

El Gamal Mixnets and Implementation of a Verifier

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Contents

1	Introduction	2
2	El Gamal Cryptography	2
2.1	Definition	2
2.2	Security	2
2.3	Properties	2
3	Mix Networks	2
3.1	Overview	2
3.2	El Gamal Mixnet	3
3.3	Operation	3
3.4	Verification	3
4	Specification/Documentation	3
5	Implementation of the Verifier	3
5.1	General Design Choices	3
5.2	Third Party Libraries	3
5.3	Math Library	3
5.4	Pseudorandom Generators and Random Oracles	3
5.5	Verifier	3
5.6	Tests	3
5.7	Performance	3
6	Conclusion	3
7	References	3

1 Introduction

2 El Gamal Cryptography

2.1 Definition

The El-Gamal cryptosystem is defined over a group $G_q = \langle g \rangle$ of prime order q , generated by $g \in G_q$. A private key $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is chosen randomly and is used to compute the public key $(g, y) \in G_q \times G_q$ where $y = g^x$.

Encryption of a plaintext $m \in G_q$ is done by choosing a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computing $(u, v) \in G_q \times G_q$ where $u = g^s$ and $v = y^s m$. Decryption of a ciphertext $(u, v) \in G_q \times G_q$ is achieved by using the private key x to compute $m = u^{-x} v$.

2.2 Security

Let $b = g^a \in G_q$ where $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then a is said to be the discrete logarithm of b in the group G_q . There is currently no known efficient classical algorithm that given (G_q, g, b) is able to calculate a in a reasonable amount of time (polynomial time). The discrete logarithm problem is thus considered to be a hard problem. (Källa)

The security of the El Gamal cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of discrete logarithm in finite cyclic groups G_q . This means that the El Gamal cryptosystem is secure as long as no one is able to compute the discrete logarithm in G_q efficiently. (Källa)

2.3 Properties

The El Gamal cryptosystem is a homomorphic cryptosystem. This

Generalization

3 Mix Networks

3.1 Overview

Intuitiv beskrivning (gör bättre)

<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/ajuels/publications/universal/Universal.pdf>

One purpose of mix networks, or mixnets, is to provide untraceability to its users. A mixnet may, for example, take as input a list of encrypted messages of different origins. These messages pass through the mixnet and is output decrypted and in a randomized order. This property may be used to enable anonymous voting systems.

A reencryption mixnet consists of a number of servers which sequentially process the messages and reencrypts the list of messages and outputs them in a randomized order. After passing through all servers, the list of ciphertexts is decrypted and the result is a list of the messages in random order. It is impossible to deduce from where each element came.

3.2 El Gamal Mixnet

3.3 Operation

3.4 Verification

4 Specification/Documentation

5 Implementation of the Verifier

5.1 General Design Choices

5.2 Third Party Libraries

5.2.1 Arithmetic Library

GMP

5.2.2 XML Parser

RapidXML

5.2.3 Cryptographic Primitives

OpenSSL

5.2.4 Testing

Google Test

5.3	Math Library
5.4	Pseudorandom Generators and Random Oracles
5.5	Verifier
5.6	Tests
5.7	Performance
6	Conclusion
7	References