


hasherezade's 1001 nights

projects and tasks that I do in my free time



← Hook the planet! Solving FlareOn4 Challenge6
with libPeConv

Solving a PyInstaller-compiled crackme →

Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process

Posted on [December 18, 2017](#)

Recently [at Black Hat Europe conference](#), [Tal Liberman](#) and [Eugene Kogan](#) from enSilo lab presented a new technique called Process Doppelgänging. The video from the talk is available [here](#). (Also, it is worth mentioning that Tal Liberman is an author of [the AtomBombing injection](#)).

This technique is a possible substituent of the well-known Process Hollowing (RunPE), that is commonly used in malware. Both, Process Doppelgänging and Process

Recent Posts

- [PE-bear - version 0.3.8 available](#)
- [White Rabbit crackme!](#)
- [Unpacking a malware with libPeConv \(Pykspa case study\)](#)
- [Solving a PyInstaller-compiled crackme](#)
- [Process Doppelgänging - a new way to impersonate a process](#)

Archives

- [April 2018](#) (1)
- [February 2018](#) (1)
- [January 2018](#) (2)

Hollowing, gives an ability to run a malicious executable under the cover of a legitimate one. Although they both serve the same goal of process impersonation, they differ in implementation and make use of different API functions. This is why, most of the current antivirus solutions struggled in detecting Process Doppelgänger. In this post we will take a closer look on how the Process Doppelgänger works and compare it with the popular RunPE.

WARNING: Running this PoC on Windows 10 may cause a BSOD – the reason is a bug in Windows 10. Details [here](#).

Process Doppelgänger vs Process Hollowing (aka RunPE)

The popular RunPE technique substitutes the PE content after the process is created (suspended), but before it is fully initialized. In order to implement this technique, we need to do by our own the step that WindowsLoader took so far: converting the PE file from it's raw form into a virtual form, relocating it to the base where it is going to be loaded, and pasting into the process' memory. Then, we can awake the process from the suspended state, and the WindowsLoader will continue loading our (potentially malicious) payload. You can find a commented implementation [here](#).

The Process Doppelgänger, in contrary, substitutes the PE content before even the process is created. We overwrite the file image before the loading starts – so, WindowsLoader automatically takes care of the fore-mentioned steps. My sample implementation of this technique can be found [here](#).

NTFS transactions

- [December 2017](#) (2)
- [November 2017](#) (1)
- [June 2017](#) (4)
- [May 2017](#) (2)
- [December 2016](#) (1)
- [November 2016](#) (1)
- [July 2016](#) (3)
- [June 2016](#) (1)
- [April 2016](#) (1)
- [March 2016](#) (2)
- [February 2016](#) (1)
- [October 2014](#) (1)
- [March 2014](#) (1)
- [February 2014](#) (2)
- [January 2014](#) (1)
- [November 2013](#) (1)
- [October 2013](#) (1)
- [September 2013](#) (1)
- [August 2013](#) (1)
- [July 2013](#) (3)
- [July 2012](#) (1)
- [May 2012](#) (1)
- [April 2012](#) (1)

Categories

- [CONFidence](#) (3)
- [CrackMe](#) (11)
- [KernelMode](#) (3)
- [Malware](#) (13)
- [Malware Decryptor](#) (5)
- [PE-bear](#) (11)
- [Programming](#) (4)
- [Techniques](#) (4)
- [Tools](#) (7)
- [Tutorial](#) (10)
- [WKE](#) (3)

On the way to it's goal, Process Doppelgänger uses a very little known API for NTFS transactions.

Transactions is a mechanism commonly used while operating on databases – however, in a similar way it exists in the NTFS file system. It allows to encapsulate a series of operations into a single unit. Thanks to this, multiple operations can be treated as a whole: they can either succeed as a whole – and be committed, or fail as a whole – and be rolled back. Outside of our transaction, the result of the operations is not visible. It starts to be noticeable after the transaction is closed.

Windows API makes several functions available for the purpose of transactions:

- [CreateTransaction](#)
- [CommitTransaction](#)
- [RollbackTransaction](#)
- [CreateFileTransacted](#)
- [MoveFileTransacted](#)
- [DeleteFileTransacted](#)
- [CreateDirectoryTransacted](#)
- [RemoveDirectoryTransacted](#)
- etc...

