

# A Clean and Lean Circom Formalization

Philosophy for the Real World of a Computer Scientist

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# Who am I?

- Associate Professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense
- Researcher at [ZKForall](#)
- Background: formal semantics of programming languages and formal verification
- Recent years: zero-knowledge proofs and fully homomorphic encryption, really cool stuff!

# Testing vs. proving I

- “Testing is asking questions; proof is the answer.”  
“We test the possibilities, you get the proof.”  
“Test the theory, prove the results.”  
*“From ‘What if?’ to ‘It is.’ ”*  
“Testing builds evidence, proof builds certainty.”  
“Test the limits, prove the potential.”
- Property-based testing is pretty cool but is not a proof!

## Testing vs. proving II

- To prove we must but how to do it? **Logically, obviously!**
- Many many approaches: first order or higher-order
- In this talk: Type Theory

# Type Theory i

- L. E. J. Brouwer: **Intuitionistic logic**
  - Rejects the law of excluded middle (LEM):  $A \vee \neg A$ , but with contradiction  $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow ((A \rightarrow \neg B) \rightarrow \neg A)$  and *ex falso sequitur quodlibet*  $\neg A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$
  - Brouwer observed that LEM was abstracted from finite situations, then extended without justification to statements about infinite collections
  - Constructivism!
- Per Martin-Löf: **Intuitionistic type theory**
- Haskell Curry and William A. Howard: **Curry-Howard isomorphism**
  - The Curry–Howard correspondence is the observation that there is an isomorphism between **proof systems** and **models of computation**.

- Thierry Coquand and Gérard Huet: [Calculus of Constructions](#)
- Frank Pfenning and Christine Paulin-Mohring: [Inductively Defined Types in the Calculus of Constructions](#)
- **Lean** (and, most notably, [Rocq](#), formerly known as the Coq Proof Assistant) are based on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions

# Lean as a Functional Programming language I

- Key characteristics
  - Lean is a **pure, strict functional language with dependent types**
- Types and Polymorphism
  - Every expression has a **type**
  - Lean supports **parametric polymorphism**

# Lean as a Functional Programming language II

- Functions are first-class
- Algebraic datatypes: structures (product types), inductives (sum types, or tagged-union), pattern matching



# Lean as a Functional Programming language III

- Safe & terminating recursion
  - Recursive definitions must be **structurally recursive** or come with a proof of termination
- Effects via Monads & type-level effects
  - Effects (I/O, state, errors) are encoded using **monads** and do-notation

# Simple Examples i

```
-- Polymorphic function: length of a list
def length {α} (xs : List α) : Nat :=
  match xs with
  | []      => 0
  | _ :: t1 => 1 + length t1

-- Algebraic datatype + pattern matching
inductive MyOption (α : Type) where
  | none : MyOption α
  | some : α → MyOption α

def getOrDefault {α : Type} (opt : Option α) (default : α) : α :=
  match opt with
  | Option.none  => default
  | Option.some x => x

-- Using monad (IO) for effectful code
def main : IO Unit := do
  IO.println s!"Hello, world!" --
```

- Tactics are commands used inside a tactic block to incrementally transform goals until the proof is finished

# Some Lean Tactics I

Tactic	Purpose	Example
<b>simp</b>	Simplifies goal and hypotheses using the simplifier	<code>simp [only add_assoc]</code>
<b>rw</b>	Rewrites using equalities as rewrite rules	<code>rw [← add_assoc] at h</code>
<b>cases</b>	Case analysis on inductive values	<code>cases n case zero =&gt; ... case succ n' =&gt; ...</code>

# Some Lean Tactics II

Tactic	Purpose	Example
<b>aesop</b>	Automated reasoning (search + rewriting + rules)	by aesop
<b>grind</b>	Performs normalization, congruence closure, rewriting, linear arithmetic	by grind
<b>omega</b>	Solves linear integer/natural Presburger arithmetic	by omega

Why do we need proofs to be **formal**?

Why not stick to “pen and paper”?

# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor I

## Definition of Prime predicate

$$\forall n, \text{Prime}(n) = 1 < n \wedge \forall k, 1 < k \rightarrow k < n \rightarrow \neg k \mid n$$

**Theorem.** For every natural number  $(n)$ , if  $(1 < n)$ , then there exists a prime number  $(k)$  such that  $(k \mid n)$ .

Formally:

$$\forall n, (1 < n \rightarrow \exists k, (\text{Prime}(k) \wedge k \mid n)).$$

*Notation  $k \mid n$  means that  $\exists c$  such that  $n = c \cdot k$*

# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor II

## Proof

Let  $(n)$  be an arbitrary natural number and assume

1.  $(1 < n)$ . (assumption)

We perform a **case distinction** on whether  $(n)$  is prime.



# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor III

## Case 1. $(n)$ is prime.

Assume

2.  $(\text{Prime}(n))$ . (case assumption)

From (2), by **conjunction introduction**, we know

3.  $(\text{Prime}(n) \wedge n \mid n)$ ,

because every number divides itself.

