

the government-owned corporations and to reorganize the Philippine National Bank, a move which the two, on behalf of the legislature, opposed. Wood consulted the offices of the judge advocate general and the attorney general which in their decision of 9 November 1926, declared that the Jones law vested supreme executive control in the governor-general and that it was unconstitutional for the legislature to compel him to share his powers with the Board of Control. Upon receiving this favorable opinion, Wood proceeded to abolish the board. Quezon and Osmeña countered by elevating the case to the Philippine Supreme Court which, in April of the following year, upheld the legality of Wood's decision. On 14 May 1928 the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court.

The Veto Question

The differences between Wood and Quezon spread to the use of the veto power. Quezon criticized Wood of using his veto power unrestrictedly, for example, during the legislative sessions of 1924-1925, when Wood vetoed 17 bills, mostly pertaining to the remittance of taxes and the imposition of penalties for tax delinquencies and the postponement in the payment of provincial loans. Wood also vetoed the legislature's appropriations for the Commission on Independence, the executive-legislative Emergency Board, legislative reference and research offices, the Philippines' dues as a member of the Interparliamentary Union, and the sending of a delegate to the League of Nations. In the 1925-1926 and 1926-1927 legislative sessions, Wood continued to use his veto power, rejecting a total of 68 bills. Among those that he vetoed were bills that required franchise grantees to affirm that they understood the aspirations of the Filipinos for independence and bound them not to oppose such aspirations; bills directing the office of the governor-general to issue bonds to finance local government projects but not empowering the governor-general to judge their feasibility; and bills changing the appropriations and salaries made by the legislature.

Commission of Independence

The promise of independence handed down by the Jones law greatly inspired Filipino nationalist leaders to take a more active stance in the campaign for independence. On 7 November 1918, the Partido Nacionalista unanimously passed a concurrent resolution providing for the appointment of a Commission of Independence for the purpose of studying all matters related to the negotiation and organization of the independence of the Philippines. The resolution empowered the commission to make recommendations to the legislature on such matters as ways and means of negotiating the grant and recognition of the independence of the Philippines; external guarantees on the stability and permanence of said independence as well as territorial integrity; and ways and means of organizing in a speedy, effectual and orderly manner a constitutional and democratic internal government.

The legislature confirmed and ratified the creation of the Commission of Independence. On 8 March 1919, it passed a joint resolution instructing the continuation of the said commission until its purpose had been attained. Moreover, it gave the commission the full power and jurisdiction to act for the legislature and to represent it in all aspects during its recess. Also approved on the same date was a "Declaration of Purposes" for the guidance of the commission, which it urged firstly, to work for the early grant of Philippine independence; and secondly, to relieve the people of the anxiety which two decades of American occupation had greatly accentuated.

The commission was originally made up of 11 senators and 40 congressmen. It was presided by Senate President Manuel Quezon, and House Speaker Sergio Osmeña. It held its first session on 8 November 1918, during which it discussed plans to send a mission to the United States for the purpose of securing the final adjustment of matters affecting national independence. On the following 15 November, the legislature passed a resolution approving the planned action of the commission. At the same time, it gave the mission the special duty during its sojourn to the United States of "strengthening the bonds of good will and mutual

confidence that existed between the peoples of the United States and the Philippines and to procure the full development of the commercial relations between both countries."

Independence Missions

The first independence mission left for the United States on 23 February 1919 aboard the American military transport *Sherman*. Its official members numbered 40. Quezon was the chairman and Rafael Palma the vice chairman. Representing the legislature, aside from Quezon and Palma, were Pedro Sison (senator, second district, Pangasinan), Vicente Singson Encarnacion (senator, first district, Ilocos), Rafael Alunan (representative, Occidental Negros, majority floor leader), Emiliano Tria Tirona (representative, Cavite, minority floor leader), Gregorio Nieva (representative, Tayabas), Mariano Escueta (representative, Bulacan), Manuel Escudero (representative, Sorsogon), Pedro Anuario (representative, Mountain Province). The cabinet was represented by Rafael Palma, who was concurrently the secretary of the interior, and by Dionisio Jakosalem, secretary of commerce and communications. Ex officio members included Jaime C. de Veyra and Teodoro Yangco, resident commissioners, and Pablo Ocampo, former resident commissioner. Other members of the mission represented various interests such as agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor. Serving as technical advisers to the mission were Quintin Paredes, attorney general; Jose Abad Santos, assistant attorney general; Conrado Benitez, dean, college of liberal arts, University of the Philippines; Jorge Bocobo, dean, college of law, University of the Philippines; and Camilo Osias, assistant director of the bureau of education.

The mission arrived in Washington, D.C. on 3 April 1919. Wilson was not there to receive it since he had gone to Europe for the peace conference on the recently concluded world war. Secretary of War Newton Baker received the mission, and it was to him that the mission presented the "Declaration of Purposes and Instructions of the Mission" from the Commission of Independence. Briefly, the instruction of the mission was

to convey to the government of the United States the frankest assurance of the good will, friendship and gratitude of the Filipino people and to submit with as much respect as well as confidence the question of Philippine independence, with a view to its final settlement.

Secretary Baker gave the mission warm and reassuring encouragement in the following words:

The Philippine Islands are almost independent now. Your legislature governs the Islands. The strongest tie between the Philippine Islands and the United States at the present time is this tie of affection of which I speak rather than the political. I know that I express the feeling of the President. I certainly express my own feeling—I think I express the prevailing feeling in the United States—when I say that we believe the time has substantially come, if not quite come, when the Philippine Islands can be allowed to sever the more formal political tie remaining and become an independent people.

But on 20 July, the Republican-dominated congress doused cold water on the hopes for an early grant of independence to the Philippines. It announced an indefinite postponement on the question of Philippine independence in view of the fact that only a few of the Republican and Democrat members of the congressional committee on Philippine affairs had been sufficiently impressed with the representation of the mission to take a stand in favor of freeing the islands at this time. Furthermore, the announcement stated that:

The general conclusion was that no step in this direction shall be taken until more convincing proof had been offered of the ability of the Filipinos to stand alone and continue to maintain institutions of government and education established by the United States which have brought such beneficent changes in the islands in twenty years. Moreover, it was deemed inadvisable to take a step of such great moment to those wards of the American Republic until the equilibrium of world conditions was restored.

Despite this setback, the hopes for an early grant of independence

did not entirely diminish. In the next few years, more independence missions were sent to the United States.

In 1922, the Philippine Parliamentary Mission was sent to the United States. It was chaired by Quezon, Osmeña, Pedro Guevara, and Jose Generoso, representing the Senate, the House of Representatives, the senate prottempore, and the house prottempore, respectively. From the Senate came Antero Soriano, Santiago Fonacier, Ceferino de Leon, Teodoro Sandiko, and Proceso Sebastian. From the House of Representatives came Guillermo Pablo, Pedro Abad Santos, Celestino Gallares, Vicente Llanes, and Emilio Virata. Teodoro Kalaw, the secretary of the interior, came as honorary member while Jorge Vargas, director of the bureau of lands, served as secretary of the mission. The mission's technical advisers were Maximo Kalaw, Wenceslao Trinidad, Jorge Bocobo, Antonio Sison, Arsenio Luz, and Dr. Justo Lukban.

Aside from presenting Harding a memorial requesting the implementation of the policy of granting independence as it was recommended by Wilson before him, the Philippine Parliamentary Mission refuted the findings and conclusions of the Wood-Forbes Mission by claiming the following:

1. A stable government has already been established in the Philippines. Therefore, the only prerequisite established by the Congress of the United States as a condition precedent to the granting of independence is fulfilled by the people of the Philippine Islands.

