


Http sessions

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- Intro on state
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State via cookies

- Http is *stateless*
 - No information is maintained between two requests
- Management of the state is added via **Cookies**
 - *set-cookie* response header and *cookie* request header



Cookies

- **Key-value** data
 - *e.g., name=alice*
- **Additional fields:**
 - ***Domain validity***
 - *e.g., 'Location=/'*
 - ***Time Validity***
 - *Expiry time*
 - *Permanent*
- **Note on overhead:**
 - Data are transferred within each **request**
 - Usually, Web servers have ***maximum allowed size***

Cookies in Flask

- <http://flask.pocoo.org/docs/1.0/quickstart/#cookies>
- Get cookies
 - Read the dict-like cookies object in the request
`request.cookies`
- Write cookies
 - Manually write the set-cookie header in the response
 - Use the `set_cookie` method of the response object

```
r = make_response()  
r.set_cookie(key, value)
```
- Unset cookies → set a cookie in the past

```
r.set_cookie(key, expires=0)
```

Cookies Flask Exercise

- Use the *sessions_flask* application as a basis
 - Implement the `set_cookie` handler
 - to return, if available, the current cookie values
 - to accept GET query parameters and set them in the cookies

Sessions

- A session is an **abstract concept**
- The server wants to **keep track** of requests from the **same client**
- Why?
 - Functionality
 - e.g., keep track of a form compiled over multiple
 - Targeted advertising
 - e.g., third party cookies
 - Authentication
 - e.g., alternative to *Basic authentication*

Sessions and cookies

- Sessions require state → HTTP state is implemented via cookies
- **Client-side session**
 - Data are stored **in** the cookies
 - Also called cookie-based session
- **Server-side session**
 - Data are stored in the server backend
 - Cookies store an **identification information**
- **Common security issue**
 - **Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)**
 - [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_\(CSRF\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF))

Cross-site request forgery

- Force execution of **unwanted actions**
 - e.g., a javascript or a link with cross-site operations
- **Defense:**
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
- **“CSRF token”**
 - Any operation that changes the state requires a secure random token
 - POST operations:
Obtained via GET operations and added as **hidden field in forms**
 - GET operations (discouraged): ← GET operations should NOT
Inserted via query parameters modify the state
- Details in the security class

CSRF in Flask [1]

- In some Web framework (e.g., Django) **CSRF Tokens are enabled by default**
- In Flask, you **must activate CSRF protection**
 - Can easily add them by using the **flask_wtf** library
 - <http://flask-wtf.readthedocs.io/en/stable/csrf.html#csrf-protection>

```
from flask_wtf.csrf import CSRFProtect  
csrf = CSRFProtect(app)
```
 - Can generate the token in jinja templates by using the **csrf_token** method
- If non-GET handlers exist that **do not use session information**, you can exempt them from the token protection
 - **csrf.exempt** method, can be used as decorator

CSRF in Flask [2]

- The algorithm used to generate the CSRF token in Flask requires definition of a ***secret_key*** attribute in the WSGI object
 - ***Properly manage secret information required in your code***
 - ***Do not store them in the repositories***
 - ***Use different secrets in development and production environments***
- GAE example:
 - Create a specialized Python module that maintains secret info
 - Can inspect GAE dev environment by using the SERVER_SOFTWARE environment variable
 - https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/standard/python/tools/using-local-server#detecting_application_runtime_environment
 - `os.getenv('SERVER_SOFTWARE', '').startswith('Google App Engine/')`

Client-side sessions [1]

- *Client-side session example (multi-phase form compilation):*
 - *set-cookie: name=alice; surname=smith*
- **Performance trade-offs**
 - the server does not store anything
 - Any server can **recover a state** → useful in **load-balancing**
 - data are exchanged in each HTTP request → **bandwidth overhead**
- Important **security considerations**
 - what if clients **modify** data?
 - what if we (developers) store data the users should not access?

