



UNIVERSITÀ
DEGLI STUDI
DI PADOVA



DIPARTIMENTO
DI INGEGNERIA
DELL'INFORMAZIONE

Lecture 09

Projects

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How to make a 7/7 project

- 1 Choose a topic (of scientific interest), and find a problem that is suitable for game-theoretic analysis
 - Multiple players, different objectives
- 2 Check what other people have already done on the topic
 - No need for a systematic review, but at least make sure not to reinvent the wheel!
- 3 Start simple, make a lot of assumptions, and then gradually drop them
 - Even simple models can provide good insights on a problem (e.g., Cournot duopoly)
- 4 When possible, run experiments/simulations and evaluate objective metrics (e.g., throughput for networks, monetary cost for power grids)
 - Does the game-theoretic solution lead to good outcomes? Comparison with optimization? Price of Anarchy?

How to make a 7/7 project

- More tips:
 - Your grade is not proportional to the complexity of your game: focus on a model that accurately describes your problem
 - When investigating related work, do not invest too much time on the math, especially when it is overly complicated: focus on experimental results and takeaways
 - ChatGPT-generated text = 0 points (you can use it to check the grammar, though)
 - Plagiarism = 0 points

How to make a 7/7 project

- Deliverables:
 - Report: 5–8 pages, double column, 10 pt
- Report sections:
 - **Introduction:** describe the setting and the problem that you are investigating; explain the core idea of your project
 - **Related work:** report few references that are closely related to your work or that investigate analogous problems
 - **Analysis:** characterize the game that you are considering, clearly defining players, strategies and payoffs; find NE, subgame-perfect NE, Bayesian NE, etc.; if your analysis results in an algorithm, it should be reported in this section
 - **Results:** show the obtained results, preferably using plots, tables, etc.; compare them with other works, and/or with other possible solutions (e.g., computing the PoA)
 - **Discussion:** discuss limitations and/or possible extensions
 - **Conclusion:** summarize your results in few words

- Automatically accepted topics
 - Anything of scientific interest *and novel*
- Conditionally accepted topics
 - Inflated topics (blockchain, 6G, edge/fog computing) → Lots of game theory works on these topics, you must come up with something really novel/interesting
 - Quantum game theory
 - Board games and videogames → Models must be realistic and lead to algorithms that can actually be implemented (that means no chess, no poker, and no Starcraft)
- Automatically rejected topics
 - Politics and elections
 - Any model that is too scuffed or arbitrary
- **Advice:** Choose a topic that is interesting for you (related to your thesis, previous projects, or personal interests)

- If you are not sure whether your topic is acceptable, just ask
- Different groups can choose the same topic but cannot do the same game-theoretic analysis
- References and examples of previous projects will be uploaded on e-learning

- **Important:** On November 16, 2023, 14:30 there will be a presentation in **classroom Te** about some tabletop games
- These games are valid project topics (automatically accepted)
- Of course, your grade will still depend on the quality of your game-theoretic analysis

- **Group formation and topic selection:** November 20, 2023, 23:59 (Italian time)
- **Project submission:** January 28, 2024, 23:59 (Italian time)
 - E-learning forms will be soon available
 - You can withdraw from the project at any point in time before the deadline and receive the 3-point bonus
 - Once you have withdrawn from a project, you cannot re-join it or join another one

LoRa networks

Topics: Networks, IoT

- **LoRa**: proprietary modulation designed for energy-constrained devices (e.g., IoT) that need to communicate at long distance (LoRa = long-range)
- LoRa modulation utilizes a technique called “chirp spread spectrum”
- The modulation is parametrized by a number called **spreading factor** $(SF) \in \{7, 8, \dots, 12\}$
 - A low SF means higher data rate \rightarrow faster transmission, preferable for the transmitting device
 - A higher SF means more reliable transmission (devices that are more distant from the base station must use a higher SF)
 - Multiple devices using the same SF interfere with each other \rightarrow want to avoid using the same SF as other devices

- *Main reference:* Tolio et al. Spreading factor allocation in LoRa networks through a game theoretic approach. In ICC 2020-2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.
- **Spreading factor allocation problem:** There are N devices scattered around a base station, they must decide which SF to use
- If there is only one device, it's easy: just set $SF=7$
- If there are multiple devices, you need to account for interference

- Optimization model: the base station assigns the SF to each device
- **Game theory model:** the devices decide their own SF according to their belief about the rest of the network
 - *Multiple players:* the devices
 - *Actions:* the spreading factor $SF \in \{7, 8, \dots, 12\}$
 - *Multiple objectives:* data rate of each device (lower in case of interference)

