

Hackerman's Hacking Tutorials

The knowledge of anything, since all things have causes, is not acquired or complete unless it is known by its causes. - Avicenna

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DVTA - Part 3 - Network Recon

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In this part, we will focus on network traffic. More often than not, thick client applications have some sort of network connectivity. They talk to some server(s) to do things.

Who am I?

I am Parsia, a security engineer at [Electronic Arts](#).

I write about application security, reverse engineering, Go, cryptography, and (obviously) videogames.

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in

Collections

Previous parts are:

- [DVTA - Part 1 - Setup](#)
- [DVTA - Part 2 - Cert Pinning and Login Button](#)

Discovering the Endpoints

In part 1 we did some network discovering with Procmon. Now we will do more using both Wireshark and Procmon. IRL use whatever tool you are comfortable with.

We do this because we need to figure out where the application talks to and using what protocol. At your day job, this step is probably the best bang for your buck in terms of the number of vulnerabilities found. Thick client applications are notorious for having inadequate server-side controls and trusting the client too much.

Capturing Loopback Traffic on Windows with Wireshark

Since we have deployed our FTP and MSSQL servers locally, we need to be able to capture local traffic. Windows does not have a real loopback adapter so WinPcap driver (used by Wireshark) cannot do it. The fix is using the npcap driver instead. For more information read <https://wiki.wireshark.org/CaptureSetup/Loopback>.

Download and install npcap from <https://github.com/nmap/npcap/releases> and then install Wireshark.

Recon with Wireshark

Run Wireshark, choose `Npcap Loopback Adapter`, and the VM's LAN. Then start capturing traffic.

[Thick Client Proxying](#)

[Go/Golang](#)

[Blockchain/Distributed Ledgers](#)

[Automation](#)


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Setting up Wireshark to capture traffic

Run the patched application from the previous post but don't do anything.

Fetch Login Token

Click on the `Fetch Login Token` button. We already know where it goes, but let's inspect it with Wireshark.

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
0.000000	10.0.2.15	10.0.0.1	DNS	67	Standard query 0x696e A time.is
0.019668	10.0.0.1	10.0.2.15	DNS	83	Standard query response 0x696e A time.is A 204.62.12.123
0.020009	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	66	49304 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
0.041151	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
0.041190	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
0.041385	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TLSv1	201	Client Hello
0.041573	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=148 Win=65535 Len=0
0.058864	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TLSv1	199	Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
0.071922	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TLSv1	251	Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message, Application Data, A
0.072074	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=146 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=0
0.101361	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=146 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101363	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=1566 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101364	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=2986 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101399	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=345 Ack=4406 Win=64240 Len=0
0.101520	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=4406 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101522	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=5826 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101523	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=7246 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101524	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	1474	443 → 49304 [ACK] Seq=8666 Ack=345 Win=65535 Len=1420 [TCP segment of
0.101539	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49304 → 443 [ACK] Seq=345 Ack=10086 Win=64240 Len=0

Captured traffic to time.is in Wireshark

Looking at the capture, it's clear what the application is doing.

- Red: DNS lookup for `time.is`
- Green: TCP connection to `time.is` (`204.62.12.123`). We can see the handshake `SYN-SYNACK-ACK`.
- Orange: TLS handshake with `time.is`. `ClientHello`, `ServerHello`, and the rest.

Normal User Login

Clear the capture and this time login with a valid set of non-admin credentials (e.g.

`rebecca:rebecca`).