The granting of independence is the next logical immediate step.

2. From 1914 to 1921, with the Filipino people in greater control of their government, more rapid progress has been made and greater improvements effected in all Philippine activities—social, economic, and governmental—than in any other similar period in Philippine history. Therefore, the mere mention of backward steps and of taking away powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the Filipino people is politically unwarranted and indefensibly absurd.

3. During the period (1914-1921) the political capacity of the people has been tried and has met every acid test. In 1921 the

Philippine government was more scientifically and efficiently organized than in any other period in Philippine history. A successful reorganization of the executive departments had been effected. A budget system had been established. Increased activities and greater results were obtained from all the bureaus of the government, including the bureaus of education, justice, and lands and the Philippine Health Service.

4. The Filipino desire for independence is not born of ingratitude toward the United States but is the natural sequence of nearly a quarter of a century of joint American and Filipino efforts in the most successful experiment in democracy ever attempted in the tropics.

5. A further delay in the recognition of Philippine independence after so many years of patient labor and constant struggle will be prejudicial to the best interests of both the American and Filipino people.

6. The granting of independence at this time will be a strong factor for international peace.

The Roxas Special Mission was sent in 1923. The mission was composed of only four members. Manuel Roxas, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was chairman. The panel of technical advisers included Jaime C. de Veyra, Jorge Bocobo and Catalino Lavadia. This mission came with a joint resolution passed by the two houses of the legislature which demanded Wood's recall and the appointment of a Filipino governor-general as a result of the recent Cabinet Crisis. President Calvin Coolidge welcomed the mission, accepted its resolution but, in the end, sustained Wood's action.²⁹⁰ In response to the mission's resolution for the grant of independence, Coolidge said:²⁹¹

Although they have made wonderful advances in the last quarter century the Filipino people are by no means equipped, either in wealth or in experience, to undertake the heavy burden which would be imposed upon them with political independence. Their position in the world is such that without American protection there would be the unrestricted temptation to maintain an extensive and costly

diplomatic service and an ineffective but costly military and naval service. It is to be doubted whether with the utmost exertion, the most complete solidarity among themselves, the most unqualified and devoted patriotism, it would be possible for the people of the Islands to maintain an independent place in the world for an indefinite future. . . .

In the mid-1920s, congressional sentiment was largely favorable to the granting of independence to the Philippines. In a cabled message to Wood, a very much troubled Frank McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, noted "that the dominant sentiment in congress seems to be to get rid of the Philippine Islands."²⁹² By the time congress adjourned in 1924, a total of 11 independence resolutions and bills had been submitted. Sen. William King of Utah called for the negotiation of a treaty of neutrality between the Philippines and the United States, to be followed by the relinquishment of American sovereignty in 1935. Cong. Henry Allen Cooper's bill authorized the Filipinos to convene a constitutional convention to write a constitution for an independent republic and, thereafter, to form a government to which American sovereignty would be transferred.

But while congress was amenable to the early grant of independence to the Philippines, the executive branch, notably the war department and the Bureau of Insular Affairs, was not. Wood was called upon by these two offices to issue a statement to counteract the snowballing pace of independence resolutions in congress. Wood's statement dismissed the readiness of the Philippines for independence by citing "the absence of instructed public opinion, preparedness for defense, a common language, and economic resources." He urged the continuation of governance of the Philippines according to the provisions of the Jones law. The desire of the executive branch to withhold Philippine independence at this time was boosted by opportune events, the most important of which was the appointment of Cong. Louis Fairfield of Indiana to the house committee debating on the independence question. Fairfield was amenable to cooperating with the war department in weaning control of the committee

away from the independence-minded legislators. He introduced a bill which reconciled the opposing views of the house and the war department. His bill designated an interim autonomous Filipino government, to be known as a commonwealth, for a period of 30 years. On the final year of the commonwealth, a plebiscite would be held prior to the proclamation of independence.²⁹³

The Third Parliamentary Mission left in 1924. Leading the mission was Quezon, who was then the Senate president. Osmeña represented the Senate while Claro M. Recto represented the house. The two resident commissioners, Pedro Guevara and Isauro Gabaldon, attended to the mission.

The Osmeña legislative committee was in Washington, D.C. from 1925 to 1926. Sen. Sergio Osmeña was sent there as special envoy. Accompanying him were two technical advisers, Jose S. Reyes and Teodoro Kalaw. Osmeña's special adviser was Jose Abad Santos.

In 1927, another mission was sent to Washington. It was headed by both Quezon and Osmeña. Accompanying them were Arsenio Luz, Dr. Miguel Canizares, Rafael Trias, and Severino Concepcion.

Two delegations were sent in 1929, the first, a legislative tariff committee; the second, a parliamentary mission. The members of the legislative tariff committee were Manuel Roxas, House speaker, Senator Osmeña; resident commissioner Camilo Osias; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Rafael Alunan; and Urbano Zafra, technical adviser. The parliamentary mission was made up of Manuel Roxas, House speaker; Pedro Gil, House minority floor leader; Manuel Briones, House majority floor leader and Sen. Juan Sumulong of the Democrata Paty.

Another mission left for the United States in 1931 and stayed there until 1933. It was chaired by two men, Sergio Osmeña, the president pro tempore of the Senate, and Manuel Roxas. Together with them were resident commissioners Pedro Guevara and Camilo Osias; Ruperto Montinola, Senate minority floor leader; Pedro Sabido, Senate majority floor leader; and Emilio Tria Tirona, House minority floor leader. Joining the mission in late 1932 was Sen. Benigno Aquino. Maximo Kalaw was the technical adviser of the mission.²⁹⁴

Supreme National Council

Toward the end of the 1920s, the campaign for independence encountered more difficulties. The earlier favorable opinion of congress for an immediate grant of independence waned. The appointment of Fairfield and later Edgar Keiss of Pennsylvania to the House committee debating on the independence question made the Republicans the majority again. The independence campaign had become sluggish and unimpressive, largely due to financial constraints, specially after the insular auditor charged it as being unconstitutional and withheld its appropriations.²⁹⁵ To inject new life into the campaign, Quezon created the Supreme National Council. Designed to replace the Commission on Independence, the council was empowered "to direct Filipino policy on all matters that concern the campaign for independence, on all matters which may affect the relations between the Philippines and the United States, and on all matters affecting the administration of the interests of the country in general." The council was made up of five Nacionalistas and five Democrats. While it endeavored to present a united front in the campaign for independence, it achieved little by way of curbing Wood's efforts to diminish Filipino autonomy or to restrain congress from presenting bills inimical to the interests of the Filipino people, as in the case of the Bacon bill, which intended to convert the Moro Province (Mindanao) into an unincorporated territory of the United States to be governed independently of the rest of the Philippines.²⁹⁶

The Plebiscite Controversy

In 1927, Wood's veto of a bill passed by the legislature resulted in another stinging controversy. The bill in question provided for the holding of a plebiscite on complete, immediate, and absolute independence for the purpose of proving that the majority of Filipinos, and not just the politicians and the radicals, were in favor of independence. Wood vetoed the bill because the calling of a plebiscite to determine the attitude of the Philippines with respect to its relationship with the United States was a

matter not within the scope of the powers of the legislature under the Jones law. When the matter was elevated to Coolidge for a final decision, the president sustained Wood's veto. Citing the plebiscite as untimely due to the need to place greater priority on measures providing for economic and political progress, Coolidge predictably reiterated the Republican administration's stance against the grant of early independence to the Philippines.

