapoport in Swingle, 11-12]).¹⁵ Nash has demonstrated that the outcome for a two-person non-zero-sum game that fulfills the conditions of Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of linear transformations, and symmetry of utility scales is the point along a compact, convex negotiation set where the product of the parties' utilities is maximized.

The major deficiency of the Nash model for our purposes, however, does not rest in the weakness of its assumptions but rather in its fundamental character as a piece of game theory. As a consequence of its concern only for the specification of an outcome, it can offer us no analysis of the dynamic process of disagreement-concession-agreement which constitutes the very essence of bargaining. We are given only a solution criterion with no insight into its *raison d'être*. The model does not even attempt to answer the question that often is most interesting to us: Under what conditions will the solution *deviate* from the idealized condition, and how will that variation take place? On the other hand, as an ideal solution, Nash's construction is extremely compelling, and its relevance may be extended to almost any kind of division problem, be it normative or descriptive. It is therefore desirable that when a theory or model does not satisfy the Nash criterion, the analysis be extended to show why the deviation has come about (Cross, 23).

Cross's approach seeks to explain the process of disagreement-concession-agreement in terms of the parties' concession rates. According to his model, each party revises its initial goals according to the other's expected concession rate, modified by experience over the course of the negotiations. Also influencing the concession rate are two time elements, the discount rate of future benefits and the fixed cost of bargaining. Using these variables in formal (differential) models, Cross arrives at a number of interesting implications, including some that parallel the inductive suggestions of the excellent empirical work of Siegel and Fouraker and others.

Whenever a party increases his demand, he increases the payoff which he expects to receive at the time of settlement, but he also delays the date of that settlement by an amount of time determined by his opponent's rate of concession. . . . [S]udden large concessions from one player tend to encourage increased demands on the part of the other (pp. 47, 50).¹⁶

¹⁵ John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica*, xviii (April 1950), 155-62. An important feature of all three works is the initial review and summary of previous work (Cross, chap. II; Coddington, chap. II; Rapoport in Swingle, chap. I). On the use of rationality models, baseline constructs, and the "zero method," see Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York 1964), 141.

¹⁶ For similar formulations, see Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker, *Bargaining and Group Decision-Making* (New York 1960), 81; Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

[W]henver both actual concession rates are less than the expected rates, both parties will converge toward an agreement (p. 51).

[We] observe a tendency for the two expected concession rates to approach each other (p. 53).

The better a learner he is [in perceiving changes in the other party's concession rate and adjusting to them], the more the outcome will go against a player (p. 60).¹⁷

The faster a player expects his opponent to concede, the greater will be his own demand (p. 73).

[O]verstating one's demands will not improve one's payoff at agreement at all! . . . In the last analysis, the best bluff is no bluff at all (pp. 170-71).¹⁸

[C]ost-imposing actions are potentially considerably greater in magnitude than are their consequences (p. 136).¹⁹

High . . . bargaining costs will have the effect of reducing the time required by the bargaining process (p. 61).

Cross's formulation is coherent, concise, elegant, and ingenious, and the fact that some of its implications have already been suggested by empirical studies only confirms the explanatory power of its general deductive principles. It also is an improvement over static economic theories which are satisfied merely with an equilibrium point or a contract zone (negotiations set), and which take little account of the dynamic process of exchange. But a theory that explains in terms of concession and time discount rates leaves some questions open. Is such an explanation any easier to operationalize than one couched in terms of utilities? And what is it, after all, that determines concession rates (as well as assigned utilities) and causes them to change? Might one not suspect that each party would not only manipulate its own concession rates but would also try to manipulate its opponent's?

Coddington picks up Cross's work and takes it into closed-loop systems analysis in which "each bargainer is making error-actuated decisions but each is attempting to steer in a contrary way . . . a pair of linked servomechanisms, the output of each one being the input of the other" (Coddington, 55). This realization leads to the refinement of some of Cross's assumptions and the use of the self-correction decision system to handle the fact that Cross's reactive tactics are theoretically (if realistically) error-based. (Coddington, ix-x, 59-64; Cross, 201 and 224.) "Whereas the strategic models (like those of game theory) give all the emphasis to the freedom of choice and the control that

¹⁷ For similar formulations, see Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 57f.

¹⁸ For similar formulations, see *ibid.*, 93; Zartman (fn. 4), 216.

