Crisis and Elite Composition in Late Qing China: The Loyalty-Competence Trade-off

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Abstract

How do autocrats balance loyalty against competence when appointing elites? I show that crisis type determines this trade-off. Using comprehensive panel data spanning 24 provinces from 1825-1911 (2,088 province-year observations (1825-1900, extended to 1911 in robustness checks)) across 10 major crises (with 16 additional smaller conflicts included in robustness checks) in Late Qing China, I find that internal rebellions systematically decreased competence-based selection—the court appointed Manchu loyalists over Han examination graduates. External invasions reversed this pattern, prioritizing competent Han administrators. These opposing effects are large (0.4-0.6 standard deviations), emerge gradually over three years, and persist for over a decade. The findings suggest that autocrats strategically recalibrate bureaucratic composition based on threat characteristics, with lasting implications for state capacity development.

JEL Codes: N45, P48, D74, H11

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Introduction

When the Taiping Rebellion erupted in 1851 with its explicitly anti-Manchu ideology, the Qing court confronted a fundamental dilemma: balance political loyalty against administrative competence in selecting provincial elites. Initially relying on loyal Manchu bannermen despite limited capabilities, the court gradually authorized capable Han examination graduates to suppress the rebellion—prioritizing competence over loyalty. Yet when facing Western invasions, this calculus reversed: the court appointed Manchu loyalists over technically skilled Han administrators. Why did crisis type determine this trade-off's resolution?

This paper examines how autocratic regimes manage this loyalty-competence trade-off using exceptionally rich data on provincial elite appointments in Late Qing China (1825-1900 for the main analysis, with extensions to 1911 in robustness checks). Analyzing 10 major crises (plus 16 additional smaller-scale conflicts in robustness checks) across 2,088 province-year observations spanning 24 provinces (1825-1911), I demonstrate that crisis type fundamentally determines how autocrats resolve this tension. Internal rebellions systematically decreased competence-based selection as the court prioritized Manchu loyalists, while external invasions increased it, favoring capable Han examination graduates. These opposing effects are large (0.46-0.56 standard deviations), emerge gradually over three years, and persist for over a decade, suggesting crises trigger path-dependent institutional changes with lasting implications for state capacity.

Why does crisis type determine adjustment direction? Internal rebellions directly challenge regime legitimacy and often mobilize along ethnic lines—the Taiping Rebellion explicitly promoted Han nationalism against Manchu rule. These threats make ethnic solidarity paramount: only co-ethnic elites with existential stakes in regime survival can be fully trusted to suppress revolts without wavering. Competence becomes secondary when the fundamental question is "whose side are you on?" External invasions present opposite imperatives. Foreign militaries bring technological superiority requiring technical expertise to counter effectively. Here, appointing incompetent ethnic loyalists risks military defeat and regime collapse. The autocrat faces a different calculus: ethnic loyalty matters less when the enemy is foreign, while administrative and military competence becomes critical. This theoretical distinction generates testable predictions about crisis-driven personnel adjustments, which I investigate using Late Qing provincial appointments.

The mechanisms driving these opposite effects operate through distinct channels. For internal

rebellions, three factors amplify loyalty concerns. First, ethnic identity alignment: Han rebel movements explicitly mobilize ethnic solidarity against Manchu rule, making Han officials' loyalty suspect regardless of competence. The court cannot risk empowering capable Han administrators who might defect or sympathize with co-ethnic rebels. Second, information asymmetry: local Han officials possess superior information about rebel networks and popular sentiment, creating agency problems when their loyalties are questionable. Appointing ethnic Manchu outsiders, despite their incompetence, reduces the risk of collusion. Third, demonstration effects: appointing Han officials during Han rebellions signals weakness and might encourage further defections, while appointing Manchus demonstrates regime resolve to maintain ethnic hierarchy.

For external invasions, different mechanisms prioritize competence. First, technological gaps: foreign militaries possess superior technology and training that only technically skilled officials can counter effectively. Ethnic loyalty cannot substitute for understanding modern artillery, naval tactics, or diplomatic protocols. Second, neutral loyalty: external threats do not mobilize along internal ethnic cleavages, reducing loyalty concerns about Han officials. The enemy is foreign, not co-ethnic, making Han officials less likely to defect. Third, visible performance metrics: military defeats are observable and attributable, creating strong incentives for the court to prioritize competence when failure means regime collapse. The asymmetric costs of appointing incompetent loyalists (military defeat, territorial loss, indemnities) exceed loyalty risks from competent officials of Han ethicity.

Evidence supporting these mechanisms emerges from my heterogeneity analysis. Crisis effects are 40% larger in provinces with higher Han population shares during internal rebellions, consistent with ethnic solidarity concerns. Conversely, external invasion effects are strongest in coastal provinces facing direct foreign military contact, where technical competence gaps are most salient. The temporal evolution also supports mechanism interpretation: the regime learned from early crisis management, with effects intensifying 60-70% in the period 1851-1875 as the regime refined its crisis-contingent personnel strategies.

The Qing context offers exceptional analytical advantages. First, detailed historical records enable comprehensive panel data covering 2,088 province-year observations across 24 provincial units (1825-1911). For each province-year, I measure elite composition by averaging officials' characteristics across 5-8 key provincial positions. Second, two distinct elite

pathways—the meritocratic examination system emphasizing Han competence versus the hereditary Banner system privileging Manchu loyalty—provide observable proxies for the loyalty-competence dimension. Third, crises varied systematically in type, timing, and geographic scope, generating identifying variation while underlying institutions remained constant. I exploit this variation using difference-in-differences specifications with province and year fixed effects, estimating effects on a range of elite composition indicators.

I construct four complementary measures of elite composition, which capture different dimensions of the loyalty-competence trade-off: (1) average core position index based on examination credentials and Banner affiliation, (2) share of officials in military versus civilian positions, (3) hierarchical centrality in the patronage network, and (4) an Full Leadership Index reflecting formal rank and power. Using difference-in-differences specifications with province and year fixed effects, I estimate how crises affected these measures in both immediate aftermath (years 1-3 post-crisis) and longer term (years 4-10).

Three main findings emerge. First, crises produced large and highly significant immediate effects on elite composition. In the first three years after crisis onset, coefficients range from 0.46 to 0.56 standard deviations across the four specifications (t-statistics between 11 and 14, all $p < 0.001$). These represent massive shifts in provincial leadership composition—roughly half a standard deviation movement in the distribution of elite characteristics. To put this in perspective, a 0.50 standard deviation shift corresponds to moving a province from the 50th percentile to approximately the 69th percentile in the relevant indicator of elite composition.

Second, effects persist for over a decade without reverting to baseline. Even ten years post-crisis, coefficients remain between 0.32 and 0.43 standard deviations and remain overwhelmingly significant (all $t>8.0$, $p < 0.001$). While magnitudes decline roughly 20-35% from peak levels, the continued significance suggests lasting institutional changes rather than temporary adjustments. This persistence has important implications: crises do not merely disturb existing patterns but trigger path-dependent shifts in how autocrats manage elite composition.

Third, crisis type determines the direction of elite composition shifts. Internal crises (rebellions such as the Taiping, Nian, and Muslim uprisings) systematically decreased competence-based selection, with immediate effects ranging from -0.47 to -0.56 standard deviations. This pattern indicates that the court responded by appointing more Manchu loyalists to provincial leadership, prioritizing ethnic solidarity when facing challenges to dynastic legitimacy from

Han populations. Conversely, external crises (foreign invasions including the Opium Wars, Sino-French War, and Sino-Japanese War) increased competence-based selection, with immediate effects ranging from 0.39 to 0.47 standard deviations, reflecting pragmatic elevation of competent Han officials when confronting technologically superior foreign militaries. The difference between internal and external crisis effects exceeds 0.9 standard deviations immediately and remains above 0.6 standard deviations long-term, with differences statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ across all specifications.

Additional heterogeneity analysis reveals geographic and temporal patterns consistent with strategic personnel management. Crisis effects were 0.4 standard deviations larger in directly affected provinces compared to non-affected regions, though significant spillover effects (0.17-0.22 standard deviations) indicate nationwide policy adjustments. Temporally, crisis responses intensified dramatically in the period 1851-1875—the era of the massive Taiping Rebellion and initial foreign invasions—with effects 60-70% larger than the preceding period, suggesting that the dynasty learned to use crises as opportunities for aggressive personnel reconfiguration.

Extensive robustness checks confirm these patterns. Results remain substantively unchanged when including province-specific time trends, using alternative standard error estimation (bootstrap), employing different estimators (Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood), controlling for lagged outcomes, and adding numerous covariates (economic, demographic, political, and military factors). Placebo tests—randomly reassigning crisis timing and examining lead effects—produce null results, ruling out spurious correlation and supporting causal interpretation.

These findings make three major contributions. First, for the study of imperial China, the analysis provides the first systematic quantitative evidence on crisis-driven personnel dynamics across the Late Qing period. While historians have documented individual cases of crisis appointments, this paper demonstrates consistent patterns at scale, revealing how the dynasty strategically managed the loyalty-competence trade-off across diverse crises and provinces. The stark divergence between internal and external crisis effects offers new insights into how ethnic hierarchies and meritocratic institutions coexisted and competed within the Qing administrative system.

Second, for comparative politics and the study of authoritarian regimes, the paper advances understanding of elite management strategies. Existing theories emphasize either loyalty (ethnic favoritism, coup-proofing) or competence (performance legitimacy, state capacity

building) but rarely examine how autocrats dynamically balance these competing imperatives. By demonstrating that crisis type determines whether loyalty or competence dominates, the analysis reveals sophisticated strategic adaptation rather than fixed preferences. This contributes to literatures on autocratic institutions, elite politics, and regime stability by showing that environmental conditions shape personnel decisions even when rulers face few formal constraints.

Third, for political economy research on state capacity, the findings illuminate how crisis sequences shape long-term institutional development. The persistence of elite composition shifts suggests crises serve as critical junctures that trigger path-dependent organizational changes. Rather than viewing state capacity as evolving smoothly or responding only to gradual economic development, the analysis reveals how discrete shock events can fundamentally reconfigure bureaucratic characteristics with lasting effects on administrative effectiveness. The 76-year (1825-1900) span of the data makes it possible to trace how accumulated crisis responses shaped the trajectory of Late Qing governance.

Beyond these academic contributions, the analysis offers insights relevant for contemporary policy and institutional design. Modern autocracies wrestle with similar loyalty-competence tensions when appointing regional leaders, military commanders, and key administrators. Understanding how historical regimes navigated these trade-offs—and the consequences of their choices—can inform analysis of current authoritarian governance from China's provincial leadership to Russian regional governors to Middle Eastern state structures. The finding that crisis type matters suggests a nuanced approach to predicting autocratic behavior, moving beyond assumptions of uniform strategies to consider how different threats elicit different personnel responses.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on elite politics in autocracies, the Qing bureaucratic system, and crisis effects on institutions. Section 3 provides historical background on Late Qing crises and administrative structures. Section 4 describes data sources, variable construction, and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents baseline results and event study analysis. Section 6 explores heterogeneity by crisis type, geography, and time period. Section 7 conducts robustness checks. Section 8 discusses theoretical implications and generalizability. Section 9 concludes.

2. Literature Review

This paper contributes to three interrelated literatures: research on elite politics in autocratic regimes, studies of the Qing bureaucratic system and imperial Chinese governance, and work on how crises shape institutional development. I review each body of scholarship below, highlighting gaps this paper addresses.

2.1 Elite Politics in Autocracies

A central challenge for autocratic leaders is managing relationships with elites whose support is necessary for regime maintenance but who may harbor ambitions to seize power themselves. This generates what Svolik (2012) terms the 'authoritarian power-sharing problem'—rulers must grant elites sufficient autonomy and resources to govern effectively while preventing them from becoming strong enough to mount successful coups or rebellions. The loyalty-competence trade-off examined in this paper represents one manifestation of this broader dilemma.

One strand of literature emphasizes strategies autocrats use to ensure elite loyalty, even at the cost of administrative effectiveness. Roessler (2011) documents how African leaders employ ethnic stacking—appointing co-ethnics to sensitive positions regardless of competence—to minimize coup risk. Similarly, Quinlivan (1999) and Powell (2012, 2014) analyze coup-proofing measures in the Middle East, showing how regimes create parallel security forces, rotate commanders frequently, and privilege loyal incompetents over capable potential rivals. These strategies successfully reduce coup probability but undermine military effectiveness, state capacity, and economic performance (Acemoglu et al. 2004; Besley and Persson 2011).

An alternative perspective highlights how some autocrats build competent bureaucracies to deliver performance legitimacy and sustain long-term rule. Geddes (1994) argues that single-party regimes can maintain power through effective governance rather than purely repression. Tsai (2007) and Landry (2008) document sophisticated performance evaluation systems in contemporary China which promote capable provincial leaders based on economic growth and social stability metrics.

However, most existing research examines either loyalty-focused or competence-focused strategies in isolation rather than analyzing how autocrats dynamically adjust this balance. Notable exceptions include Egorov and Sonin (2011), who model when dictators prefer loyal incompetents versus competent potential rivals as a function of external threats and internal

institutional strength. Their theory predicts that stronger external threats should increase emphasis on competence—a prediction this paper tests empirically. Similarly, Zakharov (2016) analyzes Soviet cadre policy, finding that Stalin prioritized loyalty during purges but competence during World War II.

This paper contributes to this literature by providing systematic evidence on how environmental conditions—specifically, different types of crises—shape the loyalty-competence trade-off. Rather than assuming fixed preferences or static strategies, I demonstrate that autocrats strategically recalibrate elite composition based on threat characteristics. The distinction between internal and external crises suggests critical: the former pushes toward loyalty while the latter pulls toward competence. This contingent strategic adjustment represents an important refinement to existing theories of authoritarian elite management.

Despite these advances, three critical gaps remain. First, existing research examines either loyalty-focused or competence-focused strategies in isolation, rarely analyzing how autocrats dynamically adjust this balance. The few exceptions—Egorov and Sonin (2011) theoretically and Zakharov (2016) examining Soviet cadres—provide limited empirical evidence on the conditions triggering strategic recalibration. Second, we lack systematic understanding of how different threat types shape elite selection. Do all crises push toward the same adjustment, or do internal threats generate opposite pressures from external ones? Third, there is no research on persistence of crisis-induced changes: are adjustments temporary or do they trigger path-dependent institutional shifts?

This paper addresses these gaps with three contributions. First, I provide systematic empirical evidence that autocrats strategically adjust the loyalty-competence balance based on environmental conditions, specifically crisis characteristics. Rather than assuming fixed preferences, I demonstrate contingent adaptation. Second, I show that crisis type is critical: internal rebellions and external invasions generate opposite effects on elite composition (differences exceeding 0.9 standard deviations). This finding refines theoretical predictions by Egorov and Sonin (2011) regarding external threat effects and extends Zakharov's (2016) Soviet case to a different institutional context with richer crisis variation. Third, I document that crisis effects persist over a decade, suggesting these adjustments represent critical junctures with lasting implications for state capacity rather than temporary disturbances. The Late Qing

setting, with its institutionalized dual-track system and comprehensive archival records, enables direct observation of mechanisms that remain opaque in modern autocracies.

2.2 The Qing Bureaucratic System and Elite Composition

The Qing dynasty (1644-1911) governed China for nearly three centuries through a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus that blended Manchu ethnic privilege with Chinese administrative traditions. This hybrid system institutionalized the loyalty-competence trade-off in ways that make it particularly valuable for empirical analysis. Two parallel elite selection mechanisms coexisted: the examination system, which theoretically prioritized merit, and the Banner system, which guaranteed Manchu ethnic representation.

The civil service examination system, inherited from previous Chinese dynasties, provided a pathway for Han Chinese to enter officialdom based on mastery of Confucian classics and literary composition. Elman (2000, 2013) documents how examinations served simultaneously as instruments of political legitimation, social mobility, and administrative recruitment. Officials who succeeded through this meritocratic process generally possessed strong educational backgrounds, administrative training, and local knowledge—qualities associated with competent governance. However, their ethnic Han identity and scholarly orientation sometimes conflicted with Manchu dynastic interests, especially during periods of internal unrest when Han populations questioned Manchu rule.

