

SECURITY (COMP0141): TYPES OF ACCESS CONTROL



EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS



TYPES OF FILE ACCESSES

subjects (s)

objects (o)

access rights (r/p)

	non-ALT	ALT
non-OBS	execute	append
OBS	read	write

Subjects are the users of the system

Objects are the different files

Access rights: execute, read, write, append (some combination of ALTeration and OBServation)

EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS

S: Alice, Bob, penguin

O: photo

R: view, tag, auth

	photo
Alice	view tag
Bob	view tag
penguin	view tag auth

tag whom?
authorise whom?

EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS

—

what if Alice
wants to change
who can
view photo?

S: Alice, Bob, penguin
O: photo, Alice, Bob, penguin
R: view, tag, auth




	photo	Alice	Bob	penguin
Alice	view	tag auth	tag	
Bob	view	tag	tag auth	tag
penguin			tag	tag auth

ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES

mandatory (MAC)

permissions assigned

discretionary (DAC)

owner sets permissions

EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS

S: Alice, Bob, penguin

O: photo, Alice, Bob, penguin

R: view, tag, auth, **owner**

	photo	Alice	Bob	penguin
Alice	view owner	tag auth	tag	
Bob	view	tag	tag auth	tag
penguin			tag	tag auth

GRAHAM-DENNING: CREATION

1. subject x creates object o





	photo
Alice	owner


2. subject x creates subject s




	profile
Alice	control owner

GRAHAM-DENNING: DELETION

3. subject x **deletes** object o



4. subject x **deletes** subject s



GRAHAM-DENNING: RIGHTS

5. subject x grants right r/r^* on o to s



	photo
Alice	owner
Bob	view

**reference
monitor**

$(x, o, \text{"owner"})?$
then add $(s, o, r/r^*)$

6. subject x transfers right r/r^* on o to s




	photo
Alice	owner
Bob	view*
penguin	view

**reference
monitor**

$(x, o, r^*)?$
then add $(s, o, r/r^*)$

GRAHAM-DENNING: RIGHTS

7. subject x deletes right r/r^* on o for s (revocation)



	photo
Alice	owner
Bob	view

reference
monitor

($x, o, \text{"owner"}$) or
($x, s, \text{"control"}$)?

then delete ($s, o, r/r^*$)

8. subject x checks rights on o for s




	photo
Alice	owner
Bob	view

reference
monitor

($x, o, \text{"owner"}$) or
($x, s, \text{"control"}$)?

then return ($s, o, *$)

EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS

S: Alice, Bob, penguin

O: photo, Alice, Bob, penguin















R: view, owner, control

2 4 2 4 2 4 1 3

	Alice	Bob	penguin	photo
Alice	control owner			owner
Bob		control owner		5 view* 8
penguin			control owner	6 view 7

EXAMPLE: SOCIAL NETWORKS

Your name, profile picture, gender and networks are always open to everyone ([learn why](#)). We suggest leaving the other basic settings below open to everyone to make it easier for real world friends to find and connect with you.

 Search for me on Facebook	This lets friends find you on Facebook. If you're visible to fewer people, it may prevent you from connecting with your real world friends.	 Everyone ▼
 Send me friend requests	This lets real world friends send you friend requests. If not set to everyone, it could prevent you from connecting with your friends.	 Everyone ▼
 Send me messages	This lets friends you haven't connected with yet send you a message.	 Friends of Friends ▼
 See my friend list		 Friends of Friends ▼
 See my education and work	This helps classmates and coworkers find you.	 Everyone ▼
 See my current city and hometown	This helps friends you grew up with and friends near you confirm it's really you.	 Everyone ▼
 See my interests and other Pages	This lets you connect with people with common interests based on things you like on and off Facebook.	 Friends Only ▼

in large systems, assign
access rights based on roles

ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES

mandatory (MAC)

permissions assigned

discretionary (DAC)

owner sets permissions

role-based (RBAC)

can implement MAC or DAC
large hierarchical organisations

RBAC

Clearly the only **scalable** solution

- 10 users of 10 resources = 100 policy definitions!
- Also means we're less likely to make mistakes

Already saw it used for UNIX permissions (owner, group, world)

People change but roles stay the same!

ACCESS CONTROL IN ORGANISATIONS

How do you ensure that an access control policy is implemented correctly?

- No gaps
- No conflicts
- No unintended restrictions

How do you maintain it? **Information asymmetry** between system administrators and system owners

CASE STUDY: BUG BOUNTIES

Category	Examples	Applications that permit taking over a Google account [1]	Other highly sensitive applications [2]	Normal Google applications	Non-integrated acquisitions and other sandboxed or lower priority applications [3]
Vulnerabilities giving direct access to Google servers					
Remote code execution	Command injection, deserialization bugs, sandbox escapes	\$31,337	\$31,337	\$31,337	\$1,337 - \$5,000
Unrestricted file system or database access	Unsandboxed XXE, SQL injection	<div>23 Jun 2016</div> <div>Facebook's Bug - Delete any video from Facebook</div>			
Logic flaw bugs leaking or bypassing significant security controls	Direct object reference, remote user impersonation				
Vulnerabilities giving indirect access to Google servers					
Execute code on the client	Web: Cross-site scripting Mobile / Hardware: Code execution	<div>“When I delete my comment, then attached video gets deleted. As it uses ONLY video-id and there are no permission checks placed to verify if the user owns the video. Assumptions are made that user will ONLY upload/attach his/her own videos.”</div>			
Other valid security vulnerabilities	Web: CSRF, Clickjacking Mobile / Hardware: Information leak, privilege escalation				

QUIZ!

Please go to

`https://moodle.ucl.ac.uk/mod/quiz/view.php?id=2850962`

to take this week's quiz!