



Iterative Improvement

CS3230: Design and Analysis of Algorithms

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Chapter 10: Iterative Improvement

- Greedy vs. Iterative Improvement
 - **Greedy strategy** constructs a solution to an optimization problem piece by piece.
 - **Iterative improvement** starts with a feasible solution and improves it repeatedly through small, localized steps.

Iterative Improvement

- Goal:
 - Find a feasible solution with an improved objective function.
- Obstacles:
 - Need initial solution. Sometimes we can start with trivial solution or one obtained by greedy strategy. However, sometimes finding an initial solution is complex.
 - How to check efficiently if modified solution is better.
 - Local vs. global optimum.

Linear Programming

- Simplex Method
- Problem statement: optimize a linear function of several variables subject to a set of constraints.
 - Maximize (or minimize) $c_1x_1 + \dots + c_nx_n$
 - subject to
$$a_{i1}x_1 + \dots + a_{in}x_n \leq (\text{or } \geq \text{ or } =) b_i \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, m$$
 - $x_1 \geq 0, \dots, x_n \geq 0$.
- Two researchers, L. V. Kantorovich and T. C. Koopmans, received the Nobel Price in Economics for their contributions to linear programming.

Simplex Method Example

- Example 1:

maximize $3x + 5y$


subject to $x + y \leq 4$

$x + 3y \leq 6$

$x \geq 0, y \geq 0$

- A **feasible solution** is any point (x, y) that satisfies all constraints of the problem.
- A **feasible region** is the set of all feasible points.
- An **optimal solution** is a feasible point that maximizes the objective function.


Simplex Method Example (2)



Simplex Method Example (3)

- Some linear programming problems are **infeasible**.
- Ex.: $x + y \leq 1$ and $x + y \geq 2$.
- Some linear programming problems result in an **unbounded** region.
- Ex.: $x + y \geq 4$ and $x + 3y \geq 6$.
- (If we want to find the minimum optimal value then the problem has a solution.)

Simplex Method Example (4)



Extreme Points

- **THEOREM (Extreme Point Theorem)**

Any linear programming problem with a nonempty bounded feasible region has an optimal solution; moreover, an optimal solution can always be found at an extreme point of the problem's feasible region.

- Thus, to solve problem, inspect a finite number of points in the feasible region.
- Compute value of objective function at each extreme point. Select the one with the best value.

Simplex Method

- Standard form:

It must be a maximization problem.

All the constraints (except for the nonnegativity constraints) must be in the form of linear equations.

All the variables must be required to be nonnegative.

- Thus, m constraints and n unknowns ($n \geq m$):

maximize $c_1x_1 + \dots + c_nx_n$

subject to $a_{i1}x_1 + \dots + a_{in}x_n = b_i$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$

$x_1 \geq 0, \dots, x_n \geq 0.$

Simplex Method (2)

- Notes:
 - The standard form can also be written in matrix form.
 - If objective function needs to be minimized \Rightarrow replace coefficients c_j with $-c_j, j = 1, 2, \dots, n$.
 - If a constraint is given as an inequality \Rightarrow add a slack variable.
 - Ex.: $x + y + u = 4$ where $u \geq 0$ and $x + 3y + v = 6$ where $v \geq 0$, instead of $x + y \leq 4$ and $x + 3y \leq 6$.
 - Variables must be nonnegative. If not, x_j can be replaced with two variables as follows: $x_j = x'_j - x''_j, x'_j \geq 0, x''_j \geq 0$.

Simplex Method (3)

- Identify **extreme points** as follows.
- Given: m equations in n unknowns ($n \geq m$).
- Set $n - m$ variables to zero to obtain a system of m equations and m unknowns.
- If system has a unique solution we have a **basic solution**.
 - The coordinates set to zero are called **nonbasic**.
 - The coordinates obtained by solving the system are called **basic**.
- If all the coordinates of a basic solution are ≥ 0 the basic solution is called a **basic feasible solution**.

Simplex Method (4)

- Example:

maximize $3x + 5y + 0u + 0v$

subject to $x + y + u = 4$

$x + 3y + v = 6$

$x, y, u, v \geq 0$.

- If $x, y = 0 \Rightarrow$ basic feasible solution $(0, 0, 4, 6)$.

$u = 4; v = 6$

- If $x, u = 0 \Rightarrow$ basic not feasible solution $(0, 4, 0, -6)$.

$y = 4; 3y + v = 6; \Rightarrow v = -6$

- $(0, 0, 4, 6)$ is an extreme point of the feasible region.

Simplex Method (5)

- Simplex tableau:

	x	y	u	v	
u	1	1	1	0	4
v	1	3	0	1	6
	-3	-5	0	0	0

- $m + 1$ rows and $n + 1$ columns.
- m rows with coefficients of corresponding constraint equation.
- Last row is the **objective row**. Initialize with coefficients of objective function with **signs reversed**.

