

Model Driven Security

Security Engineering

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Module Objectives

Present a methodology for automatically constructing secure, complex, distributed applications.

Formal: Has a well defined mathematical semantics.

General: Ideas may be specialized in many ways.


Usable: Based on familiar concepts and notation.

Wide spectrum: Integrates security into overall design process.

Tool supported: Compatible too with UML-based design tools.

Scales: Initial experience (academic and industry) positive.


Early Impact ...



Road Map

- Motivation and objectives
- Background
- Secure components
- Semantics
- Generating security infrastructures
- Secure controllers
- Experience and conclusions


Motivation



How do we go from requirements to secure systems?


From Requirements to Systems

- Ideally: Automated synthesis from specifications.
 - ▶ The Holy Grail of Software Engineering!
 - ▶ But problem is not recursively solvable.
- As described by process models.





- In practice: code-and-fix.

Adequate in-the-small. But poor quality control and scalability.



From Requirements to Systems: Security

- Engineering security into system design is usually neglected.



- Ad hoc integration has a negative impact on security.
- Two gaps to bridge:

Requirements Analysis
Security Policies



Implementation
Design Models

Running Example: A Meeting Scheduler

Functional requirements:

System should maintain a list of users and records of meetings. A meeting has an owner, a list of participants, a time, and a place. Users may carry out operations on meetings such as creating, reading, editing, and deleting them. A user may also cancel a meeting, which deletes the meeting and notifies all participants by email ...

Security requirements:


1. All users can create new meetings and read all meeting entries.
2. Only owners may change meeting data, cancel meetings, or delete meeting entries.
3. However, a supervisor can cancel any meeting.

Example — Some Questions

- How do we formalize both kinds of requirements?
- How are requirements refined into **multi-tier architectures** with support for GUIs, controllers, database back ends ...?
- Can this be done in a way that supports **modern standards/technology** for modeling (UML), middleware (EJB, .NET, ...), and security?
- How are security infrastructures kept consistent, even when **requirements change** and evolve, or the underlying **technologies** themselves **change**?

We present a methodology & tool addressing these concerns.

Approach: Specialize Model Driven Architecture




to **Model Driven Security**.

Requirements Analysis
Security Policies



Implementation
Design Models

Components of MDS



Models:

- Modeling languages **combine security** and **design** languages.
- Models specify **security** and **design** aspects.

Security Infrastructure: code + standards conform infrastructure.

Assertions, configuration data, calls to interface functions, ...

Transformation: **parameterized** by component standard

Examples: J2EE/EJB, .NET, CORBA, ...

Ideas very general.

Approach open with respect to languages and technology.

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
Background

Model Driven Architecture

- Unified Modeling Language
- Extensibility and Domain Specific Languages
- Code generation

MDA: the Role of Models

- A **model** presents a system view useful for **conceptual understanding**.
- When the models have **semantics**, they constitute formal specifications and can also be used for (rigorous) **analysis**, and **refinement**.
- MDA: a model-centric development process



Crucial difference: much of transformation is **automated**.

MDA: the Role of Standards

- MDA is an emerging Object Management Group standard.
 - ▶ Standards are political, not scientific, constructs.
 - ▶ They are valuable for building **interoperable** tools and for the widespread **acceptance** of **tools** and **notations** used.
- MDA is based on standards for
 - Modeling:** the Unified Modeling Language, for defining graphical, view-oriented models of requirements and designs.
 - Metamodeling:** the Meta-Object Facility, for defining modeling languages, like UML.

We will **selectively** introduce both of these standards.

Background

- Model Driven Architecture

Unified Modeling Language

- Extensibility and Domain Specific Languages
- Code generation


UML

- Family of graphical languages for OO-modeling. Each language:
 - ▶ is suitable for formalizing a particular **view** of systems;
 - ▶ has an **abstract syntax** defining primitives for building models;
 - ▶ has a **concrete syntax** (or **notation**) for display.
- Also includes the **Object Constraint Language**.
 - ▶ Specification language loosely based on first-order logic.
 - ▶ Used to formalize invariants, and pre- and post-conditions.
- A mixed blessing
 - + Wide industrial acceptance and considerable tool support.
 - Semantics just for parts. Not yet a **Formal Method**.

