

# **Tunisia: Possibilities for reform and implementation of migrant reception and protection**

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This case study is part of a [larger study on asylum, reception and migrant protection systems](#) which seeks to understand some of the dynamics driving or preventing reform of these systems and proposes some initial entry points for international cooperation. Other case studies include Algeria, Morocco and Egypt. This research received the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

The four countries covered by this study are to differing extents countries of origin, transit and destination, and each is characterised by complex displacement and migration dynamics. They have shown very differing levels of interest to reform reception, asylum and migrant protection systems, and to cooperate closely with the EU on migration issues. COVID-19 has exacerbated many of the existing political and economic issues faced by these countries, including high youth employment and a deterioration of public services, posing renewed challenges for local populations and migrant populations alike. This means that any cooperation will need to include a strong understanding of underlying political interests, local contexts and capacities. We map out some of the factors influencing prospects for reforming reception and asylum systems in these four countries, and indicate some initial ideas for how international partners can offer support and help strengthen migration governance and protection systems in the region.

The case study is based on desk research as well as a number of interviews with international organisations, NGOs, researchers and scholars in the first half of 2020.

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# 1. Introduction

Tunisia is an important country of migrant origin and transit, but it has also become a country of destination during the last few years. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) estimates that Tunisia hosts approximately 57,500 international migrants (UN 2019 and Camilli and Paynter 2020),<sup>1</sup> most of them are Europeans, Algerians, Libyans and Ivoirians (Migration Data Portal 2019). There is also now a sizable sub-Saharan African community in Tunis.<sup>2</sup>

Tunisia is in a region, which has been significantly affected by mixed migration flows and in which the volatile political and security situations of neighbouring countries could result in large influxes of people in the future (UNHCR 2019c). In this context, Tunisia has maintained an open-door policy towards people who are fleeing violence and persecution in neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2019a), but at the same time has also engaged in increasingly repressive practices concerning irregular migration. The 2011 war in Libya exposed Tunisia to the greatest refugee crisis in its history and pushed it to commit to the development of an asylum system (Perrin 2016: 13) – although, at the same time, there is a reluctance to engage in policy reforms that could create possible ‘pull factors’ or commit to obligations, to which the government cannot or will find it difficult to respond due to domestic political reasons.

Increased migrant arrivals have challenged Tunisia's capacity to host and integrate them. Its internal political and economic difficulties make it complicated for the country to prioritise questions related to migration and the protection of migrants and asylum seekers. Tunisia's political situation is currently not conducive to domestic reform. It took almost four months after parliamentary elections on 6 October 2019 – which resulted in a fragmented parliament – for a new government to finally be formed under the leadership of prime minister Elyes Fakhfakh, who resigned amid corruption allegations in July 2020, further denting the public's confidence (Parker 2020). A new government under Hichem Mechichi took office on 3 September 2020. Even before the onset of COVID-19, the country already faced dramatic social and economic challenges that are now certain to be amplified by the twofold public health and economic crisis provoked by the virus (Grewal 2020; Verdier 2020). Indeed, due to ongoing socio-economic challenges in Tunisia and high unemployment, particularly amongst youth, the large majority of those trying to leave Tunisia irregularly are Tunisians seeking economic opportunities they lack at home (Parker 2020).

The evolving migration pressures in Tunisia have highlighted important gaps in the country's protection system for migrants, including refugees. Although little transparency exists regarding Tunisian immigration detention centres, researchers note that there has been a long-standing practice to confine migrants and refugees to such sites. The response of the Tunisian government to the COVID-19 outbreak and the alleged forced deportation operations of sub-Saharan African migrants from detention facilities have drawn criticism (Global Detention Project 2020).

In this context, protection issues for migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers include access to legal documentation, access to livelihoods, access to education and exclusion from their surrounding environment. This makes some migrants extremely vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Abusive smuggling practices and trafficking are key concerns, especially in the Libyan/Tunisian borderlands (Danish Refugee Council N.d.).

<sup>1</sup> There are an estimated 10,000 undocumented migrants in Tunisia, but official statistics do not exist.

<sup>2</sup> Many of the sub-Saharan Africans in Tunisia are labor migrants or students who migrate to Tunisia regularly. Immigration from sub-Saharan Africa started to grow in the 2000s with the expansion of the private university sector and the relocation of the African Development Bank from Abidjan to Tunis between 2003 and 2014 (Natter 2018: 7). As a consequence of free-entry agreements with a number of African countries, many African citizens enter Tunisia for visits or to study at Tunisian universities and overstay their visas, turning them into irregular immigrants (ICMPD 2019: 29; Mixed Migration Hub 2018).

Similar to Morocco, Tunisia has largely been willing to cooperate with the EU and EU member states to prevent irregular migration to Europe, particularly Italy, but stresses the political impossibility of the European request to accept the return of third-country nationals or previously proposed regional disembarkation platforms (Lixi 2017 and Bisiaux 2020: 35). However, as with its neighbours, Tunisia is trying to develop a more proactive approach to the rest of Africa, and this may be an additional motivation for domestic reform of migration and asylum structures.

## 1.1. Migration dynamics

According to UNHCR, there were 5,202 refugees and asylum-seekers in Tunisia as of August 2020, 37% of whom were Syrians and 30% were Ivoirians (UNHCR 2020d). UNHCR registered 2,066 new refugees and asylum seekers during 2019 (86% of which had transited through Libya), resulting in an increase of 155% of the overall registered refugee population within one year (UNHCR 2019a). As of 31 August 2020, however, there were only 210 persons profiled since January 2020, 65% of which had transited through Libya (UNHCR 2020a). Among people profiled by the UNHCR,<sup>3</sup> 64% of people who arrived in the country in 2019 as part of mixed population movements expressed intention to seek asylum in Tunisia (77% in 2020); 14% of them remain in Tunisia without seeking asylum (13% in 2020), most commonly to earn money for onward migration (mostly to go to Europe); 12% will continue their journey (0,5% in 2020); 5% want to return to their country of origin (5% in 2020); and 5% are undecided (5% in 2020) (UNHCR 2019b; UNHCR 2020a).

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
International migrants (thousands)	38.0	37.9	36.7	35.0	43.2	56.5	57.5
International migrants as a share of total population (percentage)	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5
Refugees (thousands)	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.7
Refugees as a share of international migrants (percentage)	0.1	0.5	1.2	0.3	0.3	1.3	1.3
Females among international migrants (percentage)	50.2	49.7	49.1	48.6	48.5	48.3	48.2
Median age of international migrants (years)	32.7	34.4	35.8	36.9	36.4	37.6	38.2
International migrants by age group (percentage)							
0-19	22.9	21.6	20.7	20.0	20.2	19.2	19.0
20-64	71.4	71.7	72.7	73.1	74.1	74.0	73.0
65+	5.7	6.7	6.5	6.9	5.7	6.8	8.0
Migrants originating from the same SDG region (percentage)	74.4	74.4	68.1	68.0	63.2	63.3	63.3

Source: UN DESA (2019a, 20019b), UNHCR (2018) and UNWRA (2019)

Notes: Estimates of the migrant stock were based on the population of foreign citizens. Data on refugees include asylum-seekers. For migrants originating from the same SDG region, data refer to known origins only.

In 2019, according to UNHCR, 56% of migrants and refugees arrived in Tunisia by land (35% in 2020), 33% by sea (40% in 2020) and 10% by air (25% in 2020), through regular and irregular channels (UNHCR 2019b; UNHCR 2020a). The number of migrants who arrived in Tunisia via land border (mostly Sub-Saharanans coming from Libya) had more than doubled in the first semester of 2019 (1,008 migrants compared to 417 in the first semester of 2018) (FTDES 2019). Most of them aimed to go to Europe by sea and some of them left Libya to escape the security situation and rampant exploitation and abuse they were facing there. Eritreans, Sudanese and Somalians have increasingly been escaping Libya and seeking asylum in Tunisia since 2018. Many of them are unaccompanied minors, which is quite new and presents specific protection challenges (Interview, January 2020). Following the agreement between Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj to provide military support to the latter in December 2019, Tunisia strengthened security measures along its border with Libya.<sup>4</sup> The Government of Tunisia, UNHCR and IOM accelerated preparedness efforts over the past year and initiated a collaborative revision process of the Contingency Plan aimed at updating needs and budget to respond to an eventual influx of people seeking safety in Tunisia (UNHCR 2020b, UNHCR 2020c).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This includes 'individuals rescued at sea, intercepted, or arrested on the grounds of irregular stay or attempted irregular departure', who are referred to humanitarian actors and are then profiled.

<sup>4</sup> As a consequence of the deteriorating security situation in Libya, Tunisia had already mobilised military forces to its south-eastern land and sea borders, to monitor the increase in arrivals of Libyans and other refugees and migrants, to prevent the infiltration of armed groups, and to better anticipate any potential humanitarian emergencies (Mixed Migration Centre 2019: 7).

<sup>5</sup> However no substantive influx from Libya was recorded during 2020 due to the closure of the land border during COVID-19 containment measures (UNHCR 2020e).

