# Apollo3-Blue Secure Bootloader Scripts User's Guide

Revision 2.1 July 2018

# **Revision History**

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Also added an example for multi-image			
		upgrade using uart script	
		Added sections for SBL & Patch upgrade	

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# 1. Introduction

Ambiq Apollo3-Blue SDK contains a number of python scripts to demonstrate generation of Customer InfoSpace (INFO0) settings, Customer Main images, and creation of images for the Wired Update protocol over UART. This document will explain their usage.

# 2. References

REF	Title	File	
REF1	Apollo3-Blue Secure Update Flow	Apollo3-Blue_Secure_Update_Flow.pdf	
REF2 AMOTA Example User's Guide		AMOTA_example_user's_guide.pdf	

# 3. Preparation of the Python Environment

This document assumes that the user has a python3 environment available. The SBL scripts require the addition of the python crypto modules. Those can be obtained as follows:

```
pip install pycryptodome
pip install pyserial
```

Most of the python scripts discussed in this document can be found in /tools/apollo3\_scripts/ OTA related scripts are placed in /tools/amota/scripts/

# 4. Keys

Most of the Python scripts expect a file named "keys\_info.py" to be present in the same directory.

This file contains all the sensitive key information – which are either controlled by the customers themselves, or obtained through Ambiq.

These keys are used to generate InfoSpace, and to generate encrypted/signed images and required for encrypting/signing the wired update messages, as per customer requirements.

Ambiq SDK provides a template file "keys\_info0.py" with dummy values, which is to be edited by the customer with correct values and renamed as "keys\_info.py".

This file contains definition of:

- keyTblAes = Infospace Decryption Keys
- keyTblHmac = Infospace Authentication Keys
- custKey = 128b Customer defined Security Key which protects Infospace Read Access
- recoveryKey = 128b Unique Key value provided by Ambiq used for device recovery

# 5. Image Generation Scripts

#### 5.1 Generating Customer InfoSpace (INFO0)

INFO0 space on the target is 8K of separate flash area, which dictates the device behavior in a number of ways.