We focus here on **class diagrams** and **statecharts**, presenting the main ideas by example.

Class Diagrams


Describe structural aspects of systems. A **class** specifies a set of objects with common **services**, **properties**, and **behaviors**. Services are described by **methods** and **properties** by **attributes** and **associations**.



Sample requirements: The system should manage information about meetings. Each meeting has an owner, a list of participants, a time, and a place. Users may carry out standard operations on meetings such as creating, reading, editing, and deleting them. A user may also cancel a meeting, which deletes the meeting and also notifies all participants by email.

Statecharts

Describes the **behavior** of a system or class in terms of **states** and **events** that cause **state transitions**.



Sample requirements: Users are presented with a list of meetings. They can perform operations including **creating** meetings, **editing** existing meetings, **deleting** and **canceled** meetings.

Background

- Model Driven Architecture
- Unified Modeling Language
- 👉 **Extensibility and Domain Specific Languages**
 - Code generation

Domain Specific Languages

- UML provides general modeling concepts, yet lacks a vocabulary for modeling **Domain Specific Concepts**. E.g.,

Business domains like banking, travel, or health care
System aspects such as security

- There are various ways to extend UML
 1. by defining new **profiles**, or
 2. at the level of **metamodels**.

We will use both of these in our work to define domain specific modeling languages for security and system design.


1) Profiles: Extending Core UML

- UML is defined by a metamodel: **core UML**.
- Core UML can be extended by defining a **UML profile**.

For instance, **stereotypes** can be declared that introduce modeling primitives by subtyping core UML types and **OCL constraints** can be used to formalize syntactic well-formedness restrictions.

- **Example:**

A class with stereotype <<Entity>> represents a business objects with an associated persistent storage mechanism (e.g., table in a relational database).




- Profiles useful for light-weight specializations.
Substantial changes use metamodels to define languages directly.

2) Metamodels



- A **metamodel** defines the (abstract) syntax of other models.
Its elements, **metaobjects**, describe **types** of model objects.
- MOF is a standard for defining metamodels.

Meta level	Description	Example elements
M3	MOF Model	MOF Class, MOF Attribute
M2	Metamodel, defines a language	Entity, Attribute
M1	Model, consisting of instances of M2 elements	Entities “Meeting” and “Person”
M0	Objects and data	Persons “Alice” and “Bob”

M2




M1




2) Metamodeling (cont.)

M2



M1




- Abstract syntax of metamodels defined using MOF.
 - ▶ Metamodels may be defined using UML notation.
 - ▶ Supports OO-metamodels, using concepts like subtyping.
- Concrete syntax of DSL defined by a UML profile.
- MOF/UML tools automatically translate models in concrete syntax into models in abstract syntax for further processing.

Background

- Model Driven Architecture
- Unified Modeling Language
- Extensibility and Domain Specific Languages


 **Code generation**

MDA: Translation



- Fix a **platform** with a **security architecture**: **J2EE/EJB**, **.NET**, ...
- Consider EJB standard. Beans are:
 1. **Server-side components** encapsulating application business logic.
 2. **Java classes** with appropriate structure, interfaces, methods, ...
+ **deployment information** for installation and configuration.
- Generation rules explain how each kind of model element is translated into part of an EJB system.
- Translation produces **Java code** and **XML deployment descriptors**.

MDA Generation by Example



- **Entity** \mapsto EJB component with implementation class, interfaces (local, remote, home, ...), factory method *create*, finder method *findByPrimaryKey*, ...

