or not, in many parts of the world Marxism (or Leninism or Maoism) has turned out to be not an elaboration of but a substitute for Christian faith and the power of the Gospel. As for *b*), if the analysis in question is merely superficially "marxist," the original question has been erased – Christians have not "adopted" marxist analysis; they have adopted only what rather superficially *passes* as "marxist." In any event a Christian should not have to live in fear of being labeled "marxist," just because he opposes what Marxists too oppose.

THE PROBLEM OF UNBELIEF

When we look about our contemporary world we may well wonder whether the phenomenon of unbelief is a problem to more people than is that of belief. In 1881 Nietzsche said that atheism was the "temper of the West, "and we might be inclined to say that his words are truer today than they were then. It has become as difficult for half the world to understand how anyone can believe in God as it has for the other half to understand how anyone could not believe. In such a situation the temptation is to look upon unbelief as a peculiarly modern phenomenon – whether it be judged an indication of decadence or of progress. The fact is, however, that there never was an age in which unbelief did not manifest itself in one form or another; so much so that the problem of unbelief has always been inseparable from the fact of belief. The Hebrew prophets bear eloquent testimony to the presence of unbelief, even though the problem for them was primarily one of inadequate or misdirected belief. It was even a problem for the pagan world, as we can see if we read the Tenth Book of Plato's Laws, which contains, so to speak, the classic description of the varieties of unbelief. Speaking of outlawing atheism Plato tells us that there are three types of atheism against which the rulers of the state should be on their guard. First, he says, there are those who simply do not believe that there are any gods. Secondly, there are those who say that there are gods but that they have no concern with human affairs. Finally, there are those who affirm the existence of the gods and think that they can be won over by human gifts. As a final note to his description Plato informs us that the last of these are the worst of the three.

In somewhat more modern terms we might translate Plato's triple division into a double one, each member of which can then be subdivided. There is first of all the unbelief of the unbeliever, and this is really of two kinds: non-belief, which is the attitude of the atheist or agnostic, who just does not see any reason why he should believe; or anti-belief, which is the attitude of those who believe that they have positive reasons for disbelieving. Then there is the unbelief of the believer, which Plato saw, and we might well also see, as really the greater problem. Here, too, the subdivision can be a double one: there are those who, like Plato's second class of atheists, believe in a God Who makes no difference in their lives – theirs is a belief without commitment, which is to say that it is not belief – and there are those who believe in a God who submits to their legalisms – theirs is a belief in a non-god, or, it is not belief in God. We might add that there is a

third form in which the unbelief of the believer manifests itself—a form not considered by Plato—where unbelief is an inseparable negative moment in progressive belief. This sort of unbelief is which makes belief to be living faith and not dead certitude.

In a very real sense it is the unbelief of the believer which must concern us (without it the unbelief of the unbeliever might well not be a problem), but in order to render this more intelligible we must first look at the first or negatively negative form of unbelief—remembering, of course, that we are not going to solve any problems in this area by talking about it, unless it be that talking will bring about that which is essential: dialogue and action.

Atheism and Agnosticism

The twentieth century is pluralistic in a way that no other century before it was, and for this reason we can no longer be satisfied with a simplistic division of men into "believers" and "unbelievers." In each there is too much of the other. At the same time, however, the distinction is not meaningless; belief and unbelief are different, and it is possible to understand one and the other by contrasting each with its opposite number. The fact, then, is that there are atheists; there are those to whom no idea of God speaks at all, who have simply experienced no felt need of a being superior to man. For such, we might say, God or no God, their only experience is of His silence. It is a silence, of course, which even religious men—a Job or a Pascal—have experienced, but in the present instance silence is interpreted as absence. In a world where hatred and cruelty, injustice, hunger and misery hold sway and the innocent suffer, men look for God to speak, and they cannot discern His accents. So, they choose to ignore Him.