Independence Congress

The inability to secure from congress a bill that would grant the Philippines immediate independence led Filipinos mostly private citizens, to hold an independence congress on 22-26 February 1930. The congress was participated in by representatives of business and agriculture, directors of civic organizations, leaders in various professions, publicists, educators, labor, religious and student leaders, municipal presidents, Moro chiefs, coworkers of Rizal and Del Pilar in Spain, veterans of the Philippine Revolution, elective officials of provincial governments, high officials of the former Philippine Republic, and past and present members of the Philippine Legislature. In behalf of the Filipino people, the congress participants passed a resolution:

... solemnly affirmed, with full realization of the consequences and responsibilities of political independence, that our people should be allowed to live an independent life and to establish a government of their own without any further delay and without any condition which makes its advent uncertain; hence, we respectfully reiterate our petition to the people and government of the United States to grant the Philippines immediate, complete, and absolute independence.

American Pressure Groups

The mid-1920s congressional sentiment for the early grant of Philippine independence was largely attributed to two interest groups in America capable of lodging political pressure on congress. These were the farm and labor groups.

McIntyre's cable message to Wood mentioned that the desire to get rid of the Philippines was due to opposition to the free admission of Philippine sugar, cigars and other products into the United States. American agricultural producers eventually supported moves for the independence of the Philippines in the belief that Philippine exports were responsible for the drop in prices of domestically produced sugar and tobacco. Using statistics to bolster their argument, these farm groups noted that sugar exports rose by 450 percent, coconut oil exports by 223 percent, and cordage by 500 percent.²⁹⁷ The general sentiment of the farm groups may be summarized in the speech which Harold Knutson of Minnesota delivered before congress. In that speech, he stated that "it is generally agreed that the Philippine Islands today constitute the greatest single menace to our dairy industry because of their huge exports to our country."

Despite studies made by the U.S. Tariff Commission that Philippine exports were not instrumental in bringing down prices of domestically produced materials, the farm groups lobbied incessantly for reduced quotas and higher duties. A case in point was the debate on the tariff bill, specifically the duty on sugar which the farm groups wanted raised to 3 cents per pound, up from the previous 1.2 cents. The debate on the sugar bill was so heated that it almost led to a vote for Philippine independence as most senators did not want to vote on an amendment to the bill arranging for a treaty of neutrality between the Philippines and the United States but on the independence of the Philippines. This surprising turn led Senator King to introduce again his earlier resolution authorizing Filipinos to convene a Constitutional Convention to draft a constitution for an independent government, and thereafter to bring that government into existence, whereupon American sovereignty would be relinquished to that government.

Another pressure group that underscored the imperativeness of an early grant of independence came from American labor groups. They were largely opposed to the immigration to the United States of Filipinos as laborers because they tended to provide cheap labor with their willingness to accept wages lower than the standard American rates. Filipino laborers also brought down the cost of living since they could live on a meager

subsistence diet and dismal living conditions, thus, American laborers could not compete with them.

Aside from the economic grounds on which the farm and labor groups supported resolutions calling for the grant of immediate independence for the Philippines, their reasons bordered also on racism. The labor and farm groups were against continued Philippine-American relations because of the fear of interbreeding which in their estimate would produce thousands of half-breeds, thereby resulting in the impurity of the white race.²⁹⁸

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THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, 1935-1941

Towards a Transition Government

The clamor for Philippine independence continued throughout the American period, and was expressed not only in political missions to the United States, but also through songs, art, the newspapers, and other means. In 1930, an independence congress was held in Manila to discuss concrete issues regarding independence, to show Americans the seriousness of the Filipino purpose.

By this time, the U.S. mood against Philippine independence was changing. On one hand, the traditional opponents of Philippine exports to the U.S., the beet sugar lobbyists, saw Philippine sugar as a threat. With the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929, the U.S. was plunged into the Great Depression, with businesses collapsing and the unemployed increasing. Greater attention was given to the threat that Philippine products supposedly posed to the American economy. Labor groups saw the influx of Filipino laborers as another threat. Some military officers further saw in the Philippines the U.S.' Achilles heel, a strategic liability which could not be defended. Given these varied interests which opposed the continued retention of the Philippines, the U.S. congress took up legislation which would set the Philippines free.

The bill called for a ten-year transition period during which a Philippine government called the Commonwealth would be established.

A constitution would be drafted by a Filipino convention, to be approved by the president of the U.S. The Commonwealth would be almost totally autonomous, except for foreign relations, finance and other major concerns which had to be approved by the U.S. president. This bill was vetoed by Pres. Herbert Hoover, but the congress passed it over Hoover's veto.

Known as the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act (HHC), this bill was passed when a Philippine independence mission, headed by Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas, was in Washington to lobby for Philippine independence. Osmeña and Roxas brought the HHC back to the Philippines, where it became the subject of partisan politics. Osmeña and Roxas urged its acceptance by the Filipino people, while Osmeña's rival, Manuel Quezon, called for its rejection. Osmeña and Roxas argued that it was the best legislation that the mission could get from the U.S., but Quezon pointed to the pitfalls of the bill, particularly the clause which allowed American military reservations to remain in the country even after independence. A plebiscite was called; it divided the nation into those in favor of the HHC - the Pros - and those against, or the Antis. In the end, Quezon and the Antis won, and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was rejected.

Quezon went to the U.S. to try to secure a better independence bill, but the law he came home with—the Tydings-McDuffie Act—was virtually a carbon copy of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, with minor changes in wording ("military and other reservations" was changed to "naval reservations and fueling stations"). Quezon could get nothing better, but when the act was voted upon, it was approved. With its adoption, the Philippines was on a clearer road towards independence from the U.S.

The 1935 Constitution and the Inauguration of the Commonwealth

With the acceptance of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the road to independence from the Americans was clear. A Constitutional Convention was elected in 1934; it completed its work in February 1935. The convention studied and considered the constitutions of various countries, culling sections here and there, but the main model of the 1935 constitution was the American constitution. The Commonwealth

government—and even the Philippine Republic after independence—would be based on the American system of three equal branches, with the executive headed by the president. Since the U.S. president had to approve the constitution, and since many of the delegates to the convention were products of the American educational system, it was no wonder that the influence of the U.S. constitution would be strong. In accordance with the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the 1935 constitution contained several transitory conditions which restricted some of the Commonwealth's powers. Foreign relations and currency would remain in American hands during the transition period; important laws needed to be approved by the U.S. president; an American high commissioner would serve as the U.S. president's personal representative and check on activities in the Philippines; and the Philippine president had to submit an annual report to the president of the U.S. Thus, although the Philippine Commonwealth would be largely autonomous, it was still not independent.

Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the 1935 constitution in March 1935, after which it was submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite. With the adoption of the constitution, the legal basis for the Commonwealth government was complete. Elections were held in September for the presidency and the National Assembly. Manuel Quezon won resoundingly as president, with Sergio Osmeña as vice president.

In lavish ceremonies, the Commonwealth was inaugurated on 15 November 1935. Since this was the first time any power in the world was preparing its colony for concrete independence, several ranking officials of the U.S. government attended the ceremonies: Vice Pres. John N. Garner; Secretary of War George H. Dern; Spkr. Joseph W. Byrnes of the U.S. Congress; 17 senators and 26 congressmen, among others.

The Programs and Problems of the Commonwealth

The Commonwealth had ten short years to prepare itself for independence from the U.S. In preparing for independence, it had to have the close cooperation of the U.S. in many of its plans, lest these go awry. Although there was nearly complete autonomy in other matters, foreign

relations and currency remained in the hands of the Americans; any bill in these fields had to be approved by the American president. The Philippine flag was allowed to be flown, but as a sign that the Philippines was not yet independent, the U.S. flag had to be flown above it. All Commonwealth officials and employees had to take an oath of allegiance to the United States before they took their oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth. The U.S. high commissioner replaced the governor-general of the pre-Commonwealth period. The last American governor-general, Frank Murphy, became the first high commissioner.