Script "create\_info0.py" can be used to create a binary file to be populated as INFO0. It uses the key information in "keys info.py" and allows the user to define a number of other INFO0 parameters based on command line.

```
--trim CUSTIKIMJ [--trimz CUSTIKIMZ]
--gpio OVERRIDEGPIO] [--gpiolvl {0,1}]
[--wmask WIREDIFMASK] [--wSlInt WIREDSLVINT]
[--wI2c WIREDI2CADDR] [--wTO WIREDTIMEOUT] [--u0 U0]
[--u1 U1] [--u2 U2] [--u3 U3] [--u4 U4] [--u5 U5]
[--krev KREV] [--arev AREV] [--sresv SRESV]
                                    [--krev kkev] [--drev Akev] [--sresv skesv]
[--chipid0 CHIPID0] [--chipid1 CHIPID1]
[--wprot0 wpROT0] [--wprot1 wpROT1] [--rprot0 RPROT0]
[--rprot1 RPROT1] [--swprot0 SWPROT0]
[--swprot1 SWPROT1] [--srprot0 SRPROT0]
[--srprot1 SRPROT1] [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
                                    output
Generate Corvette Info0 Blob
positional arguments:
                                     Output filename (without the extension)
   output
optional arguments:
   -h, --help
                                     show this help message and exit
   --valid {0,1,2}
                                     INFOO Valid 0 = Uninitialized, 1 = Valid, 2 = Invalid
(Default = 1)?
   --version VERSION
                                     version (Default = 0)?
                                     Main Firmware location (Default = 0xc000)?
   --main MAINPTR
   --secpol {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
                                     Security Policy Bitmask (Default = 0)? (bit 0 = Auth,
                                     bit 1 = Enc, bit 2 = Version Rollback)
KeyWrap Algo (Default = 0)? (0 = none, 1 = XOR, 2 =
   --wrap \{0,1,2\}
                                     AES128)
                                     Secure Boot on Soft Reset (Default = 0) ?
Secure Boot (Default = 0) ?
   --sRst \{0,1\}
   -s {0,1}
--pl {0,1}
                                     Protection Lock Enabled (Default = 0) ?
   --sDbgAllowed {0,1}
                                     Debugger allowed during (optional) Secondary
                                     Bootloader (Default = 1) ?
InfoO Erase Allowed (Default = 1) ?
   --erase \{0,1\}
   --prog INFOPROG
                                     INFOO Program allowed (1 bit per quadrant) (Default =
                                     0xf) ?
                                     Do not wipe SRAM on debugger connection (Default = 1)
   --snowipe {0,1}
   --swo \{0,1\}
                                     debugger connection allowed (Default = 1) ?
   --dbgprot {0,1}
--trim CUSTTRIM
                                     Do not lock debugger (Default = 1) ?
                                     customer trim ?
   --trim2 CUSTTRIM2
                                     customer trim 2?
                                     Override GPIO (7 bit - in hex) - 0x7f for disabled (Default = 0x7f)
   --gpio OVERRIDEGPIO
                                     Override GPIO Polarity (0 = low, 1 = hi) (Default = 0) Wired interface mask (bit 0 = UART, bit 1 = SPI, bit 2
   --qpiolvl {0,1}
   --wmask WIREDIFMASK
                                    = I2C) (default = UART)
Wired IOS interface handshake pin (default = 4)
Wired IOS interface I2C Address (default = 0x20)
Wired interface timeout in millisec (default = 20000)
UART Config 1 (default = 0xFFFFFFFFF)
   --wSlint WIREDSLVINT
   --wi2c WIREDI2CADDR
   --wTO WIREDTIMEOUT
   --u0 U0
   --u1 U1
                                     UART Config 1 (default = 0xffffffff)
   --u2 U2
--u3 U3
                                     UART Config 2 (default = 0xffffffff)
UART Config 3 (default = 0xffffffff)
UART Config 4 (default = 0xffffffff)
   --u4 U4
```

```
--u5 U5
                         UART Config 5 (default = 0xffffffff)
--krev KREV
                         KEK Revocation Mask (Default Oxffffffff)
                         AuthKey Revocation Mask (Default OxFFFFFFFF)
--arev AREV
                         SRAM Reservation (Default 0x0)
CHIPIDO for the device (Default 0)
CHIPID1 for the device (Default 0)
--sresv SRESV
--chipid0 CHIPID0
--chipid1 CHIPID1
                         Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#0 (Default
--wprot0 WPROT0
                         0xfffffff)
                         Permanent Write Protections Mask for flash#1 (Default
--wprot1 WPROT1
                         0xffffffff)
                         Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#0 (Default OxfFFFFFFF)
--rprot0 RPROT0
                         Permanent Copy Protections Mask for flash#1 (Default
--rprot1 RPROT1
                         Oxfffffff)
                         SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#0
--swprot0 SWPROT0
                         (Default OxfFFFFFF)
                         SBL overridable Write Protections Mask for flash#1
--swprot1 SWPROT1
                         (Default Oxfffffff)
--srprot0 SRPROT0
                         SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#0
                         (Default Oxfffffff)
--srprot1 SRPROT1
                         SBL overridable Copy Protections Mask for flash#1
                         (Default Oxfffffff)
--loglevel \{0,1,2,3,4,5\}
                         Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4: Verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]
```

#### 5.1.1 Example Usage:

#### 5.1.1.1 Create INFO0 Image for non-secure Usage

Create INFO0 image with GPIO Override is set to pin 47 (0x2f) active low. Baudrate for INFO0 UART is set to 115200 (0x1C200). Main image is expected at 0xC000.

```
./create_info0.py --valid 1 info0 --pl 1 --u0 0x1C200c0 --u1 0xFFFF3031 --u2 0x2 --u3 0x0 --u4 0x0 --u5 0x0 --main 0xC000 --gpio 0x2f --version 0 --wTO 5000
```

