Assignment 2

Part 1

Part 2

1)

Exercise 3.14

Proof. Recalling the formula for the Bellman equation of v_{π} ,

$$v_{\pi}(s) = \sum_{a} \pi(a|s) \left[r(a,s) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s'|s,a) \cdot v_{\pi}(s') \right]$$

Given the Gridworld environment, we have that the immediate transition reward is 0 (as long as the agent is not starting fro A or B and not moving off the grid).

Additionally, the transition probabilites are deterministic such that $\pi(a|s) = \frac{1}{4}$, where p(s'|s,a) = 1 given the deterministic nature of the environment.

Lastly, the discount factor is $\gamma = 0.9$.

This simplifies $v_{\pi}(s)$ to

$$v_{\pi}(s) = \frac{1}{4} \left[0 + 0.9 \sum_{s' \in S} v_{\pi}(s') \right]$$
$$= 0.225 \sum_{s' \in S} v_{\pi}(s')$$

To show that the Bellman equation holds for the center state, 0.7, where this value is rounded to the nearest tenth,

$$v_{\pi}(0.7) = 0.225 \sum_{s' \in S} v_{\pi}(s')$$

$$= 0.225 [2.3 + 0.4 - 0.4 + 0.7]$$

$$= 0.225 \cdot 3$$

$$= 0.675$$

$$\approx 0.7$$

Thus, the Bellman equation holds for the center state, 0.7.

Exercise 3.22

• Case $\gamma = 0$:

In this case, we can calculate $v_{\pi_{\text{left}}}(s)$ as follows:

$$v_{\pi_{\text{left}}}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[G_t|S_t = s]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[R_{t+1} + \gamma G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 1 + 0 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 1$$

Similarly, we can calculate $v_{\pi_{\text{right}}}(s)$ as follows:

$$v_{\pi_{\text{right}}}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[G_t|S_t = s]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[R_{t+1} + \gamma G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 0 + 0 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 0$$

Thus, π_{left} is the optimal policy.

• Case $\gamma = 0.9$:

For π_{left} , we have an alternating sequence of 1 and 0 for the rewards. Given the discount factor, the expected return for π_{left} is

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\pi_{\text{left}}}(s) &= \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[G_t|S_t = s] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[R_{t+1} + \gamma G_{t+1}|S_t = s] \\ &= 1 + 0.9 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{left}}}[G_{t+1}|S_t = s] \\ &= 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} 0.9^{2k} \cdot 1 \\ &= 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} 0.81^k \cdot 1 \\ &= 1 + \frac{1}{1 - 0.81} \\ &\approx 6.26 \end{aligned}$$

For π_{right} , we have a sequence of 0 and 2 for the rewards.

Given the discount factor, the expected return for π_{right} is

$$v_{\pi_{\text{right}}}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[G_t|S_t = s]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[R_{t+1} + \gamma G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 0 + 0.9 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\text{right}}}[G_{t+1}|S_t = s]$$

$$= 0 + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 2 \cdot 0.9^{2k+1}$$

$$= 2 \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 0.9^{2k} \cdot 0.9$$

$$= 1.8 \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 0.81^k$$

$$= 1.8 \cdot \frac{1}{1 - 0.81}$$

$$\approx 9.47$$

Thus, π_{right} is the optimal policy.

• Case $\gamma = 0.5$:

Given the reward sequences of π_{left} and π_{right} above, we can calculate the expected returns for each policy as follows:

$$v_{\pi_{\text{left}}}(s) = 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} 0.5^{2k} \cdot 1$$

$$= 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} 0.25^{k} \cdot 1$$

$$= 1 + \frac{1}{1 - 0.25}$$

$$= 1 + \frac{1}{0.75}$$

$$= 1 + \frac{4}{3}$$

$$= \frac{7}{3}$$

Similarly,

$$v_{\pi_{\text{right}}}(s) = 0 + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 2 \cdot 0.5^{2k+1}$$

$$= 0 + 2 \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 0.5^{2k} \cdot 0.5$$

$$= 1 \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} 0.5^{2k}$$

$$= 1 \cdot \frac{1}{0.75}$$

$$= 1 + \frac{4}{3}$$

$$= \frac{7}{3}$$

Thus, both policies are optimal.