Perhaps, however, the problem is not that God is silent but that He chooses to speak through men and that they, even "believers," do not speak the language of God. The unbeliever looks at Christianity, for example, and what does he find? In it he finds, despite its lofty pretensions, the same ambition and ruthlessness, the same selfishness, self-satisfaction, and self-justification, the same dishonesty as elsewhere. It is difficult for him to believe that this sort of thing is supernaturally energized; above all it is difficult, when he frequently finds more "Christian" virtue in unbelievers than he does in Christians. We might argue, of course, that he is wrong to conclude from the weakness of Christians to the absence of the Christians' God, but the fact is that the God men believe in is, to a large extent at least, the God whom man makes to his own image—man cannot continue to be man and totally escape anthropomorphism. In any age, in any culture, the

characteristics which God manifests are largely a projection of the ideals of the age or the culture. This can be understood, and it need not be an obstacle; but when the projection becomes the whole reality, it is small wonder that a later age and another culture with different ideals will tend to reject it. Not only does man make God to his own image, but the image is more often than not an antiquated one; men themselves make it difficult to believe in such a God.

God, of course, survives these successive images, but for men there is always a problem. Again and again the problem has been solved in a new image, but the old image dies hard, and its passing leaves wounds behind it. The "Lord of Hosts," the "God of Armies," the avenging God of the Hebrews is no longer with us, but there is no erasing His traces from the religious literature of the West. For a long time the "spiritual principle" of the neo-Platonists dominated Christian thought, threatening to leave us with a God so separated from the world that the only way to reach Him was for man, too, to separate himself from the world. It is questionable, of course, just how "spiritual" such a God is, but there is no question of the harm which the image created. Then there was the God created in the image of the Constantinian "Imperator," who was recognizable by the favors and privileges He showered on his loyal subjects and by the promise of reward He gave to those who did not manage to be so fortunate in this life. With the coming of feudalism and the Holy Roman Empire God resembled more and more the medieval "Lord," and His Church was structured on the model of the imperial realm, leaving us a heritage of legal formalism which with difficulty we are beginning to shake off. No less embarrassing for Christianity was the explanatory God of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By filling the gaps in man's scientific knowledge He substituted miracles for honest scientific research. By fostering a static interpretation of creation He permitted His Church to place obstacles in the way of understanding a developing world. Worst of all, by permitting man to escape the harsh realities of this life in the hope of an afterlife which would right the wrongs of this one, He impeded the march of democracy and earned for the religion which cultivated him the title of "opium of the people." Nor is the image-making over; we still must contend with the twentieth-century God Who is invoked to bless nuclear weapons or Italian troops marching into Ethiopia.

It should cause no surprise that none of these images of God speaks to modern man; from such as these man simply turns away without interest. At this level, then, the problem of unbelief can well come down to the question as to whether the God men are asked to believe in is believable, whether believing in such a God would be a

significant human attitude. More than that, it is not very difficult to see that in these circumstances disbelief could be a more religious attitude than belief. One wonders if it was not something like this which prompted Feuerbach's remark that "the atheism of today is the religion of tomorrow." Here it might be well to remember that Socrates, who in the eyes of some Christian generations was a "saint," was condemned in his own age for being an atheist, or that both Socrates and Jesus Christ were rebels against the smug beliefs of their own times. The greatest enemy to authentic faith has always been the false god.

ANTI-THEISM

There is, however, another form of unbelief which is at once more vigorous in its opposition and more positive in its orientation. We can call it the unbelief of anti-theism, and it makes a certain sense where mere atheism does not, whether it be propounded by a Marx, a Nietzsche, or a Sartre. In this attitude the negation of God is not primary; the affirmation of man is. It is a "humanism," which opts for man as the supreme value, resting its negation on the conviction (presumably sincere) that God is an obstacle to man's becoming truly human. There are, of course, subtle differences. Sartre will reject any conceivable God, since a God would have to combine in Himself those attributes which would forever relegate man to a secondary role in the working out of his destiny. Marx, on the other hand, is less concerned with denying God than he is with rooting out religion, the attitude which debases ("alienates") man and turns him away from the supremely human task of creation – the creation of a better world and a better humanity. For Nietzsche it is the God in Whom men *de facto* believe Who causes the difficulty; He is the enemy of all things earthly and, therefore, of all things human. All three are convinced not merely that the only formulae for dealing with God are couched in a language which does not speak to modern man but that it is degrading for man to relate himself to any God whatever.

In one way or another the humanist sees freedom,self- determination, as that which most authentically characterizes man as man, and it sees God as a threat to this freedom. Where values are not only simply given (where man has no share in determining them) but are also absolutized in such a way that the very questioning of them becomes infidelity, man is tempted to rebel. Merely human institutions have been sanctified as "the will of God" (which is but a shorthand expression for the way the group with an inside track sees things), and any attempt to change these institutions becomes revolt

against God. This was once true with regard to slavery; it is still true with regard to other institutions which consecrate human inequality. There are still the few who call apartheid the will of God; and there are the many who look upon the private ownership of the means of production in the same light. Small wonder that even the faith of the believer is shaken when one by one the institutions sanctioned by "God's will" are called into question.

