



中国科学技术大学  
University of Science and Technology of China



# Inverse optimization of integer programming games for parameter estimation arising from competitive retail location selection

**Reporter: Yu Chengcheng**  
**Date: 2023.08.29**



**Title:** Inverse optimization of integer programming games for parameter estimation arising from competitive retail location selection

■ Published on *European Journal of Operational Research*

- Received: 7 June 2022
- Accepted: 28 June 2023
- Area of Review: *Production, Manufacturing, Transportation and Logistics*
- Keywords: Integer programming; Choice estimation; Retail location; Inverse optimization
- Authors: Tobias Crönert, Layla Martin, Stefan Minner, Christopher S. Tang



**Tobias Crönert** (Research Associate, *Technical University of Munich*, QS 49)

## ■ Education

- Research associate, Technical University of Munich, since 2019
- Master degree, University of Waterloo, 2016-2017
- Bachelor degree, Technical University of Munich, 2012 - 2016

## ■ Publication

- Operations Research
- European Journal of Operational Research
- Transportation Research Part C

## ■ Research Areas

- Future Mobility
- Hydrogen Supply Chain
- Competition



**Layla Martin** ([Assistant Professor](#), *Eindhoven University of Technology, QS 125*)

## ■ Education

- [PHD, Technical University of Munich, 2020](#)
- [Master degree, Technical University of Munich, 2017](#)
- Bachelor degree, Cooperative State University, 2015

## ■ Publication ([56 citations](#))

- Transportation Science
- [European Journal of Operational Research](#) (2)
- Transportation Research Part E (3)

## ■ Research Areas

- Transportation and logistics
- Shared mobility
- [Mixed integer programming and game theory](#)



## Stefan Minner (Full Professor, *Technical University of Munich*, QS 49)

### ■ Education

- PHD, University of Magdeburg, 1994-1999
- Bachelor degree, University of Bielefeld, 1989-1994

### ■ Publication (7433 citations)

- Operations Research (4)
- Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (4)
- Production and Operations Management (3)
- Management Science
- Transportation Science
- EJOR/TRx/IISE/IJPR/IJPE (Many)

### ■ Research Areas

- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
- Inventory Management
- Artificial Intelligence



## Christopher S. Tang (Full Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, QS 44)

### ■ Education

- PHD, Yale University, 1983-1985
- Master degree, Yale University, 1981-1983
- Bachelor degree, University of Cambridge, 1997-1981

### ■ Publication (28462 citations)

| 标题   | 引用次数 | 年份   |
|--|------|------|
| The value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain<br>HL Lee, KC So, CS Tang<br>Management science 46 (5), 626-643 | 3128 | 2000 |
| Perspectives in supply chain risk management<br>CS Tang<br>International journal of production economics 103 (2), 451-488    | 1949 | 2006 |



### ■ Research Areas

- Outsourcing
- Pricing
- Retailing
- Supply Chain Management






# 1. Background



## ■ A realistic scenario

- ✓ Suppose you **plan to open a coffee shop**
  - There are two coffee brands, Luckin and Starbucks, in the area
- ✓ **Know nothing about the consumer information** (distance preference, price preference, brand preference, etc.)
- ✓ How to locate your coffee shop?
  - **Estimate consumer information based on the existing layout!**



# 1. Background




## ■ Competitive retail location selection

- ✓ Retailers choose their store locations: **Need in-depth knowledge** of these **customer attraction parameters**
  - Common approach: Customer surveys or Discrete choice models
  - **A new entrant is unlikely to have access to such granular data**
- ✓ **Incumbent retailers**: Full knowledge of each other's payoffs and the customer choice behavior.
- ✓ **A new entrant**: Observing (near-)optimal location selection of incumbents

### **Research Problem**

- ✓ **New entrant's location problem**
  - Integer programming games: Competitive retail location selection
  - Inverse optimization: Parameter estimation





## 2. Related literature



### □ Research Gap

| Related area              | Research content   | Published research                            | Research Gap                    |
|---------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| Location choice in retail | Simultaneous competition: Assume full knowledge                                | Crönert & Minner, 2021b; Godinho & Dias, 2010 | Need full knowledge             |
|                           | Customer choice estimation: Maximum likelihood estimation or regression models | Seim, 2006; Shriver & Bollinger, 2022         | Sales level data                |
| Inverse optimization      | Classic inverse optimization   | Ahuja & Orlin, 2001; Wang 2009                | Single decision-maker           |
|                           | Inverse equilibrium problems   | Bertsimas et al. 2015; Allen et al. 2022      | Limited to continuous decisions |



### 3. Model



#### ■ Integer programming games (IPGs)

- Finite action set:

$$S_i^o = \{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{Z}^{z_i} | w_q(\mathbf{x}_i) \leq 0, \forall q \in \{1, \dots, Q^i\}\}$$

- A popular solution concept for IPGs is a **Nash equilibrium**:

$$\Pi_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_{-i}) \geq \Pi_i(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \mathbf{x}_{-i}), \forall \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i \in S_i^o, \forall i \in I$$

- However, such pure Nash equilibria do not provably exist for general IPGs (*Carvalho et al., 2022*).