National Defense

A major problem the Commonwealth had to face was the establishment of an army for national defense. If the Philippines became independent and was unable to protect itself, it would only invite other powers to take over the country. Thus, a priority was the establishment of an army. Quezon sought, and was granted, the services of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, former chief of staff of the U.S. Army who had previously commanded the Philippine department.

MacArthur, together with Cols. Dwight D. Eisenhower and James Ord, framed a plan wherein a small Philippine regular army would be built up, based on the Philippine Constabulary, while a sizable reserve force would be trained throughout the country. After 10 years, at the cost of ₱16 million a year, each island in the Philippines would have sufficient trained men to be able to defend the country, thus serving notice to the world that the Philippines was determined to protect its freedom.

The plan faced many problems. Sixteen million pesos a year was too small to build an armed force to reckon with, considering the costs of modern military equipment. And yet, the sum was a heavy drain on the government budget, which had to increase its revenues. Although U.S. Army officers and men—in particular, from the Philippine Scouts—assisted in the build up of the army, weapons were held back by Washington and the Philippine department, afraid of an insurrection by Filipinos, or of sowing tension in U.S.-Japan relations with a large weapons transfer.

Attempts to obtain torpedo boats, for example, were received with little encouragement (in the first place, the U.S. navy did not have any tested models). The Commonwealth had to turn to the British to obtain these boats for coast defense. When weapons were eventually transferred, they were surplus weapons from World War I stocks, and their selling prices were more expensive than had earlier been decided upon.

American pacifists argued that U.S. support for the defense plan might militarize the Philippines or threaten to disrupt U.S.-Japan relations. Filipinos, on the other hand, grew suspicious of why the Americans held back on their weapons and showed a lack of support for the defense plan. Politics and other interests also stepped in, on top of which the basic premise of training masses of men rather than quality officers and men proved flawed.

When World War II broke out in Europe, Quezon saw the flaws in the plan and distanced himself from MacArthur, while attempting to modify the plan to make it more effective. Realizing that it would cost much more money, Quezon then stated that the Philippines could not be defended even if every Filipino was armed. Instead, he tossed the responsibility for military defense on the U.S., which had that responsibility, Quezon stated, until 1946, when the Philippines would become independent.

Economic Policies

An extremely serious concern for the Commonwealth was the building of a healthy economy which could stand on its own after independence. During the American regime, the Philippine economy had become dependent on the U.S. and had not been encouraged to diversify. Thus, the Philippines remained predominantly an agricultural economy, focusing on agricultural export crops: sugar, abaca, and tobacco. With the gradual imposition of tariffs and duties on Philippine crops going to the U.S., trade would become unprofitable and would collapse. The U.S. had not prepared the Philippines to trade with other countries, and thus the diversification of the economy was extremely important. Ten years was a

short time to achieve this, however. Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, gradual levying of duties would begin in 1941, such that by 1946, the scheduled date for independence, duties would be 100 percent. Attempts were made to develop and diversify local industries, increase local consumption, improve transportation and communication, and seek out other markets, but time was short, and incentives and funds were lacking. Furthermore, local sugar and tobacco interests preferred to extend the free trade relationship with the U.S.

In 1937, because of the gravity of the economic situation, Quezon and Roosevelt created the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, to study the economic problems and recommend solutions. The recommendations were embodied in a law which amended the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act, which extended the time for the phaseout of free trade, but limited the Philippine duty-free products through quotas.

The deteriorating security situation in Europe and the outbreak of war in September 1939 further worsened the situation of the Philippine economy, since ships were diverted away from their normal trade routes to Europe. Philippine exports began to drop, causing falls in revenues. As the economic situation worsened, the future began to look bleak, and some American companies in Manila began closing shop.

Plans were made to hold a joint U.S.-Philippine economic conference two years before independence, but before that date, war with Japan broke out.

Social Justice and Culture

Other problems faced by the Commonwealth included leveling the gaps between social classes in the Philippines. Quezon adopted several plans as part of his social justice program, among them buying the friar lands and redistributing them to farmers. This plan was started by the Americans in the early part of the century, but had not been followed through. Quezon took over from where the Americans left off and tried to implement land reform.

To try to alleviate the social tensions in the Philippines, the Commonwealth government sought to reform the judicial system to make it more accessible to the masses. It opened rural banks and encouraged the creation of cooperatives. It set a minimum wage and fixed working hours. These became major platforms of Quezon's Social Justice Program.

Despite the plans of the government, social conditions hardly improved, and the tensions which had led to the Sakdal uprising in 1935, on the eve of the Commonwealth's inauguration, persisted. In particular, peasant unrest was felt in central Luzon and the southern Tagalog region, where various antigovernment movements arose. Some of them were Communist, others Socialist, and still others, independent. Cases of strikes and violence occurred, resulting in the police and the army being called to quell the unrest. However, the problems of social inequality were never fully solved, and the military was accused of being a tool of the landlords.

During the Commonwealth period, women won the right to vote. They had previously not enjoyed this right. This led to a movement that eventually gave it to them.

Because of the strong influence of American culture and education, Quezon also sought to develop a stronger Philippine culture. He proclaimed Tagalog as the basis for the development of a national language, sought to increase the number of schools, and promoted the inculcation of a stronger sense of love of country.

Foreign Relations Initiatives

Although under the Tydings-McDuffie Act the foreign relations of the Philippines remained in the hands of the Americans, Quezon attempted to establish informal relations with China, Japan and Mexico preparatory to establishing official relations after independence. Some of the trips made by Quezon were not sanctioned by the Americans, in particular his second trip to Japan, which he tried to keep secret, because the Americans felt Quezon was exceeding his authority.

Quezon, however, sought to obtain from Japan some promise of security, wherein Japan would recognize the neutrality of the Philippines.

Although the Tydings-McDuffie Act stated that the U.S. would take steps to secure the neutrality of the Philippines, no such action had been taken. As the Sino-Japanese War dragged on in China and Europe drifted to war, Quezon tried to supplement his national defense plan with initiatives to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

Quezon's Politics

Quezon's influence on the Commonwealth government—in its executive, legislative and judicial branches—was distinct and pervasive; the Commonwealth was virtually the government of Quezon. The 1935 constitution had provisions to strengthen the position of the president; it catered to Quezon's desire to push the Commonwealth towards independence. The National Assembly became a virtual rubber stamp for Quezon's policies, and government appointments were all made with Quezon's approval or at his behest. Quezon further worked to unite some of the political factions to produce what he called a "partyless democracy." As international conditions deteriorated because of the rise of German, Italian and Japanese militarism and the outbreak of war, Quezon asked for, and was granted, emergency powers by the National Assembly. To some Americans, Quezon was becoming a dictator as totalitarianism rose in various parts of the world. Quezon defended his additional powers by saying that emergency conditions were already upon the Philippines, to which Roosevelt acceded to Quezon.

Initially, the Commonwealth government had a unicameral legislature called the National Assembly. Quezon wanted its speaker to be a virtual figurehead, and sought to have the legislature cooperate with the executive. This resulted in accusations that the legislature was a rubber stamp. In 1940, the constitution was amended, changing the National Assembly to a bicameral congress.

The 1940 constitutional amendments also changed the term of the president and vice president, from one six-year term, with no reelection, to a four-year term, with the possibility of reelection, provided the president would not serve for more than eight years.

Quezon got along with the first two U.S. high commissioners, Frank Murphy and Paul V. McNutt. The third high commissioner, however, Francis B. Sayre, did not sympathize with Quezon's one-man rule and disagreed with many of his plans. Quezon, on the other hand, disliked Sayre's moralistic attitude and tried to bypass him by dealing directly with President Roosevelt. Sayre and Quezon clashed on the eve of World War II, and were hardly on speaking terms.

