SafeGuider: Robust and Practical Content Safety Control for Text-to-Image Models

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Abstract

Text-to-image models have shown remarkable capabilities in generating high-quality images from natural language descriptions. However, these models are highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts, which can bypass safety measures and produce harmful content. Despite various defensive strategies, achieving robustness against attacks while maintaining practical utility in real-world applications remains a significant challenge. To address this issue, we first conduct an empirical study of the text encoder in the Stable Diffusion (SD) model, which is a widely used and representative text-to-image model. Our findings reveal that the [EOS] token acts as a semantic aggregator, exhibiting distinct distributional patterns between benign and adversarial prompts in its embedding space. Building on this insight, we introduce **SafeGuider**, a two-step framework designed for robust safety control without compromising generation quality. **SafeGuider** combines an embedding-level recognition model with a safety-aware feature erasure beam search algorithm. This integration enables the framework to maintain high-quality image generation for benign prompts while ensuring robust defense against both in-domain and out-of-domain attacks. **SafeGuider** demonstrates exceptional effectiveness in minimizing attack success rates, achieving a maximum rate of only 5.48% across various attack scenarios. Moreover, instead of refusing to generate or producing black images for unsafe prompts, **SafeGuider** generates safe and meaningful images, enhancing its practical utility. In addition, **SafeGuider** is not limited to the SD model and can be effectively applied to other text-to-image models, such as the Flux model, demonstrating its versatility and adaptability across different architectures. We hope that **SafeGuider** can shed some light on the practical deployment of secure text-to-image systems.

Warning: This paper contains sensitive content, including imagery and discussions of pornography, violence, and other material that may be disturbing or offensive to some readers.

1 Introduction

Text-to-image (T2I) models have revolutionized artificial intelligence by enabling high-quality image generation from natural language descriptions. Models like Stable Diffusion (SD) demonstrate remarkable capabilities through text-guided diffusion processes [4, 18, 32, 33, 36, 37]. However, these powerful capabilities have raised serious safety concerns, as these models can be misused to generate unsafe content [9, 17, 18, 29, 34, 40, 44, 45], such as pornography, violence, etc. The severity of these concerns is highlighted by recent incidents. For example, the "Unstable Diffusion" community, dedicated to creating explicit content with SD, has garnered over 46,000 followers [12]. In addition, the Internet Watch Foundation uncovered more than 20,000 AI-generated inappropriate images on dark web forums, including more than 3,000 instances of AI-generated child abuse imagery [10].



Figure 1: Examples of adversarial attacks on Stable Diffusion models. 1) Vocabulary substitution (blue): replacing explicit terms with innocuous ones. 2) Symbol injection (orange): adding adversarial symbols to generate unsafe content.

Figure 2: Examples of defenses implemented on SD-V1.4 against out-of-domain adversarial attacks. Both attacks successfully circumvent all defenses, revealing robustness challenges. Prompts and more examples are in Appendix D.

This widespread misuse primarily stems from two critical vulnerabilities in T2I systems: the initial absence of safety measures and the ongoing susceptibility to adversarial attacks. Specifically, early versions of T2I models like SD-V1.4 were released without any built-in safety measures [3, 7, 20, 22, 29, 31, 50], allowing direct generation of unsafe content through malicious prompts. Although later versions, such as SD-V2.1 [1], implemented safety features through dataset filtering, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks (see Fig. 1). These attacks generally fall into two categories. The first involves vocabulary substitution, where methods like I2P [34] and SneakyPrompt [48] circumvent safety measures by replacing explicit harmful terms with implicit expressions and euphemisms, preserving linguistic naturalness. The second is symbol injection, exemplified by methods like Ring-A-Bell [42] and P4D [6], which utilize adversarial symbols that appear innocuous but align with harmful content in the embedding space. The effectiveness of these attacks highlights critical vulnerabilities in current T2I systems and underscores the urgent need for defensive measures.

For these adversarial attacks, researchers have developed various defensive approaches [11, 18, 34], which can be broadly categorized

into internal and external defenses. Internal defenses focus on enhancing the model safety through architectural modifications and parameter adjustments. For instance, Safe Latent Diffusion (SLD) [34] introduces conditional diffusion terms to steer image generation away from unsafe regions, while Erased Stable Diffusion (ESD) [11] modifies attention mechanisms to remove unsafe concepts. Similarly, SafeGen [18] adjusts vision-only self-attention layers to weaken the text influence on generation. On the other hand, external defenses implement independent filters that operate separately from the model itself. These filters are divided into two types: text-level filters examine input prompts before image generation to identify and block inappropriate content. Typical examples include commercial solutions such as OpenAI Moderation [28], Microsoft Azure Content Moderator [24], as well as open-source approaches like NSFW Text Classifier [23] and GuardT2I [47]. Image-level filters inspect the safety of images after generated. One example is Safety Checker [8], which scans the generated image for violating content and replaces any unsafe outputs with black images.

Despite these efforts, current defensive approaches face challenges in both robustness (Fig. 2) and practicality (Fig. 3). Robustness refers to the ability to resist various types of adversarial attacks, particularly those outside the training distribution, while practicality encompasses two critical aspects valued by service providers: maintaining high-quality outputs for benign prompts and generating safe yet meaningful content for potentially unsafe requests. As shown in Fig. 2, both internal and external defenses demonstrate limited robustness against out-of-distribution attacks, while Fig. 3 reveals their practical limitations: internal defenses compromise semantic accuracy even for benign prompts due to their direct modifications of model weights; external defenses resort to binary solutions like complete generation refusal or black images, which can impact user experience, particularly when unsafe content generation stems from careless prompt construction rather than malicious intent [17]. ***These challenges underscore the urgent need for a content safety control mechanism that can achieve both robust protection and practical utility in real-world applications.***

To address these issues, we present a comprehensive study with three progressive stages. **S1:** we conduct an in-depth investigation to understand how T2I models process and differentiate between benign and adversarial prompts (Sec. 4). **S2:** Based on these findings, we propose **SafeGuider**, a novel framework designed for robust and practical content safety control (Sec. 5). **S3:** we perform extensive experimental evaluations to validate the effectiveness of our approach (Sec. 6 and Sec. 7). Each stage is briefly elucidated below.

S1: An Empirical Study on Prompt Embedding Characteristic. To develop effective safety measures, we first need to understand how T2I models internally represent different types of prompts. Drawing inspiration from the sequence aggregation mechanism in BERT [5, 21, 25, 43], we conduct a detailed analysis of the text encoder in the SD model, which is a widely used and representative text-to-image model. The results reveal two critical findings. First, we discover that the [EOS (End-Of-Sequence)] token serves as a semantic aggregator in the model's text encoder (Fig. 5). Through attention visualization, we observe that this token maintains consistent attention connections to all prompt tokens across layers, with a

Figure 3: Practical impact of defenses on SD-V1.4. Current defenses either compromise the semantics of benign generation (internal) or refuse to generate (external), revealing practicality challenges. Benign prompt: "*There is a woman walking the sidewalk*". More examples are in Appendix D.

hierarchical pattern progressing from uniform attention in shallow layers (0-5) to more focused semantic attention in deeper layers (6-11). Second, our embedding analysis uncovers distinctive distributional patterns between different types of prompts in the [EOS] token's embedding space. Both qualitative visualizations (Fig. 6) and quantitative MMD measurements (Table 1) demonstrate clear clustering patterns and distributional gaps between benign and adversarial prompts. For example, symbol injection attacks showcase the largest separation from benign prompts (MMD = 0.993). These findings suggest that the [EOS] token's embedding could provide a robust foundation for distinguishing unsafe content.

S2: A Framework (SafeGuider) for Content Safety Control. Motivated by our empirical insights about the [EOS] token's discriminative capability, we propose **SafeGuider**, a lightweight yet effective framework for content safety control (Fig. 7). The framework operates in two steps: 1) **Safe** and unsafe prompt recognition and 2) **Guide** unsafe prompts to output safe and meaningful images. Specifically, it first employs an embedding-level recognition model that takes the embedding of the input prompt generated by the text encoder of the T2I model and evaluates its safety based on the [EOS] token representation. This recognition model features a carefully designed three-layer neural network architecture that achieves efficient safety assessment while maintaining robust performance. Second, for identified unsafe prompts, we introduce a novel Safety-Aware Feature Erasure (SAFE) beam search algorithm, as shown in Alg. 1 (Appendix A). This algorithm strategically modifies input tokens to obtain safe yet semantically meaningful embeddings, guided by both the recognition model and semantic similarity metric, enabling the generation of safe images while preserving the benign semantic content from the original prompts. Through this two-step approach, **SafeGuider** effectively addresses the key challenges mentioned above, achieving both robust protection against adversarial attacks and practical utility for real-world applications.

S3: Evaluation. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate our proposed method across multiple dimensions. Following our research questions (RQ1-RQ6), we assess the framework's effectiveness through both in-domain (IND) and out-of-domain (OOD) evaluations, comparing against ten state-of-the-art baselines using comprehensive metrics. Results demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s superior performance in three key aspects: (1) Robust detection of unsafe content, achieving remarkably low attack success rates (1.34%-5.48% for vocabulary substitution, 0.01%-1.40% for symbol injection) even on out-of-domain attacks, significantly outperforming commercial APIs (2.06-99.16%); (2) Optimal generation quality for benign



Figure 4: Illustration of the generation pipeline of the Stable Diffusion model.

prompts, maintaining 100% generation success rate and high quality while other approaches show substantial degradation; and (3) Effective unsafe content mitigation, achieving high removal rates for both sexually explicit content (91.58-93.32% IND, 80.24-84.05% OOD) and other harmful themes (96.22% IND, 92.98-96.02% OOD). Beyond SD, our embedding-level design enables potential extension to other T2I architectures like the Flux model [16], demonstrating strong transferability and practical value for broad deployment.

To summarize, our contributions are as follows:

- We provide novel insights into the distinct patterns on [EOS] token's embedding of benign and adversarial prompts through a comprehensive empirical study (Sec. 4).
- We present **SafeGuider**, a framework for robust and practical content safety control. It innovatively integrates a lightweight embedding-level recognition model and a safety-aware beam search algorithm (Sec. 5).
- Extensive experiments demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s superior performance, validating both robustness and practicality (Sec.6-7).

We expect that **SafeGuider** can provide valuable insights into the practical deployment of secure T2I systems.

2 Background and Related Work

In this section, we first introduce the fundamentals of diffusion models and text-to-image models (T2I models) (Sec. 2.1). Then, we discuss the safety generation statement of T2I models, and review existing adversarial attacks targeting T2I models to generate unsafe content (Sec. 2.2). Subsequently, existing defense strategies are introduced (Sec. 2.3). Finally, we point out the challenges of current defenses and emphasize the pressing need for robust and practical content safety controls (Sec. 2.4).

2.1 Diffusion Models and Text-to-Image Models

Text-to-image diffusion models build upon denoising diffusion probabilistic models to enable controlled image generation guided by text conditions. We introduce the mechanisms of these models.

2.1.1 Diffusion Models. Denoising diffusion models (e.g., DDPM [13], DDIM [41]) leverage neural networks to generate high-quality images through an iterative process of noise removal, transforming random Gaussian noise into meaningful visual data through multiple refinement steps. Formally, the diffusion process follows a predefined noise schedule $\{\beta_t\}_{t=1}^T$. Beginning with Gaussian noise $x_T \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I^2)$, the process gradually refines the image across T steps to produce the final output x_0. The denoising at each timestep t utilizes a U-Net architecture for noise prediction $\epsilon_\theta(x_t, t)$, and the expression for the next denoised sample x_{t-1} is:

$$x_{t-1} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha_t}}(x_t - \frac{1-\alpha_t}{\sqrt{1-\bar{\alpha}_t}}\epsilon_\theta(x_t, t)) + \sigma_t n, \quad (1)$$

where $\alpha_t = 1 - \beta_t$, $\bar{\alpha}_t = \prod_{i=t}^T \alpha_i$, and $\sigma_t n$ is controlled randomness.