- **Approximate nash equilibrium** (*Daskalakis et al., 2006*):

$$\Pi_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_{-i}) + \epsilon \geq \Pi_i(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \mathbf{x}_{-i}), \forall \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i \in S_i^o, \forall i \in I$$




### 3. Model



#### ■ Our context

- **Incumbent retailers:** Know payoff structures and customer choice behavior
- **Customers:** Select certain stores they frequent
- **New entrant:** Estimate the customers' choice parameters



### 3. Model



#### ■ Customer choice

##### ✓ Utility function (*homogeneous*)

- Retail chain brand attractiveness ( $\beta_i$ ), such as pricing and product quality,
- Accessibility ( $\tilde{d}_{jk}^o = \frac{\bar{d} - d_{jk}^o}{\bar{d}}$ ): proximity of a store
- Convenience ( $\tilde{g}_k^o = \frac{g_k^o}{\bar{g}}$ ): Points of interest near the location
- Utility function:

$$u_{ijk}^o = \beta_i + \alpha \tilde{d}_{jk}^o + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{g}_k^o$$

##### ✓ Fractional patronage (Luce's choice axiom, Luce, 1959)

$$f_{ij}^o(\mathbf{x}_i^o, \mathbf{x}_{-i}^o) = \frac{\sum_{k \in K | d_{jk} \leq \bar{d}} x_{ik}^o u_{ijk}^o}{\sum_{\tilde{i} \in I} \sum_{k \in K | d_{jk} \leq \bar{d}} x_{\tilde{i}k}^o u_{\tilde{i}jk}^o}, \forall i \in I, \forall j \in J, \forall 0 \in 0$$



### 3. Model



#### ■ Forward problem: Incumbents' location selection

##### ✓ Profit

- annualized operating margin - annualized fixed costs

$$\prod_i^o (\mathbf{x}_i^o, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{-i}^o) = \sum_{j \in J} m_{ij}^o p_j^o f_{ij}^o(\mathbf{x}_i^o, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{-i}^o) - \sum_{k \in K} c_{ik}^o x_{ik}^o$$

- Approximate candidate locations by a grid structure

##### ✓ Optimize their respective (annualized) profit

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}_i^o \in S_i^o} \prod_i^o (\mathbf{x}_i^o, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{-i}^o)$$

- Assume incumbents neglect potential entrants

Reasons: 1. No credible threats; 2. Unattainable over a longer period



### 3. Model



#### ■ Inverse problem: New entrant's parameter estimation

##### ✓ Intuitive idea

- Observing the equilibrium store locations selected by incumbents  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^0$ , the new entrant **aims to estimate**  $\alpha \in A, \beta \in B^n$
- $\epsilon$  - Approximate Nash equilibrium

##### ✓ Inverse problem:

- Unilateral improvement potential

$$\delta_i^o = \max_{\mathbf{x}_i^o \in \mathcal{S}_i^o} \{\Pi_i^o(\mathbf{x}_i^o, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{-i}^o)\} - \Pi_i^o(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^o, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{-i}^o), \forall i \in I, \forall o \in O$$

- Inverse IPG

$$\min_{\alpha, \beta} \|\mathbf{w}\delta\| = \min_{\alpha, \beta} \|(w^o \delta_i^o, \forall i \in I, \forall o \in O)\|$$

- In an  $\epsilon$  -Nash equilibrium:  $\epsilon = \min_{\alpha, \beta} \max \delta$  (Hamming distance)
- We avoid focusing too much on a single observation

$$\epsilon \approx \min_{\alpha, \beta} \|\mathbf{w}\delta\|$$





## 4. Numerical study




### ■ Comparison to full information and sampling-based benchmarks


#### ✓ Four approaches

- InvIPG
- Distribution mean (DM):  $\alpha = 0.5, \beta_1 = 0.5, \beta_2 = 0.5$
- SAA: 64 scenarios chosen from  $\{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8\}$
- Full information:  $\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_2 \sim U(0,1)$

- ✓ Assume estimate ( $\beta_3$ ) equals the ground-truth value  $\hat{\beta}_3 \sim U(0,0.5)$  in all cases. (limitations)



$|I| = |K| = 10$



$|I| = |K| = 20$




## 4. Numerical study




### ■ Hamming distances in objective function (invIPG-HD)

✓ Two measures in objective function

- invIPG:  $\epsilon \approx \min_{\alpha, \beta} ||w\delta||$  (L1-norm)
- invIPG-HD:  $\epsilon = \min_{\alpha, \beta} \max \delta$  (Hamming distance)



(a) Runtime in seconds



(b) Error ( $L_2$ -norm) between inversely estimated parameter and ground-truth values



# 5. Comments



- Positive comments:
  - ✓ Natural and fun ideas
  
- Negative comments:
  - ✓ Unable to estimate new entrant's own brand parameters





中国科学技术大学  
University of Science and Technology of China



**Thank You!**

**Reporter: Yu Chengcheng**