Briefly speaking, we can create a file inside a transaction, and for no other process this file is visible, as long as our transaction is not committed. It can be used to drop and run malicious payloads in an unnoticed way. If we roll back the transaction in an appropriate moment, the operating system behaves like our file was never created.

The steps taken

Blog Stats

■ 190,957 hits

All my works included here are licensed under:



Usage of NTFS transactions

Firstly, we need to create a new transaction, using the API [CreateTransaction](#).

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L144

Then, inside of this transaction we will create a dummy file to store our payload (using [CreateFileTransacted](#)).

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L149

This dummy file will be then used to create a section (a buffer in a special format), which makes a base for our new process.

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L173

After we created the section, we no longer need the dummy file – we can close it and roll back the transaction (using [RollbackTransaction](#)).

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L188

Usage of undocumented process creation API

So far we created a section containing our payload, loaded from the dummy file. You may ask – how are we going to create a process out of this? The well known API functions for creating processes on Windows require file path to be given. However, if we look deeper inside those functions, we will find that they are just wrappers for other, undocumented functions. There is a function `Zw/NtCreateProcessEx` which, rather than

the path to the raw PE file, requires a section with a PE content to be given. If we use this function, we can create a new process in a “fileless” way.

Definition of the NtCreateProcessEx:

```
NTSTATUS NTAPI NtCreateProcessEx (  
    OUT PHANDLE ProcessHandle,  
    IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,  
    IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes OPTIONAL,  
    IN HANDLE ParentProcess,  
    IN ULONG Flags,  
    IN HANDLE SectionHandle OPTIONAL,  
    IN HANDLE DebugPort OPTIONAL,  
    IN HANDLE ExceptionPort OPTIONAL,  
    IN BOOLEAN InJob  
);
```

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L196

Creation of process by this way requires more steps to be taken – there are some structures that we have to fill and setup manually – such as process parameters (RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS). After filling them and wring into the space of the remote process, we need to link them to the PEB. Mistake in doing it will cause the process to not run.


https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L76

After setting everything up, we can run the process by creating a new thread starting from it's Entry Point.

https://github.com/hasherezade/process_doppelganging/blob/master/main.cpp#L246


Despite some inconveniences, creating the process by a low-level API gives also interesting advantages. For example, we can [set manually the file path](#) - making an illusion, that this is the file that has been loaded, even if it was not. By this way, we can impersonate any windows executable, but also we can make an illusion, that the PE file runs from a non-existing file, or a file of a non-executable format.

Below you can see an example where the illusion was created, that the PE file runs from a TXT file:



How to detect?

Although this technique may look dangerous, it can be easily detected with the help of any tool that compares if the image loaded in the memory matches the corresponding file on the disk. Example: detection with [PE-sieve](#) (former hook_finder):




The process of injection is also not fully stealthy. It still requires writing into the memory (including PEB) of the newly created process, as well as creating a remote thread. Such operations may trigger alerts.

In addition, the mechanism of NTFS transactions is very rarely used – so, if any executable call the related APIs, it should become an object of a closer examination.

So far this technique is new, that's why it is not broadly recognized by AV products – but once we are aware of it's existence, implementing detection should not be difficult.

Share this:



Be the first to like this.

Related

[How to turn a DLL into a standalone EXE](#)

In "Malware"

[Starting with Windows Kernel Exploitation – part 3 – stealing the Access Token](#)

In "KernelMode"

[Hijacking extensions handlers as a malware persistence method](#)

In "Malware"



About hasherezade

Programmer and researcher, interested in InfoSec.

[View all posts by hasherezade →](#)

This entry was posted in [Malware](#), [Programming](#), [Techniques](#) and tagged [PE](#), [Process Doppelganging](#). Bookmark the [permalink](#).

← [Hook the planet! Solving FlareOn4 Challenge6 with libPeConv](#)

[Solving a PyInstaller-compiled crackme](#) →

3 Responses to *Process Doppelganging – a new way to impersonate a process*



[lallouslab](#) says:

December 31, 2017 at 3:17 am

Informative and straight to the point, thanks!

[Reply](#)

Pingback: [PROCESS DOPPELGANGING | Security and its occultism](#)

Pingback: [Examining and Detecting the Doppelganging Malware Evasion Technique - CorrelationX Blog](#)

Leave a Reply

Enter your comment here...

hasherezade's 1001 nights

Blog at WordPress.com.