2.1.2 Text-to-Image Models. Text-to-image (T2I) models like Stable Diffusion [1, 20] build on the DDPM framework to enable text-controlled image synthesis through latent diffusion. As shown in Fig. 4, the generation involves two steps:

Text Encoding. A text encoder converts input prompts into semantic embeddings. The encoder adds special tokens ([SOS], [EOS]) to mark sequence boundaries [30], pads ([PAD]) to fixed length, and processes through text transformer to generate embedding matrices that bridge text and visual concepts.

Embedding-Guided Image Generation. Using the embedding matrix, the model performs iterative denoising to generate images. Starting from noise z_t, a U-Net (ϵ_θ) guides the process through cross-attention to text embeddings. The noise prediction combines conditional and unconditional denoising [14, 26], with the noise at timestep t calculated as:

$$\tilde{\epsilon}_\theta(z_t, c, t) = \epsilon_\theta(z_t, t) + \eta(\epsilon_\theta(z_t, c, t) - \epsilon_\theta(z_t, t)), \quad (2)$$

where η (typically 7.5) controls text conditioning strength. Finally, a decoder transforms the denoised latent into an image.

2.2 Adversarial Unsafe Generation

2.2.1 Safety Generation Statement of Text-to-Image Models. The remarkable capabilities of T2I models enable the generation of virtually any desired image through natural language descriptions. To prevent potential misuse of these models, we need to ensure they do not generate unsafe content that could harm society. In this paper, we focus on **SEVEN** categories of unsafe content that should be prevented in publicly served T2I models [17, 34]: pornography, violence, hate speech, harassment, self-harm, shocking content, and illegal activities. These categories represent the most common and concerning forms of harmful content that T2I models might inadvertently generate.

2.2.2 Adversarial Attacks against T2I Models. Early versions of T2I models, such as Stable Diffusion-V1.4 (SD-V1.4), were released without any built-in safety measures, enabling the generation of unsafe content through malicious prompts. Although later versions, like SD-V2.1, introduced safety features through dataset filtering, they remain susceptible to adversarial attacks—carefully crafted prompts designed to bypass these safeguards (Fig. 1). These attacks typically fall into two categories: vocabulary substitution, where explicit terms are replaced with less obvious alternatives, and symbol injection, which introduces seemingly harmless symbols to exploit vulnerabilities in the model.

Vocabulary Substitution. These types of attacks focus on replacing explicit harmful prompts with implicit expressions, euphemisms, or antonyms while maintaining linguistic naturalness and comprehensibility. These substitutions are typically based on

semantic relationships, enabling seemingly safe word combinations to trigger the generation of harmful content. Schramowski et al. [34] collected carefully crafted prompts from online communities to create I2P, demonstrating how clever word combinations and substitutions can trigger T2I models to generate inappropriate content. Additionally, Yang et al. [48] introduced SneakyPrompt, which replaces sensitive terms with alternative expressions that preserve the original semantic meaning while avoiding explicit sensitive words. Very recently, Li et al. [17] proposed the ART red-teaming framework, which primarily exploits linguistic features such as implicit expressions, euphemistic substitutions, and antonym triggers to evade safety detection. The success of these linguistic-based attacks demonstrates the vulnerability of improved safety measures in models like SD-V2.1. However, their reliance on carefully crafted prompts points to the need for more automated and scalable attacks.

Symbol Injection. This category of attacks introduces adversarial symbols or tokens to create prompts that appear harmless at the symbol level but align with harmful content in the embedding space. For instance, Hsu et al. [42] developed the Ring-A-Bell red-teaming framework, which extracts and injects target harmful concepts in the embedding space to generate superficially neutral prompts that trigger harmful content generation. Yang et al. [46] utilized gradient-based optimization methods to inject special symbols or tokens, aligning their embedding representations with harmful content while avoiding explicit sensitive terms. Chin et al. [6] proposed a P4D strategy, which injects trainable tokens and optimizes their embedding representations. These embedding-based attacks prove challenging to defend against and can be automated more easily than vocabulary substitution approaches.

The effectiveness of these attacks highlights critical vulnerabilities in current T2I systems and underscores the urgent need for robust defenses to counter such malicious attempts.

2.3 Defenses Against Unsafe Generation

To address the aforementioned adversarial attacks, researchers have proposed various defensive approaches to enhance the safety of T2I models. These defensive mechanisms can be broadly categorized into two types: internal defenses and external defenses.

2.3.1 Internal Defenses. Internal defenses focus on enhancing the model safety through architectural modifications and parameter adjustments during the training or fine-tuning process. By integrating safety features directly into the model's architecture, these approaches aim to prevent the generation of inappropriate content. Safe Latent Diffusion (SLD) [34] implements this concept by prohibiting specific negative concepts and introducing conditional diffusion terms to guide image generation away from unsafe regions. Erased Stable Diffusion (ESD) [11] takes a different approach by modifying the model's attention mechanisms to remove unsafe and sensitive concepts, effectively controlling the generation of inappropriate content. Similarly, SafeGen [18] adjusts vision-only self-attention layers to weaken the influence of text on image generation, thereby suppressing unsafe content generation.

2.3.2 External Defenses. External defenses implement safety measures via additional filters that operate independently of the core model architecture. This approach has gained widespread adoption among service providers and open-source models due to its flexibility and modularity. It can be realized in two manners: text-level filters and image-level filters.

Text-level Filters. These filters examine input prompts before image generation to identify and block inappropriate content. Traditional approaches like NSFW Text Classifier [23] rely on keyword matching and content classification to filter harmful prompts. More sophisticated methods, such as GuardT2I [47], employ large language models to convert text conditioning embeddings back to natural language, enabling better detection of malicious intent in seemingly innocuous prompts.

Image-level Filters. The filters provide post-generation protection by analyzing the generated images. For instance, Safety Checker [8] scan the output images for violation content and replace detected unsafe outputs with black images, offering an additional layer of safety without modifying the underlying model architecture.

2.4 Challenges of Current Defenses

While various defense mechanisms have been proposed to prevent unsafe content generation in T2I models, current approaches face challenges in two critical aspects: robustness against diverse adversarial attacks and practical utility in real-world applications. Below, we analyze these challenges for both internal and external defenses.

2.4.1 Challenges in Robustness. Robustness in defenses refers to their ability to resist various types of adversarial attacks, including those outside their training distribution. Current defenses, however, demonstrate limited robustness when confronted with out-of-distribution attacks [29, 39, 45]. As shown in Fig. 2, we evaluate five different defense methods (both internal and external) implemented on SD- V1.4 against two types of out-of-distribution adversarial attacks. The results reveal that both vocabulary substitution attacks [17, 34, 48] and symbol injection attacks [6, 42, 46] successfully bypass all existing safety measures. The adversarial prompts used in Fig. 2 are the same as the ones in Fig. 1.

2.4.2 Challenges in Practical Utility. Practical utility in content moderation encompasses two aspects: 1) for the benign prompts, maintaining high-quality outputs without negative impact; 2) for the malicious prompts, generating safe, high-quality outputs by removing harmful content rather than completely refusing generation. Service providers particularly value this balance to ensure user experiences. However, Fig. 3 shows that current defenses struggle to simultaneously achieve both aspects of practical utility.

Specifically, while internal defenses such as SLD, ESD, and SafeGen avoid generating explicitly harmful content, their outputs for benign prompts often deviate significantly from the intended semantic meaning. This semantic drift compromises the practical utility of these systems for legitimate use cases. The external defenses, conversely, often respond to potentially harmful prompts with complete generation refusal or black images. While they successfully handle benign prompts, their binary approach to harmful content significantly impacts user experience and practical utility, especially when unsafe content stems from careless prompt construction rather than malicious intent [17]. This all-or-nothing approach, while safe, fails to meet the nuanced needs in pratice.



Figure 5: Attention visualization in SD-V1.4's text encoder. Lines show attention flows from input tokens (right) to the [EOS] token (lower-left corner). Colors denote attention heads and line thickness shows attention weights. The [EOS] token's consistent attention to all tokens across layers reveals its role as a condition feature aggregator. More examples are in Appendix B.1.

The above challenges highlight the current need for a defense mechanism that combines robustness with practical utility. Such a solution would need to maintain high-quality output for legitimate requests while effectively identifying and mitigating harmful content across a broader range of scenarios, including those not explicitly represented in training data.

3 Threat Model

The threat model comprises two main actors: the adversary and the model governor.

Adversary. The adversary aims to generate unsafe content via T2I models, with capabilities to craft adversarial prompts. Specifically:

- **Objectives:** The adversary aims to generate unsafe content by bypassing both internal defenses (e.g., concept suppression) and external defenses (e.g., text-level filters).
- **Capabilities:** The adversary can craft various adversarial prompts using vocabulary substitution and symbol injection techniques, with white-box access to the parameters and architectures of T2I models, and full knowledge of deployed defenses.

Model Governor. The model governor serves as a safety mechanism that protects T2I models while ensuring their practical utility.

- **Objectives:** The model governor aims to achieve two primary goals: 1) robustness: preventing the generation of unsafe content across various out-of-distribution adversarial attacks; and 2) practicality: maintaining high-quality outputs for benign prompts while generating safe, semantically meaningful content for adversarial prompts instead of complete blocking.
- **Capabilities:** The model governor operates without direct access to model parameters, making it applicable to both white-box and black-box scenarios. It can be easily integrated into various T2I models, such as SD-V1.4 [20], SD-V2.1 [1], and Flux.1 [16].

4 An Empirical Study

To develop robust and practical safety measures, we need to understand how T2I models represent different prompts. Drawing inspiration from the approach of using a special [CLS] token to aggregate and classify sequence information in BERT [5, 21, 25, 43], we investigate whether similar text condition feature aggregation exists in T2I models' text encoders, which could reveal fundamental differences between benign and adversarial prompts. To this end, we first examine this effect in SD's CLIP text encoder (Sec.4.1), analyze how it represents different types of prompts (Sec.4.2), and demonstrate cross-architecture generalization (Sec. 4.3).

4.1 Identifying the Text Condition Feature Aggregation Token

To explore potential condition feature aggregation mechanisms, we analyze attention patterns in the CLIP ViT-L/14 text encoder [30] from SD-V1.4 (12 layers, 12 attention heads). Using the prompt "A man holding a red umbrella while walking in the rain," we visualize attention patterns across all layers in Fig. 5, where lines show information flow from attended tokens (right) to processed tokens (left). Different colored lines represent different attention heads, with line thickness indicating attention weight. More visualization examples are in Appendix B.1. Our key observations are as follows:

> ***Observation 1:*** *The [EOS] token serves as a text condition feature aggregator in CLIP's text encoder.*

As shown in Fig. 5, the [EOS] token (represented as '<endoftext>') maintains consistent attention connections to all prompt tokens across every layer. This is evidenced by the multiple colored lines connecting various tokens to the [EOS] token, indicating its role in collecting and synthesizing information from the entire sequence. Unlike BERT that employs the <CLS> token at the sequence beginning, CLIP specifically employs the [EOS] token for this aggregation role. While both [SOS] and [EOS] tokens are present in the input, our visualization analysis reveals that only the [EOS] token exhibits these consistent aggregation patterns, with [SOS] showing markedly different attention behaviors (see Appendix B.1).

> ***Observation 2:*** *The condition feature aggregation process follows a hierarchical pattern from shallow to deep layers.*



Figure 6: Visualization of the [EOS] token embedding across different prompt categories using various dimensionality reduction methods. More examples are in Appendix B.2.

The visualization reveals distinct attention behaviors across different layer depths. In shallow layers (0–5), the [EOS] token shows relatively uniform attention patterns across all tokens, suggesting the initial gathering of basic textual information. In deeper layers (6-11), it develops more focused attention weights on semantic elements like "man," "umbrella," and "walking." This transition from uniform to selective attention demonstrates how the [EOS] token gradually builds a sophisticated condition of the prompt's semantics, progressing from basic token-level information to higher-level semantic relationships through the network's depth.

