

Supplementary Material for “Optimal Personalized Incentive Design for Joint Mobility and Vehicle-to-Grid Services Based on a Stackelberg-Nash Game”

Zhe Zhou, Tengfei Zhou, Zhengshuo Li and Xue Li

In this supplementary material, we give the proof sketch for Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 in the paper “Optimal Personalized Incentive Design for Joint Mobility and Vehicle-to-Grid Services Based on a Stackelberg-Nash Game”

The detailed proof procedure is presented in the following.

Lemma 1. *Given any fixed \mathbf{p} , the corresponding lower-level Nash game possesses a unique NE.*

Proof. As shown in [1, Th. 2.3.3(B)], strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient field $F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$ ensures both the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE). In the particular case where F is affine, this requirement becomes equivalent to the condition that the Jacobian matrix $\mathbf{J}F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$ is positive definite [1, Th. 2.3.2(C)]. After an appropriate reordering of variables, $\mathbf{J}F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$ takes a block-diagonal form $M = \text{diag}(M_v, M_w)$, where $M_v := \mathbf{J}_v F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$ and $M_w := \mathbf{J}_w F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$. The strict convexity of f_i^t and f_i^{dev} ensures that $M_v \succ 0$ [2, Lemma 1]. In addition, for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, the fact that $f_i^e + f_i^t$ are affine functions solely dependent on w implies that M_w is also positive definite. Consequently, M inherits the positive definiteness of its diagonal blocks, which verifies the lemma. \square

Proposition 1. *Suppose that the sequence $\{\alpha^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is irreducible, non-negative, and satisfies the square-summability condition, i.e., $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\alpha^k)^2 < \infty$. Furthermore, consider another sequence $\{\sigma^k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ composed of non-negative real values, such that the associated weighted infinite series $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \alpha^k \sigma^k$ is convergent. Under the assumption that the step size parameter γ is chosen to be sufficiently small to ensure stability and descent of the overall process—one can conclude that every limit point (also referred to as an accumulation point) of the sequence $\mathbf{p}^k_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ generated by the algorithm is a composite critical point of Stackelberg-Nash game.*

Proof. The applicability of [3, Th. 2] requires that Assumption 1 and Standing Assumptions 1–4 be satisfied. Because each f_i is a convex quadratic and Ω_i is polyhedral, Assumption 1 holds; moreover, Lemma 1 establishes $F(\mathbf{p}, \cdot)$ is strongly monotone, and its uniform strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity directly result from the fact that it is affine in (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{x}) . As F is affine, it satisfies Standing Assumptions 2–3, and since φ is semi-algebraic and Ω_{CSO} is convex and compact, Standing Assumption 4 is also met.

Assumption 1 and standing assumptions 1-4 are as follows:

Assumption 1: For each agent $i \in \mathcal{N}$, the cost function is

$$f_i(x, y) = \frac{1}{2} y_i^\top Q_i y_i + \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}} E_{i,j} y_j + E_{i,0} x + e_i \right)^\top y_i, \quad (1)$$

where $Q_i \in \mathbb{S}_+^{n_i}$, $E_{i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i \times n_j}$, $E_{i,0} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i \times m}$, $e_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}$.

Standing Assumption 1: For all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, and any fixed $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $y_{-i} \in \mathbb{R}^{n-n_i}$, the function $f_i(x, \cdot, y_{-i})$ is convex and continuously differentiable; the set $\mathcal{Y}_i(x)$ is of the form

$$\mathcal{Y}_i(x) := \{y_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i} \mid A_i y_i \leq b_i + G_i x, \ C_i y_i = d_i + H_i x\}, \quad (2)$$

where $A_i \in \mathbb{R}^{p_i \times n_i}$ and $C_i \in \mathbb{R}^{r_i \times n_i}$ are full row rank, and $G_i \in \mathbb{R}^{p_i \times m}$, $b_i \in \mathbb{R}^{p_i}$, $H_i \in \mathbb{R}^{r_i \times m}$, $d_i \in \mathbb{R}^{r_i}$; $\mathcal{Y}(x)$ is nonempty and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification.

Standing Assumption 2: For any fixed $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $F(x, \cdot)$ is μ -strongly monotone and L_F -Lipschitz continuous.

Standing Assumption 3: The mapping F is definable¹, continuously differentiable, and there exist constants L_{JF1}, L_{JF2} such

¹Definable functions form a vast class of functions that encompasses virtually every objective function employed in optimization or machine learning, e.g., semialgebraic functions, exponentials, and logarithms. See [4, Def. 1.5] for a formal definition and [5, App. A.2] for a practitioner’s perspective. If the f_i ’s are definable, so is F , while the inverse is not true [6, Remark. 8].

that the partial Jacobians of F satisfy

$$\|\mathbf{J}_1 F(x, y) - \mathbf{J}_1 F(x, y')\| \leq L_{JF1} \|y - y'\|, \quad (3)$$

$$\|\mathbf{J}_2 F(x, y) - \mathbf{J}_2 F(x, y')\| \leq L_{JF2} \|y - y'\|, \quad (4)$$

for any $y, y' \in \mathcal{Y}(x)$.

Standing Assumption 4: The function φ is definable and continuously differentiable in (x, y) ; its partial gradients $\nabla_1 \varphi, \nabla_2 \varphi$ are $L_{\varphi 1}$ -, $L_{\varphi 2}$ -Lipschitz continuous, respectively. The feasible set \mathcal{X} is nonempty, convex, and compact. \square

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