## 2. Overview of Tunisia's reception and asylum system

### 2.1. Legal aspects of the Tunisian reception and asylum system

The main challenge in the Tunisian reception and asylum system is the lack of legal framework and the presence of legal grey zones. Despite being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as to the 1969 AU Refugee Convention, Tunisia does not have a formal national asylum system. Furthermore, the country is not a signatory to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Nevertheless, there has been significant legislative progress since 2011 regarding the protection of migrants, refugees and vulnerable persons (Geisser 2019: 11). For instance, the new Tunisian Constitution of 26 January 2014 stipulates that "the right to political asylum shall be guaranteed as prescribed by the law. It is prohibited to surrender persons who have been granted political asylum" (Tunisia's Constitution of 2014). This is a first in the history of contemporary Tunisia, as well as the Arab world (Geisser 2019: 11). According to Geisser, the civil, political, economic and social rights enshrined in the new Constitution contribute to reducing taboos in public speech on topics that had been censored by the former dictatorship, such as the economic exploitation of migrants or discrimination against them (Geisser 2019: 11-12).

A permanent source of tension in Tunisia is the gap between strong migration pressure and limited legal migration channels to the country (IOM 2012). The most reported challenge for sub-Saharan migrants interviewed in Tunisia is thus **access to legal documentation and the inability to legally stay in the country in the longer term** (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b). Difficulties to access residence permits were reported by three out of four respondents as a major challenge they faced in Tunisia in a survey conducted by Reach and Mercy Corps; all migrant workers interviewed reported that it was virtually impossible for them to regularise their stay in Tunisia upon the expiry of their three months entry permit (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b: 32).

A **comprehensive domestic legislation to establish a national protection system for refugees and asylum-seekers** was drafted in 2014 (with financial support from the European Union implemented by the UNHCR), following pressure from civil society, human rights organisations and the UNHCR to translate the new constitutional obligation into legislation. A new version was presented by the Ministry of Justice in 2018 and submitted to Parliament recently (Bisiaux 2020: 38). The bill calls for the creation of a new body, the National Refugee Protection Institute (INPR), which will be responsible for determining refugee status (Ben Achour 2019: 54) and seeks to facilitate the access of recognised refugees to education, health and work (Bisiaux 2020: 38). The law has yet to be formally adopted and implemented. The 2019 presidential elections reportedly hampered its adoption, as other priorities came in the way (Bisiaux 2020: 38). As a result, the right to asylum is not yet recognised in the legislation nor in practice, although UNHCR carries out registration of asylum-seekers and refugee status determination on behalf of the government.

The **National Strategy on Migration** (Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs 2017) was developed beginning in 2014 and officially presented in July 2017<sup>6</sup> by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with ILO, IOM and other international partners. It has yet to be formally adopted and implemented, but it already shapes policies and approaches to some extent, as ministries, government bodies and international organisations follow the line of the strategy in their cooperation and activities (Interview, January 2020). The interventions funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa on migration governance for example have an explicit objective to support the implementation of the draft strategy.

<sup>6</sup> It was revised in 2015 and 2017 to align it with the priorities of the development plan for 2016-2020, notably those related to the contribution of migration to development (Council of the EU 2018: 14).

This strategy reaffirms the right to asylum as guaranteed by the Constitution. One of the five objectives of the strategy concerns the protection of the rights of foreign migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Tunisia which is based on the development and updating of legislation relating to immigration and the protection of migrants' rights; analysis of the profile of immigrants and asylum seekers; the fight against smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons. The strategy recognises and guarantees the protection of their rights, whatever their status or situation, and it states that particular attention will be paid to informal labour. It also states that efforts will be made to develop a legislative framework for the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. However, most of the strategy is focused on Tunisian migrants (e.g. protecting their rights, strengthening the links between the Tunisian diaspora and Tunisia, promoting regular migration opportunities for Tunisians and offering reintegration support for Tunisian returnees) – although it was pointed out by one interviewee that integrating this objective on foreign migrants was the result of a long work from the international community which managed to find the right balance (Interview, May 2020).

There has been some progress in the protection of vulnerable people, including migrants, in recent years through the adoption of three laws: the **law on the prevention and fight against human trafficking (3 August 2016)**, which includes strengthened prevention measures for non-Tunisian trafficking victims, who are even more vulnerable due to their irregular status in Tunisia; the **law on the elimination of violence against women (11 August 2017)**, which integrates migrant women; and the **law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (23 October 2018)**.

Given that there is no comprehensive domestic legal framework, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers remain in a fragile legal and socio-economic situation. In this context, interviewees reported that the access of refugees and migrants to protection measures depends on the receptivity of government officials to the issue of protection and their willingness to find a room of manoeuvre even in the absence of a legal framework.

## 2.2. Institutional framework of the Tunisian reception and asylum system

The somewhat problematic inter-institutional relations and the overlapping of competences between different ministries and institutions involved in migration policy-making in Tunisia seems to be a relevant factor contributing to the stalemate in the reform process of Tunisian immigration law initiated after the revolution (Roman and Pastore 2018: 17). Institutional leadership on the multidimensional issue of migration is a major challenge and effective migration governance in Tunisia would benefit from improvements in inter-institutional collaborative frameworks (including a clear definition of roles and responsibilities) to avoid confusion in the management of the migration process (EC 2018: 10).

There have been considerable institutional developments in the area of migration since the 2011 revolution. In 2012, a State Secretariat for Migration and Tunisians Abroad (SEMTE) was created under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Its mandate was to develop a national migration strategy. This body has been dissolved and recreated multiple times (Natter 2018: 11)<sup>7</sup> and finally ceased to exist more recently as the former Prime Minister eliminated most state secretary positions in order to install a relatively small government.

<sup>7</sup> It was renamed State Secretariat in charge of Immigration and Tunisians Abroad (SEITE) and was placed successively under the authority of both the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The ensuing turf war over the migration dossier between the Ministries of Social and Foreign Affairs has hardened the stalemate around immigration" (Natter 2018: 12). This situation was defined as 'political schizophrenia' (Roman and Pastore 2018: 17). For instance, while in 2012 it represented the new priority of the government to make migration issues new national priorities, in 2014 the State Secretariat was suppressed and its responsibilities downgraded to the Office of Tunisians Abroad (Pouessel 2014: 9).

The ministries of Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Employment and Training, Investment and International Cooperation, Health and Education all deal with different aspects of migration management. The Ministry of Social Affairs is currently leading and coordinating with all other relevant ministries.

- The *Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale en matière de Migration* (DGCIM) under the **Ministry of Social Affairs** has prepared the National Strategy and now acts as a key partner of international development partners (e.g. for the relevant migration governance support programmes under the EUTF, see annex) (Expertise France 2018). It includes the **Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE)** for diaspora relations (Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs N.d.). In 2014, Tunisia also established the **National Observatory for Migration (NOM)**, demonstrating the government's commitment to address migration in a comprehensive manner (EC 2018). The Observatory, under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs, collects information and data at the national and international level, undertakes research studies related to migration, ensures coordination between the different national institutions and contributes to the design and evaluation programmes and policies aimed at promoting the status of migrants and strengthening their attachment to the country and their contributions to development efforts (Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs. N.d.b.).
- The **Ministry of Interior** plays a key role in border management (emigration/immigration), provides oversight for reception and orientation as well as detention centres and is also responsible for designating authorities in charge of expulsion orders. It is reportedly a “*specific actor hampering the progress of the law reform*”. Beyond the fact that its management is characterised by a total lack of transparency, it does not participate in any initiative of dialogue or discussion with civil society and NGOs, contrary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Social Affairs (Roman and Pastore 2018: 17). The **National Guard**<sup>8</sup> is one of the Ministry of Interior's security forces and engages in migration-related activities as part of its border management function.
- **The Department of National Defence** also deals with irregular migration, trafficking in persons and border control (air and ground reconnaissance operations).
- **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs** acts as a focal point for international cooperation on migration issues.

The National Strategy on Migration is expected to lead to enhanced inter-ministerial interactions among public bodies and ministries (EC 2018: 10). Indeed, one of the strategy's objectives is to strengthen the governance for migration management and adjust it on an ongoing basis to the interests and prerogatives of the different ministries, national institutions, civil society in Tunisia and abroad and other international structures dealing with migration-related issues. The strategy foresees the establishment of an effective institutional framework including an inter-ministerial committee as well as multidisciplinary thematic groups that would oversee the operationalisation of the strategy and facilitate coherent migration governance. However, at this stage, it is unclear what the inter-institutional setting will look like, as the Prime Minister will decide on the composition of the committee and which ministry will be in the lead (Interview, May 2020). Civil society stakeholders have complained about the lack of a truly participatory decision-making process, and note that their autonomy, know-how and competence often tend to be disregarded by governmental actors, who “*invite us to attend meetings on migration but do not involve us in preparing the agenda and do not listen to us*” (Roman & Pastore 2018: 17).

Tunisia's **National Assembly** has in recent years become a driver for more laws strengthening the protection of migrants, notably with the law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, which has received support from a substantial number of MPs (Natter 2018: 12).