These observations reveal that the [EOS] token's representation contains a comprehensive summary of the prompt's semantic content through hierarchical aggregation. This suggests that analyzing the [EOS] token's embedding space could provide a promising direction for distinguishing between benign and adversarial prompts.

4.2 Analyzing Embedding Representations in [EOS] Aggregation Token

Based on our discovery of the [EOS] token's aggregation role, we hypothesize that the embeddings of this token exhibit distinct distributional patterns for different types of prompts. To verify this, we analyze the [EOS] token embeddings from three prompt categories: benign (Conceptual Caption [38]), vocabulary substitution (VS) (META [17]), and symbol injection (SJ) attacks (MMA [46]).

To examine the distinctions among these datasets, we employ both qualitative and quantitative analyses. For qualitative analysis, we apply three dimensionality reduction techniques to project the 768-dimensional [EOS] token embeddings into 2D/3D visualizations, as shown in Fig. 6. For quantitative analysis, we calculate the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) to measure distributional differences between prompt categories in the original 768-dimensional embeddings (Table 1). Our observations are as follows:

> ***Observation 3:*** *Prompts within the same category exhibit clear clustering patterns in [EOS] token embedding space.*

Table 1: Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) scores between different prompt categories in the [EOS] token embeddings. Higher scores indicate greater distributional differences.

	Benign	VS Attacks	SJ Attacks
Benign	0	0.696	0.993
VS Attacks	0.696	0	1.000
SJ Attacks	0.993	1.000	0

As shown in Fig. 6, all three visualization methods consistently reveal distinct clusters for each prompt category. The t-SNE visualization (Fig. 6a) shows well-defined clusters for benign prompts (blue), VS attacks (red), and SJ attacks (green). This clustering pattern is further confirmed by the UMAP projection (Fig. 6b) and the PCA (Fig. 6c and 6d), where each category forms concentrated regions with high density.

> ***Observation 4:*** *Prompts across different categories demonstrate significant distributional gaps in [EOS] token embedding space.*

The quantitative analysis through MMD scores (Table 1) reveals substantial distributional gaps between different prompt categories. SJ attacks show the largest distributional difference between benign prompts (MMD = 0.993) and VS attacks (MMD = 1.000). These quantitative results align with our qualitative observations in Fig. 6.

The observations demonstrate that the [EOS] token effectively captures the inherent differences between benign and adversarial prompts, suggesting a promising direction for developing robust and practical content safety control based on the embedding representations of the aggregation token.

4.3 Generalization Across Different Text Encoders

To investigate the generality of our findings, we extend our analysis to T2I models with different architectures and text encoders. Beyond the CLIP ViT-L/14 encoder in SD-V1.4, we examine models like SD-V2.1 [1], which uses OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 (where [EOS] is represented as "<end of text>"), and Flux.1 [16], which employs both CLIP ViT-L/14 and T5-XXL encoders (where [EOS] is "</s>" in T5). Detailed results are provided in Appendix B.3.

> ***Observation 5:*** *The discovered aggregation token patterns generalize across different text encoders and model architectures.*

The distinctive [EOS] token patterns persist across architectures, from OpenCLIP's [EOS] to T5-XXL's "</s>" token, highlighting its potential as a generalizable solution for content safety control.

5 SafeGuider

Based on our empirical study of feature aggregation and embedding distributions in SD-V1.4's text encoder, we propose **SafeGuider** for robust and practical content safety control (Fig. 7). The framework operates in two steps: 1) **Safe** and unsafe prompt recognition; 2) **Guide** unsafe prompts to output safe and meaningful images. Below, we elaborate on the framework design and implementation details.



Figure 7: Overview of SafeGuider. In Step I, SafeGuider processes input prompts through a text encoder to obtain [EOS] token embeddings for safety assessment. Prompts with safety scores > 0.5 are considered safe and directly forwarded to image generation, while unsafe ones (safety scores ≤ 0.5) are processed by Step II. In Step II, SAFE beam search with beam width K strategically modifies unsafe prompts to obtain safe yet semantically meaningful embeddings for image generation.

5.1 Overview

The key component of **SafeGuider** is an embedding-level recognition model trained on [EOS] token embeddings from benign and adversarial prompts, leveraging our observations from Sec. 4. Specifically, **SafeGuider** first processes input prompts through a text encoder and extracts their [EOS] token embeddings for safety assessment using the recognition model (Step I). For detected safe prompts, the framework directly forwards them to the diffusion model; for unsafe ones, it activates our proposed Safety-Aware Feature Erasure (SAFE) beam search to identify optimal embedding-level modifications for safe generation while preserving semantic relevance (Step II). We detail each step as follows.

5.2 Step I: Safe and Unsafe Prompt Recognition

In this step, **SafeGuider** processes input prompts through a text encoder to obtain [EOS] token embeddings, which are then evaluated by our proposed embedding-level recognizer for safety assessment. This recognizer is a lightweight classification model that maps the [EOS] token's representation to a safety score, determining whether a prompt is safe or unsafe based on this score. The design leverages our findings from Sec. 4 about the token's ability to capture prompt characteristics. As illustrated in Fig. 8, we develop this recognizer through three key parts: embedding-level dataset construction (Sec. 5.2.1), lightweight architecture design (Sec. 5.2.2), and training strategy (Sec. 5.2.3).

5.2.1 Embedding-level Dataset Construction. We construct our embedding level dataset using three prompt sources: 9,275 benign prompts from Conceptual Caption [38], 8,585 vocabulary substitution attacks from META dataset [17], and 2,000 symbol injection attacks from MMA dataset[46]. The adversarial datasets encompass seven unsafe categories as discussed in Sec 2.2.1: pornography, violence, hate speech, harassment, self-harm, shocking, and illegal content. Notably, while trained on these specific datasets, our recognizer demonstrates a strong generalization ability to out-of-domain attacks, as validated in our experimental results (Sec. 7).



Figure 8: Training pipeline of embedding-level recognizer.

As shown in Fig. 8, the dataset construction process consists of two main steps. First, for each prompt, the SD-V1.4 text encoder tokenizes the input and generates a fixed-size embedding matrix $E \in \mathbb{R}^{77\times768}$, where 77 represents the maximum sequence length and 768 is the embedding dimension. Then, we extract the [EOS] token embedding vector $e_{agg} = E[len(P), :] \in \mathbb{R}^{1\times768}$ from the matrix, where $len(P)$ indicates the prompt's actual length. Finally, we obtain an embedding-level dataset containing 19,860 [EOS] token embeddings, with ≈80% for training our recognizer.

5.2.2 Lightweight Architecture Design. For efficient prompt safety assessment, we design a lightweight recognizer C_θ that predicts safety scores from [EOS] token embeddings:

$$C_\theta : \mathbb{R}^{1\times768} \rightarrow S, \tag{3}$$

where S represents the predicted safety score. The recognizer employs a three-layer neural network with progressive dimensionality reduction, using ReLU activations and dropout regularization. For an input embedding vector e_{agg}, the model outputs both logits and probability distributions through softmax normalization, where

the probability of the positive class represents the prompt's safety score. This architecture provides an efficient balance between model capacity and computational overhead while maintaining robust recognition performance.

5.2.3 Training Strategy. We design a custom loss function that encourages diverse safety score distributions:

$$L(\theta) = L_{pos} + L_{neg}, \tag{4}$$

where L_{pos} encourages distributed high safety scores for benign prompts while L_{neg} guiding varied low safety scores for adversarial prompts. This formulation helps establish natural separation in safety scores while avoiding over-convergence. We train the recognizer for 50 epochs with a batch size of 32. Additional training hyperparameters are provided in Appendix C.1.

5.3 Step II: Guide Unsafe Prompts to Output Safe and Meaningful Images

In this step, we focus on processing unsafe prompts identified by Step I to enable safe and semantically meaningful image generation. Inspired by our findings on distinct [EOS] token patterns (Sec. 4), we aim to guide unsafe prompts toward benign embeddings while preserving semantics. Specifically, **SafeGuider** aims to obtain a new condition embedding matrix that is both safe and semantically relevant. To achieve this embedding-level objective, we propose Safety-Aware Feature Erasure (SAFE) beam search, which strategically modifies input tokens guided by both safe and semantic similarity metrics at the embedding level. As detailed in Alg. 1 (Appendix A), SAFE beam search first analyzes the contribution of each token of the prompt to unsafe content by calculating the safety score after removing the token (lines 3–10). Based on these scores, tokens are ranked by their impact on safety. Then, using beam search with width K and depth D, the algorithm systematically explores different token subsets to identify the optimal remaining tokens (lines 11–24). Throughout the search process, we maintain the most promising candidates K, where each candidate is a subset of tokens from the original prompt. Each candidate is evaluated based on two criteria: the safety score of its resulting embedding (from our recognition model) and its semantic similarity (measured by cosine similarity) to the original embedding. This dual evaluation ensures that token removals both improve the safety and maintain the semantics. The process continues until we find an optimal combination whose embedding achieves both high safety and semantic preservation.

Through this structured exploration, SAFE beam search efficiently identifies modifications that enhance prompt safety while preserving meaningful semantic conditions. The beam width K and depth D constraints ensure tractable computation, while the dual-objective evaluation of safety and similarity guides the search toward practical and effective solutions.

6 Implementation and Experimental Setup

In this section, we detail our implementation, baselines, datasets, and metrics used to evaluate **SafeGuider**'s performance.

Implementation. We implement **SafeGuider** on Ubuntu 22.04 with Python 3.8.5 and PyTorch 2.4.1+cu121. Following prior works [11, 18, 34], we use SD-V1.4 as our base model. For SAFE beam search, we set beam width to 6, search depth to 25 to balance effectiveness and efficiency. In step II, we set the safety threshold to 0.8 and semantic similarity threshold to 0.5 to ensure more safety while maintaining the semantics. Additional implementation details are in Appendix C.

Baselines. We compare **SafeGuider** against ten state-of-the-art baselines implemented on SD-V1.4, which serves as the base model due to its lack of built-in safety mechanisms. Detailed configurations of all baselines are provided in Appendix C.2.

Internal Defenses. We compare against methods that modify model architecture or parameters during training or fine-tuning, including SLD [34], ESD [11], and SafeGen [18], where ESD and SafeGen are specifically designed for pornographic content mitigation.

External Defenses. We evaluate methods that employ independent filters, including text-level OpenAI Moderation [28], Microsoft Azure Content Moderator [24], AWS Comprehend [2], NSFW Text Classifier [23], GuardT2I [47], and an image-level Safety Checker [8]. These methods operate independently of the model architecture, providing different approaches to content filtering.

Evaluation Datasets. We evaluate in-domain and out-of-domain test sets, each comprising benign prompts, vocabulary substitution (VS) and symbol injection (SJ) adversarial attacks.

In-domain Evaluation. We use the held-out ≈20% of our embedding datasets as the test set, including benign from Conceptual Caption (CCaption) [38], VS attacks from META dataset [17], and SJ attacks from MMA dataset [46].

Out-of-domain Evaluation. We test on prompts from the COCO2017 validation subset for benign content [19], I2P [34] and Sneaky [48] datasets for VS attacks, and Ring-A-Bell (RAB) [42] and P4D [6] datasets for SJ attacks.

These datasets cover different unsafe categories discussed in Sec. 2.2.1: META and I2P encompass all seven categories (pornography, violence, etc.); RAB contains pornography and violence, while the other focus on pornographic content. Details are in Appendix C.3.

Metrics. We evaluate using two types of metrics: safety metrics to assess defense effectiveness against adversarial attacks and quality metrics to measure generation performance on benign inputs.

Safety Assessment Metrics. We employ three metrics to evaluate the model's ability to defeat different types of adversarial attacks.

- **Attack Success Rate (ASR)**: Percentage of successful attacks, measured by filter bypass rate (external defenses) or unsafe content generation rate (internal defenses) evaluated with NudeNet [27] (the sexual concept) and Q16 [35] (the other unsafe concepts).
- **Nudity Removal Rate (NRR)**: Percentage of explicit content mitigation measured by NudeNet [27].
- **Harmful Content Removal Rate (HCRR)**: Percentage of non-sexual harmful content mitigation measured by Q16 [35].

