CS 161 Project 2-2: Sharing and Revocation Writeup

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cs161-acz

1 Simple Upload/Download

For this portion, the client creates two symmetric keys of 16 bytes each using `get_random_bytes()` and places them into a tuple and encrypts it with the public key from the public key server before signing the cipher text using its private key. The encrypted keys, signature, and a randomly generated 16-bit ID to identify the file are then stored into the storage server under `<username>/dir_keys/ file.txt` as $(ID, E_{pubK}(symmK_1, symmK_2), S_{priK}(E_{pubK}(symmK_1, symmK_2)))$. The ID is also stored in `<username>/files/ID` and the file data encrypted using authenticated encryption and hMACed as the value.
To download file.txt, the user would need to get the keys from `<username> /dir_keys/` and verify the signature before decrypting the cipher text. Then they would need to access `<username>/files/` for the data, check the hMAC, and then decrypt the cipher text.

2 Sharing

For this portion, my plan is to add people that will get a file shared to them as a collaborator. For example, if Alice wants to share `file.txt` to Bob then Bob needs to be added as a collaborator for the file. By using the ID of `file.txt` from upload, Alice will access the server at `alice/collaborators/ID` and will initialize a dictionary to store the collaborators in here if there is nothing in the directory already. The dictionary will be formatted to look like {'$user_1$' : ['$user_2$']} where $user_1$ will be the person sharing a file and $user_2$ being the person receiving a file. In this case, the dictionary would look like {'alice' : ['bob']} and if bob further shares it to charlie and donny then it would look like {'alice' : ['bob'], 'bob' : ['charlie', 'donny']}. This dictionary will be stored with a hMAC of this dictionary and will be used to see who can upload and download. Therefore, this dictionary must be secure against attacks compromising its integrity and authenticity.
When alice is ready to share a file to bob, then (owner, hMAC(owner) and the file ID along with the keys used to decrypt the data are sent to bob. The keys

used to decrypt the data are also encrypted with bob's public key so he can just decrypt them himself and also signed with the sender's private key.

When bob is ready to `receive_share`, then he adds in (ID, keys, signature) into the server's `bob/dir_keys/file.txt` and (owner, sender, hMAC(owner)) into the server's `bob/shared_files/ID`. Therefore, when bob wants to get the `file.txt` and update it, he will use the owner's information in `bob/shared_files/ID` and then decrypt the files using the keys in `bob/dir_keys/file.txt`. Alice's dictionary of `alice/collaborators/ID` will check if bob can upload and download.

3   Revocation

For this portion, to revoke someone means that the owner's dictionary needs to be changed. For example, if alice finds out that bob is actually a spy and therefore wants to revoke bob, then alice will need to delete all entries of bob in the dictionary's values. If bob is a key in the dictionary, then a recursive deletion can remove all those that bob shared the file with along with those down the chain. This ensures property 4 of revocation is in place.

4   Security Analysis

Attack 1 By hMAC'ing or signing the keys, mallory cannot change the keys or learn about them. This ensures both integrity and authenticity.

Attack 2 By hMAC'ing the dictionary with a cryptographic hash and a secret key, alice's dictionary will be safe from mallory trying to tamper with it or learn from it. This ensures that the dictionary is secure and only alice can change it.

Attack 3 Mallory cannot upload/download without verification through the owner's dictionary in `owner/collaborators/ID`. This ensures that if Mallory is revoked, then he cannot be added back into the dictionary unless the owner decides to re-add Bob. This is because `bob/shared_files/ID` contains a hMAC of the owner and therefore it cannot be tampered with so Mallory can't impersonate the owner.