<sup>8</sup> The National Guard is a military force separate from the Tunisian military and has been founded under the Interior Ministry. It administers reception and detention facilities and is tasked with protecting borders. It is reportedly also involved in immigration-related activities such as forcible deportations (see Global Detention Project Country Report Tunisia, March 2020).



**Unions** are also taking a keen interest in the protection of migrant workers, most notably the **Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT)** which has been one of the main initiators of the Trade Union Network for Sub-Saharan Mediterranean Migration.<sup>9</sup> Its members aim to coordinate their efforts to protect migrant workers throughout their movements, prevent the deterioration of living and working conditions of migrants and combat all forms of discrimination, racism and xenophobia (Geisser 2019: 8). In 2016, the UGTT adopted an action plan on the protection of migrant workers in Tunisia (with support from the ILO) (EC 2018).<sup>10</sup> Finally, in May 2018, the union opened the first “*espaces migrants*” in Tunis, Sousse et Sfax, in order to provide migrant workers, whatever their status, with access to reliable information, specific training and concrete services (ILO 2018).<sup>11</sup>

In the absence of a formal national asylum system, **UNHCR** conducts registration and status determination of asylum seekers and refugees in collaboration with the Tunisian Red Crescent, however operating in a system that has maintained obstacles for migrants to access asylum and other rights. Border officers and the National Guard refer arrivals to UNHCR or other national agencies. UNHCR operates a number of reception centres throughout the country. It aims to cooperate with the National Guard on migrant protection and it seems that cooperation is in the process of being strengthened in local migration hotspots such as Sfax,<sup>12</sup> e.g. through trainings and the distribution of refugee cards to police stations so that the police can better identify persons of concern.

A number of other **national organisations** play an important role in the protection of refugees and cooperate with UNHCR to that end. These include the Tunisian Red Crescent (TRC), the Arab Institute for Human Rights (IADH), the Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMSS), the Tunisian Council for Refugees (CTR). Some other NGOS provide legal assistance to refugees and asylum seekers (see an overview in the annex). These are complemented by international NGOs such as Caritas, Mercy Corps and specific refugee organisations (Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council etc.).

Our interviews revealed that despite the difficult political situation, blockages at the political level have a limited impact on national and international organisations working for the protection of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers.<sup>13</sup> International organisations, for instance, have institutional partners in all ministries and can continue to work with teams at the technical level, even in the absence of government leadership. Contrary to more political dossiers (e.g. readmission and visa facilitation agreement), issues related to refugee protection have been less affected by political volatility (Interviews, January 2020). Similarly, for NGOs, working on the ground is easier, for instance with local authorities, the regional directorates of certain ministries or administrative bodies. Some municipalities are also deemed to be very receptive to this issue (Interview, January 2020).

This was confirmed by the fact that integration schemes are set up in the cities, which are the ones receiving the most migrants. Although there is no system in place yet, national and local services are gradually establishing some forms of support (and with support by the EU Trust Fund for Africa for instance

<sup>9</sup> In 2014, 17 trade union organisations from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Egypt), the northern Mediterranean (Italy, France) and sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal) created the *Réseau syndical migrations méditerranéennes subsahariennes* – RSMMS.

<sup>10</sup> A diagnostic study on fair recruitment, elaborated in 2017 with ILO's support, has highlighted a number of priority actions to be addressed to strengthen in law and in practice the conditions of recruitment of foreign migrant workers in Tunisia (EC 2018).

<sup>11</sup> It is unclear however whether these centres are operational and they have been criticised for being able to support documented migrants only (Meshkal 2019).

<sup>12</sup> UNHCR reported that at the end of 2019, upon the request of the General Director of the National Guard of Sfax, UNHCR briefed him on its mandate and activities.

<sup>13</sup> Although EUTF projects, which benefit from consultations with Tunisian counterparts, tend to be slowed down by the changes in government (Interview, January 2020).



further detailed below). A guidance and reception unit for migrants is for instance being established in Sousse, and a convention between IOM and the National Office of Family and Population enables the Office to welcome young sub-Saharanans and to offer them free care related to sexual and reproductive health and rights. This shows that stakeholders manage to organise themselves mostly in an ad hoc way and on the ground to deal with protection and reception issues.

## 2.3. Refugee and Migrant protection in practice

### a. Access to Asylum

Migrants who want to claim asylum submit a dossier to the Tunisian Council for Refugees, which cooperates with UNHCR. Then they are often in legal limbo. They cannot be deported but they also cannot become regularised residents or access the right to formally work as an IOM spokesperson pointed out. Recognised refugees (which is not the majority of asylum seekers) can apply for one of the few places for resettlement (in 2019, only 5 people have effectively been resettled (Bisiaux 2020: 71), but otherwise have limited options and opportunities in Tunisia. Individuals with a negative decision on their asylum application, on the other hand, often become undocumented and find themselves in precarious situations (The New Humanitarian 2020).

Technically, people who have been granted refugee status have rights to accommodation, healthcare, and education in Tunisia;<sup>14</sup> however, such rights are not systematically granted due to legislative gaps and the lack of formal recognition making the assertion of these rights dependent on publicity and awareness amongst local actors (Mixed Migration Hub 2018: 3; Bisiaux 2020: 69). Given the lack of a proper asylum procedure, chain refoulement cannot be ruled out (Farahat and Markard 2020: 29-30).<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, as the documentation provided by UNHCR is not formally recognised by authorities and there is no legal framework for the detention of those who are found to have entered the country illegally, individuals in need of protection risk being arrested and considered irregular migrants which are to be punished under existing law (Mixed Migration Hub 2018: 3). The UNHCR reviews show that irregular migrants can be imprisoned for up to one year without knowing the charges against them or having access to a lawyer (Farahat and Markard 2020: 29-30). The Interior Ministry is involved in operating reception and orientation facilities (e.g. Al-Wardia (Ouardia) outside Tunis and another facility in Ben Guerdane), which some describe as detention centers, where migrants are held (Global Detention Project 2020; Bisiaux 2020: 79).

### b. Reception

Asylum seekers are legally only allowed to stay in reception centres for up to 60 days, during which they are supposed to have their claims for assistance processed (The New Humanitarian 2020; Bisiaux 2020: 55). The few centres in operation, run by UNHCR, IOM, and the Tunisian Red Crescent, have limited capacity and are often overcrowded due to people staying for longer than their allotted time,<sup>16</sup> and the Tunisian authorities have so far blocked the opening of more facilities (The New Humanitarian 2020; Bisiaux 2020: 58).

<sup>14</sup> Refugees are allowed to access basic public health facilities (and UNHCR as well as other NGOs support refugees financially – although this does not always happen in practice (Bisiaux 2020: 61)) and refugee and asylum-seeking children are granted access to primary and secondary education. See UNHCR (2020).

<sup>15</sup> Some NGOs have criticised the refoulement of irregular migrants to Libya, leaving them in the desert without any supplies (Le Figaro 2019).

<sup>16</sup> In 2019, Tunisia decided to close the Medenine center for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers due to overcrowding and inhumane conditions (InfoMigrants 2019). The Tunisian government has, since January 2020, allocated an area at the Bir Fatnassia village, near Remada, for a refugee camp that will be managed by the UNHCR. The first stage of the camp will be conceived to host 25.000 people for a six-month period. However, concerns have been expressed about the ongoing armed conflict in Libya that is likely going to push thousands of people, now asylum-seekers in Libyan camps, to escape towards the Southern border regions of Tunisia, and that the camp in Fatnassia risks living longer than the planned six months and hosting double its planned capacity, if not more (Teyeb, 2020a; Bisiaux 2020: 49).

Many migrants become trapped and live in continuous limbo, as they are required to pay for their flights home when deported (Mixed Migration Hub 2018: 3). Undocumented migrants face imprisonment and monetary fines, when apprehended. While Tunisia has visa exemptions (or free short-term tourist visa facilitations) for various sub-Saharan countries, if a non-Tunisian overstays the time set in the visa (including due to delays in the renewal of residence permits), the migrant will face significant penalties (Reach 2018a).<sup>17</sup> The fear of penalties and the inability to cover these penalties has led to a vicious cycle where migrants further overstay their visas and are thus forced to stay in the country irregularly or to cross the border to Libya illicitly to exit Tunisia (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b). These migrants often end up in situations of informal labour, precarity, and exploitation (The New Humanitarian 2020).

The Tunisian legislation stipulates that in order to work in Tunisia, a non-Tunisian must have a residence permit authorising him/her to engage in contracted labour. Authorisations are mostly given to offshore companies, employees of international organisations (Interview, January 2020). The majority of sub-Saharan workers in Tunisia are thus employed in the informal sector and do not benefit from any social or legal protection (Geisser 2019: 13). As a result, they are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by their employers, and their irregular status makes it particularly difficult for them to have recourse to the law and enforce their rights (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b). It is also worth noting that Tunisia is not a signatory of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990).

