# Post Quantum Ethereum Era Implementation results and foresight

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


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### Summary

- 1 Introduction
  - ZKNOX
  - Quantum Apocalypse
  - Solutions
- Verifiers implementation





4 The ZK endgame



5 Conclusion

## Casting



Nicolas Bacca 20+ years experience (10y+ web3) Security and hardware specialist Prev. Ledger cofounder/CTO



Renaud Dubois
20+ years experience (3+ web3)
Cryptographer
Prev. Ledger, Thales (Defense Industry)



Simon Masson 8+ years experience (4y+ web3) Cryptographer Prev. Heliax, Thales

### Missions

Bring deep expertise and innovation to every challenge on the whole security chain

- user end (be it secure enclaves, hardware wallets)
- back end (TEE, HSMs)
- on-chain (smart contracts).



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# What is Quantum Apocalypse?

Shor algorithm solves factorization and discrete logarithm problems.



## What is Quantum Apocalypse?

#### Ethereum components at risk:

- EoA private keys (notably using ECDSA)
- BLS signatures in consensus
- Data Availability Sampling (leveraging KZG commitments)

ZKNOX roadmap is to solve the first and second points.



#### **Candidates**

#### IACR has our back.

Complexity Metric	Falcon-512	Dilithium2	SPHINCS+	GeMSS
Public Key Size (Bytes)	897	1312	32	33
Private Key Size (Bytes)	7553	2528	32	64
Signature Size (Bytes)	666	2420	17088	21952

#### Table: NIST Level 1 Complexities of Selected PQ Signature Candidates

FALCON appears as the more suited for onchain complexities but is known for its signer integration to be a challenge.

Pleasant feature: FALCON has an recover version, which is similar to ecrecover functionning (recover public key from signature)

## Progressive Roadmap

#### Verifier (On chain side)

- Step1: use Account Abstraction (EIP-7702+7579/4337) with full solidity to experiment
- Step2: integrate RIP into nodes
- Step3: accept as EIP
- Final: remove eoA (EIP-7701/EIP-7560)

At first, solidity enables experiments on cheap L2s.

### Signer (User side)

- Step1: Hot wallet
- Step2: Hardware wallet

## Verifier: Implementation Results

Function	Description	Gas Cost
TETRATION_ethfalcon.verify	EVM Friendly	24M
ZKNOX_falcon.verify	NIST	7M
${\tt ZKNOX\_ethfalcon.verify}$	EVM Friendly	1.8M
${\tt ZKNOX\_epervier.verify}$	Recover EVM friendly	1.9M

Table: Gas cost of ZKNOX FALCON verification functions

- In order to reduce gas cost, ETHFALCON and EPERVIER use Keccak instead of SHAKE, without compromising security.
- EPERVIER is a recover version which reduces complexity by tweaking public key representation, avoiding NTT inversion.
- Optimal NTT, fully Yuled

# Verifier: Implementation Results

Function	Description	Gas Cost
TETRATION_ethdilithium.verify	EVM Friendly	40M
$ZKNOX_{\mathtt{dilithium.verify}}$	NIST	13.5M
$ZKNOX_{\mathtt{e}}ethdilithium.verify$	EVM Friendly	6.6M

Table: Gas cost of ZKNOX DILITHIUM verification functions

#### Verifier: Conclusions

- FALCON ×4 cheaper than DILITHIUM
- Straightforward to implement in Node, just follow NIST recommendations (see our Geth Fork)
- EVM friendly versions are preferable for step1
- NTT could be standardized rather than one or the other for more flexibility: EIP-7885
- Vectorization is very efficient to speed up NTT (EVMMAX experimentations), expected 80% gain.
- EVMMAX > NTT, but harder to implement in Core.

Scheme	Operation	RAM Consumption (KiB)	Code Size (KiB)
Falcon	Key Generation	40-64	30-50
	Signing	40-64	30-50
Dilithium	Key Generation	$\geq 7$	15-25
	Signing	≥ 7	15-25

- Hot Wallet constraints are trivial.
- Hardware wallets limitations makes FALCON non trivial to integrate
- Vendors should make their homework, onchain constraints are prioritary

How to solve RAM limitation?

- Oblivious RAM extends device RAM by using host memory as an extension
- Requires confidentiality and integrity cipher of host memory
- While a long knowm mechanism, no Hardware Wallet implements it
- Should be in the firmware

Alternative is using an EVM wrapping syscalls, easier DX but slower.

### Signers: Conclusions

- On chain constraints are prioritary. Ethereum shall lead the decision, not HW limitations.
- Oblivious RAM, plus other tricks can reduce dramatically implementation constraints
- Stay Tuned for more results

# Proving FALCON/DILITHIUM

#### Need

- Allow FALCON/DILITHIUM integration into ZKEVM
- Allow PQ-Private Payments (PQ-Railgun)
- Solution for BLS replacement is Batching with snarks/starks.

Second one could use a dedicated scheme (LABRADOR).

#### Constraints

- FALCON and DILITHIUM operates on non native fields (Babybear, STwo)
- Non Native Fields require x30 more constraints (source: Bandersnatch vs P256 in Gnark, incoming paper)

ZKNOX aim: minimal tweak to obtain ZK friendly version

# ZK friendly FALCON/DILITHIUM

#### Obvious tweaks

- Replace Hash function by a ZK friendly one
- Provide hints (see epervier definition) for easy batch inversion
- Accumulate several NTT steps, reduce once

#### Harder tweaks

- Starks fields are going shorter (no accumulation trick)
- Replacing fields is less trivial than for ECC (pick prime order curve and twist)
- FALCON is prone to overstretch attacks for ZK fields
- Estimator for S2/Babybear on dilithium provides 20% slowdown factor (WIP)

### **ZK** Conclusion

- DILITHIUM is more ZK-friendly (and MPC too)
- Still experimental phase, spec very scheme sensitive

#### Conclusion

- Easy solutions for EOA migration
- EIP-7885 (NTT) to reduce gas costs, also reduce STARK proof cplx.
- Some efforts for HW signers, vendors will lobby for DILITHIUM
- Shall we tweak the proving scheme (LABRADOR) or the signature algorithm ?
- Privacy and Batching still very experimental, require STARKS with private input

ZKNOX would gladly help Wallets/Dapps to integrate its framework.

## Questions?





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