

How Do Password Characteristics Affect Password Strength?

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Introduction

Research Question and Motivation

In our increasingly technology-oriented world, data security is a pressing and essential topic. As cybercriminals' hacking tools have improved, data leaks at major companies such as Yahoo, Facebook, LinkedIn, Marriott International, Adobe, Bank of America, British Airways, and CVS have compromised billions of users' personal information. In 2022, IBM found that the average data breach in the U.S. cost companies an average of \$9.44 million in lost business, crisis management efforts, and ransom payments. Data breaches can also allow hackers to access users' personal information such as names, addresses, credit card details, and Social Security numbers, which can be used for financial fraud or identity theft. One critical aspect of data security is password strength, which can reduce the risk of cybercriminals guessing users' passwords and accessing personal information. Given our interest in data security and the topicality of password strength as a key aspect of this subject area, we wanted to explore password data for our project.

Our research question is: How do various password characteristics affect password strength? We measure password strength in two ways: "strength" (which is calculated by an algorithm based on the password's length and complexity and is comparative to the generally bad passwords in the dataset) and the time the password takes to crack by online guessing.

Data Description

| Variable Name | Type | Description |
|-------------------|-------------|--|
| rank | numeric | Popularity in their database of released passwords |
| password | character | Actual text of password |
| category | categorical | Classification of type of password |
| true_val | double | Time to crack by online guessing standardized to seconds |
| true_val_strength | double | true_val made numeric where 11 is most crack time, 1 is lowest |
| offline_crack_sec | double | Time to crack offline in seconds |
| rank_alt | numeric | Secondary popularity rank in database of released passwords |
| font_size | numeric | Arbitrary font size Knowledge Is Beautiful used in graphic |
| strength | numeric | Quality of password where 10 is highest, 1 is lowest |
| pass_length | numeric | Length of the password |

| Variable Name | Type | Description |
|---------------|---------|--|
| num_digits | numeric | Number of digits in the password |
| num_letters | numeric | Number of letters in the password |
| num_unique | numeric | Number of unique characters (letters or numbers in the password) |

Our data come from Tidy Tuesday, originally sourced from Information is Beautiful, a design company that distills data into visualizations and infographics. Information is Beautiful acquired its data on passwords by deep-mining 20 separate data breaches in 2017, including breaches of Facebook, Sony, and Yahoo. The data only includes the 500 most popular passwords, which also tended to be low-strength. Therefore, the **strength** variable indicates password strength in relation to these generally weak passwords.

In the cleaning process, we removed the last seven observations, as all their values were “NA.” We also removed observations that had a strength recorded over ten as those may have been miscalculations or strengths that were not standardized to values 1 through 10. From there, we were left with 485 observations. Additionally, we combined the **value** and **time_unit** variables into one time standardized to seconds called **true_val**. Previously, **value** referred to the time to crack by online guessing, and time unit was the time unit to match with that value (seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, or years). Based on **true_val**, we made a new variable called **true_val_strength** for use in ordinal regression. This variable translated **true_val** values to numbers 1-10, since **true_val** values were not actually continuous but rather discrete values (2.17 years, 0.00321 days, etc.). Standardizing these times to 1-10 also allowed us to better visualize our data, since there was a large gap between observations—some took only seconds to crack, while others took years. Finally, we added four new variables: **pass_length**, **num_digits**, **num_letters**, and **num_unique**. We added these variables because we believe that password length and composition could impact strength.

Exploratory Data Analysis

Given our prior knowledge of what makes passwords stronger, we chose to focus our exploratory data analysis on the predictors password length and number of unique characters, along with their relationships with other variables in the dataset.

Summary Statistics:

| | Variable | Mean | Median | Sd | Min | Max |
|---|--------------------------|------|--------|-----|-----|-----|
| 1 | strength | 6.6 | 7 | 2.3 | 0 | 10 |
| 2 | true_val_strength | 8.6 | 9 | 2.1 | 1 | 11 |
| 3 | pass_length | 6.2 | 6 | 1.1 | 4 | 9 |
| 4 | num_digits | 0.46 | 0 | 1.6 | 0 | 9 |
| 5 | num_letters | 5.7 | 6 | 1.9 | 0 | 8 |
| 6 | num_unique | 5.2 | 5 | 1.5 | 1 | 9 |

From the table, the average number of digits in a password are 0.464, the average number of letters is 5.718, the average number of unique characters is 5.192, and the average password length is 6.181. In general, this indicates that the most popular passwords in the data leaks used all unique letters and rarely used numbers. In terms of our predictors, the average strength was 6.6, and the average **true_val_strength** was 8.6, representing an online crack time of about two and a half days. This indicates that the compared to generally weak passwords, the average password in this dataset had a higher-than-average “strength” by both measures. In other words, the distribution of our data under **strength** and **true_val_strength** are left-skewed. An explanation of why we focused on these variables can be found in the methodology section.

