**Should Hypothesis Testers Spend Less Time Testing Hypotheses?**

**Abstract**

In the last decade, the field of psychology has experienced a so-called replication crisis. Issues with low replication rates, publication bias, inflated false-positive rates, low statistical power, and questionable research practices have been continuously demonstrated through so-called meta-scientific studies – studies using science to study the scientific process itself. Until recently, explanations for the replication crisis have primarily focused on statistical methodology, problematic publishing practices, and poor incentives. Many solutions have been proposed, including distinguishing between confirmatory (hypothesis testing) and non-confirmatory (hypothesis generating) research. Following these discussions, many steps have been taken to “tighten the screws” (Scheel et al., 2021, p. 744) on confirmatory research to reduce error and misrepresentation, including the preregistration of hypotheses and analysis plans. In the last years, however, the focus has shifted towards unresolved problems with measurement practices and theory development. It is becoming increasingly realized that no amount of statistical rigour can protect oneself from poorly specified theoretical concepts and inadequate measurement practices - a problem that has been both highlighted and disregarded within psychology for over 50 years. As a result, some are now arguing for an increased focus on non-confirmatory research as a means to facilitate a cumulative, incremental science of psychology.