3	0.000183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49307 → 49622 [SYN] Seq=0
4	0.000205	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49622 → 49307 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
5	0.000227	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=1

6	0.000527	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	292	49307 → 49622	[PSH, ACK] S
7	0.000538	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307	[ACK] Seq=1
8	0.011330	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	170	49622 → 49307	[PSH, ACK] S
9	0.011344	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622	[ACK] Seq=10
10	0.011522	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	402	49307 → 49622	[PSH, ACK] S
11	0.011532	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307	[ACK] Seq=44
12	0.012191	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	1732	49622 → 49307	[PSH, ACK] S
13	0.012222	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622	[ACK] Seq=26
14	0.021456	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	368	49307 → 49622	[PSH, ACK] S
15	0.021502	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307	[ACK] Seq=86
16	0.024064	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	218	49622 → 49307	[PSH, ACK] S
17	0.024075	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622	[ACK] Seq=40
18	0.024363	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	798	49307 → 49622	[PSH, ACK] S
19	0.024372	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307	[ACK] Seq=93
20	0.025108	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	926	49622 → 49307	[PSH, ACK] S
21	0.025120	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622	[ACK] Seq=76
22	0.026925	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	412	49307 → 49622	[PSH, ACK] S
23	0.026936	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49307	[ACK] Seq=13
24	0.027710	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	468	49622 → 49307	[PSH, ACK] S
25	0.027724	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49307 → 49622	[ACK] Seq=92
26	10.132239	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	91	443 → 49306	[PSH, ACK] Seq
27	10.132461	204.62.12.123	10.0.2.15	TCP	60	443 → 49306	[FIN, ACK] Seq
28	10.132470	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49306 → 443	[ACK] Seq=1 Ac

▶ Frame 6: 292 bytes on wire (2336 bits), 148 bytes captured (1184 bits) on interface 1
 ▶ Null/Loopback
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
 ▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49307, Dst Port: 49622, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 104
 ▶ Data (104 bytes)

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 90	21 8f 40 00 80 06 00 00E... !@... ..
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01	c0 9b c1 d6 21 a3 7e 44 !~D
0020	77 aa 14 85 50 18 00 20	75 cb 00 00 12 01 00 68	w...P... u.....h
0030	00 00 01 00 00 00 24 00	06 01 00 2a 00 01 02 00\$. ...*....
0040	2b 00 0b 03 00 36 00 04	04 00 3a 00 01 05 00 3b	+....6... :...;
0050	00 24 06 00 5f 00 01 ff	04 07 0c 3a 00 00 00 73	.\$..._... :...s
0060	71 6c 65 78 70 72 65 73	73 00 00 00 08 94 00 ec	qlexpres s.....
0070	d5 aa b5 06 e1 52 49 84	d8 50 b2 46 4c 06 5d f0RI...P·FL·]
0080	08 a5 85 e1 ef 36 43 bb	1e e6 fa 62 7c dc f5 016C...·b ...
0090	00 00 00 01	

First, we see the TCP connection and then the login traffic to port 49622. To decode the traffic with Wireshark, right-click on any outgoing packet and select `Decode As...`. Then select `TDS` for the combo box under `Current`. This tells Wireshark to decode all traffic to that port using the `TDS` dissector.



Choosing the TDS dissector for MSSQL traffic

And now packets are annotated.

1	0.000000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UDP	84 61621 → 1434 Len=12
2	0.000103	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	UDP	248 1434 → 61621 Len=94
3	0.000183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108 49307 → 49622 [SYN] Seq=0
4	0.000205	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108 49622 → 49307 [SYN, ACK] S
5	0.000227	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=1
6	0.000527	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	292 TDS7 pre-login message
7	0.000538	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=1
8	0.011330	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	170 Response
9	0.011344	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=10
10	0.011522	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	402 TDS7 pre-login message
11	0.011532	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=44
12	0.012191	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	1732 TDS7 pre-login message
13	0.012222	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=26
14	0.021456	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	368 TDS7 pre-login message
15	0.021502	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=86
16	0.024064	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	218 TDS7 pre-login message
17	0.024075	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=40
18	0.024363	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	798 TLS exchange
19	0.024372	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=93
20	0.025108	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	926 Response
21	0.025120	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49307 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=76
22	0.026925	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	412 SQL batch
23	0.026936	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49307 [ACK] Seq=13

Annotated MSSQL traffic in Wireshark

Some observations:

1. TLS is not enabled. That's bad.
2. SQL queries are created on the client and sent outside. This is ripe for exploitation.