Plots:

Longer Passwords are Typically Stronger




Figure 1

Longer Passwords Typically Take Longer crack time represented by numbers 1–10




Figure 3

Unique Characters Tend To Increase Strength Grouped by Category




Figure 2

Unique Characters Tend to Increase Time Grouped by Category




Figure 4

Figure 1 demonstrates that there appears to be a positive relationship between password length and the strength variable based on the line of best fit. We can also see this from the data themselves based on how the size of the points change as strength increases. For passwords of length 6, 7, and 8, most passwords have strengths of above 5. For passwords of length 4 and 5, there are some passwords with strengths above 5, but there appear to be a similar number of passwords with these lengths with strengths below 5. This graph also helps visualize the composition of the data itself. The large size of several points associated with password length 6 indicates that, by far, most passwords in this dataset have length 6.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the number of unique characters appears to have a positive relationship with password strength. This relationship holds for all categories, except simple-alphanumeric. Although there appears to be a positive relationship between number of unique terms and password strengths for some passwords in this category, the horizontal line in this plot also shows that some passwords with varying numbers of unique terms have the same password strength. Additionally, the size of the points in the plot demonstrates that some categories of passwords were more popular in our data, especially name, cool-macho, fluffy, and sport.

Figure 3 shows a positive relationship between password length and online crack time (`true_val_strength`), as demonstrated by the positive slope of the line of best fit. In general, longer passwords take longer to crack, and the vast majority of passwords with online crack time categories of 9 or above are 6 characters or longer. Looking at the distribution of our data, it appears that there should be a stronger positive relationship between password length and online crack time, but the outlier at length 9 reduces the slope of our line of best fit. The passwords with length 9 and `true_val_strength` of 1 are really the only deviation from the trend that length increases strength.

Figure 4 demonstrates that there appears to be a positive relationship between number of unique characters and online crack time. However, whether this trend holds differs by password category. The passwords in the food, nerdy-pop, and sport categories are clustered around high online crack times (represented by values 1-10) and do not appear to have any clear pattern. For passwords in the alphanumeric category, the groups of points in the plot that look like two parallel lines with positive slopes are consistent with the general trend of positive relationship between number of unique characters and online crack time. However, many passwords with 2 or less unique characters have high online crack times, demonstrated by the vertical line at the left of the plot, and one point with 9 unique characters has a very low online crack time.

Methodology

In our analysis, we treat our two outcome variables, strength and online crack time, as ordinal outcomes.

The strength variable is a number 1-10, in order of increasing password strength, making ordinal a good fit. The strength variable meets the ordinal assumption of proportional odds, since it is reasonable to assume that one-unit changes in each predictor have the same conditional relationship with being in each strength category. For example, the strength variable is calculated in part based on password length, and each one character increase in password length has the same conditional relationship with being in each strength category.

add to this

In terms of our outcome variables, we excluded `offline_crack_sec` because it is just a merely transformation of `online_crack_sec`. In terms of our predictors, we focused on `pass_length`, `num_digits`, `num_letters`, and `num_unique` variables. We excluded the `rank` and `rank_alt` variables because our research question explores what characteristics of passwords make them stronger, and their popularity in these data leaks did not have to do with their actual composition and is likely not representative of how popular these passwords are on the whole. We excluded the password variable, since the actual text of the password could not be used as a predictor—the composition of the password is encompassed in our `num_digits`, `num_letters`, `num_unique`, and `pass_length` variables. We did not end up using `num_letters` in our model because the ordinal model

could not handle including more than 4 variables given that our dataset only had 500 observations. We reasoned that this should not affect our analysis, since the number of letters is correlated with the number of digits (which we did include). The number of letters can be derived from the number of digits, since all passwords in our dataset included either letters, digits, or some combination of both—no passwords included special characters.