#### 5.1.1.2 Create INFO0 Image for secure Usage (Only applicable for secure SKU)

Create INFO0 image with GPIO Override is set to pin 47 (0x2f) active low. Baudrate for INFO0 UART is set to 115200 (0x1C200). Main image is expected at 0xC000. Secure Boot is enabled.

```
./create_info0.py --valid 1 info0 --pl 1 --u0 0x1C200c0 --u1 0xFFFF3031 --u2 0x2 --u3 0x0 --u4 0x0 --u5 0x0 --main 0xC000 --qpio 0x2f --version 0 --wTO 5000 -s 1
```

# 5.2 Generating Customer Firmware Images

Corvette SBL recognizes a number of different image types.

- SBL (Secure Bootloader)
- AM3P (Ambig Third Party)
- Patch (Ambig Patch)
- Main (Secure Firmware)
- NonSecure (Non-Secure Firmware)
- Child (3<sup>rd</sup> Party firmware libraries)
- Info0 (Info0 Update Binary)
- CustOTA (Other) Used with Secondary bootloader to pass through customer specific upgrade image types

Details of individual image formats is described in a separate document ([REF1]). Script "create\_cust\_image\_blob.py" can be used to create a binary image blob as understood by the SBL.

The images generated such are good to be used directly with Flash Programming Tools (Jflash/JFlashLite, IAR, Keil), or transferred to the device wirelessly using customer defined OTA protocol and application.

```
usage: create_cust_image_blob.py [-h] [--bin APPFILE]
                                                     --load-address LOADADDRESS]
                                                     [--magic-num {0xc0,0xcc,0xc1,0xcb,0xcf}]
                                                     [-o OŬTPUT]
                                                    [-o OUTPUT]
[--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
[--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
[--authalgo {0,1}] [--encalgo {0,1}]
[--child0 CHILD0] [--child1 CHILD1]
[--version VERSION] [--crcI {0,1}]
[--crcB {0,1}] [--authI {0,1}]
[--authB {0,1}] [--erasePrev {0,1}]
[-p {0,1,2,3}] [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
Generate Corvette Image Blob
optional arguments:
   -h, --help
                                      show this help message and exit
   --bin APPFILE
                                      binary file (blah.bin)
   --load-address LOADADDRESS
                                      Load address of the binary.
   --magic-num {0xc0,0xcc,0xc1,0xcb,0xcf}
                                     Magic Num (0xc0: Main, 0xcc: Child, 0xc1: CustOTA, 0xcb: NonSecure, 0xcf: Info0) - default[Main]
Output filename (without the extension)
   -o OUTPUT
   --authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                                     Authentication Key Idx? (8 to 15)
   --kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                                     KEK index? (8 to 15)
Authentication Algo? (O(default) = none, 1 = SHA256)
Encryption Algo? (O(default) = none, 1 = AES128)
child (blobpt#4 for Main / feature key for AM3P)
   --authalgo {0,1}
--encalgo {0,1}
   --childo CHILDO
                                     child (blobPtr#1 for Main)
   --child1 CHILD1
                                     version (15 bit)
Install CRC check enabled (Default = Y)?
   --version VERSION
   --crcI {0,1}
--crcB {0,1}
                                      Boot CRC check enabled (Default = N)?
   --authI {0,1}
--authB {0,1}
                                      Install Authentication check enabled (Default = N)?
                                     Boot Authentication check enabled (Default = N)?
   --erasePrev {0,1}
                                     erasePrev (Valid only for main)
   p \{0,1,2,3\} protection info 2 bit C W --loglevel \{0,1,2,3,4,5\}
                                     Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4: Verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]
```

## 5.2.1 Example Usage:

#### 5.2.1.1 Create a non-secure customer image

Create a non-secure customer image from a built binary with Flash base address of 0xC000 (hello\_world.bin). This is the Customer Main Non-Secure format from the [REF1].

```
./create_cust_image_blob.py --bin hello_world.bin --load-address 0xC000 --magic-num 0xCB -o main nonsecure ota --version 0x0
```

