QAP, PCP, POE

Oct 1, 2024

Distributed Lab

Plan

Recap

Quadratic Arithmetic Program

Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

QAP as a Linear PCP

Proof Of Exponent

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Recap

Definition

zk-SNARK

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Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge.

Argument of Knowledge — a proof that the prover knows the data (witness) that resolves a certain problem, and this knowledge can be "extracted".

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- ✓ **Non-interactiveness** to produce the proof, the prover does not need any interaction with the verifier.
- ✓ **Zero-Knowledge** the verifier learns nothing about the data used to produce the proof, despite knowing that this data resolves the given problem and that the prover possesses it.

We can do that in a way like the computer does it — **boolean circuits**.




Figure: Boolean AND and OR Gates

But nothing stops us from using something more powerful instead of boolean values...

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


Figure: Boolean AND and OR Gates

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


Figure: Boolean AND and OR Gates

> 100000 gates just for SHA256... But nothing stops us from using something more powerful instead of boolean values, gates.

Similar to Boolean Circuits, the **Arithmetic Circuits** consist of gates and wires.

- **Wires**: elements of some finite field **F**.
- **Gates**: field addition (+) and multiplication (×).




Figure: Addition and Multiplication Gates

Example

How can we translate if statements?

```
def example(a: bool, b: F, c: F) -> F:
    if a:
        return b * c
    else:
        return b + c
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Corresponding equations for the circuit are:

$$r_1 = b \times c$$
, $r_3 = 1 - a$, $r_5 = r_3 \times r_2$
 $r_2 = b + c$, $r_4 = a \times r_1$, $r = r_4 + r_5$




Figure: Example of a circuit evaluating the if statement logic.

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Each **constraint** in the Rank-1 Constraint System must be in the form:

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Where $\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \rangle$ is a dot product.

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Thus

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n a_i w_i\right) \times \left(\sum_{j=1}^n b_j w_j\right) = \sum_{k=1}^n c_k w_k$$

That is, actually, a quadratic equation with multiple variables.

Example

Consider the most basic circuit with one multiplication gate:

$$x_1 \times x_2 = r$$
. The witnes vector $\mathbf{w} = (r, x_1, x_2)$. So

$$w_2 \times w_3 = w_1$$

$$(o + w_2 + o) \times (o + o + w_3) = w_1 + o + o$$

$$(ow_1 + 1w_2 + ow_3) \times (ow_1 + ow_2 + 1w_3) = 1w_1 + ow_2 + ow_3$$

Therefore the coefficients vectors are:

$$\mathbf{a} = (0, 1, 0), \quad \mathbf{b} = (0, 0, 1), \quad \mathbf{c} = (1, 0, 0).$$

The general form of our constraint is:

$$(a_1w_1 + a_2w_2 + a_3w_3)(b_1w_1 + b_2w_2 + b_3w_3) = c_1w_1 + c_2w_2 + c_3w_3$$

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$$r = x_1 \times (x_2 \times x_3) + (1 - x_1) \times (x_2 + x_3)$$

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Thus, the next constraints can be build:

$$x_1 \times x_1 = x_1$$
 (binary check) (1)

$$x_2 \times x_3 = \text{mult}$$
 (2)

$$x_1 \times \text{mult} = \text{selectMult}$$
 (3)

$$(1 - x_1) \times (x_2 + x_3) = r - \text{selectMult}$$
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The witness vector: $\mathbf{w} = (1, r, x_1, x_2, x_3, \text{mult, selectMult})$.

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The coefficients vectors:

$$\mathbf{a}_1 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{b}_1 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{c}_1 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)$$

$$\mathbf{a}_2 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0), \qquad \mathbf{b}_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{c}_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)$$

$$\mathbf{a}_3 = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{b}_3 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), \quad \mathbf{c}_3 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$$

$$\mathbf{a}_4 = (1, 0, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{b}_4 = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0), \quad \mathbf{c}_4 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1)$$

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- ✓ Although Rank-1 Constraint Systems provide a powerful method for representing computations, they are not succinct.
- ✓ We need to transform our computations into a form that is more convenient for proving statements about them.

Notice

A very convenient form for representing computations is **polynomials!**

Idea: Instead of checking polynomial equality P(x) = Q(x) at multiple points $Q(x_1), \ldots, Q(x_n)$ (essentially, checking each constraint), we check it only once at $\tau \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$: $P(\tau) = Q(\tau)$. Soundness is guaranteed by the **Schwartz-Zippel Lemma**.

We finished with:

$$a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m, b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_m, c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_m,$$

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Of course, they form corresponding matrices:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & \dots & a_{1n} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & \dots & a_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_{m1} & a_{m2} & \dots & a_{mn} \end{bmatrix} \quad B = \begin{bmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} & \dots & b_{1n} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} & \dots & b_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ b_{m1} & b_{m2} & \dots & b_{mn} \end{bmatrix} \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} c_{11} & c_{12} & \dots & c_{1n} \\ c_{21} & c_{22} & \dots & c_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ c_{m1} & c_{m2} & \dots & c_{mn} \end{bmatrix}$$

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An example of a single "if" statement:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{a}_1 &= (\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{1},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0}) \\ \mathbf{a}_2 &= (\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{1},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0}) \\ \mathbf{a}_3 &= (\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{1},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0}) \\ \mathbf{a}_4 &= (\mathtt{1},\mathtt{0},-\mathtt{1},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0},\mathtt{0}) \end{aligned} \qquad A = \begin{bmatrix} \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{1} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} \\ \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{1} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} \\ \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{1} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} \\ \mathtt{1} & \mathtt{0} & -\mathtt{1} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} & \mathtt{0} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m, \quad b_1, b_2, \dots, b_m, \quad c_1, c_2, \dots, c_m,$$

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Pleeeeeenty of zeroes, right? And this is just one out of 3 matrices...

The previous witness vector:

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$$\mathbf{w} = (1, r, x_1, x_2, x_3, \text{mult, selectMult})$$

Let's take a closer look at the matrix columns:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Consider 4th constraint: $(1 - x_1) \times (x_2 + x_3) = r$ – selectMult

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So, every column is a mapping of constraint number to a coefficient for the witness element.

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			3				
	0	0	1	0	0	0	
	0	0	0	1	0		
	0	0	1	0	0	_	
4	1	0	-1	0	0	0	0

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$$L(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} y_i \ell_i(x), \quad \ell_i(x) = \prod_{j=0, j \neq i}^{n} \frac{x - x_j}{x_i - x_j}.$$

As we know, such a mapping can be builds using Lagrange interpolation polynomial with the following formula:

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There are *n* columns and *m* constraints. So, it results in *n* polynomials such that:

$$A_j(i) = a_{i,j}, i \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}, j \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}$$

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The same is true for matrices B and C, with 3n polynomials in total, n for each of the coefficients matrices:

$$A_1(x), A_2(x), \ldots, A_n(x), B_1(x), B_2(x), \ldots, B_n(x), C_1(x), C_2(x), \ldots, C_n(x)$$

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The same is true for matrices *B* and *C*, with 3*n* polynomials in total, *n* for each of the coefficients matrices:

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Note

We could have assigned any *unique* index from \mathbb{F} to each constraint (say, t_i for each $i \in \{1, ..., m\}$) and interpolate through these points:

$$A_j(t_i) = a_{i,j}, i \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}, j \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}$$

Example

Considering the witness vector **w** and matrix A from the previous example, for the variable x_1 , the next set of points can be derived:

$$\{(1,1),(2,0),(3,1),(4,-1)\}$$

The Lagrange interpolation polynomial for this set of points:

$$\begin{split} \ell_1(x) &= -\frac{(x-2)(x-3)(x-4)}{6}, \qquad \ell_2(x) = \frac{(x-1)(x-3)(x-4)}{2}, \\ \ell_3(x) &= -\frac{(x-1)(x-2)(x-4)}{2}, \qquad \ell_4(x) = \frac{(x-1)(x-2)(x-3)}{6}. \end{split}$$

Thus, the polynomial is given by:

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$$A_{x_1}(x) = 1 \cdot \ell_1(x) + 0 \cdot \ell_2(x) + 1 \cdot \ell_3(x) + (-1) \cdot \ell_4(x)$$
$$= -\frac{5}{6}x^3 + 6x^2 - \frac{79}{6}x + 9$$

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Illustration: The Lagrange interpolation polynomial for points $\{(1,1), (2,0), (3,1), (4,-1)\}$ visualized over R.

Question

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Consider two polynomials p(x) and q(x):

$$p(x) = -\frac{1}{2}x^2 + \frac{3}{2}x,$$