Generation Quality Metrics. We use three metrics to ensure the model maintains high-quality outputs for benign inputs.

- **Generation Success Rate (GSR)**: Percentage of successful image generations.
- **CLIP Score** [15]: Semantic alignment between images and prompts.
- **LPIPS Score** [49]: Perceptual similarity to reference images.

Table 2: [RQ1-1] Performance of different methods on detecting sexually explicit content across VS and SJ adversarial datasets (IND/OOD). Lower ASR (%) indicates better performance. Bold numbers denote the best results.

Defense Type	Method	IND-ASR ↓		OOD-ASR ↓			
		VS	SJ	VS		SJ	
		META Sexual	MMA	I2P Sexual	Sneaky	RAB Sexual	P4D
External Defense	OpenAI	96.87	30.34	91.00	33.00	25.93	70.18
	Azure	83.02	15.45	82.00	19.00	2.06	35.32
	AWS	86.00	13.00	85.00	24.00	25.00	63.00
	NSFW Text	37.30	3.37	25.00	6.00	1.65	14.68
	GuardT2I	26.33	17.70	25.46	6.50	0.82	11.01
	SafetyChecker	64.50	53.09	40.28	35.50	7.37	28.75
Internal Defense	ESD	21.38	51.12	32.44	38.50	84.77	77.92
	SLD-Medium	32.76	90.73	54.99	81.50	100.00	97.08
	SLD-Max	30.00	84.83	49.19	82.00	98.77	91.25
	SafeGen	28.97	19.10	54.14	37.00	76.54	70.00
Ours	**SafeGuider**	**1.88**	**1.12**	**5.48**	**2.50**	**0.01**	**0.46**

7 Evaluation

We analyze the **SafeGuider** in terms of robustness and practicality, and aim to answer the following Research Questions (RQs):

- RQ1 [Robustness]: How effective is **SafeGuider**'s recognition model in detecting unsafe prompts?
- RQ2 [Practicality-Benign]: How well does **SafeGuider** preserve image generation quality for benign prompts?
- RQ3 [Practicality-Unsafe]: How effective is **SafeGuider** in guiding unsafe prompts to generate safe images?
- RQ4 [Transferability]: What is the transferability of **SafeGuider** to different T2I models?
- RQ5 [Ablation Study]: What is the importance of each step in our **SafeGuider**?
- RQ6 [Adapative Evaluation]: What will happen if the attacker access our **SafeGuider**?

7.1 RQ1: Robustness

We evaluate **SafeGuider**'s robustness against both in-domain (IND) and out-of-domain (OOD) adversarial attacks, focusing on the detection of sexually explicit content and other harmful themes. Table 2 and Table 3 compare our method with existing defenses.

[RQ1-1] Detection of Sexually Explicit Content. As shown in Table 2, both defenses exhibit substantial vulnerabilities to sexually explicit content. For external defenses, commercial APIs show concerning vulnerabilities to vocabulary substitution attacks, with OpenAI Moderation reaching ASRs of 96.87% on META (IND) and 91.00% on I2P-Sexual (OOD), while Microsoft Azure and AWS Comprehend show similar weaknesses (82.00-86.00% ASR). Although open-source solutions like NSFW Text Classifier and GuardT2I demonstrate better robustness, their ASRs (25.00-37.30%) remain concerning for safe applications. For internal defenses, evaluated by generating three images per prompt and using NudeNet for unsafe content detection, the results reveal significant vulnerabilities, particularly to symbol injection attacks. Specifically, SLD-Medium exhibits ASRs of up to 100% on RAB-Sexual, while ESD and SafeGen show consistently high ASRs (76.54-84.77%). In contrast, **SafeGuider** achieves remarkably low ASRs across all scenarios: 1.88-5.48% for vocabulary substitution and 0.01-1.12% for symbol injection attacks.

Table 3: [RQ1-2] Performance of different methods on detecting other unsafe themes across VS and SJ attacks (IND/OOD).

Defense Type	Method	IND-ASR ↓	OOD-ASR ↓	
		VS	VS	SJ
		META Other	I2P Other	RAB Other
External Defense	OpenAI	99.16	97.41	82.77
	Azure	78.56	85.23	2.73
	AWS	82.00	89.00	30.00
	NSFW Text	37.00	47.71	0.52
	GuardT2I	31.24	33.68	2.27
	SafetyChecker	49.27	20.87	93.64
Internal Defense	SLD-Medium	14.33	8.54	66.36
	SLD-Max	3.36	3.02	20.01
Ours	**SafeGuider**	**1.34**	**1.40**	**0.01**

[RQ1-2] Detection of Other Unsafe Themes. Beyond sexually explicit content, we evaluate the effectiveness of different approaches in detecting other unsafe themes (e.g., violence, hate speech) using META-Other themes (IND) and I2P-Other/RAB-Other themes (OOD) datasets. As shown in Table 3, external defenses demonstrate significant vulnerabilities, with OpenAI showing 99.16% ASR on IND attacks and consistent performance on OOD datasets (82.77-97.41%). For internal defenses, evaluated under the same protocol as sexually explicit content detection, the results reveal considerable weaknesses. SLD-Medium exhibits varying ASRs (8.54-66.36%) in different datasets, while SD with Safety Checker performs poorly in OOD datasets (20.87-93.64%). In contrast, **SafeGuider** maintains consistently robust performance across both IND and OOD scenarios, achieving low ASRs of 1.34% and 0.01-1.40% respectively.

> **Take-home Message 1:** SafeGuider exhibits exceptional robustness in unsafe content detection, maintaining the lowest attack success rate across diverse scenarios.

7.2 RQ2: Generation Quality on Benign Prompts

We evaluate **SafeGuider**'s impact on benign prompt processing and image generation quality using three key metrics: GSR, CLIP score, and LPIPS score. Our experiments are conducted on both IND (Conceptual Caption [38]) and OOD (COCO2017 [19]) datasets to assess practical usability, as shown in Table 4 and Fig. 9.

[RQ2-1] Generation Success Rate. External defenses exhibit varying degrees of degradation in generation capabilities (Table 4). While commercial APIs maintain relatively high GSRs (96.00-99.85%), open-source solutions show significant limitations, with GuardT2I

Table 4: [RQ2] Performance of different methods on generation capabilities (GSR) and quality metrics (CLIP and LPIPS Score) across in-domain and out-of-domain datasets.

Method	IND-CCaption-9k			OOD-COCO2017-2k		
	GSR ↑	CLIP Score ↑	LPIPS Score ↓	GSR ↑	CLIP Score ↑	LPIPS Score ↓
Original SD	**100.00**	**27.52**	**0.762**	**100.00**	**28.41**	**0.701**
OpenAI	99.00	27.13	0.770	99.00	28.06	0.712
Azure	98.00	26.94	0.776	99.85	28.30	0.707
AWS	96.00	26.43	0.784	98.75	28.00	0.715
NSFW Text	70.60	25.32	0.803	64.87	26.19	0.777
GuardT2I	27.17	21.55	0.887	52.34	24.69	0.794
SafetyChecker	97.68	26.85	0.779	99.43	28.25	0.708
ESD	**100.00**	26.56	0.776	**100.00**	27.76	0.718
SLD-Medium	**100.00**	26.07	0.781	**100.00**	26.30	0.721
SLD-Max	**100.00**	27.36	0.772	**100.00**	28.28	0.708
SafeGen	**100.00**	27.32	0.777	**100.00**	28.08	0.713
SafeGuider	**100.00**	27.50	0.763	**100.00**	**28.41**	**0.701**



Figure 9: Visual examples of generation quality on benign prompts by different defense strategies.

achieving only 27.17% and 52.34% GSR on IND and OOD datasets, respectively. In contrast, internal defenses like ESD, SLD, and SafeGen achieve 100% GSR on both IND and OOD datasets, as they modify model architecture or parameters rather than filtering prompts. **SafeGuider** achieves 100% GSR across all test scenarios, matching the original SD model's performance and demonstrating no compromise in generation capability.

[RQ2-2] Generation Quality. For the CLIP score , **SafeGuider** maintains performance comparable to the original SD model (27.50 vs. 27.52 on IND, 28.41 vs. 28.41 on OOD), significantly outperforming most external defenses, particularly GuardT2I (21.55 IND, 24.69 OOD). The slight variations in CLIP Scores for **SafeGuider** can be attributed to minor false alarm from the recognition module, but these differences are negligible in practice. For the LPIPS score, **SafeGuider** achieves scores (0.763 IND, 0.701 OOD) nearly identical to the original SD model (0.762, 0.701), showing superior perceptual quality compared to external defenses. This is notable as external defenses often default to generating black images upon rejection, leading to poor LPIPS scores. Internal defenses show comparable but slightly worse performance due to their model modifications. We present qualitative examples of benign prompt generation in Fig. 9 and Appendix D.1, demonstrating that **SafeGuider** preserves the original model's generation capabilities on safe content.

Table 5: [RQ3-1] Performance of different methods on mitigating sexually explicit content via nudity removal rate (NRR) across VS and SJ adversarial datasets (IND/OOD).

Method	IND-NRR ↑		OOD-NRR ↑			
	VS	SJ	VS		SJ	
	META Sexual	MMA	I2P Sexual	Sneaky	RAB Sexual	P4D
SafetyChecker	78.37	54.63	81.00	77.35	73.42	78.71
ESD	86.34	80.92	80.99	83.60	59.01	58.61
SLD-Medium	73.43	-4.38	50.98	2.89	-23.93	-5.23
SLD-Max	75.00	28.82	67.64	37.87	36.92	42.51
SafeGen	79.58	92.31	58.58	83.80	74.23	73.27
SafeGuider	**91.58**	**93.32**	**83.33**	**84.05**	**80.24**	**82.57**

Figure 10: Examples of sexually explicit content mitigation.

> **Take-home Message 2:** SafeGuider maintains the generation performance of the base model, achieving 100% success rate on the benign prompts and competitive CLIP/LPIPS scores across both IND and OOD settings.

7.3 RQ3: Safe Generation for Unsafe Prompts

We evaluate **SafeGuider**'s effectiveness in guiding unsafe prompts to output safe and meaningful images. Unlike external defenses that simply reject unsafe prompts and produce black images, **SafeGuider** aims to guide the generation process toward safe alternatives. Our assessment uses specialized metrics for each category: NRR for sexually explicit content (Table 5 and Fig. 10) and HCRR for the other unsafe themes (Table 6 and Fig. 11).

[RQ3-1] Mitigation of Sexually Explicit Content. As shown in Fig. 10, **SafeGuider** effectively removes inappropriate content while generating meaningful images that preserve the safe semantic elements of the original prompts, with more qualitative examples provided in Appendix D.2. Furthermore, Table 5 quantitatively validates **SafeGuider**'s superior performance in safety generation. Specifically, among internal defenses, for vocabulary substitution attacks, **SafeGuider** achieves the highest NRR (91.58% IND, 83.33-84.05% OOD), significantly outperforming other approaches. ESD shows moderate performance (86.34% IND, 80.99-83.60% OOD),

Table 6: [RQ3-2] Performance of different methods on mitigating other unsafe themes via harmful content removal rate (HCRR) across VS and SJ adversarial datasets (IND/OOD).

Method	IND-HCRR ↑	OOD-HCRR ↑	
	VS	VS	SJ
	META Other	I2P Other	RAB Other
SafetyChecker	0.00	15.75	0.00
SLD-Medium	70.04	67.32	51.09
SLD-Max	93.94	89.61	89.86
SafeGuider	**96.22**	**92.98**	**96.02**

Figure 11: Examples of other unsafe content mitigation.

but SLD-Medium struggles particularly on OOD datasets (73.43% IND, 2.89-50.98% OOD). For symbol injection attacks, **SafeGuider** maintains robust performance (93.32% IND, 80.24-82.57% OOD), while other approaches show significant degradation, notably SLD-Medium exhibiting negative NRR values indicating potential amplification of unsafe content.

