

ThingPot: an interactive Internet-of-Things honeypot

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Motivation

Popularity

- IoT becomes more and more popular

Security challenges

- Limited resources of IoT devices
- Large number of diverse devices

Serious consequences

- IoT-related attacks (e.g. Mirai) have already emerged

Questions

What are the most common protocols used by IoT devices?

Which **vulnerabilities and attacks on IoT protocols** are known?

Can **honeypots** be harnessed to identify attack vectors w.r.t. IoT?

What can be done to **prevent observed IoT attacks**?

What is a honeypot?
What is XMPP?
What is an IoT platform?

Honeypot: learn by deception!

- Emulation of a real device
- Detect, deflect or counteract

In XMPP/REST/... language

Hey! “I’m a ...”

- SmartTV
- Home appliance
- Medical device
- Sensor system
- Automotive device





Honeypot: learn by deception!

- Advantages:
 - Collect data on actual attacks
 - Take advantage of emulation
 - Can help IoT security development
- Classification:
 - High Interaction Honeypot (HIH)
 - Low Interaction Honeypot (LIH)
 - Medium Interaction Honeypots (MIH)


XMPP: eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol

- Application-layer protocol for instant messaging
- Jabber ID (JID): XMPP account
- Extension for IoT (XEP-0323, 0324, 0325, 0326)




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
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
IoT platform



ThingPot PoC & use case




ThingPot PoC & use case




ThingPot PoC & use case

Physical topology




ThingPot implementation & use case

Philips Hue




ThingPot implementation & use case

Philips Hue



ThingPot implementation & use case

Attack paths



ThingPot in the wild!



Data

- **46** days (from June 22nd to August 7th, 2017)
- **113,741** backend requests in total
- **619** different IPs involved

Findings

1. Targeted attack trying to take control

```
{ "body": "{ \"groups\": { \"2\": { \"state\": { \"all_on\": \"true\", \"action\": { \"on\": \"true\", \"bri\": \"fa  
lse\" } }, \"1\": { \"state\": { \"all_on\": \"true\", \"action\": { \"on\": \"false\", \"bri\": \"false\" } } }, \"lig  
hts\": { \"1\": { \"state\": { \"bri\": \"false\", \"on\": \"true\", \"reachable\": \"true\" } }, \"2\": { \"state\": {  
\"bri\": \"true\", \"on\": \"true\", \"reachable\": \"true\" } } }, \"sensors\": { \"1\": { \"config\": { \"on\": \"fa  
lse\" } } } }\", \"header\": { \"CONNECTION\": \"close\", \"HOST\": \"morris.jusanet.org\", \"X_REAL_IP\": \"163.172.170.  
161\", \"USER_AGENT\": \"shooter\", \"ACCEPT\": \"*/.*\", \"entry_id\": 34604, \"time\": \"2017-07-20-17:35:00\", \"ur  
l\": \"/api/\", \"remote_ip\": \"172.16.10.2\", \"type\": \"POST\", \"reply_content\": [{ \"success\": { \"username\": \"s  
e0s5cJTufws9IaF3PTggBwQsvb3WR685EHMqcwP\" } } ] }
```

“shooter”

31567 requests on the honeypot

92 IPs involved

"/api/" with the POST method

Findings

1. Targeted attack trying to take control
2. Attack with the body following the *multipart/form-data* format

```
{ "body": "-----d17eeb5c8e4e32c2\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"on\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\ntrue\\r\\n-----\r\n-----d17eeb5c8e4e32c2\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"productid\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\nPhilips-LWB010-1-A19D\r\n_v3\\r\\n-----d17eeb5c8e4e32c2--\\r\\n\", \"header\": { \"CONNECTION\": \"close\", \"HOST\": \"morris.jusanet.org\"\r\n, \"X_REAL_IP\": \"107.181.174.84\", \"USER_AGENT\": \"000modscan\", \"ACCEPT\": \"*//*\" }, \"entry_id\": 402, \"time\": \"2017-07-05-10:2\r\n2:09\", \"url\": \"/api/philips/hue/7d552aaef73123a13f023876857c49f3\", \"remote_ip\": \"172.16.10.2\", \"type\": \"POST\", \"reply_co\r\ntent\": { \"detail\": \"Method \\\"POST\\\" not allowed.\" } }
```

