
# How I earned \$\$\$\$ by finding confidential customer data including plain-text passwords!





How directory indexing and file path traversal led to confidential customer data in plain sight!

Application security, I remembered that I had forgotten to make arrangements for an upcoming family meeting. It required me to avail the services of a very popular Indian startup. And that's when it struck me "why not spend some of my time to look for some security loopholes on the site which I use regularly?"

# 1. Finding Sub-Domains

I started my recon with enumerating the subdomains. Here I used <u>@tomnomnom</u>'s **AssetFinder**, the output was then fed to an another great tool by @tomnomnom httprobe.

One domain in particular looked important to me, it is something like "https://api.xxxx.com"

# 2. Directory Searching

Second step I usually do is searching for directories/files. Here, I used **Dirsearch** with a custom wordlist from SecLists to discover content. While traversing through all the results, I browsed "https://api.xxxx.com/application/logs", to my surprise, the directory was accessible and indexing was enabled.

# Index of /typo3conf/ext

Name

**Last modified** Size Description

Parent Directory		-	
<u>automaketemplate/</u>	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	
introduction/	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	
jquerycolorbox/	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	
<u>realurl/</u>	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	
<u>tt_news/</u>	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	
wt_spamshield/	23-Nov-2011 21:07	-	

Apache/2 Server at example.org Port 80

Source: <a href="https://docs.typo3.org/m/typo3/guide-security/8.7/en-us/GuidelinesAdministrators/DirectoryIndexing/Index.html">https://docs.typo3.org/m/typo3/guide-security/8.7/en-us/GuidelinesAdministrators/DirectoryIndexing/Index.html</a>

It was a log directory, some of the logs were old, dating back to 2018, so I tried to access the most recent log files, it was a php file "log-09–09–2019.php" and got an error "No direct script access allowed". Moving on I noticed there was a gunzipped/compressed version of the same log file "log-09–09–2019.php.gz".


The gunzip file was getting downloaded, I uncompressed it and opened the file in vim and "VOILA!!". It opened me to a completely different world, it was a stash of gold/customer data for any hacker out there.

In the file I found customer's email address, phone no., credit card

# numbers (some digits masked), PLAIN-TEXT passwords (no way).

There were **FB OAuth tokens**, basically all of the data which can lead to a data breach.

The issue was reported and I received a 4 digit bounty in \$



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