The Banner system, by contrast, represented the Manchu ethnic and military hierarchy. Organized into Eight Banners during the pre-conquest period, this hereditary structure provided the Qing conquest elite with guaranteed positions in the bureaucracy and military. Elliott (2001) and Crossley (1990, 1999) analyze how the Banners served as instruments of ethnic control, ensuring Manchu dominance over the Han majority despite being vastly outnumbered. Banner affiliation signaled loyalty to the dynasty's ethnic core but was not necessarily correlated with administrative competence, since positions were hereditary rather than meritocratic.

Kuhn (1980, 1990) examines Late Qing provincial elite politics, documenting how crises disrupted established patterns. His detailed case studies of the Taiping era (1850-64) show that the court granted temporary military commissions to Han Chinese regional leaders like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang to command new forces during the rebellion, while simultaneously tightening control over formal provincial appointments to prioritize loyalty. These tactical military appointments differed fundamentally from the formal bureaucratic positions this paper

analyzes. Esherick (1987) and Rankin (1986) analyze the implications of these shifts for state-society relations and elite networks. However, this historical literature primarily relies on qualitative case studies of individual leaders or specific provinces, making it difficult to distinguish systematic patterns or causal effects of crises on elite composition.

Recent quantitative studies have begun examining Qing elite data more systematically. Bai and Jia (2016) analyze examination success rates and their relationship to local institutional quality. Chen and Kung (2016) study how weather shocks affected examination performance. Hao and Liu (2016) examine elite turnover patterns. However, none of these studies directly address how crises shaped elite composition or systematically test the loyalty-competence trade-off at the provincial level across the Late Qing period.

This paper makes three contributions to scholarship on Qing governance. First, it provides the first systematic quantitative analysis of provincial elite composition across nearly a century, enabling identification of general patterns rather than relying solely on case studies. Second, it explicitly operationalizes and measures the loyalty-competence dimension using multiple complementary indicators derived from examination credentials, Banner affiliations, position types, and network characteristics. Third, it causally identifies crisis effects by exploiting temporal and geographic variation in internal rebellions and external invasions, addressing selection and endogeneity concerns that complicate causal inference.

2.3 Crises and Institutional Change

A third literature to which this study contributes examines how major crises shape institutions and state development. Historical institutionalism often emphasizes critical junctures—brief periods when structural constraints loosen, enabling institutional innovations that generate path-dependent trajectories (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). Wars, revolutions, and severe economic crises often serve as such junctures, fundamentally restructuring state-society relations and administrative capacity.

Tilly (1975, 1990) argues that European state formation was driven primarily by war-making imperatives, as military competition forced rulers to develop taxation capacity, bureaucratic administration, and centralized authority. This 'bellicist' perspective has been extended to diverse contexts from Latin America (Centeno 2002) to East Asia (Kang 2002). Dincecco and Prado (2012) provide econometric evidence that historical warfare is correlated with modern state capacity across countries. However, this research typically examines long-run institutional development over the centuries rather than medium-term adjustments across

decades, and focuses on aggregate state capacity rather than key inputs into that capacity, such as elite composition .

Studies of contemporary developing countries document effects of crises on governance. Besley and Persson (2011) model how external threats can trigger investments in state capacity. Dell and Querubin (2018) show that Vietnamese districts exposed to more intense American bombing during the war subsequently developed better local infrastructure and governance. Gennaioli and Voth (2015) find that medieval German cities facing greater military threats developed more sophisticated fiscal institutions.

However, existing research rarely distinguishes between different types of crises or examines the specific mechanism of elite composition change. Do internal versus external threats have similar or opposite institutional effects? How long do crisis-induced changes persist? Does geographic proximity to conflict zones matter for institutional responses? This paper addresses these questions by exploiting rich variation in crisis characteristics within a single institutional context—late Qing China—while maintaining sufficient temporal scope to assess persistence.

The analysis reveals that crises do not uniformly strengthen or weaken institutions but rather reshape them in ways that depend critically on threat type. Internal crises pushed the Qing toward ethnic favoritism and away from meritocracy, potentially undermining administrative effectiveness. External crises had opposite effects, temporarily enhancing meritocratic selection. This heterogeneity suggests that effects of crises on state development are more complex than simple linear relationships between conflict exposure and capacity building, requiring attention to crisis characteristics and pre-existing institutional configurations.

2.4 Synthesis and Contributions

Drawing these literatures together, three key gaps emerge, which this paper addresses. First, while research on authoritarian elite politics emphasizes either loyalty or competence strategies, we lack systematic evidence on how autocrats dynamically balance these competing imperatives in response to changing environmental conditions. Second, despite extensive qualitative scholarship on Qing governance, quantitative analysis of provincial elite composition remains limited. Third, although critical juncture theories highlight the importance of crises for institutional development, the specific mechanisms through which crises reshape bureaucratic characteristics require further empirical investigation.

This paper bridges these gaps by analyzing comprehensive data on Late Qing provincial elite appointments to identify causal effects of different crisis types on bureaucratic composition.

The analysis demonstrates that: (1) autocrats strategically adjust the loyalty-competence balance based on threat characteristics rather than maintaining fixed preferences; (2) internal and external crises have opposite effects on elite composition, with implications for administrative effectiveness; and (3) crisis-induced institutional changes persist over decades, suggesting path-dependent development rather than temporary adjustments. These findings advance understanding of autocratic governance, Qing administrative history, and crisis-driven institutional change.

This section provides institutional context for the Late Qing period (1825-1900, the main analysis period) essential for the empirical analysis. Section 3.1 describes the five provincial positions analyzed and explains why they provide optimal settings for examining loyalty-competence trade-offs. Section 3.2 details the dual-track bureaucratic system—the institutional mechanism enabling crisis-contingent adjustments in elite composition. Section 3.3 distinguishes internal rebellions from external invasions, explaining why these crisis types generated opposite pressures on personnel decisions and deriving testable hypotheses (H1-H3) which Section 4's empirical strategy tests.

The Qing case offers analytical advantages for studying autocratic elite management. Unlike modern regimes where informal networks and patron-client relationships obscure loyalty-competence tensions, the Qing institutionalized these trade-offs through formal dual-track appointment systems (examination versus banner tracks) with comprehensive archival documentation. This institutional clarity enables direct observation of the mechanisms theorized in Section 2, making the Qing case valuable for developing general insights about how autocrats dynamically rebalance elite composition when facing different threat types. Moreover, the temporal and geographic variation in crises (1825-1911 across 24 provincial units) provides quasi-experimental leverage unavailable in modern autocratic settings.

3. Historical Context

To understand the empirical patterns documented in this paper, this section provides context on three institutional features of Late Qing China: the provincial administrative positions analyzed, the dual-track bureaucratic system that created the loyalty-competence tension, and how internal versus external crises generated different pressures on elite appointments.

3.1 Provincial Administration and Positions Analyzed

This paper analyzes elite composition across five key provincial administration positions during the Late Qing period (1825-1911). Understanding these positions and why they provide the optimal setting for examining the loyalty-competence trade-off requires context on provincial governance structure.

An important measurement consideration concerns the distinction between formal provincial appointments and temporary crisis commissions. My dependent variables measure only the five core provincial positions analyzed (governor-general, governor, provincial treasurer, judicial commissioner, regional military commander), not temporary appointments such as militia organizers (tuanlian dachen) or special commissioners.

Why focus on formal appointments rather than temporary commissions when the latter might seem more directly relevant to crisis response? Three complementary rationales justify this measurement choice: institutional control, evolutionary dynamics, and empirical identification advantages.

First, formal positions controlled institutional infrastructure and administrative resources essential for sustained governance. While temporary commissioners like Zeng Guofan commanded militias during crises, formal provincial officials controlled tax collection, civil administration, and the regular bureaucratic apparatus. The governor of Hunan, for instance, controlled provincial revenues, appointed county magistrates, and managed routine administration—institutional powers that temporary militia organizers lacked. Historical evidence demonstrates that temporary commissioners consistently sought formal provincial authority precisely because it provided institutional leverage. Zeng Guofan spent a decade organizing militias before receiving governor-general authority in 1860, after which his institutional influence expanded substantially as he gained control over provincial administration and finances. This pattern suggests formal positions represented the "real" institutional power the court allocated.

Second, temporary appointments frequently evolved into formal positions, creating an observable pathway for analyzing regime strategy. The Taiping crisis illustrates this dynamic: capable Han officials first received temporary military commissions (1851-1853), then formal provincial authority as the crisis persisted (1853-1860s). My empirical estimates capture both

initial temporary commissions and subsequent formalization through formal appointment data, as temporary commissioners who proved effective typically received formal provincial positions within 2-4 years. The data thus reflects the complete institutional response—both tactical flexibility and strategic personnel adjustments—rather than merely immediate crisis reactions.

Third, focusing on formal appointments provides superior empirical identification because formal positions generated consistent systematic records across all provinces and time periods. The Qing History Draft (Qing Shi Gao) comprehensively documents formal appointments with standardized information: official titles, appointment dates, backgrounds, and exam credentials. Temporary commissions, by contrast, varied dramatically in scope, authority, and documentation. Some "special commissioners" wielded substantial power while others held largely ceremonial titles. The scattered historical records make systematic cross-province comparison difficult and introduce significant measurement error. Formal appointments thus provide the empirical foundation for identifying causal effects.

These three rationales converge: formal appointments controlled institutional infrastructure, absorbed successful temporary appointees, and generated systematic data for causal inference. The measurement strategy therefore captures the court's strategic personnel adjustments through positions where both loyalty and competence considerations generated meaningful trade-offs.

Late Qing provincial administration operated through several senior positions with distinct responsibilities. The Qing History Draft (Qing Shi Gao) defines these positions' formal duties, though actual practice often diverged from official regulations (Zhao et al. 1977).

Governor-General (zongdu): The highest provincial authority, typically overseeing one to three provinces. Held concurrent titles including President of the Board of War and Censor-in-Chief. Official duties included "managing military and civil affairs, supervising civil and military officials, inspecting subordinate officers, and securing the frontier" (Zhao et al. 1977: 2391). The court appointed approximately 8-9 governor-generals across the empire's strategic regions.

Governor (xunfu): Provincial chief executive managing a single province's civil administration. Concurrent titles included Vice President of the Censorate. Official duties included "propagating imperial virtue, pacifying military and civilian populations, clarifying

government and punishments, promoting benefits and eliminating harm, examining and evaluating officials" (Zhao et al. 1977: 2391). Each province had its own governor.

Provincial Treasurer (buzhengshi): Chief financial officer managing provincial revenues, taxation collection, and budget administration. Also known as the Provincial Administration Commissioner, this position reported to both the governor and the Board of Revenue in Beijing. As Zhong and Xie (2021: 22) document through analysis of Qing administrative records, "financial affairs belong to the governor's exclusive responsibility," with the provincial treasurer handling operational details under gubernatorial supervision.

Judicial Commissioner (anzheshi): Provincial chief justice handling criminal cases, appeals, and legal administration. Also known as the Provincial Surveillance Commissioner, this position reviewed all death penalty cases before submission to Beijing and reported to both the governor and the Board of Punishments.

Additionally, garrison generals (jiangjun) commanded Eight Banner forces in strategic provincial locations. However, garrison generals operated in a parallel military hierarchy reporting directly to the Imperial Household Department rather than through provincial civil administration (Zhong and Xie 2021: 19-20). During the study period, approximately 60% of provinces maintained permanent banner garrisons with garrison generals.

Positions Analyzed in This Study

This paper focuses on five positions: governor-general, governor, provincial treasurer, judicial commissioner, and regional military commander. The primary dependent variable measures the average elite credentials across these five positions in each province-year. Several methodological and theoretical considerations justify this focus.

First, these five positions formed the integrated civil administration responsible for provincial governance. Governors held supervisory authority over treasurers and judicial commissioners, creating clear lines of bureaucratic accountability for taxation, justice, and routine administration—the core functions of provincial government (Wang 1993). Unlike governor-generals who oversaw multiple provinces, making attribution of provincial conditions ambiguous, these five positions operated at a consistent administrative level with clear provincial jurisdictions.

Second, these positions could be filled from either the examination track (prioritizing competence) or the banner hereditary track (prioritizing loyalty). The court faced genuine choices when appointing officials to these positions. When facing crises, should the emperor prioritize examination-educated Han officials with demonstrated administrative expertise and local knowledge, or banner appointees with guaranteed ethnic loyalty but limited technical skills? This trade-off lies at the heart of the paper's research question.

Third, appointments to these positions directly responded to provincial conditions and crisis pressures. Historical evidence demonstrates crisis-contingent appointment patterns. For instance, Emperor Yongzheng's 1728 edict criticized governors-general in Shandong, Hunan, and Hubei for neglecting fiscal oversight, explicitly ordering Governor-General of Henan and Shandong Tian Wenjing and Governor-General of Huguang (Hunan and Hubei) Maizhu to jointly investigate treasury deficits with provincial officials—a temporary deviation from normal practice that the emperor emphasized "is implemented because of specific individuals, and should not become precedent" (Qing Shizong Shilu, juan 73, Yongzheng 6/9, cited in Zhong and Xie 2021: 23). This episode reveals both the normal division of responsibilities and the court's willingness to adjust appointments when crises demanded.

Fourth, comprehensive personnel records exist for these positions across all provinces from 1825 to 1911 (Qian 1980), enabling systematic quantitative analysis spanning 2,088 province-year observations across 24 provincial units (1825-1911). For each province-year, I aggregate information across 5-8 key provincial positions. This period encompasses major dynastic crises from the First Opium War through the dynasty's final years (1851-1864) and subsequent administrative reconstruction, marking a period when provincial governance structures had stabilized after mid-century chaos. The analysis extends backwards to 1825 using the Qing Shilu for major appointments in earlier years, providing coverage for the full 1825-1911 study period.

The main analysis focuses on 1825-1900, when provincial governance structures remained institutionally stable. Both the civil service examination system and the Banner hereditary pathway functioned as designed throughout this period, enabling clean identification of crisis-driven personnel adjustments within a consistent institutional framework. The main analysis excludes the constitutional reform period (1901-1911), though robustness checks include it because the Qing court fundamentally restructured governance during this decade: abolishing the civil service examination system in 1905, initiating constitutional preparations in 1906, and

systematically recentralizing authority from provincial officials to Beijing. These reforms altered the institutional environment in ways that confound crisis-driven adjustments with deliberate centralization efforts. Appendix Table C1 extends the analysis through 1911, showing that main effects attenuate during the reform period, consistent with institutional disruption offsetting crisis-contingent patterns.

Why exclude governor-generals? Governor-generals pose aggregation problems for causal identification. With a single governor-general overseeing Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui provinces simultaneously, it is unclear which province's conditions drove his appointment. Moreover, governor-general positions were relatively few (8-9 across the empire) compared to 24 provincial governorships, providing insufficient statistical power for within-position analysis.

Why exclude garrison generals? Garrison generals were exclusively banner military appointees serving in a parallel command structure. As documented in Section 3.1 below, the banner system granted hereditary privileges ensuring only Manchus and their allies could hold these positions. Unlike the three civil positions, garrison general appointments never involved choosing between examination graduates versus banner officials—they always represented the loyalty pole of the trade-off. Including garrison generals would dilute the signal this paper seeks to identify how different crisis types affected the court's willingness to trade competence for loyalty (or vice versa) in positions where both tracks provided viable candidates.

The paper measures elite composition by averaging officials' credentials across five key positions (governor-general, governor, provincial treasurer, judicial commissioner, regional military commander) in each province-year. Officials' credentials reflect their entry pathway (examination success versus hereditary privilege), military versus civil career track, Elite Prioritization Index in patronage relationships, and bureaucratic rank. These dimensions capture complementary aspects of the loyalty-competence trade-off: examination credentials and civil backgrounds indicate technical competence; banner affiliation and military backgrounds indicate political loyalty.

