

Kohaku Wallet: Post-Quantum Smart Accounts on Ethereum Today

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ZKNox



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ZKNOX Casting



Nicolas Bacca, "Chief"

20⁺ years experience (10⁺y web3)
Security and hardware specialist
Prev. Ledger cofounder/CTO



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Expertise and innovation to every challenge on the whole security chain:

- ▶ user end
(secure enclaves, hardware wallets),
- ▶ back end
(TEE, HSMs),
- ▶ on-chain
(smart contracts).

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<https://zknox.eth.limo/>

<https://github.com/zknoxhq/>

Summary

Introduction: Quantum Apocalypse

Verifiers SC implementation

Signers implementation

Validity and Privacy lattices results

Conclusion

Introduction: Quantum Apocalypse


Shor algorithm solves factorization and discrete logarithm problems. All current authentication systems are cooked as soon as Quantum computer rises.



When ?



When ?




When ?

Federal agencies:

NIST: 2035 ANSSI/BSI: 2030

Blockchains might not care about feds, but for stablecoins regulation, those might be hard deadlines.

EF got your back



Candidates

Complexity metric	FALCON512	DILITHIUM2	SPHINCS+	GemSS
Public Key size	897	1312	32	33
Private Key size	7553	2528	32	64
Signature size	666	2420	17088	21952

Current proposals:

- ▶ FALCON (FNDSA FIP206 draft): EIP8052/EIP7619
- ▶ Dilithium (MLDSA: FIPS204): EIP8051

Difference for 8052/7619: zk friendly hash (separate core from hashing to domain), 7932 specification

8051 and 8052 comes with contracts, signers, and hardware signer (8051 only). (Wait for next talk for the onchain demonstration).

Advertisement

All is delivered as public good, experiment, integrate, give feedback, hack this week end (ETHGLOBAL).



Blog



Github

A PQ-vault, staking ETH (gas cost is high, better suited for high amount with few movements)

Remarks

- ▶ Authentication might be solved a bit later, (but we shall on the shelf solution).
- ▶ Confidentiality shall be solved NOW.

Ethereum components at risk:

1. EoA private keys (notably using ECDSA)
2. Private Payments (Privacy Pool, TC, Stealth, RAILGUN)
3. BLS signatures in consensus (lean CL)
4. Data Availability Sampling (leveraging KZG commitments)

ZKNOX provides solution for first point, and experimentations results for 2 and 3.

Progressive Roadmap

Verifiers:

- ▶ Step1: use Account Abstraction (EIP-7702+7579/4337) with full solidity to experiment
- ▶ Step2: benchmark in nodes (validate gas hypothesis)
- ▶ Step3: EIP accepted
- ▶ remove eoA (EIP-7701/EIP-7560)

Signers:

- ▶ Step1: Software signers
- ▶ Step2: hardware signers
- ▶ remove eoA (EIP-7701/EIP-7560)

Verifiers: implementation results

Function	Description	Gas Cost
TETRATION ethfalcon.verify	EVM Friendly*	24M
ZKNOX falcon.verify	NIST	7M
ZKNOX ethfalcon.verify	EVM Friendly	1.8 M
ZKNOX epervier.verify	Recover EVM friendly	1.9M

Function	Description	Gas Cost
ZKNOX dilithium.verify	NIST	13.3M
ZKNOX ethfalcon.verify	EVM Friendly	6 M

Signers implementation

Scheme	Operation	RAM Consumption	Code size
FALCON	Keygen	40 Kb	30-50 Kb
	Signing	40 Kb	30-50
Dilithium	Keygen	7 Kb	30-50 Kb
	Signing	7 Kb	30-50

Low Ram implementation of Dilithium is possible, falcon reach the limit for a SE implementation.

Next experiment: solve RAM limitation with ORAM (extend RAM with external ciphering on host). Part of another ZKNOX implication in Kohaku: universal Ethereum Application.

Proving FALCON and DILITHIUM

Need

- ▶ Allow FALCON/DILITHIUM integration into ZKEVM
- ▶ Allow PQ-Private Payments (PQ-Railgun)
- ▶ Solution for BLS replacement is Batching with snarks/starks.

Second one could use a dedicated scheme (LABRADOR, Lean CL team work).

- ▶ FALCON and DILITHIUM operates on non native fields (Babybear, STwo)
- ▶ Non Native Fields require x30 more constraints (source: Bandersnatch vs P256 in Gnark, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/933>)
- ▶ Solution for BLS replacement is Batching with snarks/starks.

ZK friendly FALCON/DILITHIUM

Obvious tweaks

- ▶ Replace Hash function by a ZK friendly one
- ▶ Provide hints (see epervier definition) for easy batch inversion
- ▶ Accumulate several NTT steps, reduce once (Credit to Zhenfei)

Harder tweaks

- ▶ Starks fields are going shorter (no accumulation trick) Replacing fields is less trivial than for ECC (pick prime order curve and twist)
- ▶ FALCON is prone to overstretch attacks for ZK fields
- ▶ Estimator for S2/Babybear on dilithium provides 20% slowdown factor (WIP)

Results

Function	Description	gas cost	Max per block
ECDSA	Starkware built in	-	3000
ETH_FALCON	ZKnox Use Keccak-ctr	102M	50
ETH_FALCON	Starkware+ ZKNOX Keccak-ctr	340M	15
FALZKON Use	Blake2s-ctr	41M	125

Result for a high level Cairo, dedicated AIR shall dramatically reduce this factor.

Dilithium requires less hashing and more easily tuned : better zk candidate.

<https://github.com/ZKNoxHQ/falzkon>

Accomplishments

- ▶ dramatical reduction of complexities (ZK and SC verifiers) (x12 gains)
- ▶ first hardware wallet fully in SE execution of PQ signature
- ▶ first full suite with secure element PQ signer to on chain contract verification (8051)
- ▶ experimentations for the ZK endgame

Conclusion

Easy

- ▶ Easy solutions for EOA migration (use AA+ 8051/8052)
- ▶ 8051 and 8052 proposals, help us with ACD
- ▶ PQ ciphering (view keys) is easy (just more storage cost)

FALCON is greater for plain constraints, less for ZK/MPC/signers constraints.

Hard

- ▶ no succinct replacement of pairings (consensus + private Payments systems)
- ▶ almost probably no constant size PQ replacement

Addition to $O(1)$ bandwidth will strongly strike those part of the protocol.

Now let's witness the first full suite with a HW signer and on chain PQC transaction.