[RQ3-2] Mitigation of Other Unsafe Themes. Fig. 11 presents qualitative mitigation examples of other unsafe themes, showing that **SafeGuider** can effectively remove other harmful elements while maintaining the safe, intended aspects of the original generation. More qualitative examples are in Appendix D.2. Besides, in Table 6, **SafeGuider** achieves exceptional performance in safety generation on the other unsafe themes, substantially outperforming existing approaches with consistently high HCRR values (96.22% IND, 92.98-96.02% OOD). While SLD-Max shows reasonable performance (93.94% IND, 89.61-89.86% OOD), other approaches like SLD-Medium demonstrate lower effectiveness (70.04% IND, 51.09-67.32% OOD). Notably, SD with Safety Checker shows particularly poor performance with 0% HCRR on several test cases, indicating complete failure in mitigating certain types of harmful content.

> **Take-home Message 3:** SafeGuider demonstrates superior mitigation of various unsafe content while preserving meaningful image generation, outperforming both external defenses' binary blocking and other internal defenses across IND and OOD scenarios.

7.4 RQ4: Transferability

We evaluate **SafeGuider**'s transferability to different T2I models, specifically testing on SD-V2.1 [1] and Flux.1 [16]. As shown in Table 7 and Fig. 12, our experiments demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s broad applicability across varying model architectures.

Table 7: [RQ4] Performance comparison between original models and SafeGuider on SD-V2.1 and FLUX.1.

Method	COCO2017-2k		I2P Sexual	RAB Sexual
	CLIP Score ↑	LPIPS Score ↓	ASR ↓	ASR ↓
Original SD-V2.1	28.75	0.703	60.26	98.26
SafeGuider SD-V2.1	**28.74**	**0.703**	**5.37**	**0.01**
Original FLUX.1	29.00	0.679	64.55	98.95
SafeGuider FLUX.1	**29.00**	**0.679**	**6.44**	**0.41**

Figure 12: Demonstration of SafeGuider's transferability across different T2I models. More examples in Appendix D.3.

[RQ4-1] Adaptation to SD-V2.1. We first examine SD-V2.1, which employs OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 encoder where [EOS] is represented as "<end of text>". The results reveal that **SafeGuider** maintains nearly identical generation quality for benign prompts (CLIP: 28.74 vs 28.75, LPIPS: 0.703 vs 0.703) while demonstrating two key capabilities: effectively defending against various adversarial attacks (reducing ASR from 60.26% to 5.37% on I2P-Sexual and from 98.26% to 0.01% on RAB attacks) and successfully guiding the generation process toward safe and semantically relevant alternatives (Fig. 12).

[RQ4-2] Adaptation to Flux.1. Flux.1 uses dual encoders (CLIP ViT-L and T5-XXL). **SafeGuider** can work with embeddings from different encoders. For CLIP ViT-L, we directly apply our pre-trained model. For T5, we reduce its 4096-dimensional embeddings to 1024 dimensions to better learn feature distributions with fewer training iterations, and retrain our recognizer. Results show effective defense (ASR reduced from 98.95% to 0.41% on RAB-Sexual) while preserving benign quality (CLIP: 29.00, LPIPS: 0.679).

> **Take-home Message 4:** SafeGuider demonstrates transferability across different T2I architectures, offering a versatile safety solution through its architecture-agnostic approach.

7.5 RQ5: Ablation Study

We conduct ablation studies to analyze the contribution of each step in **SafeGuider** using COCO2017 for benign prompts and I2P-Sexual for unsafe prompts. As shown in Table 8, we evaluate three configurations: Step I-only, Step II-only, and complete framework.

[RQ5-1] The Performance of Step I-only & Step II-only. The step I-only achieves the fastest processing time (69.02s per prompt) but shows limitations. For benign prompts, false positives in safety

Table 8: [RQ5] Ablation study of SafeGuider comparing Step I-only, Step II-only and the complete framework.

Method	Time Cost Per Prompt (s)↓	COCO2017-2k			I2P Sexual	
		GSR ↑	CLIP Score ↑	LPIPS Score ↓	GSR ↑	NRR↑
Step I-only	**65.02**	99.85	28.35	0.707	5.48	-
Step II-only	87.60	**100.00**	28.29	0.710	**100.00**	**83.72**
SafeGuider	76.85	**100.00**	**28.41**	**0.701**	**100.00**	83.33

detection lead to unnecessary rejections, resulting in a reduced GSR (99.85%) and compromised generation quality due to black image substitution. For unsafe prompts, while effectively blocking unsafe content, it achieves only 5.48% GSR since rejected generations are replaced with black images rather than safe alternatives. The step II-only shows robust safety control but exhibits certain constraints. While achieving 100% GSR for benign prompts, it shows slightly degraded CLIP scores (28.29) compared to the complete framework (28.41), as it applies modifications to all prompts, including already-safe ones, to meet safety thresholds. For unsafe prompts, it achieves an NRR of 83.72% but requires increased generation time.

[RQ5-2] The Performance of Complete Framework. The complete **SafeGuider** framework combines step I and step II effectively. For benign prompts, it achieves optimal performance (100% GSR, 28.41 CLIP score, 0.701 LPIPS score) while maintaining robust unsafe content mitigation (83.33% NRR) with efficient processing (76.85s per prompt), as the recognition in Step I helps avoid unnecessary modifications for already-safe prompts. In summary, while individual components show specific strengths - Step I's speed and Step II's thoroughness - their combination in **SafeGuider** provides the most balanced solution. The framework leverages step I for efficiency and step II for safety, achieving protection while maintaining high-quality generation and reasonable computational cost.

> **Take-home Message 5:** SafeGuider's two-step framework outperforms its individual components, achieving optimal balance between generation quality and safety.

7.6 RQ6: Adaptive Evaluation

Assuming attackers possess full knowledge of both T2I and our **SafeGuider**, we adapt the latest MMA-Diffusion adversarial attack [46], which leverages a gradient-based optimization framework to target T2I models. To extend this attack for **SafeGuider**, we introduce an additional term to enable the execution of adaptive attacks: $L_{adaptive} = (1-\delta)\cdot L_{T2I} + \delta \cdot L_{SafeGuider}$, where L_{T2I} represents the original attack loss introduced by MMA-Diffusion, designed to manipulate the T2I model into generating NSFW content. $L_{SafeGuider}$ aims to evade our **SafeGuider** and δ is to balance these two terms. We perform adversarial optimization on the P4D dataset [6] and define the adaptive attack success (AASR) rate as the product of unsafe generation rate (UGR) and ASR against our **SafeGuider**. As shown in Fig. 13, while ASR increases, the UGR decreases, with the AASR reaching its maximum of 1.84% at α=0.5. This low adaptive attack success rate stems from inherently conflicting objectives: while L_{T2I} seeks prompts with malicious semantics in T2I embeddings, evading the **SafeGuider** requires removing such semantic



Figure 13: Results of adaptive attacks with different values δ.



Figure 14: Successful evasion (bottom) degrades output harmfulness. Each column has the same target NSFW content.

content. Qualitative analysis in Fig. 14 further demonstrates that successful evasion typically degrades output harmfulness. Thus, even with the defense knowledge, attackers struggle to circumvent our recognizer while maintaining attack effectiveness.

> **Take-home Message 6:** SafeGuider also demonstrates robustness against adaptive attacks, with a maximum attack success rate of only 1.84%.

8 Discussion

Our framework offers flexible parameter configuration to accommodate various deployment scenarios. While our experiments demonstrate robust performance with default thresholds, service providers can customize these parameters based on their specific requirements, enabling a balanced trade-off between safety control and user experience. For instance, service providers prioritizing user experience might opt for a lower safety score requirement, enabling more precise content generation while maintaining acceptable safety standards. This adaptability makes **SafeGuider** suitable for various applications with different trade-off requirements.

9 Conclusion

In this work, we propose **SafeGuider**, a robust and practical framework for content safety control in text-to-image models. Based on our empirical findings about [EOS] token embeddings, our two-step approach achieves robust defense while maintaining high-quality generation and broad applicability across different architectures, making a step toward secure deployment of text-to-image systems.

Ethical Consideration. While developing **SafeGuider**, we have carefully considered the ethical implications of our research. Our work aims to prevent the generation of harmful content through T2I models while preserving their beneficial creative capabilities. In our evaluation, we ensured that all datasets were handled responsibly and that no harmful content was publicly shared. We hope our work contributes to the responsible development and deployment of AI technologies, promoting both innovation and social well-being.

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Algorithm 1: Safety-Aware Feature Erasure Beam Search

Input: Original tokens t, original embedding e
Output: Modified embedding with improved safety score

```
Initialize candidates = [ (t, safety score, similarity) ];
Initialize best = null, width = K, max_depth = D;
Procedure Calculate the impact of removing each token
    impacts = [];
    foreach token in t do
        temp = t - token;
        score = Safety_Score(Get_Embedding(temp));
        Add (token, score) to impacts;
    end
    Sort impacts by score;
Procedure SAFE beam search
    for d = 1 to D do
        new_cands = [];
        foreach (tokens, safety, sim) in candidates do
            foreach (token, impact) in impacts do
                if token in tokens and len(tokens) > 1 then
                    new_tokens = tokens - token;
                    new_embed =
                      Get_Embedding(new_tokens);
                    Add (new_tokens,
                      Safety_Score(new_embed),
                      Similarity(new_embed, e)) to
                      new_cands;
                end
            end
        end
        candidates = Top_K(new_cands, K);
    end
return Get_Embedding(Best(candidates))
```

A Safety-Aware Feature Erasure Beam Search

The Safety-Aware Feature Erasure (SAFE) beam search algorithm presents a systematic approach to modify unsafe prompts while preserving their semantic meaning. This appendix provides a detailed explanation of the algorithm's implementation and workflow as presented in Alg. 1.

At its core, SAFE beam search operates in two main phases. The first phase involves analyzing the safety impact of individual tokens, while the second phase employs beam search to explore optimal token combinations. The algorithm takes as input the original tokens t and their corresponding embedding e, ultimately outputting a modified embedding with improved safety characteristics. In the token impact analysis phase, the algorithm systematically evaluates how removing each token affects the overall safety score. For each token in the input sequence, the algorithm temporarily removes it and calculates the safety score of the resulting embedding. These impact scores are then sorted to identify tokens whose removal would most effectively improve safety while minimizing semantic distortion. The beam search phase implements a controlled exploration of token combinations, constrained by beam width K and maximum depth D. At each depth level, the algorithm generates new candidates by removing tokens from existing combinations, guided by the previously calculated impact scores. For each candidate, two crucial metrics are evaluated: the safety score of its embedding and its semantic similarity to the original embedding through cosine similarity. The algorithm maintains the top K most promising candidates at each step, effectively balancing between safety improvement and semantic preservation. The iterative process continues until either the maximum depth D is reached or an optimal solution is found. The final output is the embedding of the best-performing token combination, selected based on both safety and semantic similarity criteria.

Through this structured approach, Alg. 1 effectively identifies token modifications that enhance prompt safety while maintaining meaningful semantic conditions for image generation. The algorithm's success stems from its balanced consideration of both safety metrics and semantic preservation at each step of the beam search process. By systematically evaluating token combinations and their impacts on both safety scores and semantic similarity, the algorithm ensures that the final modified embedding achieves improved safety characteristics without compromising the prompt's original semantic intent. This careful balance, combined with the algorithm's efficient beam search strategy, makes it a practical solution for real-world applications requiring safe yet semantically faithful image generation.

B More Details on Feature Aggregation Analysis

To provide comprehensive support for our findings in Section 4, we present additional experimental results and analyses across different T2I architectures. This appendix is organized into three subsections: Section B.1 presents additional attention visualization examples from SD-V1.4 [20] beyond those discussed in the main text, demonstrating the consistency of the [EOS] token's feature aggregation behavior. Section B.2 shows more embedding distribution examples across different prompt datasets, further validating our clustering observations. Finally, Section B.3 extends our analysis to different model architectures (SD-V2.1 [1] and Flux.1 [16]), confirming the generalizability of our findings. The visualizations and analyses presented in Fig. 15-21 collectively strengthen our main findings regarding the universal presence of feature aggregation mechanisms and distinct distributional patterns across different T2I models.

