JUL 30, 2018 - 5 MINUTE READ - COMMENTS - REVERSE ENGINEERING DVTA WRITEUP

DVTA - Part 3 - Network Recon

In this part, we will focus on network traffic. More often than not, thick client applications have some sort of network connectivity. They talk to some server(s) to do things.

Who am I?

I am Parsia, a security engineer at Electronic Arts.

I write about application security, reverse engineering, Go, cryptography, and (obviously) videogames.

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Collections

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Previous parts are:

- DVTA - Part 1 - Setup
- DVTA - Part 2 - Cert Pinning and Login Button

Discovering the Endpoints

In part 1 we did some network discovering with Procmon. Now we will do more using both Wireshark and Procmon. IRL use whatever tool you are comfortable with.

We do this because we need to figure out where the application talks to and using what protocol. At your day job, this step is probably the best bang for your buck in terms of the number of vulnerabilities found. Thick client applications are notorious for having inadequate server-side controls and trusting the client too much.

Capturing Loopback Traffic on Windows with Wireshark

Since we have deployed our FTP and MSSQL servers locally, we need to be able to capture local traffic. Windows does not have a real loopback adapter so WinPcap driver (used by Wireshark) cannot do it. The fix is using the npcap driver instead. For more information read https://wiki.wireshark.org/CaptureSetup/Loopback.

Download and install npcap from https://github.com/nmap/npcap/releases and then install Wireshark.

Recon with Wireshark

Run Wireshark, choose `Npcap Loopback Adapter`, and the VM's LAN. Then start capturing traffic.

Thick Client Proxying
Go/Golang
Blockchain/Distributed Ledgers
Automation
Reverse Engineering
Crypto(graphy)
CTFs/Writeups
WinAppDbg
AWSome.pw - S3 bucket squatting - my very legit branded vulnerability

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

Setting up Wireshark to capture traffic

Run the patched application from the previous post but don't do anything.

Fetch Login Token

Click on the `Fetch Login Token` button. We already know where it goes, but let's inspect it with Wireshark.

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Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
0.000000	10.0.2.15	10.0.0.1	DNS	67	Standard query 0x696e A time.is
0.019668	10.0.0.1	10.0.2.15	DNS	83	Standard query response 0x696e A time.is A 204.62.12.123
0.020009	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	66	49304 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
0.041151	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
0.041190	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
0.041385	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TLSv1	201	Client Hello
0.041573	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=148 Win=65535 Len=0
0.058864	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TLSv1	199	Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
0.071922	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TLSv1	251	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message, Application Data, Ap
0.072074	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=146 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=0
0.101361	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=146 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101363	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=1566 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101364	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=2986 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101399	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=345 Ack=4406 Win=64240 Len=0
0.101520	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=4406 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101522	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=5826 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101523	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=7246 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101524	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=8666 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101539	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=345 Ack=10086 Win=64240 Len=0

Captured traffic to time.is in Wireshark

Looking at the capture, it's clear what the application is doing.

- Red: DNS lookup for `time.is`
- Green: TCP connection to `time.is` (`204.62.12.123`). We can see the handshake `SYN-SYNACK-ACK`.
- Orange: TLS handshake with `time.is`. `ClientHello`, `ServerHello`, and the rest.

Normal User Login

Clear the capture and this time login with a valid set of non-admin credentials (e.g. `rebecca:rebecca`).

3	0.000183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108 49307 → 49622 [SYN] Seq=0
4	0.000205	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108 49622 → 49307 [SYN, ACK]
5	0.000227	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=1

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

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MSSQL traffic captured in Wireshark

First, we see the TCP connection and then the login traffic to port `49622`. To decode the traffic with Wireshark, right-click on any outgoing packet and select `Decode As...`. Then select `TDS` for the combo box under `Current`. This tells Wireshark to decode all traffic to that port using the `TDS` dissector.



Choosing the TDS dissector for MSSQL traffic

And now packets are annotated.

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

1	0.000000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UDP	84	61621 → 1434 Len=12
2	0.000103	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UDP	248	1434 → 61621 Len=94
3	0.000183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49307 → 49622 [SYN] Seq=0
4	0.000205	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49622 → 49307 [SYN, ACK] S
5	0.000227	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=1
6	0.000527	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	292	TDS7 pre-login message
7	0.000538	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=1
8	0.011330	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	170	Response
9	0.011344	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=10
10	0.011522	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	402	TDS7 pre-login message
11	0.011532	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=44
12	0.012191	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	1732	TDS7 pre-login message
13	0.012222	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=26
14	0.021456	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	368	TDS7 pre-login message
15	0.021502	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=86
16	0.024064	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	218	TDS7 pre-login message
17	0.024075	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=40
18	0.024363	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	798	TLS exchange
19	0.024372	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=93
20	0.025108	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	926	Response
21	0.025120	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=76
22	0.026925	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	412	SQL batch
23	0.026936	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=13

Annotated MSSQL traffic in Wireshark

Some observations:

1. TLS is not enabled. That's bad.
2. SQL queries are created on the client and sent outside. This is ripe for exploitation.