¹⁹ For similar formulations, see David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics*, xxiv (October 1971), 19-38, esp. 28-29.

decision-makers may have over the process, the cataclysmic models (like Cross's model and the present framework) give emphasis to the built-in dynamics of the process before which the decision-maker is powerless" (p. 79). The penultimate conclusion is that "A theory of the bargaining relationship has yet to be developed" (p. 80); but the last chapter is a rather disappointing continuation of refinements that does not fully exploit the potentialities of the cybernetic approach.

Considering that the Swingle symposium starts with an excellent review of game-theoretic approaches to conflict resolution (by Rapoport) and that it is published in a social psychology series, it is surprising that it has so little to say about the Cross-Coddington theme of mutual adjustment of interpersonal behavior.²⁰ It is not surprising, however, that the contributions which its chapters do make are in the nature of inductive, empirical findings, and not new formulations or refinements of a model. Thus, they can offer hypotheses and support theories, but they cannot explain results.²¹

One of the best chapters, by Bartos, reports on group experiments concerning the relation between toughness (high opening bid and low concession rate) and final payoff. Results showed that toughness generated softness and vice versa, that negotiators tended to reciprocate concessions in frequency but in inverse magnitude, that toughness tended to be rewarded, that the time required to arrive at agreement varied inversely with the firmness of beliefs about the opponent's interests, and that the likelihood of toughness' preventing agreement varied directly with the accuracy of beliefs about the opponent's interests (pp. 57, 59-60, 65).²² These findings all support Cross's formulations and fit within Siegel's and Fouraker's broader experiments and their equally supportive inductive summary: "the bargainer who opens negotiations with a high request, has a small rate of concession, has a high minimum level of expectation, and is very perceptive and quite unyielding, will fare better. . . ."²³

The contradictions of a strategy based on the adjustment of expected concession rates, however, are well examined in a wider-ranging but

²⁰ None of the Swingle chapters refer to Cross's or Coddington's work, or even to Siegel and Fouraker. Two chapters in Swingle are not treated here; one, by Kenneth Terhune, because it focuses on psychology, personality, and behavior without touching power; the other, by I. L. Horowitz, because it is neither theoretical nor empirical.

²¹ Cf. Cross, 37, 64, on explanation in regard to Siegel and Fouraker; and Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, xxi (April 1969), 486-511, on explanation in regard to induction.

²² See also Swingle, in Swingle, 251. A full-length work by Otomar J. Bartos developing the subject further is entitled *The Process and Outcome of Negotiations* (New York, forthcoming).

²³ Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 93.

less rigorous chapter by the symposium's editor. "[C]oncession-making may not be interpreted as a cooperative gesture but rather as evidence of the opponent's weakness. . . . Players, therefore, are in a dilemma in which unyielding behavior can preclude the establishment of cooperation which in turn may have disastrous results, whereas making a cooperative gesture may encourage the opponent to press for further concessions and, in dangerous games of chicken, to press for final capitulation" (p. 262).

The situation is a sort of dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma of concession rates, and is a much more important twist on Cross's approach than those examined by Coddington in his book. In fact, the problem was the major issue in an exchange between the two in the *American Economic Review*, where the point of brinkmanlike concession rates was introduced by Coddington as *another* conceivable type of behavior, a point Cross never answered very well.²⁴ Rather than showing linear concession rates, two parties are likely to strut and spar a while, hardening terms to establish toughness, and, in true "chicken" style, jump to agreement with little bargaining at the very last minute;²⁵ in other words, there would be a shift between Cross's "unstable" and "stable" conditions, a difference which he does not examine and which his formulations (in their given form) cannot handle (Cross, 54-57).²⁶ Unfortunately, Swingle's discussion does not solve his own dilemma either, since it focusses largely on the effects on strategy of varying utilities in the matrix of a chicken game, with international examples and cases from the literature used rather anecdotally.

The reality of the Chicken Dilemma is attested to by a number of empirical studies,²⁷ most notably by the serious attempt of Oran Young to combine supportable propositions with comparative inquiry. Under "Hypothesis 8: Resolve and Prudence," Young suggests: "Conditions of crisis raise incentives both to demonstrate resolve clearly and to react in a prudent fashion to the dangers of destructive outcomes. The resultant cross-pressures tend to produce bargaining patterns among the principals which are unpredictable and subject to erratic oscillations."²⁸ Toward the end of the chapter, he also mentions in passing a more explicit theorem: "A party that can hold its position successfully un-

²⁴ Coddington, "A Theory of the Bargaining Process: Comment," and Cross, "Reply," *American Economic Review*, LVI (March 1966), 522-33.