Then by **existential introduction** on (3), we conclude:

4.  $(\exists k, (\text{Prime}(k) \wedge k \mid n))$ .

This completes Case 1.

# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor IV

## Case 2. $(n)$ is not prime.

Assume

5.  $(\neg \text{Prime}(n))$ . (case assumption)

Since  $(n)$  is not prime and  $(1 < n)$ , by the definition of non-prime, we obtain:

6.  $(\exists k, (1 < k \wedge k < n \wedge k \mid n))$ . ( $\exists$ -introduction from the definition of composite)

Let

7.  $(k)$  be such that

- $(1 < k)$ ,
- $(k < n)$ ,
- $(k \mid n)$ . (from 6 by  $\exists$ -elimination)

## Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor V

From  $(1 < k)$ , by **induction on smaller numbers** (or, in classical math: by applying the lemma recursively to a strictly smaller number), we may apply the theorem to  $(k)$ . Since  $(k < n)$  and  $(1 < k)$ , we get:

8.  $(\exists p, (\text{Prime}(p) \wedge p \mid k))$ . (by IH / recursive application)

Choose such a  $(p)$ . So we have:

9.  $(\text{Prime}(p))$  and  $(p \mid k)$ . (from 8 by  $\exists$ -elimination)

From  $(p \mid k)$  and  $(k \mid n)$ , by the **transitivity of divisibility**, we obtain:

10.  $(p \mid n)$ . (divisibility transitivity)

# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor VI

Now by **existential introduction** applied to prime  $(p)$ :

$$11. (\exists p, (\text{Prime}(p) \wedge p \mid n)).$$

This completes Case 2.

# Natural Deduction Proof for the existence of a prime factor VII

## Conclusion

Since from the assumption  $(1 < n)$ , both cases—either  $(n)$  is prime or not—lead to the conclusion

$$\exists k, (\text{Prime}(k) \wedge k \mid n),$$

we may discharge the case distinction and conclude by **implication introduction**:

$$1 < n \rightarrow \exists k, (\text{Prime}(k) \wedge k \mid n).$$

Finally, by **universal introduction** (since  $(n)$  was arbitrary):

$$\forall n, (1 < n \rightarrow \exists k, (\text{Prime}(k) \wedge k \mid n)). \quad \square$$

# Existence of Prime factor in Lean

```
/-- A prime is a number larger than 1 with no trivial divisors -/
def IsPrime (n : Nat) := 1 < n ∧ ∀ k, 1 < k → k < n → ¬ k ∣ n

/-- Every number larger than 1 has a prime factor -/
theorem exists_prime_factor :
  ∀ n, 1 < n → ∃ k, IsPrime k ∧ k ∣ n := by
  intro n h1
  -- Either `n` is prime...
  by_cases hprime : IsPrime n
  · grind [Nat.dvd_refl]
  -- ... or it has a non-trivial divisor with a prime factor
  · obtain ⟨k, _⟩ : ∃ k, 1 < k ∧ k < n ∧ k ∣ n := by
      simp_all [IsPrime]
    obtain ⟨p, _, _⟩ := exists_prime_factor k (by grind)
    grind [Nat.dvd_trans]
```

Now we know how to formally prove in Type Theory

What about ZKP circuits?

# Zero-knowledge proofs i

- Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff's **zero-knowledge proof** (ZKP) is a cryptographic concept
- A prover convinces a verifier that a statement is true without revealing why it is true
- The prover shows knowledge of a secret witness (e.g., a password, preimage of a hash, a transaction's private data) that satisfies some publicly known constraints
- But the verifier learns nothing beyond the fact that the constraints are indeed satisfiable
- ZKPs must satisfy completeness (honest proofs pass), soundness (cheaters fail), and zero-knowledge (the proof reveals nothing)



- To prove a statement in zero-knowledge, a (class of) computation(s) is formalized as **arithmetic circuits** over a finite field composed of small, verifiable arithmetic steps
  - A proof is about one such computation
- Its components are:
  - Inputs: public inputs + private witness
  - Gates: simple field operations (addition, multiplication)
  - Constraints: equations that must hold for the witness to be valid
  - Output: a boolean condition (valid/invalid)

- Circom is a domain-specific language (DSL) for describing (field) arithmetic circuits used in zk-SNARKs

- Everything is a circuit:
  - Circom programs are compositions of components, each with inputs, outputs, and internal signals
- Signals = wires:
  - Signals carry field elements (in the prime field of the proof system)
  - Assigning `signal = expr` does not compute a value — it declares a constraint

- Constraints are equations defined with `===`

```
a * b === c;  
a + b === 7;
```

- Components are reusable:

```
component add = Add();  
add.a <== x;  
add.b <== y;  
out <== add.out;
```

- Assignment operators:
  - `===` → constraint
  - `<==` → wiring/connection of signals
  - `<--` → witness assignment (for template-internal computation)
- Templates = parametric circuits:

```
template AddN(n) {  
    signal input in[n];  
    signal output out;  
    ...  
}
```