Simplex Method (6)

- Objective row: used to check whether tableau represents an optimal solution (all coefficients ≥ 0 , except possibly last column).
- Ex.: Basic feasible solution $(0, 0, 4, 6)$ is not optimal.
- Negative value in x -column means we can increase objective function $z = x + 3y + 0u + 0v$.
- Idea: increase value of x , but “compensate” with u and v to keep point feasible.

$$x + u = 4 \text{ where } u \geq 0$$

$$x + v = 6 \text{ where } v \geq 0$$

$$x \leq \min\{4, 6\} = 4.$$

- New extreme point $(4, 0, 0, 2)$ with $z = 12$.

Simplex Method (6b)

- Objective row: used to check whether tableau represents an optimal solution (all coefficients ≥ 0 , except possibly last column).
- Another choice:
- Negative value in y -column means we can increase objective function $z = x + 3y + 0u + 0v$.
- Idea: increase value of y , but “compensate” with u and v to keep point feasible.

$$y + u = 4 \text{ where } u \geq 0$$

$$3y + v = 6 \text{ where } v \geq 0$$

$$y \leq \min\{4, \frac{6}{3}\} = 2.$$

- New extreme point $(0, 2, 2, 0)$ with $z = 10$.

Simplex Method (6c)

- Common Rule 1: Choose the most negative variable/value in the objective row. This hopefully leads to the largest increase in the objective function.

Terminology: entering variable in pivot column.

- Rule 2: For each positive entry in the pivot column, compute the θ -ratio by dividing the row's last entry by the entry in the pivot column.

u	1	1	1	0	4
v	1	3	0	1	6

- Ex.: $\theta_u = \frac{4}{1} = 4$, $\theta_v = \frac{6}{3} = 2$.

Simplex Method (7)

- The row with the **smallest θ** determines the departing variable
→ identifies **pivot row**.
- Departing variable: basic variable to become nonbasic in the next tableau.

u	1	1	1	0	4
v	1	3	0	1	6

Simplex Method (7b)

$$u \quad \left| \begin{array}{cccc|c} 1 & 3 & 0 & 1 & 6 \end{array} \right|$$

- Divide all the entries in the pivot row by the pivot.

$$\overleftarrow{row}_{new}: \frac{1}{3} \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad 2.$$

- Replace each of the other rows by the following difference:

$$row - c \cdot \overleftarrow{row}_{new} \quad (c: \text{row's entry in pivot column}).$$

$$row \ 1 - 1 \cdot \overleftarrow{row}_{new}: \frac{2}{3} \quad 0 \quad 1 \quad -\frac{1}{3} \quad 2.$$

$$row \ 3 - (-5) \cdot \overleftarrow{row}_{new}: -\frac{4}{3} \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad -\frac{5}{3} \quad 10.$$

Simplex Method (8)

- Next Simplex tableau:

	x	y	u	v	
u	$\frac{2}{3}$	0	1	$-\frac{1}{3}$	2
v	$\frac{1}{3}$	1	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	2
	$-\frac{4}{3}$	0	0	$\frac{5}{3}$	10

- Basic feasible solution $(0, 2, 2, 0)$ with $z = 10$.

Simplex Method (8b)

- Final Simplex tableau:

	x	y	u	v	
u	1	0	$\frac{3}{2}$	$-\frac{1}{2}$	3
v	0	1	$-\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
	0	0	2	1	14

- Basic feasible solution $(3, 1, 0, 0)$ with $z = 14$.
- Optimal solution because all values in objective row are positive.

Maximum Matching

- Def.: A **matching** in a graph G is a subset of its edges with the property that no two edges share a vertex.
- Def.: A **maximum matching** is a matching with the largest number of edges.
- **Maximum matching problem**: find a maximum matching in a graph G .
- Simpler case: consider a **bipartite graph** where all the vertices can be partitioned into disjoint sets V and U , so that every edge connects a vertex in one of these sets in the other set.

Maximum Matching

- A graph is bipartite if it is 2-colorable.
- Def.: A perfect matching matches all vertices of a graph.

Stable Matching Problem

- Goal: Given n men and n women, find a “suitable” matching.

$Y = \{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n\}$: set of n men.

$X = \{w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n\}$: set of n women.

- Participants rate members of opposite sex (no ties).
- Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
- Each woman lists men in order of preference from best to worst.