Going through the packets, select the one that says `SQL batch` and see the SQL query is created client-side and sent out. Any time you see client-side queries, you should be concerned.

15	0.000785	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49263 [ACK
16	0.001597	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	926 Response
17	0.001608	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49263 → 49622 [ACK
18	0.001710	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	412 SQL batch
19	0.001720	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49263 [ACK
20	0.002908	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	468 Response

▶ Frame 18: 412 bytes on wire (3296 bits), 208 bytes captured (1664 bits) on interface
 ▶ Null/Loopback
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
 ▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49263, Dst Port: 49622, Seq: 720, Ack: 622.
 ▾ Tabular Data Stream
 Type: SQL batch (1)
 ▶ Status: 0x01, End of message
 Length: 164
 Channel: 0
 Packet Number: 1
 Window: 0
 ▾ TDS Query Packet
 ▶ Packet data stream headers
 Query: `SELECT * FROM users where username='rebecca' and password='rebecca'`

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 cc 05 62 40 00 80 06 00 00E... .b@.....
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 c0 6f c1 d6 53 d9 14 99o...S...
0020	7a 40 fc 2d 50 18 00 1d 31 26 00 00 01 01 00 a4	z@--P... 1&.....
0030	00 00 01 00 16 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 02 00 00 00
0040	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 53 00 45 00 4c 00S E L
0050	45 00 43 00 54 00 20 00 2a 00 20 00 46 00 52 00	E C T * F R
0060	4f 00 4d 00 20 00 75 00 73 00 65 00 72 00 73 00	O M u s e r s
0070	20 00 77 00 68 00 65 00 72 00 65 00 20 00 75 00	w h e r e
0080	73 00 65 00 72 00 6e 00 61 00 6d 00 65 00 3d 00	s e r n a m e =
0090	27 00 72 00 65 00 62 00 65 00 63 00 63 00 61 00	' r e b e c c a
00a0	27 00 20 00 61 00 6e 00 64 00 20 00 70 00 61 00	' a n d p a
00b0	73 00 73 00 77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 3d 00 27 00	s s w o r d =
00c0	72 00 65 00 62 00 65 00 63 00 63 00 61 00 27 00	r e b e c c a

Client querying MSSQL server

The following query is executed (later we will come back and play with this):

- `SELECT * FROM users where username='rebecca' and password='rebecca'`

The response contains the query results which leaks the structure of the `users` table:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
124	228.230489	10.0.2.15	204.62.12.123	TCP	54	49338 → 443
125	228.787195	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	412	SQL batch
126	228.787217	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 493
127	228.789256	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	480	Response
128	228.789272	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49327 → 493

Token - ColumnMetaData
Columns: 5
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Column 4
Column 5
Usertype: 0
Flags: 9
Type: 38 (INTNTYPE)
Type size: 4
Column name length: 7
Column Name: isadmin
Token - Row
Field 1 (INT4TYPE - Int (4 byte data representation))
Field 2 (BIGVARCHRTYPE - VarChar)
Field 3 (BIGVARCHRTYPE - VarChar)
Field 4 (BIGVARCHRTYPE - VarChar)
Field 5 (INTNTYPE)
Token - Done
.... .001 0000 = Status flags: 0x010, Row count valid
Operation: 0x00c1
Row count: 1

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 ee	0d 1a 40 00 80 06 00 00	...E...@...
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01	c1 d6 c0 b9 ab 04 b9 c7
0020	21 fc c8 cd 50 18 00 1b	56 97 00 00 04 01 00 c6	!...P...V...
0030	00 33 01 00 e3 03 00 12	00 00 81 05 00 00 00 00	.3.....