It becomes imperative, then, that we be honest and ask ourselves whether Christianity has not in fact frequently stood in the way of progress, whether it has not stood on the side of the *status quo* and opposed even the kind of revolution without which human history would not be history. Faith is not weakened by this sort of honesty; it is strengthened. Honesty, then, demands that we seriously ask whether the complaints of the anti-theists are not at least partially justified. Some believers, of course, are not all believers, but it is a not uncommon view of faith – on both sides of the dividing line – which sees it as committed to an antecedently established divine plan and not to a creative humanity whose task it is to transform the world and itself in the process. Now, although the view is by no means characteristic of belief, if some believers can in fact look with equanimity at the real evils in our present world and leave to God the responsibility of righting its wrongs hereafter, one might at least understand the nonbeliever who mistakes the meaning of belief. We cannot, for example say that Christianity has magnified God by minimizing man – the long reign of *The Imitation of Christ* as the paradigm of Christian spirituality forestalls that. We cannot even say that standard seminary training and religious formation – which, presumably, set the tone for Catholic training in general – have in the past been willing to emphasize genuinely human values, that they have not been predicated on the imposition of a preconceived ideal, where legalism drives out freedom and religious life eliminates private life.

One wonders, then, whether sometimes the humanist unbeliever is not more Christian than the Christian believer, whether, without knowing it, he magnifies God by magnifying man – more than he who of set purpose seeks to magnify God. Nor is it too strange that, if an atmosphere has been created where humanism tends to be equated with atheism, the reaction should be to equate theism with anti-humanism. If the believer, then, is to assert, as it would seem he should, that man without God is not truly man, he must do more than assert it. He must be able to show concretely that this is indeed the case. Perhaps, however, this can be done only against the backdrop of an enduring possibility of denying God – and here once more the unbeliever performs a service to belief, by making it something to be

fought for, even interiorly.

Belief Without Commitment

It is difficult to say, however, that a kind of unbelief which is all too frequent among "believers" performs a service to anything or to anyone. The paradox is this: the believer accepts God, therefore he cannot be said to reject Him – that would be too blatant a contradiction – but nevertheless, if he does not affirm what belief necessarily implies, his belief is at the same time a nonbelief. Belief cannot stop at affirmation – without commitment to what is affirmed affirmation is empty, a mere formalism. The question, then, is: What is commitment, what can it mean to be committed to God? The answer is that commitment to God is meaningless, unless it be also – and, if we are speaking of direct commitment, primarily – commitment to man. Now, if this means anything, it means loving man, precisely because he is man, not because love is a divine command or a moral law, not because in loving man we are loving God, but because we have eyes to see that man is lovable and that we are less than human if we do not love him. Love is not something we do, rendering ourselves more perfect by doing it; love is a relationship, a response to the value which man as man embodies. It is precisely this character of response which the term "charity" tends to obscure, with its emphasis on fulfilling a duty to God. This, too, compels one to ask how many Christians really love – a problem when "charity" is something which is "practiced" or "worked at," but a problem which becomes particularly acute when one considers the views of some "Christians" regarding Jews, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Communists!

Perhaps what we must do is to recognize that it is not our task to safeguard the interests of God – He is quite capable of taking care of that Himself – but rather to safeguard the rights of man, even against the intolerable demands of a legalistic God Whom we have fashioned to ourselves. This does not mean that we have to deny, or even to question, the principle of authority – that would ultimately be equivalent to denying God – but it does mean asserting the possibility of questioning the exercise of authority. To deny that would be the apotheosis of authority, a turning away from the true authority of God Himself. Opposition to authority, then, can be unbelief; but it can also be safeguarding authority from itself, a commitment which belief in authority itself involves.

