

Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences: The effects of Moscow redevelopment program*

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Abstract

How does inclusion in social policy programs strengthen individuals' support for subsequent redistribution? Existing work often conflates the effects of policy inclusion with the concrete material benefits they provide and broader contextual factors, such as economic shocks and long-running ideological education. Consequently, little is known about whether and how inclusion in specific government programs leads to spill overs in support for future social policy programs and redistribution generally. In this paper, we propose that programs can shape subsequent attitudes if they are carried out in a way that builds institutional trust. We study a unique dataset of 1300 Moscow residents in order to estimate the effect of participating in a government-sponsored redevelopment program on preferences for redistributive social policy. Our design exploits unique features of the program designed to foster institutional trust by engaging citizens in the policy design process and educating them on its implementation. We find that there is a positive effect: individuals in buildings slated for redevelopment are more likely to agree that government should reduce income differences between rich and poor, provide for unemployed, and provide housing to everyone who needs it. We show that the primary channel through which this effect operates is increased trust in the government. Our results shed light on how programs can be used strategically to promote a redistributive agenda. They also suggest a pathway for the co-persistence of redistribution preferences and redistributive state policies.

1 Introduction

Does inclusion in social policy programs strengthen individuals' support for broader state-led redistribution? Existing work on inclusion in social policy programs is inconclusive. On the one hand, traditional observational work finds large, positive correlations between exposure to social policy and subsequent support for redistribution (e.g. Pierson, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001). Yet, such work focuses on the context in which social policy

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is enacted – amid economic traumas that reshape perceptions of vulnerability (Margalit, 2013; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018; Carreri and Teso, 2018) or long-running indoctrination via state schools (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020) – rather than inclusion in programs per se. On the other hand, a growing body of work taking advantage of natural experiments finds that program inclusion has weak effects on broader attitudes (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014; Andersen et al., 2020). Because such work relies on random allocation of benefits that are then delivered, these findings are largely attributed to the wealth effects of benefits, however. Consequently, existing work provides little leverage over how inclusion in specific programs *ceteris paribus* shapes attitudes and creates spillovers in preferences towards future, more generalized forms of redistribution. In doing so, it has potentially obscured the role of an important strategic tool governments can use to build popular support for welfare state expansion, form policy coalitions to enact it (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm, 2008), and ultimately shape taxation and spending (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

In this paper, we argue that inclusion in social policy programs can strengthen preferences for redistribution specifically by means of fostering greater institutional trust in the policymaker. Existing work on support for redistribution largely focuses on individuals’ socio-economic or ideological characteristics, largely ignoring problems of credible commitment. In this literature, the benefits promised by politicians today are assumed to be delivered as promised tomorrow barring exogenous revenue shocks (e.g. Pierson, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001).¹ A growing body of work problematizes this perspective, however, showing how institutional trust (Kuziemko et al., 2015) and high quality institutions (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*a*; Mares, 2005; Berens, 2015; Algan, Cahuc and Sangnier, 2016; Marques II, 2016) underpin support for redistribution by shaping expectations that programs will be enacted faithfully as promised. At the same time, a different strand of literature argues that policies can help solve this problem by increasing institutional trust when they include consultative elements in which policymakers both consult with and educate citizens on policies that will effect them.²

To test the plausibility of our argument, we take advantage of a housing redevelopment program in Moscow, Russia launched in 2017. The program was designed to replace a set of 5-story buildings (colloquially known as *khrushchevki*) built rapidly during the 1950’s and 1960’s to address post-World War II housing shortages. These buildings were generally lower in quality and less spacious than other city housing, while also being understood to be near the end of their planned service lives. The program was structured to swap these apartments for units in newly constructed building, which were expected to be of much higher value and quality.³ Because it

¹In a recent review article, for example, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) make no mention of the possibility that governments may fail to deliver benefits for opportunistic reasons and that these fears could condition support for social policy. By contrast, Mares and Carnes (2009) point to this possibility as an important frontier for research on redistributive preferences.

²This literature has been particularly interested in consultation in democratic settings on subsequent attitudes (e.g. Carpin, Cook and Jacobs, 2004; Thompson, 2008; Farrar et al., 2010). An emerging literature has also begun to show that such processes also shape attitudes in autocratic settings and are often deliberately used as strategically tools for doing so, *see* (Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016; Truex, 2016, 2017; Stromseth et al., 2017; Smyth, 2019*b,a*).

³Certainly, the real estate markets thought so. In anticipation of the program, the average value of property in the buildings slated for demolition and whose residents at the time of the program’s implementation would receive new housing appreciated by 28% between the start of 2017 and August 2019 according to one estimate, compared to an average of only 10% elsewhere in Moscow (*Renovatsiya: Tseny rastut, predlozhenie tozhe [Renovation: Prices and supply grow]*, 2019).

was financed from the state budget, the program was redistributive in the classic sense.

The renovation program was structured such that buildings had to vote to participate in the renovation program and only some potentially eligible buildings were afforded the opportunity to vote. Importantly, buildings selected to vote were subjected to an intensive government campaign of consultation to encourage them to vote yes on inclusion. This campaign involved participants in the policy design process, educated them, and responded to their concerns. By contrast, buildings that were excluded from voting were not allowed to participate in the swaps by default and were not included in the state consultation campaign.⁴ At the same time, the program also had features that allow us to disentangle the effects of policy inclusion from other alternatives. First, the material benefits of the program were unclear as of 2019, when our data was collected. Although the consultative components of the program and voting on relocation we define as inclusion were carried out in 2017, the government was still making key decisions about where, when, and into what types of housing specific participants would be relocated and revising prior decisions as late as 2019 (Smyth, 2019b). Construction of the first wave of new units and relocations was not expected until 2020 at the earliest and was delayed further by the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, those who participated in the program faced a great deal of uncertainty about their material gains in an environment often characterized by policy uncertainty and revisions at the expense of the populace (Frye, 2010, 2017). Second, the program was not designed to respond to an economic crisis or trauma and was announced during a relatively average year for the post 2010 Russian economy. Finally, despite the remaining legacy of the Soviet educational system, the program was carried out at a time when pro-redistribution ideologies (i.e. Communism) was no longer the focus of state education.

To examine the effects of inclusion in the housing program on attitudes towards subsequent redistribution, we use data from an original survey of 1342 Moscow residents from 5-story *khrushchevki* buildings fielded in 2018. This was after residents had been included in the program and its consultative elements were conducted but before any construction on new buildings commenced or relocations occurred. Our sample is divided into a set of buildings initially included in the program and one that was excluded but otherwise met criteria for consideration. Although there is some evidence the authorities made use of neighborhood-level political data in deciding on which buildings to include (Smyth, 2019b), our identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that the authorities' information about attitudes *within* neighborhoods was incomplete. In many neighborhoods the authorities often included some buildings but excluded others nearby with similar physical characteristics – age, construction material, floor plan, physical condition, etc. – that were also potentially eligible. Our empirical design takes advantage of this by comparing residents of buildings that were physically proximate (within 500 meters) but differed on their initial inclusion in the program. We argue that this comparison not only ensures balance between our included and excluded groups on the observable characteristics of the buildings themselves, the physical proximity also holds constant a number of objective features of the buildings (property values, infrastructure, local governance, etc.) that could endogenously shape attitudes towards redistribution.⁵

Finally, we also rely on the fact that key data on unobservable attitudinal characteristics of building residents

⁴It is important to note that buildings excluded from initial voting could still participate in the renovation program if they petitioned to hold a vote. The process required to petition to vote was extremely bureaucratic and required substantial levels of self-organization and collective action, however.

⁵Due to historical settlement patterns and how initial residency was allocated under the Soviet Union, such buildings tend to

– propensity towards collective action, socio-economic status, political attitudes, etc. – was only available to the government at the neighborhood level, if at all. This meant that the government would have been unable to target specific buildings to engage in classical clientelistic exchanges or as part of a prospective strategy of distributive politics (Frey, 2019; De La O, 2013).⁶ Coupled together, these characteristics of our sample allow us to argue that the government’s choice of one set of buildings over another was plausibly exogenous. Our argument is bolstered by post-facto balance tests (see Section 4 of the observable characteristics of our buildings and their residents which validate many of our identification assumptions.

Our analysis shows that inclusion in the program had a significant effect on preferences for more generalized forms of redistribution. In particular, residents of the buildings initially targeted by the program were more likely to agree with the statements that the government should reduce income differences between rich and poor, provide for the unemployed, and provide housing for everyone who needs it. Using mediation analysis we show that the primary transmission mechanism is through individuals’ changing attitudes towards government officials. Consistent with our theoretical argument, residents of included buildings are more likely to believe that incumbent officials are following public opinion and are less likely to believe that the program itself was corrupt. Both of these attitudes mediate the relationship between inclusion and redistributive preferences. We also show that beliefs about the material benefits of the program – receipt of apartments with higher value or that are more spacious – do not appear to mediate the relationship, providing evidence that our effect is not a function of anticipated wealth or benefits. Also consistent with our argument, our analysis suggests that inclusion is positively associated with more self-reported knowledge of and support for the program. In a series of robustness checks vis-a-vis a parallel, municipally representative survey of Muscovites, we also show that the attitudes of those excluded from the program are largely similar to those among the rest of the city. This evidence bolsters our contention that our main effects are driven by increases in support for redistribution among those included in the program, rather than an alternative explanation centered around grievances among the excluded. Finally, our evidence suggests that the effects of inclusion can be relatively long-lived, as our survey was conducted in late 2018 and early 2019. This was nearly a year and a half after the program was announced (May 2017) and the consultative elements took place. It was also before any actual re-locations or even a final, binding decision on where, when, and into what types of housing participants would re-locate into. This last point also suggests that our findings cannot be explained purely by theories of expected material gains, since any such effects would themselves need to be premised on beliefs about the credibility of government promises given uncertainty about the details of the policy.

Our findings are consistent with the argument that inclusion in social policy programs can matter for overall preferences towards redistribution by shaping attitudes towards the government. We believe that two

have residents with roughly similar socio-economic characteristics and life experiences even in the present day.

⁶Strictly speaking, the program would not be usable for clientelistic exchange, in any case. Clientelism is generally regarded as the use of individual incentives to acquire votes (Mares and Young, 2016). Such exchanges are premised on the ability of politicians to monitor and sanction non-compliance with the terms of clientelistic exchange at the individual level (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Because entire buildings are relocated (or not) under the Moscow program, it is not plausible to hold individual voters accountable for their behavior. More broadly, service-based clientelism via programs such as this one in Russia are generally rare (Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2019).

elements of the policy process explain this result and reinforce our interpretation of these findings. First, the Moscow housing program included a wide array of consultative mechanisms that involved residents of included buildings in designing the policy. By soliciting and implementing feedback, the authorities may have shaped preferences towards broader redistribution by signaling their responsiveness. Second, the policy process also involved extensive educational campaigns aimed at both informing respondents about the details of the policy and helping them to understand how it addressed potential concerns, whether initially or during revisions made after consultations. Such campaigns served to generate credible commitments about the details of the program, its implementation, and the concrete material gains it could produce. Institutional and political trust has been shown to be correlated with anticipated increases in future well-being (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Thus educational efforts may have shaped preferences towards redistribution by creating institutional trust separately from the consultative elements of the program. We argue that consistent with a large body of work on consultative policymaking (Mendelberg, 2002; Chambers, 2003; Farrar et al., 2010), these two elements of the program enabled the authorities to build institutional trust in participants and bolster perceptions of them as honest, credible brokers.

Because both elements were carried simultaneously by the authorities, we are unable to distinguish between their effects in our research design. However, we believe that first one is more likely to have had an impact on institutional trust and, ultimately, on redistribution preferences due to the inherent uncertainty as to the final material benefits participants would ultimately receive. Although the consultation campaign and voting were we define as inclusion were carried out in 2017, the program itself would not produce material benefits until substantially later. Construction of the new buildings and implementation was planned to begin in 2020, with most re-locations happening closer to the end of the program period in 2030. Crucially, however, the government was revising basic details about the program as late as 2019, including the location and design of replacement housing, the time frame for re-locations, and financial terms (Smyth, 2019*b*). This creates a credible commitment problem, particularly in a setting, such as Russia, characterized by weak political competition and institutional constraints (North et al., 1990; Frye, 2010).

Our work contributes to the growing literature explaining redistribution preferences in several ways. First, previous research suggests that redistribution preferences can become self-replicating. Most accounts have focused on the ways in which policy programs and institutions create these reinforcing beliefs, however.⁷ By contrast, we suggest another pathway: some redistributive policy programs foster institutional trust, altering participants' perceptions of the government's quality and build support for broader efforts. Although the correlation between demand for redistribution and quality of government has been previously explored (Svallfors, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015), these studies have primarily focused on a direct relationship by manipulating perceptions of the government. In doing so, they neglect the possibility that social policy programs can be used strategically to shape popular perceptions. Our work highlights the government's ability to take matters into its own hands and use social policy programs as an instrument to shape popular perceptions even in a setting

⁷One prominent explanation argues that beliefs that effort pays off are affected by taxation and in turn lead to more taxation, for example (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Another account argues that the persistence of both social policy preferences and redistribution can be reinforced by the adoption of political institutions that make the election of pro-redistribution politicians more or less likely (Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009).

such as Russia where institutions are generally regarded as weak (Frye, 2010, 2017, i.e.). In doing so, our work suggests a potential mechanism by which politicians can attempt to expand the size of coalitions in favor of welfare state expansion and influence national-level outcomes (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm, 2008).

Second, our work also suggests that the ways in which specific policies are designed are a potentially important explanation for their ability to shape broader attitudes towards redistribution. As in existing accounts, our work highlights the ways in which perceptions of social programs and policymakers matter for subsequent attitudes. Whereas existing accounts primarily study how the nature of policies shape attitudes using aggregated electoral and budgetary data (De La O, 2013; Frey, 2019), our work uses individual-level evidence that allows us to directly explore how policy programs incorporating confidence building measures and education (i.e. consultation) shape redistributive attitudes. Moreover, whereas this work primarily focuses on the consequences of clientelistic program implementation, to our knowledge our paper is among the first to instead focus on the role of consultation and public inclusion. Our work also differs from existing accounts of how policy inclusion shape attitudes, which primarily focus on how the material benefits of social policy can shape subsequent attitudes (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014; Andersen et al., 2020). Unlike many of these studies, we find an unambiguous positive effect of program inclusion in support for subsequent redistribution that cuts against theoretical expectations based on material benefits. We explain this discrepancy to pointing to the understudied problem of credible commitment in understanding the effects of social policy. In our setting, the material benefits of the Moscow renovation program were highly uncertain at the time our data was collected, contrasting with the programs studied in existing work. Consequently, our findings are more plausibly linked to the effects of inclusion in the program on beliefs about the credibility of officials and institutional trust, *ceteris paribus*. Even if expectations of material benefits are at play, our work suggests that such explanations are themselves premised on prior beliefs about the credibility of officials and their policies.

