Game Theory and Lower Bounds for Randomized Algorithms

David Woodruff

Outline

- 2-player zero-sum games and minimax optimal strategies
- Connection to randomized algorithms
- General sum games, Nash equilibria

Game Theory

- How people make decisions in social and economic interactions
 - Applications to computer science
- Users interacting with each other in large systems
 - Routing in large networks
 - Auctions on Ebay

Definitions

- A game has
 - Participants, called players
 - Each player has a set of choices, called actions
 - Combined actions of players leads to payoffs for each player

Shooter-Goalie Game

- 2 players: shooter and goalie
- Shooter has 2 actions: shoot to her left or shoot to her right
- Goalie has two actions: dive to shooter's left or to shooter's right
 - left and right are defined with respect to shooter's actions
- Set of actions for both Shooter and Goalie is {L, R}
- If shooter and goalie each choose L, or each choose R, then goalie makes a save
- If shooter and goalie choose different actions, then the shooter makes a goal

Payoff Matrix

- If goalie makes a save, goalie has payoff +1, shooter has payoff -1
- If shooter makes a goal, goalie has payoff -1, shooter has payoff +1

payoff	goalie	
$\mathrm{matrix}\ M$	L	R
shooter L	(-1,1)	(1, -1)
R	(1,-1)	(-1,1)

- Payoff is (r,c), where r is payoff to row player, and c is payoff to the column player
- For each entry (r,c), r+c = 0. This is called a zero-sum game
- Zero-sum game does not imply "fairness". If all entries are (1,-1) it is still zero-sum

An Aside

- Row-payoff matrix R consists of the payoffs to the row player
- C is the column-payoff matrix
- $M_{i,j} = (R_{i,j}, C_{i,j})$ for all i and j

payoff	goalie	
$\mathrm{matrix}\ M$	L	R
shooter L	(-1,1)	(1, -1)
R	(1,-1)	(-1,1)

Row payoff	goa	alie
matrix	L	R
shooter L	-1	1
R	1	-1

• R + C = 0 for zero-sum games

Pure and Mixed Strategies

- How should the players play?
- Pure strategy:
 - Row player chooses a deterministic action I
 - Column player chooses a deterministic action J
 - Payoff is $R_{I,I}$ for row player, and $C_{I,I}$ for column player
- Pure strategies are deterministic, what about randomized strategies?
 - Players have a distribution over their actions
 - Row player decides on a $p_i \in [0,1]$ for each row, with $\sum_{actions\ i} p_i = 1$
 - Column player decides on a $q_j \in [0,1]$ for each column, with $\sum_{actions\ j} q_j = 1$
- Distributions p and q are mixed strategies

How to define payoff for mixed strategies?

Expected Payoff


- Assume players have independent randomness
- $V_R(p,q) = \sum_{i,j} \Pr[\text{row player plays i, column player plays j}] \cdot R_{i,j} = \sum_{i,j} p_i q_j R_{i,j}$
- $V_C(p,q) = \sum_{i,j} \Pr[\text{row player plays i, column player plays j}] \cdot C_{i,j} = \sum_{i,j} p_i q_j C_{i,j}$
- What is $V_R(p,q) + V_C(p,q)$?
 - 0, since zero-sum game

payoff	goalie	
$\mathbf{matrix}\ M$	L	R
shooter L	(-1,1)	(1, -1)
R	(1, -1)	(-1,1)

If p = (.5, .5) and q = (.5, .5) what is
$$V_R$$
?
$$V_R = .25 \cdot (-1) + .25 \cdot 1 + .25 \cdot 1 + .25 \cdot (-1)$$
 If p = (.75, .25) and q = (.6, .4) what is V_R ?
$$V_R = -0.1$$

Minimax Optimal Strategies

- Row player wants a distribution p* maximizing her expected payoff over all strategies q of her opponent
- p^* achieves lower bound $lb = \max_{p} \min_{q} V_R(p, q)$



• The row player can guarantee this expected payoff no matter what the column player does. Ib is a lower bound on the row-player's payoff

Minimax Optimal Strategies

- Column player wants distribution q^* maximizing his expected payoff over all strategies p of his opponent
 - q^* achieving $\max_{q} \min_{p} V_C(p, q)$
- Claim: $\max_{q} \min_{p} V_{C}(p,q) = -\min_{q} \max_{p} V_{R}(p,q)$
- Proof: $\max_{q} \min_{p} V_{C}(p,q) = \max_{q} \min_{p} -V_{R}(p,q)$ $= \max_{q} (-\max_{p} V_{R}(p,q))$ $= -\min_{q} \max_{p} V_{R}(p,q)$

Payoff to row player if column player plays q^* is ub = $\min_{q} \max_{p} V_R(p,q)$

Column player can guarantee the row player does not achieve a larger expected payoff, so this is an upper bound ub on row player's expected payoff

Lower and Upper Bounds

Row player guarantees she has expected payoff at least

$$\mathsf{lb} = \max_{\mathsf{p}} \min_{\mathsf{q}} \mathsf{V}_{\mathsf{R}}(\mathsf{p},\mathsf{q})$$

Column player guarantees row player has expected payoff at most

$$ub = \min_{q} \max_{p} V_{R}(p, q)$$

 $lb \leq ub$, but how close is lb to ub?