Stable Matching Problem (2)

- Men's preference profile:

	favorite ↓ <hr/> 1 st		least favorite ↓ <hr/> 3 rd
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

Stable Matching Problem (3)

- Women's preference profile:

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}		least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

Stable Matching Problem (4)

- Representation in Ranking Matrix:

	Amy	Bertha	Claire
Xavier	1,2	2,1	3,1
Yancey	2,1	1,2	3,2
Zeus	1,3	2,3	3,3

Stable Matching Problem (5)

- Perfect matching: everyone is matched monogamously.
 - Each man is matched to exactly one woman.
 - Each woman is matched to exactly one man.
- Stability: no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.
 - In matching M , an unmatched pair $m-w$ is **unstable** if man m and woman w prefer each other to current partners.
 - Unstable pair $m-w$ could each improve by eloping.
- Stable matching: perfect matching with no unstable pairs.

Stable Matching Problem (6)

- Stable matching problem: Given the preference lists of n men and n women, find a stable matching if one exists.

Stable Matching Problem (7)

- Q: Is assignment $X - C$, $Y - B$, $Z - A$ stable?

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}	2^{nd}	least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

Stable Matching Problem (8)

- Q: Is assignment $X - C$, $Y - B$, $Z - A$ stable?

	favorite		least favorite
	↓		↓
	1 st	2 nd	3 rd
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

Stable Matching Problem (9)

- Q: Is assignment $X - C$, $Y - B$, $Z - A$ stable?
- A: No. Bertha and Xavier will hook up.

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}	2^{nd}	least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

Stable Matching Problem (10)

- Q: Is assignment $X - C$, $Y - B$, $Z - A$ stable?
- A: No. Bertha and Xavier will hook up.

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}	2^{nd}	least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

Stable Matching Problem (11)

- Q: Is assignment $X - A$, $Y - B$, $Z - C$ stable?
- A: Yes.

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}	2^{nd}	least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Xavier	Amy	Bertha	Clare
Yancey	Bertha	Amy	Clare
Zeus	Amy	Bertha	Clare

Stable Matching Problem (12)

- Q: Is assignment $X - A$, $Y - B$, $Z - C$ stable?
- A: Yes.

	favorite ↓ 1^{st}	2^{nd}	least favorite ↓ 3^{rd}
Amy	Yancey	Xavier	Zeus
Bertha	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus
Clare	Xavier	Yancey	Zeus

Propose-And-Reject Algorithm

- Propose-and-reject algorithm. [\[Gale-Shapley 1962\]](#). Intuitive method that guarantees to find a stable matching.

Propose-And-Reject Algorithm

ALGORITHM *Propose – And – Reject*

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) do

 Arbitrarily select a man m and choose

$w =$ next woman on m 's list to whom m has not yet proposed

 if (w is free)

 assign m and w to be engaged

 else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')

 assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free

 else

w rejects m

Proof of Correctness: Termination

- Observation 1: Men propose to women in decreasing order of preference.
- Observation 2: Once a woman is matched, she never becomes unmatched; she only “trades up.”
- Claim: Algorithm terminates after at most n^2 iterations of while loop.
- Proof: Each time through the while loop a man proposes to a new woman. There are only n^2 possible proposals.

Proof of Correctness: Termination

	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	5 th
Victor	A	B	C	D	E
Wyatt	B	C	D	A	E
Xavier	C	D	A	B	E
Yancey	D	A	B	C	E
Zeus	A	B	C	D	E

- $n(n - 1) + 1$ proposals required.

Proof of Correctness: Termination

	<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>4th</i>	<i>5th</i>
Amy	W	X	Y	Z	V
Bertha	X	Y	Z	V	W
Clare	Y	Z	V	W	X
Diane	Z	V	W	X	Y
Erika	V	W	X	Y	Z

- $n(n - 1) + 1$ proposals required.

Proof of Correctness: Termination

- Claim: All men and women get matched.
- Proof (by contradiction):
 - Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that Zeus is not matched upon termination of the algorithm.
 - Then some woman, say Amy, is not matched upon termination.
 - By Observation 2, Amy was never proposed to.
 - But, Zeus proposes to everyone, since he ends up unmatched.

Proof of Correctness: Stability

- Claim: No unstable pairs.
- Proof (by contradiction):
 - Suppose A-Z is an unstable pair: each prefers each other to partner in Gale-Shapley matching S^* .
 - Case 1: Z never proposed to A.
 - \Rightarrow Z prefers his GS partner to A.
 - \Rightarrow A-Z is stable.
 - Case 2: Z proposed to A.
 - \Rightarrow A rejected Z (right away or later).
 - \Rightarrow A prefers her GS partner to Z.
 - \Rightarrow A-Z is stable.
 - In either case A-Z is stable, a contradiction.

Summary

- Stable matching problem. Given n men and n women, and their preferences, find a stable matching if one exists.
- Gale-Shapley algorithm. Guarantees to find a stable matching for **any** problem instance.