Additionally, based on our research and prior knowledge, we believed it was reasonable to focus on password length, number of unique characters, number of digits, and category as the most important predictors of password strength. Longer passwords with more varied compositions (unique characters and digits) are typically harder to guess because that increases the options for what the password might look like. Category may also be an important indicator of strength when, instead of using brute force attacks, the person or program guesses the most common passwords—passwords that fall into certain categories may be more common and thus easier to crack.

Call:

```
polr(formula = factor(strength) ~ . - password - true_val - true_val_strength -
      offline_crack_sec - rank - num_letters - rank_alt - font_size,
      data = pass_more)
```

Coefficients:

| | Value | Std. Error | t value |
|--------------------------|---------|------------|---------|
| categoryanimal | -0.5422 | 0.7617 | -0.7119 |
| categorycool-macho | -0.8514 | 0.7015 | -1.2137 |
| categoryfluffy | -0.8548 | 0.7243 | -1.1802 |
| categoryfood | -3.0098 | 0.9140 | -3.2929 |
| categoryname | -0.6723 | 0.6809 | -0.9873 |
| categorynerdy-pop | -0.2455 | 0.7982 | -0.3076 |
| categorypassword-related | -0.7074 | 0.8632 | -0.8195 |
| categoryrebellious-rude | -1.5309 | 0.9026 | -1.6960 |
| categorysport | -0.8894 | 0.7473 | -1.1901 |
| pass_length | -0.3116 | 0.1418 | -2.1972 |
| num_digits | -1.1207 | 0.2267 | -4.9428 |
| num_unique | 3.6946 | 0.2155 | 17.1474 |

Intercepts:

| | Value | Std. Error | t value |
|------|---------|------------|---------|
| 0 1 | 4.4379 | 1.1224 | 3.9538 |
| 1 2 | 6.3768 | 1.1000 | 5.7971 |
| 2 3 | 7.2025 | 1.0380 | 6.9389 |
| 3 4 | 8.5633 | 1.0033 | 8.5348 |
| 4 5 | 11.4748 | 1.0175 | 11.2772 |
| 5 6 | 12.3062 | 1.0212 | 12.0507 |
| 6 7 | 15.0371 | 1.1057 | 13.5991 |
| 7 8 | 17.6989 | 1.1877 | 14.9012 |
| 8 9 | 22.0490 | 1.3242 | 16.6502 |
| 9 10 | 25.7696 | 1.4916 | 17.2765 |

Residual Deviance: 906.9067

AIC: 950.9067

categoryanimal

categorycool-macho

categoryfluffy

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 0.58146937 | 0.42682081 | 0.42536309 |
| categoryfood | categoryname | categorynerdy-pop |
| 0.04930122 | 0.51053601 | 0.78227931 |
| categorypassword-related | categoryrebellious-rude | categorysport |
| 0.49292180 | 0.21634774 | 0.41089807 |
| pass_length | num_digits | num_unique |
| 0.73226425 | 0.32603949 | 40.22927327 |

Call:

```
polr(formula = factor(true_val_strength) ~ . - password - num_letters -
      offline_crack_sec - strength - rank - true_val - rank_alt -
      font_size, data = pass_more)
```

Coefficients:

| | Value | Std. Error | t value |
|--------------------------|---------|------------|---------|
| categoryanimal | -2.1008 | 1.7570 | -1.1956 |
| categorycool-macho | -2.2598 | 1.3952 | -1.6197 |
| categoryfluffy | -2.1499 | 1.4265 | -1.5071 |
| categoryfood | -1.3163 | 3.5464 | -0.3712 |
| categoryname | -2.0787 | 1.2922 | -1.6087 |
| categorynerdy-pop | -0.8051 | 3.3502 | -0.2403 |
| categorypassword-related | -2.5701 | 1.9118 | -1.3443 |
| categoryrebellious-rude | 3.1858 | 1.8991 | 1.6776 |
| categorysport | -1.7996 | 2.0268 | -0.8879 |
| pass_length | 12.2155 | 1.1713 | 10.4294 |
| num_digits | -4.0217 | 0.4257 | -9.4473 |
| num_unique | -0.1844 | 0.1566 | -1.1776 |