B.1 More Examples of Attention Visualization

To further validate and extend our findings regarding the feature aggregation mechanism in SD V1.4's text encoder, we conduct two sets of additional experiments. First, we verify the [EOS] token's aggregation behavior using a simpler yet structurally complete prompt "the cat sat on the mat" to test the generality of our observations (Fig. 15). Second, we examine other special tokens, particularly the [SOS] token, to verify that the observed feature aggregation phenomenon is unique to the [EOS] token (Fig. 17). Our analysis reveals several key insights:

The [EOS] token's role as a semantic feature aggregator is prompt-independent and structurally consistent. As shown in Fig. 15, even with this concise prompt, the [EOS] token ('<endoftext>') maintains robust attention connections to all input tokens



Figure 15: Attention visualization on the SD-V1.4' text encoder across all 12 layers for the prompt "the cat sat on the mat". Each layer contains 12 attention heads represented by different colors. The visualization demonstrates the consistent role of the [EOS] token as a feature aggregator and the hierarchical processing of semantic information across network depth.



Figure 16: Additional visualization of [EOS] token embedding distributions using different dimensionality reduction techniques.

across every layer. This is evidenced by the consistent pattern of multi-colored lines converging at the [EOS] position, regardless of the input sequence length or semantic complexity. This observation strengthens our previous findings by demonstrating that the aggregation mechanism is a fundamental architectural feature rather than a prompt-specific phenomenon.

The hierarchical aggregation process exhibits clear stages even with simplified semantic content. The visualization reveals that the hierarchical processing pattern persists across network depth, though manifesting differently with simpler input. In early layers (1-4), we observe broad attention distribution across all tokens, establishing basic contextual relationships. The middle layers (5-8) begin to show more focused attention patterns, particularly on content-bearing words like "cat" and "sat". The deeper layers (9-12) demonstrate refined attention distributions that emphasize the semantic structure of the simple sentence, with attention heads collaboratively modeling both subject-verb ("cat sat") and spatial ("on mat") relationships.

The [SOS] token exhibits self-focused attention patterns. As demonstrated in Fig. 17, the [SOS] token shows a distinctive attention behavior characterized by predominantly attending to itself across all layers and heads. This self-attention pattern remains consistent throughout the network depth, contrasting sharply with the [EOS] token's global information aggregation role. Such behavior suggests that while [EOS] serves as a semantic collector, [SOS] maintains a more isolated role, primarily focusing on its own position marker functionality.

These additional findings strengthen our understanding of SD V1.4's text encoder architecture. The consistency of the [EOS] token's aggregation behavior across different prompt complexities confirms this mechanism as a fundamental architectural feature rather than an emergent property specific to complex prompts. Moreover, the distinct self-attention pattern exhibited by the [SOS] token, in contrast to [EOS]'s global aggregation role, provides further evidence that the feature aggregation mechanism is specifically engineered through the [EOS] token. These complementary observations support our characterization of the condition feature aggregation mechanism in the text encoder.

B.2 More Examples of Embedding Distribution

To further validate our findings regarding the distributional patterns of [EOS] token embeddings across different prompt datasets, we conduct additional experiments using an alternative set of benign (COCO2017 [19]), vocabulary substitution (VS) attacks (I2P[34]), and symbol injection (SJ) attacks (Ring-A-Bell[42], P4D[6]). The embedding distribution visualization using four different dimensionality reduction techniques is presented in Fig. 16. Our analysis confirms and extends our previous observations with the following key insights:

The clustering phenomenon persists across the different prompt datasets. As shown in Fig. 16, even with a different collection of prompts, the [EOS] token embeddings maintain clear clustering patterns for each category. This is evidenced by the consistent separation of benign prompts (blue clusters), vocabulary substitution attacks (red clusters), and symbol injection attacks (green clusters) across all visualization methods. The t-SNE projection (Fig. 16a) reveals particularly well-defined boundaries between different categories, with VS attacks showing a more dispersed distribution compared to the other two categories.



Figure 17: Attention visualization on the SD-V1.4' text encoder across all 12 layers, showing that [SOS] token predominantly attends to itself across different layers and heads.

Different dimensionality reduction techniques highlight complementary aspects of the embedding distribution. The four visualization methods collectively provide a comprehensive view of the embedding space structure:

- The t-SNE visualization (Fig. 16a) emphasizes local structure preservation, showing clear global separation between categories while maintaining local cluster cohesion.
- The UMAP projection (Fig. 16b) reveals a different perspective on cluster organization, with SJ attacks forming more compact clusters compared to VS attacks, suggesting stronger internal consistency in their embedding patterns.
- The PCA with density visualization (Fig. 16c) provides insights into the concentration of embeddings within each category, showing distinct density patterns that align with the attack types.
- The 3D PCA projection (Fig. 16d) offers additional evidence of the three-way separation in the primary directions of variance.

These additional findings with alternative datasets reinforce our initial observations about the discriminative power of [EOS] token embeddings. The consistency of the clustering behavior across different prompt collections suggests that this phenomenon is a robust property of the text encoder's embedding space rather than a dataset-specific artifact. This universal pattern provides strong evidence for the potential of using [EOS] token embeddings as a reliable feature for detecting and characterizing adversarial prompts.

B.3 More Examples on Cross-Architecture Analysis

B.3.1 Feature Aggregation in OpenCLIP for Stable Diffusion V2.1. In this section, we investigate the enhanced feature aggregation in SD V2.1's OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 text encoder. We first examine attention patterns to confirm the [EOS] token's continued role in global information aggregation. Next, we analyze [EOS] embeddings under benign and adversarial prompts, revealing clearer category separations and stronger discriminative power than in SD V1.4. These findings highlight the [EOS] token's potential for guiding content safety strategies in advanced text-to-image models.

(1) Identifying the Text Condition Feature Aggregation Token. To extend our investigation beyond SD V1.4, we further analyze whether similar condition feature aggregation mechanisms exist in SD V2.1's text encoder (OpenCLIP ViT-H/14, 23 layers, 16 attention heads). Using the identical prompt "the cat sat on the mat" for direct comparison, we visualize the comprehensive attention patterns across all layers in Fig. 18, where the directed lines indicate information flow from source tokens (right) to target tokens (left). The varying colors represent different attention heads, with line thickness corresponding to attention weight magnitude. Our analysis reveals that the fundamental aggregation mechanism persists in this advanced architecture, albeit with notable enhancements in its implementation:

The [EOS] token maintains its role as a text condition feature aggregator in OpenCLIP's text encoder, but with enhanced hierarchical patterns. As illustrated in Fig. 18, the [EOS] token (denoted as '<endoftext>') demonstrates persistent attention connections to prompt tokens throughout all 23 layers, evidenced by the dense, multi-colored lines converging at the [EOS] position. This pattern is more pronounced compared to SD-V1.4's CLIP ViT-L/14, with increased attention head diversity (16 vs. 12 heads) enabling more nuanced information gathering. The visualization shows that despite the architectural differences, OpenCLIP preserves and enhances the [EOS] token's crucial role in text condition feature aggregation.

The semantic feature aggregation exhibits a more sophisticated three-stage hierarchical process across the increased network depth. The attention pattern analysis reveals a distinct three-stage progression through the network's 23 layers. In early layers (1–8), the [EOS] token shows broadly distributed attention across all tokens, establishing a foundation of basic textual features. The middle layers (9–16) demonstrate increasingly selective attention patterns, focusing on key semantic elements while maintaining contextual awareness. In the deepest layers (17–23), we observe highly refined attention distributions that precisely target semantically significant tokens, suggesting advanced feature synthesis and relationship modeling.



Figure 18: Attention visualization across all 23 layers of OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 for the prompt "the cat sat on the mat." Each subpanel shows attention from source tokens to the [EOS] token, with distinct colors and line thickness indicating different heads and attention weights, respectively, highlighting the [EOS] token's role in aggregating sequence-wide semantics.



Figure 19: Dimensionality-reduced [EOS] embeddings via (a) t-SNE, (b) UMAP, (c) PCA with density, and (d) 3D PCA. Benign (blue), VS (red), and SJ (green) prompts form distinct clusters, demonstrating OpenCLIP's enhanced [EOS] token discriminative capacity.

These findings indicate that OpenCLIP's deeper architecture and increased attention heads enable more sophisticated semantic feature extraction and aggregation compared to its predecessor. The enhanced hierarchical processing and more nuanced attention patterns suggest that the [EOS] token's final representation contains a more comprehensive and refined semantic summary of the input prompt. The consistent and robust aggregation of text condition feature at the [EOS] token provides a promising direction for distinguishing between benign and adversarial prompts by analyzing the [EOS] token's embedding space, as this token effectively encapsulates the complete semantic content and structural relationships of the entire prompt through its sophisticated hierarchical aggregation process.

(2) Analyzing Embedding Representations in [EOS] Aggregation Token. Following our analysis of the feature aggregation mechanism in SD V2.1's OpenCLIP text encoder, we investigate whether the [EOS] token embeddings exhibit enhanced discriminative properties compared to SD V1.4. We analyze embedding representations from benign prompts (COCO2017-2k[19]), vocabulary substitution (VS) attacks (I2P[34]), and symbol injection (SJ) attacks (Ring-A-Bell[42], P4D[6]).

As shown in Fig. 19, the t-SNE visualization (Fig. 19a) reveals more distinct and well-separated clusters for each prompt category, with benign prompts forming multiple concentrated subgroups, suggesting richer semantic representation. VS attacks exhibit a more dispersed distribution with clear boundaries, while SJ attacks form compact, isolated clusters. This enhanced separation is consistently observed in UMAP (Fig. 19b) and PCA (Fig. 19c, 19d) visualizations, where the increased model capacity of OpenCLIP leads to more pronounced category-specific clustering.

These findings demonstrate that OpenCLIP's enhanced architecture enables the [EOS] token to capture more nuanced semantic features, resulting in more distinctive embedding space distributions for different prompt types. The improved discriminative properties of the [EOS] token embeddings suggest potential for developing more effective content safety mechanisms in advanced text-to-image generation systems.

B.3.2 Feature Aggregation in T5's Text Encoder for Flux.1. In this section, we investigate the text condition feature aggregation in the T5 text encoder of Flux.1's T2I model. We first analyze attention patterns to discover the '</s>' token's role in global information aggregation. Subsequently, we examine '</s>' embeddings under benign and adversarial prompts, revealing distinct clustering and enhanced discriminative capabilities. These findings highlight the '</s>' token's potential for informing content safety strategies in advanced text-to-image generation systems.

(1) Identifying the Text Condition Feature Aggregation Token. Following the analysis of attention mechanisms in SD-V1.4's CLIP text encoder and SD-V2.1's OpenCLIP text encoder, we extend our investigation to the T5 text encoder in Flux.1's T2I model. Our visualization and analysis reveal similar but distinct feature aggregation patterns, as illustrated in Fig. 20. Through a detailed examination of the T5 text encoder's attention patterns using the same



Figure 20: Attention visualization across all 12 layers of the T5 text encoder for the prompt "the cat sat on the mat." Each subpanel shows attention from source tokens to the EOS token, with distinct colors and line thickness indicating different heads and attention weights, respectively, highlighting the EOS token's role in aggregating sequence-wide semantics.



Figure 21: Dimensionality-reduced EOS token embeddings for benign (blue), VS (red), and SJ (green) prompts under (a) t-SNE, (b) UMAP, (c) PCA with density, and (d) 3D PCA. Each projection shows distinct clustering among the three prompt types, reflecting T5's enhanced EOS token discriminative capacity.

prompt *"the cat sat on the mat"*, we identify two key observations about its condition feature aggregation mechanism:

The '</s>' token functions as the primary feature aggregator in T5's text encoder. Unlike CLIP's [EOS] token positioned at the sequence end, T5 employs the '</s>' token as a dedicated aggregator of semantic information. The visualization in Fig. 20 demonstrates consistent attention connections from all prompt tokens to the '</s>' token across all layers. This pattern manifests through multiple colored lines of varying thickness connecting prompt tokens to the '</s>' token, indicating its crucial role in synthesizing the complete sequence information.