- Compilation flow:
  - Circom  $\rightarrow$  Rank 1 Constraint System (R1CS)
  - Witness generation (input assignment)
  - Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) proof generation

- [Circomlib/Comparators.lean#L15](#)

```
template IsZero() {  
  signal input in;  
  signal output out;  
  
  signal inv;  
  
  inv <-- in != 0 ? 1 / in : 0;  
  
  out <== -in * inv + 1;  
  in * out === 0;  
}
```

- Clean is a high-level domain-specific language (DSL), implemented in Lean, designed to describe arithmetic circuits for zero-knowledge proofs in a modular way
- Essentially circuits are instances of a monad of constraints
- Clean defines its own tactics, e.g. `circuit_proof_start`



- **Circuit**
- A circuit is a *monad*, an abstraction for programming with effects in functional programming, borrowed from Category Theory by [Eugenio Moggi](#)
- Concretely, a `Circuit` is a function  $(\text{offset} : \mathbb{N}) \rightarrow \alpha \times \text{List} (\text{Operation } F)$  for some return type  $\alpha$   

```
def Circuit (F : Type) [Field F] ( $\alpha$  : Type) :=  $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \alpha \times \text{List} (\text{Operation } F)$ 
```

- The monad is a mix of:
  - a writer monad that accumulates the list of operations
  - a state monad that keeps track of the offset
  - where the next offset is computed from the operations added in the previous step

# Correctness of a Clean Circuit I

- FormalCircuit
- It requires:
  - a spec, which is a relationship between inputs and outputs
  - assumptions, which are the conditions that must hold for the circuit to make sense
  - a proof of *soundness*:  $\text{assumptions} \wedge \text{constraints} \rightarrow \text{spec}$ , for any witness
  - a proof of *completeness*:  $\text{assumptions} \rightarrow \text{constraints}$ , using some existing witness

## Correctness of a Clean Circuit II

- When viewed as a black box, the circuit acts similarly to a function
- The assumptions act as preconditions, and the spec acts as the postcondition

```
structure FormalCircuit (F : Type) [Field F]
    (Input Output : TypeMap)
    [ProvableType Input] [ProvableType Output]
  extends elaborated : ElaboratedCircuit F Input Output where
  Assumptions (_ : Input F) : Prop := True
  Spec : Input F → Output F → Prop
  soundness : Soundness F elaborated Assumptions Spec
  completeness : Completeness F elaborated Assumptions
```

# Correctness of isZero I

- Main function

---

Circom

```
template IsZero() {  
  signal input in;  
  signal output out;  
  signal inv;  
  inv <-- in!=0 ? 1/in : 0;  
}
```

---

Clean

```
def main (input : Expression (F p)) := do  
  let inv ← witness fun env =>  
    let x := input.eval env  
    if x != 0 then x^-1 else 0  
  let out <== -input * inv + 1  
  out <== -in*inv +1;  
  in*out === 0;  
  return out
```

---

# Correctness of isZero II

- Circuit

```
namespace IsZero

def main(...) := ...

def circuit : FormalCircuit (F p) field field where
  main
  localLength _ := 2

  Assumptions _ := True

  Spec input output :=
    output = (if input = 0 then 1 else 0)

  soundness := ...
  completeness := ...

end IsZero
```

# Correctness of isZero III

- Soundness

```
soundness := by
  circuit_proof_start
  simp only [id_eq, h_holds]
  split_ifs with h_ifs
  . simp only [h_ifs, zero_mul, neg_zero, zero_add]
  . rw [neg_add_eq_zero]
    have h1 := h_holds.left
    have h2 := h_holds.right
    rw [h1] at h2
    simp only [id_eq, mul_eq_zero] at h2
    cases h2
    case neg.inl h1 => contradiction
    case neg.inr hr =>
      rw [neg_add_eq_zero] at hr
      exact hr
```

- Completeness

```
completeness := by
  circuit_proof_start
  cases h_env with
  | intro left right =>
    simp only [left, ne_eq, id_eq, ite_not, mul_ite, mul_zero] at right
    simp only [id_eq, right, left, ne_eq, ite_not,
              mul_ite, mul_zero, mul_eq_zero, true_and]
    split_ifs <;> aesop
```



- The objective of this talk was to talk about Type Theory, the Lean system and [ZK Security](#)'s Clean approach to ZKP circuit verification.

- There are other approaches to verify circuits in other ZKP DSL (and proof systems).
- Notably, Nethermind's:
  - Plonky 3: [CertiPlonk](#)
  - Halo 2: [Halva](#)

- Also worth mentioning is the combination of AI and (Lean) theorem proving by:
  - Google Deepmind's [AlphaProof](#)
  - Harmony's [Aristotle](#)

- Another very interesting technique to enforce privacy is *fully homomorphic encryption*, where the effect of operations applied to encrypted data is preserved in the decrypted data.
- How do we verify such constructions?

**I guess we have a lot to talk about! =)**

**Thank you!**

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