Secure Home Network Deployment


Initial Scan Setup:


To begin the process of deploying a secure home network, I utilized Nessus Essentials to conduct an advanced vulnerability scan. This involved meticulously configuring a new scan after launching Nessus Essentials, precisely inputting the IP addresses of each target device to ensure comprehensive coverage. Adhering to best practices for a thorough security assessment, I applied the recommended configuration settings for an advanced scan profile, aiming to uncover a wide array of potential vulnerabilities that could compromise my home network's integrity. This scanning phase was a crucial step in identifying weaknesses before implementing remediation strategies to fortify my network's defenses.


The devices targeted in these scans included:


- Arris DG9450 (Original Gateway): 192.168.x.x (Scanned in the initial baseline assessment before replacement)
- TP-Link Archer AX55 (Current Gateway): 192.168.x.x (Scanned in subsequent re-assessments after replacement of the Arris gateway)
- Visio Smart TV 65 inch V series: 192.168.x.x
- Acer Aspire 5 Laptop: 192.168.x.xHP Google Chromebook: 192.168.x.x


Initial Baseline Scan:











Initial Vulnerability Scan Results:

A vulnerability scan of the home network identified a total of 34 vulnerabilities across four hosts.

Router Vulnerabilities

The router (192.168.x.x, referring to the original ISP-provided router before replacement) displayed 28 vulnerabilities, with one categorized as high severity and two as medium. The high-severity vulnerability on the router is an SSL/TLS certificate with a known hard-coded private key, which could allow a remote attacker to decrypt intercepted traffic or perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Additional medium-severity vulnerabilities on the router include an SSL certificate signed using a weak hashing algorithm (such as MD5, MD2, MD4, or SHA1), an

expired SSL certificate, and an SSL certificate that cannot be trusted due to an unrecognized, self-signed, or improperly chained certificate. Low-severity findings on the router include DHCP server detection and ICMP Timestamp Request Remote Date Disclosure, which could reveal network layout information or assist attackers in defeating time-based authentication.

Laptop Vulnerabilities

The laptop (192.168.x.x) exhibited 101 vulnerabilities, with a significant number being informational but also including one medium-severity vulnerability related to SMB signing not being required. This absence of SMB signing could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against the SMB server. Overall, the scan highlights critical security weaknesses, particularly concerning the router's SSL/TLS configuration, which could lead to severe compromise of network communications and data integrity.

Remediation:

SSL Certificate Warnings

My vulnerability scan indicates warnings such as "SSL Self-Signed Certificate" and "SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted" across all my networked devices following the system upgrade. This is an anticipated and perfectly acceptable characteristic of a secure home network setup. By replacing the ISP's modem/router combo with my TP-Link AX55 and enabling HTTPS for local administrative access, I successfully remediated critical previous issues, including a high-severity vulnerability related to SSL/TLS certificates with known hard-coded private keys, as well as medium-severity warnings for certificates signed using weak hashing algorithms and expired certificates. The current "Self-Signed Certificate" and "Certificate Cannot Be Trusted" warnings are now the expected behavior for my private home network where obtaining a certificate from a public Certificate Authority is unnecessary and impractical. Nessus flags these because it cannot validate them against a trusted public CA chain, which is precisely how self-signed certificates function. The uniform appearance of these warnings across my devices simply confirms their connection to and interaction with the router's secure local interface. A comprehensive report detailing these configuration changes can be found in the attached Secure Home Network Deployment Report.

Host-Level Security Hardening on Acer Aspire 5

Significant host-level security hardening measures were implemented on the Acer Aspire 5 laptop, running Windows 11 Home. A key step involved enforcing cryptographic signing for Server Message Block (SMB) traffic, which was a previously identified vulnerability that could have allowed man-in-the-middle attacks. This was achieved by directly editing system registry keys, setting RequireSecuritySignature and EnableSecuritySignature to '1' under both the LanmanServer and LanmanWorkstation parameters, with PowerShell verification

confirming successful enforcement. Furthermore, to bolster protection for Remote Desktop Configuration (RDC), and recognizing that <code>gpedit.msc</code> is not available on Windows Home, I utilized **Policy Plus** to apply additional security policies. These policies were instrumental in disabling or restricting Remote Desktop access and enforcing stricter RDC authentication settings, thereby significantly reducing the system's exposure to unauthorized remote login attempts.

SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites on Smart TV

The "SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32)" vulnerability identified on my Smart TV was notably **not detected in the initial vulnerability scan, becoming apparent only in the subsequent re-scan**, underscoring the critical importance of conducting post-remediation scans to fully verify the effectiveness of security measures and uncover previously missed issues. Despite efforts to update the TV's firmware, it was found to be currently up-to-date, indicating that the manufacturer has not released a patch to address this specific cryptographic weakness. Furthermore, the Smart TV's interface offers no granular control to reconfigure or disable these medium-strength cipher suites. Given these technical limitations and the inability to directly remediate the issue, the strategic decision has been made to isolate the Smart TV. It will be moved to an IoT (Internet of Things) Wi-Fi segment of the network, effectively segmenting it from other critical devices and sensitive data, thereby preventing this inherent weakness from impacting the overall security posture of the home network.

ICMP Timestamp Request Remote Date Disclosure


Despite diligently configuring the TP-Link Archer AX55 router to disable WAN (Internet-side) ping responses, the "ICMP Timestamp Request Remote Date Disclosure" vulnerability continues to appear across all scanned devices. This persistent detection is occurring primarily due to ICMP timestamp responses originating from the LAN (Local Area Network) interfaces of the devices themselves, as well as the router's deliberate response to LAN pings for diagnostic purposes. While ideally, all devices would filter these specific ICMP types (13 and 14), configuring each individual device to block these informational responses is a more involved process. For the immediate future, efforts to block this at the individual device level will be deferred, recognizing the low severity of this informational disclosure in a contained home network environment, especially with WAN-side protections in place.


DHCP Server Detection


The "DHCP Server Detection" finding is a low-severity, informational alert from Nessus. It simply indicates the presence of a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server on the network, which is an essential service for automatically assigning IP addresses to connected devices and enabling network functionality. While Nessus suggests filtering out unnecessary network information, typical consumer-grade routers like the TP-Link AX55 offer limited advanced configuration options to suppress or hide the DHCP server's presence without disrupting normal


network operations. For a home network, the convenience and necessity of a functional DHCP server usually outweigh the minimal informational risk associated with this finding, which is more of an operational characteristic than a direct security vulnerability.

Subsequent Scan:









Conclusion:

In conclusion, this project successfully addressed critical security vulnerabilities and significantly enhanced the overall security posture of the home network. The initial baseline scan revealed concerning high and medium-severity vulnerabilities, particularly related to the ISP-provided router's SSL/TLS configuration and the laptop's SMB signing. Through strategic device replacement, meticulous configuration, and host-level hardening using tools like Policy Plus, these major risks were effectively mitigated. While certain informational findings, such as self-signed SSL certificates, ICMP timestamp disclosure, and DHCP server detection, remain present, they are understood to be either expected behavior for a private network or low-severity characteristics with established acceptable risks. The implementation of robust security measures, including HTTPS for local access, SMB signing enforcement, and the

planned isolation of the Smart TV, has substantially reduced the network's attack surface and established a more resilient and secure environment for all connected devices.