#### 5.2.1.2 Create a secure customer image

Create a secure customer image from a built binary with Flash base address of 0xC100 (hello\_world\_0xc100.bin). This is the Customer Main format from the [REF1]. AES128 encryption (kek, encalgo) and SHA256-HMAC based authentication is enabled (authkey, authalgo, authl). Post install boots should verify the signature for authenticity (authB).

```
./create_cust_image_blob.py --bin hello_world_0xc100.bin --load-address 0xC000 --magic-num 0xC0 -o main_secure_ota --version 0x0 --kek 8 --authkey 10 --encalgo 1 --authB 1 --authI 1
```

# 6. Generating Wired Update Images

To facilitate Wired update using SBL through an external host, the image blobs are further encapsulated in a predefined format as described in [REF1].

Script "create\_cust\_wireupdate\_blob.py" facilitates generation of these encapsulated images.

This script also internally takes care of generating split encapsulated images, if the image size is bigger than what can be accepted by SBL in one transaction over wired interface.

```
usage: create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py [-h] [--load-address LOADADDRESS]
                                                                 --bin APPFILE]
                                                                [--DIN APPILE]
[-i {0,1,3,4,2,5,6,7,32}]
[--options OPTIONS] [-o OUTPUT]
[--authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
[--kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}]
[--authalgo {0,1}] [--encalgo {0,1}]
                                                                   -split SPLIT
                                                                [--loglevel {0,1,2,3,4,5}]
Generate Corvette Wired Update Blob
optional arguments:
   -h, --help
                                        show this help message and exit
   --Íoad-address LOADADDRESS
                                        Load address of the binary - Where in flash the blob will be stored (could be different than install
                                        address of binary within). binary file (blah.bin)
   --bin APPFILE
   -i \{0,1,3,4,2,5,6,7,32\}
                                        ImageType (0: SBL, 1: AM3P, 3: Main, 4: Child, 2:
Patch, 5: CustOTA, 6: NonSecure, 7: Info0, 32:
Info0-NoOTA) - default[Main]
Options (16b hex value) - bit0 instructs to perform
   --options OPTIONS
                                        OTA of the image after wired download (set to 0 if
                                        only downloading & skipping OTA flow)
Output filename (without the extension)
   -o OUTPUT
   --authkey {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
                                        Authentication Key Idx? (8 to 15)
  --kek {8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}
KEK index? (8 to 15)
--authalgo {0,1}
--encalgo {0,1}
--split SPLIT
Specify the max block size if the image will be downloaded in pieces
   --loglevel \{0,1,2,3,4,5\}
                                        Set Log Level (0: None), (1: Error), (2: INFO), (4: Verbose), (5: Debug) [Default = Info]
```

# 6.1 Example Usage:

# 6.1.1 Create Non-Secure Wired Update Image blob

Create Non-Secure Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Upgrade image (generated as in section 5.2.15.2.1.1), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin main nonsecure ota.bin -i 6 -o main nonsecure wire --options 0x1
```

## 6.1.2 Create INFO0-NOOTA Wired Update Image blob

Create INFO0-NOOTA Wired Update Image blob from the INFO0 image (generated as in section 5.1.15.1.1.1) in the previous step:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --bin info0.bin -o info0_wire -i 32 --load-address 0
```

#### 6.1.3 Create Secure Bootloader (SBL) Wired Update Image blob

Create SBL Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Upgrade image (provided by Ambiq), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin sbl_ota.bin -i 0 - o sbl wire --options 0x1
```

#### 6.1.4 Create Secure Wired Update Image blob

Create Secure Wired Update Image blob corresponding to the Secure or non-secure Upgrade image (generated as in section 5.2.15.2.1.1 or section 5.2.1.2), as shown in the [REF1]:

```
./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin
main_nonsecure_ota.bin -i 6 -o main_nonsecure_swire --options 0x1 --kek 11 --
authkey 9 --encalgo 1 --authalgo 1