Since September 2019, recognised refugees in Tunisia who held regular employment with a contract validated by the Minister of Employment or who were self-employed, were able to enrol in the Tunisian social security system, thereby formalising their employment. This marked an important step toward the social-economic inclusion of refugees in Tunisia (UNHCR 2019d). In June 2020, the Arab Institute for Human Rights announced that the first refugee in the country, a Sudanese citizen, has obtained a social security number with the *Caisse nationale de securite sociale* (CNSS), saying the measure fits into continued work and coordination between the Institute, UNHCR and the Ministry of Social Affairs (TAP news agency 2020).

The rigid legislation has been criticised by some experts, who call it an “irregularity machine” (*“une machine à fabriquer de l’irrégularité”*) (Geisser 2019: 13) or believe that it can lead to abuses from the administration or the security forces and de facto creates vulnerabilities (Boubakri 2015; Interview, January 2020). In recent years, a political interest to attract students has led to the opening of private universities to migrants through quotas, bilateral conventions (with francophone countries mostly). Yet migrant students can also end up in vulnerable situations and be subject to exploitation, especially when they lack resources.<sup>18</sup>

Other challenges most reported by sub-Saharan migrants interviewed in Tunisia relate to access to healthcare and housing, as well as respondents’ strained relations with the host community, with sub-Saharan migrants reportedly being frequent victims of incidents affecting their safety and security (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b).<sup>19</sup> Refugees and migrants report being excluded from services due to language

<sup>17</sup> Penalties are fees applied by the state for each week of illegal overstay in the country (20 dinars a week). A cap of 3,000 dinars was established in 2018 under pressure from IOM (Interview, January 2020).

<sup>18</sup> Sub-Saharan African students face partly incompatible rules from different ministries that make their timely regularisation almost impossible: while the application for a stay permit at the Ministry of Interior requires a proof of enrollment by the university, the Ministry of Higher Education allows universities to issue these proofs only one month after classes start, while the Ministry of Finance issues financial sanctions for every week spent irregularly in Tunisia (Natter 2018: 14).

<sup>19</sup> These challenges have been reinforced by COVID-19, with only 30% of migrants surveyed in Tunisia who believe they would have access to health services in case of coronavirus symptoms and 33% who don’t know if they do have access. The main barrier for accessing health services was reportedly discrimination against foreigners, followed by lack of money and lack of information of where to go. The pandemic has also reduced the availability of basic goods (and to a less extent access to asylum) for migrants and increased racism and xenophobia (presentation of the 4Mi data collection in a joint IOM - MMC - IMREF webinar on the impact of COVID-19 on

barriers and discriminatory practices (Reach 2019; Msakni 2019: 18). Regular migrants also have access to free emergency care, care related to sexual and reproductive health and rights, and vaccination (regular healthcare is not free for Tunisians nor for non-Tunisians). Yet irregular migrants tend to renounce healthcare for fear of criminalisation and deportation (Arfa 2017: 54). The Ministry of Social Affairs is currently preparing new legislation on universal health coverage, which has some migration-related aspects, but pending a new government, this legislation has been put aside (Interview, January 2020). Finally, all children (including refugees, or asylum-seekers and migrants – even if their parents are in an irregular situation in the country (Reach & Mercy Corps 2018b: 36)) have access to free primary and secondary education, as the legislation does not make a distinction between Tunisian and non-Tunisian children.<sup>20</sup>

### 3. Factors influencing the current reception and asylum systems

There are several factors (political, economic and societal) that influence the current state and interests around the operationalisation of migrant reception and asylum systems in Tunisia. These interact and also determine where entry points and possibilities for international support can be most fruitful.

Several political factors explain why migration as a political topic to address has been “put on the backburner”, after initial dynamism on migration-related issues between 2011 and 2014 (Natter 2018: 12). In sharp contrast to European politics, in Tunisia migration and asylum issues are not high political priorities, mostly due to the more immediate political, economic and social challenges facing the governments, but also a conscious decision by Tunisian politicians to keep migration issues (e.g. related to irregular migration, disembarkation and reception facilities) below the political radar, given their potential to quickly escalate and create problems for the political system (Lixi 2018; Roman & Pastore 2018: 9). Moreover, the **many changes of government** have considerably slowed down decision-making in all public policy areas, and *“the fragmentation and disempowering of the administration under Ben Ali has left serious marks on inter-institutional coordination and trust”* (Natter 2018: 12).

According to experts, the fact that the law on asylum has not yet been adopted can be explained by **political leaders’ fear that it would encourage sub-Saharan migrants to transit or to settle permanently in Tunisia** (Geisser 2019: 17) **or that the authorities would be bound by obligations to which they cannot respond** (e.g. setting up refugee status determination structures, reception, assistance for asylum-seekers, integration of recognised refugees, amendment of legislation relating to migrants and foreigners, etc.) (Boubakri 2015: 25). A similar view was expressed by an interviewee about the integration of migrants in general: while the Tunisian authorities “tolerate” migrants and accept to welcome and protect them de facto, they are wary of reforming the laws and enshrining this protection in the texts, as it could create an *‘appel d’air’* and they want to maintain control over the arrival and reception of migrants (Interview, January 2020).

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Mobility along the Central Mediterranean Route, 9 June 2020). 61% of surveyed refugees and migrants reported experiencing reduced access to work as one of the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on their daily lives (Mixed Migration Centre 2020). According to IOM, 53% of working migrants overall in Tunisia lost their jobs during the lockdown (TAP 2020).

<sup>20</sup> Although it happens that at the local level, schools refuse sub-Saharan children, in which case the Tunisian Council for Refugees or IOM intervene (Interview, January 2020).

Moreover, the absence of policy change can be explained by the fact that **Tunisia is wary of taking sides in the internal Libyan conflict** to secure future cooperation and trade with Libya, and as a result would find it difficult and inappropriate to pass a law until the political situation in Libya is stable (Roman & Pastore 2018: 17). As Natter notes, *“the non-treatment of the administrative situation of Libyan citizens in Tunisia reflects this strategic neutrality towards Libya: they are neither considered migrants, nor refugees, but ‘guests’ or ‘brothers’.”* (Natter 2018: 12).

Finally, the externalisation by the EU and its member states of **asylum and asylum processing** also may partially explain the reluctance to adopt the asylum law (Carrera et al. 2018: 29),<sup>21</sup> as Tunisian authorities fear that it would further facilitate EU externalisation (Interview, January 2020).<sup>22</sup> Tunisia for instance strongly opposes the opening of additional official ‘refugee reception centers’ in the country, as suggested by the EU (Tarhini 2018) and is wary of getting ‘trapped’ by EU external migration policies if it were to reform its own policies (Interview, January 2020) and be a priori designated as safe third country (Bisiaux 2020: 38). Moreover, *“Tunisia’s refusal to be turned into a migrant center also stems from **security-related fears**”,* as the country is dealing with terrorism, smuggling, and returning foreign fighters, and is thus reluctant to add another burden to its overstretched security apparatus (Abderrahim 2017). Security issues, next to the socio-economic situation, take a high priority in Tunisian politics.

Others however point out that in fact the reason for the asylum law being stuck is of a more practical reason. Interviewees of a 2018 study (including INGOs, CSOs, government actors), noted that *“the problem is not a lack of political will; it is that the Tunisian Parliament has a huge backlog of law reforms to discuss”* with asylum not being discussed first (Roman and Pastore, 2018, p. 16).

The **socioeconomic situation** of Tunisia explains the low salience of immigration of sub-Saharan migrants (including refugees) and protection issues. The country remains fragile facing important challenges: according to International Labour Organisation data in June 2020, total unemployment was 16.2%, while youth unemployment was much higher at 36.5% (WB 2020). This creates a fear of social dumping and a reluctance to open up the labour market to migrant workers and to regularise irregular migrants. The labour law itself is very restrictive and includes a ‘national preference’, which contributes to ‘irregularising’ many sub-Saharans, while at the same time protecting European and North American workers (development workers, ‘expatriates’, entrepreneurs, businessmen, etc.) (Geisser 2019: 14). According to a 1966 law, “foreigners may not be recruited when Tunisian skills exist in the specialties concerned by the recruitment” (Geisser 2019: 14).

There is thus a dissonance between the Tunisian state’s defence of the rights of Tunisians in an irregular situation abroad and its silence with regard to the rights of sub-Saharan migrants in the same situation on its own territory (Nasraoui 2017: 173). Labour unions have played a role in this economic narrative, with some sectoral and regional federations of the UGTT indirectly accusing sub-Saharan migrants of lowering the cost of labour and developing a rush for productivity, threatening the status and working conditions of Tunisian employees (Geisser 2019: 8). Frustrations related to the perception that migrants are treated better than nationals are also reported (Interview, January 2020).

<sup>21</sup> For instance, part of the EU’s effort to externalise asylum has consisted of supporting the UNHCR’s project to help the Tunisian government draft specific legislation on asylum (Carrera et al. 2018: 29). UNHCR worked with judges and the government on the draft asylum law and provided training and guidance to ministries (particularly the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry for Women) and judges (Papadopoulou 2015). The EU has likely sought to encourage Tunisia to develop its asylum system to make it a safe country for returned migrants and asylum seekers (Abderrahim 2019: 10).