All the plans that the Commonwealth had started, however—as well as the disagreements between Sayre and Quezon, and between MacArthur and Quezon—were abruptly shaken by the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941.

13

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

World War II broke out in the Pacific—and in the Philippines—on 8 December 1941. To place the war and the resulting Japanese occupation in perspective, it must be recalled that the Philippines had entered a preparatory period towards independence, wherein the Philippine Commonwealth government remained under the authority of the U.S. but was granted much autonomy in local affairs. With the American government scheduled to recognize Philippine independence in 1946, Filipinos saw the U.S. as an ally.

While the relations of Filipinos with Americans were generally cordial and friendly, their relations with the Japanese tended to be less close. Japan had risen to become the second-largest trading partner of the Philippines, but many Filipino intellectuals worried that Japan might take over the Philippines after the United States left. To some of them, Japan loomed as a menace, especially after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 and the start of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Japanese militarism and atrocities on mainland Asia were reported in Manila's newspapers regularly. But while the war in China seemed distant, one had only to look at the Philippines' backyard to see the large Japanese immigrant population in the country—the Japanese businesses in Manila, the ubiquitous Japanese barbers, gardeners, photographers, and vendors, and the large Japanese community in Davao.

A small minority of Filipinos, many of whom had studied in or visited Japan, tried to counter this fear by elucidating on the good side of Japan and minimizing the threat it posed. After all, both the Philippines and Japan, they explained, were Asian countries. The majority of the Filipinos, though, read the news but did not feel any imminent danger. What mattered most was that conditions were stable, that for as long as the American flag flew over the islands, the Japanese would not dare to attack.

It was at this point that World War II broke out in Europe, on 1 September 1939. The outbreak affected the Philippines adversely. Weapons which the government had ordered would no longer be available. Trade was disrupted as merchant ships were diverted to the Atlantic and, as a result, Philippine revenues dropped. U.S. economic measures against Japan also cut back Philippine exports. The Commonwealth's timetable, which had already been running late, was disrupted.

Despite the feeling of security that most Filipinos had in 1940-1941, the Commonwealth and American governments realized the need to prepare the civilian population for the ravages of war, should it break out. In April 1941, the government organized the Civilian Emergency Administration, but it worked slowly, beset by peacetime inertia. The CEA lagged behind civil defense preparations in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. Nevertheless, air raid drills, practice evacuations and some mobilization of the economy were started in mid-1941.

With Japan's occupation of the southern portion of French Indo-China, military preparations for the defense of the country began to move in earnest. The Philippine Army was called to the service of the United States, and a joint U.S.-Philippine Army command, known as the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), was created. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was recalled from retirement and put in command. Filipino reservists were called to the colors and inducted into the service of the U.S., and immediately began refresher training. Reinforcements—including modern B-17 bombers, new submarines and tanks—began arriving from the U.S. According to MacArthur's timetable, he would be fully ready by March 1942.

Outbreak of War and the Defense of the Philippines

The Pacific war broke out on 8 December 1941, as military and civilian preparations were still going on. Initially, most Filipinos were confident that the war would last only a few weeks, with the Japanese being repulsed from Philippine shores. Scores of young Filipino men enlisted in the Philippine Army. This was a war to defend the country and its way of life. Besides, the Japanese had bombed the cities of Baguio and Davao on the first day of the war. More decisive was the Japanese bombing of Clark Field, also on 8 December, which destroyed many of the fighters and bombers of MacArthur's air force. From the first day of the war onwards, the Japanese took control of the air over the Philippines. On 10 December, the Japanese bombed and completely destroyed the key U.S. naval base in Cavite, forcing the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to abandon Manila Bay as a base of operations. American control of the sea was thus also lost in the first few days of the war. As Manila itself was bombed, panic ensued. Civilians evacuated Manila, lootings took place, and bank runs occurred. The innocence of the so-called "peacetime" era vanished quickly.

The Japanese initially landed on Batan Island in the Batanes group, Appari, and Vigan in northern Luzon, and Legaspi in southern Luzon, all in the opening days of the war. Davao, in Mindanao, was invaded on 20 December. MacArthur's original defense plan was to hold the enemy at the beaches, but since he lacked enough troops to cover all the beaches, he concentrated the Filipino divisions on the strategic beaches of Lingayen Gulf, Zambales, Batangas, and Quezon province. The main Japanese landings came on 22 December, in Lingayen Gulf. The Japanese landed where the Filipino lines were spread thin. With superior naval, air and land forces, they overwhelmed the Filipino defenders, forcing them to retreat. Other Japanese forces landed in Atimonan and Mauban, in Quezon province. Some Philippine Army units fought gallantly, but others were routed and defeated. Seeing the failure of his beach defense plan, MacArthur—on Christmas Eve, 1941—ordered the execution of War Plan Orange and declared Manila an open city. War Plan Orange was the standard U.S. Army defense plan for the Philippines. It involved the

withdrawal of all military forces in Luzon to the Bataan peninsula and the fortress of Corregidor, there to block the mouth of Manila Bay and await reinforcements from the U.S. Manila as an open city meant that all military forces and supplies would be removed from it. The seat of the Commonwealth government was also transferred from Manila to Corregidor. With no military forces in Manila, the Japanese had no reason to bomb it further, and thus the open city declaration was meant to spare Manila from further attack. The Japanese, however, continued to bomb the city, causing numerous deaths and much damage.

The USAFFE forces in Bataan and Corregidor resisted the Japanese attack far longer than the Japanese had expected. Filipino and American soldiers fought together in trying to hold Bataan, hoping for reinforcements to arrive from the U.S. The reinforcements never arrived, however, because the American Pacific Fleet had been severely hit in Pearl Harbor, and the Japanese controlled the seas and sky in the Philippines. Because it had been foreseen that the Filipino-American forces would eventually have to give up, President Quezon and General MacArthur were evacuated from Corregidor to Australia. MacArthur took over the defense of Australia, but promised the Filipinos that he would return. Quezon was evacuated to Washington, D.C. to lead the Philippine Commonwealth government-in-exile.

The defenders of Bataan fought on, but the Japanese received reinforcements and launched a general attack on Good Friday, 3 April 1942. Weakened because of lack of food and medicine, the Bataan defenders were forced to give up in the face of the Japanese onslaught on 9 April 1942. After the surrender, the tired, hungry and sick defenders were forced to march out of Bataan in what was called the Death March, where thousands of Filipino and American soldiers were killed or brutally treated. The survivors were marched off to San Fernando in Pampanga, where they were tightly packed in closed boxcars, and sent by rail to the prison camp in Capas, Tarlac. There, more of the defenders died.

Corregidor held out for almost a month after Bataan fell, but surrounded by the enemy and subjected to continuous attacks, it eventually capitulated when the Japanese invaded the island fortress. After

much heavy fighting, Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, commanding the forces in Corregidor and its three other island forts, surrendered to the Japanese. The Japanese, however, refused to accept just the surrender of Corregidor and its satellite islands, and demanded, instead, the surrender of Filipino-American troops in the whole Philippines. With no choice, General Wainwright had to order the other commanders in the Philippines to surrender on 7 May 1942. The defense of Bataan and Corregidor, however, proved to the whole world that the Filipinos could fight vigorously for the defense of their country, although hampered by the lack of food, medicines and armaments.

Under the Japanese

Manila was taken by Japanese forces on 2 January 1942. Immediately, they declared the existence of martial law and established the Japanese Military Administration. From that time on, there existed both a de facto government in the Philippines, run under the Japanese Military Administration, and a government-in-exile, headed by President Quezon, who was evacuated from Manila to Corregidor, and later to the U.S.