OR (for secure main image)
    ./create_cust_wireupdate_blob.py --load-address 0x20000 --bin
main_secure_ota.bin -i 3 -o main_secure_swire --options 0x1 --kek 11 --authkey
9 --encalgo 1 --authalgo 1
```

Secure wired update ensures that only trusted host is allowed to download any upgrades to the device. Please note that this is not to be confused with the nonsecure or secure image itself, which pertains to validation enforcements by the SBL on the installed images.

# 7. Creating Device Recovery Message

A corrupt INFO0 (e.g. invalid signature, or invalid values for Security fields) on a secure SKU Apollo3-Blue MCU causes SBL to go into a "recovery" mode. The only option possible in this case is to use the Wired Update feature to send a "RECOVER" message with proper credentials to do a factory-reset.

To generate a RECOVER message with proper credentials, customer would need to contact Ambiq using a secure channel and provide certain details (Unique CustomerID assigned to them, a range of CHIP Part#s along with a unique 128b Nonce value). Ambiq will then provide an "Ambiq Recovery Blob", which is bound to the CustomerID, Nonce and particular part.

Even for non-secure SKU's this procedure can be used to revert back to factory settings.

Script "create\_recover\_message.py" can then be used to generate the "RECOVER" message using the Ambiq Recovery Blob, along with customer supplied Nonce & CustomerID.

```
Generate Corvette Recovery Message
optional arguments:
  -h, --help
-f BINFILE
                  show this help message and exit
                  Binary file representing the raw Recovery Blob provided by
                  Output filename (without the extension)
Nonce 0 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambiq
  -o OUTPUT
  --n0 N0
                  (default = 0xffffffff)
                  Nonce 1 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambig
  --n1 N1
                  (default = 0xffffffff)
                  Nonce 2 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambig
  --n2 N2
                  (default = 0xffffffff)
  --n3 N3
                  Nonce 3 - should correspond to the value provided to Ambig
                  (default = 0xFFFFFFF)
  --custId CUSTID
                  Customer ID - should correspond to the value provided to
                  Ambiq (default = 0xffffffff)
```

# 7.1 Example Usage:

# 7.1.1 Create Secure recover message

Create Secure recover message for customer with custID 0x1000, with supplied Ambiq Recover Blob in am rec.bin (generated corresponding to nonce 0x0, 0xDEADBEEF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xA5A5A5A)

```
./create_recover_msg.py -f am_rec.bin -o recover_secure --n0 0 --n1 0xDEADBEEF --n2 0xFFFFFFFF --n3 0xA5A55A5A --custId 0x1000
```

#### 7.1.2 Create Non-Secure recover message

Create Non-Secure recover message for customer with custID 0x1000 (generated corresponding to nonce 0x0, 0xDEADBEEF, 0xFFFFFFF, 0xA5A55A5A)

```
./create_recover_msg.py -o recover
```

# 8. UART Wired Update

For UART based wired update to work, the device needs to be provisioned to allow UART wired update through InfoSpace settings. SBL will get into update mode in one of the two cases:

- Encountering fatal error (e.g. invalid main image)
- GPIO Override (configured through InfoSpace)

The host needs to be connected to the device on the configured pins to match with the InfoSpace UART configurations, and needs to initiate the communication within a short window configured (through InfoSpace).

Script "uart\_wired\_update.py" is designed to emulate the host side functions in a limited way when using the UART as wired interface.