<sup>22</sup> The EU’s attempt to outsource refugee protection is reportedly even more strongly criticised since the adoption in March 2014 of the EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership, which includes Tunisia’s commitment to develop an asylum system, together with its engagement to negotiate a readmission agreement (Perrin 2016: 13-14).

The new government may struggle to resolve the country's long-standing economic problems, even more so with the significant challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, this factor is unlikely to falter in the near future and unemployment will remain very high on the agenda. This makes it unlikely that the reception and integration of migrants will become an important political issue any time soon, although one interviewee pointed to the fact that the increased vulnerability induced by COVID-19 (and the impact on national health) has prompted more institutional engagement towards migrants, with two ministerial meetings having been organised as of May 2020. It remains to be seen however if this will be a lasting dynamic.<sup>23</sup>

Even if there was stronger political interest to adopt and reform asylum, reception and integration approaches in Tunisia, **societal factors** strongly affect its implementation and also hampers current protection practices. Tunisia is a more recent country of destination and a large part of its society and institutions still do not consider it as such, which may explain why the corresponding legal and policy framework is still underdeveloped (Roman & Pastore 2018: 16). But an even more relevant factor is the Tunisians' rather closed attitude towards migrant communities (Roman & Pastore 2018: 16), as well as pervasive racism towards sub-Saharanans, who report a growth of verbal and physical racist attacks after 2011 (Natter 2018; Meshkal 2019). To some extent, the lack of assistance and integration (combined with the increased visibility of refugees and migrants and heightened media attention) also tends to exacerbate racism and frustrations, as it negatively affects dynamics between the host community and the refugee and migrant population (Reach 2019).

However, this attitude towards migrants presents variations. The situation is for instance slightly different for Libyans who are more often welcomed because of their cultural proximity (they are called 'brothers')<sup>24</sup> and the fact that they are seen as "deserving of refuge". Besides, *"many Libyans invested in the real-estate market and their money represented an important investment source at a time when the Tunisian economy was suffering after the revolution"* (ICMPD 2019: 29). Moreover, before 2011, many Tunisians were in fact migrant workers in Libya, so there is a degree of reciprocity in the welcoming of Libyans in Tunisia nowadays. It is also worth noting that despite this racism and reluctance to welcome sub-Saharanans, millions of citizens have mobilised themselves after 2011 in favour of sub-Saharan migrants and refugees, often compensating for the shortcomings of the UNHCR and the Tunisian authorities in terms of reception (Geisser 2019: 8). Hospitality and solidarity gestures are thus not rare when migrants and refugees are found to be in need (e.g. of shelter) by Tunisian citizens (Interview, January 2020).

These **particularly complex interlinkages between migration and politics** (on the one hand, the liberalisation of the public sphere and increase in civil society activism after 2011, and on the other hand, the increase in racist attacks) have hindered the solidarisation between Tunisians and migrants in the post-revolutionary period (Natter 2018: 11) and has led one interviewee to state that "migrants are accepted if they do not disturb" (Interview, January 2020). Moreover, **ambivalent attitudes in the Tunisian public combined with the political factors above** (Libyans are considered as 'brothers' but politically, accepting them as refugees would mean taking sides in the conflict) **as well as the economic factors give a quite complex and ambiguous blend of factors**. While racism in itself cannot explain the lack of legal frameworks, combined with the fact that migration is not a politicised issue at all, it seems that there is no momentum currently either politically or in the Tunisian society to strengthen the protection, reception and integration frameworks for sub-Saharan immigrants. Attitudes towards migrants furthermore hamper the proper implementation of any protection and integration approaches and are likely to do so in the future.

<sup>23</sup> COVID-19 has also exposed "migration reporting shortfalls" and reminded Tunisians of the heightened challenges facing refugees and asylum seekers in the country, with some news outlets criticising authorities' late reaction to the urgent needs of many refugees and asylum-seekers — mostly students — who were without food and medication (Teyeb 2020b).

<sup>24</sup> Similarly to Syria, with which there is a tradition of movement of people for work or studies (Boubakri 2015: 18).

The volatility in the institutional structure for migration in the last few years, and the reluctance to show any political commitment to an asylum system, suggest that engagement of international partners in relation to reforming and passing the migration strategy or improved policies for asylum may still have limited impact.<sup>25</sup> The new government is well aware that the country needs political stability to start urgent reforms, but it remains to be seen whether it will adopt a different approach to reception and asylum (and adopt the pending laws). The COVID-19 pandemic adds yet another challenge to the full agenda of this new government, as the resulting economic recession will likely lead to an estimated 4.4% decline in GDP (Al Mongi, Al Saidani 2020). It has forced the government to put the country on lockdown and suspend most economic activities (The North Africa Post 2020). Yet, in this context, it is encouraging that the Speaker of the House of People's Representatives, Rached Ghannouchi, met with a delegation from IOM, UNHCR, the Initiative of Support to sub-Saharanans and the Coordination Unit of sub-Saharan Students in Tunisia in April 2020, and said there is readiness to strengthen legislation on the rights of migrants and refugees (Agence Tunis Afrique Presse 2020).

Above factors explain that when it comes to migration (which overall is not a strong salient topic), main issues relate to Tunisians emigrating abroad due to the lack of opportunities rather than African immigration to Tunisia. This approach and framing echo the focus of the National Strategy on Migration which prioritises Tunisian emigration and return. Issues related to refugees and asylum in Tunisia are often confined to the southern border with Libya and connected to the 2011 influx of sub-Saharan Africans during the Libya crisis, which has been perceived in negative terms.<sup>26</sup>

This may also help explain that most openings for institutional support and capacity-building of government actors take place in areas benefiting Tunisians (reintegration support, labour mobility of Tunisians abroad, diaspora, national migration survey) rather than the group of sub-Saharan Africans as further explained below.

## 4. Mapping of existing EU funded interventions in the area of asylum, protection and migration

International donors and partners have supported Tunisia in various areas related to migrant reception and protection both from a humanitarian and a development perspective during past years.

The European Union's support to Tunisia (in the context of the EU-Tunisia partnership and the Valletta Action Plan) spans across the following areas:


- Protection of vulnerable migrants in Tunisia (including women and children)
- Protection of refugees and asylum-seekers in Tunisia
- Fight against human trafficking and smuggling of migrants
- Socio-economic integration and promotion of entrepreneurship among immigrants and refugees in Tunisia
- Governance of migration policies, institutional support and capacity-building
- Management of migration flows and promotion of mobility
- Mobilisation of the diaspora for the development of Tunisia.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> For instance, the migration governance component of the EUTF ProGreS Migration programme implemented by ICMPD has in its first year focused on a less controversial issue of data collection, which was slowed down by the restrictions related to COVID-19. Progress on the support for the implementation of the National Migration Strategy and coordination seems slower.

<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, the influx of Libyan refugees, who often came with money and invested in Tunisia's economy, is seen as a positive event.

<sup>27</sup> Document on "Migration in the Tunisia-EU partnership" provided by the EU Delegation in Tunis (see annex).

According to the EU's own mapping, the division of resources between these different areas is as follows (see above colour code for grouped projects; see the annex for a full list of projects):



A number of projects under the EUTF support the implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and a national protection system for refugees through **capacity-building** of Tunisian institutions and supporting the socio-economic integration of migrants.

Other programmes and projects focus on boosting the legal and institutional framework on **labour migration** and the protection of migrant workers in Tunisia. Beyond support to state structures, international partners also implement projects directly supporting the **protection, self-reliance and access to rights and services** of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. Some attention has also been given to **strengthening data collection** on migration dynamics.

Some of this support also takes place at the decentral level (with the aim to support inclusion of migration, both emigration of Tunisians, return migration as well as immigration) into local development plans.

Partners and beneficiaries (e.g. of trainings) usually include the Ministry of Interior (including police and national guards), Ministry of Social Affairs (Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE), National Observatory for Migration (NOM), DGCIM), National Institute of Statistics as well as other relevant line ministries, NGOs.

The graph above shows that 80% of EU resources during past years have been dedicated to the governance of migration policies, institutional support and capacity-building; management of migration flows and mobilisation of the diaspora (and most of these interventions relate to governance of Tunisian (return) migration). The remaining 20% are allocated to the protection of vulnerable migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in Tunisia as well as to supporting the socio-economic integration and entrepreneurship of immigrants and refugees in Tunisia. The priorities of the Trust Fund in Tunisia, following the priorities of the National Strategy on Migration, focus heavily on mobilising Tunisians abroad for investment in the country, providing social and economic assistance to Tunisian returnees, supporting young Tunisians prone to migration in regions most affected by emigration, as well as supporting Tunisia in the development of an Integrated Border Management system. Little focus is put on improving governance frameworks for the protection and integration of sub-Saharan migrants specifically, thus following above-noted Tunisian migration priorities. This was confirmed by Roman and Pastore:



*“EU–Tunisia negotiations and cooperation policies are still predominantly focused on European security-oriented priorities (i.e., migration management, border control, fight against human trafficking and smuggling, return and readmission), while other migration-related policy issues, especially concerning immigration to Tunisia and the situation of sub-Saharan migrants in the country (e.g., migrant integration, rights protection, antidiscrimination measures, and the national law reform) are generally not included.”*  
(Roman and Pastore 2018: 23)

Reflecting Tunisia's own priorities in the area of migration, the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers seems less of a priority in the EU's financial support, despite the implementation of some good projects in this area. More needs to be done in terms of protection, reception, integration and access to basic services in the face of the challenges identified at the beginning of this chapter.