Intercepts:

| | Value | Std. Error | t value |
|-------|---------|------------|---------|
| 1 2 | 30.0988 | 3.3669 | 8.9397 |
| 2 3 | 37.1905 | 4.2517 | 8.7471 |
| 3 4 | 41.7130 | 4.4530 | 9.3673 |
| 4 5 | 47.8291 | 4.6903 | 10.1974 |
| 5 6 | 53.0538 | 5.3539 | 9.9093 |
| 6 7 | 55.1551 | 5.6692 | 9.7289 |
| 7 8 | 62.3844 | 6.1357 | 10.1675 |
| 8 9 | 65.2460 | 6.6060 | 9.8768 |
| 9 10 | 77.7581 | 7.8402 | 9.9178 |
| 10 11 | 89.2016 | 8.9607 | 9.9548 |

Residual Deviance: 146.3203

AIC: 190.3203

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| categoryanimal | categorycool-macho | categoryfluffy |
| 1.223622e-01 | 1.043671e-01 | 1.164979e-01 |
| categoryfood | categoryname | categorynerdy-pop |
| 2.681322e-01 | 1.250919e-01 | 4.470352e-01 |
| categorypassword-related | categoryrebellious-rude | categorysport |
| 7.653060e-02 | 2.418719e+01 | 1.653680e-01 |
| pass_length | num_digits | num_unique |

2.018866e+05

1.792228e-02

8.315665e-01

[1] 201894.4

A tibble: 13 x 5

| term | estimate | std.error | statistic | p.value |
|----------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| <chr> | <dbl> | <dbl> | <dbl> | <dbl> |
| 1 (Intercept) | -24.9 | 2.88 | -8.67 | 4.34e-18 |
| 2 categoryanimal | -0.586 | 1.55 | -0.378 | 7.05e- 1 |
| 3 categorycool-macho | 0.147 | 1.47 | 0.0999 | 9.20e- 1 |
| 4 categoryfluffy | 0.330 | 1.54 | 0.215 | 8.30e- 1 |
| 5 categoryfood | -13.5 | 983. | -0.0138 | 9.89e- 1 |
| 6 categoryname | 0.483 | 1.43 | 0.337 | 7.36e- 1 |
| 7 categorynerdy-pop | 1.56 | 1.63 | 0.951 | 3.41e- 1 |
| 8 categorypassword-related | 2.04 | 1.79 | 1.14 | 2.56e- 1 |
| 9 categoryrebellious-rude | -1.20 | 1.79 | -0.674 | 5.00e- 1 |
| 10 categorysport | 0.466 | 1.54 | 0.303 | 7.62e- 1 |
| 11 pass_length | -0.301 | 0.291 | -1.03 | 3.01e- 1 |
| 12 num_digits | -1.76 | 0.295 | -5.96 | 2.57e- 9 |
| 13 num_unique | 4.77 | 0.459 | 10.4 | 2.21e-25 |

A tibble: 13 x 5

| term | estimate | std.error | statistic | p.value |
|----------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| <chr> | <dbl> | <dbl> | <dbl> | <dbl> |
| 1 (Intercept) | -52.0 | 9.59 | -5.42 | 0.0000000587 |
| 2 categoryanimal | -1.11 | 4.57 | -0.243 | 0.808 |
| 3 categorycool-macho | -0.950 | 3.83 | -0.248 | 0.804 |
| 4 categoryfluffy | -1.86 | 3.72 | -0.499 | 0.618 |
| 5 categoryfood | -1.48 | 5.96 | -0.248 | 0.804 |
| 6 categoryname | -1.35 | 3.26 | -0.414 | 0.679 |
| 7 categorynerdy-pop | 13.7 | 4963. | 0.00276 | 0.998 |
| 8 categorypassword-related | -1.72 | 6.53 | -0.264 | 0.792 |
| 9 categoryrebellious-rude | 21.3 | 5643. | 0.00378 | 0.997 |
| 10 categorysport | 4.40 | 48.2 | 0.0913 | 0.927 |
| 11 pass_length | 10.4 | 1.96 | 5.30 | 0.000000115 |
| 12 num_digits | -3.31 | 0.779 | -4.25 | 0.0000210 |
| 13 num_unique | -0.592 | 0.502 | -1.18 | 0.238 |