Quezon had instructed national leaders to remain in Manila and cooperate with the Japanese, but only so that they could alleviate the plight of the Filipinos. He felt that it was better that these men, members of the prewar elite, kept their places in the government, rather than let perceived die-hard pro-Japanese or radical personalities like Artemio Ricarte (a Philippine-American War general who had refused to accept U.S. rule and went into voluntary exile in Japan) and Benigno Ramos, charismatic leader of the peasant Sakdal party takeover. After much discussion, these leading personalities—among them Jose Yulo, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto decided to cooperate with the Japanese military rulers, even as Quezon waited in Corregidor.

The decision of Quezon to keep so many of the prewar elite members of the government in power, and the decision of these men—made in a matter of weeks—to collaborate with the Japanese, suited basic Japanese administrative policy, which was to leave civil affairs as much as possible

with the existing administrative structure. Because the Philippines already had a functional bureaucracy, the Japanese planned to use this structure to implement their aims and maintain stability. As a corollary to this, the Japanese Military Administration and the Japanese Fourteenth Army, under Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, would not advocate any radical social change. The Philippine Executive Commission—as the Japanese renamed the reconstructed Filipino government—was made responsible, not to the Filipino people, but to the Japanese. It was formally established on 23 January 1942, with Quezon's prewar executive secretary, Jorge B. Vargas, named as its chairman. Unnecessary prewar government offices, such as those of the vice president, the secretary of national defense, and others, were abolished, while others were combined.

But even with the Executive Commission, it was the Japanese Military Administration and the Japanese Fourteenth Army that held final authority over policy. The Executive Commission followed orders from the Military Administration, recommended appointments for various government positions, and exercised a limited legislative function. All actions taken by the commission, however, had to be approved by the Japanese Military Administration. All of the major government offices were assigned Japanese advisers.

To centralize the administration, some restructuring was effected. Offices and provinces were reduced, salaries were lowered, and all prewar political parties were disbanded, and, in their place, was created the Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (Kalibapi for short), a service association built along Japanese lines to mobilize Filipinos for collaboration with the Japanese.

To further strengthen control over the people, a series of district and neighborhood associations was established, again based on Japanese practice. Ostensibly used for the rationing and distribution of food and other prime commodities, these associations also served as a check against guerrillas and as a method of controlling public opinion, particularly anti-Japanese sentiment.

Realizing that independence had been long-sought and fought for by Filipinos, the Japanese government—no less than Prime Minister Hideki

Tojo made the first announcement—dangled it as an attraction before the Filipinos, provided they “understood the true meaning of the Japanese Occupation, and cooperate as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In addition, if the Filipinos recovered their true Asian spirit, worked towards economic self-sufficiency, and restored peace and order, then independence would be granted soon.

Almost all Filipinos doubted the sincerity of the Japanese promise, and those on the spot—members of the Executive Commission—even considered rejecting the offer, since it was seen as being not only insincere, but also impractical. However, it was decided to play along and, within the framework of the soon-to-be-created republic, assert Filipino rights and needs.

The Second Philippine Republic

A constitution was drafted, one that was explicitly of transient character, and the Second Philippine Republic was inaugurated on 14 October 1943 amidst much publicity but with reluctant and forced public participation. Jose P. Laurel was “elected” as president. But hardly had independence been proclaimed when the republic was made to sign a pact of alliance with Japan. This enabled Japanese forces to continue to stay on Philippine soil, and allowed Japanese nationals to exploit Philippine natural resources.

The Laurel government, under great duress, attempted to exercise its sovereignty by removing Japanese “advisers” and other personnel from Malacañang Palace. It tried to restore peace and order, attempted to restructure the shattered economy, and increase the supply of foodstuffs, as well as improve the distribution and sale of prime commodities. On a longer-term level were plans to improve social conditions and upgrade the moral consciousness of the people.

The 1943 republic aimed high, but time was short and conditions were hardly ideal. Continued abnormal conditions resulting from the presence of Japanese military forces, irregular transportation and communications due to active guerrilla resistance and bandits, natural

calamities, and lack of support by the people led to many of the government's programs being still-born. In spite of "independence," the Japanese military wielded power and pressured the government, for instance, to draft Filipinos to construct Japanese airfields. And despite the Laurel republic's struggle to assert itself in Manila, in the provinces the situation hardly changed, and the Japanese remained in control.

Culture During the Occupation

In addition to the granting of "independence," the Japanese planned a major cultural reorientation for the Filipinos to reawaken their indigenous culture as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, spread the Japanese language and culture, and for them to renounce their Occidental cultural influences. All forms of media were controlled. Newspapers and radio were directly censored, short-wave radios were reconditioned so they could not receive broadcasts from the Allied countries, and leaflets, posters and pamphlets were circulated in large numbers. Primary and secondary schools were opened, but textbooks were excised of sections dealing with the U.S., the Commonwealth government, and democracy. The study of the Japanese language became mandatory in schools and even in some government offices as it became a national language together with Tagalog. Radio Taiso (a series of exercises carried out by following commands and music broadcast by radio) was instituted in schools and government offices to instill the Japanese sense of discipline.

The quest for the native Filipino culture was encouraged, and writers delved into their precolonial past, the Philippine Revolution, and developed themes encouraging the people to go back to the barrio and rural life. This, in many ways, proved to be a boon for Filipino culture.

Economic Collapse

The main impression almost all Filipino residents of Manila and the other cities had, however, was of economic hardship and Japanese brutality. The Philippines before the war had not been economically self-sufficient,

having had to import even rice from its neighbors. Under the Japanese Occupation, a severe lack of food and prime commodities was felt almost immediately, and rationing was quickly implemented. One reason for the shortages was that all import channels, on which the Philippines had been dependent on before the war for finished goods, were cut off by the war. A second reason was that the war disrupted the farming cycle, and crops ready for harvest had been lost in the fighting in late 1941. A third reason was that the Japanese military forces had adopted a policy of local self-sustenance, thus further increasing the demands on the limited supply. Filipino farmers were reluctant to plant crops that would only be seized by the Japanese or by bandits. Thus, production was reduced. Various plans to hike production—such as increasing the area of cultivated lands and introducing new seeds and fertilizers—failed dismally due to climatic conditions and lack of cooperation by Filipinos.

The irregular transportation and communication system was another reason why food and prime commodities did not reach the cities. All motor vehicles were confiscated by the Japanese administration for its own use. Moreover, the importation of oil and its products ceased and the country returned to the horse-and-carreta stage. Only the Manila Railroad System generated for the transport of people and commodities. Many of the bridges, roads and communications lines had been damaged or destroyed during the battle for the defense of the Philippines. The Japanese Army and the Executive Commission worked hard to reconstruct these in 1942, but guerrilla raids made it difficult to maintain secure transportation routes. Even with the inauguration of the Philippine Republic, transportation remained directly under the Japanese, ostensibly because of the incapability of the local officials. Much of the merchant marine had also been destroyed or damaged during the fighting, and the Japanese attempted to build wooden sailing ships to provide sufficient water-borne transportation. In these construction projects—including military defenses—men, women and children were pressed to render labor with promises of food and wages.

To improve Philippine economic conditions, the Japanese Military Administration produced a five-year development plan to restructure the

Philippine economy. Recognizing the ills of the prewar economic policy—over-reliance on sugar as an export product and over-dependence on the U.S. market—the five-year plan instead concentrated on bolstering the food supply. The area devoted to planting food crops was increased, and new strains from Japan and Taiwan were introduced. Sugar production, which was not particularly important to the war effort, was cut down and, in its place, cotton plantations were established.