 $q(x) = \frac{1}{3}x^3 - 2x^2 + \frac{8}{3}x + 1.$

With corresponding sets of points:

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$$\{(0,0),(1,1),(2,1),(3,0)\}, \{(0,1),(1,2),(2,1),(3,0)\}$$

Ouestion

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$$\{(0,0),(1,1),(2,1),(3,0)\}, \{(0,1),(1,2),(2,1),(3,0)\}$$

The sum of these polynomials can be calculated as:

$$r(x) = \frac{1}{3}x^3 - 2\frac{1}{2}x^2 + 4\frac{1}{6}x + 1$$

The resulting polynomial r(x) corresponds to the set of points:

$$\{(0,1),(1,3),(2,2),(3,0)\}$$




Figure: Addition of two polynomials

$$(w_1A_1(X) + w_2A_2(X) + \dots + w_nA_n(X)) \times \times (w_1B_1(X) + w_2B_2(X) + \dots + w_nB_n(X)) = = (w_1C_1(X) + w_2C_2(X) + \dots + w_nC_n(X))$$

Now, using coefficients encoded with polynomials, we can build a constraint number $X \in \{1, \dots m\}$ in the next way:

$$(w_1A_1(X) + w_2A_2(X) + \dots + w_nA_n(X)) \times \times (w_1B_1(X) + w_2B_2(X) + \dots + w_nB_n(X)) = = (w_1C_1(X) + w_2C_2(X) + \dots + w_nC_n(X))$$

Or written more concisely:

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$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i A_i(X)\right) \times \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i B_i(X)\right) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i C_i(X)\right)$$

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i A_i(j)\right) \times \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i B_i(j)\right) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i C_i(j)\right) \ \forall j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$$

Hold on, but why does it hold? Let us substitute any X = j into this equation:

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i A_i(j)\right) \times \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i B_i(j)\right) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i C_i(j)\right) \ \forall j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$$

Recall that we interpolated polynomials to have $A_i(j) = a_{j,i}$. Therefore, the equation above can be reduced to:

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i a_{j,i}\right) \times \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i b_{j,i}\right) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i c_{j,i}\right) \ \forall j \in \{1,\ldots,m\}$$

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But hold on again! Notice that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i a_{j,i} = \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{a}_j \rangle$ and therefore we have:

$$\langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{a}_j \rangle \times \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{b}_j \rangle = \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}_j \rangle \ \forall j \in \{1, \ldots, m\},$$

so we ended up with the initial *m* constraint equations!

Now let us define polynomials A(X), B(X), C(X) for easier notation:

$$A(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i A_i(X), \quad B(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i B_i(X), \quad C(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i C_i(X)$$

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Therefore:

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$$A(X) \times B(X) = C(X)$$

Now, we can define a polynomial M(X), that has zeros at all elements from the set $\Omega = \{1, \dots, m\}$

$$M(X) = A(X) \times B(X) - C(X)$$

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Now, we can define a polynomial M(X), that has zeros at all elements from the set $\Omega = \{1, \dots, m\}$

$$M(X) = A(X) \times B(X) - C(X)$$

It means, that M(X) can be divided by vanishing polynomial $Z_{O}(X)$ without a remainder!

$$Z_{\Omega}(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{m} (X - i), \qquad H(X) = \frac{M(X)}{Z_{\Omega}(X)}$$
 is a polynomial

Definition (Quadratic Arithmetic Program)

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Suppose that *m* RiCS constraints with a witness of size *n* are written in a form

$$A\mathbf{w} \odot B\mathbf{w} = C\mathbf{w}, \qquad (A, B, C \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times n})$$

Then, the **Quadratic Arithmetic Program** consists of 3*n* polynomials $A_1, \ldots, A_n, B_1, \ldots, B_n, C_1, \ldots, C_n$ such that:

$$A_j(i) = a_{i,j}, B_j(i) = b_{i,j}, C_j(i) = c_{i,j}, \forall i \in \{1, ..., m\} \forall j \in \{1, ..., n\}$$

Then, $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ is a valid assignment for the given QAP and **target polynomial** $Z(X) = \prod_{i=1}^{m} (X-i)$ if and only if there exists such a polynomial H(X) such that

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i A_i(X)\right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i B_i(X)\right) - \left(\sum_{i=1}^n w_i C_i(X)\right) = Z(X)H(X)$$

Probabilistically Checkable Proofs




Figure: Illustration of a Probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) system. The prover \mathcal{P} generates a PCP oracle π that is queried by the verifier \mathcal{V} at specific points q_1, \ldots, q_m .




Figure: Illustration of a Probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) system. The prover \mathcal{P} generates a PCP oracle π that is queried by the verifier \mathcal{V} at specific points q_1, \ldots, q_m .