Client-side sessions [2]

- **Security issues**
 - what if clients **modify** data?
 - e.g., avoid previous input validation, fake authentication information
- **Defense:**
 - use cryptography to protect **data authenticity**
 - **Message Authentication Code** or **Digital Signatures**
 - *details in the security class*
- What **confidentiality of information** stored in the cookies?
 - Do we (developers) store critical data in the session?
 - Critical = that the user should not be able to read
 - e.g., server-side database information
 - **YES → protect confidentiality: encrypt** the data
 - **NO → authenticity is enough**

Concepts of MAC and Digital Signatures

- Message Authentication Coded (MAC) and Digital Signatures are cryptographic primitives to guarantee data **integrity** and **authenticity**
 - **Without knowledge of the secret key it is impossible to modify data without being detected**
- **MAC → symmetric setting**
 - Authenticate(key, data): $\text{MAC}(\text{key}, \text{data}) \rightarrow \text{tag}$
 - Verify(key, data, tag): $\text{MAC}(\text{key}, \text{data}) == \text{tag}$ (time const → digest_compare)
 - The keys used to authenticate and verify are the **same**
- **Signature → asymmetric setting**
 - Authenticate(sk, data): $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, \text{data}) \rightarrow \text{signature}$
 - Verify(pk, data, signature): $\text{Verify}(\text{pk}, \text{data}, \text{signature})$
 - The keys used to authenticate (sign) and verify are **different**

Client-side sessions [3]

- **Revocation issues**
 - Any self-contained crypto authenticated information should really store an **expiry** information
 - Details in the security course (x509, PGP, ...)
- **Verification issues**
 - Crypto implementations are difficult to implement and to use
 - e.g, metadata verification, allowed protocols, constant-time verification, ...
 - <https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-token-libraries/>
- **Best practice: use existing libraries with good implementations**

Flask client-side sessions

- Flask **session** object
 - Standard dictionary interface to access data (key-value)
 - Also available by default in jinja templates
 - Use the *session.clear* to delete the session
- Flask uses client-side sessions by **default**
 - **Must** define the **secret_key** attribute of the flask wsgi object

Flask session exercise

- Use the *sessions_flask* application as a basis
 - Implement the *create_session* handler that adds the GET query arguments to the session object, and returns a page with all the contents of the session object
 - Implement the *clear_session* handler to clear the current session, if exists. Return a page that shows whether the session did not exist or if it has been cleared
 - Inspect how the session is implemented in the cookies

JWT and JOSE


- Standard to sign and encrypt serialized data in the Web
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-32>
 - “compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties”
- <https://jwt.io/introduction/>
 - JOSE header . {plaintext payload, JWE payload} . JWS signature
 - JWE → Json Web Encryption
 - JWS → Json Web Signature
 - Note: although called “signature”, quite any service will use a MAC for performance reasons

JWT in Flask

- Flask uses the *itsdangerous* library to implement a **variant** of JWT
- Exercise:
 - Does Flask hide session information?
- Extra homework (send it by email):
 - produce Python code that, given the Flask session JWT and the server secret key, returns the information stored within
 - (*not trivial*) extend the session functionality with JWE to protect information confidentiality

Server-side sessions

- A typical approach to implement sessions is to use server storage and to exchange a reference to the state information



Server-side sessions on GAE

- Flask server-side sessions can be easily deployed by using the *Flask-session* library
 - <https://pythonhosted.org/Flask-Session/>
- However, Flask-session supports standard database interface
 - Can be used with memcached (sessions might unexpectedly disappear....)
- We suggest *beaker*, a powerful stand-alone specialized library to handle **caching** and **state** information
 - <https://beaker.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>
 - Supports Flask sessions
 - Supports Google Datastore

Flask + GAE + Beaker server-side sessions

```
import beaker
from beaker.middleware import SessionMiddleware
from flask.sessions import SessionInterface

session_opts = {
    'session.type': 'ext:google',
    'session.auto': True,
    'session.httponly' : True,
    'session.secure' : True
}

class BeakerSessionInterface(SessionInterface):
    def open_session(self, app, request):
        session = request.environ['beaker.session']
        return session
    def save_session(self, app, session, response):
        session.save()

app.wsgi_app = SessionMiddleware(app.wsgi_app, session_opts)
app.session_interface = BeakerSessionInterface()
```

Homework

- Implement an application with authentication functions, with (minimal) registration and login forms
 - Authentication is handled via a **session**
 - Implement handlers that can be accessed only if the user is authenticated
- Do not forget
 - Cookies exercise (slide 5)
 - Session exercise (slide 16)
 - JWT extra-homeworks (slide 18)