A Pure Strategy Observation

- Suppose we want to find row player's optimal strategy p*
- Claim: can assume column player plays a pure strategy. Why?
 - For any strategy p of the row player, $V_R(p,q) = \sum_{i,j} p_i q_j R_{i,j} = \sum_j q_j \cdot (\sum_i p_i R_{i,j})$
 - Column player can choose q to be the j for which $\sum_i p_i R_{i,j}$ is minimal
- Ib = $\max_{p} \min_{q} V_{R}(p, q) = \max_{p} \min_{j} \sum_{i} p_{i} R_{i,j}$
- ub = $\min_{q} \max_{p} V_{R}(p,q) = \min_{q} \max_{i} \sum_{j} q_{j} R_{i,j}$

Shooter-Goalie Example

payoff	goalie	
$\mathbf{matrix}\ M$	L	R
shooter L	(-1,1)	(1, -1)
R	(1,-1)	(-1,1)

Claim: minimax-optimal strategy for both players is (.5, .5)

Proof: For the shooter (row-player), let $\mathbf{p}=(p_1,p_2)$ be the minimax optimal strategy

$$p_1 \ge 0$$
, $p_2 \ge 0$, and $p_1 + p_2 = 1$. Write $\bf p$ = (p, 1-p) with p in [0,1]

Suppose goalie (column-player) plays L

Shooter's payoff is
$$p \cdot (-1) + (1-p) \cdot (1) = 1 - 2p$$


Suppose goalie plays R

Shooter's payoff is
$$p \cdot (1) + (1 - p) \cdot (-1) = 2p - 1$$

Choose
$$p \in [0,1]$$
 to maximize $lb = \max_{p} \min(1 - 2p, 2p - 1)$

$$p = \frac{1}{2}$$
 realizes this, and $lb = 0$

Similarly show optimal strategy $\mathbf{q} = (q_1, q_2)$ of goalie is (1/2, 1/2) and ub = 0 ub = lb = 0, which is the *value of the game*



Asymmetric Shooter-Goalie

	L	R
shooter L	$\left(-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2}\right)$	(1, -1)
R	(1,-1)	(-1, 1)

Goalie is now weaker on the left

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2)$ be the minimax optimal shooter (row-player) strategy Suppose goalie (column player) plays L

Shooter's payoff is
$$p \cdot \left(-\frac{1}{2}\right) + (1-p) \cdot (1) = 1 - (\frac{3}{2})p$$

Suppose goalie plays R

Shooter's payoff is
$$p \cdot (1) + (1 - p) \cdot (-1) = 2p - 1$$

Choose
$$p \in [0,1]$$
 to maximize $lb = \max_{p} \min(1 - \left(\frac{3}{2}\right)p, \ 2p - 1)$

Maximized when
$$1 - \left(\frac{3}{2}\right)p = 2p - 1$$
, so $p = 4/7$, and $lb = 1/7$

What is the column player's minimax strategy?

Asymmetric Shooter-Goalie

	L	R
shooter L	$\left(-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2}\right)$	(1, -1)
R	(1,-1)	(-1, 1)

Let $\mathbf{q} = (q, 1 - q)$ be the minimax optimal goalie (column-player) strategy Suppose shooter (row player) plays L

Goalie's payoff is
$$q \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) + (1 - q) \cdot (-1) = \frac{3q}{2} - 1$$

Suppose shooter plays R

Goalie's payoff is
$$q \cdot (-1) + (1 - q) \cdot (1) = 1 - 2q$$

Choose
$$q \in [0,1]$$
 to realize $\max_{q} \min(\frac{3q}{2} - 1, 1 - 2q)$

$$\frac{3q}{2} - 1 = 1 - 2q$$
 implies q = 4/7, and expected payoff at least -1/7

Remember: this means row player's ub at most 1/7

Uhh... lb = ub again... Value of the game is 1/7

Another Example


- Suppose in a zero-sum game, Row player's payoffs are:
- -1 -2
- 1 2
- What is row player's minimax strategy? Why?
- Suppose her distribution is (p, 1-p)
- Expected payoff if column player plays first action is:

$$p \cdot (-1) + (1 - p) \cdot 1 = 1 - 2p$$

• Expected payoff if column player plays second action is:

$$p \cdot (-2) + (1 - p) \cdot 2 = 2 - 4p$$

- These lines both have a negative slope
- Should play p = 0
- Can show column player should always play first action and value of game is 1



Exercise 1: What if both players have somewhat different weaknesses? What if the payoffs are:

Show that minimax-optimal strategies are $\mathbf{p} = (2/3, 1/3), \mathbf{q} = (3/5, 2/5)$ and value of game is 0.

