



Using IDAPython to Make Your Life Easier: Part 1

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By Josh Grunzweig December 29, 2015 at 3:00 PM Category: Unit 42 Tags: IDA Pro, IDAPython, malware

As a malware reverse engineer, I often find myself using IDA Pro in my day-to-day activities. It should come as no surprise, seeing as IDA Pro is the industry standard (although alternatives such as radare2 and Hopper are gaining traction). One of the more powerful features of IDA that I implore all reverse engineers to make use of is the Python addition, aptly named 'IDAPython', which exposes a large number of IDA API calls. Of course, users also get the added benefit of using Python, which gives them access to the wealth of capabilities that the scripting language provides.

Unfortunately, there's surprisingly little information in the way of tutorials when it comes to IDAPython. Some exceptions to this include the following:

- "The IDA Pro Book" by Chris Eagle
- "The Beginner's Guide to IDAPython" by Alex Hanel
- "IDAPython Wiki" by Magic Lantern

In the hopes of increasing the amount of IDAPython tutorial material available to analysts, I'm providing examples of code I write as interesting use-cases arise. For Part 1 of this series, I'm going to walk through a situation where I was able to write a script to thwart multiple instances of string obfuscation witnessed in a malware sample.

Background

While reverse-engineering a malicious sample, I encountered the following function:

```
00405C7D loc_405C7D:
                                                                                                      ; CODE XREF: sub_405BF0+6B'j
                                                         jle
mov
shl
 text:00405C82
 text:00405C84
 text:00405C95
 text:00405C95 loc_405C95:
                                                                                                         CODE XREF: sub_405BF0+B1 j
.text:00405C95
.text:00405C95
.text:00405C9A
                                                                        dl, [eax+esi]
dl, [esi]
text:00405C9A
text:00405C9B
text:00405C9D
text:00405CA1
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA3
text:00405CA5
text:00405CAE
                                                                                                         CODE XREF: sub_405BF0+8B'j
                                                                       ; sub_405BF0+94 j
offset CriticalSection ; lpCriticalSection
                                                         push
call
                                                                        eax, dword_41C050
eax, 9
eax, offset unk_42
edi
                                                         mov
shl
add
.text:00405CB3
.text:00405CB6
.text:00405CBB
 text:00405CBC
.text:00405CBC
```

Figure 1 String decryption function

Based on experience, I suspected this might be used to decrypt data contained in the binary. The number of references to this function supported my suspicion.




Figure 2 High number of references to suspect function

As we can see in figure 2, there are 116 instances where this particular function is called. In each instance where this function is called, a blob of data is being supplied as an argument to this function via the ESI register.

```
.text:00401004
                                         esi, offset unk_418BE0
                                 call
                                         sub_405BF0
.text:0040100E
                                 mov
                                              ds:Lo
                                         ebp,
                                                          ; lpLibFileName
.text:00401014
                                 push
                                         eax
.text:00401015
                                         ebp ;
                                 call
.text:00401017
                                         esi, offset unk_418BF0
                                 mov
.text:0040101C
                                         edi, eax
.text:0040101E
                                 call
                                         sub_405BF0
.text:00401023
                                 push
.text:00401024
                                 push
                                         edi
                                                            hModule
.text:00401025
                                         edi, ds:GetPro
                                 call
.text:0040102B
                                         edi ;
.text:0040102D
                                         esi, offset unk_418C08
                                 mov
.text:00401032
                                         dword_41D020, eax
.text:00401037
                                 call
                                         sub_405BF0
.text:0040103C
                                 push
                                                           ; lpLibFileName
.text:0040103D
                                         ebp ;
                                 call
                                         esi, offset unk 418C18
.text:0040103F
                                 mov
.text:00401044
                                 mov
                                         ebx, eax
                                         sub_405BF0
.text:00401046
                                 call
.text:0040104B
                                 push
.text:0040104C
                                 push
                                         ebx
                                                            hModule
                                         edi ;
.text:0040104D
                                 call
                                         esi, offset unk 418C2C
.text:0040104F
                                 mov
.text:00401054
                                         dword_41D01C, eax
                                 call
                                         sub 405BF0
.text:00401059
.text:0040105E
                                 push
.text:0040105F
                                 push
                                         edi ; GetProcA
.text:00401060
                                 call
                                         esi, offset unk 418C44
.text:00401062
                                         dword 41D018,
.text:00401067
.text:0040106C
                                         sub_405BF0
```

