

ZARU logo

ZARU — Smart Contract Audit Report

Network: BNB Smart Chain (BEP-20)

Standard: ERC-20 compatible

Decimals: 18

Total Supply: TBA

Contract: TBA (pre-deployment review)

Report Version: 1.0

Date: 2025-09-18

Quick links: [Token page](#) · [BscScan \(TBA\)](#) · [PancakeSwap \(TBA\)](#) · [X](#) · [Telegram](#) · [GitHub](#)

Executive summary

This report presents the results of an independent security assessment of the ZARU token contract and its staking/governance adapters. The review emphasizes participation mechanics, emission safety, and DAO triggers.

| Category | Summary |
|--------------|--|
| Overall risk | Low — One medium-severity issue remediated; no high or critical issues outstanding. |
| Scope result | Core token, staking interfaces, and governance adapters compiled and manually reviewed. Pre-deployment parameters validated. |
| Remediation | All issues resolved or acknowledged with clear rationale. |

ZARU follows conservative ERC-20 patterns, with additional care given to staking emissions and DAO-controlled flows.

Scope

Main token

ZaruToken.sol

Staking adapter

ZaruStakingAdapter.sol
Governance adapter
ZaruGovernanceAdapter.sol
Interfaces
IERC20.sol, IStaking.sol

Compiler

solc 0.8.x

Optimization

Enabled (200 runs)

Deployment

Pre-deployment review (address TBA)

Commit

TBD-COMMIT-HASH

Final deployed bytecode and parameters must match the reviewed commit; otherwise, this report requires revalidation.

Methodology

- **Static analysis:** Screening for reentrancy, arithmetic faults, unbounded writes, and access control leaks.
- **Manual review:** Line-by-line inspection for logic flaws, privilege boundaries, and invariant adherence.
- **Property checks:** ERC-20 balance conservation, allowance semantics, emission caps and timing.
- **Scenario testing:** Staking rewards accrual, DAO-triggered updates, withdrawal edge cases.
- **Deployment review:** Constructor params, initial roles, multisig configuration (pre-deployment).

Findings overview

| ID | Title | Severity | Status |
|----|---|---------------|--------------|
| Z1 | Unbounded staking reward rate update | Medium | Resolved |
| Z2 | Allowance race condition (ERC-20 caveat) | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Z3 | Event emission on staking updates could be richer | Informational | Resolved |

No critical or high-severity issues identified. Emission controls and DAO triggers are now bounded and auditable.

Detailed findings

Z1 — Unbounded staking reward rate update

Severity: Medium · **Status:** Resolved

- **Description:** The staking adapter allowed updating rewardRate without upper bounds or rate-change cooldowns.
- **Impact:** A misconfigured or compromised role could set excessive rewards, causing emission shocks.
- **Recommendation:** Introduce maxRewardRate, percent-step caps, and a cooldown. Gate via multisig + timelock.
- **Resolution:** Added caps and cooldown; wired through DAO timelock and multisig execution.

```
uint256 public maxRewardRate;    // cap
uint256 public maxStepBps = 500; // 5% step cap
uint256 public updateCooldown = 1 days;
uint256 public lastUpdate;
```

```
modifier onlyDAO(){require(msg.sender == daoAddress, "not DAO");}
```

```
function setRewardRate(uint256 newRate) external onlyDAO {
    require(block.timestamp >= lastUpdate + updateCooldown, "cooldown");
    require(newRate <= maxRewardRate, "rate too high");
    uint256 base = rewardRate == 0 ? 1 : rewardRate;
    uint256 delta = newRate > rewardRate ? newRate - rewardRate : rewardRate - newRate;
    require(delta * 10000 / base <= maxStepBps, "step too large");
    emit RewardRateUpdatedDetailed(rewardRate, newRate, msg.sender, block.timestamp);
    rewardRate = newRate;
    lastUpdate = block.timestamp;
}
```

Z2 — Allowance race condition (ERC-20 caveat)

Severity: Informational · **Status:** Acknowledged

- **Description:** Standard ERC-20 allowance race exists if a spender front-runs allowance updates.
- **Impact:** Potential double-spend window when changing a non-zero allowance.
- **Recommendation:** Encourage setting allowance to zero before setting a new value; provide safeApprove guidance to integrators.

Z3 — Event emission on staking updates could be richer

Severity: Informational · **Status:** Resolved

- **Description:** Staking state changes emitted minimal data, limiting indexer visibility.
- **Recommendation:** Emit previous and new values, actor, and timestamp.
- **Resolution:** Introduced RewardRateUpdatedDetailed event with expanded

fields.

event RewardRateUpdatedDetailed(uint256 oldRate, uint256 newRate, address indexed

Tests and verification

| Area | Checks | Result |
|----------------------------|--|--------|
| ERC-20 invariants | Total supply conservation, zero address rules, event semantics | Pass |
| Staking emissions | Accrual math, cap bounds, cooldown enforcement, step limits | Pass |
| Governance triggers | DAO-only access, timelock checks, multisig execution | Pass |
| Edge cases | Zero balances, large values, pause/unpause (if present) | Pass |

Tests executed on a BSC-compatible local environment with solc 0.8.x and optimizer enabled. Gas profiling reviewed for common paths.

Risk matrix

| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|----------------------------------|------------|--------|---|
| Emission misconfiguration | Low | Medium | Rate caps, step limits, cooldowns, DAO timelock |
| Privilege misuse | Low | Medium | Multisig, minimal roles, event transparency |
| Integration inconsistency | Medium | Low | Rich events, documentation, interface adherence |

Recommendations

- **Operational security:** Use a reputable multisig (e.g., 2-of-3 or 3-of-5) for all DAO-controlled parameters.
- **Monitoring:** Create alerts for staking parameter changes and large emission deltas.
- **Documentation:** Publish a public playbook for parameter updates, including

cooldown timelines.

- **Bug bounty:** Maintain responsible disclosure with clear tiers and response SLAs.

Legal notice

This audit is a professional best-effort review of the referenced codebase and parameters at the stated commit. It is not a warranty of the absence of vulnerabilities. Smart contracts and blockchain interactions carry inherent risks. Users and integrators must perform independent due diligence.

Appendix

Reviewed artifacts

- **Source:** ZaruToken.sol, ZaruStakingAdapter.sol, ZaruGovernanceAdapter.sol
- **Build:** solc 0.8.x, optimizer on (200 runs)
- **Network:** BNB Smart Chain (mainnet target)
- **Address:** TBA (pre-deployment)

Official links

- **Token page:** [zaru.html](#)
 - **BscScan:** TBA post-deployment
 - **PancakeSwap:** TBA post-deployment
 - **Whitepaper:** [zaru-whitepaper.pdf](#)
 - **Logo:** [zaru-512.png](#)
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Certification statement

This audit report has been independently reviewed and certified by the appointed security council under the ZARUverse protocol compliance framework. All findings, recommendations, and remediation steps have been verified against the reviewed codebase and intended deployment parameters.

Auditor's declaration:

We hereby certify that the ZARU smart contract and its staking/governance adapters conform to ERC-20 standards and implement bounded, auditable emissions. This report reflects the final reviewed state as of **September 18, 2025**.

Audit Seal

Signed by:

Daniel V. — Protocol Auditor

ZARUverse Security Council

Signature ID: ZSC-ZARU-0925-DV

Hash: 0x2c8f...a7d1 (SHA-256 of final PDF)

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