Three main extensions of PCPs that are frequently used in SNARKs are:

- **IPCP** (**Interactive PCP**): The prover commits to the PCP oracle and then, based on the interaction between the prover and verifier, the verifier queries the oracle and decides whether to accept the proof.
- **IOP** (**Interactive Oracle Proof**): The prover and verifier interact and on each round, the prover commits to a new oracle. The verifier queries the oracle and decides whether to accept the proof.
- **LPCP** (**Linear PCP**): The prover commits to a linear function and the verifier queries the function at specific points.




Figure: Illustration of an Interactive Oracle Proof (IOP). On each round *i* $(1 \le i \le r)$, \mathcal{V} sends a message m_i , and \mathcal{P} commits to a new oracle π_i , which \mathcal{V} can query at $\mathbf{q}_i = (q_{i,1}, \dots, q_{i,m})$.

QAP as a Linear PCP

QAP AS A LINEAR PCP 0000

A **Linear PCP** is a PCP where the prover commits to a linear function $\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k)$ and the verifier queries the function at specific points q_1, \dots, q_r . Then, the prover responds with the values of the function at these points:

$$\langle \pi_1, \mathbf{q}_1 \rangle, \langle \pi_2, \mathbf{q}_2 \rangle, \ldots, \langle \pi_r, \mathbf{q}_r \rangle.$$

Example (QAP as a Linear PCP)

Recall that key QAP equation is:

$$L(x) \times R(x) - O(x) = Z(x)H(x).$$

Now, consider the following **linear PCP for QAP**:

- 1. P commits to an extended witness w and coefficients $\mathbf{h} = (h_1, \dots, h_n) \text{ of } H(x).$
- 2. \mathcal{V} samples $\gamma \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$ and sends query $\gamma = (\gamma, \gamma^2, \dots, \gamma^n)$ to \mathcal{P} .
- 3. P reveals the following values:

$$\pi_1 \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{L}(\gamma) \rangle, \qquad \qquad \pi_2 \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{R}(\gamma) \rangle,
\pi_3 \leftarrow \langle \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{O}(\gamma) \rangle, \qquad \qquad \pi_4 \leftarrow Z(\gamma) \cdot \langle \mathbf{h}, \gamma \rangle.$$

4. V checks whether $\pi_1\pi_2 - \pi_3 = \pi_4$.

QAP as a Linear PCP OOO●

Why is it so fo to use such a shock

Why is it safe to use such a check?

The polynomials L(x), R(x) and O(x) are interpolated polynomials using |C| (number of gates) points, so:

$$\deg(L) \leqslant |C|$$
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OAP AS A LINEAR PCP

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Thus, we can estimate the degree of polynomial M(x) = L(x)R(x) - O(x).

$$\deg(M) \leqslant \max\{\deg(L) + \deg(R), \deg(O)\} \leqslant 2|C|$$

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If an adversary \mathcal{A} does not know a valid witness \mathbf{w} , he can compute a polynomial $(\widetilde{M}(x), \widetilde{H}(x)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\cdot)$ that satisfies a verifier \mathcal{V} :

$$\Pr_{s \overset{\mathcal{R}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}} [\widetilde{M}(s) = Z(s)\widetilde{H}(s)] \leqslant \frac{2|C|}{|\mathbb{F}|}$$

If $|\mathbb{F}|$ is large enough, $2|C|/|\mathbb{F}|$ is negligible.

Proof Of Exponent

Encrypted Verification

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To evaluate encrypted polynomial e.q.:

$$g^{p(\tau)}$$

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To evaluate encrypted polynomial e.g.:

$$g^{p(\tau)} = g^{(\tau^2 - 5\tau)} = (g^{\tau^2})^1 (g^{\dot{\tau}_1})^{-5}$$

Prover needs ecnrypted powers of tau: $\{g^{\tau^i}\}_{i \in [d]}$.

Verifier:

✓ Picks a random value $\tau \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$.

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✓ Calculates $h(x) = \frac{p(x)}{t(x)}$.

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- ✓ Using $\{g^{\tau^i}\}_{i \in [d]}$ calculates $g^{p(\tau)}$ and $g^{h(\tau)}$.

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Verifier:

 \checkmark Checks whether $g^{p(\tau)} = (g^{h(\tau)})^{t(\tau)}$.

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Adversary:

✓ Picks a random value $r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$, calculates g^s .

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- ✓ Outputs prover parameters $\{g^{\tau^l}\}_{i \in [d]}$.

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- ✓ Calculates $g^{\widetilde{p}(\tau)} = (g^{t(\tau)})^s$.

- ✓ Picks a random value $\tau \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$
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- ✓ Calculates $h(x) = \frac{p(x)}{t(x)}$.
- ✓ Using $\{g^{\tau^i}\}_{i \in [d]}$ calculates $g^{p(\tau)}$, $g^{h(\tau)}$.

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- ✓ Using $\{g^{\tau^i}\}_{i \in [d]}$ calculates $g^{p(\tau)}$, $g^{h(\tau)}$.
- ✓ Using $\{g^{a\tau^i}\}_{i\in[d]}$ calculates $g^{p'(\tau)}=g^{ap(\tau)}$.

Verifier:

- ✓ Picks a random values $\tau \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$, $a \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}$.
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- ✓ Provides encrypted polynomials to the verifier.

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Thanks for your attention!