The plan, however, failed dismally. The Taiwan rice did not produce as much as expected. Farmers were unfamiliar with the needs of the new variety, which was not able to adapt quickly to the climate. Cotton, despite optimistic reports, also did not yield as much as planned, partly due to the farmers' reluctance to plant and harvest it. What cotton was produced went to the Japanese Army and, thus, chronic clothing shortage resulted. Many farmers also sided with the underground resistance movement, and denied their produce to the Japanese when they could. A devastating typhoon in late 1943 also destroyed much of the rice crop in central Luzon.

Further aggravating the lack of food and prime commodities was the people's reluctance to accept Japanese military bank notes—these were forced on Filipinos at the tip of the bayonet as real money. Filipinos derisively referred to the bills as "Mickey Mouse" money—play money. As the occupation wore on and the supply of goods dwindled, inflation set in. Prices soared to impossible levels, necessitating the printing of a 500-peso note by mid-1944, and towards the end of the war, a 1,000-peso note. As money lost its value, the people resorted to bartering, and crimes rose.

Those who benefited from this situation were the farmers—and the blackmarketeers. Sacks of rice cost thousands of pesos, and where money had no meaning, jewels, rare magazines and books, and even furniture and pianos were bartered for the life-saving cereal. Distribution and price control agencies created by the government proved useless as a thriving black market emerged.

Some members of the Japanese administration, realizing that the Muslims had remained separate during the Spanish and American regimes, recognized the need to implement a different policy towards them. The Japanese Navy initially considered separating Mindanao from the rest of

the Philippines and administering it separately. The Mindanao-Sulu area was strategic and necessary for the conduct of campaigns in the south, but military necessity and a shortage of knowledgeable bureaucrats resulted in direct military rule in Mindanao and Sulu, which was harsh, despite developments in Luzon. Many Muslims sided with the pro-American guerrilla units, and with the topography well suited to irregular warfare, Mindanao and Sulu, save for the coastal urban centers and key towns along major highways, were never successfully occupied.

The same may be said of the Visayas islands and the mountain regions. Lack of occupying soldiers led to only limited coastal and urban control by the Japanese. In the rest of the islands and mountains, strong guerrilla resistance forces and free civil governments were organized.

Filipino Reaction

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines was built on irreconcilable interests. There was a theoretic framework built on the Philippines, as an independent nation in the community of Greater East Asia and propaganda, political, educational, and cultural policy was geared toward this. However, the military character of the occupation was predominant. Thus, no matter what political, economic or cultural policy was effected, military necessity came first. Some Japanese intellectuals and liberals attempted to win over the allegiance of the Filipino, but it was the soldiers, more than anyone else, who had a direct impact on the Filipino and his way of life.

That impact was, on the whole, negative. Japanese officers and soldiers who saw only the military side of things and knew nothing of Filipino psychology resorted to corporal measures to punish infractions of rules, no matter how minor. The ubiquitous sentries slapped those who did not bow properly to them. The *Kempeitai* (military police) summarily arrested suspected guerrilla members and subjected them to torture. Some military units commandeered food, vehicles and houses. Stories of rape abounded, and even before Japanese military units entered Manila, the specter of the Rape of Nanking, in which the Japanese had massacred tens

of thousands of Chinese in 1937, loomed in the Filipino mind. And women were forced to become “comfort women”—prostitutes for the Japanese Army.

The harsh conduct of the Japanese soldier, an alien culture which clashed with the Filipinos’ historical experience, and the friendly relationship with the Americans along with the ideals nurtured by the American system, drove Filipinos to reject and resist the Japanese. While there were a few who sincerely cooperated with the Japanese—there were also opportunists who took advantage of the situation—the majority of the Filipinos harbored anti-Japanese sentiments and waited for the return of the Americans.

The anti-Japanese sentiment expressed itself in various forms. The most obvious was active resistance, which manifested itself in the many guerrilla groups that came into existence. Hardly any area was untouched by guerrilla combat or intelligence operatives. Civilians who did not directly join the guerrilla resistance movement generally supported it by providing food and supplies, collecting intelligence or disseminating counter-propaganda. Most of the groups were aligned with the U.S. and received American aid and support. Guerrilla units abounded, some based on unsurrendered USAFFE elements, others led by local politicians who did not submit to Japanese rule. The guerrillas came from all walks of life—men and women, students, children, professionals, military men, peasants, laborers, Muslims, cultural minorities, and local Chinese and other nationalities. In the Visayas and Mindanao, the guerrilla groups were eventually centralized under defined commands, due to the relative weakness of Japanese military forces there. In Luzon, however, much factional warfare between groups occurred due to conflicting territorial, political or personal motives, aided by a divisive terrain.

Many of the guerrilla groups were loyal to the Philippines and to MacArthur and the U.S. To establish some system of order among them, MacArthur decided to offer official recognition to selected groups, promising them arms and ammunition, as well as formal status and benefits. After being recognized by the U.S. headquarters in Australia, most of the guerrilla groups were ordered to lie low and collect intelligence

rather than directly confront the Japanese. This, it was felt, would prevent Japanese retaliation, especially since the guerrilla forces were still not fully organized and equipped.

Among the main guerrilla groups which fought against the Japanese were, in Luzon, the U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon (USAFIP NL), commanded by Maj. Russell W. Volckmann; the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces (LGAF) under Maj. Robert B. Lapham; the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, under Luis Taruc; the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) under Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorpe; the Free Philippines group; Anderson’s Guerrillas (under Capt. Bernard L. Anderson); the Bulacan Military Area under Capt. Alejo Santos; the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas under Eleuterio Adevoso; Marking’s Fil-American Troops under Col. Marcos Agustin; the Chinese Volunteer Guerrillas; Fil-American Cavite Guerrilla Forces under Col. Mariano N. Castañeda; President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas, under Vicente Umali. Various units also operated in the Bicol area, under Lt. Wenceslao Vinzons and other leaders. Major guerrilla organizations in the Visayas included the Sixth Military District in Panay and environs, led by Col. Macario Peralta; the Seventh Military District in Negros and adjacent islands, under Maj. Salvador Abcede; the Cebu Area Command under James M. Cushing; the Bohol Area Command under Maj. Ismael P. Ingeniero; and the Leyte Area Command under Col. Ruperto T. Kangleon. Units also existed in the other Visayan islands, such as the Palawan Special Battalion and the Samar Area Command. In Mindanao, guerrilla forces were united under the Tenth Military District headquarters under Lt. Col. Wendell W. Fertig. Various other forces were created independently, such as that of Salipada K. Pendatun, a joint Muslim-Christian force, which later came under Fertig’s command.

Resistance groups not aligned with the U.S. also existed. Most famous of these was the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap) movement, which sprang out of the merger of the prewar Socialist and Communist parties in central Luzon, with a large peasant base and an agenda for postwar social reform. For the time being, they allied themselves with the general antifascist cause, but, as with other guerrilla groups, ran

into conflict with neighboring resistance groups over territorial jurisdiction and motives. Unlike the U.S.-aligned guerrillas, the Hukbalahaps did not follow MacArthur's "lie-low" order and targeted Japanese, Filipino collaborators and landlords. Sometimes they were able to take over whole towns and hold these temporarily.

Many Filipinos who could not fight resisted in other ways. Some government officials feigned collaboration but provided intelligence to the guerrillas. Other Filipinos degraded the Japanese conquerors, joking about them and belittling them behind their backs. Realizing that the war would end in a U.S. victory, most Filipinos preferred to wait it out, surviving until the prewar order could be returned.