Finally, our work joins a growing body of research into redistributive preferences outside of the mostly developed, democratic countries that have dominated contemporary research (Mares and Carnes, 2009). In such settings there is the presumption of strong political accountability and powerful incentives to heed public opinion.⁸ One consequence is that existing work generally assumes that *de jure* social policies promised today will be delivered *de facto* tomorrow absent demographic or economic shifts (Pierson, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001; Iversen, 2005). Building on the economic literature on institutions and investment, more recent contributions have problematized the ability of politicians to credibly commit to delivering social policy in settings with weak institutional constraints and explored the consequences for preferences for redistribution (Mares, 2005; Berens, 2015; Marques II, 2016). Our work contributes to this emerging literature by showing how policy can serve as a tool to build support and credible commitments in settings with otherwise limited political accountability, such as contemporary Russia. On the one hand, our findings are consistent with the broader, emerging literature on “consultative authoritarianism”, in which governments can strategically include the public in policymaking processes to shape public opinion and preferences (He and Warren, 2011; Truex, 2017). Whereas existing work

⁸Indeed, existing work on micro-level preferences for social policy is largely motivated by the implicit understanding that such preferences shape the range of feasible policy and, when aggregated, shape the ultimate policies adopted (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack, Iversen and Rehm, 2008; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019).

focuses attention on how demonstrations of responsiveness build support for politicians themselves, we add to this literature by showing that it may also increase support for related elements of the government’s policy agenda. On the other hand, our work is also consistent with a more direct interpretation, in which policy processes can render promises more credible and allow non-democratic governments to use anticipated gains from social policy to strategically shape attitudes towards the government and support for social policy. In doing so, it helps to clarify the building blocks of authoritarian social contracts.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the literature review and outlines the possible hypotheses with respect to the effect of the redevelopment program on redistribution preferences. Section 3 gives the historical background of the Moscow redevelopment program. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and gives the results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Related literature

Contemporary work on individual-level support for redistribution has identified a wide variety of factors that can shape redistributive preferences. One set of contributions have tended to focus on economic characteristics and how they shape individuals’ beliefs about their position (current and/or future) on the income ladder. Key factors in this literature include individual income (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), risks of job loss (Rehm, 2011; Carnes and Mares, 2015), desire for insurance against income volatility (Moene and Wallerstein, 2014; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012), vertical mobility (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018), relative income (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017), experiences with inequality and recessions (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018), and beliefs about the level of inequality (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018). Individual experiences have also been thoroughly explored, with particular emphasis on traumatic personal experiences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Roland and Yang, 2017) and exposure to violent natural events (Gualtieri, Nicolini and Sabatini, 2019). Another strand of literature has focused on non-material factors, including cultural transmission (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), the legacy of Communist governments (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017), beliefs about hard work paying off (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*), the fraction of foreign-born population (Rueda, 2018; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019).

More recent contributions have begun to explore how exposure to social policies themselves might shape attitudes towards redistribution. Classical work in this field has had difficulties in separating the effects of exposure to specific social policies from the economic traumas they were meant to ameliorate (Margalit, 2013; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018; Carreri and Teso, 2018) or ideological indoctrination carried out in state educational systems aimed at promoting redistributive ideology (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2020). More recent contributions have attempted to exploit natural experiments in order to separate out these effects from those of the policies themselves. One strand of work focuses on the material implications of social policy programs for redistributive preferences using micro-level data. A number of studies exploit random allocation of benefits in order to understand how exogenous increases in wealth shape attitudes, suggesting that such

programs in fact shift attitudes, albeit in a nuanced way (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, N.d.; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014; Andersen et al., 2020). Although they tend to increase hostility towards taxation policies that might force individuals to pay more and beliefs about the relative importance of work versus luck in economic outcomes, they have limited effects on broader attitudes towards redistribution. More importantly, however, these studies focus on random allocations of benefits that are actually delivered, meaning these effects are more attributable to increases in wealth than policy inclusion *per se*. Another strand of literature uses aggregated data to show that the nature of policies can also shape attitudes towards public goods. Using data on conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs that are insulated from abuse by politicians seeking to trade benefits for individual votes (i.e. clientelism), both Frey (2019) and De La O (2013) show that such programs foster political support for politicians that promote social policies that decouple benefits from individual electoral behavior. Frey (2019) goes one step further, showing that over time programmatic CCT programs increase generalized public goods provision. Although the paper relies solely on aggregate electoral and budgetary data, the findings are consistent with an argument whereby the material benefits of CCTs enable voters to resist clientelism and increase their appetite for public goods. Again, however, these studies cannot readily distinguish the effects of program inclusion, *ceteris paribus*.

In this paper, we depart from existing work by arguing that inclusion in social programs can have an independent effect on support for broader redistribution. To do so, however, these programs must be structured in such a way as to build institutional trust in politicians and enable them to make credible commitments that future policies will be enacted efficiently. Traditionally, micro-level work on support for redistribution has largely assumed that social policies are delivered *de facto* tomorrow as promised *de jure* today, thus treating policy implementation as unproblematic. Put differently, politicians' promises to deliver the promised benefits to eligible recipients in the promised amounts and at the promised time are inherently taken as credible. As work in the literature on institutions and investment has long demonstrated, however, the ability of the state to credibly commit to policy can not be taken for granted and is premised on institutional constraints that guard against opportunism (North et al., 1990; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). Building on these insights, recent contributions to the literature on redistributive preferences have begun to examine the conditions under which low trust in government (Kuziemko et al., 2015) and poor institutional quality – particularly corruption and tax evasion – create credible commitment problems for the state (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005a; Mares, 2005; Berens, 2015; Algan, Cahuc and Sangnier, 2016; Marques II, 2016).⁹ Intuitively, where the state cannot credibly commit to delivering social policy as promised, individuals' must discount their expectations about the relative costs and benefits of redistribution and are less likely to support redistribution. Thus a critical component of support for broader redistribution is likely the belief that officials will faithfully execute future redistributive programs as honestly and as promised. Building on these arguments, inclusion in specific social policy programs can foster broader support for redistribution if inclusion strengthens institutional trust among program participants. From this perspective, policy may be an important strategic tool for politicians. By enacting policies in such a way as to signal responsiveness and build institutional trust, they can ease popular concerns about how policy will be implemented, create credible commitments, and build support for a broader

redistributive agenda.

Although the material benefits of policies or their susceptibility to abuse for clientelistic purposes are important, the ways in which policymakers interact with the populace during policy design and implementation might also shape subsequent support for state-led redistribution. In this paper, we focus on one plausible pathway by which policy inclusion can be used increase trust in politicians: consultation. Consultative processes are generally defined as those in which participants are given opportunities to interact with public officials to provide feedback and suggestions on proposed policies that affect them (He and Warren, 2011). Such processes are often iterative: officials propose or alter policies, solicit feedback from the public, make changes, and then seek more public feedback. They also incorporate educational components, in which policymakers explain the real-world implications of complex policy choices and provide transparency about implementation. The goal of consultative policy processes is to create informed participants who can actively help shape policies to better meet their needs and achieve policy goals.

Existing work suggests that consultative processes can shape broader attitudes via both direct and indirect pathways. The direct effect of consultation flows through the effects of the process on institutional trust in policymakers. Unsurprisingly, existing work shows that consultation increases support for specific programs by enabling participants to directly shape them (Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004; Stromseth et al., 2017). Empirical work also suggests that consultation has spillover effects to broader attitudes towards policymakers involved in the process, however. Consultation has been shown to generate empathy and respect for the officials engaged in the process (Mendelberg, 2002; Chambers, 2003), which in turn leads to greater trust in those officials by those engaged in consultation (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011; Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016; Truex, 2017) and stronger beliefs in the legitimacy of the state (Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004; Truex, 2017). This effect appears to largely emerge due to changing perceptions of officials' responsiveness that fosters greater institutional trust, even in non-democratic regimes (Gueorguiev and Malesky, 2019; Stromseth et al., 2017; Truex, 2017) or where the performance of responsiveness has few substantive effects (Smyth, 2019*b,a*). Thus even in settings with weak institutions, consultation is a potentially important mechanism for increasing the credibility of policy commitments. In such environments, they should therefore strengthen support for redistribution directly by helping to ameliorate concerns about state-led social policies and its governance.

Consultative policy processes can also shape support for redistribution via a more indirect channel that flows through their educational components. A large literature shows that institutional and political trust is correlated with anticipated increases in future well-being (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000), including in Russia and other post-Soviet countries (Mishler and Rose, 2001, 2005; Stickley et al., 2009). Causal inference studies compliment these findings by demonstrating that voters positively react to campaign promises under some circumstances (Corazzini et al., 2014; Elinder, Jordahl and Poutvaara, 2015; Born, van Eck and Johannesson, 2018). A crucial insight of this literature, however, is that promises must be credible in order to create expectations of future-well being and strengthen institutional trust (Corazzini et al., 2014), particularly in settings with weaker institutional

⁹Poor quality institutions and low levels of institutional trust are likely highly correlated. For example, low quality institutions are generally correlated with high levels of corruption. Beliefs about corruption and honesty are in turn closely connected with trust in public officials. Empirically, lower trust is correlated with perceptions that officials are corrupt (Chang and Chu, 2006).

constraints (Cruz et al., 2018). Policy processes with a significant public education component offer a potential way of creating credible commitments. Not only do such campaigns provide information on who stands to benefit (and by how much) from particular policies, they also create clear expectations about the eligibility and timing of benefits. Consequently, any failure to meet these expectations is both obvious and effects a clearly defined group, creating ideal conditions for collective action against the authorities. Thus, policy processes involving educational campaigns can help generate credible commitment by fostering expectations about their material benefits and by providing participants tools to police implementation.

Before turning to our discussion of the Moscow Renovation Program, it is important to note that our argument is compatible with existing theories of support for social policy. Returning to our earlier discussion, work on the political economy of investment highlights the ways in which weak constraints create uncertainty vis-a-vis state actors. This uncertainty, in turn, decreases willingness to invest by inducing heavy discounting and revisions to the potential costs of economic activity (North et al., 1990). Social policy and redistribution are in some ways akin to investment, as benefits and taxes paid today are expected to be returned to individuals tomorrow when they become eligible. As a consequence, existing theories of support for redistribution and social policy implicitly assume a state that can faithfully deliver on its promises (Mares, 2005; Marques II, 2016). For theories that focus on direct material benefits from inclusion in a program, the inability of the state to credibly commit would lead to heavy discounting, a decrease in expected benefits, and lower support for redistribution and social policy. Similarly theories based on altruism also require some degree of certainty about who will get benefits, their magnitude, and the effect on the welfare of others (i.e. Rueda and Stegmüller, 2016). Thus in both of these theories, institutional trust and beliefs that the state’s redistributive policies are credible are causally prior to the actual effects. Consequently, in this paper we focus on the role of institutional trust in mediating the relationship between social policy program inclusion and support for redistribution due to its causally prior nature. We do not rule out, however, a longer causal chain in which institutional trust enables expectations about material benefits or altruism that shape support for redistribution.

3 Historical background

In this paper, we focus attention on a Housing Renovation Program that began in 2017 in order to understand how inclusion in social policies can shape support for redistribution. The Housing Renovation Program was announced in 2017 as a way of replacing aging buildings, known as *khrushchevki*,¹⁰ constructed in the 1950’s and 60’s in Moscow. Because these buildings were originally constructed to address severe post-World War II housing shortages, they were generally constructed using highly standardized designs and prefabricated concrete. Each building consisted of between 3 and 5 sections that contained 20-apartments and lacked basic amenities such as an elevator or garbage chute. The apartments themselves varied little across different designs and building series, with relatively small kitchens, 1-3 rooms, and a single bathroom (see Table 1). In all, nearly 24 million square meters of dwellings were constructed during this period (Colton, 1998; Gunko et al., 2018).

By the post-Soviet period, a substantial part of the *khrushchevki* stock had begun to show rather serious

¹⁰Colloquially named after Soviet Premiere Nikita Khrushchev.

problems. The buildings originally had intended service lives of only 40-50 years (Stepanian and Lyamin, 1995), and many deteriorated faster due to widespread use of low-quality construction materials.¹¹ The need to maintain this stock created additional pressures on the city budget, as the city government is de facto responsible for housing maintenance.¹² Further, consumers were focused on newer designs that offered better living conditions — particularly elevators, garbage chutes, more living space, and larger kitchens — as early as the late 1960’s, supplanting demand for them (Colton, 1998). The *khrushchevki* buildings were so looked down on, that they were often referred to derisively as *khrushcheby* — “Khrushchev’s slums” — by city residents.¹³

Although some attempts at replacing the *khrushchevki* were undertaken in the early 1990’s, these efforts were relatively limited in scope and only covered approximately 20% of the stock at the time.¹⁴ Our work focuses on a new program that was introduced in January 2017 that built on and expanded earlier efforts substantially. As initially proposed, the new program would encompass most of remaining 7934 *khrushchevki* (Gunko et al., 2018). Under its terms, participants would exchange their old apartments for new housing built at the Moscow City Government’s expense. Initially, the city nominally promised that the new apartments would be located in the same district and would be more spacious than those they were replacing, however many basic details — designs for the new buildings, floor plans for units, financial terms, timelines for relocation — were missing.¹⁵

The program was meant to be redistributive in nature. The construction of new buildings would be financed by the city budget, where income and the corporate profit taxes make up over 80% of revenue. While individual incomes are taxed at a flat 13% rate, the corporate tax burden is disproportionately borne by individuals with above average incomes. At the same time, the residents of 5-story apartment buildings are likely to be of lower than average income. Not only are property values of such apartments substantially lower than average, but the problems noted above create strong incentives for higher income individuals that can afford to move to do so.¹⁶

Unlike previous efforts, the 2017 program created streamlined provisions for the city to go forward with demolitions in the face of potentially recalcitrant residents. Any re-locations require assent from building residents, but the new program substantially lowered the share of building residents required to approve demolition and re-location plans.¹⁷ By May 14 of 2017, the government identified a subset of 4566 buildings from among

¹¹*Pyatietazhki snosimyykh serii [5-story buildings to be demolished]* (N.d.).

¹²Formally, the majority of 5-story buildings are maintained by the state-owned district *GBU Zhilishchnik* companies, with the residents paying a rate that is fixed at the city level. In the event of shortfalls or unforeseen repair projects, the city must subsidize these companies out of its own budget.