Furthermore, as highlighted in section 2.2, there is a need to strengthen inter-institutional leadership on the issue of migration, through a clear definition of roles and responsibilities as well as collaboration frameworks (EC 2018: 10). Given that the National Strategy on Migration is expected to enhance inter-ministerial interactions, international partners' support to its operationalisation should also ensure that migration as a multidimensional topic is owned across the government and that institutional structures for collaboration are put in place when the strategy is adopted. One of the objectives of an ICMPD-implemented component of the EUTF ProGreS intervention focuses on training and capacity-building, yet progress seems slow (the progress rate for training the Ministry of Social Affairs was around 30% in May 2020 for instance, although there is one more year of intervention (Interview, May 2020)).

## 5. Possible entry points for further international support

Based on the analysis conducted so far, it is possible to draw some preliminary implications and possible entry points for international partners' engagement in strengthening the protection and integration system in Tunisia.

A lot of awareness-raising work has already been done through capacity-building projects by international partners. Yet, there is still a long way before Tunisia has comprehensive legislation in place that protects the rights of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. The evolving and complex migratory context still requires reforms in the legislation and policies for which institutional support by international partners is important (including support to inter-ministerial collaboration).

However, given that there has been little progress on legal and policy reform with existing policies being in limbo since several years, it is unclear whether additional efforts at the national policy level in support of the adoption of pending reforms and strategies will have immediate benefits without the buy-in of national actors. UNHCR has for years provided technical support and lobbied the government to present the draft law to parliament and will continue to keep it on the agenda. As mentioned above, it is unlikely that migration will be high on the agenda of the new government and the creation of an asylum system still appears distant.

Yet bilateral political consultations could be a good mechanism to frame a broader dialogue on issues of mutual interest, including regular and irregular migration. Such a regular institutionalised framework would be useful and appreciated, although government buy-in would be necessary to make it productive and mutually beneficial.

Some aspects of the national policy may be supported irrespective of its adoption, and it seems more promising to focus here on protection and access to services on the ground and in areas where migrants are hosted. There is thus in the interim, a need for additional support and financial resources to help the development of a proper **reception system across the country** (Roman and Pastore 2018: 24) and to take up best practices, even in the absence of legal clarity.

Capacity-building and institutional support is important to keep a level of awareness which can support the possible future adoption and implementation of the draft policy. Needs exist in the following areas:

- training/capacity building on existing protection provisions and rights of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, especially for border authorities (police, National Guard). There is still a huge gap in the practices of authorities involved in immigration and the guarantee of due process and access to rights of asylum-seekers and refugees. UNHCR is involved in training and ICMPD has been working with border authorities on integrated border management. This is however a continuous issue.
- Engagement and training of all involved ministries (Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and specialised Committees such as the Tunisian National Committee against Trafficking and Prevention of Torture). This has taken in the past the form of study visits to other countries (e.g. as part of the EU Regional Development and Protection Programme) and fulfils a function to expose officials to greater knowledge on asylum and refugee issues and in managing mixed migration flows. More joint exposure may also strengthen coordination, e.g. in the area of referral.
- Capacity building for local authorities and cities.
- As noted above, racial discrimination is an issue in Tunisia. Following the adoption of Organic Act # 50 on racial discrimination in 2018, the government has not yet established a National Commission to combat racial discrimination as had been foreseen. Capacity support both in relation to its setting up and in terms of strengthening the legal system to increase the currently low number of investigations and prosecutions of cases of racial discrimination could be another piece of the puzzle for a stronger system for migrant reception and integration in the long-term (OHCHR 2020).

Our interviewees also emphasised the need for **emergency shelter, food and healthcare, and humanitarian funding** (Interviews, January 2020). The increased presence of extremely vulnerable groups (e.g. unaccompanied minors, single women) emphasises the urgency of an improved response as the lack of protection leaves them exposed to severe risks (Reach 2019). This situation has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 situation. Beyond legal protection, these vulnerable migrants also strongly need psychological support, as *“mental health problems are pervasive, exacerbated by severe traumas faced along migration trajectories and the lack of psychological support”* (Reach 2019; Bisiaux 2020: 63).<sup>28</sup>

Direct assistance to migrants is best provided by working through IOM, UNHCR and their respective national organisations and national and international NGOs as they provide services to migrants. This may have a greater immediate impact on the protection and reception of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in the absence of a comprehensive legal framework. Activities of these actors have remained underfunded in 2019.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> As of 31 August 2020, 210 persons had been profiled since January 2020, of which 65% transited through Libya, of which 92% experienced some form of violence or abuse (torture, ill-treatment in detention, sexual and gender-based violence etc.) (UNHCR 2020a).

<sup>29</sup> E.g. UNHCR reported that only 24% of the money requested to cover basic needs for refugees, asylum seekers and other persons of concern in 2019 had been raised.

The **societal perception** of sub-Saharan migrants in Tunisia plays a strong role for the possibility of reform and implementation of an improved system. For any (future) reforms to be successful, there will need to be a focus on such societal aspects. According to Roman and Pastore, *“civil society advocacy actions aimed at reforming Tunisian immigration law, de-penalising irregular migration, enhancing the protection of migrant rights, fostering migrant integration, and contrasting discrimination and racism are losing strength”* (Roman and Pastore 2018: 23). A potential entry point for international partners could thus be to **support civil society organisations** so that these issues do not completely slip off the agenda.

In order to build an adequate protection and reception system and implement policies that respond to the needs of the country, there is also an **urgent need for a solid data collection and statistical system**, enabling a mapping of migrants (socio-economic profile, difficulties in access to services etc.). EU support is currently contributing to a national migration survey. Complementarity to this, and countering the existing lack of awareness within the political system on the scale of protection challenges of sub-Saharan migrants, specific research focus could shed further light on the situation. It may however be that this is not a priority of government authorities and will need to be carried out in cooperation with national and international NGOs and IOs.

Support to the Tunisian authorities to open the labour market to migrants and refugees in an orderly way without promoting social dumping could also strongly enhance integration prospects. This could be done in parallel with supporting sectors that suffer from the emigration of Tunisians escaping the economic situation. However, given above described socio-economic challenges, it is less clear that there are political entry points for changing the current access to work of (irregular) migrants.

An important aspect of any engagement according to several interviewees is the **coordination between technical and financial partners**. The number of partners and the level of duplication was indeed seen as one of the greatest challenges in the area of migration, also because donors and agencies tend to focus on specific geographic areas. There is reportedly a matrix with all member states and G7 projects which incites countries to coordinate and avoid to finance the same projects (Interview, January 2020).

According to interviewees, the fact that Tunisia is perceived as a model in the region regarding democratic transition and its geographical position mean that there are a lot of interests at stake regarding migration in the country. One interviewee highlighted the need to open the debate geographically (involving not only Tunisia, but also origin countries) and to maintain a formal and informal dialogue. Solid governance and a lack of legal framework are still obstacles in Tunisia, and the country needs the international community to take care of the migrants entering the country (whether for short- or long-term). Any intervention in this field will have to take into account both the multisectoral and multidimensional nature of migration and the political situation in the country (Interviewees, January 2020).

## ANNEX

### Legal framework

- **Law on the prevention and fight against human trafficking (3 August 2016), which:** this law also includes strengthened prevention measures for non-Tunisian trafficking victims, who are even more vulnerable due to their irregular status in Tunisia. These measures include the possibility to provide a temporary residence permit for non-Tunisian victims of trafficking in Tunisia as well as the facilitation of their voluntary return to their country of origin, taking into account the factors and security risks that could affect the victims during and after their return. Moreover, a Ministry of Finance decree of 26 September 2017 provides for an exemption from administrative penalties for overstaying for victims of trafficking, on the advice of the National Authority to Combat Trafficking in Persons. However, one of our interviewees noted that this law does not solve long-term protection and integration problems, as when the trial is over, victims lose their temporary residence permit and return to an irregular situation (Interview, January 2020).
- **Law on the elimination of violence against women (11 August 2017):** this law integrates migrant women and establishes civil and penal mechanisms to ensure the protection of women, whether Tunisian or foreign, against all forms of violence.
- **Law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (23 October 2018):** Tunisia was the first Arab country to introduce such a law which criminalises racist actions and provides protection against all forms of racial discrimination. The law foresees penalties ranging from 1 month to 3 years and fines of 1 000 dinars (320 euros) to 3 000 dinars (960 euros) for acts including racist slurs, inciting hatred, participating in sustained discrimination. The penalty reaches 15 000 dinars (about 5 000 euros) for companies or organisations. However, the country still has important steps to make as was evident following the murder of Falikou Koulibaly, the President of the Ivoirian Association in Tunisia in December 2018 (Aliriza 2019).

