El Gamal Mix-Nets and Implementation of a Verifier

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Introduction


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Mix Networks

One purpose of mix networks is to provide untraceability to its users. A mix-net takes as input a list of encrypted messages. Verificatum is a reencryption mix-net. Such a mix-net consists of a number of servers, mix servers, which sequentially process the messages and reencrypts the list of messages and outputs them in a randomized order. After passing through all servers, the list of ciphertexts is decrypted and the result is a list of the messages in random order.

In the context of electroinic voting a reencryption mix-nets may work as follows.

- 1. The mix servers prepare the mix-net by generating public and secret keys.
- 2. Each voter encrypts his vote and appends it to a public list of encrypted votes.
- 3. In sequential order each mix server takes as input the list of encrypted votes, reencrypts and outputs them in a randomized order, replacing the previous list of encrypted votes.
- 4. After all mix servers have processed the list, each vote is jointly decrypted and posted on a bulletin board making the outcome of the election universally available without revealing how anyone voted.




MIX SERVER

Each server in the mix-net perform the same actions during execution.

- 1. It is given the list of ciphertexts from the previous server.
- 2. It reencrypts these ciphertexts with its private key.
- 3. It randomly shuffles the list of ciphertexts.
- 4. It passes the reencrypted and shuffled list of ciphertexts to the next server.

During these steps a zero-knowledge proof is produced which can prove that the server indeed did output a list of shuffled and reencrypted ciphertexts without tampering with the ciphertexts.



VERIFIER F1 F2 ... Fx C1 C2 ... Cy Werifierare Nej

EL GAMAL CRYPTOGRAPHY

The El Gamal cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem based on the computational difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in cyclic groups.

The cryptosystem is defined over a group G_q of order q with generator g. The secret key x is chosen randomly in \mathbb{Z}_q and the public key y is created as follows

$$y = g^x$$

Encryption of a plaintext $m \in G_q$ is done by choosing a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computing

$$\operatorname{Enc}(m,s) = (u,v) = (g^s, y^s m) \in G_q \times G_q$$

Decryption of a ciphertext $(u,v)\in G_q\times G_q$ is achieved by using the private key x to compute

$$Dec(u, v) = u^{-x}v = (g^s)^{-x}y^s m = (g^x)^{-s}y^s m = y^{-s}y^s m = m$$

The El Gamal Cryptosystem possesses a homomorphic property. This means that for two messages $m_1,m_2\in G_q$ and random numbers $s_1,s_2\in\mathbb{Z}_q$

$$\operatorname{Enc}(m_1, s_1) \cdot \operatorname{Enc}(m_2, s_2) = \operatorname{Enc}(m_1 m_2, s_1 + s_2)$$

By choosing one of the messages to be the identity element, $m_2 = 1$, and letting the other one being any message $m_1 = m$, one has obtained the ability to reencrypt a particular ciphertext without knowing the original plaintext nor the randomness.

$$\operatorname{Enc}(m, s_1) \cdot \operatorname{Enc}(1, s_2) = \operatorname{Enc}(m_1, s_1 + s_2)$$

This property of a cryptosystem is necessary if it should be used in a reencryption mix-net.

Conclusion

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