¹³A 2017 survey showed that Moscow residents of *khrushchevki* considered their buildings to be in a worse shape compared with residents of the neighboring buildings (*Renovatsia v Moskve glazami sobstvennikov zhilya [Renovation in Moscow in the eyes of property owners]*, 2017). The same survey showed that *khrushchevki* residents were less likely to have expensive improvements been made to their apartments (even controlling for income levels), indicating that, on average, that they were more likely to expect to relocate sooner or later.

¹⁴*Decree No 608-pp, July 6 (1999); Decree No 48, January 20 (1998); Pertsova (2017).*

¹⁵*Decree No 497-pp, August 1 (in Russian) (2017); Planirovka kvartir po programme renovatsii [Apartment plans for the renovation program]* (2017).

¹⁶According to a recent estimate, the average price per square meter in a brick *khrushchevka* is 7% lower than the city average, and is 14% lower in prefabricated concrete *khrushchevka* (*Obzor rynka nedvizhimosti po itogam iylya 2020 [An overview of real estate market in June 2020]*, 2020).

¹⁷Under the old provisions, a unanimous consent of property owners was required to demolish and resettle an apartment building.

all *khrushevki* and put them on a list of buildings obligated to vote on whether they would opt into the program or not.¹⁸ From May 15 to June 15, the voting was carried out by residents of these buildings. In this paper, we focus on how inclusion in this voting process shapes attitudes towards redistribution. Although inclusion in the voting only conferred potential benefits on those who subsequently voted to participate in the program, inclusion on the list of buildings mandated to vote was nonetheless an indication of eligibility.

Inclusion on this list and subsequent votes in favor of opting into the program only conferred the promise of material benefits.¹⁹ Not only were actual relocations only expected to be carried out significantly later (2020-2030), but as we discuss below the precise nature of the benefit — the location, value, and even size of units and the buildings they would be located in — were unclear at the time voting took place (mos.ru, 2020).

Initially, the program was highly popular across the city, with over 80% approval in some initial polls (*Programma renovatsii: Otnoshenie... [Renovation program: Attitudes...]*, 2017). Despite initial support of the general program, however, the details of the program quickly became contentious. Residents of *khrushevki* located in more desirable parts of the city, as well as those in good condition, opposed the program due to uncertainty about where their new apartments would be located. Replacement housing would not be constructed until after the program was underway, meaning that those in buildings slated for demolition would have to trust the government to provide the promised housing in the future.²⁰ Such trust is in short supply, as the Russian government regularly shifts the details of public policy and regulations in ways that create policy uncertainty for the citizenry and call into question the government's policy promises (Frye, 2010, 2017; Smyth, 2019a). Social policy is no exception to rapid shifts in policy that the populace perceives as harmful (Marques II, 2016; Wilson Sokhey, 2017). With respect to housing, potential participants were particularly concerned about the lack of legal guarantees that new housing would be of equivalent or higher value than the properties being replaced. This left many skeptical about promises about the size and location of replacement properties.²¹ Consequently, even among supporters of relocation, there were often calls for increased benefits, legal protections, clarifications of their rights, and guarantees about the apartments given in compensation (Smyth, 2019a). Opposition also emerged from the surrounding neighborhoods, where residents objected to the replacement of *khrushevki* due to concerns about housing density, destruction of public spaces, strain on local services and infrastructure, and the externalities of construction itself. There was a series of protest rallies; the largest one was held on May 14 and attracted approximately 30,000 people, a large amount by Moscow standards (Zhelnina, 2019).

The Moscow City government responded to this discontent by modifying the process by which the Housing Renovation policy would be made and implemented. Specifically, it abandoned a purely top-down effort and introduced consultative elements designed to educate, seek popular input, make adjustments to the policy, and

Under the new rules, consent of two thirds of property owners was sufficient.

¹⁸We discuss the process of forming this list in the following section, as it is central to our identification strategy.

¹⁹It is worth noting, however, that the overwhelming majority of buildings on the initial list actually opted in. Thus for the most part being on the list of buildings designated to vote was tantamount to being included in the social policy portion of the program

²⁰By August 2020, only some 18 thousand people have received new apartments — a small minority of program participants.

The bulk of the relocations is expected to take place in 2020-2032 (mos.ru, 2020).

²¹ Evans (2018); *Sovet pri presidente raskritikoval [The council criticized...]* (2017); *V Gosdume schitaut chto... [The State Duma considers...]* (2017); *Komitet Gosdumy podderzhal... [The Duma committee supported...]* (2017).

then insure that those effected by the program were aware of the material impact of these changes. Both Sergei Sobianin (Voronov and Chernykh, 2017) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Churakova and Liauv, 2017) made public statements stressing the need for a consultative process to determine the list of buildings to be renovated. As early as on April 19, before the voting started, the heads of most neighborhood (raion) administrations were ordered to hold meetings with residents. These were followed with meetings in April and May with higher-level prefecture officials.²² In neighborhoods affected by the renovation, these meetings were often attended by hundreds of people (Egorova et al., 2017). Some of the concerns raised by the public centered around the worries about whether the relocations will take place within the same neighborhood, uncertainty regarding the voting procedure, and the quality of infrastructure in the new neighborhoods (Politika, 2017). Although not all building residents participated in these, there is a great deal of evidence that even non-participants provided input through informal discussion and formal residents' meetings with members of their building's residents' association who passed their feedback onto officials. In May-June 2017, the Moscow administration followed with an information campaign aimed at promoting voting for the renovation, as well as addressing the issues raised at the April 19 meetings (Abramova, 2018). According to some observers, the intensity of the media campaign increased after the anti-renovation protest rally on May 14. Prior to that day, Moscow mayor Sergei Sobianin made only three public appearances dedicated to the renovation. Following the protests, however, his communications with the public became much more frequent. Effort to promote the program reached out into social media as well as traditional media (Ivanova, 2017). The government also attempted to manipulate public opinion by reaching out to pro-renovation residents. Groups of pro-renovation activists were organized at the behest of local officials, representatives of management companies, or loyal deputies at the local municipal councils (Rukov, 2017). These groups were tasked with campaigning in favor of the renovation.

A crucial feature of the voting process was the opportunity for the residents to change their votes at any time. As a consequence, the authorities could use initial voting results as an additional consultative mechanism to gauge responses to the program and make adjustments. Indeed, the key enabling legislation behind the process underwent substantial amendment during the voting period and was not finally passed until well after voting began. The authorities made over 144 amendments based on public feedback and including over 90 percent of them in the final bill.²³ And as with the results of earlier meetings, the authorities engaged in a targeted campaign to communicate these changes to those voting on inclusion in the program.

Ultimately, the city's efforts were extremely successful with the majority of residents in the included buildings voting in support of the renovation program. According to a poll carried out in July 2017, 81% of *khrushchevki* residents reported having been informed by the authorities about the renovation program — compared with only 38% of the residents in the neighboring buildings (*Renovatsia v Moskve glazami sobstvennikov zhilya [Renovation in Moscow in the eyes of property owners]*, 2017) and 69% of them believed that living conditions would improve for all or majority of program participants. When the voting ended, 4079 buildings out of 4566 voted in favor, with the rest opting out or not meeting the turnout quota of 50%.

²² *Programmu renovatsii zhilya obsudat... [Renovation program to be discussed...]* (2017).

²³ *Gosduma prinyala zakon o renovatsii v Moskve [The State Duma passes the Moscow renovation law]* (2017); Egorshina (2017).

4 Data and Empirical Strategy

We conducted a street survey of 1,342 residents of 5-story buildings in the city of Moscow in fall of 2018. As a rule, identifying the effects of inclusion into social policy programs on preferences is difficult, because individuals are not selected into them at random. For housing programs specifically, individuals self-select into the types of housing that they occupy and its location. The redevelopment program that we study adds an additional set of complications. First, the program was designed in such a way as to require that potential participants vote on whether their building would become part of the program. Only upon a successful building-wide vote would residents be able to swap their apartments for new ones. Second, the process of conducting building-level votes involved two distinct, but parallel tracks. At the beginning of the program, the government created a list of some of the potentially eligible 5-story buildings, obligating them to hold a vote on inclusion. Other 5-story buildings that were not on the original list could hold votes, but only if the vote was initiated by the residents themselves through an organizationally taxing process. Buildings that were neither on the list nor petitioned to vote were excluded from the program. A simple comparison of program participants to non-participants would therefore be fraught.

To overcome these challenges to inference and interpretation, we instead designed our survey to take advantage of variation among the *khrushchevki* in whether they were initially included on the list of buildings forced to vote rather than ultimate participation. Our argument is premised on the notion that inclusion of buildings on the initial list exposed residents to consultative efforts that reshaped their attitudes towards redistribution by altering perceptions of state officials. In this setting, those buildings that were mandated to vote would have been exposed to two potential channels. On the one hand, residents of included *khrushchevki* were singled for a highly targeted campaign of consultation by officials, while those that were excluded from the initial list were not. As noted in the previous section, the authorities went out of their way to demonstrate that they were responsive to the demands made by residents of the eligible buildings throughout the process. On the other hand, residents in eligible buildings included on the initial list were also subjected to an educational campaign designed to familiarize them with the contours of the program. Although these efforts took place amidst continuing, public discussion and constant revisions to the program, they nonetheless put participants in close proximity to officials and helped them understand the implications of the policy. Either way, our theory suggests that inclusion entailed a consultative process that should effect attitudes towards redistribution by fostering institutional trust and reshaping attitudes towards the government. Our identification strategy therefore rests on the premise that both our channels plausibly operated only on those initially mandated to vote on inclusion. It also rests on the fact that the nature of the benefit to be received was highly uncertain and under constant revisions until well after our data was collected (Smyth, 2019b), which makes alternative explanations related to material concerns less plausible. Thus, by comparing residents of otherwise similar, nearby buildings that differed only in whether the government designating that they vote on inclusion, we can estimate the effects of inclusion on attitudes towards redistribution.

As we discuss in more detail in Appendix B, our initial sample frame consisted of all 5-story apartments in Moscow that met the criteria for selection into the program (i.e. built between 1955 and 1980), excluding

buildings with non-standard blueprints.²⁴ We selected 50 groups of 2-4 buildings each such that every group had at least one eligible and ineligible building located less than 500 meters apart and was confined to a single electoral district or to neighboring districts with similar voting records. We also required the buildings in every group to be of the same construction material (brick or prefabricated concrete) to account for intrinsic differences in property value and perceived quality. Interviews were conducted either in the entrance way of the buildings or in the public space nearby, and non-residents of the target building were screened out of the survey.

In addition with the broader inferential challenges noted at the beginning of this section, our empirical strategy deals with a number of potential additional sources of endogeneity specific to our context. One major challenge arises if the government designated buildings eligible to vote based on criteria that would predict individual-level support for redistribution preferences. Formally, many of the eligibility criteria that the government publicly cited were related to the buildings themselves, including their design template (i.e. “series”), historical/cultural importance, and expert assessments of their condition.²⁵ Interviews conducted by the authors also suggested that the government was interested in the value of underlying land to the developers. These factors could potentially be correlated with preferences for redistribution. To test these intuitions, in Appendix A we examine the determinants of eligibility using the full sample of Moscow’s 5-story buildings. Our illustrative analysis suggests that district-level voting behavior, building design (as a proxy for condition and property value), and income (in the form of car ownership) all predict eligibility. We argue, however, that many of these factors are unlikely to differ substantially between buildings that are 500 meters apart and located within the same districts, as they have access to the same amenities and infrastructure, are subject to the same micro-climate, and are subject to the same local governments.

Officials were also keen to avoid including buildings on the eligible list if residents were expected to overwhelmingly oppose the reform²⁶. They might have also used aggregated individual-level data on attitudes towards the program, political preferences, and propensity towards collective action to determine eligibility. Any of these factors could create endogeneity bias in our analysis. However, the government had limited individual-level data available to assess these criteria beyond basic, building-level demographics. Publicly, the government announced that it would be conducting telephone surveys of 5-story building residents narrowly aimed at gauging building-level support (Voronov, 2017; Buranov, 2017). This survey was unlikely to have provided useful information, however, as it was hastily conducted on a rolling basis over the course of a month in which the government was constantly altering the basic economic terms of the program.²⁷ Indeed, after the eligibility list was drawn up, the government faced protests from both buildings it included that opposed

²⁴This exclusion is largely due to the fact that such buildings are typically considered higher quality and generally had larger apartments. As a consequence, they generally have higher value than apartments built using standard plans and introduce more unobservables related to property values into any comparison.

²⁵See *Moskovskie vlasti rasskazali kto izbezhit renovatsii* [Moscow authorities tell who will avoid renovation] (2017).

²⁶See *Sploshnogo snosa ne budet* [There will be no wholesale demolitions] (2017).

²⁷Changes we documented in our qualitative analysis of media reports included the appearance and layout of new apartments, building amenities and locations, how mortgages would be handled, and the principle of equivalency (value versus space) used for assigning new apartments.

the program and those that were excluded and wished to join it.²⁸ Critically, the survey also did not include basic questions on political preferences or collective action, forcing the authorities to make use of district-level aggregate information to gauge these.²⁹ Again, we argue that our design, which exploits variation in eligibility among nearby buildings within the same district, should control for many of these factors. Proximate buildings should have roughly similar values on likely predictors of program and political support, such as basic demographics, income, sectoral employment patterns, the presence and quality of local civil society groups, and property values. Their political preferences and collective action potential should also be indistinguishable to authorities using direct measures, which consist mostly of district level data.

To gauge whether our intuition about the value of proximity in eliminating potential endogeneity concerns is correct, we conducted balance tests between the eligible and ineligible buildings we selected for our survey using both publicly available building-level data and individual data from our survey. At the building-level (Table 2), all but one of the values were balanced, including those related to the income of residents, which is the most important correlate of redistribution preferences. In particular, the percentages of car owners and 2016 real estate prices were the same for the two groups of buildings, as well as the average distance to the nearest metro station — an important proxy for infrastructure quality and price.³⁰

The percentages of people working in health, education, and several other lower-income professions were also equal. These factors tend to be one of the strongest demographic predictors of political support for the state and its programs (Rosenfeld, 2020, 2021). We also examine whether pre-program social capital and collective action potential vary between the two groups, using variables specific to the Russian context. Management by a state-owned *GBU Zhilishnik* company can proxy for collective action potential, since alternative forms of managing buildings (i.e. private management company or cooperatives) require significant coordination on behalf of residents (Borisova, Polishchuk and Peresetsky, 2014). Similarly, whether the land plot under and around buildings has been demarcated and privatized, also requires collective action on behalf of the residents. We find that these variables do not differ across our samples.