As Christians, then, we must recognize the possibility of a very healthy anticlericalism, if by that we mean the refusal to let authority overstep the bounds of its own competence. The problem comes at a

level of what we might call clerical or ecclesiastical thinking, which may or may not be genuinely authoritative. Concretely – if somewhat crudely – the question might be asked: to what extent can a good Catholic disagree with the party line? Is there room for independent thinking in matters theological, to say nothing of the philosophical, the scientific, or the artistic? The complaint is not entirely groundless that priests tend to do our thinking for us, even in nonreligious matters that they will make decisions for us, where our own should be the arbiters. We have all experienced the not uncommon pundit attitude among priests. The question, however, is whether Catholicism as such fosters such an attitude. Is it true that there is a Catholic position on every question of moment, that we deviate from that position only at the risk of casting suspicion on our orthodoxy? Is there a Catholic position on pacifism, such that the Catholic may not even speculate on the subject? If one questions the possibility of realizing in the twentieth century the abstract conditions for a just war, is that, as one theologian has said, not thinking according to the mind of the Church? Are we supposed to retreat from a discussion on social reform when someone rouses the specter of "creeping socialism?" Is it temerarious, or even disloyal, to recognize good elements in dialectic materialism? Is there really a "mind of the Church" in all these matters, making it impossible for Catholics to think independently in such areas? From another point of view, is a Catholic free to push his investigations, scientific or otherwise, as far as reason and the available evidence permit, without running the risk of censure? And, even if in theory he is free, it might still be objected that in practice he is not, that existing pressures can create a psychological atmosphere of fear inimical to disinterested research, even on matters which have not been settled by any authoritative decision of the Church.

Today it is the rare Catholic who seeks to defend the Inquisition or the Crusades, unless it be by the somewhat negative argument which says that the actions of an earlier age should not be judged by the standards of a later. Suppose, however, in the light of our present standards, we put the question in another way. Would a Catholic have been disloyal if, at the time of the Inquisition, he had questioned its justifiability? Would it have been unchristian in the twelfth century to have seen the Crusades as an unjustifiable expenditure of human life (both Christian and Moslem) for the acquisition of that to which Christians had no right and which under the conditions was not worthwhile acquiring? If today we can admit that the Church has not always been right in its decisions, can we also admit that those who opposed those decisions at the time they were made may have been performing a Christian duty? It is said that the theologians of the

sixteenth century condemned Galileo, but refused to look through his telescope, presumably because the disturbing world it revealed was too much for their categories. In that instance who had the greater faith, Galileo or the theologians?

All this inevitably brings us to the matter of questioning in our own day: can it be done, should it be done, should it be encouraged? Questioning, of course, cannot imply the antecedent assurance that the answer will be unfavorable to the present position—that would not be questioning, it would be affirmation. It would seem, nevertheless, that loyalty itself could demand questioning even where to some the issue seems already to be settled. There is, then, a loyal way of asking whether the Catholic attitude toward divorce should be so uncompromising as it is or whether the matter of birth control should not be left to the educated consciences of those who are immediately involved in the problem. It need not be disloyalty which questions whether an unconditional rule of clerical celibacy is the best thing for the needs of the modern Church, or whether all the arguments in the question of state support to Church-related schools are on the side of the Catholics. It would be worse than sad if, in twenty-five years, we were to find positions changed, only to look back and see that those who foresaw the need of change were charged with disloyalty—or suspect faith—in their day.

What all this comes down to is that only a strong faith, a confident faith, can refuse to be wedded to the past, to a past which is weighted down with its absolutized formulations. It also means that the task today is not that of preserving the past, it is that of squaring faith with contemporary experience as former ages always managed to do. What we must do, then, is to recognize without embarassment that faith, too, is historical, that it must, while remaining essentially the same, in every age keep pace with experience. If dogma is to be dogma, it cannot change; but this does not mean that it cannot be reconceptualized; above all it does not mean that it cannot be reformulated. This, then, brings us back to the question of the extent to which our belief is truly belief and not a hidden unbelief. If we think that the cause of the God in Whom we believe can be advanced by anything short of total honesty, to that extent our belief is not belief but superstition. Honesty puts demand upon us which cannot be brushed aside, and honesty demands of us that we ask ourselves the question: Where have we failed, to what extent do we make of belief a mockery, which cannot hope to claim the adherence of honest men? Might it even be possible to say that commitment without belief is preferable to belief without commitment?