0040	00 10 00 38 02 69 00 64	00 00 00 00 00 08 00 a7	...8.i.d
0050	64 00 09 04 d0 00 34 08	75 00 73 00 65 00 72 00	d.....4. u.s.e.r.
0060	6e 00 61 00 6d 00 65 00	00 00 00 00 08 00 a7 64	n.a.m.e.d
0070	00 09 04 d0 00 34 08 70	00 61 00 73 00 73 00 774.p.a.s.s.w
0080	00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 00	00 00 00 09 00 a7 64 00	.o.r.d.d
0090	09 04 d0 00 34 05 65 00	6d 00 61 00 69 00 6c 004.e.m.a.i.l.
00a0	00 00 00 00 09 00 26 04	07 69 00 73 00 61 00 64&.i.s.a.d
00b0	00 6d 00 69 00 6e 00 d1	01 00 00 00 07 00 72 65	m.i.n.re
00c0	62 65 63 63 61 07 00 72	65 62 65 63 63 61 10 00	becca.r.ebecca.
00d0	72 65 62 65 63 63 61 40	74 65 73 74 2e 63 6f 6d	rebecca@ test.com
00e0	04 00 00 00 00 fd 10 00	c1 00 01 00 00 00 00 00
00f0	00 00		..

Login query response

Admin Login

We know administrators can login to the application and backup data to an FTP server. We want to observe this traffic with Wireshark.

Logout and login with `admin:admin123`. Note admin interface has only one button, `Backup Data to FTP Server`. This should give us the clue that FTP credentials are hardcoded.

Looking at Wireshark, we will see two different streams of traffic:

1. Connection to the MSSQL server.
2. Connection to the FTP server.

The connection to the MSSQL server is similar to what we have seen before (port `49622`).

4 0.000159	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	292 TDS7 pre-login message
5 0.000170	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack
6 0.000369	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	170 Response
7 0.000381	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49266 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=105 A
8 0.000388	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	466 TDS7 pre-login message

8	0.000398	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	488 TDS7 pre-login message
9	0.000425	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=44 Ac
10	0.000949	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	398 TDS7 pre-login message
11	0.000961	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49266 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=296 A
12	0.001101	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	218 TDS7 pre-login message
13	0.001111	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=201 A
14	0.001172	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	798 TLS exchange
15	0.001181	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=201 A
16	0.001731	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	926 Response
17	0.001743	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49266 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=720 A
18	0.034752	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	232 SQL batch
19	0.034771	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84 49622 → 49266 [ACK] Seq=622 A
20	0.035420	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	394 Response

▶ Frame 18: 232 bytes on wire (1856 bits), 118 bytes captured (944 bits) on interface 1
 ▶ Null/Loopback
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
 ▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49266, Dst Port: 49622, Seq: 720, Ack: 622, Len: 74
 ▾ Tabular Data Stream
 Type: SQL batch (1)
 ▶ Status: 0x01, End of message
 Length: 74
 Channel: 0
 Packet Number: 1
 Window: 0
 ▾ TDS Query Packet
 ▶ Packet data stream headers
 Query: select * from expenses

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 72 06 5b 40 00 80 06 00 00E.r.[@.....
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01 c0 72 c1 d6 21 02 8e 45r.!...E
0020	39 86 6a 2a 50 18 00 1d 85 ce 00 00 01 01 00 4a	9.j*P.....J
0030	00 00 01 00 16 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 02 00 00 00
0040	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 73 00 65 00 6c 00s.e.l.
0050	65 00 63 00 74 00 20 00 2a 00 20 00 66 00 72 00	e.c.t. *.f.r.
0060	6f 00 6d 00 20 00 65 00 78 00 70 00 65 00 6e 00	o.m.e.x.p.e.n.
0070	73 00 65 00 73 00	s.e.s.

Backup traffic to MSSQL server

The application connects and runs the following query:

- `select * from expenses`

Next is the FTP connection to `localhost:22`. We can see it's in cleartext and user/pass is visible.