In Table 3 we report the balance tests at the individual level (in addition to other statistics, we report the p -value for program inclusion when we regress the characteristic on inclusion and building group dummies). The individuals that were surveyed in two groups of buildings had similar demographics (gender, age, education, and income) and the same fraction of retirees and state employees. The latter two groups may be particularly vulnerable to state pressure (Rosenfeld, 2021); hence, we do not find evidence that the buildings (at least the buildings in our sample) were deemed eligible based on the ease of coercing their residents into approving the renovation program. The same fraction of people lived in apartments that they (or their parents/grandparents) received during the Soviet era and privatized in the post-Soviet period. Respondents in both parts of the sample also had similar number of bedrooms in the apartment and number of people per bedroom living in the apartment. Perhaps more importantly, the amount of investment that the residents made into improving their

²⁸See *Okolo 15 domov iskluchat.. [About 15 houses will be excluded...]* (2017).

²⁹A Moscow electoral district has some 2000-2500 eligible voters, which corresponds to approximately 10 four-section *khrushchevki*.

³⁰Real estate prices were gathered for a different project in August and December 2016 from the cian.ru website (an online portal for real estate transactions). Data for the fraction of retirees, car owners, children, as well as the people working in different professions was gathered in February 2017 from the atlas.mos.ru website (an online map run by Moscow city government).

apartments also did not seem to vary, as the same fraction of people in both samples lived in apartments with wooden window frames.³¹ Taken together with the building-level results, therefore, our balance tests suggest that variation in eligibility for physically proximate buildings was unlikely to be driven by factors related to redistribution preferences.

In addition to the potential challenges to our inferential strategy noted above, there are two more plausible unobservable factors that could create selection bias: use of the program for clientelist exchange and corruption/cronyism. Both are unlikely due the design of the program, which both requires all building residents to vote to approve re-location and then re-locates all residents of buildings that do so. Clientelist politics is premised on individual exchanges of benefits for votes and requires politicians to sanction voters that do not uphold their end of the bargain (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Such individual sanctions are not possible when the program dictates all building residents be relocated and provides no mechanism for removal of from the program once a building votes on inclusion. A more efficient technology to achieve the same ends already available to policymakers would be direct assignment of individuals to state-owned apartments (in Russian *sotsial'nii nayim*). Moreover, our balance tests suggest that our empirical strategy produces similar shares of residents most vulnerable to clientelism, budget-sector workers that depend on the state (Rosenfeld, 2021; Forrat, 2018), across our matched sets of included/excluded buildings. Similarly corruption or cronyism would require officials to relocate all residents of a building to reward specific individuals. As before, this program would be much costlier and less efficient with respect to individuals within a building than simply assigning them a state-owned apartment. For developers, this strategy is plausible but is accounted for in our empirical design that compares physically proximate buildings with similar property values.

4.1 Measures and Estimation Strategy

Our primary dependent variables of interest are a series of questions in which respondents were first reminded that while some believe the government has many obligations to citizens, others believe its resources are limited. Respondents were then asked to what extent they believe that the government must decrease the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor. The preamble of the question is designed to force respondents to think about cost trade-offs related to social policy, while the question itself directly captures the concept of redistribution. The formulation is relatively standard and widely used in the literature on preferences for redistribution.³² Following common practice in the literature, we also ask respondents about whether the government should have social obligations in several, specific spheres: aid to the sick (via healthcare services), insuring an adequate quality of life for the elderly, insure an adequate quality of life for the unemployed, provide adequate housing to citizens who need it, and provide quality education for children. Within the Russian context, programs related

³¹In our questionnaire, we included a question about the material from which the window frames in the apartment were made. When the buildings were originally constructed, wooden frames were installed. During the past 20 years, plastic frames were often used to replace the deteriorating originals; installation of new frames is often the first step in making improvements to one's apartment.

³²Similar questions can be found on the International Social Survey Program, European Social Survey, American National Electoral Survey, World Values Survey, and General Social Survey. For usage, Iversen and Soskice (2001); Rehm (2009, 2011); Alesina and Giuliano (2011); Rueda and Stegmueller (2019).

to all of these goals are widely understood to be redistributive and are highly salient (Remington, 2011). They also represent an array of different types of risk groups that social policy might cover. To the extent that results are consistent across them, therefore, they both speak to the external validity of our work across policy domains and its substantive significance.

Our main specification is an ordinary-least squares linear regression model with building-group level fixed effects that takes the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta D_i + \mu X_i + \rho_d + \epsilon_i. \quad (1)$$

Here, Y_i is our dependent variable of interest, D_i is a dummy variable equal to one for our “treated” observations (i.e. those in buildings selected by the government to vote in May 2017), X_i is a vector of individual controls described below, ρ_d is a set of building group fixed effects, and ϵ_i is the error term. It is important to note that the coefficient for D_i here measures the intent-to-treat effect of the treatment, because in some cases, buildings in our control group held votes on inclusion in the program (e.g. one-sided noncompliance). These were eligible for inclusion in our control group, because buildings that voted against inclusion in the program were never included in any of the lists we used to stratify the sample frame into buildings eligible for inclusion in the treatment and control groups. We return to this issue in Section 5.2, where we instrument for actual voting with the assignment variable to estimate a Complier Average Treatment Effect that accounts for this possibility (Gerber and Green, 2012).

Because buildings, not individuals, are assigned treatment, we also include a number of individual level controls derived from our survey that prior work suggests should be associated with support for redistribution. These include a dummy variable indicating the respondent is male, the respondent’s reported age, a dummy variable for whether the respondent has higher education, an ordinal measure of income based on individuals’ self assessment of their purchasing power, the number bedrooms in the apartment, the number of people per bedroom in their apartment, and a vector of dummy variables indicating that the respondent is unemployed, employed by the government, has privatized their apartment, or their apartment has wooden window frames.³³ We also supplement this with building-level data from the reformazhkh.ru database on whether the building is managed (i.e. maintenance provision and trash collection) by the state or private management companies. Finally, to account for the fact that the unit of treatment assignment was the building, we also make use of standard errors clustered at the building level in all specifications.

5 Results

In Table 4 we begin our analysis by showing how inclusion in the 5-story program (and the associated policy process) shaped individuals attitudes towards redistribution and more general forms of social policy. All dependent variables are standardized. Inclusion into the program is associated with a higher level of support for redistribution (i.e. closing the gap between the rich and the poor) — a 0.1195 sd increase in the belief

³³As noted above, replacing wooden window frames is often the first step individuals take in renovating their apartment, making it a proxy for investment into their housing.

that the government should reduce income differences between rich and poor ($p = 0.0182$). The corresponding standardized coefficient is smaller than those for several controls that are significant at conventional levels — being a state employee, or living in a state-managed building — but larger than the other significant control: age. Other controls do not reach significance at conventional levels in this specification. This result is in line with our expectations that inclusion in the program increases support for redistributive social programs.

Participation in the program is also associated with higher levels of support for two types of more specific social policies: unemployment benefits and housing provision. For support for unemployment benefits, the coefficient is equal to 0.1216 ($p = 0.0238$), with the only other variable that reaches significance at conventional levels being our proxy for investment in one’s apartment (i.e. wood framed windows). The effect of inclusion is larger in magnitude, however. For support for housing provision, the coefficient is equal to 0.1271 ($p = 0.0368$). The corresponding standardized coefficient is larger than the one for income, but smaller than for the other two significant independent variables: higher education and number of residents per bedroom. The coefficients for support for healthcare, benefits for the elderly, or education are not significant at conventional levels, however. This is likely due to the near universal support for these types of social policy, with more than 85% of respondents in our sample strongly agreeing that the government should support these types of benefits.³⁴ Consequently, inclusion in the program may simply have not provided enough new information to shape attitudes towards these programs, particularly if the effect of the program was generally positive.

In Table 5 we repeat the estimation without including fixed effects for the building group. Instead, we account for two variables at higher levels of aggregation that may confound our results: electoral outcomes (turnout, support for the incumbent, and support for the opposition) at the electoral district level and the material used in each building (brick or concrete). As before, the inclusion into the program is associated with statistically significant higher levels of support for unemployment ($p = 0.0975$), housing provision ($p = 0.0274$), and general rich-to-poor redistribution ($p = 0.0377$).

5.1 Mediation effects

Having established that inclusion in the program shapes support for redistribution, generally, and a range of other social policies, we then proceed to explore which channels may be driving the relationship. Our specification for this takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} M_i &= \alpha_1 + \beta_1 D_i + \mu_1 X_i + \epsilon_{1i} \\ Y_i &= \alpha_2 + \beta_2 D_i + \gamma M_i + \mu_2 X_i + \rho_d + \epsilon_{2i}, \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where M_i is the mediator variable associated with the channel in question. The total effect of the treatment on the dependent variable would then be the sum of β_2 or the direct effect of treatment on the outcome and

³⁴We conducted a parallel street survey of 600 Muscovites, which we discuss in more detail below. In this survey, we found that 86%, 88%, and 89% of respondents strongly agreed the state should provide healthcare, benefits for the elderly, and education (respectively). This contrasts with 46%, 50%, and 65% of respondents that strongly agreed the government should provide unemployment benefits, housing, and decrease the gap between the rich and poor (respectively).

$\beta_1\gamma$ or the mediated effect of treatment on the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Both equations (2) include a battery of controls to rule out alternative explanations and spurious correlations.

To test whether the mechanism involves increased trust in government we deploy two measures. The first one is the belief that Russian president Vladimir Putin and Moscow mayor Sergei Sobianin were guided by public opinion during the course of the redevelopment program. Although Mayor Sobianin was substantially more active than President Putin in the policy making process behind the housing program, both were highly visible and generally regarded as the primary authors of the program. The variable is equal to 0 if the respondent believes that neither Putin nor Sobianin is guided by public opinion; 1 if the respondent believes that one of them is guided by public opinion; and 2 if both are guided by public opinion. The second measure — belief in corrupt intent of public officials — is 0 or 1 depending on whether the respondent agrees that “the [renovation] program will enrich public officials and the construction business”. To test whether the program may cause individuals to expect a material gain that, in turn, will lead them to become less willing to support redistribution, we use two dummy variables equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statements that “The majority of program participants will receive larger housing” or “Participants of the program will receive higher-value housing” respectively.

In Table 6 we report the estimation of model (2). Panel A of the table corresponds to the first equation. We find that all of our potential mediators are affected by the treatment: program participants are more likely to believe that the replacement properties will be larger and of higher value, are more likely to believe that the incumbent executives are guided by public interest while implementing the program, and are less likely to think that the program will be used for corrupt purposes. All of the effects are significant at $p = 0.0118$ or better.

Panels B-D of Table 6 report the estimation of the second equation of (2), for each of the three dependent variables that are affected by the treatment: belief that the government should provide for the unemployed, provide housing to everyone who needs it, and reduce income differences between rich and poor. We also report the Sobel statistics for each potential mediator, which indicates whether the change in the dependent variable that flows through the potential mediator is itself statistically significant.

Panel B suggests that the belief that incumbent executives are guided by public interest is the only mediator that is a statistically significant predictor of support for redistribution ($p = 0.0582$), conditional on treatment. The corresponding Sobel statistic is significant at $p = 0.0903$. In Panel C we look at the effects of treatment and potential mediating variables on the beliefs that the government should provide for the unemployed. The belief that the program will enrich public officials is negatively and significantly ($p = 0.0043$) associated with the dependent variable. Again, the Sobel statistic is significant at conventional levels. Finally, in Panel D the dependent variable is support for state housing provision. We find that both the belief that incumbent executives are guided by public interest, and the belief that the program enriches officials and the construction industry, are associated with the dependent variable ($p = 0.0002$ and $p = 0.0365$, respectively). The corresponding Sobel statistics are also significant ($p = 0.008$ and $p = 0.0598$, respectively). Taken together, this evidence is

³⁴Data from our survey suggests that 61.4% of respondents believed that Mayor Sobianin was responsible for the program, while 34.3% believed the same for President Putin. These numbers eclipse other government actors. For a typical example of Mayor Sobianin’s activity, see *Sozdan shtab po realizatsii... [Renovation headquarters established...]* (2017). For one related to President Putin, see Voronov (2017).

generally consistent with the trust channel that we proposed in previous sections. We also find that the belief that replacement properties will be larger negatively affects support for government unemployment benefits, conditional on the treatment (Panel C, $p = 0.0442$), which suggests a different channel acting in the opposite direction. This evidence is consistent with a wealth effect, in which the effect of inclusion on support for unemployment benefits is mediated by beliefs that they will get more spacious apartments. However, the Sobel statistic fails to reach conventional levels of significance in this specification, implying that these results should be interpreted with caution and the effect of mediation itself may not be statistically significant. Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of program inclusion on support for redistributive programs is mediated by institutional trust and not expectations of material benefit.

We then proceed to use a quasi-Bayesian procedure proposed in (Imai and Yamamoto, 2013) and implemented in R by Tingley et al. (2014) to estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) of treatment on our dependent variables, and compute the 95% confidence intervals for these effects.³⁵ This method allows for multiple mediators where the mediator of interest is assumed to depend on the treatment, other mediators, and their interaction effects. With this method, the ACME is nonparametrically identified under three assumptions. First, the treatment is exogenous given the pre-treatment covariates; second, the mediator of interest is exogenous given the treatment, pre-treatment covariates, and the alternative mediators; third, the alternative mediators are exogenous given the treatment and pre-treatment covariates. Given these assumptions, Table 7 presents the results of our mediation analysis for each of the mediating variables and each of our three dependent variables. In each panel of the table, one mediating variable is assumed to be the primary mediator, and the three other variables are assumed to be alternative mediators. For each mediator variable, the table reports the values of the average causal mediation effect (ACME) and the average direct effect (ADE); their 95% confidence intervals; and the proportion of the total treatment effect explained by the mediator variable.

The mediation effect of the belief that incumbents are guided by public interests is significant at a $p < 0.05$ level for the rich/poor and housing provision dependent variables, with mediation effect explaining 11.7% and 10.7% the total treatment effect, respectively. The mediation effect of the belief that officials will enrich themselves is significant at a $p < 0.05$ level for unemployment benefits and housing provision dependent variables, explaining 19.3% and 10.4% of the total effect. Again, these results support our assertion that the effect of participation in government programs on redistribution preferences is likely mediated by changes in the trust in government actors. Crucially, in these specifications our variables related to expectations of material gain are not significant. This suggests that anticipated material benefits are unlikely to be confounding or explaining the relationships that we identify. Given that beliefs that social programs are an implicit assumption in much of the literature on altruistic motives for supporting redistribution, these findings are also somewhat suggestive that altruism is unlikely to be directly driving the effects we observe (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019).