“000modscan”, “mass”, “botlight”
HTTP POST with interesting body
5392 requests on the honeypot
33 IPs involved
URL: with targeted keyword

Findings

1. Targeted attack trying to take control
2. Attack with the body following the *multipart/form-data* format
3. Attack with url

HTTP GET:

1. /api/philips/hue/{32_chars}
2. /api/phi/light/{32_chars}
3. /api/philips1/hue/{32_chars}
4. /api/philips2/hue-link/{32_chars}
5. /api/belkin/wemo/{32_chars}
6. /api/tplink/light/{32_chars}
7. /api/hue/{0-750}
8. /api/phi/light/{32_chars}/tokens
9. /api/{32_chars}/tokens
10. /api/{32_chars}

Findings

1. Targeted attack trying to take control
2. Attack with the body following the *multipart/form-data* format
3. Attack with url
4. General scanning tools or libraries

- skipfish
- Nikto
- Jorjee:
- masscan:
- Python library: urllib [9]
- /http/testp3.pospr.waw.pl/testproxy.php
- Proxyradar: On <https://proxyradar.com/>

Findings

1. Targeted attack trying to take control
2. Attack with the body following the *multipart/form-data* format
3. Attack with url
4. General scanning tools or libraries
5. Other unrelated attacks

```
{ "body": "cmd=%63%64%20%2F%76%61%72%2F%74%6D%70%20%26%26%20%65%63%68%6F%20%2D%6E%65%20%5C%5C%78%33%36%31%30%63%6B%65%72%20%3E%20%36%31%30%63%6B%65%72%2E%74%78%74%20%26%26%20%63%61%74%20%36%31%30%63%6B%65%72%2E%74%78%74", "header": {"HOST": "84.19.176.29", "USER_AGENT": "Wget(linux)", "ACCEPT": "*//*"}, "entry_id": 23290, "time": "2017-07-28-21:42:29", "url": "/command.php", "remote_ip": "179.157.71.100", "type": "POST", "reply_content": "<h1>Not Found</h1><p>The requested URL /command.php was not found on this server.</p>"} }
```

```
cd/var/tmpecho - ne\\x3610cker > 610cker.txtcat610cker.txt
```

```
{ "body": "XML=%3CCiscoIPPhoneExecute%3E%3CExecuteItem%20URL%3D%22Dial%3A00%22%20Priority%3D%22%22%20%2F%3E%3C%2FCiscoIPPhoneExecute%3E", "header": {"HOST": "84.19.176.29", "USER_AGENT": "curl/7.29.0", "ACCEPT": "*//*"}, "entry_id": 12978, "time": "2017-07-20-22:52:38", "url": "/CGI/Execute", "remote_ip": "163.172.182.232", "type": "POST", "reply_content": "<h1>Not Found</h1><p>The requested URL /CGI/Execute was not found on this server.</p>"} }
```


Conclusion

➤ XMPP

- ✓ Integration of different components in multi-node communications
- ✓ May provide additional layers of security
- ✓ Attacker activities are very limited

➤ REST

- ✓ Large number of attacker activities



Conclusion

- **ThingPot: First IoT platform honeypot**
(<https://github.com/Mengmengada/ThingPot>)
- **Five types of attacks were found:**
 - ✓ Attackers are looking (e.g. via Shodan.io) for devices like **Philips Hue, Belkin Wemo, TPLink, etc.**
 - ✓ Attackers are interested to obtain information about the smart devices and **to take control of them**
 - ✓ Attackers are using the **TOR network** to mask their real source address

Thank you for your attention!