Figure 3 Instances where the suspect function (405BF0) is called

At this point I am confident that this function is being used by the malware to decrypt strings during runtime. When faced with this type of situation, I typically have a few choices:

- 1. I can manually decrypt and rename these obfuscated strings
- 2. I can dynamically run this sample and rename the strings as I encounter them
- 3. I can write a script that will both decrypt these strings and rename them for me

If this were a situation where the malware was only decrypting a few strings overall, I might take the first or second approach. However, as we've identified previously, this function is being used 116 times, so the scripting approach will make a lot more sense.

Scripting in IDAPython

The first step in defeating this string obfuscation is to identify and replicate the decryption function. Fortunately for us, this particular decryption function is quite simple. The function is simply taking the first character of the blob and using it as a single-byte XOR key for the remaining data.

E4 91 96 88 89 8B 8A CA 80 88 88

In the above example, we would take the 0xE4 byte and XOR it against the remaining data. Doing so results in the string of 'urlmon.dll'. In Python, we can replicate this decryption as such:

In testing this code, we get the expected result.

```
1 >>> from binascii import *
2 >>> d = unhexlify("E4 91 96 88 89 8B 8A CA 80 88 88".replace(" ",''))
3 >>> decrypt(d)
4 'urlmon.dll'
```

The next step for us would be to identify what code is referencing the decryption function, and extracting the data being supplied as an argument. Identifying references to a function in IDA proves to be quite simple, as the XrefsTo() API function does exactly this. For this script, I'm going to hardcode the address of the decryption script. The following code can be used to identify the addresses of the references to the decryption function. As a test, I'm simply going to print out the addresses in hexadecimal.

```
for addr in XrefsTo(0x00405BF0, flags=0):
2
     print hex(addr.frm)
3
4
   Result:
5
   0x401009L
6
   0x40101eL
7
   0x401037L
8
  0x401046L
9
  0x401059L
10 0x40106cL
11 0x40107fL
12 <truncated>
```

Getting the supplied argument to these cross-references and extracting the raw data proves to be slightly more tricky, but certainly not impossible. The first thing we'll want to do is get the offset address provided in the 'mov esi, offset unk_??' instruction that proceeds the call to the string decryption function. To do this, we're going to step backward one instruction at a time for each reference to the string decryption function and look for a 'mov esi, offset [addr]' instruction. To get the actual address of the offset address, we can use the GetOperandValue() API function.

The following code allows us to accomplish this:

```
def find_function_arg(addr):
1
2
     while True:
3
       addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
       if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "esi" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
4
5
         print "We found it at 0x%x" % GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
6
         break
8
   Example Results:
   Python>find_function_arg(0x00401009)
10 We found it at 0x418be0
```

Now we simply need to extract the string from the offset address. Normally we would use the **GetString()** API function, however, since the strings in question are raw binary data, this function will not work as expected. Instead, we're going to iterate byte-by-byte until we reach a null terminator. The following code can be used to accomplish this:

```
1 def get_string(addr):
2   out = ""
3   while True:
4    if Byte(addr) != 0:
5       out += chr(Byte(addr))
6    else:
7       break
8    addr += 1
9    return out
```