22	0.568373	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49267 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8
23	0.568430	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	21 → 49267 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
24	0.568472	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
25	0.569367	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	370	Response: 220-FileZilla Serv
26	0.569391	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
27	0.593092	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	106	Request: USER dvta
28	0.593118	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=144 Ack
29	0.593289	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	148	Response: 331 Password requi
30	0.593339	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=12 Ack=
31	0.593389	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	114	Request: PASS p@ssw0rd
32	0.593407	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=176 Ack
33	0.600177	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	114	Response: 230 Logged on
34	0.600202	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=27 Ack=
35	0.600252	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	112	Request: OPTS utf8 on
36	0.600271	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=191 Ack
37	0.600420	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	212	Response: 202 UTF8 mode is a

▶ Frame 31: 114 bytes on wire (912 bits), 59 bytes captured (472 bits) on interface 1

▶ Null/Loopback

▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1

▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49267, Dst Port: 21, Seq: 12, Ack: 176, Len: 15

▶ File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

▶ PASS p@ssw0rd\r\n

[Current working directory:]

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 37	06 68 40 00 80 06 00 00E..7 .h@....
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01	c0 73 00 15 a2 2c 1f 6bs...k
0020	c7 52 01 45 50 18 00 1f	50 75 00 00 50 41 53 53	·R·EP... Pu·PASS
0030	20 70 40 73 73 77 30 72	64 0d 0a	p@ssw0r d..

FTP traffic and password displayed in Wireshark


For easier visualization, right-click on any packet in the stream and select

Follow > TCP Stream.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
22	0.568373	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	49267 → 21 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK
23	0.568430	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	108	21 → 49267 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
24	0.568472	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0
25	0.569367	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	370	Response: 220-FileZilla Server 0.9.60 beta
26	0.569391	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=144 Win=7936 Len=0
27	0.569392	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	FTP	106	Request: USER dvta
28	0.5			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=144 Ack=12 Win=7936 Len=0
29	0.5			FTP	148	Response: 331 Password required for dvta
30	0.5			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=12 Ack=176 Win=7936 Len=0
31	0.5			FTP	114	Request: PASS p@ssw0rd
32	0.5			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=176 Ack=27 Win=7936 Len=0
33	0.6			FTP	114	Response: 230 Logged on
34	0.6			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=27 Ack=191 Win=7936 Len=0
35	0.6			FTP	112	Request: OPTS utf8 on
36	0.6			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=191 Ack=41 Win=7936 Len=0
37	0.6			FTP	212	Response: 202 UTF8 mode is always enabled. No need to send
38	0.6			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=41 Ack=255 Win=7936 Len=0
39	0.6			FTP	94	Request: PWD
40	0.6			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=255 Ack=46 Win=7936 Len=0
41	0.6			FTP	146	Response: 257 "/" is current directory.
42	0.6			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=46 Ack=286 Win=7680 Len=0
43	0.6			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=286 Ack=54 Win=7936 Len=0
44	0.6			FTP	146	Response: 500 set to I
45	0.6			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=54 Ack=305 Win=7680 Len=0
46	0.6			FTP	178	Response: 227 Entering Passive Mode (127,0,0,1,203,177)
47	0.6			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=60 Ack=352 Win=7680 Len=0
48	0.6			TCP	84	21 → 49267 [ACK] Seq=305 Ack=60 Win=7936 Len=0
49	0.6			FTP	178	Response: 227 Entering Passive Mode (127,0,0,1,203,177)
50	0.6			TCP	84	49267 → 21 [ACK] Seq=60 Ack=352 Win=7680 Len=0

Following the TCP stream in Wireshark

Application logs in with `dvta:p@ssw0rd` and then stores `admin.csv` on the FTP server (which we can assume contains information from the `expenses` table).



All FTP traffic in stream displayed in Wireshark

Register Functionality

We can also register new users. Users will not be administrators. Let's look at that traffic too.