Simplified game


- Assumptions: only 2 devices; both close enough to the base station (can use SF7); if no interference \rightarrow utility = 13 - SF; if interference \rightarrow utility = 0
- $N = 2$ devices with $S_1 = S_2 = \{\text{SF7}, \text{SF8}\}$ (SF9 or higher is strictly dominated)

		Device 2	
		SF7	SF8
Device 1	SF7	0, 0	6, 5
	SF8	5, 6	0, 0

- This becomes a simple **anti-coordination** game

Simplified game

- q = probability device 1 plays SF7
- r = probability device 2 plays SF7



- **Algorithm:** devices play SF7 with probability $6/11$, SF8 with probability $5/11$

Dropping some assumptions


- Assumptions: only 2 devices; ~~both close enough to the base station (can use SF7)~~; if no interference \rightarrow utility = $13 - \text{SF}$; if interference \rightarrow utility = 0
- Same-distance case (minimum SF is SF_j for both)

		Device 2	
		SF_j	$\text{SF}_j + 1$
Device 1	SF_j	0, 0	$12 - j, 12 - j - 1$
	$\text{SF}_j + 1$	$12 - j - 1, 12 - j$	0, 0

- Need to handle also other cases (see paper)


- Result of the game-theoretical analysis: algorithm that each device executes locally
- Input: distance from base station
- Output: probability $p(\text{SF}_j)$ associated with each SF
- Devices choose their SF according to p

- Publicly available ns-3 simulator for LoRa networks:
<https://github.com/signetlabdei/lorawan>
- Simulation: game theory algorithm versus baseline approach
(use lowest available SF) for variable number of devices (N)



What can be improved?

- Previous model is a static game: time dimension is neglected
- One may consider a **dynamic game** where devices have the **option to alternate SF**




- Many resource allocation problems can be modeled as anti-coordination games
- Players maximize their utility when choosing different options
- Similar to multi-path routing problems, in which nodes prefer to choose different paths
- Analysis of long-term collaboration → Multi-stage or repeated games
- Modeling uncertainty about nodes status → Bayesian games

Mobile/IoT Crowdsourcing

Topics: Data science, IoT, Privacy

- Organizing large-scale data collection is hard
- Possible solution: **crowdsourcing**, i.e., an organization or research team collects data from volunteers through an online platform



- *Main reference:* Dasari et al., 2020. Game theory in mobile crowdsensing: A comprehensive survey. *Sensors*, 20(7), p.2055.
- Data collected via crowdsourcing: mobile data, IoT data, wearable data
- Main hurdles:
 - **Privacy:** Collected data is often sensitive (location, activity data, lifestyle) → How do users know that they can entrust this information to the data collector?
 - **Quality of data:** In contexts where users receive a reward, they may decide to send inaccurate data or large volumes of data → How does the data collector handle these cases?

Toy example

- Game between user and data collector
- User has possible strategies: donate (D) or not (N) his/her data
- Data collector has possible strategies: use privacy-preserving algorithms (P) or use standard algorithm (S)
 - Standard algorithms give higher utility K to the data collector but may lead to privacy leaks with probability q ;
 - privacy-preserving algorithms give lower utility k
 - The user receives a reward r in exchange for their data; however, privacy leaks cause a loss in utility $-\ell$

		Data collector	
		P	S
User	D	r, k	$r - \ell, K$
	N	$0, 0$	$0, 0$

Toy example

- Numerical example: $K = 2$, $k = 1$, $r = 1$, $\ell = 2$

		Data collector	
		P	S
User	D	1, 1	-1, 2
	N	0, 0	0, 0

- In this case, there is only one NE
- However, cooperation may be enforced via repetition of the game (we will see this later in the course)
- Intuition: building a good reputation to increase payoff on the long term


Power grids (smart and non-smart)

Topics: Electrical engineering


Power grid



- **Traditional grid model:** centralized distribution network (generator) that produces alternate current powering the whole network



- **Modern power grid:** some of the consumers are also generators (solar panels, wind turbines, etc.)
- This may lead to interference with the central distribution
- Sometimes *power curtailment* is necessary (central distribution pays solar panel owners to limit production)



- **Smart grid:** decentralized distribution network where
 - power usage and loss are monitored by sensors
 - multiple power sources (micro-grids) communicate with each other
 - automatic decisions are possible
- current use cases: retailers profiling their customers
- ideal use case: automatic handling of conflicts and power loss