### National non-state actors and organisations relevant for reception and protection

A number of national organisations play an important role in the protection of refugees and cooperate with UNHCR to that end (UNHCR 2019c):

- **Tunisian Red Crescent (TRC),** a humanitarian association which deals with the profiling of new arrivals, reception and shelter management, multi-sector assistance (food and non-food items, cash vouchers), healthcare support and reimbursements, education support.
- **Arab Institute for Human Rights (IADH),** an NGO which undertakes capacity building and advocacy on international protection, legal counselling and legal representation to support refugees and asylum seekers seeking legal assistance.
- **Tunisian Association for Management and Social Stability (TAMSS),** a development NGO which provides livelihoods and self-reliance and promotes the socio-economic rights of refugees and asylum seekers. It supports access to employment, including vocational training, micro-business and wage employment.
- **Tunisian Council for Refugees (CTR),** a humanitarian NGO which deals with the profiling of new arrivals, reception and shelter management, multi-sector assistance (food vouchers and non-food items, cash assistance), support to healthcare and education, individual case management and community based protection, psychosocial support, assistance to persons with specific needs, among others. The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Women, Children, Family and the Elderly signed a partnership agreement with the CTR to enable refugees and asylum seekers in Tunisia to access social services offered by the respective Ministries (UNHCR 2019a).

Other important **CSOs** include organisations that existed before the revolution but started to embrace migrants' rights in their work after it:

- The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) defends the social and economic rights of people, including migrants' rights.
- The Tunisian Association of Sub-Saharan Students (AESAT).
- Terre d'Asile Tunisie (TAT) has been founded with a view to protect irregular migrants and workers (Natter 2018) has provided assistance, though reportedly with little access to detention/ reception facilities.
- The Organisation against torture in Tunisia (OCTT) has access to detention facilities and has also included visits to refugees and asylum seekers.<sup>30</sup>
- The Adventist Development and relief agency (ADRA) and
- The Islamic Relief Tunisia (IRT) have both carried out projects in the area of economic integration.

## Mapping of projects

### National policies and capacity-building

**The EU Trust Fund supports the implementation of the National Strategy on Migration (ProGreS Tunisia 2016-2020)** through capacity-building of Tunisian institutions involved in the budgetisation, implementation and monitoring of the Strategy (including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Investment and International Cooperation, of Social Affairs (the NOM), of Employment and Training, of Interior as well as regional councils) and supporting the socio-economic integration of migrants.<sup>31</sup> It includes 4 components, of which two are relevant also for non-Tunisian migrants. Component 1 focuses on the implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and is implemented by ICMPD and with a budget of 3 Mio EUR over 3 years (2018-2021).

Component 4, launched in April 2018 (and allocated 3.3 Mio EUR out of the overall 12.8 Mio EUR) aims at the socio-economic integration of young people and the integration of migration into the strategies of territorial development for four Tunisian governorates (Jendouba, Médenine, Kasserine and Grand Tunis). The project had been co-led by the State Secretariat for Immigration and Tunisians Abroad.

Furthermore, the IOM-UNDP programme “**Mainstreaming Migration in National Development Strategies**” (MM) aims to ensure policy coherence among national planning at the national and local level in sectors related to migration, including health and employment, among others. For instance, “migration & development” working groups led by ministerial representatives (and including governmental, non-governmental actors and IOs representatives) have been set up to elaborate sectoral development plans in which concrete actions were identified to maximise the potential of migration for development.

The **EU, with UNODC**, also supports the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and Health in the **fight against smugglers and traffickers** (2017-2022).

**IOM provided capacity-building to the National Observatory for Migration from 2016 to 2019**, supported the establishment of a system for the collection, analysis and sharing of knowledge on migration and the development of policies and strategies that take into account emerging migration trends. Funded by Finland, it also worked closely with the **Tunisian Ministry of Health** to promote an inclusive migration policy that forsters migrants' right to health, improve access to health and protection services for the most

<sup>30</sup> See Global Detention Project, Immigration Detention in Tunisia, 2020.

<sup>31</sup> The Lemma project (coordinated by Expertise France, FIAPP with the Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration (OFII), and associating other member states including Belgium, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden) also strengthens the capacities of the Tunisian government to develop and implement its National Strategy on Migration. See EC 2016; Observatoire National de la Migration. N.d. and EC 2016b.

vulnerable migrants, strengthen the government's and civil society's capacity to effectively promote the health and protection needs of vulnerable migrants, and improve multi-sectoral collaboration at regional and national levels to share national and international good practices (IOM N.d.).

Finally, UNHCR implements the refugee protection pillar of the "**Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for North Africa**" (2019-2020) to strengthen the capacities of Tunisian stakeholders to set up a national protection system and identify persons in need of international protection. It also trains border officials to raise their awareness of asylum and protection issues, thus ensuring that border management takes into consideration the protection needs of refugees and asylum-seekers (UNHCR 2019c: 2).

### **Labour migration**

The **Regional Programme on Labour Migration** (implemented by GIZ, IOM, ILO and Enabel – 2018-2021) aims to boost labour migration governance in the North African countries by strengthening the policy, legislative and institutional framework on labour migration (EC 2019).

The Swiss Development Cooperation funded **FAIR (Phase I) project, and key areas of intervention of FAIR Phase II**, which seeks to contribute to the promotion of fair recruitment practices and the protection of workers' rights, brought about through increased safe migration options and effective regulation of public and private employment agencies (ILO N.d.).

The regional project "**Promoting Migration Governance**"- **PROMIG-FES (2017-2020) financed by BMZ** is a strategic partner of the Mediterranean Sub-Saharan Migration Trade Union Network. It seeks to promote the role of trade unions in the joint governance of migration, rights-based mobility and social dialogue. The aim is, among others, for trade unions to develop national strategies and coordinate them at the regional level for a better integration and protection of migrant workers (FES 2017).

### **Protection and integration**

Beyond support to state structures, international partners also implement projects directly supporting the protection of migrants, such as the **EU-IOM Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa (2017-2021)**, which contributes to the strengthening of migrant protection and sustainable reintegration systems by improving protection and enabling the assisted voluntary return of stranded migrants and migrants in transit (EC 2019).

The programme "**Enhancing self-reliance and access to rights for refugees and asylum-seekers in North Africa**" (implemented by UNHCR) aims to increase stability through enhanced access to rights for refugees and asylum-seekers in four North African countries and to reduce the risk of dangerous onward movements to Europe (EC 2019).

Another major project is the "**Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for North Africa**". IOM is implementing the development and protection pillars of the programme, which respectively aimed to strengthening the resilience of migrants and internally displaced populations, together with their host communities, by addressing challenges to socio-economic integration and promoting a culture of rights, dialogue and social cohesion (2016-2021); and to strengthening migration governance and the protection of the rights of migrants along the migration route in Tunisia (2019-2021). The civil society pillar (2019-2022) contributes to the establishment or reinforcement of inclusive services, fostering social cohesion and employment opportunities at community/decentralised levels (see table in annex).

In Grand Tunis, a **project financed by SDC (2017-2020)** aims to ensure migrants' access to health structures through accompaniment and assistance in the short term, and in the long term to set up a network of health professionals, associations, migrants and journalists (FDFA 2020). A complementary project, an **assistance platform for migrants in Grand Tunis and the Sfax region (2016-2018)**, provided continuity to the service of the "Maison du Droit et des Migrations" in Tunis as a place of reception, orientation and individualised assistance to migrants, with a geographical expansion in Sfax, as well as capacity-building for the Ministries of Social Affairs, of Health, and of Justice (FDFA 2020).

Finally, the **Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project (MC2CM)** (co-financed by the EU and SDC and implemented by ICMPD – 2017-2021) brings together experts and cities to contribute to improved migration governance at city level, including migrants' access to basic services and human rights (ICMPD N.d.).

### **Data collection**

Some attention has also been given to strengthening data collection on migration dynamics. For instance, EU interventions, as part of the EUTF programme ProGreS Migration (in its support to the National Strategy on Migration) supports the National Statistics Institute and the National Migration Observatory to conduct a household survey on migration in Tunisia including foreign migrants<sup>32</sup> (MED-HIMS). This contributes to filling the gap in national statistics in this field. IOM also supports capacity-building in the management and collection of migration data, notably through its Development Fund.

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
<sup>32</sup> This survey has been rolled out in other countries in which, according to one interviewee, it was “a struggle to integrate foreign migrants in the survey” (Interview, May 2020).



## La migration dans le partenariat Tunisie-Union européenne

Le partenariat Tunisie - Union européenne dans le domaine de la migration s'articule autour du Partenariat pour la mobilité de 2014, cadre d'un dialogue politique flexible et approfondi.