21	0.067238	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49337 → 49622 [ACK] Seq=
22	0.080771	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TDS	416	SQL batch
23	0.080794	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	84	49622 → 49337 [ACK] Seq=

```

Frame 22: 416 bytes on wire (3328 bits), 210 bytes captured (1680 bits) on interface 1
Null/Loopback
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49337, Dst Port: 49622, Seq: 763, Ack: 1356, Len: 16
Tabular Data Stream
  Type: SQL batch (1)
    Status: 0x01, End of message
    Length: 166
    Channel: 0
    Packet Number: 1
    Window: 0
  TDS Query Packet
    Packet data stream headers
    Query: insert into users values('test1','password','test1@example.com','0')

```

0040	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00	00 00 69 00 6e 00 73 00i n s
0050	65 00 72 00 74 00 20 00	69 00 6e 00 74 00 6f 00	e r t . . i n t o
0060	20 00 75 00 73 00 65 00	72 00 73 00 20 00 76 00	u s e r s . v
0070	61 00 6c 00 75 00 65 00	73 00 28 00 27 00 74 00	a l u e s (' t
0080	65 00 73 00 74 00 31 00	27 00 2c 00 27 00 70 00	e s t 1 . ' , ' p
0090	61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00	6f 00 72 00 64 00 27 00	a s s w o r d ' .
00a0	2c 00 27 00 74 00 65 00	73 00 74 00 31 00 40 00	, ' t e s t 1 @
00b0	65 00 78 00 61 00 6d 00	70 00 6c 00 65 00 2e 00	e x a m p l e .
00c0	63 00 6f 00 6d 00 27 00	2c 00 27 00 30 00 27 00	c o m ' , ' 0 ' .
00d0	29 00) .

SQL statement to register a new user

As we can see, traffic is similar to the previous parts. This time we are sending an `insert` query:

- `insert into users values('test1','password','test1@example.com','0')`

Note the `0` in the end. It's setting the `isadmin` column that we observed earlier.

Recon with Procmon

We can do the same with Sysinternals Procmon. We can see the traffic but we can identify the endpoints. For the record, Procmon does a lot more than what we are using it for.

Quit the application, run it again, login as admin and backup the data. Then run Procmon and set the following filters similar to what we did in part 1 to identify the FTP endpoint:

- Process Name contains `dvta`. I have set this to `contains` because I have versioned patched executables from part 2.
- Operation is TCP Connect. Or you could only enable network activity like part 1 ([DVTA - Part 1 - Setup - Discover the FTP Address](#)).

Time of Day	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path
8:05:33.07...	DVTA-v3.exe	2228	TCP Connect	IE11Win7:49278 -> time.is:https
8:05:47.88...	DVTA-v3.exe	2228	TCP Connect	IE11Win7:49279 -> IE11Win7:49622
8:10:29.85...	DVTA-v3.exe	2228	TCP Connect	IE11Win7:49280 -> IE11Win7:49622
8:10:29.86...	DVTA-v3.exe	2228	TCP Connect	IE11Win7:49281 -> IE11Win7:ftp
8:10:29.86...	DVTA-v3.exe	2228	TCP Connect	IE11Win7:49282 -> IE11Win7:58196

Application endpoints displayed in Procmon

We can see connections to:

- Fetching login token from `time.is:443`.
- MSSQL server at `localhost:49622`.
- FTP at `localhost:22` and `54823` (ephemeral port for actual `STOR` action).

Conclusion

We learned how to identify network endpoints using two tools. We did some limited traffic analysis. In the next part, we will learn how to manipulate traffic in different ways.

Posted by Parsia • Jul 30, 2018 • Tags: [Wireshark](#) [Procmon](#)

[DVTA - Part 2 - Cert Pinning and Login Button](#)

[DVTA - Part 4 - Traffic Tampering with dnSpy](#)

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Parsiya

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