# 现代伦理《道德形而上学的奠基》

## 康德的二元论

- 意志 义务 法则 VS 自爱 偏好 —幸福
- 自由的先验形式 VS 自然的经验质料
- 康德认为,以往所有的伦理学(无论是古典的还是基督教的) 都是基于人性之经验质料的科学,也就是实用人类学,而他 首次提出了真正的先验道德科学,也就是道德形而上学
- 道德哲学的两个部分(道德形而上学VS实用人类学)反映了道德生活的内在斗争(义务VS偏好),其最终根据在于存在秩序的二元论(物自体VS现象界)
- 作为先验道德情感的敬重是弥合康德二元论的桥梁

#### 从符合义务到出于义务

- 双重道德斗争:是否符合义务?是否出于义务?在法则伦理的框架中综合了古典伦理和基督教伦理
- Here it would be easy to show how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it anything new, we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle. (4:404)
- though much may be done in conformity with what duty commands, still it is always doubtful whether it is really done from duty ... We can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives. (4:406)

# 假言命令和定言命令

#### • 假言命令:

- (1) 技术命令(为了某种具体的可能目的)
- "如果想要治好/毒死某人,就应该让他服用..."
- (2) 实用命令(为了总体性的必然目的,即幸福)
- "如果想要此世的幸福,就应该践行德性。"
- "如果想要彼世的幸福,就应该服从上帝。"

#### • 定言命令: 道德命令

- "只应该这样行动,以至于你能够意愿该行动的准则成为一个普遍的法则。"或者"只应该这样行动,就如该行动的准则能够被你意愿成为自然的普遍法则。"
- 实用命令和定言命令的区别究竟何在?

# 假言命令和定言命令

- 只要给定具体的目的,技术的假言命令是后天分析的;如果可以得出确切的幸福概念,实用的假言命令也将是先天分析的; 唯有定言命令才是<u>先天综合的(为什么?4:420-421)</u>
- 假言命令只是有条件的意志原则,唯有定言命令才是无条件的意志法则,从中推论出义务体系:针对自我/他人的完全/不完全义务
- 举例:不应该自残自杀(针对自我的完全义务)、不应该作虚假承诺(针对他人的完全义务)、应该完善自我(针对自我的不完全义务)、应该帮助他人(针对他人的不完全义务)
- 判定标准: 违背完全义务导致**思维的矛盾**, 违背不完全义务导致**意志的矛盾** (4:424)

# Wrong = unlawfull

- If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law, since that is impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the advantage of our inclination. (4:424)
- 道德法则或者义务体系是普遍必然的; 违背义务的实质就是违背合法则性, 试图成为道德法则的例外

# 道德法则的三大公式

- 道德法则的普遍性公式:"应该这样行动,以至于你能够意愿行动的准则成为一个普遍的法则。"
- 道德法则的目的性公式:"应该这样行动,以至于你自己的和任何其他人的人格(person)中的人性(humanity),你都要始终将其视作目的,而不仅仅视作手段,来使用。"
- 道德法则的立法性公式: "应该这样行动,以至于你的每一个准则都符合所有意志的普遍立法,也就是符合每个人自我立法的目的王国。"

#### 道德法则的三大公式

- 三个公式表达的不是三条道德法则,而是同一条道德法则的三个方面:第一个公式是道德法则的形式,第二个公式是道德法则的质料,第三个公式是道德法则的完备规定;不过,第一个公式是判定意志道德价值的最严格的方法
- A progression takes place here, as through the categories of the unity of the form of the will (its universality), the plurality of the matter (of objects, i.e. of ends), and the allness or totality of the system of these. (4:437)

## 意志自律与目的王国

• 道德法是意志的自我立法,体现了意志的自律;其他任何行动准则都是自然强加给意志的,仅仅暴露了意志的他律

[自律 autonomy / 他律 heteronomy]

- 自律的意志只服从自己给自己立的法,这就是理性存在者的内在价值: 尊严
- 所有自律的意志构成了目的王国,其中每一个意志主体既是立法者,也是臣民,道德法则的三个公式就是目的王国的宪章

## 从分析到综合

- This section then, like the first, was merely analytic. That
  morality is no phantom and this follows if the categorical
  imperative, and with it the autonomy of the will, is true and
  absolutely necessary as an a priori principle requires a
  possible synthetic use of pure practical reason. (4:445)
- 道德形而上学要建立关于道德的先验综合命题,前两章已经彻底清除了道德生活的经验质料,给出了道德法则的先验形式
- 然而,前两章关于道德法则的论述是分析的,即,仅仅从自由 意志这个概念本身出发,便可推出道德法则的体系;第三章的 任务是综合的,即,要论证我们确实拥有自由意志

#### 从自然到自由

- 因果律 (causality): 每一个事件都有原因
- 自然和自由是两种因果律: 自然法则和道德法则
- 自然法则: 每一个自然事件都由外在原因所决定
- 消极自由:摆脱外在的自然法则(摆脱他律)
- 积极自由: 服从内在的道德法则(实现自律)
- 问题在于: 我们真的拥有自由吗?

## 对于自由的"论证"

- 第一个论证: 作为理性的实践主体, 我们必须预设我们拥有自由意志(4:448)
- 第二个论证:作为注定追求幸福的主体,我们必然对于配得幸福具有兴趣,而这其实就是对于自由意志的兴趣(4:450)
- 这两个论证只在实践的意义上是有效的,在形而上学的层面是无效的
- 正是在此处,康德提出,我们必须回到《纯粹理性批判》对于两个世界的划分,才能真正论证自由意志(4:451)

## 人: 现象界和物自体之间

We must admit and assume behind appearances something else that is not appearance, namely things in themselves, although, since we can never become acquainted with them but only with how they affect us, we resign ourselves to being unable to come any closer to them or ever to know what they are in themselves ... as regards mere perception and receptivity to sensations he must count himself as belonging to the world of sense, but with regard to what there may be of pure activity in him (what reaches consciousness immediately and not through affection of the senses) he must count himself as belonging to the intelleaual world, of which however he has no further cognizance. (4:451)

# 人: 现象界和物自体之间

Hence he has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and cognize laws for the use of his powers and consequendy for all his actions; first, insofar as he belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy); second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason ... independence from the determining causes of the world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. With the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is now inseparably combined, and with the concept of autonomy the universal principle of morality, which in idea is the ground of all actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature is the ground of all appearances. (4:452-453)

# 从消极自由到积极自由

- 区分现象界和物自体,前者服从自然法则,后者不服从;这个区分也适用于人自身:人具有表象自我(apparent self)和本真自我(authentic self)
- 每个人的表象自我属于现象界,服从自然法则,每个人的本真自我不属于现象界,不服从自然法则(=消极自由),不服从自然法则就是不服从他律,而不服从他律就等于自律(=积极自由)
- 上述论证的根本前提在于:无论是现象界还是物自体,都服从 某种法则,没有不服从法则的存在。这一前提是否违反康德关 于物自体不可知的原则?

## 给理性划界,为信仰留下地盘

- the idea of a pure world of understanding as a whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong as rational beings (though on the other side we are also members of the world of sense), remains always a useful and permitted idea for the sake of a rational belief, even if all knowledge stops at its boundary. (4:462)
- And thus we do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be required of a philosophy that strives in its principles to the very boundary of human reason. (4:463)