Le sommet de La Valette sur la migration en novembre 2015 a renforcé le partenariat et la coopération entre la Tunisie et l'Union européenne pour relever ensemble les défis que représente la migration et pour exploiter les possibilités qu'elle offre.








A l'occasion de ce sommet, un fonds fiduciaire d'urgence, appelé aussi « fonds de la Valette », est mis en place par l'Union européenne afin de financer les projets qui vont appuyer la mise en œuvre d'un plan d'action avec des objectifs prioritaires.

Ainsi, la Tunisie et l'Union européenne travaillent ensemble à travers différents programmes et projets qui soutiennent les objectifs du plan d'action de la Valette et ceux de la stratégie nationale migratoire de la Tunisie.

### Principaux domaines du partenariat

-  Protection des migrants vulnérables en Tunisie (dont les femmes et les enfants)
-  Protection des réfugiés et des demandeurs d'asile en Tunisie
-  Lutte contre la traite des Êtres humains et le trafic de migrants
-  Insertion socio-économique et promotion de l'entrepreneuriat des immigrés et des réfugiés en Tunisie
-  Gouvernance des politiques migratoires, appui institutionnel et renforcement des capacités
-  Gestion des flux migratoires et promotion de la mobilité
-  Mobilisation de la diaspora pour le développement de la Tunisie

Domaine	Projet / programme	Objectifs	Partenaires	Montant	Durée	Source de financement
<b>ProGreS (Programme Gouvernance et Stratégie) migration</b>				€ 12.800.000		
	<b>Gouvernance de la migration (composante 1)</b>	Contribuer à l'opérationnalisation de la Stratégie Nationale Migratoire de la Tunisie et soutien à l'enquête statistique sur la migration en Tunisie (Tunisie-HIMS)	Ministère des Affaires Sociales (ONM, DGCIM), INS, <i>ICMPD (partenaires de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 3.000.000	<b>2016-2020</b>	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Mobilisation de la diaspora (composante 2)</b>	Contribuer à mobiliser les talents de la diaspora afin de renforcer sa capacité de réseautage et d'investissement pour la création d'entreprises innovantes et d'emploi	Ministère de l'Industrie et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, <i>GIZ (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 4.000.000		
	<b>Réinsertion socio-économique des migrants (composante 3)</b>	Soutenir les efforts des autorités tunisiennes concernant la réinsertion sociale et économique des migrants de retour de façon à garantir la dignité des personnes	OTE, ANETI, Ministère des Affaires Sociales (DGPS), <i>Expertise France et OFII (partenaires de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 2.500.000		
	<b>Gestion locale des migrations (composante 4)</b>	Contribuer au développement de mécanismes efficaces pour aborder la problématique de la migration au niveau local à travers des initiatives d'intégration économique et sociales dans les régions concernées par la migration	Ministère des Affaires Sociales (DGCIM), <i>AfD, Mercy Corps, Grdr (partenaires de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 3.300.000		
<b>Programme régional de Développement et Protection pour l'Afrique du Nord</b>				€ 5.600.000		
	<b>Volet protection des migrants</b>	Renforcer la gouvernance en matière de migration et la protection des droits des migrants le long de la route migratoire en Tunisie.	<i>OIM (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 900.000	<b>2019-2021</b>	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
	<b>Volet protection des réfugiés</b>	Renforcer les capacités des acteurs tunisiens pour mettre en place un système de protection national et identifier les personnes ayant besoin d'une protection internationale (réfugiés)	<i>HCR (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 300.000	<b>2019-2020</b>	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
	<b>Volet Développement</b>	Renforcer la résilience des migrants, des personnes déplacées et des communautés d'accueil en traitant les défis sociaux, économiques et culturels et en promouvant une culture de droits, de dialogue et de cohésion sociale	<i>OIM (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 2.400.000	<b>2016-2021</b>	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Volet Société Civile</b>	Contribuer à la création ou au renforcement de services inclusifs, en favorisant la cohésion sociale et les possibilités d'emploi aux niveaux communautaire/décentralisé	Services publics tunisiens, <i>Organisations Non Gouvernementales, Organisations de la Société Civile</i>	€ 2.000.000	<b>2019-2022</b>	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette

# TUNISIA: Possibilities for reform and implementation of migrant reception and protection

	<b>Renforcer la résilience et l'accès aux droits pour les réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile</b>	Améliorer l'accès aux droits pour les réfugiés et les demandeurs d'asile et réduire le risque de mouvements migratoires dangereux	<i>HCR (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 2.000.000	2019-2022	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Vers une approche holistique de la gouvernance de la migration et de la mobilité en Afrique du Nord</b>	Renforcer la gouvernance de la migration dans les pays d'Afrique du Nord en renforçant le cadre politique, législatif et institutionnel relatif à la migration de la main-d'œuvre, tout en contribuant à la mise en place et à la mise en œuvre de programmes de mobilité de trois pays (Égypte, Maroc et Tunisie).	<i>GIZ, OIM, BIT (partenaires de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 5.000.000	2018-2021	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Démanteler les réseaux criminels impliqués dans le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains.</b>	Contribuer à la lutte contre les passeurs et les trafiquants de migrants en Afrique du Nord.	<i>UNODC (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 3.200.000	2017-2022	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Facilité pour la protection et la réintégration des migrants</b>	Contribuer à la protection des migrants en transit en Tunisie et assurer une réinsertion durable dans les pays d'origine des migrants qui souhaitent bénéficier du dispositif de retour volontaire	<i>OIM (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 2.500.000	2017-2021	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Mobilisation européenne pour l'Entreprenariat en Afrique</b>	Promouvoir la migration régulière et la mobilité avec la mobilisation de la diaspora tunisienne en Europe pour créer des activités économiques innovantes et des opportunités d'emploi	<i>Expertise France (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 2.500.000	2019-2022	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>EuroMed Migration</b>	Promouvoir une approche globale et partagée des questions migratoires, renforcer un dialogue approfondi, constructif et opérationnel et une coopération efficace sur les migrations, la mobilité et les questions de protection internationale entre pays de l'Union européenne et pays du Sud de la Méditerranée	<i>ICMPD (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 500.000	2016-2022	Instrument Européen pour le Voisinage - Enveloppe régionale
	<b>DiafriInvest</b>	Mobiliser la diaspora au service du développement tunisien	<i>ANIMA Investment network</i>	€ 228.000	2018-2022	Instrument Européen pour le Voisinage - Enveloppe régionale
	<b>Mediterranean City-to-City Migration</b>	Contribuer à améliorer la gouvernance migratoire (fondée sur les droits) dans un réseau de villes euro-méditerranéennes	<i>ICMPD (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 1.800.000	2017-2021	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>Programme de gestion des frontières au Maghreb</b>	Soutenir les efforts déployés par les institutions nationales, en premier lieu la Garde côtière tunisienne, pour sauver des vies en mer, améliorer la gestion des frontières maritimes et lutter contre les passeurs opérant dans la région	<i>ICMPD (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 20.000.000	2018-2021	Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence (FFU) de La Valette
	<b>ARISE- Awareness rising and information for safety and empowerment campaign</b>	Sensibiliser sur les risques liés à la migration irrégulière pendant le voyage et dans les pays de destination, ainsi qu'en sur les voies légales pour rejoindre l'Europe, tant en Tunisie que dans les pays d'origine	<i>OIM (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 899.988	2018-2020	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
	<b>Renforcement des Capacités des ONGs pour mieux Lutter contre la Traite des Etres Humains en Afrique</b>	Contribuer à la lutte contre la traite en Côte d'Ivoire, Tunisie et Sénégal en renforçant les capacités des ONGs en Tunisie, Sénégal et Côte d'Ivoire.	<i>France Terre d'Asile (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 622.747	2017-2020	Instrument Européen pour le Voisinage - Enveloppe régionale
	<b>MIEUX Tunisia action</b>	L'initiative MIEUX est une facilité à court-terme axée sur la demande qui, depuis 2009, a appuyé plus de 120 pays à travers le monde dans le renforcement de leurs capacités sur des aspects liés aux migrations, en fournissant de l'expertise entre paires pour l'UE et les pays partenaires. Les prochaines activités se concentrent sur communication de la recherche	<i>ICMPD (partenaire de mise en œuvre)</i>	€ 114.181	2014-2021	Instrument pour la Coopération au Développement (volet migration)
<b>TOTAL =</b>				<b>€ 57.764.916</b>		

AfD	Agence Française de Développement
ANETI	Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Formation, Agence Nationale de l'Emploi et du Travail indépendant
BIT	Bureau International du Travail
DGCIM	Ministère des Affaires Sociales, Direction Générale de la Coopération internationale en matière de Migration
EF	Expertise France
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit/ Agence allemande de coopération
Grdr	Migration-Citoyenneté-Développement
HCR	Haut Commissariat aux Réfugiés
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
INS	Ministère du Développement et de la Coopération Internationale, Institut Nationale de la Statistique
OFII	Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration
OIM	Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations
ONM	Ministère des Affaires Sociales, Observatoire Nationale de la Migration
OTE	Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs & Crimes

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