- **Possible games** (*main reference*: Saad et al., 2012. Game-theoretic methods for the smart grid: An overview of microgrid systems, demand-side management, and smart grid communications. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 29(5), pp.86-105.):
 - Cooperative games between micro-grids to minimize power loss
→ are coalitions sustainable?
 - (Bayesian) non-cooperative games between consumers → selfish consumption may lead to power outages
- Remark: In these applications, strategy sets are typically continuous (how much energy to buy, sell, etc.) → NE are found as stationary points as in the Cournot duopoly
- You may use PandaPower for simulations:
<http://www.pandapower.org/>

Network intrusion detection and response

Topics: security, networks

- Network **intrusion detection** consists in the task of identifying ongoing attacks within a network (reconnaissance, phishing, malware, DoS, etc.)
 - NID is not an exact science, you have uncertainty in the detection
- Network **intrusion response** is how attacks are handled
 - You cannot just block all traffic and interrupt all services (that would be the perfect DoS)

- An intrusion detection game is an adversarial game between an attacker (hacker) and a defender (the target network/company)
- However, it is not necessarily a zero-sum game: the defender wants not only to protect itself from the attack, but also to maintain the usual activity
 - Utility function can be application-specific
- Simplest case: the attacker chooses between different types of attack, some easier to detect than others; the defender decides on the policy to adopt, it could be a conservative policy or a relaxed policy

- More possible games (*main reference*: Kiennert et al., 2018. A survey on game-theoretic approaches for intrusion detection and response optimization. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(5), pp.1-31.):
 - **Resource allocation** → Which nodes in the network should be monitored?
 - **Response optimization** → React immediately, or wait and collect information on the attacker?

- Tips for a more realistic model:
 - Rather than a generic network, think of a specific target for an attacker (a bank? a factory? a hospital?)
 - Different networks may have different vulnerabilities and may be targeted by different types of attack
 - E.g., see: Hu et al., 2020. Optimal decision making approach for cyber security defense using evolutionary game. IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, 17(3), pp.1683-1700.
 - Once you have decided on a target, you can use knowledge-bases like Mitre Att&ck (<https://attack.mitre.org/>) to research common attacks used against similar targets

Shapley value and data/feature selection

Topics: machine learning, data science

- In machine learning, we may encounter the following problems:
 - Too many features, need to determine which ones are important (feature selection)
 - Different data sources, need to estimate their individual value (data valuation)
- The Shapley value allows to estimate the value of features or data sources
- Game-theoretic intuition: consider a coalition of n players (features or data sources); the Shapley value of player i is its marginal contribution to the coalition

- Consider a coalition $C = \{1, \dots, n\}$ of n players, and a utility function $v : 2^C \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ representing the value of sub-coalitions
- The Shapley value of i is computed as

$$\varphi_i = \sum_{S \subseteq C \setminus \{i\}} w(|S|) \cdot (v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S))$$

with

$$w(k) = \frac{k!(n-k-1)!}{n!}$$

- The weight $w(|S|)$ is to compensate for having $1/w(|S|)$ possible coalitions of size $|S|$

- Consider a ML problem where you have either many features or heterogeneous data sources
- Choose a suitable utility function (e.g., accuracy for classification problems)
- Select top k features or data sources out of n according to their Shapley value
- Bonus: Shapley value is hard to compute for large values of n (Complexity is $O(2^n)$); use approximators such as Monte Carlo estimation or gradient-based methods
- *Main reference*: Ghorbani and Zou, 2019, May. Data shapley: Equitable valuation of data for machine learning. In International conference on machine learning (pp. 2242-2251). PMLR.

More topics

- **Autonomous vehicles** = self-driving cars
- **Traffic-related scenarios** can be modeled as games: reacting to moving obstacles, **multi-story parking**
- *Main reference*: Crosara et al., 2023, June. Game Theoretic Analysis of Overtaking Maneuvers for Autonomous Vehicles with Moving Obstacles. In 2023 International Balkan Conference on Communications and Networking (BalkanCom) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.

- **Jamming** = an attacker aims to disrupt communications at the physical layer using noise
- Simplest jamming game: multiple available channels, attacker needs to decide which channel to disrupt, transmitter should try to avoid that channel (zero-sum game)
- *Main reference*: Scalabrin et al. A zero-sum jamming game with incomplete position information in wireless scenarios. In Proceedings of European Wireless 2015; 21th European Wireless Conference 2015 May 20 (pp. 1-6). VDE.