SMUG BELIEF

The indictment of dishonesty, formalized, legalistic faith has been severe, and yet as Plato saw, and we must too, this is not the worst possible state. Belief which is not belief is bad; belief in a god who is not God is worse. Plato called it belief in gods who could forget their dignity so far as to be appeased by merely human gifts, who could, in fact, be reduced to subhuman dimensions by a belief which molds them to its own desires. In one very real sense we are free from that, because the gift we offer to God is not merely human—in all humility we see in it not a human but a divine gift, the gift of God's own Son. In offering this gift we recognize, at least in theory, that we are also offering ourselves, not in order to appease God but in order to raise ourselves to the level of the divine. Nevertheless, without disputing the truth of the offering we make we should recognize that it carries within it its own built-in risk. To recognize the validity of the gift we offer is to run the risk of believing that we have an inside track with the God to Whom we offer the gift. But to do this is to believe in an ungodly God, one who permits a particular group to relate itself to Him in such a way that it simply knows that others are in error, and then permits the same group to dismiss what might be the salutary counterbalance of other opinions by mouthing the consoling dogma that "error has no rights."

If the God we have thus enthroned is one Who allows us to see all our human efforts as ultimately oriented to securing our own personal salvation, there is serious question as to whether we have not made to ourselves a God Who is not worthy of His own creatures. We do not, I suppose, experience any difficulty in recognizing that faith in such a God is scarcely distinguishable from superstition—but that is not even the question. The question is, To what extent do we effectively encourage this kind of superstition by the type of devotion we countenance? More importantly, to what extent do we, in an age in which the structure of human society has changed and is continuing to change so much, tend to limit God by perpetuating an ecclesial—or clerical—structure, which simply contradicts the structure of society itself, at a time when reforms in organizational structure are everywhere recognized as necessary? Presumably there is in the Church a hierarchical structure of sacramental orders which is inseparable from its divine institution but this essential, pastoral structure too frequently becomes obscured by a structure of honorific titles, which is scarcely more than political and which puts into the hands of individuals a power which no man can safely wield. Can belief survive when He in Whom we believe is hidden by the very structures which

were calculated to make His revelation available to men?

LIVING FAITH

There is an answer, if only partial, to that last question in the very character of belief which makes it different from knowledge. Belief is a process, a sort of calculus, always approaching, but never achieving, complete grasp. There is, then, present in it—there must be present in it—that negative moment of unbelief which makes it living faith rather than dead certainty. Just as all but absolute being is partially non-being, all but absolute truth is partially non-truth, all but absolute goodness partially non-goodness, so all belief, by the very fact that it is belief, is partially non-belief. Nor can there be absolute belief; such would not be belief at all, but total knowledge.

Perhaps the most startling manifestation of the negative moment of non-belief at the very heart of belief is to be found in the Church as a whole—or, for that matter, in the whole of Christendom—where belief and sin exist side by side, for to believe and still be sinful is to believe and disbelieve simultaneously. Sin is simply foreign to the logic of a belief which is at once affirmation and commitment. Nor is this to endow sin with some sort of metaphysical necessity; it is simply to acknowledge historically that this is the way men are.

Continuing in the historical perspective we can see another manifestation of the dialectical tension between belief and non-belief in the very existence of the pluralistic society which is ours, where the beliefs of some negate the beliefs of others. The solution of this is not to dissolve the pluralistic into a monolithic society; rather it is to recognize that the negative moment of non-belief contributes to the vitality of belief as belief.

More significantly still, perhaps, there is within the very activity of believing a dialectic of believing and not believing. If we are honest we must constantly acknowledge that we scarcely know what we mean when we say, "I believe in God." The very terms of the formulation are obscure; only with time and a great deal of effort can they be even partially clarified. A lifetime is not enough for us to know fully what we mean when we say, "I." The preceding analysis should make it manifest that the implications of "believe" can be grasped, if at all, only in fleeting glimpses. As for "God," our faith itself tells us that only God Himself knows what that term signifies. It is not merely the inadequacies of our formulations, however, which make belief at best partial; it is the inadequacy of our experience. At different stages in our development we employ the same formulas (we do not ordinarily seek a substitute for "I believe in God"), but the formulas could

continue to have the same content only at the price of stagnation. What they say to us today cannot, must not, be what they will say to us tomorrow. But, if they do not say to us all that they can possibly say, then, partially at least, they do not say the truth. Belief cannot stand still; it is oriented toward ever more adequate belief and ultimately toward vision, but short of vision our belief is predominantly ignorance.