```
UART Wired Update Host for Apollo3
positional arguments:
                                 Serial COMx Port
  port
optional arguments:
   -h, --help
-b BAUD
                                 show this help message and exit
                                 Baud Rate (default is 115200)
                                Binary file for raw message
Binary file to program into the target device
   --raw RAW
   -f BINFILE
  -i \{0,1,3,4,2,5,6,7,32,255\}
                                ImageType (0: SBL, 1: AM3P, 3: Main, 4: Child, 2: Patch, 5: CustOTA, 6: NonSecure, 7: Info0 32: Info0_NOOTA) 255: Invalid) - default[Invalid]
                                OTA Descriptor Page address (hex) - (Default is 0xFE000 - at the end of main flash) - enter 0xFFFFFFF to instruct SBL to skip OTA
  -o OTADESC
  -r \{0,1,2\}
                                 Should it send reset command after image download? (0
                                = no reset, 1 = POI, 2 = POR) (default is 1)
Should it send abort command? (0 = abort, 1 = abort
  -a \{0,1,-1\}
                                and quit, -1 = no abort) (default is -1)
Specify the max block size if the image will be
  --split SPLIT
                                 downloaded in pieces
```

# 8.1 Example Usage:

## 8.1.1 Program INFO0 using INFO0-NOOTA

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program INFO0 using the INFO0-NOOTA blob (generated as in section 6.1.2):

```
./uart wired update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 0 -f info0 wire.bin -i 32
```

# 8.1.2 Program Main Non-Secure Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program Main Firmware using the Non-Secure wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.1)<sup>1</sup>:

```
./uart wired update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f main nonsecure wire.bin -i 6
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The default command assumes last page of available flash to construct the OTA descriptor page, as required by the Upgrade process, as described in [REF1]. For non-default allocation of the OTA descriptor page, it can be specified using –o parameter.

#### 8.1.3 Program Main Secure Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to (re)program Secure Main Firmware using the Secure wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.36.1.1):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f main_secure_swire.bin -i 3
```

#### 8.1.4 Program SBL Upgrade Firmware

Use the UART Wired Update script to upgrade SBL Firmware using the SBL wire update blob (generated as in section 6.1.3):

```
./uart wired update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 1 -f sbl wire.bin -i 0
```

#### 8.1.5 Recover the Device

Use the UART Wired Update script to send Device Recover message (generated as in section 7.1.2):

```
./uart wired update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -r 0 -o 0xFFFFFFFF --raw recover.msg
```

#### 8.1.6 Upgrading multiple images in one step

SBL supports upgrading multiple images in a single upgrade cycle using multiple entries in OTA Descriptor.

UART Wired Update scripts can be used to achieve the same. The script is to be run multiple times, once for each image. The key here is that OTA Descriptor is to be set only in the first invocation, and reset is to be issued only for the last one.

Example below shows upgrading an isolated data segments and main image (all considered non-secure main images generated as in section 6.1.1) together using uart wired update.py:

First image (also programs the OTA Descriptor, and does not reset the device):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img1_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 0 Second image (does not program the OTA Descriptor or reset the device):
```

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img2_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 0 -o 0xffffffff
```

Third image (does not program the OTA Descriptor but resets the device to initiate the upgrade):

```
./uart_wired_update.py -b 115200 COM<X> -f img3_nonsecure_wire.bin -i 6 -r 1 -o 0xffffffff
```

# 9. OTA Update

Ambiq SDK provides an example OTA application AMOTA, which implements a specific transfer protocol with a counterpart host implemented as a Phone App (Ambiq\_BLE App)

Script "ota\_binary\_converter.py" in \tools\amota\scripts\ can be used to generate an OTA blob compatible to AMOTA. Most of the optional parameters are no longer relevant for Apollo3.

## 9.1 Example Usage

#### 9.1.1 AMOTA update of NonSecure/Secure Main Firmware

Generate the OTA blob compatible to AMOTA using the Update Image (generated as in section 5.2.1.1 or section 5.2.1.2):