Section 4.2 operationalizes these dimensions through four specifications (Elite_Core_Avg-Elite_Full_Avg), each emphasizing different aspects of elite composition. The primary measure, Elite_Core_Avg (Average Core Position Index), combines examination credentials with banner affiliation to create a composite score for each province-year. This composite

measure captures the overall competence-versus-loyalty profile of provincial civil administration.

3.2 The Dual-Track Bureaucratic System

The Qing dynasty institutionalized a loyalty-competence trade-off through its dual-track appointment system. Two parallel pathways to high office coexisted throughout the dynasty, producing officials with opposite strengths and weaknesses.

Track 1: Hereditary Banner Privilege (The Loyalty Path)

The Eight Banner system granted extensive hereditary privileges to Manchus and their Mongol and Han Chinese allies who aided the Qing conquest. This created an institutionalized pathway to high office based on ancestry rather than merit.

Banner families received three critical advantages that guaranteed lifetime dependence on the dynasty. The first was automatic access to government positions without examination. Banner descendants inherited official posts based solely on their father's rank, entirely bypassing competitive civil service examinations (Fairbank and Liu 1980: 20-22). High-ranking banner families could secure provincial governorships and other senior positions for their sons through hereditary succession rights.

The second advantage of banner families was reserved quotas in lucrative provincial positions. During the Shunzhi reign, an edict acknowledged that "provinces have many officials, all requiring personnel," noting that "banner officials and Han officials should each occupy half" of appointments (Qing Shizu Shilu, juan 108, Shunzhi 14/3, cited in Zhong and Xie 2021: 16). Though this exact ratio was not maintained uniformly across all positions and time periods, substantial quotas for banner appointees persisted throughout the dynasty, particularly in positions controlling customs revenues, salt monopolies, and wealthy circuits.

The third advantage consisted of permanent stipends and residential privileges independent of office-holding. Banner families received state salaries regardless of employment status and occupied privileged garrison compounds in Beijing and provincial capitals, creating complete economic dependence on dynastic survival (Crossley 1999).

The Loyalty Advantage

This hereditary system produced absolute political loyalty. Banner families' entire social status, income, and legal privileges derived from Qing rule. Unlike examination graduates who might harbor Han nationalist sympathies or maintain local power bases through kinship networks, banner officials had no alternative source of support. Their loyalty was structural rather than personal—regime collapse meant loss of everything.

Ethnic solidarity reinforced institutional dependence. The Qing was fundamentally a conquest dynasty ruling a Han majority comprising over 95% of the empire's population. Manchu banner families understood that any successful challenge to Manchu supremacy would eliminate their privileged position. This made them especially reliable when confronting internal rebellions that challenged the dynasty's ethnic legitimacy. During the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), when rebel ideology explicitly promoted Han nationalism and anti-Manchu rhetoric, the court could trust that banner officials would suppress the uprising with maximum force regardless of civilian casualties, whereas Han officials might sympathize with co-ethnic rebels or suggest reluctant to implement harsh measures (Kuhn 1978).

The Competence Problem

However, hereditary privilege came with severe administrative costs that emperors recognized but could not eliminate without undermining the ethnic basis of their rule.

The first cost was the limited technical expertise of hereditary elites. Unlike examination graduates who spent decades mastering administrative law, fiscal regulations, and policy analysis, hereditary appointees received positions based purely on birth. Many lacked basic training in governance. Emperor Qianlong's 1790 complaint exemplifies this problem: he criticized certain governors-general for incorrectly claiming that "criminal matters and fiscal affairs are not their exclusive responsibility" and delegating them "entirely to governors and provincial officials" (Qing Gaozong Shilu, juan 1139, Qianlong 46/8). This critique reveals banner officials' insufficient engagement with core administrative duties even at the highest provincial level.

The second disadvantage of making hereditary appointments consisted of social and institutional distance from local power structures. Banner families lived in segregated garrison compounds, physically separated from Chinese society. Despite becoming largely Sinicized by the late Qing, Manchu officials typically lacked the deep social networks and local knowledge that examination graduates possessed—particularly problematic in southern provinces like

Fujian and Guangdong where local gentry power was strongest (Crossley 1999). This social distance made effective local administration difficult. Banner officials struggled to mobilize local elite cooperation, lacked intelligence about local conditions, and could not easily navigate the complex informal networks of kinship and patronage that undergirded actual governance.

A third administrative cost of the hereditary principle was economic incentive misalignment and corruption. Because hereditary officials viewed positions primarily as income sources rather than career opportunities, they prioritized personal enrichment over administrative performance. Emperor Yongzheng explicitly identified this dynamic in his critique of provincial treasury deficits: "because governors rely on provincial treasurers for their expenses, either through gentle relations and mutual embezzlement, or by first discovering the treasurer's shortcomings and then using threats to extort bribes for personal use" (Qing Shizong Shilu, juan 3, Yongzheng 1/1, cited in Zhong and Xie 2021: 23). The emperor understood that structural incentives encouraged corruption but could not eliminate them without fundamentally reforming the banner system.

A final cost of hereditary appointments was military incompetence despite military roles. By the mid-Qing period, banner military effectiveness had seriously declined. The hereditary officer corps had become divorced from actual military capability, with many garrison commanders having never seen combat and viewing their positions primarily as sinecures (Fairbank and Liu 1980). When foreign invasions demanded modern military organization and tactics, banner officials proved incapable of adaptation.

Track 2: Civil Service Examination System (The Competence Path)

Parallel to the hereditary banner system, the Qing maintained the civil service examination system inherited from previous Chinese dynasties. This created a meritocratic pathway to high office based on demonstrated intellectual achievement.

The examination system operated through three ascending levels: provincial examinations (producing juren degree holders), metropolitan examinations (producing jinshi degree holders), and palace examinations (determining final rankings among jinshi). Candidates spent years, often decades, mastering Confucian classics, historical precedents, legal codes, and literary composition. Success required not just memorization but analytical ability to apply classical principles to contemporary governance problems (Elman 2000).

Success rates were extraordinarily low, ensuring that degree holders represented genuine intellectual elites. Across the entire Qing period (1644-1911), the examination system produced approximately 26,000 metropolitan degree holders (jinshi) and 112,000 provincial degree holders (juren) from millions of candidates who attempted the examinations (Zhong and Xie 2021: 17). This extreme selectivity—combined with the multi-year preparation required—meant examination success demonstrated exceptional cognitive ability, cultural sophistication, and perseverance.

The Competence Advantage

Examination graduates possessed several critical capabilities that hereditary banner appointees systematically lacked.

The first was technical administrative expertise. Years of studying legal codes, fiscal regulations, judicial precedents, and administrative procedures gave examination graduates practical governance skills beyond theoretical knowledge. They understood taxation systems, legal procedures, personnel management, and bureaucratic protocols—precisely the knowledge essential for effective provincial administration (Elman 2000). This expertise proved especially valuable during crises requiring rapid resource mobilization or fiscal innovation.

Secondly, examination graduates possessed deep knowledge of local society and embedded social networks. Most examination graduates were Han Chinese who grew up in the provinces they would later govern. They understood local economic structures, kinship hierarchies, religious practices, and cultural norms. They spoke local dialects fluently and could communicate directly with populations under their jurisdiction without translators. Moreover, their examination success embedded them in local elite networks—scholarly associations, kinship ties, and patron-client relationships—that facilitated informal governance. When formal bureaucratic channels proved insufficient, examination graduates could mobilize local resources through these networks.

A third advantage of examination graduates consisted of literary and diplomatic skills crucial for foreign relations. Examination success required mastery of classical Chinese prose and poetry. This literary training proved invaluable for drafting official documents, conducting diplomatic negotiations with foreign powers, and representing the dynasty in formal communications—tasks in which Manchu banner officials' limited exposure to Western learning and diplomatic conventions became a severe handicap. As Western imperialism

intensified, the ability to understand foreign diplomatic protocols, international law, and treaty negotiation became essential. Examination graduates who studied Western learning possessed these skills; hereditary banner officials, confined to traditional Manchu military training, did not (Elman 2005).

Finally, examination graduates possessed proven analytical ability and problem-solving capacity. The examination system functioned as an extended intelligence test lasting decades. Success demonstrated not just knowledge but problem-solving capacity, analytical reasoning, and ability to synthesize complex information under time pressure—precisely the cognitive skills required for effective crisis management. When confronting novel challenges like Western military technology or international law, examination graduates proved more capable of adaptation than banner officials whose positions derived from birth rather than ability.

The Loyalty Problem

However, examination graduates' superior competence came with political risks from the dynasty's perspective.

The first political risk emanated from ethnic identity and potential Han nationalism. Examination graduates were overwhelmingly Han Chinese who had internalized Confucian political philosophy emphasizing Chinese cultural supremacy and the Mandate of Heaven. Many privately questioned the legitimacy of "barbarian" Manchu rule over the culturally superior Han civilization. During internal rebellions—particularly those like the Taiping uprising which explicitly challenged Manchu ethnic dominance—the court worried that Han officials might sympathize with rebel causes, suggest unwilling to suppress fellow Han with sufficient ruthlessness, or even defect to rebel movements promising Han restoration (Kuhn 1978).

A second political risk was that examination graduates had local power bases providing alternative political resources. Unlike banner officials whose power derived entirely from the court, examination graduates often had deep roots in their home provinces through kinship networks, scholarly associations, land holdings, and patron-client relationships. These local connections provided alternative sources of political support and economic resources. If central authority weakened during crises, examination graduates might use these local bases to establish regional autonomy or resist central directives.

Thirdly, examination graduates might have ideological commitments conflicting with crisis imperatives. Examination training emphasized Confucian ideals of benevolent governance, minimal taxation, official moral exemplarity, and rule by virtue rather than force. These values sometimes conflicted with crisis imperatives requiring harsh suppression, heavy taxation, or ethically questionable tactics. Examination graduates might resist policies they viewed as violating proper governance norms, potentially undermining crisis response effectiveness.

A final risk of appointing examination graduates was their potential for ambitious careerism and factional politics. Because examination graduates achieved positions through demonstrated ability rather than hereditary right, they often harbored ambitions for continued advancement. This created incentives for factional politics, strategic positioning, and blame-shifting behavior that could undermine coordinated crisis response. Moreover, examination graduates' intellectual sophistication made them more capable of concealing information, manipulating reports, or pursuing private agendas—precisely the monitoring problems that motivated the court's preference for loyal but less competent banner officials.

The Fundamental Trade-off

The examination system thus presented the mirror image of hereditary privilege: it produced highly competent administrators whose political reliability remained questionable. The court faced a strategic dilemma in every senior appointment: rely on loyal but incompetent banner officials, or competent but potentially unreliable examination graduates?

As Zhong and Xie (2021: 21) observe through their analysis of Qing administrative records, "the nature of the crisis determined which liability proved more acceptable." During internal rebellions challenging dynastic legitimacy, ethnic loyalty trumped administrative competence—the court could accept fiscal mismanagement or judicial inefficiency but could not tolerate officials who might sympathize with rebels. Conversely, during external invasions requiring diplomatic sophistication and technical expertise which banner officials could not provide, competence became essential regardless of loyalty concerns. The court would risk employing potentially disloyal Han officials rather than suffer defeats from banner officials' incompetence.

This crisis-dependent calculation explains the divergent personnel patterns this paper documents. External threats like the Opium Wars forced the court to prioritize examination graduates despite loyalty risks. Internal rebellions produced the opposite response, as the court retreated to its ethnic core despite accepting reduced administrative effectiveness.

3.3 Conceptual Framework

The loyalty-competence trade-off in autocratic elite selection depends on two key factors that vary systematically with crisis type.

First, loyalty risk: How severe are the agency problems created by identity cleavages between the ruler and potential appointees? This risk intensifies when crises mobilize along ethnic, religious, or regional lines that map onto the bureaucracy's internal divisions. Officials sharing identity with challengers face conflicting loyalties that undermine the autocrat's control—they may defect, provide intelligence to rebels, or implement policies half-heartedly. Conversely, when threats originate from external actors with no domestic ethnic constituency, identity-based loyalty concerns diminish.

Second, competence requirements: How specialized are the technical skills required to manage the crisis? Some threats demand sophisticated capabilities—diplomatic negotiation, military technology, administrative innovation—that only highly trained elites possess. Other challenges require political will and coercive capacity more than specialized expertise. When competence requirements are high, appointing loyal but incompetent officials risks catastrophic failure; when requirements are modest, competence becomes dispensable.

Crisis type determines where regimes fall in this two-dimensional space: Internal rebellions that mobilize ethnic solidarity combine high loyalty risk with modest competence requirements. Suppressing domestic insurgencies primarily requires military force, political resolve, and willingness to implement harsh collective punishments against co-ethnic populations. Technical administrative skills matter less than assured commitment to regime survival. This combination pushes autocrats toward loyalty-prioritizing appointments: better to accept administrative inefficiency than risk defection during existential challenges to ethnic rule.

External invasions by technologically superior powers combine low loyalty risk with high competence requirements. Foreign enemies do not exploit internal ethnic cleavages or offer domestic officials plausible defection opportunities. Meanwhile, countering advanced militaries demands diplomatic sophistication, understanding of international law, and capacity for rapid institutional adaptation. This combination pushes autocrats toward competence-prioritizing appointments: ethnic loyalty cannot substitute for specialized skills when facing foreign technology gaps.

This framework generates testable predictions about crisis-driven personnel adjustments. The mechanisms outlined below explain how these two factors operated in the Qing context, producing the opposing effects on elite composition documented in Section 5.

3.4 Internal vs. External Crises: Distinct Implications for Elite Selection

The Late Qing period witnessed two fundamentally different types of security threat, each with distinct implications for the loyalty-competence trade-off in elite appointments. Understanding how these crises differed clarifies why they generated opposite pressures on personnel selection.

Internal Rebellions: Threats to Regime Legitimacy

Internal crises consisted of armed uprisings by domestic populations challenging Qing rule. Major internal rebellions during the study period included:

The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864): A millenarian movement led by Hong Xiuquan which established a rival state controlling much of southern China at its peak. The Taiping ideology explicitly rejected Manchu rule, promoted Han nationalism, and advocated overturning the Confucian social order—posing an existential threat to dynastic legitimacy (Kuhn 1978; Platt 2012). The rebellion's massive scale and explicit anti-Manchu ideology made it a defining crisis for late Qing elite politics.

The Nian Uprising (1851-1868): A bandit-based rebellion in north-central China that exploited weak local governance and economic distress following natural disasters. The Nian movement challenged state authority through mobile guerrilla warfare that proved difficult to suppress (Perry 1980).

The Muslim Rebellions (1862-1877): Ethnic uprisings in Yunnan, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang that combined religious identity with anti-Qing sentiment. These rebellions threatened frontier security and raised concerns about centrifugal forces in ethnically diverse border regions (Atwill 2005).

The Boxer Uprising (1899-1901): An anti-foreign, anti-Christian movement that initially enjoyed court support before foreign intervention forced suppression. Though primarily directed at foreigners, the Boxer movement revealed ongoing Han resentment of foreign influence enabled by Qing weakness.

These internal crises shared three characteristics relevant to elite appointment decisions. First, they directly challenged the dynasty's ethnic legitimacy. Rebels frequently employed anti-Manchu rhetoric, framing their resistance as Han liberation from foreign conquest or criticizing the dynasty's inability to expel Western imperialists. This made ethnic loyalty paramount—the

court needed officials whose commitment to Manchu supremacy was beyond question, even if it meant accepting administrative incompetence.

Second, these internal crises required mass mobilization and harsh suppression of Han populations. Effective counterinsurgency required officials to order violence against their co-ethnics, destroy civilian property to deny rebel resources, and implement collective punishments. Han officials might suggest reluctant to implement such measures with maximum force, whereas Manchu banner officials faced no ethnic solidarity conflicts. The court preferred officials who would suppress rebellions ruthlessly regardless of Han civilian casualties.

Third, internal rebellions did not demand sophisticated technical expertise. Suppressing domestic rebels required military force, political will, and logistical persistence more than diplomatic skill, knowledge of international law, or administrative innovation. Banner officials' incompetence in fiscal management or judicial procedures mattered less than their guaranteed loyalty when facing internal threats to regime legitimacy.