Exercise 2: For the game with payoffs:

Show that minimax-optimal strategies are $\mathbf{p} = (\frac{4}{7}, \frac{3}{7}), \mathbf{q} = (\frac{17}{35}, \frac{18}{35})$ and value of game is $\frac{1}{7}$.

Exercise 3: For the game with payoffs:

$$(-1/2, 1/2)$$
 $(-1, 1)$ $(1, -1)$ $(2/3, -2/3)$

Show that minimax-optimal strategies are $\mathbf{p} = (0,1)$, $\mathbf{q} = (0,1)$ and value of game is $\frac{2}{3}$.

Von Neumann's Minimax Theorem

- In each example,
 - row player has a strategy p* guaranteeing a payoff of lb for her
 - column player has a strategy q* guaranteeing row player's payoff is at most ub
 - lb = ub!
- Von Neumann: Given a finite 2-player zero-sum game,

$$lb = \max_{p} \min_{q} V_{R}(p,q) = \min_{q} \max_{p} V_{R}(p,q) = ub$$

Common value is the *value of the game*

- In a zero-sum game, the row and column players can tell their strategy to each other and it doesn't affect their expected performance!
 - Don't tell each other your randomness

Lower Bounds for Randomized Algorithms

- A randomized algorithm is a zero-sum game
- Create a row-payoff matrix R:
 - Rows are possible inputs (for sorting, n!)
 - Columns are possible deterministic algorithms (e.g. every algorithm for sorting)
 - $R_{i,j}$ is cost of algorithm j on input i (e.g. number of comparisons)
- A deterministic algorithm with good worst-case guarantee is a column with entries that are all small
- A randomized algorithm with good expected guarantee is a distribution
 q on columns so the expected cost in each row is small

Lower Bounds for Randomized Algorithms


- Minimax-optimal strategy for column player is best randomized algorithm
- A lower bound for a randomized algorithm is a distribution \mathbf{p} on inputs so for every algorithm j, expected cost of running j on input distribution \mathbf{p} is large
 - $\max_{\substack{\text{input}\\\text{distributions }p}} \min_{\substack{\text{deterministic}\\\text{algorithms }j}} V_R(p,j) = \min_{\substack{\text{randomized}\\\text{algorithms }q}} \max_{\substack{\text{inputs }i\\\text{algorithms }q}} V_R(i,q)$
 - show lb = $\max_{\substack{\text{input}\\\text{distributions p}}} \min_{\substack{\text{deterministic}\\\text{algorithms j}}} V_R(p,j)$ is large
 - give strategy for the row player (distribution on inputs) such that every column (deterministic algorithm) has high cost

Lower Bounds for Randomized Sorting

- Theorem: Let A be a randomized comparison-based sorting algorithm. There's an input on which A makes an expected $\Omega(\lg n!)$ comparisons
- Proof: consider uniform distribution on n! permutations of n distinct numbers
- n! leaves
- No two inputs go to same leaf
- How many leaves at depth lg(n!) -10?

•
$$\leq 1+2+4+...+2^{(\lg n!)-1} \leq \frac{n!}{512}$$

- 511/512 > .99 fraction of inputs are at depth > lg(n!)-10
- Expected depth $> .99(\lg(n!) 10) = \Omega(\lg n!)$



General-Sum Two-Player Games

- Many games are not zero-sum, have "win-win" or "lose-lose" payoffs
- Game of "chicken"
- Suppose two drivers facing each other each drive on their left (L) or right (R)

payoff	Bob	
$\mathrm{matrix}\ M$	L	R
Alice L	(1,1)	(-1, -1)
R	(-1, -1)	(1,1)

What is a good notion of optimality to look at?

Nash Equilibria

- (p, q) is stable if no player has incentive to individually switch strategy
 - For any other strategy \mathbf{p}' of row player, row player's new payoff $=\sum_{i,j}p_i'q_jR_{i,j}\leq\sum_{i,j}p_iq_jR_{i,j}=$ row player's old payoff
 - For any other strategy \mathbf{q}' of column player, column player's new payoff $=\sum_{i,j}p_i\ q_j{}'C_{i,j} \leq \sum_{i,j}p_iq_jC_{i,j} = \text{column player's old payoff}$
- For chicken, ((1,0),(1,0)) and ((0,1),(0,1)) and ((1/2,1/2),(1/2,1/2)) are Nash Equilibria
- Theorem (Nash): Every finite player game (with a finite number of strategies) has a Nash equilibrium