Results

Our first ordinal model shows the relationship between the predictors category, password length, number of digits, and number of unique characters and the log-odds of being in the next-highest strength category. The predictors with the largest impact on strength, as indicated by the magnitude of their slopes are number of unique characters and being categorized as food-related. The number of digits also had a relatively high slope magnitude, and password length had a small slope magnitude. It may seem strange that while controlling for the other predictors in the model, as the number of digits or password length increases, the odds of being in the next-highest strength category are predicted to decrease. However, this is because our model controls for the number of unique characters. Since our slope for number of unique characters is positive (and the exponentiated slope is greater than 1), a unique additional digit or character (which would make

the password longer) is predicted to increase the odds of being in the next-highest strength category, but if the additional digit or character is not unique, it is predicted to decrease those odds. Although we do not conduct a formal hypothesis test, the high-magnitude t-values associated with the number of digits, being in the food category, and especially the number of unique characters (t value of 17.147) indicate that these predictors have a meaningful relationship with password strength and would be important to include in a model that predicts strength.

In terms of what the key coefficients from our model mean in context, the slope for `categoryfood` indicates that while controlling for all other predictors, our model predicts being in the food category to decrease a password's odds of being in the next-highest strength category (1 to 2, or 2 to 3, for example) by a multiplicative factor of 0.049. The slope for `num_unique` indicates that while controlling for all other predictors, as the number of unique characters in the password increases by 1, our model predicts the odds of being in the next-highest strength category to increase by 40.23 times.

Our second ordinal model shows the relationship between the same predictors and `true_val_strength`, which again represents an online crack time, represented by values 1-10. The predictors with the largest impact on strength, as indicated by the magnitude of their slopes are password length, number of digits, and being in the rebellious-rude category. The low magnitude slope for the number of unique characters makes sense in this model because the online crack time is determined by how long it takes to guess a password using brute force. If the computer is guessing every possible character every time, then uniqueness does not matter. The high-magnitude t-values associated with the number of digits (t value of -9.447) and password length (10.429) indicate that these predictors have a meaningful relationship with online crack time and would be important to include in a model that predicts online crack time.

In terms of what the key coefficients from our model mean in context, the slope for `categoryrebellious-rude` indicates that while controlling for all other predictors, our model predicts being in the rebellious-rude category to increase a password's odds of being in the next-highest strength category by 24.19 times. The slope for `pass_length` means that while controlling for all other predictors, as the password length increases by 1 character or digit, our model predicts the odds of being in the next-highest strength category to increase by 201,894.4 times.

Altogether, our two ordinal models suggest that different characteristics improve password strength depending on how password strength is defined. To increase the traditional, numeric measure of password strength, it may be most helpful to have more unique characters. Additionally, it may be helpful to not have a food-related password, as these passwords may be more easily guessed. To increase the time it takes to crack the password online, it appears most important to have a longer password, regardless of its composition. This makes sense based on the mechanism of online guessing, which is brute force, or trying all possible combinations.

online crack time – should define early as brute force attack

Discussion

In terms of the research question. In terms of limitations, to reiterate, this data holds the 500 most common passwords from a data leak - and so since they are the most common, they might all also just not be strong to begin with. The strength variable that was attached, therefore, did not reference all passwords, just the ones in the data set, so super strength should not be correlated with saying that the password is very good, it is just good in comparison to the rest of the passwords in the data set. Additionally, the passwords in this data set did not have special characters or capital letters. Again this is because, being the most common, they have to be relatively simple, so we were not able to analyze these characteristics and see what influence they have. Most passwords nowadays are forced to be inherently strong (with a minimum character, digit, and special character limit), and a lot of these leaked passwords did not follow these rules, but the analysis still confirms the belief that usually, with more unique characters and numbers, passwords tend to get stronger.

To improve upon analysis, (although this may not be ethically valid) it would probably help to have a more representative idea of how passwords are in a breach (as opposed to just the most popular ones), and from there, we can test their online and offline guess time, which we can again, correlate to strength.

Sources

External research: <https://www.keepersecurity.com/blog/2022/09/14/why-is-password-security-important/>
<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-benefits-of-making-password-strength-more-transparent/>
<https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/3R8N1DZJ>

Data source: <https://github.com/rfordatascience/tidytuesday/blob/master/data/2020/2020-01-14/readme.md>