External Invasions: Technical and Diplomatic Challenges

External crises consisted of military conflicts with foreign powers imposing unequal treaties and territorial concessions. Major external invasions during the study period included:

The First Opium War (1839-1842): British military intervention following China's attempts to suppress the opium trade. British victory forced open Chinese ports, imposed indemnity payments, and established the unequal treaty system that would persist until the 1940s (Waley-Cohen 1999).

The Second Opium War (1856-1860): Anglo-French expedition that captured Beijing, burned the Summer Palace, and imposed further territorial and economic concessions including foreign diplomatic residence in the capital. This defeat demonstrated China's military inferiority and forced acceptance of Western diplomatic norms (Platt 2018).

The Sino-French War (1884-1885): Conflict over French colonial expansion into Vietnam, then a Chinese tributary state. French victory established French Indochina and demonstrated China's inability to defend tributary states, undermining the traditional East Asian tributary system (Lung 2005).

The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895): Devastating defeat by recently modernized Japan resulting in loss of Taiwan, Korean independence (ending tributary status), and massive

indemnity payments. This defeat proved more shocking than Western invasions because it came from a fellow Asian power, triggering urgent calls for reform (Paine 2003).

These external invasions differed fundamentally from internal rebellions in their implications for personnel selection. First, they posed no direct threat to the dynasty's ethnic legitimacy. Foreign powers sought commercial privileges, territorial advantages, and diplomatic recognition but did not challenge Manchu rule over Han populations. Western imperialists preferred dealing with the Qing court as a unified government rather than encouraging Han nationalist movements that might create instability. This reduced the salience of ethnic loyalty in official selection—the court could employ Han officials without fearing their ethnic sympathies would lead to collaboration with foreign enemies.

Second, external invasions demanded technical expertise and diplomatic sophistication that hereditary privilege could not provide. Negotiating with foreign diplomats required knowledge of international law, understanding of Western political systems, and increasingly, foreign language capabilities. Treaty negotiations involved complex commercial regulations, extraterritoriality arrangements, and tariff schedules—precisely the technical details where examination-educated officials' superior education proved essential. Banner officials' limited literacy and cultural isolation made them nearly useless in diplomatic contexts (Elman 2005).

Third, external wars required administrative competence to mobilize resources efficiently. Foreign military threats demanded rapid military modernization, fiscal innovation to fund indemnity payments and defensive preparations, and organizational reform to coordinate response across multiple provinces. These imperatives required the technocratic skills that examination training developed. Banner officials' administrative incompetence became a fatal liability when facing foreign invasions demanding efficient resource mobilization.

Testable Predictions

elite composition indicators (specifically Elite_Core_Avg, which combines examination credentials, ethnicity, and official rank) for governors, provincial treasurers, and judicial commissioners.

H1 (Internal Rebellions → Lower Elite Credentials): Provinces experiencing internal rebellions should exhibit lower average origin scores, reflecting increased appointments of banner officials with hereditary credentials. When facing domestic challenges to ethnic legitimacy, the court prioritizes loyalty over competence despite accepting reduced administrative

effectiveness. Ethnically Manchu officials become especially valuable in suppressing Han rebellions, leading to increased banner representation even in positions traditionally filled by examination graduates.

H2 (External Invasions → Higher Elite Credentials): Provinces experiencing external invasions should exhibit higher average origin scores, reflecting increased appointments of examination graduates with superior technical skills. When facing foreign military threats demanding diplomatic sophistication and administrative competence, the court prioritizes competence over loyalty despite ethnic concerns. Examination-educated Han officials become essential for treaty negotiations and resource mobilization, leading to their increased appointment even in frontier provinces where loyalty concerns might normally dominate.

H3 (Crisis Heterogeneity): The magnitude of these effects should vary with crisis intensity and duration. More severe or prolonged crises should generate stronger shifts in elite composition as the trade-off's stakes increase. Short-lived or localized crises might not trigger substantial personnel changes if the court believes existing officials can manage the situation.

The empirical analysis tests these predictions by exploiting temporal and geographic variation in crisis exposure across the 24 provincial units from 1825 to 1911. If the loyalty-competence trade-off drives personnel decisions as theorized, we should observe that internal rebellions systematically reduce elite credentials in affected provinces while external invasions systematically increase them, with effects proportional to crisis severity.

4. Data and Empirical Strategy

4.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction

The sample covers 24 provincial-level administrative units (21 provinces plus 3 special frontier regions) between 1825 and 1900 for the main analysis (with extensions through 1911 for robustness checks), yielding 2,088 province-year observations (24 provinces × 87 years). For each province-year, I measure elite composition by averaging officials' characteristics across 5-8 key provincial positions (Governor-General, Governor, Provincial Treasurer, Judicial Commissioner, Regional Military Commander).

The main analysis focuses on 1825-1900, when provincial governance structures remained institutionally consistent. We extend the analysis through 1911 in robustness checks (Appendix

Table C1) to examine whether including the constitutional reform period (1901-1911) alters the findings. This extended period enables analysis of ten major crises with sufficient pre-crisis and post-crisis observations for difference-in-differences estimation. The 1825 starting point coincides with the Daoguang Emperor's reign (1821-1850), when administrative documentation standardization improved data quality. The 1911 endpoint precedes the Republic of China's establishment, which fundamentally restructured provincial administration.

Each observation corresponds to a high-ranking provincial post in a given year: Governor-General (zongdu), Governor (xunfu), Provincial Treasurer (buzhengshi), Judicial Commissioner (anchashi), or Regional Military Commander (zhufang jiangjun). Civil offices exist in nearly all provinces, while military and governor-general posts concentrate in frontier or strategic regions. Aggregating by province-year and classifying officials by elite origin produce the final panel for analysis.

Crises are identified using standard historical chronologies (Kuhn 1980; Wright 1957; Fairbank and Liu 1980). Each event is coded as an internal rebellion or an external invasion based on primary threat source. A province is considered affected if located within approximately 300km of a major battle or occupation site. This threshold balances several considerations: (1) Historical operational ranges—Qing provincial military forces, comparable to contemporary armies marching 20-30km daily, could effectively project power for approximately 10-15 days (roughly 300km); (2) Administrative communication constraints—the Qing courier relay system, with stations spaced approximately 30km apart, enabled 5-6 day message transmission within 300km from provincial capitals, representing the practical limit of timely governance responses; (3) Empirical validation—robustness checks confirm results remain stable across alternative cutoffs (200km, 400km, 500km), with 300km providing a conservative middle ground.Appendix B lists the 26 crises. Among these, 10 major crises (listed in Appendix Table B1) form the analytical core, while 16 smaller conflicts provide supplementary variation.

Crisis onset is defined as the year when rebellions formally established themselves as organized threats to dynastic authority, or when foreign invasions first engaged Qing forces, rather than using escalation points or peak intensity years. For the Taiping Rebellion, this is 1851 when Hong Xiuquan declared the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, not 1853 when rebels captured Nanjing. For external invasions, I use the year when hostilities commenced rather than treaty signing years. This approach captures the full elite adjustment process, as personnel changes

occurred gradually over subsequent years rather than instantaneously. The three-year "immediate effect" window (years 1-3 post-crisis) reflects the period during which regimes strategically recalibrated elite composition in response to evolving crisis conditions.

4.2 Measuring Elite Composition

Elite composition is proxied through four standardized indicators (mean zero, standard deviation one). Each measure captures a different dimension of the loyalty-competence trade-off:

- Elite_Core_Avg: Core Position Index — Combines examination credentials (jinshi, juren degrees), ethnicity (Han versus Manchu Banner affiliation), and official rank. Computed as $Score_i = \alpha \cdot Exam_i + \beta \cdot Han_i + \gamma \cdot Rank_i$, then averaged across all key officials in the province-year. Higher scores indicate competence-based selection; lower scores indicate hereditary or loyalty-based appointments.
- Elite_CivMil_Avg: Civil-Military Index — Share of military-track officials among top provincial posts, capturing preference for Banner loyalists versus civil administrators. Calculated as the ratio of military positions to total positions.
- Elite_Maximum: Maximum Authority Score among the four civil-military officials (governor, finance commissioner, judicial commissioner, garrison general). This captures the highest-quality appointee in provincial leadership. Higher scores indicate establishment insiders; lower scores suggest political outsiders.
- Elite_Full_Avg: Full Leadership Index — Rank-weighted authority of the highest provincial position, measuring the status and prestige of the top appointment. Computed as $\max[Rank_i \times PositionWeight_i]$.

Pairwise correlations range from 0.67 to 0.82, confirming that all measures capture a common underlying dimension while each reflects distinct facets of elite composition. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Composition

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Panel A: Outcome Variables (Standardized)					
Elite_Core_Avg: Core Position Index	0.00	1.00	-2.87	3.21	2,088

Elite_CivMil_Avg: Civil-Military Index	0.00	1.00	-1.98	2.76	2,088
Elite_Maximum: Maximum Authority Score	0.00	1.00	-2.34	3.45	2,088
Elite_Full_Avg: Full Leadership Index	0.00	1.00	-2.56	2.89	2,088

Panel B: Sample Coverage

Provinces	**21**
Years	1825-1911 (76 years)
Crisis episodes	26 total (15 internal, 11 external)
Province-years with crises	432 (23.6% of sample)

Notes: Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the four elite composition measures used as outcome variables. All variables are standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the full sample. Panel B describes sample coverage. The unit of observation is province-year, aggregating five principal administrative offices (Governor-General, Provincial Governor, Provincial Treasurer, Judicial Commissioner, Regional Military Commander) across 24 provincial-level units (21 regular provinces plus 3 special frontier administrative regions). Crisis episodes: The sample includes 26 total crisis events (15 internal, 11 external), of which 10 are major crises forming the analytical core (5 internal, 5 external) and 16 are smaller conflicts providing supplementary variation. See Appendix Table A1 for detailed institutional coverage and Appendix B for crisis timeline and definitions.

4.3 Empirical Strategy

The empirical design employs a two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences strategy exploiting temporal and spatial variation in crisis exposure. This approach isolates causal effects of crises on elite composition from pre-existing provincial differences, national time trends, and potentially endogenous crisis occurrence.

Baseline Specification. The baseline model estimates the average effect of crises on elite composition:

$$Ypt = \beta^1 PostCrisispt(1-3) + \beta^2 PostCrisispt(4-10) + \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (1)$$

where denotes one of the four elite composition measures for province p in year t. The indicators andequal one for years 1-3 and 4-10 following crisis onset, respectively. Province fixed effects (αp) capture time-invariant heterogeneity; year fixed effects (γt) absorb nationwide shocks. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. The coefficients β_1 and β_2 capture immediate and persistent crisis effects; positive values indicate increased emphasis on competence; negative values indicate increased emphasis on loyalty. Estimates are reported in Table 2 and Figure 1.

Event Study Specification. To examine dynamic adjustment and verify parallel trends, I estimate:

$$Ypt = \Sigma k = -5, k \neq -1^{10} \beta k \, Dp, t + k + \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (2)$$

where equals one if year t is k years relative to crisis onset (with k = −1 omitted as the reference year). Coefficients for pre-crisis years (k < 0) test the parallel trends assumption; post-crisis coefficients trace the dynamic path of adjustment. Joint F-tests reveal no significant pre-crisis trends (all p > 0.76), supporting causal interpretation. Estimates are reported in Table 3 and Figures 1-2.

Crisis Type Heterogeneity. To test whether internal rebellions and external invasions produce opposite effects, I estimate:

$$Ypt = \Sigma c \in \{Internal, External\} [\delta c1(CrisisTypeptc \times PostCrisispt(1-3))$$

$$+ \delta c2(CrisisTypeptc \times PostCrisispt(4-10))] + \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (3)$$

where CrisisTypeptc indicates crisis type c (internal or external) in province p during year t. The coefficients δc1 and δc2 capture short-term (years 1-3) and medium-term (years 4-10) effects by crisis type. Theoretical expectations are δInternal < 0 (internal rebellions favor loyalty) and δExternal > 0 (foreign wars favor competence). Wald tests of H_0: δInternal = δExternal assess the difference in direction and magnitude. Estimates are reported in Table 4 and Figures 2-3.

Geographic Heterogeneity. To examine spatial concentration versus spillovers, I estimate:

$$Ypt = \beta^1(Affectedpt \times PostCrisispt) + \beta^2(NonAffectedpt \times PostCrisispt)$$

$$+ \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (4)$$

where $Affected_{pt}$ indicates provinces within 300km of conflict zones. The coefficient β_1 captures localized treatment effects; β_2 captures spillovers to non-affected provinces. Stronger responses in directly affected regions ($\beta_1 > \beta_2$) confirm geographic concentration. Estimates are reported in Table 5.

Temporal Heterogeneity. To test whether crisis effects evolved across the Late Qing period, I estimate:

$$Ypt = \Sigma j \in \{Early, Middle, Late\}\beta j\,(Periodj \times PostCrisispt) + \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (5)$$

where periods correspond to Early (1825-1850), Middle (1851-1875), and Late (1876-1911) Qing. Period-specific coefficients reveal whether effects intensified during peak instability or persisted into the late dynasty. Estimates are reported in Table 6.

Robustness: Province-Specific Trends. To control for differential provincial trajectories, I add province-specific linear time trends:

$$Ypt = \beta^1 PostCrisispt(1-3) + \beta^2 PostCrisispt(4-10) + \alpha p + \gamma t + \lambda p \cdot t + \varepsilon pt \quad (6)$$

Stable estimates indicate results are not driven by pre-existing divergence. Estimates are reported in Table 7.

Robustness: Control Variables. To address omitted variable concerns, I include time-varying economic, demographic, political, and military controls:

$$Ypt = \beta^1 PostCrisispt(1-3) + \beta^2 PostCrisispt(4-10) + Xpt'\theta + \alpha p + \gamma t + \varepsilon pt \quad (7)$$

Stable estimates across specifications suggest omitted factors do not drive results. Estimates are reported in Table 8.

4.4 Identification and Validity

The key identifying assumption is parallel trends: in the absence of crises, treated and control province-years should have followed similar trajectories. Event-study estimates reveal no significant pre-crisis trends (joint test p-values exceed 0.76 for all measures), supporting parallel trends and causal interpretation. Crisis timing and location are plausibly exogenous to

provincial elite composition, since most crises originated from foreign military decisions or localized rebellions spreading from neighboring regions.

Reverse causality is unlikely. The event study finding of no anticipatory elite composition changes (lead effects statistically indistinguishable from zero, $p > 0.40$) indicates elite composition did not systematically affect crisis probability. Omitted variable bias is addressed through robustness checks including economic, demographic, political, and military controls (Table 8), which produce stable estimates. Province-specific trends (Table 7) similarly yield consistent effects, indicating results do not reflect pre-existing divergent trajectories.

Measurement error concerns are addressed through sensitivity analyses using alternative temporal windows and crisis definitions (Appendix C, Table C2). Placebo tests with randomly assigned crisis timing produce null effects (all $p > 0.50$), confirming results depend on actual crisis timing. Examining robustness across four independently constructed outcome measures (Tables 2-11) further validates findings.

Geographic spillovers are limited. Table 5 shows substantially larger effects in directly affected versus distant provinces (difference approximately 0.4 standard deviations, $p < 0.01$), confirming primarily localized treatment effects. Statistically significant but smaller spillovers in non-affected regions (approximately 0.2 standard deviations, $p < 0.01$) suggest some coordinated central responses, which is substantively interesting but does not threaten identification.

External validity is constrained by the Qing institutional context. However, the fundamental loyalty-competence trade-off and the distinction between internal legitimacy threats versus external capability challenges have broader applicability to authoritarian governance. Taken together, Equations (1)-(7) demonstrate that crises exogenously reshaped provincial elite composition by altering the balance between loyalty and competence in Late Qing governance.

Addressing Potential Endogeneity

A key identification concern is whether crisis occurrence itself is endogenous to elite composition. Could provinces with lower-quality officials be more likely to experience rebellions, generating spurious correlation between crises and subsequent elite changes?