²⁵ The point is briefly touched on by Swingle, in Swingle, 131f; see also Richard Witkin, "The Straphangers' Cliffhanger," *New York Times*, December 31, 1969.

²⁶ Cross discusses bluffing as a constant strategy, 166-79, esp. 170, and not as a prelude to agreement.

²⁷ See Lall (fn. 12), 297, 311; Zartman (fn. 4), 102f, 113f.

²⁸ Young (fn. 5), 177.

less the opposing side is willing to assume the responsibility for initiating overt violence tends to have a significant advantage."²⁹ Finally, the erratic oscillations" are recognized as being "extraordinarily complex,"³⁰ but are in general a function of "the transition from one phase to another in an unfolding crisis, and changing patterns of perceptual asymmetries between participants with regard to matters of resolve and inhibitory fears."³¹ For all the importance of rigorous, controlled inquiry and the use of concepts and propositions in empirical studies, this type of formulation seems to fall between two stools. Young's informed depictions of the crises in Berlin, 1948-49 and 1961, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba are sound exercises in political history, and his introductory chapters are intelligent conceptual discussions. But the propositions (such as Hypotheses 8 and 16 above, or 15, below) that govern the organization of data in each chapter are not tied together by any theory; even when they are testable, they are not tested by citation of supportive case material. In fact, rather than providing political theory about bargaining, propositions such as "Resolve and Prudence" indicate the imperviousness of important characteristics of negotiation to theorizing.³²

III

Jan Pen has suggested that, in regard to negotiation, it is not the outcome which is indeterminate but the theory.³³ That is a statement of hope rather than of analysis, a hope that Cross thus far comes closest to fulfilling despite the problems noted. Yet theories can only be determinate (i.e., completely explained) with regard to some specific variables.³⁴ In the rest of this review, I will suggest that the important variable of power has been systematically neglected in theorizing about negotiation, and that its inclusion would allow explanation of an aspect of negotiation not hitherto covered. Lest hopes spring prematurely, I should add that no power (political) theory of negotiation will

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 215. On the use of "soft" terms such as "success," see Zartman (fn. 4), 220.

³⁰ Young (fn. 5), 216.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 178. If "oscillations," "phases," and "patterns" are in fact the same thing, then such relationships are tautological.

³² Bartos tends to agree, in a useful article, "How Predictable are Negotiations?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xi (December 1967), 481-95.

³³ Jan Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining," *American Economic Review*, xlii (March 1952), 24-42. Unfortunately, Pen's theory, which purports to provide explanation in terms of power and will, is no more determinate and even harder to operationalize than most, as both Cross, 17 and 28, and Coddington, 37-40, have noted.

³⁴ Cf. Richard Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), 91.

be presented here (for lack of space and a few critical components) but that only some pretheoretical considerations will be sketched.

For the most part, these studies have rejected the concept of power because of its tautological nature. Power determines the ability to win, but the ability to win determines who has (most) power.³⁵ As Cross points out clearly, "In part, the profusion of conflicting definitions is due to a failure to distinguish clearly enough between a bargaining outcome and the bargaining process. . . . A definition of power, however, cannot contribute anything to an analysis if it is simply taken to be synonymous with or descriptive of the outcome" (p. 17; see also pp. 144-45). The reaction to this realization is dual. Since they cannot handle it, some studies ignore power, leaving an empty space for it, whereas others try to find their explanations in other terms. (Many approaches do both.) Cross's and Coddington's explanations are a conscious attempt to pick up Karl Deutsch's suggestion that decision making could be looked at "somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering."³⁶ Cross and Coddington introduce self-correcting concession rates as the answer: "each bargainer neglects the fact that changes in his own demand will affect the other bargainer's concession rate" (Coddington, 78); the theory is determinate precisely because there is no choice and "the decision-maker is powerless" (Coddington, 79) before the inexorable conjuncture of concession rates.