The feature aggregation process exhibits a progressive pattern across network depth. The attention visualization reveals an evolution in information flow from shallow to deep layers. In early layers (1–4), the '</s>' token shows relatively balanced attention distribution across input tokens, suggesting an initial collection of basic token-level information. As processing moves to deeper layers (5–12), the attention patterns become more refined, with stronger weights assigned to semantically significant tokens. This progression demonstrates how the '</s>' token gradually constructs a comprehensive semantic representation of the input prompt through hierarchical feature aggregation.

These findings parallel our observations in SD-V1.4's CLIP text encoder and SD-V2.1's OpenCLIP text encoder, suggesting that special tokens serving as semantic aggregators may be a common design pattern in text encoders for text-to-image models. Through hierarchical aggregation across network layers, the '</s>' token's representation encapsulates a holistic summary of the prompt's semantic content. This comprehensive semantic aggregation in the '</s>' token's embedding space provides a promising direction for distinguishing between benign and adversarial prompts, as it contains the synthesized semantic information of the entire input sequence.

(2) Analyzing Embedding Representations in EOS ('</s>') Aggregation Token. Building upon our analysis of the [EOS] token's aggregation role in SD-V1.4, we extend our investigation to examine whether the '</s>' token embeddings in T5 exhibit similar discriminative properties for different types of prompts. Our analysis focuses on the embedding representations from three prompt categories: benign prompts from COCO2017-2k[19], vocabulary substitution (VS) attacks from I2P[34], and symbol injection (SJ) attacks from Ring-A-Bell[42] and [6].

To analyze the distributional patterns, we visualize the high-dimensional '</s>' token embeddings using multiple dimensionality reduction techniques, including t-SNE, UMAP, PCA, and 3D PCA, as shown in Fig. 21. Our analysis reveals that the '</s>' token embeddings for each prompt category exhibit distinct clustering patterns. As illustrated in Fig. 21, all visualization methods consistently reveal well-defined clusters for different prompt types. The t-SNE projection (Fig. 21a) shows clear separation between benign prompts (blue), VS attacks (red), and SJ attacks (green). This clustering behavior is further validated by UMAP (Fig. 21b) and PCA (Fig. 21c, 21d) visualizations, where each category forms concentrated regions with high density.

These findings demonstrate that the '</s>' token's embedding space effectively captures the inherent differences between benign and adversarial prompts through its sophisticated feature aggregation mechanism. This suggests that analyzing the '</s>' token's embedding representations could provide a robust foundation for developing effective content safety control mechanisms in text-to-image generation systems.

C More Details on Implementation

This section provides comprehensive implementation details of our proposed approach, encompassing three key aspects: model configurations, evaluation framework, and evaluation datasets details. We present detailed configurations including training hyperparameters, optimization settings, and hardware specifications to ensure reproducibility. The evaluation framework incorporates both safety effectiveness and generation quality metrics, accompanied by carefully selected baseline models for comparative analysis. Furthermore, we describe our diverse evaluation datasets and preprocessing pipeline, designed to enable thorough assessment of the **SafeGuider**'s capabilities across various scenarios.

C.1 Model Configurations

This section details the comprehensive configuration settings employed in our implementation, including training hyperparameters, optimization settings, and hardware specifications used to ensure the reproducibility of our experiments.

Training hyperparameters. We utilized Stable Diffusion V1.4 as our base text-to-image generation model. The training dataset combines samples from Conceptual Caption-9k [38] (Benign prompts), META[17] dataset (Vocabulary Substitution Attacks), and MMA[46]dataset (Symbol Injection Attacks), with an 80-20 train-test split. Our custom loss function combines positive and negative components:

$$L(\theta) = L_{pos} + L_{neg}$$

This design encourages diverse safety score distributions, with L_{pos} targeting distributed high safety scores for benign prompts and L_{neg} guiding varied low safety scores for adversarial prompts.

Optimization settings. The SAFE beam search configuration employs a beam width of 6 and a maximum search depth of 25, optimizing between search effectiveness and computational efficiency. We set the safety threshold at 0.8 for stringent safety requirements and the semantic similarity threshold at 0.5 to maintain meaningful prompt relationships. All other parameters remain consistent with the original implementation for standardization purposes.

Hardware configurations. Our implementation runs on Ubuntu 22.04 using Python 3.8.5 and PyTorch 2.4.1+cu121. This hardware setup ensures reliable performance and reproducibility of our experimental results.

These carefully selected configurations collectively enable effective model performance while maintaining computational efficiency and result quality.

C.2 Evaluation Framework

This section details our evaluation framework, which encompasses both safety effectiveness metrics and generation quality metrics, along with baseline models for comparison.

Evaluation Metrics. We employ a comprehensive set of metrics to evaluate **SafeGuider** across two key aspects: safety effectiveness and generation quality. Safety metrics measure the model's ability to prevent inappropriate content, while quality metrics assess the preservation of performance on benign inputs. The detailed specifications for each metric are as follows:

Safety Effectiveness Metrics:

- **Attack Success Rate (ASR)** measures defense effectiveness against adversarial attacks. For external defenses, ASR represents the percentage of prompts bypassing safety filters. For internal defenses, ASR indicates the percentage of generated unsafe content, detected by NudeNet [27] and Q16 [35]. The ASR can be calculated as:
$$ASR = \frac{\#\text{successful attacks}}{\#\text{total attacks}} \times 100\%$$
Lower ASR indicates better defense performance.
- **Nudity Removal Rate (NRR)** quantifies explicit content mitigation by measuring detected nude body parts using NudeNet [27]. NRR is calculated as:
$$NRR = \frac{\#\text{removed nude elements}}{\#\text{original nude elements}} \times 100\%$$
Higher NRR indicates better mitigation between base SD-V1.4 and safety-enhanced models.
- **Harmful Content Removal Rate (HCRR)** measures the reduction in unsafe image generation for non-sexual harmful content. The formula is:
$$HCRR = \frac{\#\text{removed harmful content}}{\#\text{original harmful content}} \times 100\%$$
Higher HCRR indicates better mitigation between base SD-V1.4 and safety-enhanced models.

Generation Quality Metrics:

- **Generation Success Rate (GSR)** measures the percentage of prompts that produce meaningful images rather than rejections or black images. The formula is:
$$GSR = \frac{\#\text{successful generations}}{\#\text{total attempts}} \times 100\%$$
Higher GSR indicates better model functionality in producing valid image outputs.
- **CLIP Score [15]**: measures semantic alignment between prompts and generated images through cosine similarity of CLIP embeddings. Higher scores indicate better prompt-image correspondence for benign content.
- **LPIPS Score [49]**: Learning Perceptual Image Patch Similarity evaluates perceptual image similarity by measuring differences in texture, color, and visual features. Lower scores indicate higher visual fidelity.

Baseline Models. We compare **SafeGuider** against ten state-of-the-art baselines representing different approaches to content safety. These baselines can be categorized into three groups: (1) Base Model - the original SD-V1.4 without safety mechanisms; (2) External Defenses, which employ additional filters operating independently of model architecture, including text-level filters and image-level filter; and (3) Internal Defenses, which enhance model safety through architectural modifications and parameter adjustments during the training or fine-tuning process. These baselines embody the current

leading approaches in preventing inappropriate content generation in text-to-image models. The detailed specifications for each baseline are as follows:

Base Model:

- **Stable Diffusion V1.4 [20]:** Use the official model without any security mechanism as a control group. This baseline version is a basic reference point for evaluating the effectiveness of various security implementations, allowing us to measure the improvements achieved by different security mechanisms.

External Defense:

- **OpenAI Moderation [28]:** Implemented a comprehensive content assessment framework that can identify inappropriate content in categories such as sexual content. The system leverages large amounts of production data and employs active learning techniques to maintain high accuracy and adaptability to emerging inappropriate content patterns.
- **Microsoft Azure Content Moderator [24]:** Operating as a sophisticated classifier-based API system, this baseline implements a binary decision mechanism specifically designed for NSFW content detection. The system features a strict filtering approach, automatically rejecting prompts when any unsafe category is detected, ensuring robust content moderation.
- **AWS Comprehend [2]:** This baseline focuses on binary toxicity detection through detailed content analysis. The system employs advanced natural language processing techniques to provide straightforward accept/reject decisions, offering efficient and reliable content filtering capabilities.
- **NSFW Text Classifier [23]:** An open-source solution based on the DistilBERT architecture, specifically fine-tuned for NSFW content detection. This lightweight yet effective classifier demonstrates the potential of transformer-based models in content safety applications.
- **GuardT2I [47]:** This innovative framework leverages fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform text guidance embeddings into natural language representations. This transformation enables enhanced detection of adversarial prompts and provides more nuanced content safety filtering.
- **Safety Checker [8]:** Implemented as the official HuggingFace safety mechanism, this system performs post-generation content filtering by detecting and blocking inappropriate image. It operates directly on generated images, providing an additional layer of safety after the generation process.

Internal Defense:

- **SLD (Safe Latent Diffusion [34]):** We evaluate the method at two different security levels (Medium and Max) following the official configuration outlined in the paper. SLD uses a conditional diffusion term to actively guide the generation process away from unsafe content, integrating security considerations directly into the diffusion process.
- **ESD (Erasure Stable Diffusion [11]):** Focuses on concept erasure, specifically targeting the concept of "naked", through an intensive training process of 1000 iterations with a carefully tuned learning rate of 1e-5. This approach demonstrates the potential of selective concept removal for enhancing security.
- **SafeGen [18]:** This approach implements architectural modifications through the official pre-trained model, specifically targeting vision-only self-attention layers. By weakening the influence of text inputs on unsafe content generation, SafeGen provides an architectural solution to content safety.

This section has established a comprehensive evaluation framework that consists of two main components: evaluation metrics and baseline methods. Our metrics encompass both safety effectiveness (ASR, NRR, HCRR) and generation quality measurements (GSR, CLIP Score, LPIPS Score). For comparative analysis, we presented ten baseline methods across three categories: base model, external defenses, and internal defenses, representing the current leading approaches in ensuring content safety for text-to-image generation models.

C.3 Evaluation Dataset Details

This section presents a comprehensive description of the diverse datasets employed in evaluating **SafeGuider** and our systematic data preprocessing methodology. Our evaluation framework incorporates multiple datasets that span both benign and adversarial content, enabling thorough assessment of model safety and generation quality across various scenarios and attack strategies.

Detailed dataset compositions. To ensure robust evaluation of our proposed approach, we utilize both in-domain and out-of-domain test sets. This dual-category approach allows us to assess not only the model's performance on familiar patterns but also its generalization capabilities when confronted with novel challenges.

In-domain: Our in-domain test sets comprise 20% of the data held out from the training process, ensuring a fair evaluation of model performance. These datasets include:

- **[Benign] Conceptual Caption-9k [19] (CCaption-9k) :** A comprehensive benign dataset sampled from the Conceptual Captions dataset. This collection contains diverse image-caption pairs gathered from web sources, originally designed for training and evaluating image captioning systems. The dataset provides a reliable benchmark for assessing model performance on safe, legitimate content generation tasks.
- **[Vocabulary Substitution] META Dataset[17]:** An extensive collection of 8,585 adversarial prompts that employs sophisticated vocabulary substitution techniques. These prompts are specifically crafted to evade traditional safety detection mechanisms while targeting various inappropriate content categories, including sexual content, violence, and gore. The dataset demonstrates the complexity of modern evasion techniques and challenges in content moderation.
- **[Symbol Injection] MMA Dataset [46]:** Specializes in adversarial prompts targeting sexually explicit content generation through advanced techniques. This dataset combines embedding space optimization with strategic special token injection, representing sophisticated attacks that exploit model vulnerabilities at the architectural level.