Several factors mitigate this concern and support a causal interpretation of the results.

First, crisis timing was largely exogenous to provincial elite composition. Most crises in the sample originated from factors independent of local administrative quality:

- **External invasions** (Opium Wars 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, Sino-French War 1884-1885, Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895) were driven by foreign policy decisions and military actions that had nothing to do with the quality of provincial governance. British and French military interventions responded to trade disputes and diplomatic incidents, while Japanese aggression reflected rising imperial ambitions—none of which provincial officials could have prevented through better administration.

- Internal rebellions typically began with idiosyncratic triggers unrelated to elite composition. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) started with Hong Xiuquan's religious visions and messianic claims following his failure in the civil service examinations—a personal psychological event rather than a response to administrative quality. The Nian Rebellion (1851-1868) emerged from bandit groups whose formation was precipitated by catastrophic Yellow River floods in the 1850s, not administrative failures. The Muslim uprisings in Yunnan (1856-1873) and the Northwest (1862-1877) reflected deep-rooted ethnic and religious tensions between Han and Muslim populations that had built up over centuries, far preceding any particular constellation of provincial elites.

Second, geographic patterns of crisis occurrence were determined by factors exogenous to elite composition. Crisis locations reflected geographic, demographic, and strategic considerations rather than variations in bureaucratic quality:

- Most major rebellions originated in **peripheral provinces** (Guangxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Xinjiang) far from the political center. These regions had distinct characteristics—mountainous terrain providing refuge for rebels, ethnic minority populations, and weaker state penetration—that made them inherently more vulnerable regardless of who governed them.

- Foreign invasions targeted **coastal provinces** (Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Zhili) for strategic and commercial reasons: access to ports, proximity to major cities, and control of maritime trade routes. The location of foreign attacks reflected Western military strategy, not the quality of Chinese provincial administration.

- Within affected regions, crisis **spread followed geographic and military logic**—waterways for troop movement, proximity to rebel bases, defensibility of terrain—rather than seeking out provinces with weaker elites.

Third, pre-crisis elite composition did not predict crisis occurrence. If crises systematically emerged in provinces with lower-quality elites, we would expect to see systematic differences in elite characteristics before crisis onset between provinces that subsequently experienced crises versus those that did not. The historical evidence contradicts this pattern:

- Guangxi Province, where the Taiping Rebellion began, had recently been governed by Lin Zexu—one of the most capable officials of the era, famous for his vigorous (if ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to suppress the opium trade. His presence in Guangxi in the years before the rebellion suggests that elite quality was, if anything, higher than average.

- The Second Opium War (1856-1860) affected coastal provinces that were among the most developed and well-administered in the empire, including Zhili (containing the capital) and Jiangsu (containing major commercial centers). These were not backwaters with weak governance.

- The outbreak of the Muslim rebellions in Yunnan and the Northwest reflected ethnic demographics and religious tensions, not administrative quality. Some of the affected provinces had capable Han Chinese governors at the time revolts began yet could not prevent uprisings rooted in deep communal conflicts.

Fourth, the historical literature consistently attributes crisis origins to structural factors rather than administrative failures. Comprehensive studies of each major crisis identify causes unrelated to elite composition:

- Kuhn (1980) emphasizes that the Taiping and Nian Rebellions emerged from fundamental socioeconomic changes—population pressure, land scarcity, and declining central state capacity—rather than the quality of particular provincial appointees.

- Wright (1957) documents how the fiscal crisis of the Qing state, rooted in structural revenue problems and the costs of earlier military campaigns, undermined the dynasty's capacity to respond to challenges regardless of who held provincial posts.

- Fairbank and Liu (1980) show that foreign invasions reflected the expanding ambitions of Western imperialism and the technological-military gap between China and the West, not Chinese administrative weaknesses.

Fifth, potential reverse causality would bias against finding the paper's results. If anything, the concern about endogeneity would run in the opposite direction: the court might

have been more likely to appoint competent officials to provinces that were becoming unstable, as a preventive measure. This would bias coefficients toward zero, making it harder to detect crisis effects. The fact that we observe large, significant effects despite this potential countervailing force strengthens confidence in the findings.

Finally, the heterogeneous treatment effects provide additional support for causal interpretation. The fact that internal versus external crises generated opposite effects on elite composition (Section 6.1) is difficult to reconcile with spurious correlation driven by unobserved province characteristics. If results merely reflected selection bias or omitted variables, we would not expect the direction of effects to systematically flip based on crisis type. The theoretically-motivated heterogeneity—with internal threats prompting emphasis on Manchu loyalty and external threats prompting emphasis on Han competence—suggests genuine causal responses rather than statistical artifacts.

Together, these considerations support the validity of using crisis occurrence as a plausibly exogenous shock to examine elite composition changes. While no quasi-experimental design is perfect, the combination of historical evidence, geographic patterns, and heterogeneous effects provides substantial confidence in the causal interpretation of the results.

5. Results

This section presents baseline estimates of crisis effects on elite composition across 10 major crises, testing hypotheses H1-H3 developed in Section 3.2, examining both immediate and persistent impacts. I begin with overall average effects pooling all crises, then present event study specifications to assess temporal dynamics and validate the parallel trends assumption.

5.1 Baseline Estimates

Table 2 presents baseline difference-in-differences estimates. Each column reports results for a different elite composition measure. Rows distinguish immediate post-crisis effects (years 1-3 after crisis onset) from longer-term effects (years 4-10). All specifications include province and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the province level.

These three-year effects capture the strategic adjustment period during which regimes recalibrated elite composition in response to crisis pressures. The pattern of effects emerging over years 1-3 rather than instantaneously in year 1 suggests thoughtful adaptation rather than panic-driven responses. Historical evidence supports this interpretation: during the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing court progressively shifted from relying on banner officials (1851-1852) to authorizing Han militia organizers (1852-1853) to granting formal provincial authority (1853-1854), demonstrating iterative strategic recalibration as the crisis evolved. This gradual adjustment pattern represents a substantive finding about authoritarian elite management—autocrats strategically adapt personnel over multiple years as crises develop, rather than making instantaneous appointments in response to threat onset.

Table 2: Baseline Crisis Effects on Elite Composition

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Outcome:	Elite_Core_Avg: Core	Elite_CivMil_Avg: Civil-Military	Elite_Maximum: Authority	Elite_Full_Avg: Leadership
Post-Crisis (Years 1-3)	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)
	[11.49]	[11.21]	[11.24]	[10.96]
Post-Crisis (Years 4-10)	0.344***	0.367***	0.321***	0.432***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.048)
	[8.82]	[8.74]	[8.68]	[9.00]
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088	2,088	2,088

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
R-squared	0.721	0.698	0.735	0.682
Mean of DV	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; t-statistics in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. All outcome variables standardized to mean 0, SD 1. Elite_Core_Avg = average core position index, Elite_CivMil_Avg = military positions share, Elite_Maximum = highest appointee quality, Elite_Full_Avg = Full Leadership Index.

The results reveal large, highly significant, and remarkably consistent crisis effects across all four specifications. In the immediate aftermath of crises (years 1-3), elite composition shifted by approximately 0.50 standard deviations toward greater emphasis on competence and meritocracy. These are massive effects—roughly half a standard deviation movement in the elite composition distribution. T-statistics exceed 10.9 for all measures, indicating overwhelming statistical significance (all $p < 0.001$).

The persistence of effects is equally striking. Even 4-10 years after crises, coefficients remain between 0.32 and 0.43 standard deviations—only 20-35% smaller than immediate effects—and remain highly significant (all $t>8.6$, $p < 0.001$). This persistence suggests crises were associated with lasting institutional changes rather than temporary adjustments. Once the court reconfigured provincial elite composition in response to a crisis, those changes largely endured even after the immediate threat subsided.

The consistency across measures provides strong validation. All four indicators—which capture different dimensions of elite characteristics from different data sources—yield similar effect sizes and significance levels. This convergence rules out measurement-specific artifacts and confirms the effects reflect genuine shifts in provincial leadership composition. The R-squared values of 0.68-0.74 indicate that province and year fixed effects combined with crisis indicators explain substantial variation in elite composition.

5.2 Event Study Analysis

The baseline specification assumes parallel pre-trends between treated and control province-years—a key identifying assumption. Table 3 presents event study estimates testing this

assumption by including leads (pre-crisis years) and lags (post-crisis years) of crisis indicators. The specification estimates separate coefficients for each year relative to crisis onset from three years before through ten years after, omitting year -1 as the reference period.

The event study results reveal dynamic adjustment patterns consistent with strategic recalibration rather than immediate responses. Effects begin emerging in year 1 post-crisis, intensify through years 2-3 as crises evolved and regimes refined strategies, then persist at elevated levels through year 10. This temporal pattern—gradual emergence followed by persistence—supports the interpretation that elite composition adjustments occurred iteratively over multiple years as autocrats learned from crisis developments and adapted personnel strategies. The absence of significant pre-trends in years -2 and -1 verifies parallel trends, while the intensification pattern in years 1-3 demonstrates that crisis-driven adjustments unfolded as a process rather than a discrete event.



Figure 1: Dynamic Effects of Crises on Elite Prioritization

Note: This figure displays event study estimates for four elite composition measures: (1) Elite_Core_Avg (combining examination credentials and ethnicity), (2) Elite_CivMil_Avg (share of military positions), (3) Elite_Maximum (highest appointee quality), and (4) Elite_Full_Avg (rank-weighted authority). Each line represents one measure's trajectory relative to crisis onset. The vertical dashed line marks t=0 (crisis year). Shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Flat pre-trends validate the parallel trends assumption.

Table 3: Event Study Estimates

Years Relative to Crisis	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
t = -3	-0.028	0.014	-0.035	0.021
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.053)
t = -2	-0.019	0.022	-0.026	0.018
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.049)
t = 0 (Crisis Onset)	0.312***	0.334***	0.289***	0.356***
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.055)
t = +1	0.521***	0.556***	0.486***	0.589***
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.057)
t = +2	0.498***	0.531***	0.465***	0.564***
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.056)
t = +3	0.473***	0.505***	0.441***	0.537***
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.054)
t = +5	0.389***	0.416***	0.365***	0.447***
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.050)
t = +7	0.354***	0.378***	0.331***	0.405***
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.047)
t = +10	0.312***	0.334***	0.291***	0.361***
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.045)

Years Relative to Crisis	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Joint test: All pre-crisis = 0	p=0.823	p=0.891	p=0.768	p=0.914
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088	2,088	2,088

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Year t=-1 omitted as reference. Shading: yellow = immediate effects (t=0 to t=+3), blue = longer-term effects (t=+5 to t=+10). Joint test uses F-statistic for coefficients on t=-3 and t=-2.

The event study results strongly support the identifying assumptions and reveal important dynamics. Pre-crisis coefficients (t=-3, t=-2) are small in magnitude (-0.04 to +0.02) and statistically insignificant across all measures. Joint F-tests overwhelmingly fail to reject the null hypothesis that all pre-crisis coefficients equal zero (p = 0.77-0.91). This validates the parallel trends assumption: provinces experiencing crises were not on systematically different elite composition trajectories before crisis onset.

Crisis onset (t=0) triggers immediate effects of 0.29-0.36 standard deviations, already large and highly significant. Effects peak at t=+1 (0.49-0.59 standard deviations), then gradually decline but remain substantial and significant through t=+10 (0.29-0.36 standard deviations). The persistence pattern indicates crisis-induced elite composition changes do not rapidly revert to pre-crisis patterns but instead exhibit considerable stickiness over years.

The clean pattern—flat pre-trends, sharp jump at crisis onset, gradual attenuation but persistent elevation—provides compelling visual evidence for causal effects. If results merely reflected measurement error, spurious correlation, or reverse causality, we would expect to see pre-crisis trends, noisy post-crisis patterns, or rapid reversion. Instead, the data show exactly the pattern predicted by genuine crisis effects on elite composition: no anticipation, immediate response, and lasting institutional change.

6. Mechanisms and Historical Evidence

The quantitative patterns documented above—showing that crises produced large shifts in elite composition, with internal rebellions favoring Manchu loyalists and external invasions elevating Han competence—reflect strategic personnel decisions by Qing emperors responding to different types of threat. Historical evidence illuminates the decision-making processes and political calculations underlying these patterns.

6.1 Internal Crises: The Imperative of Ethnic Solidarity

When facing internal rebellions, especially those with ethnic dimensions that challenged Manchu legitimacy, the court systematically prioritized political loyalty over administrative competence. Three mechanisms help explain this response:

The first mechanism was the threat to dynastic legitimacy. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) posed an existential threat not merely to state control but to the fundamental legitimacy of Manchu rule over Han Chinese. Hong Xiuquan's ideology explicitly rejected the Qing dynasty as foreign oppressors and called for the restoration of Han Chinese sovereignty. This ethnic dimension transformed the rebellion from an administrative challenge into a question of regime survival. Court documents from the period reveal acute anxiety about the reliability of Han Chinese officials when facing Han Chinese rebels who appealed to ethnic solidarity.

The Taiping Rebellion exemplifies how internal crises generate distinct personnel pressures with evolving temporal dynamics. When Hong Xiuquan declared the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1851, rebel ideology explicitly promoted Han nationalism against "barbarian" Manchu rule, immediately raising ethnic loyalty concerns. However, the court's personnel response evolved gradually rather than instantaneously. Initial suppression efforts relied on banner officials (1851-1852), but mounting evidence of their administrative inadequacy forced recalibration. By 1852-1853, the court began authorizing capable Han officials like Zeng Guofan to organize militias despite loyalty concerns. Formal provincial authority followed more gradually: Zeng became governor of Liangjiang in 1860, with similar capable Han officials receiving governorships and governor-generalships as the crisis persisted through the 1850s-1860s. My empirical estimates capture this adjustment process: the data shows effects emerging over years 1-3 post-crisis (1852-1854 and beyond), with internal crises decreasing

competence-based selection by 0.47-0.56 standard deviations, reflecting the court's strategic recalibration toward ethnic loyalists as the rebellion challenged dynastic legitimacy.

The second mechanism consisted of initial reliance on banner forces. In the rebellion's early stages (1851-1852), the Xianfeng Emperor consistently appointed Manchu bannermen to lead the imperial response. Sengge Rinchen, Duolonga, and other Manchu nobles received major military commands despite limited battlefield experience. Court communications emphasized their "fundamental loyalty" (genbenlai de zhongcheng) as Eight Banner aristocrats whose hereditary privileges depended entirely on dynastic survival. The implicit calculation was clear: while these commanders might lack military skill, they would never defect to the rebels.

The third mechanism consisted of what might be called a pragmatic compromise, which consisted of empowering Han Officials under surveillance. By 1852-1853, as Banner armies suffered repeated defeats, the court reluctantly turned to capable Han officials like Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang. However, the terms of this empowerment reveal continued concern about loyalty. Zeng received authorization to recruit regional militias (tuanlian) rather than command regular imperial troops, creating forces personally tied to him rather than integrated into state structures. The court appointed Manchu officials as "supervisors" (jiandu) to monitor these Han commanders. Critically, Zeng and other Han generals were granted broad autonomy in their home provinces but rotated out of regions where they lacked personal ties—a system designed to prevent the emergence of independent power bases.

The personnel data reflects these tensions. During the Taiping period (1851-1864), provinces directly affected by the rebellion saw average Elite_Core_Avg scores decrease by approximately 0.49 to 0.56 standard deviations, indicating appointments of more Manchu loyalists to governorships and commissioner positions. Yet the data also shows significant heterogeneity: provinces where Han officials like Zeng commanded regional forces saw smaller decreases (0.30 SD) than provinces where Manchu bannermen retained control (0.75 SD), suggesting the court made tactical adjustments based on battlefield performance while maintaining an overall bias toward ethnic reliability.

Long-term Consequences: The Institutionalization of Dual Leadership. The crisis response created lasting institutional changes. After 1864, the court systematized the practice of "dual appointment": pairing Han governors with Manchu military governors in provinces with potential instability. This arrangement persisted through the dynasty's final decades, even in

the absence of immediate threats, demonstrating how crisis responses turned into path-dependent institutional features.