5.2 Robustness

In order to examine the robustness of our results, we begin by exploring whether inclusion in the Housing Renovation program may have shaped attitudes via a channel other than the associated policy process as we

³⁵For a recent application of this technique see include Young (2019).

propose. Two observable implications of our argument, are that residents in included buildings should be more likely to have higher levels of self-reported knowledge of the program and greater support for it. The former implication follows from our emphasis on the consultative and educational components of the program, where officials have incentives to make sure that residents of included buildings understand the policy, its material benefits, and how it has been modified. The latter follows from the fact that policy processes are unlikely to shape trust in politicians if they result in negative attitudes towards the policy itself. In order to test these implications, in Table C4 we regress the respondent’s self-reported knowledge of and attitudes toward the renovation program on program inclusion. We indeed find that program inclusion positively affects both: increasing knowledge and attitudes by 0.3102 and 0.3871 sd, respectively ($p < 0.0001$ for both).

A third observable implication of our theory is that our results should be driven by shifts in the preferences of those included in the program towards greater support for redistribution, rather than making those excluded more opposed. The latter is likely if the actual mechanism we identify is related to resentment at being excluded or fear of negative externalities. We test this proposition in Table C5 by including data from a survey of 600 randomly selected Muscovites that was run in parallel with our survey of 5-story building residents and that used a similar questionnaire. We rerun our main specifications but now including dummy variables indicating respondents from our included buildings and those from excluded 5-story buildings. In this specification, we forgo building-pair fixed effects, instead using cluster robust (at the building level) standard errors. Table C5 suggests that our results for programs to decrease the gap between the rich and poor, as well as housing, are driven by greater support among the included. The dummy for the included is positive and statistically significant for these specifications, while the excluded are statistically indistinguishable from the average Muscovite. For unemployment, however, it does appear that exclusion drives the result, as the co-efficient on exclusion is negative and significant. This result suggests that the effects of inclusion may have complex interactions with notions of who deserves aid that deserve further exploration in future work.

We also examine whether our results are driven by heterogeneity in the preferences in the young and old. The impressionable years theory is a well-established theory that helps to explain how experiences (with policy or traumatic events) shapes preferences for redistribution Roth and Wohlfart (2018). This theory would assume that the effect of the program would be the strongest, or, perhaps, even limited to, individuals between 18 and 25 years of age. The results that we find are the opposite: the effect of the treatment is predicted to be stronger in the people above that age. Table C6 shows that the coefficient for the interaction term is significant ($p = 0.0578$, $p = 0.0012$, and $p = 0.0826$) for the support of the government reducing rich-poor income differences, providing for the unemployed, and providing housing for all who need it. We believe that there may be several reasons why our results might differ from those of Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), Roth and Wohlfart (2018), or Carreri and Teso (2018). First, these works look at negative, prolonged experiences, such as living through a recession, while in our case the experience is positive and localized in time. Second, in our case the experience is more immediate, with only 1.5 years between the voting and the time when the survey took place.

We also check the robustness of our results to how our sample was constructed. In particular, we included a small number of nearby buildings that were across electorally similar electoral districts rather than within the same district. As Table C7 demonstrates, however, our results are robust to analysis that excludes these

buildings and limits the sample to only those building-pairs located in the same district.

Finally, in Table C8 we check the robustness of our results to one-sided non-compliance, which in our case would manifest as a member of the control group receiving treatment despite their assignment. As noted above, our empirical strategy was based on comparing buildings that were initially assigned to the program by the government to those that never appeared on government lists of buildings that voted for inclusion in the program. In the course of our research, we discovered that some buildings voted on inclusion and opted out of the program. In these cases, buildings formally voted but were not included in any of the lists, despite being subjected to the consultative campaign. Similarly, the proximity of excluded buildings makes it possible that their residents might have been swept up in outdoor consultation campaigns and advertising. We apply the standard correction for one-sided non-compliance in the experimental literature, which involves instrumenting for whether individuals actually voted using the treatment variable as an instrumental variable (Gerber and Green, 2012). This enables us to estimate the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) rather than the Intent-to-treat Effect measured in Table 4. As Table C8 indicates, our results are similar, with statistically significant and positive effects of treatment on support for redistribution $p = 0.0165$, unemployment $p = 0.0211$, and housing $p = 0.0348$. Thus, the possibility of one-sided non-compliance does not substantially alter our results.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have explored how inclusion in specific social policy programs can shape broader support for redistribution. Drawing on existing institutional theories, we argue that the effect of programs *ceteris paribus* are contingent on their ability to resolve credible commitment problems and foster institutional trust. To test the argument, we took advantage of a Housing Renovation program in Moscow, Russia that represented both a substantial redistributive effort on the part of state authorities and a significant effort to engage program participants in the policymaking process via solicitations of feedback, demonstrations of responsiveness, and education. To measure the effects of inclusion, we used data from a unique survey of 1500 Muscovites that took advantage of otherwise identical, physically proximate buildings that differed in whether they were assigned to the program.

We find that those included were more supportive of redistribution writ large, as well as generic housing and unemployment programs. Using mediation analysis, we show that the primary channel of this effect is through increased institutional trust in the government. Consistent with our argument, we also show that inclusion in the program leads to greater support for the program and self-reported knowledge of its details. We also show that our results cannot be explained by the impressionable age theory and are not driven by the excluded participating in the policy-making process (i.e. one-sided non-compliance). Finally, we also note that our findings are unlikely to be purely driven by alternative explanations linked to material benefits or altruism. Theoretically, we argue that both of these explanations are themselves dependent on credible commitments about programs, something in short supply in settings like contemporary Russia with weak institutions. Thus the institutional trust channel we identify is both causally prior to and compatible with other explanations. Empirically, uncertainty in the details of the program made the value of potential replacement apartments unclear, challenging explanations

based on material benefits or altruistic beliefs that others will benefit and increasing the salience of credible commitment. Institutional trust is therefore at minimum a necessary condition. Taken together, our findings suggest that the ways in which social policies are made and implemented can have profound implications for individual-level support for generic social policies.

Our findings make a number of contributions to existing work on redistributive preferences. First, existing work has tended to focus on the role of policy programs and institutions in creating redistribution preferences that are self-replicating. The effects of such institutions and programs are relatively slow-moving and subject to path dependency, curtailing the ability of politicians to use them to create support for their policy agendas. By contrast, our work suggests that politicians can make use of relatively short-term processes, associated with the design and implementation of policy, in order to generate trust in themselves and build support for a broader redistributive agenda. In doing so, our work calls attention to an under explored strategic element of the relationship between policymaking and redistributive preferences that warrants further exploration. It also has important implications for our understanding of how (and when) redistributive programs can be translated into more positive popular perceptions of government and (potentially) political support.

Second, our work also joins a growing body of research that explore how expectations about the government, and specifically its ability to faithfully and competently translate *de jure* policy promises of redistribution into *de facto* benefits. Like much of this research, our work suggests that support for state-led redistribution is contingent on beliefs about whether politicians are trustworthy, responsive, and non-corrupt, thus making it likely that they will deliver. As with existing work on institutional trust and redistributive preferences, our work call attention to the need to further explore the extent to which credible commitment underpins existing explanations of redistributive preferences based on material benefits or altruism that are likely contingent on beliefs about how social policy is implemented. In much of this research, however, trust in politicians is taken as exogenous to the politicians themselves in rooted in deeply rooted institutions and beliefs. We contribute to this novel research agenda by pointing to the need to consider the ability of politicians to strategically manipulate attitudes towards them. By consulting citizens and/or educating them on the material benefits of programs during policymaking and implementation, politicians can shape popular attitudes on their trustworthiness and potentially alter preferences towards redistribution. In showing this endogenous and strategic dimension to the relationship between institutional trust and redistributive preferences, therefore, our work calls attention to the importance of considering proximal factors alongside more traditional institutional ones.

An important remaining question from our study is which specific elements of the policymaking and implementation process shape support for subsequent redistribution. In this paper, we have proposed two plausible pathways to explain this link. On the one hand, preferences for redistribution might be shaped by the involvement of program participants in policymaking via processes that enable them to contribute iteratively to the design of redistribution and thus build a sense of responsiveness. On the other hand, the relationship may flow through educational elements of the process, which inform them of the material benefits of programs and strengthen institutional trust. Because the Moscow Renovation program involved strong elements of both, we are unable to distinguish between the two in this study. Although it is certainly plausible that these pathways are not mutually exclusive and both hold, a key avenue for future work will be to explore the relative importance

of each. Doing so will provide further insights into how policymakers can strategically shape public opinion towards redistribution and the welfare state.

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Figure 1: An archetypical block of I-510 series apartment buildings. All buildings in this picture appeared on the May 2017 list, and voted in favor of the program.

Series	Walls	Apartment area, m2			Kitchen, m2	Ceiling, cm
		1-room	2-room	3-room		
I-510	Concrete	30.5-32.2	41-45.5	54-55	5.5	2.48-2.7
I-511	Brick	30.1	41.1-43.7	56.7	4.9-5.3	2.48-2.7
I-515	Concrete	30.4-32	40-45.6	54-58.3	5.5	2.48

Source: flatinfo.ru (2019), *Description of I-510 series.* (2019).

Table 1: Characteristics of typical 5-story apartment buildings.

	May 2017 list		Test	p	N
	No	Yes			
Distance to closest metro station	2162	1908	Two-tailed t	0.7283	121
State-managed	0.6271	0.6250	Fisher's exact	1.0000	123
			Chi 2	0.9806	123
Year built	1964.3	1963.5	Two-tailed t	0.3362	123
			Ranksum	0.4892	123
Overall condition, 0-excellent, 100-poor	35.4	38.1	Two-tailed t	0.1659	104
Car owners	0.2124	0.2073	Two-tailed t	0.5757	110
Retirees	0.2512	0.2454	Two-tailed t	0.5801	110
Children	0.1507	0.1578	Two-tailed t	0.3904	110
Work in health care	0.0108	0.0098	Two-tailed t	0.5602	110
Work in education	0.0161	0.0155	Two-tailed t	0.7447	110
Work in culture	0.0025	0.0030	Two-tailed t	0.5113	110
Work in utilities	0.0024	0.0040	Two-tailed t	0.0981	110
Work in transport	0.0060	0.0065	Two-tailed t	0.6685	110
Price per m sq, 1000 RuR	1.56e+05	1.57e+05	Two-tailed t	0.8100	52
Total number of buildings	59	64			
Total N of people surveyed	669	673			
Number of brick buildings	36	39			
N of people surveyed in brick buildings	393	394			
Number of panel buildings	23	25			
N of people surveyed in panel buildings	276	279			
Buildings: Unmarked land	47	53	Chi2	0.1164	
Buildings: Municipal land	11	6			
Buildings: Privatized land	1	5			

The table reports test statistics comparing two groups of buildings in our sample: Those that appeared on the May 2017 list, and those that did not. *State-managed* is 1 if the building is managed by the municipally-owned *GBU Zhilishnik* company; *car owners*, *retirees*, *children*, and *work in ...* are the proportions of residents in a building belonging to those categories. *Price per sq meter, 2016* is the average per meter price of apartments that were in this building that were listed on the cian.ru website in December 2016.

Table 2: Comparing buildings on and off May 2017 list.

	May 2017 list		Test	p	N
	No	Yes			
Male	0.44	0.40	Fisher's exact	0.1844	1342
			Chi 2	0.1722	1342
			Conditional difference	0.1629	1342
Age	44.57	45.07	Two-tailed t	0.5466	1342
			Ranksum	0.5377	1342
			Conditional difference	0.4644	1342
Higher education	0.46	0.49	Fisher's exact	0.1901	1342
			Chi 2	0.1878	1342
			Conditional difference	0.1033	1342
Income	0.50	0.50	Two-tailed t	0.9243	1340
			Ranksum	0.8182	1340
			Conditional difference	0.5979	1340
Retiree	0.22	0.22	Fisher's exact	0.6930	1342
			Chi 2	0.6866	1342
			Conditional difference	0.6360	1342
State employee	0.24	0.25	Fisher's exact	0.7992	1342
			Chi 2	0.7973	1342
			Conditional difference	0.7208	1342
Privatized apartment	0.54	0.53	Fisher's exact	0.7428	1342
			Chi 2	0.7362	1342
			Conditional difference	0.3084	1342
Number of rooms	2.13	2.09	Two-tailed t	0.3082	1342
			Ranksum	0.2408	1342
			Conditional difference	0.2281	1342
Residents per room	1.70	1.68	Two-tailed t	0.6172	1342
			Conditional difference	0.7883	1342
Wood window frames	0.36	0.37	Fisher's exact	0.7345	1342
			Chi 2	0.7123	1342
			Conditional difference	0.6735	1342
Hour of interview	15.32	15.22	Two-tailed t	0.5329	1342
			Kolmogorov-Smirnov	0.1526	1342

The table compares individuals in two groups of buildings where the survey was carried out. First, these are the buildings included in the May 2017 list. Second, these are the buildings not included in that list. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category ("We do not have enough money even to buy food") and 1 to the highest (). *Retiree* and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood.

Table 3: Comparing individuals in buildings on and off May 2017 list.