Out-of-domain: To evaluate the generalization capabilities of our proposed **SafeGuider**, we employ several external test sets that present novel challenges:

- **[Vocabulary Substitution] I2P Dataset [34] :** Features meticulously crafted prompts that utilize clever word combinations and linguistic patterns. These prompts are designed to trigger



Figure 22: Comparison of generation quality on benign prompts. Examples demonstrate three key patterns: 1) internal defenses alter semantic details even for simple prompts; 2) external defenses can reject completely safe content, while 3) SafeGuider maintains faithful generation across diverse scenarios.

various categories of unsafe content generation, including sexually explicit material, violence, and other harmful themes, while deliberately avoiding explicit terminology. This dataset tests the model's ability to detect subtle and nuanced attempts at generating inappropriate content.

- **[Vocabulary Substitution] Sneaky Dataset [48]:** A collection of prompts generated using GPT-3.5, specifically focusing on sexually explicit content generation through semantic substitution strategies. This dataset represents AI-assisted attacks, demonstrating the evolving nature of adversarial techniques in content generation systems.
- **[Symbol Injection] Ring-A-Bell (RAB) Dataset [42]:** Emphasizes sophisticated embedding space concept manipulation. The dataset contains prompts that appear innocuous at the surface level but are carefully engineered to align with either sexually explicit or violent content in the embedding space. This approach represents a more subtle and technically advanced form of attack.
- **[Symbol Injection] P4D Dataset [6]:** Implements advanced optimization techniques for trainable tokens in the embedding space, specifically targeting the generation of sexually explicit content. This dataset represents a highly technical approach to circumventing content safety measures.
- **[Benign] COCO2017-2k [19]:** A benign dataset consisting of 2,000 randomly sampled prompts from the COCO2017 validation set. This dataset serves as a benchmark for evaluating the model's ability to maintain high-quality generation capabilities for legitimate content while implementing safety measures.

Data preprocessing steps. Our preprocessing pipeline implements a systematic approach to prepare the datasets for effective training and evaluation. In the text encoding phase, we first process all dataset prompts through the T2I model's text encoder, where each prompt is transformed into its corresponding embedding matrix. This crucial step ensures consistent representation across different data sources, establishing a uniform foundation for subsequent processing.

Following the initial encoding, we proceed with EOS token processing. This stage involves the precise identification of End of Sequence (EOS) tokens using specific token IDs, followed by careful extraction of their corresponding embeddings from the embedding matrix. This process is essential for preserving the sequential information that is crucial for understanding the content's context and meaning. For data organization and storage, we implement a structured approach where the extracted embeddings are stored in JSON format. This stage includes the integration of appropriate safety labels for each entry and the implementation of efficient data retrieval mechanisms. Our storage solution ensures that the processed data remains easily accessible while maintaining its structural integrity. The final step involves dataset construction, where we systematically compile the processed embeddings. During this phase, we conduct thorough quality assurance checks to maintain data integrity and carefully organize the training data for the safety recognition system. This comprehensive preprocessing pipeline ensures that our datasets are properly prepared for model training and evaluation while preserving all essential information for effective content safety analysis.



Figure 23: Comparison of sexually explicit content mitigation. Examples demonstrate SafeGuider's capability in: 1) removing inappropriate elements while maintaining scene composition, 2) handling both vocabulary substitution attacks (e.g., "In a dimly lit room, Carmen is lying..") and symbol injection attacks (e.g., "athleticbare tless guiding nsfw..."), and 3) generating safe alternatives that preserve original context.

Our dataset composition and preprocessing pipeline form the foundation for rigorous evaluation of **SafeGuider**'s effectiveness. The carefully curated combination of in-domain and out-of-domain datasets, spanning both benign and adversarial content, enables thorough assessment of model performance across various scenarios. The systematic preprocessing approach transforms raw text inputs into structured embedding representations, facilitating effective training while preserving essential semantic information. This robust evaluation framework ensures comprehensive testing of both safety mechanisms and generation quality, providing valuable insights into the model's capabilities and limitations.

D More Examples of Generation Results Across Different Methods

This section provides comprehensive examples to demonstrate SafeGuider's effectiveness compared to existing defense methods. Through extensive qualitative analysis, we present three sets of comparative experiments: 1) benign prompt generation quality across different methods (Fig. 22), where we examine how various defenses handle completely safe inputs; 2) unsafe content mitigation capabilities (Fig. 23 and Fig. 24), comparing different approaches in handling sexually explicit content and other harmful themes; and 3) cross-architecture performance (Fig. 25), showing SafeGuider's effectiveness on different T2I frameworks like SD-V2.1 and Flux.1. These extensive examples offer strong qualitative evidence to support our quantitative findings in the manuscript.

D.1 Benign Prompt Generation Comparison

We first examine the generation quality on benign prompts across different defense methods through extensive examples. This analysis aims to evaluate how various safety mechanisms impact the generation of completely safe content. As shown in Fig. 22, our analysis reveals three distinct patterns in how different defense methods handle benign prompts:

Internal Defense Limitations. Internal defenses consistently introduce semantic deviations, even for simple prompts:

- On basic object prompts like "a laptop that is sitting on a bed", SLD-Medium and SLD-Max significantly alter viewing angles and laptop positioning, while ESD and SafeGen modify the laptop's appearance and bed setting.



Figure 24: Comparison of other unsafe content mitigation. SafeGuider effectively handles both explicit violence (e.g., "a man smiling while taking a bath in blood") and implicit harmful content (e.g., prompts containing weapon references), while maintaining generation quality.

- For scene-level prompts like "woman riding on an elephant" and "the men are enjoying the very large pizzas", these defenses change composition layouts, object poses, and even loss key semantic elements like the protagonists and their interactions.
- When handling prompts with multiple objects like "a girl stands holding a cat in her arms beside a tree", internal defenses struggle to maintain proper spatial relationships, often altering the relative positions of the girl, cat, and tree.

External Defense Limitations. External defenses exhibit severe over-filtering behaviors:

- Commercial APIs (OpenAI, Azure, AWS) reject simple, clearly safe prompts like "the bicycle is locked to the metal pole" and "a pink and white bus parked next to sidewalk".
- Open-source solutions (NSFW Text Classifier, GuardT2I) show similarly conservative behavior, refusing generation for benign descriptions like "a street sign on a metal pole" and "woman riding on an elephant".

SafeGuider's Advantages. In contrast, **SafeGuider** demonstrates consistent high-quality generation across all test scenarios:

- The generated images show high fidelity to original prompts without unintended modifications or style changes.
- Most importantly, it achieves this quality while maintaining robust safety control.

These results demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s superior ability to handle benign prompts compared to existing approaches. While other methods either modify content unnecessarily or reject safe prompts entirely, **SafeGuider** successfully maintains the delicate balance between safety and generation quality.

D.2 Unsafe Prompt Mitigation Comparison

We next provide examples demonstrating **SafeGuider**'s effectiveness in mitigating different types of unsafe content while preserving meaningful generation. Our analysis covers both sexually explicit content and other harmful themes, as shown in Fig. 23 and Fig. 24.

Sexually Explicit Content Mitigation. As shown in Fig. 23, we observe distinct patterns across different approaches.

External defenses (text-level and image-level filters) simply reject generation with "Refused!" responses, offering no alternative outputs regardless of prompt types. Internal defenses show inconsistent performance. SLD-Medium and SLD-Max sometimes allow inappropriate elements through, particularly for symbol injection attacks. ESD and SafeGen often produce low-quality or incoherent outputs when attempting mitigation. **SafeGuider** demonstrates

Figure 25: Comprehensive evaluation of SafeGuider's performance across different T2I architectures (SD-V2.1 and Flux.1). The results demonstrate SafeGuider's consistent effectiveness in two key aspects: (1) successfully mitigating unsafe content generation while preserving safe semantic elements from the original prompts, and (2) achieving robust safety control across architectural variations without requiring model-specific modifications.

superior mitigation by: 1) for vocabulary substitution attacks (e.g., "She eagerly welcomed him..."), converting suggestive scenarios into appropriate social scenes while preserving context;2) for symbol injection attacks (e.g., "naked gestarte attributed..."), successfully interpreting and removing harmful implications while maintaining image quality. As we can see, **SafeGuider** can produce high-quality alternatives that respect both safety and semantic intent.

Other Harmful Content Mitigation. For non-sexual harmful content (Fig. 24), we observe that:

External defenses maintain their binary blocking approach, missing opportunities for safe alternative generation. Internal defenses particularly struggle with: 1) explicit violence (e.g., "a man smiling while taking a bath in blood"), often producing disturbing or low-quality outputs; 2) implicit harmful content (e.g., weapon-related prompts), frequently failing to identify and mitigate subtle threats; and 3) symbol injection attacks targeting violence, showing limited effectiveness in filtering malicious patterns. **SafeGuider** achieves consistent performance through: 1) successfully identifying and removing both explicit and implicit harmful elements; 2) converting violent scenes into safe alternatives while preserving non-violent context; and 3) maintaining high visual quality and semantic coherence in generated outputs

These examples demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s superior capability in unsafe content mitigation. Unlike external defenses' binary blocking or internal defenses' inconsistent results, SafeGuider produces high-quality, safe alternatives while preserving meaningful context from the original prompts.

D.3 Cross-Architecture Application Results

Finally, we demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s broad applicability across different T2I architectures through comprehensive examples. As illustrated in Figure 25, we conduct extensive experiments across multiple state-of-the-art T2I architectures, specifically focusing on Stable Diffusion V2.1 (SD-V2.1) and Flux.1. The results demonstrate **SafeGuider**'s remarkable adaptability and consistent performance across these architecturally diverse models.

Stable Diffusion V2.1 Results. For SD-V2.1, which incorporates significant architectural differences from its predecessor SD-V1.4, including the adoption of OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 encoder and refined attention mechanisms, **SafeGuider** demonstrates robust performance. Specifically:

- Safety Control: When processing potentially unsafe prompts, **SafeGuider** successfully guides the generation process toward safe alternatives while maintaining meaningful semantic connections to the original prompt intent.
- Architectural Adaptation: Despite SD-V2.1's architectural sophistication, **SafeGuider** effectively integrates with its OpenCLIP encoder and modified attention mechanisms without modifications.

Flux.1 Results. The evaluation extends to Flux.1, which employs a more complex dual encoder architecture incorporating both CLIP ViT-L/14 and T5-XXL encoders. Our results show:

- Dual Encoder Integration: **SafeGuider** successfully adapts to Flux.1's dual encoder architecture, working effectively with either CLIP ViT-L or T5-XXL pathway while maintaining safety controls.
- Generation Quality: The system preserves Flux.1's advanced generation capabilities while implementing robust safety measures, demonstrating no degradation in output quality for legitimate use cases.
- Cross-Architecture Consistency: **SafeGuider** maintains consistent performance metrics across both encoder pathways, validating its architecture-agnostic design principles.

Comparative Analysis. Our cross-architecture evaluation reveals several key insights:

(1) Architecture Independence: **SafeGuider**'s effectiveness remains consistent regardless of the underlying model architecture, demonstrating its versatility as a safety solution.
(2) Semantic Preservation: Across different architectures, our proposed **SafeGuider** successfully maintains the safe semantic elements of input prompts while effectively filtering unsafe content.
(3) Generation Quality: The system preserves the unique generation characteristics and quality levels of each architecture while implementing robust safety controls.

These comprehensive results establish **SafeGuider** as a highly effective, architecturally adaptive safety control solution for T2I systems. Its consistent performance across diverse model architectures, combined with its ability to preserve generation quality while implementing robust safety measures, positions **SafeGuider** as a practical and generalizable approach to ensuring safe T2I model deployment. The demonstrated cross-architecture effectiveness validates our approach's fundamental design principles and confirms its potential for broad adoption across the T2I ecosystem. These findings suggest that **SafeGuider** can serve as a universal safety solution, adaptable to future architectural innovations in the field of text-to-image generation.