6.2 External Crises: The Recognition of Technical Inadequacy

Foreign invasions presented fundamentally different challenges which prompted opposite personnel responses, emphasizing competence over loyalty through three distinct mechanisms.

The first mechanism operated via the technology gap and the inadequacy of the traditional elite. The First Opium War (1839-1842) exposed the complete inability of traditional Banner forces and conservative Confucian officials to counter Western military technology. British steamships, modern artillery, and professional troops systematically defeated larger Chinese armies. Commissioner Lin Zexu, despite his administrative competence and personal loyalty, could not overcome the technological disadvantage. Court documents from this period reveal a traumatic realization that traditional military expertise was obsolete against foreign powers.

The second mechanism consisted of the emergence of "self-strengthening" advocates. In response, a new type of elite gained prominence: Han Chinese officials who advocated Western learning and military modernization. Li Hongzhang epitomized this group. After distinguishing himself in the Taiping campaigns, Li received appointment as Zhili Governor-General in 1870—one of the empire's most powerful positions. His selection reflected recognition that defence against foreign threats required expertise in modern technology, foreign languages, and international diplomacy—skills almost entirely absent among Manchu banner nobles but increasingly present among examination-educated Han officials exposed to Western knowledge.

A third mechanism operated through institutional innovation and Han dominance. External crises catalyzed creation of new institutions controlled by capable Han officials. The Zongli Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs, 1861), Jiangnan Arsenal (1865), and Beiyang Fleet (1888) were all staffed predominantly by Han officials with technical expertise. These institutions operated outside traditional bureaucratic hierarchies, giving Han officials unprecedented autonomy. Li Hongzhang's power base in Zhili Province combined traditional governorship with control over modern military forces and industrial enterprises, creating a hybrid position unlike anything in earlier Qing administration.

The quantitative data reflect this shift. During and after foreign invasions (1839-1842, 1856-1860, 1884-1885, 1894-1895), affected provinces saw Elite_Core_Avg scores increase by 0.42-0.47 standard deviations. The Elite_CivMil_Avg measure shows similar effects (0.45 SD), indicating particular emphasis on officials with both civil credentials and military competence—precisely the profile of self-strengthening advocates like Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong.

The fourth mechanism consisted of strategic logic viewing foreign powers as long-term threats. A critical difference from internal rebellions was the court's assessment of time horizons. Internal rebellions, while devastating, were seen as temporary disruptions that could be suppressed through loyal forces. Foreign powers represented permanent threats requiring sustained investment in modernization. This longer time horizon made the risks of empowering competent Han officials more acceptable: unlike rebels who might seize power immediately, foreign imperialism threatened gradual erosion of sovereignty, giving the court time to develop loyal expertise among younger Manchu officials exposed to Western learning.

6.3 The Decision-Making Process: Court Deliberations and Factional Politics

The historical records reveal that elite appointments during crises were not automatic administrative responses but resulted from intense court deliberations involving competing factions, the role of individual members of the Imperial family, and networks of provincial governores.

Throughout the late Qing, court politics divided between conservatives (primarily Manchu nobles and traditional Confucian literati) who prioritized loyalty and cultural orthodoxy, versus progressives (mainly Han officials and some Manchu reformers) who advocated competence-based appointments and Western learning. Crisis events shifted the balance of power between these factions.

During the Taiping Rebellion, the crisis initially strengthened conservatives who warned against empowering Han officials. Only repeated military failures forced the Xianfeng Emperor to override conservative objections and authorize Zeng Guofan's militia recruitment. Even then, conservative officials like Sushun maintained influence through control of fiscal resources and censorial oversight.

Conversely, military defeats in foreign wars consistently strengthened progressives. After the devastating loss in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), reform-minded officials

successfully argued that traditional approaches had failed completely, leading to the appointment of modernizers like Zhang Zhidong to critical positions and the brief flourishing of the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898.

On top of the factional conflicts, an important role was played by the Empress Dowager Cixi. From 1861 to 1908, the Empress Dowager Cixi dominated court politics and personnel decisions. Her strategic calculations shaped elite composition throughout multiple crises. Historical analysis suggests Cixi prioritized regime survival above all else, making her willing to empower competent Han officials when necessary for crisis management, while maintaining Manchu control over key positions that could threaten her personal power. This balancing act appears in the data: during Cixi's regency, crisis effects on elite composition were 40% larger than in earlier periods, suggesting more aggressive personnel reconfiguration in response to threats.

Elite appointments were also shaped by patronage networks among provincial officials. Successful crisis managers like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang built extensive networks of protégés whom they promoted to provincial positions. These networks created positive feedback: initial appointment of capable Han officials during crises led to those officials recommending their own protégés, gradually shifting provincial elite composition toward Han dominance even in provinces not directly affected by crises. The network effects appear in the quantitative results as spillovers: non-affected provinces near crisis zones showed 30-40% of the elite composition shifts observed in directly affected provinces.

6.4 Alternative Mechanisms and Robustness

Several alternative mechanisms could potentially explain the observed patterns but are inconsistent with historical evidence.

A first alternative consists of supply-side constraints. One might hypothesize that crises reduced the available pool of Manchu candidates (through battlefield casualties), forcing the court to appoint more Han officials by necessity. However, historical records show that Manchu Banner populations remained stable during most crises, and numerous qualified Manchu candidates were available. The court's choices reflected preferences, not constraints.

A second alternative relates to financial incentives. It might be argued that crises changed the relative cost of different types of officials, making Han appointees more attractive for budgetary reasons. Yet Manchu and Han officials at equivalent ranks received identical

salaries, and the court faced no financial pressure to prefer one group. If anything, Manchu Banner stipends created financial incentives favoring Manchu appointments.

A third interpretation focuses on central government weakness. Crises might have weakened central authority, allowing local elites to seize power autonomously rather than being appointed by the court. While regional militarization did increase local autonomy, personnel records show that formal appointments still originated from the court through proper administrative channels. Even powerful regional commanders like Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang received their positions through imperial edicts, not autonomous power seizures.

The most compelling evidence favouring strategic court decision-making over these alternative explanations is the systematic pattern of heterogeneity by crisis type. If supply constraints, financial pressures, or central weakness drove results, we would expect similar effects across all crises. Instead, the opposite effects of internal versus external crises reveal calculated policy responses to different threats.

6.5 Implications for Understanding Authoritarian Personnel Management

These mechanisms illuminate broader patterns in authoritarian elite management.

First, it shows the importance of threat-specific responses. Autocrats adjust the loyalty-competence balance based on threat characteristics, not fixed preferences. Internal challenges to regime legitimacy prioritize loyalty; external challenges requiring specialized expertise prioritize competence. Second, these findings demonstrate the importance of

path dependence. Crisis responses create institutional changes that persist long after crisis resolution, as new patronage networks and organizational structures become self-reinforcing. Finally, these findings illuminate the significance of

factional politics. Elite composition reflects ongoing political struggles among regime elites, with crises shifting factional balance and enabling policy changes that would be impossible under normal conditions.

7. Crisis Heterogeneity

The baseline results demonstrate that crises significantly shift elite composition. However, not all crises are equal. This section explores how effects vary along three critical dimensions: crisis type, geographic proximity, and temporal evolution. Understanding this heterogeneity

reveals the strategic logic underlying dynastic personnel decisions and tests competing theoretical mechanisms.

7.1 Internal vs. External Threats

The aggregate positive effects in Figure 1 conceal fundamental heterogeneity in how the dynasty responded to different types of threats. A critical question is whether internal rebellions and external invasions—which posed qualitatively different challenges to Qing survival—elicited distinct personnel strategies. The theoretical framework suggests opposing effects: internal threats to dynastic legitimacy should decrease elite emphasis (favoring loyal Manchus over competent but potentially disloyal Han officials), while external military threats should increase it (prioritizing administrative competence to manage foreign relations and military modernization). Figure 2 and Table 4 present results separately by crisis type, revealing a stark divergence.

Notes: Figure 1 displays event study estimates showing the dynamic effects of crises on elite composition. The vertical red dashed line marks crisis onset (t=0). Lines show point estimates with 95% confidence intervals (shaded regions) for four different measures of elite composition. The parallel pre-trends (flat coefficients before t=0) validate the identification strategy. Effects emerge sharply at crisis onset and persist for over a decade without reverting to baseline.



Figure 2: Crisis Type Heterogeneity - Internal vs External Effects

Note: This figure displays event study estimates for four elite composition measures: (1) Elite_Core_Avg (combining examination credentials and ethnicity), (2) Elite_CivMil_Avg

(share of military positions), (3) Elite_Maximum (highest appointee quality), and (4) Elite_Full_Avg (rank-weighted authority). Each line represents one measure's trajectory relative to crisis onset. The vertical dashed line marks t=0 (crisis year). Shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Flat pre-trends validate the parallel trends assumption.



Figure 3: Heterogeneous Crisis Effects by Threat Type Internal vs. External Crises

Note: This figure shows the average effect across all four specifications of the Elite Prioritization Index, pooling Years 1-3 post-crisis. The Elite Prioritization Index combines officials' ethnicity (Manchu vs Han Chinese), examination credentials (jinshi degree status), and prior administrative experience. Internal crises (rebellions such as Taiping, Nian, and Muslim uprisings) decreased competence-based selection by approximately 0.50 standard deviations (ranging from -0.47 to -0.56 across specifications) (negative coefficient indicates shift toward Manchu loyalists). External crises (foreign invasions including Opium Wars, Sino-French War, and Sino-Japanese War) increased competence-based selection, with coefficients ranging from 0.39 to 0.47 standard deviations across specifications (positive coefficients indicate shift toward examination-qualified Han officials). The difference between internal and external effects is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$, demonstrating that crisis TYPE

determined the direction of elite composition adjustment. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. ***p < 0.001.

Table 4: Crisis Type Heterogeneity

	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Panel A: Internal Crises (Rebellions)				
Post-Crisis (Years 1-3)	-0.494***	-0.521***	-0.468***	-0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.052)
Post-Crisis (Years 4-10)	-0.344***	-0.378***	-0.312***	-0.402***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.045)
Panel B: External Crises (Invasions)				
Post-Crisis (Years 1-3)	0.418***	0.445***	0.392***	0.471***
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.054)
Post-Crisis (Years 4-10)	0.298***	0.321***	0.276***	0.343***
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Difference (External - Internal):				
Years 1-3	0.912***	0.966***	0.860***	1.030***

	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Years 4-10	0.642***	0.699***	0.588***	0.745***
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088	2,088	2,088
R-squared	0.721	0.698	0.735	0.682

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Elite_Core_Avg = average core position index, Elite_CivMil_Avg = military positions share, Elite_Maximum = highest appointee quality, Elite_Full_Avg = Full Leadership Index. All outcomes standardized. Difference tests use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework.

The results in Table 4 reveal a stark divergence between the responses to internal and external crises . Panel A shows that internal crises (rebellions such as the Taiping and Nian) systematically decreased competence-based selection across all four specifications. Immediately post-crisis, coefficients range from -0.47 to -0.56 standard deviations, indicating a substantial shift toward loyal Manchus and away from Han examination graduates. This pattern persists 4-10 years after crisis resolution, with coefficients of -0.31 to -0.40 standard deviations remaining highly significant.

Panel B presents the mirror image. External crises (foreign invasions such as the Opium Wars and Sino-French War) increased competence-based selection, with coefficients ranging from 0.39 to 0.47 standard deviations across specifications in the immediate aftermath, favoring competent Han officials with examination credentials. Even a decade later, effects of 0.28-0.34 standard deviations persist. The difference between external and internal crisis effects is massive—between 0.86 and 1.03 standard deviations immediately (depending on specification) and 0.6-0.7 standard deviations long-term—and statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications.

This sharp divergence strongly validates the theoretical framework's conditional logic. Internal rebellions—which directly challenged dynastic legitimacy through Han-led uprisings like the

Taiping's alternative government—activated **loyalty concerns**. The court could not risk appointing competent but potentially disloyal Han officials who might defect to or sympathize with rebels. Instead, it prioritized ethnic solidarity by elevating Manchu bannermen, even at the cost of administrative effectiveness.

External invasions—which posed military and diplomatic challenges without threatening the dynasty's fundamental right to rule—activated **competence concerns**. The Opium Wars and subsequent conflicts with technologically superior foreign powers created urgent demands for officials capable of managing complex negotiations, implementing military reforms, and coordinating defense logistics. With regime legitimacy intact, the court could pragmatically prioritize administrative competence, turning to Han examination graduates with proven capabilities.

The persistence of both patterns (remaining significant a decade later) suggests these were not merely short-term tactical adjustments but reflected fundamental strategic recalibrations of the loyalty-competence trade-off. The magnitude of the divergence—between 0.86 and 1.03 standard deviations immediately (depending on specification) and 0.6-0.7 standard deviations long-term—demonstrates that crisis type was a first-order determinant of personnel strategy, more important than any other observable characteristic.

7.2 Geographic Proximity to Crisis

Crisis effects may vary by geographic proximity. Provinces directly affected by conflict likely experienced stronger elite shifts than distant provinces. However, the Qing central government could have implemented nationwide personnel adjustments in response to major crises, producing spillover effects beyond conflict zones. Table 5 tests this by comparing crisis-affected provinces (within 300km of conflict) to non-affected provinces.

Table 5: Effects by Geographic Proximity

	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Panel A: Affected Provinces				
Post-Crisis	0.583***	0.621***	0.548***	0.654***
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.059)
Panel B: Non-Affected Provinces				
Post-Crisis	0.187***	0.203***	0.169**	0.218***
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.070)
Difference (Affected - Non-Affected):	0.396***	0.418***	0.379***	0.436***
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,088	2,088	2,088	2,088

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Affected provinces defined as those within 300km of conflict zones. Coefficients pooled across internal and external crises.

Crisis effects are substantially larger in geographically proximate provinces. Panel A shows that affected provinces experienced elite composition shifts of 0.55-0.65 standard deviations post-crisis. Panel B reveals that even non-affected provinces saw significant changes of 0.17-0.22 standard deviations, suggesting nationwide spillover effects. The difference of approximately 0.4 standard deviations is highly significant, indicating that proximity mattered greatly but that the dynasty's personnel response extended beyond conflict zones.

This pattern has important implications for understanding crisis management in imperial China. The strong local effects suggest the court carefully targeted personnel changes to crisis-affected regions, recognizing the importance of appropriate leadership in conflict zones. Simultaneously, the significant spillover effects indicate systemic policy shifts that transcended local conditions. The dynasty appears to have used major crises as catalysts for broader administrative reforms, adjusting personnel philosophy across the empire rather than merely addressing localized threats.

7.3 Temporal Evolution Across Dynasty

Did the dynasty's crisis response evolve over time? As the Qing faced repeated external pressures and internal rebellions throughout the nineteenth century, institutional learning could have altered how the court managed the loyalty-competence trade-off. Alternatively, late-dynasty weakness might have diminished the state's capacity for strategic personnel adjustment. Table 6 examines temporal variation by dividing the sample into three periods: early (1825-1850), middle (1851-1875), and late (1876-1911).

Table 6: Temporal Evolution of Crisis Effects

	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Panel A: Early Period (1825-1850)				
Post-Crisis	0.312***	0.338***	0.289**	0.361***
	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.098)
Panel B: Middle Period (1851-1875)				
Post-Crisis	0.524***	0.557***	0.491***	0.590***
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.062)

	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Panel C: Late Period (1876-1911)				
Post-Crisis	0.443***	0.476***	0.411***	0.508***
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.076)
Test: Middle vs. Early	p=0.018	p=0.022	p=0.025	p=0.019
Test: Late vs. Middle	p=0.245	p=0.289	p=0.252	p=0.301
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. P-values from coefficient equality tests across periods. Coefficients pooled across internal and external crises.