Exercise 3.25

The value of being in state s and acting optimally (choosing the best action according to the optimal policy) is the maximum of the expected returns for all actions available in s. Thus by definition, $v^*(s)$ can be expressed as

$$v_*(s) = \max_{a} \left(r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} p(s'|s, a) \cdot \max_{a'} (q_*(s', a')) \right)$$
$$= \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}(s)} (q_*(s, a)), \ \forall s \in \mathcal{S}$$

Exercise 3.26

By definition,

$$q_*(s, a) = \mathbb{E}[R_{t+1} + \gamma v_*(S_{t+1}) | S_t = s, A_t = a]$$

We can break down the expected value into the immediate reward and the discounted future reward,

$$q_*(s, a) = \mathbb{E}[R_{t+1} + \gamma v_*(S_{t+1}) | S_t = s, A_t = a]$$

= $\mathbb{E}[R_{t+1} | S_t = s, A_t = a] + \gamma \mathbb{E}[v_*(S_{t+1}) | S_t = s, A_t = a]$

By the Law of Total Expectation, we can express $\gamma \mathbb{E}[v_*(S_{t+1})|S_t=s,A_t=a]$ as

$$\gamma \mathbb{E}[v_*(S_{t+1})|S_t = s, A_t = a] = \sum_{s' \in S} \mathbb{E}[v_*(S_{t+1})|S_t = s, A_t = a, S_{t+1} = s'] \cdot p(s'|s, a)$$
$$= \sum_{s' \in S} v_*(s') \cdot p(s'|s, a)$$

Thus, we can express $q_*(s, a)$ as

$$q_*(s, a) = r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} v_*(s') \cdot p(s'|s, a), \ \forall s \in \mathcal{S}, a \in \mathcal{A}(s)$$

Exercise 3.27

Since π_* is defined as the optimal action taken in state s, we can express it as the action that maximizes the expected return from state s as

$$\pi_*(s) = \arg\max_a(q_*(s,a)), \ \forall s \in \mathcal{S}$$

Exercise 3.28

Since $q_*(s, a)$ can be defined to be

$$q_*(s, a) = r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} v_*(s') \cdot p(s'|s, a)$$

and $\pi_*(s)$ was defined above as $\pi_*(s) = \arg\max_a(q_*(s,a))$, we can express $\pi_*(s)$ as

$$\pi_*(s) = \arg\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}(s)} \left(r(s, a) + \gamma \sum_{s' \in S} v_*(s') \cdot p(s'|s, a) \right), \ \forall s \in \mathcal{S}$$

Exercise 4.1

• $q_{\pi}(11, \mathtt{down})$:

Going down from state 11 will result in a deterministic immediate reward of -1 and then the episode will terminate.

Thus, $q_{\pi}(11, \mathtt{down}) = -1$.

• $q_{\pi}(7, \text{down})$:

$$\begin{split} q_{\pi}(7,\mathsf{down}) &= \mathbb{E}_{\pi}[G_t|S_t = 7, A_t = \mathsf{down}] \\ &= R_t + \underbrace{\gamma}_{1} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\pi}[G_{t+1}|S_{t+1} = 11]}_{v_{\pi}(11)} \\ &= -1 + (-14) \text{ (According to the values of } v_{\pi} \text{ in figure 4.1)} \\ &= -15 \end{split}$$

6)

To calculate the value of $v_2(s)$ for each state s, we can the iterative policy evaluation algorithm with $v_{k+1}(s) = v_2(s)$ and $v_k(s) = v_1(s)$.

To make the calculations easier, we can observe that

$$v_2(2) = v_2(3) = v_2(5) = v_2(6) = v_2(7) = v_2(8) = v_2(9) = v_2(10) = v_2(12) = v_2(13)$$

 $v_2(1) = v_2(4) = v_2(11) = v_2(14)$

This is true because the states mentioned above whose value functions share the same value have the same number of actions and same values for the immediate rewards and the transition probabilities. Thus, it is sufficient to calculate the value of $v_2(s)$ for only one state from each group of states that share the same value.

$$\begin{split} v_2(2) &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(1|2, \mathtt{left}) \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(2|2, \mathtt{up}) \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(6|2, \mathtt{down}) \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(3|2, \mathtt{right}) \cdot -1 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-8 \right] \\ &= -2 \end{split}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{split} v_2(1) &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(\texttt{end}|1, \texttt{left}) \cdot 0 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(1|1, \texttt{up}) \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(5|1, \texttt{down}) \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + p(2|1, \texttt{right}) \cdot -1 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 0 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] + \frac{1}{4} \left[-1 + 1 \cdot -1 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left[-7 \right] \\ &= -1.75 \end{split}$$

Lastly, the terminal states remain the same as in $v_1(s)$ (value of 0). Therefore, we can illustrate the value of $v_2(s)$ for each state s as follows:

0	-1.75	-2	-2
-1.75	-2	-2	-2
-2	-2	-2	-1.75
-2	-2	-1.75	0