The negative moment of unbelief has another, more important, function—we might call it the function of purifying belief. Only if we retain the power to disbelieve in the image we have created for ourselves can we overcome the danger of believing in a false god. We have seen this in the history of the world; we should be able to see it in our own history. We are told by contemporary philosophers that to know the truth of a statement is to know what it would mean for it to be false. We can go further and say that to know the truth of a statement is to know the extent to which it is also partially false.

To get back to the question of God, can our faith in Him be truly faith if it cannot face the question: Suppose there is no God? For some the response maybe that of Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov: without God "all is permitted." This is the God Who defines and sanctions good and evil. To throw aside the distinction between good and evil, when God is thrown aside, is to have no God in the first place. Or perhaps the response is that of Nietzsche: there is no God, therefore man himself must shoulder the responsibility of creating a genuinely moral world. Here at least God is not utilized as a means to moral ends, and belief in Him becomes a significant option. Such an attitude need not at all be incompatible with belief. It added luster to the faith of a Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who could speak of modern man's task as "learning to live as though God were not there." Bonhoeffer's willingness to die for a conviction, for the grandeur of man, even if there were no God, is supreme proof of the reality of his faith. There is a desperate courage in unbelief, and the willingness to face it as even a possibility highlights the courage of belief. Faith must not be a haven for our desire of security; it must, as Kierkegaard says, be accompanied by a sense of risk—which goes with an absence of rational certainty—if it is to be worthy of being called faith. Belief demands courage; not merely the courage to suffer persecution for what one believes, but even more the courage to accept the risk of believing rather than knowing. Albert Camus said that the big question for man in the twentieth century is, "Can one be a saint without God?" Only if one can will he ever be a saint with God.

We have seen that the modern humanist fears that God, any God, constitutes a threat to man's freedom of self-determination. It is the

task of the modern believer to show concretely, by the way he lives his belief, that to limit freedom, as one does by the free decision of faith, is not to destroy but to enhance freedom. To be more specific, it is the task of the Catholic believer to show that he is more free in believing than he would be in not believing. He must be able to acknowledge that Catholic faith – in the eyes not only of its opponents but even of some of its proponents – has been identified with all sorts of backward positions (scientific, economic, social, political) and that, nevertheless, he can find in it the means of facing an uncertain future with a full measure of human responsibility for that future.

If the Catholic can do that, then he can look without perturbation at growing unbelief – whether in the unbeliever or the believer – because he can see in it a vital force which in the long run will enhance the beauty of truth.

PHENOMENOLOGY AS RESOURCE FOR CHRISTIAN THINKING

Since the title of this paper points to a somewhat new way of relating philosophical thought and Christian religion, it might be well at the outset to reflect a bit on its meaning. To begin with, I take "resource for Christian thinking" to mean "that to which the Christian can go for significant intellectual support of his religious commitment." Since, however, "phenomenology" is primarily an instrument of *philosophical* methodology, it scarcely seems reasonable to expect from it direct support of a specifically religious commitment. A philosophical methodology cannot enter directly into religious commitment at all. Quite obviously, for example, the Christian cannot put this sort of thing on a level with revelation, which supplies both content and motivation for his faith. Nor can a philosophical method be equated with the ministry of the Word, which makes available to mind and heart the content of revelation. There can, furthermore, be no question of comparing it with grace whose function is to fortify the Christian's subjective response to the object of his faith, nor is it to be counted along with prayer and worship which implement and elaborate this response. By the same token, it can in no way be placed alongside the sacraments which embody concretely the grace whereby the Christian lives, prays, worships. Finally it must be said, though some might want to dispute this, that phenomenology cannot be looked upon as strictly speaking contributing to the methodology of the Christian's theology, which on the one hand interprets for him the very meaning of revelation and, on the other, exercises control over the ministry of the Word. If, then, phenomenology is to have significance for Christian thinking, it must be by way of the help it can give to the sort of reflection on religion which we can call a Christian philosophy of religion (or, perhaps, a philosophy of Christian religion).

Having said this, however, we are forced back to an even more fundamental question as to just what a philosophy of religion can be. That it is neither religion, nor a substitute for religion, all, I think, will agree. Religion is not and must not become philosophical thinking. It must not, therefore, and cannot be an intellectualizing of genuine religious commitment – that would be a denaturing of religion. Nor is philosophy of religion to be looked upon as a rational reflection on the content of faith, as though, so to speak, religion had to stand trial before the bar of reason before it could legitimately make claims on