The survival life style assured, however, that the prewar order would not be restored. The Filipino had to make do with local food substitutes—banana catsup replaced tomato catsup, toasted coconut rind replaced chestnuts (this became known as "castanyog")—and proved that he could stand on his own in the meantime. His appetite for American goods had been whetted, however. When the Americans returned, the local items were swept away.

Survival, particularly in Manila, became the Filipino's main preoccupation in the war's last years. Cemeteries were robbed of clothes and jewels; racketeers controlled the economy; electric and telephone wires were stolen to be sold to the Japanese. Some women, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the Japanese or simply because they had no other source of money, went out with Japanese officers or turned to prostitution. Opportunists took advantage of the situation and, disguised as guerrillas, stole food and supplies from the common folk; others worked with the Japanese to gain power.

The Return of the Americans

Most Filipinos felt that the occupation was temporary. From underground radios and newspapers they could follow the war's development and see through the Japanese propaganda. In August 1944, American planes bombed Japanese bases in the Philippines. In September,

Manila itself was bombed. In October, the Americans landed in Leyte, and MacArthur triumphantly announced that he had returned. The Japanese put up a stiff fight for Leyte, however, sending there the bulk of their surviving navy. The resulting naval battle, known as the Battle for Leyte Gulf, was, and still is, considered the largest naval battle in world history. The Japanese, in a desperate attempt to drive back the Americans, also developed the so-called Special Attack Units also known as the *Kamikaze* or Divine Wind—suicide attacks by airplanes on American warships. However, the Americans continued their advance, assisted greatly by Filipino guerrilla units. In December 1944, U.S. forces landed in Mindoro and, in January 1945, in Lingayen Gulf in Luzon. In February 1945, the Americans entered Manila.

With the return of the Americans, the guerrillas sprang into action. The Japanese prodded the Laurel government to declare war against the U.S. Instead, Laurel declared a state of war with the U.S., without conscription. The Japanese military, despairing of getting the support of the Philippine Republic, organized its own local armed force, the Kalipunang Bayan ng mga Pilipino (Makapili), composed of members of the prewar radical Sakdal party and pro-Japanese Filipinos. Although some of the Makapili members were openly pro-Japanese, the majority was forced into joining the organization without understanding what its real purpose was.

The American forces, together with the guerrilla forces, retook town after town, while the Japanese withdrew to the mountains to hold a last-ditch delaying action, or else took it out on the defenseless civilian population. There were battles in the towns and cities. Manila was literally destroyed when a Japanese naval force defended it to the death, and over a hundred thousand noncombatant civilians were either massacred by the Japanese or killed in the fighting. Other key cities—Bacolod, Baguio, Cavite, Cebu, Davao, and Zamboanga, among others—were also devastated, and residents in many other towns were massacred by the Japanese. In this devastation, countless historical and cultural treasures were destroyed; today, this loss is still felt keenly.

The war finally ended with the surrender of Japan on 15 August

1945, following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Russian entry into the war. Organized Japanese forces continued to resist in the mountainous areas until orders from Tokyo caused the commander in chief of the Japanese forces, Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, to come down from the mountains and surrender to the Americans.

With the return of the American forces, the Commonwealth government was restored, first in Tacloban, Leyte, and later in Manila, but the prewar order that many had hoped for would never return. The Commonwealth government had operated in exile in Washington, D.C., fighting for greater assistance to the Philippine front and planning to rehabilitate the country after the war. President Quezon, however, had died of complications arising from tuberculosis in the U.S. in August 1944. His successor, Sergio Osmeña, inherited a variety of problems.

After the War

The postwar Philippines was a ravaged country, its industries destroyed, its economy derailed, its government partly restored but with no offices, and the people aggrieved by the loss of over a million lives. The mood was initially jubilant with the return of the Americans, but this turned to disappointment and frustration in the postwar years.

The immediate task of the government was relief and rehabilitation; it was initially carried out by the U.S. Army, assisted by the Philippine government and the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration. But the government had virtually no funds. The U.S. had pledged to repay the Philippines for every carabao lost, and the Philippine government depended on this promised aid. Independence was granted in 1946, but the economy was still a shambles. Filipinos ravenously fed on U.S. relief goods, but the supply was finite, and the government had to get the economy restarted. The U.S. passed a rehabilitation act in 1946, but granted the Philippines only ₱1.24 billion. The Philippine government had estimated its losses, including human lives, at ₱16 billion. Making matters worse, the U.S. Senate required that, as a prerequisite, the

Philippines grant Americans the same privileges as Filipinos in exploiting natural resources. This prerequisite, called economic blackmail by some writers, required an amendment to the Philippine constitution. The amendment was passed, but only after stormy debates that split the people. In an attempt to aid the recovery of the Philippines, free trade—which had characterized Philippine trade during the American regime—was extended, gradually to be phased out by 1973.

Their economic problems apart, Filipinos were also divided into those who wanted to prosecute their countrymen who had collaborated with the Japanese and those who preferred to let the issue pass, or else saw most collaborators as softening the blow of Japanese rule. A special People's Court was created to try suspected collaborators, but the trials were overtaken by events and, eventually, Pres. Manuel Roxas—who had served in the government under the Japanese, but was also active in the guerrilla movement—granted amnesty to political, economic and cultural collaborators in 1948.

The Philippines pursued war reparations claims from the Japanese government after the war, but only got a fraction of what it had lost.

Various other problems came up—rackets and confusion in war damage claims and backpay benefits for veterans; disappointment with the U.S.' treatment of Filipino veterans claims; discrimination in veterans benefits; rebuilding the shattered economy; social instability (peasants mounted a rebellion after long-sought agrarian reforms failed to materialize); loss of morals and confidence in the government; loose firearms, which led to unstable peace and order conditions, and others. The complexity of the problems, along with the disillusionment at the failure of the government to successfully resolve issues or to substantially develop an independent economy, led to the reawakening of nationalist sentiments in later years. Even today, the wounds, the losses, and the confusion which resulted from World War II and the Japanese Occupation are still very much present.

On the other hand, the Japanese Occupation can also be seen as a testing ground for the developing Filipino nation. Many Filipinos chose to resist actively, joining the guerrillas. Others chose to cooperate with the

Japanese, but only in order that the impact of the Japanese Occupation could be softened. The Philippines was virtually united in opposing, directly or indirectly, the new colonizer. In another sense, the Japanese Occupation showed Filipinos that they could survive hardships and difficulties on their own. The economic trials brought to the fore the ingenuity of the Filipino, and enabled him to survive.

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THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1946-1972

The Restoration of the Commonwealth Government, 27 February 1945.

Pres. Sergio Osmeña the fourth president of the Philippines, wading ashore with Gen. Douglas MacArthur and his staff on Red Beach, Leyte on 20 October 1944, symbolized the victorious return to the Philippines from Washington, D.C. of the Commonwealth government-in-exile. Osmeña succeeded to the presidency when on 1 August 1944, Pres. Manuel L. Quezon died at Saranac Lake in New York. The symbolism was further strengthened when MacArthur ceremoniously turned authority over the liberated area to Osmeña in Tacloban on 23 October on the steps of the damaged provincial capitol.

The battle for the liberation of the Philippines lasted a few more months and it was not until 27 February 1945 that the Commonwealth government was reinstalled at the pock-marked Malacañang Palace, one of the few buildings still standing in the city of Manila. In a very brief but moving ceremony, General MacArthur turned over to President Osmeña the reins of the reestablished Commonwealth government of the Philippines.¹ The restored government was, however, without resources. Manila was in ruins, as was the economy. Osmeña made three visits to Washington to plead the cause of Philippine rehabilitation.

The congress of the Commonwealth government was also convened. This body replaced the National Assembly, the original lawmaking body