```
./ota binary converter.py --appbin main ota.bin -o main ota amota
```


Thereafter, the normal procedure to upgrade the image using AMOTA & Ambiq\_BLE App on the phone ([REF2]) can be followed to upgrade the image on the device.

# 10. Programming Options & Usage of scripts

This section depicts various options of programming the device, and how the scripts described in this document facilitate the same.


#### 10.1 INFO0

- Script <create\_info0.py> can be used to create an INFO0 binary.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update Device Info0 to match with this generated binary.
  - Using Jlink Script <ili>jlink-prog-info0.txt>
  - Using OTA
    - Generate OTA image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type Info0
    - o Update it over the air
  - Using Wired Update
    - Two possible options:
      - No OTA This will cause SBL to update Info0 bypassing the OTA processing
        - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type Info0-NoOTA
        - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type Info0-NoOTA
      - Process it through regular OTA processing (like other images)
        - Generate OTA image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type Info0
        - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type Info0
        - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type Info0




## 10.2 Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Non-Secure)

- Generate Program Image using preferred toolchain (linked at 0xC000 or above [to match with INFO0 setting]).
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated binary.
  - Using Flashing Tools or IDEs to program the flash (use the generated image directly)
  - Using OTA
    - Generate OTA image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type NonSecure
    - Update it over the air
  - Using Wired Update
    - Generate OTA image using <create cust image blob.py> with image type NonSecure
    - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type NonSecure
    - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type NonSecure
  - Manufacturing Programming
    - For the first time programming at manufacturing facility, the image could be directly loaded to the final install location without needing to go through the traditional OTA
    - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type
       NonSecure set options as 0 (Disable OTA). Use load-address as the actual install address
    - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type NonSecure




## 10.3 Firmware Images or Data Binaries (Secure)

- Generate Program Image using preferred toolchain (linked at 0xC100 [match with INFO0 setting + 0x100]).
- Generate Update image using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py> with image type Main
  - o This will create necessary headers needed by SBL for secure boot.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Using Flashing Tools or IDEs to program the flash (use the update image directly)
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - o Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type Main
    - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type Main




#### 10.4 SBL Update

- SBL update image is provided by Ambiq.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type SBL
    - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type SBL



# 10.5 Ambiq Patch Update


- Ambiq Patch update image is provided by Ambiq.
- There are multiple ways thereafter to update the Device with this generated update image.
  - Update it over the air (use the update image directly)
  - Using Wired Update
    - Create Wired Update Blob using <create\_cust\_wired\_update\_blob.py> with image type patch
    - Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to download using image type patch



## 10.6 Device Recovery

#### 10.6.1 Non-Secure Part

- Generate RECOVER message using <create\_recover\_msg.py>
- Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to send the recover message using "raw" option



#### 10.6.2 Secure Part

- Contact Ambiq securely to get Ambiq Recovery Blob specific to the part(s).
- Generate RECOVER message using <create\_recover\_msg.py>, supplying the aforementioned blob image.
- Use <uart\_wired\_update.py> to send the recover message using "raw" option




# 11. Example OTA Process flow using scripts

Please refer to [REF1] for various image types, the corresponding header formats, and the overall design of the Secure OTA in Apollo3 Blue.

This section briefly describes how the sample scripts supplied with Ambiq Apollo3 SDK can be used to help with the OTA process.

- Generate the Program Image prg.bin (linked at 0xC000) using IDE of choice
- Create Corresponding OTA Image ota.bin using <create\_cust\_image\_blob.py>
  - load-address (0xC000) specified indicates where the user wants the image to be installed in main flash at the end of OTA
- Create Wired Update Image Blob to prepare the OTA image for wired update, wu.bin using <create\_cust\_wireupdate\_blob.py>
  - Set options to 0x1 to indicate to SBL to initiate an OTA for the downloaded image
  - load-address (0x60000) specified indicates where the user wants the image to be temporarily loaded in main flash before initiating OTA
    - For flash constrained systems, we allow this temp place to overlap with final install location, as long
      as the temp address is greater than or equal to install address) where you want to store the OTA
      image.
- Use script <uart\_wired\_update.py> to transfer the wired update blob, and instruct SBL to initiate OTA on the downloaded image
  - o Option -o specifies where SBL can build the OTA Descriptor (Default is last page in flash)
    - Should point to a free page in flash
    - Cannot overlap with either the temporary load-address for the downloaded image, or the final install address for the main image
    - Cannot be located in a protected region of flash
  - This script configures the OTA Descriptor, downloads the Wired update blob and initiates the OTA of the same, following the process described in [REF1]



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