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.1195** (0.0499)	-0.0205 (0.0422)	0.0240 (0.0441)	0.1216** (0.0531)	0.1271** (0.0602)	-0.0314 (0.0498)
Male	0.0349 (0.0624)	-0.0996 (0.0662)	-0.0600 (0.0667)	0.0123 (0.0663)	-0.0919* (0.0538)	-0.0720 (0.0624)
Age	0.0079** (0.0033)	0.0062** (0.0030)	0.0056* (0.0029)	0.0018 (0.0026)	0.0010 (0.0028)	-0.0005 (0.0033)
Higher education	-0.0916 (0.0625)	-0.0943* (0.0542)	-0.0641 (0.0630)	-0.0813 (0.0566)	-0.1811*** (0.0593)	-0.0456 (0.0711)
Income	-0.2439 (0.2038)	0.1893 (0.1991)	0.1792 (0.1940)	-0.2874 (0.2190)	-0.3177* (0.1872)	0.0751 (0.2102)
Unemployed	-0.1387 (0.2440)	0.3840*** (0.0906)	0.2817** (0.1277)	0.2298 (0.2043)	-0.1215 (0.2497)	0.2851*** (0.0786)
Retiree	-0.0184 (0.1178)	-0.1534 (0.1109)	-0.1247 (0.1084)	-0.1120 (0.1236)	-0.1058 (0.1062)	0.0636 (0.1023)
State employee	0.2242*** (0.0618)	0.0558 (0.0664)	0.1463** (0.0635)	0.0209 (0.0720)	0.0723 (0.0717)	0.0948 (0.0780)
Privatized apartment	0.0616 (0.0659)	0.0217 (0.0592)	0.0977 (0.0594)	-0.0040 (0.0634)	-0.0044 (0.0544)	0.0474 (0.0603)
Number of rooms	-0.0756 (0.0508)	-0.0715 (0.0521)	-0.0686 (0.0557)	-0.0556 (0.0622)	0.0588 (0.0571)	-0.0210 (0.0570)
Residents per room	-0.0035 (0.0579)	0.0172 (0.0448)	-0.0451 (0.0483)	-0.0212 (0.0591)	0.1067** (0.0504)	0.0174 (0.0460)
Wood window frames	-0.0211 (0.0527)	-0.0666 (0.0536)	0.0567 (0.0557)	0.1052* (0.0631)	0.0031 (0.0607)	-0.0292 (0.0584)
State-managed building	0.2576** (0.1171)	0.1489 (0.1001)	-0.0300 (0.1246)	0.1100 (0.1154)	0.1981 (0.1533)	0.2878* (0.1656)
N	1281	1336	1337	1294	1301	1335
R2	0.0890	0.1016	0.0993	0.1149	0.1067	0.0894

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. Building group fixed effects. SEs are clustered at building level. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The effect of the redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (building group FE).

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.1291** (0.0614)	-0.0035 (0.0642)	0.0304 (0.0636)	0.1264* (0.0757)	0.1666** (0.0746)	-0.0112 (0.0696)
Male	0.0461 (0.0588)	-0.0864 (0.0650)	-0.0640 (0.0663)	0.0230 (0.0647)	-0.0693 (0.0534)	-0.0785 (0.0623)
Age	0.0080*** (0.0031)	0.0056* (0.0033)	0.0061* (0.0032)	0.0024 (0.0025)	-0.0004 (0.0027)	-0.0006 (0.0031)
Higher education	-0.0757 (0.0617)	-0.1228** (0.0571)	-0.0982 (0.0670)	-0.1092* (0.0552)	-0.2281*** (0.0597)	-0.0879 (0.0757)
Income	-0.2149 (0.2021)	0.3089 (0.2025)	0.2436 (0.1859)	-0.2892 (0.2153)	-0.3749* (0.2036)	0.0647 (0.2056)
Unemployed	-0.0499 (0.2412)	0.5017*** (0.0813)	0.3561*** (0.1350)	0.2536 (0.1833)	-0.1184 (0.2363)	0.4057*** (0.0850)
Retiree	-0.0006 (0.1140)	-0.0972 (0.1140)	-0.1240 (0.1125)	-0.1374 (0.1184)	-0.1193 (0.1064)	0.1048 (0.1010)
State employee	0.2274*** (0.0593)	0.0764 (0.0658)	0.1653*** (0.0608)	0.0634 (0.0768)	0.0871 (0.0711)	0.1023 (0.0714)
Privatized apartment	0.1091* (0.0632)	0.1097* (0.0563)	0.1688*** (0.0575)	-0.0248 (0.0644)	0.0492 (0.0558)	0.1084* (0.0595)
Number of rooms	-0.0835 (0.0525)	-0.0804 (0.0543)	-0.0791 (0.0569)	-0.0078 (0.0656)	0.0654 (0.0591)	-0.0318 (0.0521)
Residents per room	0.0024 (0.0513)	0.0081 (0.0493)	-0.0650 (0.0482)	0.0013 (0.0578)	0.0990* (0.0522)	0.0327 (0.0461)
Wood window frames	-0.0401 (0.0542)	0.0021 (0.0566)	0.1164** (0.0565)	0.0519 (0.0620)	0.0048 (0.0658)	0.0043 (0.0627)
State-managed building	0.1338* (0.0694)	0.1689** (0.0710)	0.1367* (0.0717)	0.0540 (0.0845)	0.0856 (0.0807)	0.1856** (0.0850)
Brick building	0.0416 (0.0610)	0.0562 (0.0660)	0.0427 (0.0663)	0.0704 (0.0792)	0.0234 (0.0738)	0.0421 (0.0741)
2013 mayoral, turnout	-0.6239 (1.2783)	1.0297 (1.0225)	-0.5313 (1.0262)	-2.4161* (1.3674)	-2.7364** (1.1447)	0.3208 (1.2309)
2013 mayoral, Sobianin's vote share	1.8869* (1.0338)	-0.4425 (1.0514)	-1.0528 (1.1187)	3.4383** (1.3857)	1.8781 (1.2313)	-0.6956 (1.2318)
2013 mayoral, Navalny's vote share	2.2342 (1.4926)	-0.6431 (1.7011)	-1.8828 (1.8861)	5.3764*** (1.8606)	2.9031 (1.9192)	-1.8254 (2.0174)
N	1264	1319	1320	1277	1284	1318
R2	0.0414	0.0257	0.0352	0.0360	0.0441	0.0220

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. SEs are clustered at building level. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (no building group FE).

	More space	More value	Incumbents guided	Corrupt intent
Panel A: Effect of treatment on potential mediators				
May 2017 list	0.1324** (0.0506)	0.2334*** (0.0483)	0.2050*** (0.0561)	-0.2267*** (0.0549)
N	1340	1340	1325	1340
R2	0.1470	0.1519	0.1541	0.1064
Panel B: Rich-poor redistribution				
May 2017 list	0.1154** (0.0492)	0.1262** (0.0495)	0.1063** (0.0502)	0.1149** (0.0495)
<i>Variable</i>	0.0287 (0.0320)	-0.0298 (0.0316)	0.0570* (0.0298)	-0.0198 (0.0293)
N	1281	1281	1268	1281
R2	0.0897	0.0897	0.0922	0.0893
Sobel p	.3961	.3543	.0903	.5037
Panel C: Unemployment				
May 2017 list	0.1294** (0.0519)	0.1249** (0.0530)	0.1203** (0.0528)	0.1004* (0.0527)
<i>Variable</i>	-0.0553** (0.0272)	-0.0150 (0.0288)	0.0277 (0.0345)	-0.0864*** (0.0297)
N	1294	1294	1282	1294
R2	0.1175	0.1151	0.1138	0.1215
Sobel p	.1085	.6031	.434	.0173
Panel D: Housing				
May 2017 list	0.1266** (0.0598)	0.1303** (0.0610)	0.0924 (0.0587)	0.1113* (0.0601)
<i>Variable</i>	0.0035 (0.0307)	-0.0147 (0.0271)	0.1160*** (0.0301)	-0.0641** (0.0303)
N	1301	1301	1288	1301
R2	0.1067	0.1069	0.1176	0.1104
Sobel p	.9091	.5903	.008	.0598

All models are OLS. Outcome variables are z-scored. All models include building group fixed effects and controls as in Table 4. Standard errors are clustered at building level. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the one shown in the column header. In Panel B/C/D, the dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [reduce income differences between rich and poor/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. In Panels B, C, and D, *Variable* denotes the variable in the column header.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Possible channels by which the redevelopment program shapes preferences for social policies.

	Redistribution		Unemployment		Housing	
	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE	ACME	ADE
More space	0.005 (-0.004, 0.013) [0.033]	0.135 (0.032, 0.239) XX	-0.007 (-0.016, 0.002) [-0.054]	0.137 (0.037, 0.237) XX	-0.001 (-0.007, 0.004) [-0.006]	0.193 (0.093, 0.293) XX
More value	-0.01 (-0.022, 0.002) [-0.071]	0.15 (0.04, 0.259) XX	-0.002 (-0.011, 0.007) [-0.015]	0.132 (0.033, 0.23) XX	-0.008 (-0.019, 0.003) [-0.042]	0.201 (0.096, 0.306) XX
Incumbents guided	0.016 (0.002, 0.031) [0.117]	0.124 (0.019, 0.228) XX	0.003 (-0.011, 0.017) [0.02]	0.127 (0.02, 0.233) XX	0.02 (0.005, 0.036) [0.107]	0.171 (0.067, 0.275) XX
Corrupt intent	0.003 (-0.011, 0.018) [0.023]	0.137 (0.028, 0.246) XX	0.025 (0.007, 0.043) [0.193]	0.106 (0.005, 0.207) XX	0.02 (0.002, 0.038) [0.104]	0.172 (0.071, 0.273) XX

Table 7: Multi-mediation analysis, 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix A Detailed Survey Sampling Procedure

The sample selection process for our survey was as follows. We first compiled the list of all five-story apartment buildings in Moscow built between 1955 and 1980, excluding buildings constructed to non-standard designs, and buildings that had less than 45 apartments. Such buildings were generally higher-quality — they were built of brick, and had somewhat larger apartments — making them harder to compare to buildings using standard designs. Excluding these ensured that the remaining buildings would have similar floor plans, overall size, and number of apartments in a standard block. We divided the remaining buildings into two lists based on whether they were constructed of prefabricated concrete panel or brick. This was done because wall material was a strong correlate of support for the redevelopment program, even for buildings of standardized series; brick buildings were perceived to be of a higher quality, and support for redevelopment and relocation in these buildings was lower.

We then split each of these lists into two. List A consisted of those buildings that were included in the May 2017 list and where the state-organized vote was held. List B consisted of those buildings where we knew the residents never had to vote to join the program. These were the buildings that did not appear on the May 2017, the August 2017 list, or its updated version published in August 2018.³⁶

We then proceeded to identify all electoral districts that had buildings from both list A and list B (the procedure was repeated separately for concrete and brick buildings). We chose one building from each list such that the distance between the buildings was minimized. The two resulting buildings were the *primary buildings* those residents were to be surveyed. We discarded all electoral districts where the primary buildings were more than 500 meters apart. If there was more than one building in a list in that electoral district, we selected a *back-up building* from that list with the smallest combined distance to the two primary buildings. We then verified whether the buildings in question were still standing using Google and Yandex (Russia’s local search engine) Map applications.

The number of people to be surveyed in each electoral district was computed as follows. First, we calculated the total number of apartments in list A and list B. The quota for each list was equal to the minimum of these two numbers times 3/20. So, for example, if the primary building in list A had 80 apartments, and the backup building had 60, and list B had a single building with 120 apartments, the total quota would be 18 interviews from buildings in list A, and 18 interviews from the building in list B. The pollsters were then instructed to start interviewing residents in the primary building, and proceed to the backup building if the total quota was not met. The interviews themselves were conducted either in the entrance way of the buildings or in the public space nearby. Respondents were screened to determine if they were residents of the target building and the interview stopped if they were not.

Because there were not enough pairs on our list to reach our target sample size of 1500 respondents, we supplemented our lists with a set of physically proximate buildings from different electoral districts, but within the same administrative district.³⁷ The procedure for selecting the remaining buildings was as follows. First,

³⁶The latter two lists consisted only of the buildings where the residents voted to join the renovation program. There was no centralized register for buildings that were not on the May 2017 list and where the residents voted to opt out of the program.

³⁷This issue arises due to expected non-response rates for this type of survey, which our survey provider determined based on

we composed lists A and B for each administrative district, excluding any buildings that were selected as either primary or backup at the previous stage. We then selected the most proximate pair of buildings, and repeated the procedure until the pair of buildings selected at the next iteration was more than 500 meters apart. Such buildings will largely conform to our identification strategy, since physical proximity should still insure relative similarity between buildings along most unobservables. Nevertheless, these additional buildings obviously violate our identification assumption, since in these cases buildings might have been included/excluded based on the differences in electoral data in their district. In other words, for these buildings, the authorities had data fine grained enough to account for electoral considerations in their selection. In selecting these buildings, we attempt to account for this by dropping all pairs with sufficiently different electoral outcomes. We calculate these outcomes using the normalized first principal component of the outcome of the 2016 State Duma (parliamentary) elections.³⁸ We then dropped all pairs where the difference between the outcomes at their electoral districts differed by more than 0.25. We then sampled the resulting list in order (from closest to most distant) until we reached the target sample size. The interview and screening procedure for these buildings was similar to our original list. The full lists of buildings used in our study are given in Tables A1 and A2.

Finally, sample selection for the municipally representative sample of 600 Muscovites was done using a three-stage selection procedure. In the first stage quotas for respondents were assigned to each of Moscow's 10 (*okrugs*) in proportion to each district's share of the overall city population. Between one and five administrative districts (*raion*) were then selected from okrug, depending on the number of respondents assigned to it in the first stage for a total of 34 neighborhoods across the city. Between 12 and 20 respondents were interviewed in each administrative district, with the precise number determined by the number of districts selected within each okrug and the target number of respondents per okrug. In the second stage, respondents in each neighborhood were approached and asked a set of screening questions designed to determine if they live in the neighborhood and basic demographic features. Respondents who did not live in the given neighborhood were rejected. Finally, at the third stage, respondents were selected in order to fulfill quotas on basic demographic parameters - age, gender, and education level — in order to insure representativeness relative to the city population. The non-response rate for this portion of the sample was 51.7%.

It is important to note that we needed to conduct an additional data collection of 96 respondents in March of 2019. This stems from a mistake in our original dataset, which listed several of buildings as not having been included in the program despite their inclusion in a later wave. As some of these buildings were included in our group of excluded buildings and surveyed, we needed to find replacements. We did so by repeating the original procedure in order to find new excluded buildings to match with the included ones from the effected pairs.

previous experience. Generally, one can expect 3 respondents per 20-flat section, with each apartment building in Moscow having a different number of sections depending on its location and design. Our first list of buildings did not have enough sections in the included building, so it was necessary to find additional buildings in order to reach the desired survey size.

³⁸The first principal component explained 37.2% of the variance, with the eigenvalue equal of 3.34. Higher values of the index corresponded to higher vote share of pro-opposition/liberal parties, and a lower vote share of the pro-government United Russia and its close ally LDPR.