At this point, it's simply a matter of taking everything we've created thus far and putting it together.

```
def find_function_arg(addr):
2
     while True:
3
       addr = idc.PrevHead(addr)
       if GetMnem(addr) == "mov" and "esi" in GetOpnd(addr, 0):
4
5
          return GetOperandValue(addr, 1)
     return ""
6
   def get_string(addr):
8
     out = ""
9
10
     while True:
11
       if Byte(addr) != 0:
12
         out += chr(Byte(addr))
13
       else:
14
         break
15
       addr += 1
     return out
16
17
18 def decrypt(data):
19
     length = len(data)
20
     0 = ""
21
22
     while c < length:</pre>
23
       o += chr(ord(data[0]) ^ ord(data[c]))
24
25
     return o
```

```
30
     string = get_string(ref)
31
     dec = decrypt(string)
32
     print "Ref Addr: 0x%x | Decrypted: %s" % (x.frm, dec)
33
34
   Results:
35
   [*] Attempting to decrypt strings in malware
   Ref Addr: 0x401009 | Decrypted: urlmon.dll
36
                        Decrypted: URLDownloadToFileA
37
   Ref Addr: 0x40101e
38 Ref Addr: 0x401037 | Decrypted: wininet.dll
39 Ref Addr: 0x401046 | Decrypted: InternetOpenA
40 Ref Addr: 0x401059 | Decrypted: InternetOpenUrlA
41 Ref Addr: 0x40106c | Decrypted: InternetReadFile
42 <truncated>
```

We can see all of the decrypted strings within the malware. While we can stop at this point, if we take the next step of providing a comment of the decrypted string at both the string decryption reference address and the position of the encrypted data, we can easily see what data is being provided. To do this, we'll make use of the MakeComm() API function. Adding the following two lines of code after our last print statement will add the necessary comments:

```
1 MakeComm(x.frm, dec)
2 MakeComm(ref, dec)
```

Adding this extra step cleans up the cross-reference view nicely, as we can see below. Now we can easily identify where particular strings are being referenced.




Figure 4 Cross-reference to string decryption after running IDAPython script

Additionally, when navigating the disassembly, we can see the decrypted strings as comments.

```
.text:00401004
                                         esi, offset unk_418BE0
.text:00401009
                                                           ; urlmon.dll
                                 call
                                         sub 405BF0
.text:0040100E
                                         ebp, ds:Loa
                                 mov
                                                          ; lpLibFileName
.text:00401014
.text:00401015
                                 call
                                         esi, offset unk 418BF0
.text:00401017
.text:0040101C
                                         edi, eax
                                 mov
                                                             URLDownloadToFileA
                                 call
                                         sub_405BF0
                                                            lpProcName
hModule
.text:00401023
                                 push
.text:00401024
                                 push
                                         edi
.text:00401025
                                         edi, ds:GetPr
                                 call
                                         edi ;
.text:0040102B
                                          esi, offset unk 418C08
.text:0040102D
                                         dword_41D020, eax
.text:00401032
                                 call
.text:00401037
                                         sub 405BF0
                                                            wininet.dll
                                                           ; lpLibFileNam
.text:0040103C
                                 push
.text:0040103D
                                 call
.text:0040103F
                                         esi, offset unk_418C18
.text:00401044
                                         ebx, eax
                                                            InternetOpenA
                                 call
.text:00401046
                                         sub_405BF0
.text:0040104B
                                push
.text:0040104C
                                 push
.text:0040104D
                                 call
                                         edi ; GetProcAd
.text:0040104F
                                         esi, offset unk_418C2C
.text:00401054
                                         dword_41D01C, eax
text:00401059
                                 call
                                         sub_405BF0
                                                             InternetOpenUrlA
                                push
.text:0040105E
                                         eax
.text:00401060
                                 call
                                         edi ;
.text:00401062
                                          esi, offset unk_418C44
.text:00401067
                                         dword_41D018, eax
                                                           ; InternetReadFile
.text:0040106C
                                         sub 405BF0
```

Figure 5 Assembly after IDAPython script is run

Conclusion

Using IDAPython, we were able to take an otherwise difficult task of decrypting 161 instances of encrypted strings in a malicious binary and defeat the binary quite easily. As we've seen, IDAPython can be a powerful tool for a reverse engineer, simplifying various tasks and saving precious time.

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