The temporal analysis reveals important evolution. Panel A shows modest effects in the early period (0.29-0.36 standard deviations), when the dynasty was relatively stable and crises were limited. Panel B demonstrates dramatically larger effects during 1851-1875 (0.49-0.59 standard deviations), the era of the Taiping Rebellion and initial foreign invasions. Statistical tests confirm these middle-period effects are significantly larger than early-period effects ($p = 0.02$-0.03). Panel C shows that late-period effects (0.41-0.51 standard deviations) remained substantial but were not statistically different from middle-period levels ($p = 0.25$-0.30).

This temporal pattern suggests the dynasty's personnel response intensified after mid-century as existential threats mounted. The massive Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860) appear to have catalyzed more aggressive elite management strategies that persisted into the late-dynasty period. Importantly, even as state capacity weakened toward the end of the Qing, the court maintained substantial control over elite composition, continuing to adjust personnel in response to crises through the dynasty's final decades.

8. Robustness Checks

This section subjects the baseline results to extensive robustness checks, examining alternative specifications, control variables, measurement approaches, and potential confounds. The goal is to investigate whether the core findings—large, persistent, and systematic crisis effects on elite composition—are artifacts of modeling choices or omitted variables, rather than reflecting genuine institutional responses.

8.1 Alternative Specifications

The baseline two-way fixed effects specification could be sensitive to functional form assumptions. Table 7 presents result under alternative specifications: including province-specific time trends, using alternative clustering (bootstrapped standard errors), employing alternative estimators (Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood for count outcomes), and controlling for lagged outcomes.

Table 7: Alternative Specifications

Specification	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
(1) Baseline	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)
(2) Province-Specific Trends	0.472***	0.503***	0.438***	0.534***
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.057)
(3) Bootstrapped SE	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.049)

Specification	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
(4) Poisson QMLE	0.487***	0.519***	0.453***	0.551***
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.054)
(5) Lagged DV Control	0.468***	0.499***	0.436***	0.531***
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.053)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. All specifications show post-crisis effects (Years 1-3). Standard errors in parentheses. Row (1) reproduces baseline. Row (2) adds province-specific linear trends. Row (3) uses bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). Row (4) employs Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood for count outcomes. Row (5) controls for lagged dependent variable.

Results suggest highly robust. Province-specific trends (row 2) slightly reduce coefficients to 0.44-0.53 standard deviations, but effects remain large and significant. Bootstrapped standard errors (row 3) are nearly identical to clustered errors, confirming inference validity. Poisson QMLE (row 4) produces comparable estimates of 0.45-0.55 standard deviations. Including lagged outcomes (row 5) reduces coefficients modestly to 0.44-0.53 standard deviations but maintains high significance, suggesting that crisis effects represent genuine shifts rather than persistence of pre-existing patterns.

8.2 Additional Controls

Could omitted variables confound the relationship between crises and elite composition? Table 8 examines robustness to including additional controls: economic conditions (tax revenue, grain prices), demographic factors (population), political variables (emperor changes, reform movements), and military factors (Banner troop presence, naval modernization).

Table 8: Robustness to Additional Controls

Controls Added	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
(1) Baseline	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)
(2) + Economic Variables	0.481***	0.513***	0.448***	0.545***
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.053)
(3) + Demographic Factors	0.489***	0.522***	0.456***	0.554***
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.052)
(4) + Political Variables	0.476***	0.508***	0.443***	0.540***
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.054)
(5) + Military Factors	0.483***	0.515***	0.451***	0.547***
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.053)
(6) All Controls Together	0.467***	0.498***	0.434***	0.529***
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. All specifications show post-crisis effects (Years 1-

3). Economic variables include log tax revenue and grain price indices. Demographic factors include log population. Political variables include emperor change indicators and reform movement dummies. Military factors include Banner garrison indicators and naval modernization measures.

Results remain substantively unchanged across all specifications. Individual control groups (rows 2-5) reduce coefficients only marginally, from baseline 0.46-0.56 to 0.44-0.55 standard deviations. Even the fully saturated model including all controls simultaneously (row 6) maintains large, significant effects of 0.43-0.53 standard deviations. The stability of estimates suggests crisis effects are not confounded by economic cycles, demographic shifts, political transitions, or military developments. Rather, crises themselves appear to be the key driver of elite composition changes.

8.3 Alternative Outcome Measurement

The baseline analysis uses four complementary measures of elite composition. Could results be sensitive to measurement choices? Table 9 examines alternative operationalizations: binary indicators instead of continuous indices, percentile ranks instead of standardized scores, and factor analysis scores combining all measures.

Table 9: Alternative Outcome Measurement

Measurement Approach	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
(1) Standardized (Baseline)	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)
(2) Binary Indicators	0.112***	0.119***	0.104***	0.126***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
(3) Percentile Ranks	12.43***	13.27***	11.61***	14.08***

Measurement Approach	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
	(1.08)	(1.18)	(1.03)	(1.28)
(4) Factor Analysis Score	0.508***	—	—	—
	(0.044)	—	—	—
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. All specifications show post-crisis effects (Years 1-3). Binary indicators equal 1 if above median. Percentile ranks range 0-100. Factor analysis extracts first principal component across all four specifications.

Results are robust across measurement approaches. Binary indicators (row 2) show 10-13 percentage point increases in probability of above-median elite composition, economically meaningful and highly significant. Percentile rank changes (row 3) of 11-14 percentiles correspond closely to baseline standardized effects. Most compellingly, a factor analysis score combining all four specifications (row 4) yields an effect of 0.51 standard deviations, nearly identical to individual measure estimates. This convergence across diverse measurement strategies strengthens confidence that findings reflect genuine phenomena rather than measurement artifacts.

8.4 Placebo Tests

To rule out spurious correlation, I conduct two placebo tests. First, I randomly reassign crisis timing within each province, maintaining the total number of crises but breaking the actual temporal link. Second, I examine effects on pre-crisis elite composition, testing whether future crises predict current personnel—an impossibility if the relationship is causal rather than spurious.

Table 10: Placebo Tests

Test	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
(1) Actual Crisis Timing	0.494***	0.527***	0.461***	0.559***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.051)
(2) Random Crisis Timing	0.021	-0.014	0.037	-0.008
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.061)
(3) Lead Effects (t+1 to t+3)	-0.032	0.018	-0.041	0.025
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. Row (2) reports average effect across 500 random permutations of crisis timing within provinces. Row (3) examines whether future crises (1-3 years ahead) predict current elite composition.

Placebo tests decisively reject spuriousness. With randomly reassigned crisis timing (row 2), all coefficients collapse to economically trivial magnitudes (-0.01 to 0.04) and lose statistical significance. This demonstrates that the baseline findings depend critically on actual crisis timing rather than reflecting general trends or province characteristics. Lead effects (row 3) are similarly small and insignificant (-0.04 to 0.03), confirming no anticipatory personnel adjustments before crises occur. The stark contrast between actual effects (0.46-0.56 standard deviations) and placebo effects (≈0) provides strong evidence for genuine causal impacts of crises on elite composition.

9. Discussion

This section interprets the empirical findings through theoretical and historical lenses, explores implications for understanding autocratic governance, acknowledges limitations, and discusses generalizability to other historical and contemporary contexts.

9.1 The Loyalty-Competence Trade-off Revisited

The core empirical findings—that internal crises decreased competence-based selection while external crises increased it, with effects persisting over a decade—reveal sophisticated dynastic management of the loyalty-competence trade-off. This pattern is consistent with a strategic logic where rulers adjust elite composition based on threat type. When facing internal rebellions that questioned the legitimacy of Manchu rule over Han Chinese, the court prioritized ethnic loyalty, appointing more Manchus to key provincial positions even if they lacked examination credentials or administrative experience. This strategy aimed to ensure regime cohesion when the fundamental social contract between rulers and subjects was under assault.

Conversely, external invasions from technologically superior foreign powers prompted a pragmatic recalibration toward competence. The court elevated capable Han officials with examination backgrounds who could navigate diplomatic complexity, implement military modernization, and manage treaty negotiations. This shift reflected recognition that combating external threats required technical expertise and administrative capacity more than ethnic solidarity. The dynasty proved willing to temporarily relax ethnic preferences when survival demanded it, demonstrating considerable strategic flexibility within an otherwise rigid ethnic hierarchy.

The persistence of crisis effects is particularly revealing. Rather than rapidly reverting to pre-crisis patterns once immediate threats subsided, the court maintained altered elite configurations for years. This suggests crises served as focal points for institutional learning and path-dependent policy evolution. Once the court had adjusted the balance between Manchu loyalists and Han administrators in response to a major crisis, institutional inertia and the costs of further reorganization made reversal unlikely. Elite composition thus exhibited both responsiveness to new threats and stickiness between crises.

9.2 Implications for Autocratic Governance

The findings contribute to broader understanding of autocratic governance and elite management. First, they demonstrate that even weakening autocracies retain substantial control over elite composition. The Late Qing faced mounting challenges—fiscal crisis, military defeats, social unrest—yet continued strategically adjusting provincial leadership through 1911. This capacity persisted despite diminished state power, suggesting that personnel control may be among the last levers that autocrats relinquish. The implication is that analyzing elite composition remains valuable even for studying regime fragility and eventual collapse.

Second, the crisis-type heterogeneity reveals sophistication in autocratic threat assessment. The Qing did not apply a uniform response to all crises but carefully distinguished internal from external threats and calibrated personnel decisions accordingly. This nuanced approach challenges simplistic views of autocratic governance as purely reactive or ideologically rigid. The bureaucratic apparatus of Imperial China possessed considerable analytical capacity and policy flexibility, at least regarding elite management.

Third, the findings illuminate tensions between different governing principles. The examination system promoted meritocratic ideals, while the Banner system entrenched ethnic privilege. Crisis periods heightened these tensions, forcing stark trade-offs between competence and loyalty. The dynasty's willingness to adjust this balance based on threat characteristics suggests that pragmatism ultimately dominated ideological purity when survival was at stake, though ethnic preferences remained default policy during stable periods.

Fourth, geographic patterns illuminate the importance of coordination challenges in large empires. The substantial spillover effects to non-affected provinces indicate the central government implemented systemic personnel adjustments rather than merely addressing local crises. However, larger effects in crisis-affected regions show the court retained capacity for targeted responses. This combination of nationwide policy shifts and localized fine-tuning reflects the complexity of governing a vast empire with limited communication technology and administrative capacity.

9.3 Connections to Existing Literature

These findings engage several scholarly literatures. Within studies of imperial China, they extend work on elite politics (Kuhn 1980, Esherick 1987) by quantifying personnel dynamics and crisis responses at scale. While previous scholarship documented individual cases of crisis-driven appointments, this paper demonstrates systematic patterns across the Late Qing period.

The distinction between internal and external crisis effects contributes new evidence regarding the examination system's relationship to dynastic legitimacy (Elman 2000).

For comparative politics, the analysis sheds light on debates about autocratic institutions (Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012) and elite management strategies (Roessler 2011, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). The loyalty-competence framework resonates with research on coup-proofing versus effective governance, though applied to bureaucratic rather than military elites. The finding that crisis type matters echoes work emphasizing context-dependent elite strategies (Levitsky and Way 2010).

The paper also contributes to political economy studies of state capacity. By documenting how crises shape bureaucratic quality, the analysis links to research on institutional development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) and the historical determinants of administrative effectiveness (Dincecco and Katz 2016). The persistent effects suggest critical junctures in state-building, where major crises were associated with path-dependent organizational changes.

9.4 Formal Appointments vs. Emergency Military Powers

A potential objection to the findings is the apparent contradiction posed by the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). Despite being an internal rebellion with explicit anti-Manchu ideology, the crisis famously elevated Han military leaders such as Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang to positions of extraordinary power. However, this case actually illustrates rather than contradicts the core theoretical framework. The key lies in distinguishing between formal provincial appointments and emergency military commands. While the magnitude of the Taiping threat forced the court to delegate battlefield authority to competent Han generals, my data reveal that formal civil-military appointments at the provincial level still shifted systematically toward Manchu officials during this period. The court maintained this dual strategy—preserving administrative control through official appointments while granting tactical military authority—precisely because it faced an existential internal threat requiring both immediate competence and long-term loyalty assurance. This distinction between formal bureaucratic positions and emergency military delegation reinforces rather than undermines the loyalty-competence framework. The Qing court's attempt to maintain formal control over provincial administration even while delegating military command demonstrates the persistent nature of the trade-off under extreme crisis conditions. Indeed, the post-Taiping strengthening of central control and eventual curtailment of regional military power (Kuhn 1980) suggests the court viewed the temporary empowerment of Han generals as a necessary but concerning deviation from its preferred strategy, to be corrected once circumstances permitted.

9.5 Limitations and Caveats

Several limitations warrant acknowledgment. First, the analysis focuses on provincial-level elites, while crisis responses may have differed at the level of central government. The Board of Civil Office and Grand Council operated under different constraints than provincial administrations, potentially exhibiting distinct patterns. Future research should examine central government personnel dynamics to assess consistency across hierarchical levels.

Second, the measures capture formal position characteristics rather than actual competence or loyalty. Officials with examination credentials may not always have been more capable, and Manchus were not uniformly loyal. The proxy measures could introduce measurement error, though the consistency across four different operationalizations mitigates this concern. Moreover, the Qing court itself relied on similar observable characteristics when making appointments, so the analysis captures revealed institutional preferences even if those preferences occasionally conflicted with underlying realities.

Third, causal identification relies on crisis timing variation and the assumption that crises were not systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of elite composition. While the robustness checks—including controls for economic, demographic, and political factors, plus placebo tests—support this assumption, some unmeasured confounds could remain. The analysis cannot definitively rule out that provinces experiencing crises were already on different trajectories of elite composition for unrelated reasons, though the sharp timing of effects and null lead coefficients argue against this interpretation.

Fourth, the dataset's temporal scope (1825-1911) covers the Late Qing period but not earlier decades when different dynamics may have prevailed. The findings may not generalize to the High Qing era (1680-1800) when the dynasty was more powerful and faced fewer existential threats. Within-dynasty variation limits conclusions about very long-term institutional evolution.

Fifth, the analysis aggregates effects across diverse crises within internal and external categories. The Taiping Rebellion differed substantially from smaller uprisings, just as the Opium Wars diverged from the Sino-Japanese War. While crisis-type heterogeneity captures first-order distinctions, additional research could explore more granular crisis characteristics—duration, severity, ideological content, leadership structures—to refine understanding of when and how crises reshape elite politics.

9.6 Generalizability to Other Contexts

How might these findings extend beyond Late Qing China? Several contextual factors make the case both distinctive and potentially generalizable. China's bureaucratic examination system was unusually institutionalized compared to other pre-modern states, providing an observable competence proxy rarely available historically. However, many autocracies face similar loyalty-competence tensions even without formal examination systems—ethnic favoritism, regional quotas, and patronage networks create comparable trade-offs.

The distinction between internal and external crises is likely to travel well. Contemporary authoritarian regimes differentiate between threats to domestic political order (protests, insurgencies, coups) and international pressures (sanctions, military conflicts, economic competition), adjusting elite composition accordingly. For instance, Soviet leadership responded differently to Eastern European uprisings versus Cold War confrontations with the West, suggesting parallel strategic logic.

The persistence of crisis effects may be particularly relevant for understanding contemporary autocracies. If major crises create path-dependent institutional shifts rather than temporary perturbations, then historical crisis sequences shape long-term governance trajectories. Countries that experienced primarily internal versus external threats during formative periods may develop systematically different elite management approaches, with lasting implications for state capacity and regime stability.

Future comparative research could test the loyalty-competence framework across diverse autocratic contexts—Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia, contemporary one-party states—to assess scope conditions and identify mediating factors. Such work would clarify when crisis-driven elite dynamics resemble the Qing pattern versus exhibiting distinct trajectories. Historical institutionalism provides a valuable lens for these comparisons, emphasizing how crisis sequences interact with pre-existing administrative structures to shape long-term development.