Building group id		UIK	May 2017 list	Address ID		
1	Bogorodskoye	874	Yes	Millionnaya St., 8 b. 3	I-511	1
1	Bogorodskoye	874	Yes	Millionnaya St., 10	I-410	7
1	Bogorodskoye	874	No	Pogonnyi proezd 1 b.10	I-511	9
2	Bogorodskoye	877	Yes	1st Myasnikovskaya St., 14	II-28	20
2	Bogorodskoye	877	No	Pogonnyy Proyezd, 6	I-511	4
2	Bogorodskoye	877	No	Pogonnyy Proyezd, 8	I-511	29
2	Bogorodskoye	877	Yes	1st Myasnikovskaya St., 14A	I-511	13
5	Bogorodskoye	857	Yes	Igral'naya St., 4	II-68	15
5	Bogorodskoye	856	No	Igral'naya St., 6 b. 2	II-29	28
5	Bogorodskoye	857	Yes	Glebovskaya St., 4	I-511	1
8	Izmaylovo	1031	Yes	Nikitinskaya St., 1 b.1	I-511	6
8	Izmaylovo	1031	No	Nikitinskaya St., 1 b.2	II-14	3
8	Izmaylovo	1031	Yes	Nikitinskaya St., 1 b.3	I-511	5
9	Izmaylovo	1039	No	3st Parkovaya St., 36 b.3	I-511	16
9	Izmaylovo	1029	Yes	3st Parkovaya St., 39 b.3	I-511	14
10	Novogireyevo	1104	Yes	Novogireyevskaya St., 49/28	I-511	5
10	Novogireyevo	1104	No	Martenovskaya St., 22 b.1	I-511	5
10	Novogireyevo	1104	No	Martenovskaya St., 20	II-28	4
11	Novogireyevo	1098	No	Perovskaya St., 55	I-511	7
11	Novogireyevo	1097	Yes	2st Vladimirskaya St., 59/39	I-511	7
12	Perovo	1163	No	1st Vladimirskaya St., 35 b.1	II-14	7
12	Perovo	1163	Yes	2st Vladimirskaya St., 34	I-511	7
15	Kuntsevo	2617	No	Bobruyskaya St., 18 b.3	I-511	12
15	Kuntsevo	2617	Yes	Yartsevskaya St., 11 b.3	I-511	12
16	Kuntsevo	2618	Yes	Bobruyskaya St., 20	I-511	24
16	Kuntsevo	2618	No	Bobruyskaya St., 24	I-511	24
20	Mozhaysky	2661	No	Gvardeyskaya St., 13	I-515	4
20	Mozhaysky	2662	Yes	Mozhaiskoe hwy, 20 b.2	I-209A	9
20	Mozhaysky	2661	No	Gvardeyskaya St., 15 b.1	I-511	9
21	Fili-Davydkovo	2899	Yes	Vatutina St., 5 b.2	I-511	9
21	Fili-Davydkovo	2899	No	Vatutina St., 4 b.1	I-511	10
24	Novomoskovsky Administrative Okrug	3361	No	Shcherbinka, Yubileynaya St., 12	I-447-38	15
24	Novomoskovsky Administrative Okrug	3359	Yes	Shcherbinka, Vysotnaya St., 3	I-447	15
27	Golovinskiy	289	No	Konakovskiy Proyezd, 15	I-511	12
27	Golovinskiy	289	Yes	Leningradskoye hwy, 74	I-511	12
28	Koptevo	360	No	Cherepanovskiy Proyezd, 50a	II-14	7
28	Koptevo	360	Yes	Cherepanovskiy Proyezd, 58	II-03	14
29	Koptevo	367	Yes	Generala Rychagova St., 6	I-511	11
29	Koptevo	367	No	Generala Rychagova St., 3 b.1	II-14	11
31	Koptevo	370	No	Koptevskiy bulvar 4	I-511	13
31	Koptevo	370	Yes	Matrosa Zheleznyaka Bul'var, 18/12	I-511	21
33	Alexeyevsky	481	No	Novoalekseyevskaya St., 23	I-511	8
33	Alexeyevsky	481	Yes	1st Rizhskiy Pereulok, 2 b.4	I-511	8
34	Alexeyevsky	485	No	Pavla Korchagina St., 9	II-14	14
34	Alexeyevsky	485	Yes	Konstantinova St., 11	I-511	14
43	Nagatinsky Zaton	1869	Yes	Sudostroitelnaya St., 21/11	I-511	10
43	Nagatinsky Zaton	1880	No	Sudostroitelnaya St., 30	II-14-13	10
43	Nagatinsky Zaton	1869	Yes	Sudostroitelnaya St., 25 b.1	I-511	7
44	Nagornyy	1912	No	Varshavskoye Hwy, 98	I-511	15
44	Nagornyy	1912	Yes	Varshavskoye Hwy, 92	I-511	9
47	Lefortovo	1407	Yes	Aviamotornaya St., 5	I-511	5
47	Lefortovo	1407	Yes	2st Sinichkina St., 7	I-511	5
47	Lefortovo	1407	No	2st Sinichkina St., 1/2	I-511	10
49	Lyublino	1409	Yes	Prospekt 40 Let Oktyabrya, 6	I-511	13
49	Lyublino	1409	No	Kubanskaya St., 14 b.2	I-511	12
50	Lyublino	1436	Yes	Sovkhozskaya St., 31	I-511	9
50	Lyublino	1436	No	Novorossiyskaya St., 19	I-515	9
51	Lyublino	1437	No	Sudakova St., 25 b.1	I-447	9
51	Lyublino	1437	Yes	Sudakova St., 26	I-511	9
53	Ryazanskiy	1574	No	Kononova St., 18	I-511	9
53	Ryazanskiy	1574	Yes	Zarayskaya St., 15	I-511	9
54	Ryazanskiy	1577	Yes	Ryazanskiy Prospekt, 49 b.2	I-511	8
54	Ryazanskiy	1577	Yes	Ryazanskiy Prospekt, 49 b.3	I-511	15
54	Ryazanskiy	1577	No	Mikhaylova St., 18 b.1	I-511	8
54	Ryazanskiy	1577	No	Mikhaylova St., 14	I-511	15
55	Yuzhnoportovy	1634	Yes	Mel'nikova St., 15/10	I-511	7
55	Yuzhnoportovy	1634	No	Sharikopodshipnikovskaya St., 7 b.2	II-14	7
56	Zyuzino	2189	No	Azovskaya St., 6 b.1	II-14	7
56	Zyuzino	2189	Yes	Sivashskaya St., 13	I-511	7
60	Kotlovka	2254	Yes	Nagornaya St., 15 b. 1,2	I-511	13
60	Kotlovka	2254	No	Nagornaya St., 12 b.3	I-511	13
61	Kotlovka	2261	No	Nagornyy Bul'var, 9	II-14	9
61	Kotlovka	2261	Yes	Nagornyy Bul'var, 11	I-510	9
62	Kotlovka	2255	No	Remizova St., 3 b.1	II-14-13	9
62	Kotlovka	2257	Yes	Remizova St., 10	I-511	9

Table A1: List of brick buildings.

Appendix B Determinants of Building Inclusion in Various Lists

In this part, we look at what factors contributed to the inclusion of a building in the renovation program. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table B3 we show the average marginal effects for the inclusion of a building in the May 2017 list; our observations consisted of all 5-floor buildings constructed between 1955 and 1980. We find that buildings in administrative districts with a more educated population had a smaller probability of being included in the May 2017 list, with each additional percent of highly educated people in 2002 reducing the probability by 1.09%. If the building is located in an electoral district with a higher turnout and a more pro-opposition vote in 2013 mayoral elections, then the building was also less likely to have been included on the May 2017 list; finally, brick buildings, those that were constructed according to non-standard projects, and those in a better condition also faced smaller chances of having been included in the list.

In Columns 3 and 4 of the same table, we look at all buildings that were not included in the May 2017 list, and look at the factors that contributed to their inclusion in the list published in August 2018. These were the buildings where the residents have held a homeowners meeting and decided to join the redevelopment program. Political preferences were again important — buildings in electoral districts with more pro-opposition and less pro-government voting were less likely to have joined the program. The building type also mattered, with brick and non-standard buildings being less likely to join. Buildings with a larger share of car owners or a larger number of retirees were also less likely to have joined the program.

Building group id		UIK	May 2017 list	Address ID		
3	Bogorodskoye	879	No	Ivanteyevskaya St., 20	I-515	11
3	Bogorodskoye	879	Yes	Boytsovaya St., 18 b. 2	I-510	9
3	Bogorodskoye	879	No	Bul'var Marshala Rokossovskogo, 28/14	I-510	10
3	Bogorodskoye	879	Yes	Bul'var Marshala Rokossovskogo, 20/18	I-510	12
6	Vostochnoye Izmaylovo	924	Yes	15st Parkovaya St., 29 b. 1	I-335	11
6	Vostochnoye Izmaylovo	921	No	16 Parkovaya St., 25 b.1	I-515	10
14	Perovo	3389	Yes	Zelenyy prospekt, 49	I-515	9
14	Perovo	1182	No	Metallurgov St., 44 b.2	I-515	9
17	Kuntsevo	2605	Yes	Ekateriny Budanovoy St., 1/12	I-335	12
17	Kuntsevo	2614	No	Molodogvardeyskaya St., 18 b.2	I-515	12
22	Fili-Davydkovo	2900	No	Amin'yevskoye hwy, 32	I-515	19
22	Fili-Davydkovo	2900	Yes	Artamonova St., 8 b.2	KPD-4572	19
23	Novomoskovsky Administrative Okrug	3361	No	Shcherbinka, Yubileynaya St., 10	I-447-38	14
23	Novomoskovsky Administrative Okrug	3360	Yes	Shcherbinka, Simferopol'skaya St., 4		14
25	Shcherbinka settlement	3356	Yes	Shcherbinka, 40 Let Oktyabrya St., 1	I-464	5
25	Shcherbinka settlement	3356	No	Shcherbinka, Lyublinskaya St., 8	I-467	10
26	Shcherbinka settlement	3359	Yes	Shcherbinka, 40 Let Oktyabrya St., 6/1	I-447	19
26	Shcherbinka settlement	3359	No	Shcherbinka, Vysotnaya St., 6		10
26	Shcherbinka settlement	3359	No	Shcherbinka, Vysotnaya St., 9	I-464-17	5
32	Timiryazevskiy	437	No	Ivanovskaya St., 22	I-510	12
32	Timiryazevskiy	437	Yes	Dmitrovskoye Hwy, 15 b.2	I-510	12
36	Maryina Roshcha	658	Yes	2st Mar'inoy Roshchi St., 14	I-515	8
36	Maryina Roshcha	658	Yes	2st Proyezd Mar'inoy Roshchi, 17	I-515	3
36	Maryina Roshcha	658	No	2st Mar'inoy Roshchi St., 14 b.A	I-515	15
37	Rostokino	749	Yes	Malakhitovaya St., 9	I-511	19
37	Rostokino	749	No	Prospekt Mira, 192	I-510	11
37	Rostokino	749	No	Rostokinskaya St., 1	I-510	10
38	Pokrovskoye-Streshnevo	2964	No	Polesskiy Proyezd, 6 b.1	I-510	12
38	Pokrovskoye-Streshnevo	2964	Yes	Polesskiy Proyezd, 6 b.2	I-510	13
39	Mikhaylovo-Yartsevskoye Poseleniye	3381	No	Shishkin Les, 21		18
39	Mikhaylovo-Yartsevskoye Poseleniye	3381	Yes	Shishkin Les, 19		18
40	Presnenskiy	99	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 19a	I-515	18
40	Presnenskiy	99	No	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 25	I-515	9
41	Presnenskiy	100	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 7a	I-515	5
41	Presnenskiy	100	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 9a	I-515	4
41	Presnenskiy	100	No	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 7	I-515	9
42	Donskoy	1783	No	Sevastopolskiy Prospekt, 3 b.2	I-511	10
42	Donskoy	1783	Yes	Sevastopolskiy Prospekt, 7 b.5	I-510	10
45	Tsaritsyno	1997	Yes	Kaspiyskaya St., 28 b.2	I-510	12
45	Tsaritsyno	1997	No	Kaspiyskaya St., 28 b.1	II-32	6
45	Tsaritsyno	1997	Yes	Kaspiyskaya St., 28 b.3	I-515	4
52	Lyublino	1421	Yes	Taganrogskaya St., 11 b.3	I-515	9
52	Lyublino	1436	No	Novorossiyskaya St., 17	I-515	9
57	Zyuzino	2194	Yes	Kakhovka St., 15 b.1	I-510	11
57	Zyuzino	2194	No	Kerchenska St., 3	I-515	18
57	Zyuzino	2194	Yes	Kakhovka St., 15 b.2	I-510	7
58	Konkovo	2242	No	Profsoyuznaya St., 110 b.3	I-515	27
58	Konkovo	2227	Yes	Profsoyuznaya St., 93 b.1	I-515	16

Table A2: List of concrete buildings.

	May 2017		May 2017		August 2018		August 2018	
Higher ed. share, raion	-1.0906**	(0.4625)			0.1698	(0.2556)		
2013 mayoral, turnout	-2.3564***	(0.6236)	-2.2770***	(0.6242)	-0.1610	(0.3386)	-0.2313	(0.4331)
2013 mayoral, Sobianin's vote share	0.0260	(0.6989)	0.8452	(0.6064)	0.6848	(0.4188)	0.8585*	(0.4766)
2013 mayoral, Navalny's vote share	-1.5695*	(0.8117)	-0.2209	(0.7770)	-0.7574*	(0.4213)	-0.2129	(0.5098)
Distance to metro, km	-0.0070	(0.0225)	0.0604	(0.0447)	0.0077	(0.0144)	0.0134	(0.0280)
Brick walls	-0.2588***	(0.0386)	-0.2033***	(0.0300)	-0.2090***	(0.0319)	-0.2474***	(0.0284)
Non-standard project	-0.1090***	(0.0351)	-0.0753***	(0.0232)	-0.0811***	(0.0205)	-0.0503***	(0.0168)
State-managed	0.0082	(0.0495)	0.0578	(0.0727)	0.0338	(0.0262)	0.0121	(0.0271)
Condition, 0-excellent, 1-poor	-0.0682	(0.1814)	-0.2048*	(0.1201)	0.0964	(0.1174)	0.0419	(0.1039)
Car owners	-0.2590	(0.1639)	-0.0896	(0.1377)	-0.6534***	(0.1793)	-0.3700**	(0.1775)
Retirees	-0.1318	(0.1997)	0.1401	(0.1748)	-0.6151***	(0.1907)	-0.4297**	(0.1776)
Children	-0.2534	(0.2703)	-0.2886	(0.2270)	-0.3526	(0.2319)	-0.2656	(0.2365)
Work in health care	-1.2127*	(0.6796)	-1.1302*	(0.6122)	-0.3519	(0.4406)	-0.0364	(0.4903)
Work in education	1.1523	(0.7374)	-0.0911	(0.5541)	0.4146	(0.6745)	0.1078	(0.7348)
Work in culture	-0.6036	(1.5024)	-0.0449	(1.2853)	-1.0263	(1.4064)	-1.6335	(1.4673)
Work in utilities	-3.0358	(2.6993)	1.5495	(1.1750)	0.6598	(1.5253)	0.1310	(1.6840)
Work in transport	1.1356	(1.1472)	-0.7304	(0.8524)	3.0047***	(1.1015)	3.0667***	(1.0963)
Privatized land	-0.0133	(0.0494)	0.0149	(0.0374)	-0.0381	(0.0345)	-0.0152	(0.0408)
Undesignated land	0.0957***	(0.0236)	0.0513**	(0.0223)	0.0581**	(0.0265)	0.0837***	(0.0252)
District FE	NO		YES		NO		YES	
N	5306		4606		2411		2321	
Pseudo R2	.2279		.3812		.1866		.2782	

The table reports average marginal effects from logistic regressions, evaluated at means of other variables. The first two models are for the inclusion of buildings in the May 2017 list. The third and fourth are for the inclusion of buildings in the August 2018 list, conditional on not being in May 2017 list. Higher ed. share is the fraction of people with higher education in a raion according to 2002 census. 2013 mayoral electoral returns are fractions, given at UIk (electoral district) level. Brick walls and Non-standard project are 0 or 1. State-managed is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district GBU zhilishnik. Overall condition is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor); the latter 4 variables are from reformazkh.ru. Privatized and Unmarked land are dummy variables. SE clustered at district level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B3: Inclusion of buildings in May 2017 and August 2018 lists.