Yet even in this approach, there is a vacant chair for the concept of power. Coddington admits that the "theory of the adjustment of expectations will not be seriously pursued in this work" (p. 15), while attention is concentrated on expectations and decision making (adjustment being the linkage point between his two closed loops). Similarly, Nash's assumption of symmetry rules out differences in power and hence the use of power, and the Siegel and Fouraker and Bartos experiments show the effects of power without having any ways of analyzing it.³⁷ All such studies talk about convergence at a Pareto-optimal point. Yet none has tackled the next, obvious problem: What causes (or how do the parties bring about) such convergence?

³⁵ Gruder in Swingle, 112, trips on the tautology, as does Lall (fn. 12), 162. See also Coddington, xvi, on "skill" as a similar tautology.

³⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, *Nerves of Government* (Glencoe, Ill. 1963), ix, cited in Coddington, 542.

³⁷ Cf. Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 42-70, 90, 93; Bartos, in Swingle, on abstract versus "spoken" experiments, 51, 54.

Cross recognizes the problem. He suggests that a "proper definition" of power might be related to cost-imposing ability (akin to Harsanyi's "cost of power"),³⁸ but rejects it as necessarily too complicated (pp. 17-18, 145-47). Coddington does not even recognize the problem; his further refinements are designed to ensure consistency in the process of adjustment (reaction) rather than to assess influence (action) (pp. 86-91).

The response of the social psychologists in Swingle's symposium is quite the opposite. Power is recognized, typologized, summarized, and left hanging in midair in pieces—a great half-step forward to join several others going in the same direction, for there is little correlation with outcomes, or theorizing about the effects. It is a bit as if the analysts got caught up in the subject of the problem as formulated above and never got to the verb. It is difficult to summarize all the findings, since the chapters are themselves summaries of various experiments, but the component typologies can be noted. Raven and Kruglanski, Gruder, and Tedeschi all write about threats, promises, and persuasion (informational influence, lies and distortions, and warnings and predictions, according to their respective ways of treating persuasion)³⁹ (pp. 72-73, 76-77, 79-80, 92-94, 98-99, 131-36, 156-59, 161-64); Gruder (pp. 131-32) and Tedeschi (p. 156) both touch on commitment; and Raven and Kruglanski (pp. 74-76, 80-81, 94-99) also treat referent, legitimate, and expert influence. This last article also suggests some of the possible effects of the various sources of power. Yet none of these review chapters seek to pull the taxonomic ends together under a coherent theory to explain negotiation processes and outcomes.

Is there any place, then, to begin looking for a theory that explains how parties to negotiation cause convergence in terms of power? It has been too little noted, in the discussions of power, that the concept itself is (or purports to be) causal and explanatory. Power is the ability of one party to cause another to change its behavior in an intended direction.⁴⁰ An explanatory theory of convergence in terms of power is

³⁸ John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," in R. Bell, D. Edwards, and R. H. Wagner, eds., *Political Power* (Glencoe, Ill. 1969), 226-38, originally appearing in *Behavioral Science*, vii (January 1962), 67-80.

³⁹ James T. Tedeschi, in Swingle, 161n, uses the neologism "mendations" for communication of non-volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of warnings), an unhappy word for a useful concept. I have termed the same thing "predictions," and used "promises" for communications of volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of threats), in Zartman (fn. 4), 207f.

⁴⁰ Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz,

thus merely a theory that explains the causes of convergence in terms of the causes of convergence—a tautology that is more serious and basic than the one noted by Cross. Power is not a thing, not even a thing-symbolizing-a-relationship, like money; it is an area for inquiry but not a concept of inquiry. The problem is therefore to conceptualize this capability (power) in such a way as to overcome the tautology of relational power, which does not separate process from outcome, without retreating into the taxonomic diversity of ingrediential power (the sources, bases, or elements of power).⁴¹ To be fully explanatory, a theory must not merely correlate effects or assert a causative relation, but must tell, in its chosen terms, what it is in one element that causes another.