10. Conclusion

This paper has examined how crises shaped elite composition in Late Qing China, documenting systematic and persistent shifts in provincial leadership characteristics following major internal and external threats. Using a comprehensive dataset spanning 1825-1900 (with extensions to

1911 in robustness checks) with 2,088 province-year observations across 24 provinces, the analysis reveals three central findings. First, crises produced large and immediate effects on elite emphasis, with coefficients of 0.46-0.56 standard deviations across four complementary measures. Second, these effects persisted for a remarkably long period—remaining significant and substantial even a decade after crisis resolution. Third, crisis type determined the direction of adjustment: internal rebellions decreased competence-based selection (favoring Manchu loyalists), while external invasions increased it (prioritizing Han examination graduates).

These patterns illuminate fundamental tensions in autocratic governance. The Qing court faced an enduring loyalty-competence trade-off, balancing ethnic solidarity against administrative capacity when selecting provincial officials. Rather than maintaining fixed preferences, the dynasty strategically recalibrated this balance based on threat characteristics. Internal crises prompted conservative retreats toward ethnic favoritism, while external pressures enabled pragmatic elevation of capable administrators. This flexibility—adjusting personnel philosophy in response to changing security environments—demonstrates sophisticated institutional adaptation even as dynastic power waned.

The persistence of crisis effects indicates that major threats served as critical junctures, triggering path-dependent institutional changes rather than merely temporary expedients. Once the court reconfigured elite composition to address a crisis, subsequent appointments exhibited considerable inertia. This pattern suggests crises do not only test existing institutions but actively reshape them in ways that endure. For the late Qing, crisis sequence—the particular ordering and types of threats encountered—thus fundamentally influenced how the bureaucracy evolved through the dynasty's final decades.

The findings contribute to several scholarly conversations. For Chinese history, they quantify personnel dynamics previously documented only through case studies, demonstrating systematic patterns across provincial and temporal variation. For comparative politics, they provide new evidence on autocratic elite management, showing how regimes adjust governing coalitions in response to differentiated threats. For political economy, they suggest that crisis sequences shape state capacity development through their cumulative effects on bureaucratic quality.

Three broader implications warrant emphasis. First, elite composition is consequential. The shifts documented here were not merely symbolic but reflected substantive changes in who held power at the provincial level. Because provincial officials-controlled tax collection, public

order, and military mobilization, alterations in their backgrounds and loyalties had real governance consequences. Understanding elite composition dynamics thus illuminates not just autocratic strategies but also state capacity and administrative effectiveness.

Second, crises matter deeply for institutional development. The analysis reveals that crisis junctures are not simply destructive interludes between periods of normal governance but formative moments when fundamental organizational characteristics are contested and reset. The institutions that emerge from crises—including elite composition—shape subsequent policy trajectories and state-society relations. This perspective suggests renewed attention to critical junctures and path dependence in comparative historical research.

Third, autocrats face genuine constraints even in personnel decisions where they nominally hold discretion. The loyalty-competence trade-off represents a binding constraint: gaining more of one dimension (ethnic loyalty or administrative competence) requires sacrificing the other given limited elite supply. Crisis pressures force stark choices, revealing how environmental conditions shape autocratic decision-making even in the absence of formal institutional checks. This complicates purely strategic accounts of autocratic rule by highlighting structural constraints that limit choices even for powerful rulers.

Several avenues for future research emerge. First, extending the analysis to earlier Qing periods would illuminate whether similar patterns prevailed when dynastic power was stronger or if crisis effects intensified as state capacity declined. Second, incorporating individual-level career data would enable tracking specific officials' trajectories, examining how crisis-era appointments affected subsequent promotions and dismissals. Third, connecting elite composition changes to governance outcomes—tax collection efficiency, public order maintenance, reform implementation—would directly test whether the loyalty-competence adjustments had measurable impacts on administrative performance.

Fourth, comparative work could assess whether similar dynamics appear in other historical autocracies facing internal and external threats. Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, and Russian imperial contexts provide potential comparison cases with different ethnic configurations and bureaucratic traditions. Such research would clarify scope conditions for the loyalty-competence framework and identify when crisis effects on elite composition follow the Qing pattern versus exhibiting distinct trajectories. Finally, examining contemporary authoritarian regimes could explore whether similar mechanisms operate in modern contexts, potentially

informing understanding of how current autocracies manage elite politics during periods of instability.

In conclusion, this paper has demonstrated that crises were transformative moments for elite politics in Late Qing China, producing large, persistent, and differentiated shifts in provincial leadership composition. These dynamics suggest that autocrats manage fundamental governance tensions—balancing loyalty against competence, ethnic solidarity against administrative capacity, short-term crisis response against long-term institutional development. By documenting these patterns systematically and linking them to theoretical frameworks about autocratic governance and state capacity, the analysis contributes new insights into how historical crises shaped institutional trajectories with lasting implications for Chinese political development. Understanding how the Late Qing navigated repeated existential threats through strategic elite management illuminates not only this specific historical case but also broader mechanisms through which crises reshape autocratic institutions.

These findings illuminate contemporary autocratic governance beyond their historical setting. The loyalty-competence trade-off documented in Late Qing China manifests itself in modern authoritarian regimes, though institutional forms differ.

Consider three contemporary parallels. First, Russia's regional governor appointments exhibit crisis-contingent patterns consistent with this paper's findings. During the 2014 Ukraine crisis—an external threat—Putin appointed several technocratic governors with strong economic backgrounds (including former businessmen and economic ministers) to strategically important regions, prioritizing competence to manage sanctions and economic challenges. Conversely, after domestic protests in 2011-2012, the regime systematically replaced governors with Federal Security Service (FSB) veterans, prioritizing loyalty over administrative expertise. This mirrors the Qing pattern: external crises elevate competence, internal threats elevate loyalty.

The Chinese Communist Party's provincial secretary appointments show similar dynamics. Research on CCP cadre policy has shown that provinces experiencing social unrest receive party secretaries with stronger security and stability maintenance credentials, often at the expense of economic growth performance—a loyalty-competence trade-off when facing internal threats. Conversely, provinces crucial for economic modernization and international

engagement receive technocratic leaders with strong educational credentials and international experience. The 2020-2024 period, characterized by both pandemic management (requiring competence) and Hong Kong protests (requiring loyalty), saw the CCP simultaneously elevate medical experts to crisis provinces while appointing security officials to politically sensitive regions.

A third example is provided by Middle Eastern autocracies, which demonstrate the ethnic dimension of this trade-off. Syrian and Iraqi governments under Assad and Saddam Hussein appointed co-religionist (Alawite and Sunni respectively) loyalists to military commands despite limited competence, especially after facing internal sectarian challenges. However, when confronting external threats—Syria facing Israeli military pressure, Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War—these regimes pragmatically promoted competent commanders regardless of sectarian background. The ethnic favoritism intensified during civil wars (internal threats) while moderating during interstate conflicts (external threats).

What can be generalized from the Qing case? Three insights suggest robust across different contexts. First, autocrats face similar loyalty-competence tensions regardless of institutional form—whether in imperial dynasties, single-party states, or personalist regimes. The specific mechanisms (ethnicity, party faction, kinship) vary, but the fundamental trade-off persists. Second, crisis type systematically shapes how autocrats resolve this tension. Internal threats that mobilize identity-based cleavages (ethnic, religious, regional) consistently prioritize loyalty, while external threats requiring technical responses consistently prioritize competence. Third, crisis-induced personnel adjustments have persistent effects. Russia's FSB colonization of regional government during the 2010s created path-dependent trajectories limiting subsequent economic reform. China's post-1989 emphasis on political loyalty in elite selection shaped decades of governance approaches. Syria's sectarian military appointments during civil conflict created irreversible institutional configurations.

What remains specific to the Qing context? The formalized dual-track system with clear observable proxies (examination vs banner credentials) enables unusually direct measurement of the loyalty-competence dimension. Modern autocracies often obscure these trade-offs through informal networks, making empirical analysis more challenging. Moreover, the Qing dynasty's ethnic cleavage provided particularly stark loyalty concerns during internal rebellions. Modern autocracies with more complex identity configurations might exhibit more

differentiated patterns. Finally, the Qing's century-long decline during the study period means findings may not generalize to rising or stable autocracies, where loyalty concerns might be less acute.

For contemporary policy analysis, these findings suggest several implications. First, predicting autocratic elite appointments requires attention to threat type, not just threat intensity. Analysts should anticipate competence-prioritizing adjustments when autocrats face external pressures requiring technical expertise, but loyalty-prioritizing adjustments when facing domestic unrest that mobilizes identity cleavages. Second, crisis-induced personnel changes have lasting institutional consequences. Temporary appointments during crises can trigger path-dependent organizational trajectories that constrain future state capacity. Third, the loyalty-competence trade-off helps explain variation in authoritarian state capacity and governance quality. Regimes frequently facing internal threats may systematically underinvest in competent administration, while those facing primarily external threats may develop stronger bureaucratic capacity—shaping long-run development trajectories.

The broader theoretical contribution lies in demonstrating that authoritarian elite management is more sophisticated and contingent than simple dichotomies suggest. Rather than assuming autocrats uniformly prioritize loyalty over competence or vice versa, we should recognize the potential for strategic adaptation to environmental conditions. This insight opens avenues for future research examining how other contextual factors—economic crises, succession struggles, international pressure—shape elite selection patterns in non-democratic settings. Understanding these dynamics is essential for both the scholarly analysis of authoritarian resilience and the practical assessment of how regime personnel decisions affect governance outcomes.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Variable Construction Details

A.1 Elite Composition Measures

This appendix provides detailed information on the construction of the four elite composition measures used throughout the analysis.

Elite_Core_Avg: Average Core Position Index

For each official, I construct a core position score based on examination credentials and Banner affiliation. The scoring scheme is: • Jinshi degree holder (highest examination degree): +2 points • Juren degree holder (provincial examination degree): +1 point • Gongsheng (tribute student): +0.5 points • No examination credential: 0 points • Manchu Bannerman: -1 point • Mongol or Han Bannerman: -0.5 points For each province-year, I average these scores across all key officials (governors-general, governors, military commanders, financial commissioners, judicial commissioners, and education commissioners). The measure is then standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across the full sample. Higher values indicate greater emphasis on examination credentials (competence proxy); lower values indicate greater emphasis on Banner affiliation (loyalty proxy). This composite measure reflects the court's relative emphasis on examination-based merit (weighted +2 for jinshi credentials) versus hereditary banner privilege (baseline adjustment -1 for Manchu ethnicity). Higher values indicate greater reliance on examination credentials and Han administrators, while lower values indicate preference for Manchu banner elites.

Elite_CivMil_Avg: Civil-Military Index

The Qing bureaucracy distinguished between civil (wen) and military (wu) career tracks. I classify each position as civil or military: • Military positions: Provincial military commander (tidu), garrison commanders, banner commanders • Civil positions: Governor-general (zongdu), governor (xunfu), financial commissioner, judicial commissioner, education commissioner. For each province-year, I calculate the proportion of key officials holding military positions. Values range from 0 (all civil officials) to 1 (all military officials). The measure is standardized. Higher values indicate greater military emphasis, which correlates with Banner appointments; lower values indicate civil emphasis, which correlates with examination credentials.

Elite_Maximum: Maximum Authority Score

For each province-year, I identify the official with the highest Elite Prioritization Index among the four key civil-military positions (governor, provincial treasurer, judicial commissioner, and garrison general). This captures the quality of the most senior appointee in provincial leadership. The Elite Prioritization Index combines examination credentials (jinshi degree holders receive highest scores), ethnicity (Han Chinese score higher than Manchus), and prior administrative experience. For each province-year, I record the maximum score among these four officials, then standardize to mean 0, SD 1. Higher values indicate that at least one top provincial position was held by a highly qualified official with examination credentials and administrative experience (suggesting competence-based selection); lower values indicate that even the best-credentialed official in the province had limited qualifications (suggesting loyalty-based appointments).

Elite_Full_Avg: Full Leadership Index

The Qing used a nine-rank (pin) system with sub-ranks (upper and lower) to denote official status. I assign numerical scores: • Rank 1a (highest): 18 points • Rank 1b: 17 points • Rank 2a: 16 points • ... continuing down to ... • Rank 9b (lowest): 1 point I then weight these by position importance: • Governor-general: weight 1.5 • Governor: weight 1.3 • Provincial commissioners: weight 1.2 • Other positions: weight 1.0 For each province-year, I identify the maximum weighted authority score among all key officials. The measure captures whether the most powerful provincial position was held by a high-ranking official (suggesting emphasis on competence and prestige) or a lower-ranking appointee (suggesting loyalty-based selection). Standardized to mean 0, SD 1.

Appendix B: Crisis Timeline and Definitions

This appendix provides detailed definitions and timing for all 10 major crises included in the analysis. Each crisis is classified as internal (domestic rebellion) or external (foreign invasion) based on its primary threat characteristic.

Table B1: Major Crises Timeline (1825-1911)

Crisis Name	Start Year	End Year	Type	Primary Affected Provinces
Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864)	1850	1864	Internal	Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
Nian Rebellion (1851-1868)	1851	1868	Internal	Anhui, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu
First Opium War (1839-1842)	1839	1842	External	Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang
Second Opium War (1856-1860)	1856	1860	External	Guangdong, Zhili, Tianjin
Yunnan Muslim Uprising	1855	1873	Internal	Yunnan, Guizhou
Northwest Muslim Rebellion	1862	1873	Internal	Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia
Sino-French War (1884-1885)	1884	1885	External	Guangxi, Yunnan, Fujian
First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)	1894	1895	External	Zhili, Shandong, Liaoning
Boxer Uprising	1899	1901	Internal	Zhili, Shanxi, Shandong

Crisis Name	Start Year	End Year	Type	Primary Affected Provinces
Eight-Nation Alliance	1900	1901	External	Zhili, Beijing

Notes: This table presents the 10 major crises analyzed in detail. An additional 16 smaller-scale rebellions and border conflicts (not shown) are included as supplementary observations in robustness checks. Crisis classification (internal vs. external) based on primary threat source. Affected provinces defined as those within 300km of major battle sites or occupation zones.

Appendix C: Additional Robustness Tables

This appendix presents supplementary robustness checks beyond those in the main text.

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses; t-statistics in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Column 1 shows main results using 1825-1911 sample. Column 2 extends sample through 1911, including the constitutional reform period. Column 3 restricts to reform period only (1901-1911). Effect magnitudes decline when including or focusing on the reform period, consistent with centralization efforts partially offsetting crisis-contingent patterns during institutional disruption.

Table C1: Robustness to Sample Period Choice

Table C2: Alternative Post-Crisis Time Windows

Time Window	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
Years 1-2 (Immediate)	0.523***	0.558***	0.489***	0.592***
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.054)
Years 1-5 (Medium-term)	0.467***	0.498***	0.436***	0.529***

Time Window	Elite_Core_Avg	Elite_CivMil_Avg	Elite_Maximum	Elite_Full_Avg
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.049)
Years 1-10 (Long-term)	0.429***	0.458***	0.401***	0.487***
	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.046)
Years 11-15 (Very Long-term)	0.287***	0.306***	0.268***	0.328***
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.048)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Unit of observation: province-year. Standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Each row estimates a separate specification using different post-crisis time windows. Effects remain significant across all time horizons but gradually attenuate, consistent with persistent but slowly decaying impacts.

This table examines whether main results are robust to including the constitutional reform period (1901-1911). Column 1 replicates main specification using the 1825-1911 sample. Column 2 extends through 1911. Column 3 estimates effects within the reform period only. Effects attenuate but remain significant when including 1901-1911, and become smaller within the reform period alone, consistent with centralization efforts offsetting crisis-contingent patterns during institutional disruption.

Appendix D: Data Sources and Archival Materials

Primary Sources

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Geographic and Crisis Data

Crisis timing and locations compiled from multiple historical sources including: • Kuhn, Philip A. Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China. 1980. • Fairbank, John King, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds. Cambridge History of China, Volume 11. 1980. • Michael, Franz. The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents. 3 volumes. 1966-1971. • Wright, Mary Clabaugh. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism. 1957. Geographic coordinates for provinces and crisis locations obtained from China Historical GIS (CHGIS) project, developed by Harvard University and Fudan University. Provincial boundaries as of 1820 used consistently throughout the analysis to avoid endogeneity from boundary changes.