Going through the packets, select the one that says `SQL batch` and see the SQL query is created client-side and sent out. Any time you see client-side queries, you should be concerned.

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

Client querying MSSQL server

The following query is executed (later we will come back and play with this):

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- `SELECT * FROM users where username='rebecca' and password='rebecca`

The response contains the query results which leaks the structure of the `users` table:



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

Login query response

Admin Login

We know administrators can login to the application and backup data to an FTP server. We want to observe this traffic with Wireshark.

Logout and login with `admin:admin123`. Note admin interface has only one button, `Backup Data to FTP Server`. This should give us the clue that FTP credentials are hardcoded.

Looking at Wireshark, we will see two different streams of traffic:

1. Connection to the MSSQL server.
2. Connection to the FTP server.

The connection to the MSSQL server is similar to what we have seen before (port `49622`).



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```
 8 0.000398    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     466 TDS7 pre-login message
 9 0.000425    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=44 Ac
10 0.000949    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     398 TDS7 pre-login message
11 0.000961    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49266 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=296 A
12 0.001101    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     218 TDS7 pre-login message
13 0.001111    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=201 A
14 0.001172    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     798 TLS exchange
15 0.001181    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=201 A
16 0.001731    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     926 Response
17 0.001743    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49266 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=720 A
18 0.034752    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     232 SQL batch
19 0.034771    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TCP      84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=622 A
20 0.035420    127.0.0.1    127.0.0.1    TDS     394 Response

▷ Frame 18: 232 bytes on wire (1856 bits), 118 bytes captured (944 bits) on interface 1
▷ Null/Loopback
▷ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
▷ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49266, Dst Port: 49622, Seq: 720, Ack: 622, Len: 74
◢ Tabular Data Stream
    Type: SQL batch (1)
  ▷ Status: 0x01, End of message
    Length: 74
    Channel: 0
    Packet Number: 1
    Window: 0
  ◢ TDS Query Packet
    ▷ Packet data stream headers
      Query: select * from expenses

0000  02 00 00 00 45 00 00 72  06 5b 40 00 80 06 00 00   ····E··r ·[@·····
0010  7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01  c0 72 c1 d6 21 02 8e 45   ········ ·r··!··E
0020  39 86 6a 2a 50 18 00 1d  85 ce 00 00 01 01 00 4a   9·j*P··· ·······J
0030  00 00 01 00 16 00 00 00  12 00 00 00 02 00 00 00   ········ ········
0040  00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00  00 00 73 00 65 00 6c 00   ········ ··s·e·l·
0050  65 00 63 00 74 00 20 00  2a 00 20 00 66 00 72 00   e·c·t· · *· ·f·r·
0060  6f 00 6d 00 20 00 65 00  78 00 70 00 65 00 6e 00   o·m· ·e· x·p·e·n·
0070  73 00 65 00 73 00                                  s·e·s·
```

Backup traffic to MSSQL server

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The application connects and runs the following query:

- `select * from expenses`

Next is the FTP connection to `localhost:22`. We can see it's in cleartext and user/pass is visible.

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

FTP traffic and password displayed in Wireshark

For easier visualization, right-click on any packet in the stream and select `Follow > TCP Stream`.

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

Following the TCP stream in Wireshark

Application logins with `dvta:p@ssw0rd` and then stores `admin.csv` on the FTP server (which we can assume contains information from the `expenses` table).

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

All FTP traffic in stream displayed in Wireshark

Register Functionality

We can also register new users. Users will not be administrators. Let's look at that traffic too.

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

SQL statement to register a new user

As we can see, traffic is similar to the previous parts. This time we are sending an `insert` query:

- `insert into users values('test1','password','test1@example.com','0')`

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Note the `0` in the end. It's setting the `isadmin` column that we observed earlier.

Recon with Procmon

We can do the same with Sysinternals Procmon. We can see the traffic but we can identify the endpoints. For the record, Procmon does a lot more than what we are using it for.

Quit the application, run it again, login as admin and backup the data. Then run Procmon and set the following filters similar to what we did in part 1 to identify the FTP endpoint:

- `Process Name contains dvta`. I have set this to `contains` because I have versioned patched executables from part 2.
- `Operation is TCP Connect`. Or you could only enable network activity like part 1 (DVTA - Part 1 - Setup - Discover the FTP Address).



Application endpoints displayed in Procmon

We can see connections to:

- Fetching login token from `time.is:443`.
- MSSQL server at `localhost:49622`.
- FTP at `localhost:22` and `54823` (ephemeral port for actual `STOR` action).

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Conclusion

We learned how to identify network endpoints using two tools. We did some limited traffic analysis. In the next part, we will learn how to manipulate traffic in different ways.

Posted by Parsia • Jul 30, 2018 • Tags: Wireshark Procmon

DVTA - Part 2 - Cert Pinning and Login Button

DVTA - Part 4 - Traffic Tampering with dnSpy

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

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