Appendix C Additional Robustness Checks

Robustness checks in this section are described in Section 5.2.

	Program knowledge	Program attitudes
May 2017 list	0.3102*** (0.0520)	0.3871*** (0.0519)
Male	-0.0906 (0.0552)	-0.0063 (0.0549)
Age	0.0109*** (0.0025)	-0.0016 (0.0025)
Higher education	0.0942* (0.0556)	-0.2176*** (0.0554)
Income	0.2404 (0.1715)	0.2002 (0.1717)
Unemployed	-0.2211 (0.2124)	-0.3807* (0.2137)
Retiree	-0.1510 (0.0980)	0.1831* (0.0980)
State employee	-0.1381** (0.0674)	-0.0691 (0.0671)
Privatized apartment	0.0667 (0.0571)	0.0103 (0.0568)
Number of rooms	0.0452 (0.0487)	0.0381 (0.0486)
Residents per room	0.0317 (0.0461)	0.0488 (0.0462)
Wood window frames	-0.1359** (0.0596)	-0.0008 (0.0595)
State-managed building	-0.0103 (0.1286)	0.4960*** (0.1279)
N	1336	1296
R2	0.1658	0.1988

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. In column 1 the dependent variable is the individual's awareness of the renovation program (1 - <Hear about it for the first time>, 2 - <Heard something>, 3 - <Know well>). In Column 2 the dependent variable is the individual's attitude toward the program (1 - <Completely negative>, 2 - <Somewhat negative>, 3 - <Somewhat positive>, 4 - <Completely positive>). <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C4: The effect of redevelopment program on the program knowledge and attitudes.

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.0754*	-0.0009	-0.0032	-0.0102	0.1757***	-0.0369
	(0.0402)	(0.0453)	(0.0449)	(0.0592)	(0.0487)	(0.0514)
5-story building not on May 2017 list	-0.0592	0.0014	-0.0409	-0.1369**	0.0198	-0.0257
	(0.0513)	(0.0517)	(0.0518)	(0.0540)	(0.0570)	(0.0542)
Male	0.0236	-0.0539	-0.0576	-0.0299	-0.0692*	-0.0660
	(0.0402)	(0.0461)	(0.0435)	(0.0489)	(0.0369)	(0.0413)
Age	0.0086***	0.0038	0.0026	0.0009	-0.0005	-0.0014
	(0.0020)	(0.0026)	(0.0031)	(0.0020)	(0.0019)	(0.0021)
Higher education	-0.0448	-0.0572	-0.0547	-0.1108***	-0.1990***	-0.0786
	(0.0461)	(0.0517)	(0.0507)	(0.0388)	(0.0397)	(0.0512)
Income	-0.2710**	-0.0157	-0.1150	-0.3144***	-0.5041***	-0.1061
	(0.1265)	(0.2210)	(0.2368)	(0.1158)	(0.1421)	(0.1588)
Unemployed	0.0351	0.4142***	0.2905***	0.1692	-0.1280	0.3469***
	(0.1865)	(0.0602)	(0.0984)	(0.1598)	(0.1742)	(0.0579)
Retiree	0.0220	-0.1335*	-0.1124	-0.0500	-0.0720	0.0404
	(0.0786)	(0.0780)	(0.0798)	(0.1008)	(0.0834)	(0.0717)
State employee	0.2194***	0.0880*	0.1575***	0.1291**	0.1385**	0.0805
	(0.0434)	(0.0498)	(0.0433)	(0.0612)	(0.0572)	(0.0495)
Privatized apartment	0.0840*	0.1202***	0.1594***	-0.0848	0.0196	0.1327***
	(0.0493)	(0.0391)	(0.0420)	(0.0580)	(0.0463)	(0.0477)
Number of rooms	-0.0412	-0.0276	-0.0027	-0.0174	0.0964**	0.0057
	(0.0400)	(0.0412)	(0.0531)	(0.0429)	(0.0437)	(0.0353)
Residents per room	0.0612	0.0253	0.0008	0.0044	0.0829**	0.0443*
	(0.0471)	(0.0280)	(0.0382)	(0.0340)	(0.0324)	(0.0259)
Wood window frames	-0.0022	0.0041	0.0977**	0.0855*	0.0455	0.0253
	(0.0440)	(0.0419)	(0.0478)	(0.0463)	(0.0554)	(0.0495)
N	1848	1938	1938	1880	1882	1937
R2	0.0333	0.0111	0.0168	0.0177	0.0297	0.0108

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. SEs are clustered at building level. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C5: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (no building group FE, appended data from Moscow-wide sample).

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.1641*** (0.0546)	-0.0564 (0.0442)	0.0197 (0.0467)	0.1747*** (0.0560)	0.1589*** (0.0603)	-0.0055 (0.0518)
Male	0.0357 (0.0626)	-0.0942 (0.0664)	-0.0570 (0.0670)	0.0101 (0.0662)	-0.0934* (0.0537)	-0.0737 (0.0620)
Age 18-25	0.0384 (0.1376)	-0.3604*** (0.1231)	-0.1849 (0.1694)	0.2358** (0.1019)	0.0505 (0.1088)	0.0553 (0.1503)
Age 18-25 × May 2017 list	-0.3731* (0.1948)	0.3147* (0.1628)	0.0377 (0.2042)	-0.4528*** (0.1367)	-0.2915* (0.1665)	-0.2379 (0.2121)
Higher education	-0.0979 (0.0614)	-0.1164** (0.0549)	-0.0787 (0.0656)	-0.0729 (0.0591)	-0.1843*** (0.0597)	-0.0479 (0.0739)
Income	-0.2717 (0.2058)	0.1898 (0.1982)	0.1708 (0.1943)	-0.3026 (0.2201)	-0.3124* (0.1866)	0.0833 (0.2087)
Unemployed	-0.1574 (0.2389)	0.4004*** (0.0893)	0.2823** (0.1325)	0.2041 (0.2064)	-0.1419 (0.2521)	0.2668*** (0.0820)
Retiree	0.1539* (0.0865)	-0.0330 (0.0789)	-0.0121 (0.0874)	-0.0680 (0.0988)	-0.0970 (0.0818)	0.0416 (0.0796)
State employee	0.2230*** (0.0629)	0.0576 (0.0666)	0.1462** (0.0635)	0.0190 (0.0707)	0.0655 (0.0715)	0.0887 (0.0781)
Privatized apartment	0.0700 (0.0628)	0.0306 (0.0585)	0.1042* (0.0588)	-0.0060 (0.0623)	-0.0096 (0.0544)	0.0410 (0.0594)
Number of rooms	-0.0798 (0.0512)	-0.0721 (0.0532)	-0.0705 (0.0561)	-0.0599 (0.0612)	0.0557 (0.0567)	-0.0232 (0.0561)
Residents per room	-0.0160 (0.0565)	0.0034 (0.0448)	-0.0566 (0.0478)	-0.0220 (0.0579)	0.1051** (0.0503)	0.0179 (0.0443)
Wood window frames	-0.0142 (0.0534)	-0.0545 (0.0540)	0.0653 (0.0550)	0.1035* (0.0621)	0.0018 (0.0606)	-0.0331 (0.0577)
State-managed building	0.2133* (0.1107)	0.1411 (0.0972)	-0.0471 (0.1196)	0.0867 (0.1199)	0.1899 (0.1544)	0.2862* (0.1597)
N	1281	1336	1337	1294	1301	1335
R2	0.0877	0.1041	0.0986	0.1197	0.1093	0.0910

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. Building group fixed effects. SEs are clustered at building level. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C6: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies, impressionable age effect.

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.1637** (0.0653)	-0.0431 (0.0503)	-0.0021 (0.0557)	0.0513 (0.0627)	0.0662 (0.0748)	-0.0205 (0.0641)
Male	-0.0186 (0.0725)	-0.1165 (0.0791)	-0.0999 (0.0825)	0.0412 (0.0744)	-0.0286 (0.0610)	-0.0810 (0.0721)
Age	0.0056 (0.0041)	0.0064* (0.0037)	0.0043 (0.0039)	0.0011 (0.0028)	0.0030 (0.0032)	-0.0015 (0.0042)
Higher education	-0.0562 (0.0698)	-0.0876 (0.0609)	-0.0877 (0.0729)	-0.1167* (0.0602)	-0.1838** (0.0710)	-0.0340 (0.0839)
Income	-0.2198 (0.2585)	0.4779* (0.2436)	0.2588 (0.2853)	-0.2674 (0.2727)	-0.1835 (0.2344)	0.3631 (0.2641)
Unemployed	-0.2880 (0.2967)	0.4254*** (0.0961)	0.4829*** (0.0916)	0.4391** (0.2177)	0.2929 (0.1843)	0.4036*** (0.0933)
Retiree	-0.0135 (0.1511)	-0.0707 (0.1347)	-0.0945 (0.1425)	-0.0803 (0.1491)	-0.0646 (0.1234)	0.1277 (0.1328)
State employee	0.2431*** (0.0751)	0.0295 (0.0817)	0.1722** (0.0759)	0.0937 (0.0865)	0.1486* (0.0821)	0.1143 (0.0870)
Privatized apartment	0.0256 (0.0849)	0.0263 (0.0704)	0.0959 (0.0757)	-0.0322 (0.0748)	-0.0405 (0.0571)	0.0399 (0.0766)
Number of rooms	-0.0899 (0.0619)	-0.0290 (0.0617)	-0.0339 (0.0672)	-0.0402 (0.0743)	0.0801 (0.0618)	-0.0090 (0.0715)
Residents per room	0.0028 (0.0780)	0.0570 (0.0516)	-0.0499 (0.0626)	-0.0429 (0.0712)	0.1260** (0.0593)	-0.0120 (0.0610)
Wood window frames	-0.0357 (0.0627)	-0.0439 (0.0610)	0.0855 (0.0717)	0.0794 (0.0776)	0.0181 (0.0791)	-0.0057 (0.0699)
State-managed building	0.1701 (0.1262)	0.0465 (0.1034)	-0.1033 (0.1434)	-0.0458 (0.0831)	0.0237 (0.1373)	0.2344 (0.2027)
N	925	967	967	937	947	966
R2	0.0890	0.1216	0.1068	0.1145	0.1145	0.1031

OLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. Building group fixed effects. SEs are clustered at building level. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C7: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (building group FE, within-uik groups only).

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
Voted	0.1702** (0.0710)	-0.0291 (0.0583)	0.0343 (0.0614)	0.1729** (0.0749)	0.1827** (0.0866)	-0.0448 (0.0684)
Male	0.0352 (0.0610)	-0.0995 (0.0644)	-0.0601 (0.0647)	0.0120 (0.0635)	-0.0932* (0.0517)	-0.0719 (0.0607)
Age	0.0075** (0.0032)	0.0062** (0.0029)	0.0056* (0.0029)	0.0014 (0.0025)	0.0005 (0.0027)	-0.0004 (0.0032)
Higher education	-0.0937 (0.0613)	-0.0939* (0.0528)	-0.0646 (0.0614)	-0.0839 (0.0554)	-0.1835*** (0.0586)	-0.0449 (0.0691)
Income	-0.2476 (0.1976)	0.1898 (0.1933)	0.1787 (0.1887)	-0.2899 (0.2117)	-0.3185* (0.1830)	0.0762 (0.2035)
Unemployed	-0.1617 (0.2340)	0.3879*** (0.0890)	0.2771** (0.1259)	0.2040 (0.1954)	-0.1445 (0.2431)	0.2912*** (0.0762)
Retiree	-0.0224 (0.1150)	-0.1529 (0.1078)	-0.1252 (0.1055)	-0.1181 (0.1202)	-0.1104 (0.1036)	0.0643 (0.0992)
State employee	0.2223*** (0.0601)	0.0561 (0.0645)	0.1459** (0.0617)	0.0187 (0.0697)	0.0702 (0.0698)	0.0953 (0.0757)
Privatized apartment	0.0593 (0.0646)	0.0224 (0.0573)	0.0969* (0.0575)	-0.0073 (0.0620)	-0.0073 (0.0536)	0.0483 (0.0588)
Number of rooms	-0.0813 (0.0496)	-0.0705 (0.0509)	-0.0699 (0.0542)	-0.0627 (0.0602)	0.0509 (0.0558)	-0.0194 (0.0553)
Residents per room	-0.0069 (0.0564)	0.0179 (0.0440)	-0.0459 (0.0474)	-0.0253 (0.0572)	0.1014** (0.0487)	0.0184 (0.0450)
Wood window frames	-0.0193 (0.0512)	-0.0669 (0.0522)	0.0570 (0.0540)	0.1078* (0.0609)	0.0055 (0.0584)	-0.0296 (0.0569)
State-managed building	0.2668** (0.1210)	0.1471 (0.0958)	-0.0282 (0.1219)	0.1177 (0.1218)	0.2087 (0.1613)	0.2854* (0.1579)
N	1281	1336	1337	1294	1301	1335
R2	0.0824	0.1010	0.0992	0.1092	0.1002	0.0897

Second stage of 2SLS regressions. Outcome variables are z-scored. Building group fixed effects. SEs are clustered at building level. For the first stage, we regress whether the individual voted on the building's inclusion in the May 2017 list. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. <Difficult to answer> response is treated as missing. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C8: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies, one-sided non-compliance.