One way of meeting the problem would be to remain within the concept of utilities and allow power to be expressed as added value (the sources of power to represent additional utilities). Threat and warning then become (negative) values to add to a given position if a party proceeds on its chosen course, whereas promises and predictions become positive additions (inducements).⁴² Power then is seen as the value of the deprivation or gratification required to dissuade or persuade a party to move from one position to another. Through this device, much of the reported psychological work on threats and other types of power could be related to outcomes and to game-theoretical analysis (through extended decision-trees or successive matrices), and to economic analysis (through utilities). If negotiation is treated as a self-stabilizing (i.e., outcome-reaching) process of output and feedback, then the abstract evaluation of communications between and within the two parties can be more accurately portrayed through the use of power as an added value. Similarly, the Nash solution could also be treated as an ideal type, achieved and hence explained without any use of power; picking up Cross's suggestion, deviation from this ideal could then be evaluated and understood through the concept of power as added value.

For all the conceptual attractiveness of this notion, the theoretical problems are not solved thereby. The chief remaining catch is that

"Decisions and Non-Decisions," in Bell, Edwards and Wagner (fn. 38), 79-93 and 100-109.

⁴¹ See Dahl, *ibid.*, 81, on base; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1960), 110-49, on elements. On power as money, see Talcott Parsons "On the Concept of Political Power," in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner (fn. 38), 251-84.

⁴² On the positive and negative pairs, see J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 420-30; Baldwin (fn. 19), and "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xv (December 1971), 471-86; Zartman (fn. 4), 206-11 and throughout.

power, so conceived, is not a constant function. As presently formulated, the concept of power can explain breakdown and agreement only if some acceptance level for each party, or equilibrium point between the parties, is posited or discovered. Viewed as an added value, it can be used to make better (i.e., both more realistic and more abstract) formulations of adjustment and convergence, particularly in the analysis of past cases; but that is not the same thing as a theoretical—as opposed to an analytical—formulation. Admittedly, to understand a past outcome is not to explain a future one (or even postdict a past one), at least in the same step. Yet the processes are related. If political scientists are ever to do more than add to the large number of studies in political history on individual negotiations,⁴³ and both understand and explain what goes on beyond the unique event (past or present/future), both theory and analysis need to be further developed. Social psychologists and economists are pacing us, but political scientists had better begin to find their stride if they are even going to show.

In the meanwhile, can it be said that a comparative case analyst, such as Young, would be better off in his understanding or explanation if he made use of Cross, Coddington, or Swingle and his co-contributors? Young's study stands out as an important example of a new breed that examines its cases comparatively and on the basis of stated hypotheses. By that very nature, however, the work would be even more useful if it went a step further toward systematic analysis and theory through the use of the type of studies reviewed here. Young's hypotheses are in their preliminary state; they are cumbersome and unrelated to an overarching theoretical framework, and yet they are by no means unamenable to such restructuring. Admittedly, it is difficult to operationalize Cross and Coddington, although Cross does make an occasional effort to illustrate his formulations with references to historical events. It would not, however, be an artificial exercise to examine bargaining during international crises in terms of patterns of concessions or communication and response, as Young comes close to doing under his fifteenth hypothesis on the coercive use of asymmetries.⁴⁴ Indeed, such

⁴³ For some good recent examples, see Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty* (University Park, Pa. 1970); R. J. Terchek, *The Making of the Test Ban Treaty* (Leiden 1970); Robert Randle, *Geneva 1954* (Princeton 1970); Nicholas Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971). For a collection of case studies in both the description and analysis of negotiations, see Zartman, ed. *The Analysis of Negotiation* (New York 1974).

⁴⁴ "As alternatives to actions that might precipitate violence during a crisis, efforts to structure the fundamental dimensions and specific issues of the clash in order to utilize or create advantageous asymmetries are apt to become highly influential coercive procedures" Young (fn. 5), 362. For another discussion of asymmetry in negotiation, see Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

a framework would provide the theoretical coherence and overcome the *ad hoc* or *a priori* nature of unrelated hypotheses, thus giving the analysis some claim to explanatory power. It is also possible to structure an analysis of international negotiations on the power typologies developed in the Swingle symposium, but such elements need to be related to outcomes or some other variables if explanation or even analysis is to be undertaken. Some of the experiments cited in Swingle suggest effects of the use of various types of power, and are thus more helpful for the refinement of choice (strategic) models of bargaining; such findings could usefully be tested against case studies alone or in combination with process (cataclysmic) models. There are some tremendous conceptual and operational problems to be overcome before such analysis can be carried through.⁴⁵ All the more reason to try soon.

⁴⁵ For an attempt to depict a simple monetary negotiation in rather tight, schematic terms, and the problems and lessons thereby brought to light, see *ibid.*, 67-74.