- **Entity Attribute** \mapsto getter/setter methods

```

date getStart() { return start;}
void setStart(date start) { this.start = start; }
  
```

- **Entity Method** \mapsto method stub

```

void notify() { }
  
```

- **Association Ends** \mapsto schema for maintaining references

```

Collection getParticipants() { return participants; }
void addToParticipants(Person participant)
    { participants.add(participant); }
void deleteFromParticipants(Person participant)
    { participants.remove(participant); }
  
```


Road Map

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Secure components

- Semantics
- Generating security infrastructures
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Context: Models and Languages



- A **Security Design Language** glues two languages together.
Approach open (modulo some semantic requirements).
- Each language is equipped with an **abstract** and **concrete syntax**, a **semantics**, and a technology-dependent **translation function**.
- Dialect bridges **design language** with **security language** by identifying which **design elements** are **protected resources**.
- UML employed for

Metamodeling: Object oriented def. of language syntax (MOF).

Notation: Concrete language syntax for security design models.


Secure Components

Role-Based Access Control

- Generalization to SecureUML
- Component modeling and combination

We address here relevant concepts and their syntactic representation.
Semantics will be handled subsequently.

Security Policies



- Many policies address the **confidentiality** and **integrity** of data.

Confidentiality: No unauthorized access to information

Integrity: No unauthorized modification of information

- Example:** Users may **create** new meetings and **view** all meetings, but may only **modify** the meetings they own.
- Can be formalized as **Access Control Policies**, specifying which subjects have rights (privileges) to read/write which objects.
- Can be enforced using a **reference monitor** as protection mechanism.
Checks whether **authenticated** users are **authorized** to perform actions.
- We will focus on access control policies/mechanisms in following.

Access Control

- Two kinds are usually supported.

Declarative: $u \in \text{Users}$ has $p \in \text{Permissions} : \Longleftrightarrow (u,p) \in \text{AC}$.

Programmatic: via assertions at relevant program points.

System environment provides information needed for decision.

- **R**ole **B**ased **A**ccess **C**ontrol is a commonly used declarative model.

- ▶ Roles group privileges.

- ▶ Other additions possible, e.g., hierarchies and sessions.

- These two kinds are often combined, e.g.,

a user in the role customer may withdraw money from an account
when he is the owner and the amount is less than 1,000 SFr.

Access Control — Declarative

- Declaratively: authorization is specified by a relation.

A user is granted access iff he has the required permission.

$$u \in \text{Users has } p \in \text{Permissions} : \Longleftrightarrow (u, p) \in \text{AC}.$$

- Example:

User
Alice
Bob
John

User	Permission
Alice	read file a
Alice	write file a
Alice	start application x
Alice	start application y
Bob	read file a
Bob	write file a
Bob	start application x
John	read file a
John	write file a
John	start application x

Permission
read file a
write file a
start application x
start application y

Role-Based Access Control

- **Role-Based Access Control** decouples users and permissions by **roles**, representing jobs or functions.
- Formalized by a set Roles and the relations $UA \subseteq \text{Users} \times \text{Roles}$ and $PA \subseteq \text{Roles} \times \text{Permissions}$, where

$$AC := PA \circ UA$$

i.e., $AC := \{(u, p) \in \text{Users} \times \text{Permissions} \mid \exists r \in \text{Roles} : (u, r) \in UA \wedge (r, p) \in PA\}$.

- **Example:**

User	Role
Alice	User
Alice	Superuser
Bob	User
John	User

Role
User
Superuser


Role	Permission
User	read file a
User	write file a
User	start application x
Superuser	start application y

Result is increased abstraction and more manageable policies.

RBAC — Extensions

1. Role hierarchy (for \geq a partial order):

$$AC := PA \circ \geq \circ UA$$



Larger roles inherit permissions from all smaller roles

2. Hierarchies on users (UA) and permissions (PA).
3. **Authorization constraints**: formulae used to make stateful access control decisions.

Example: a user in the role customer may withdraw money from an account **when he is the owner and the amount is less than 1,000 SFr.**

Secure Components

- Role-Based Access Control


Generalization to SecureUML

- Component modeling and combination

SecureUML – Syntax


- Abstract syntax defined by a MOF metamodel.
- Concrete syntax based on UML and defined with a UML profile.
- Syntax and semantics based on an extension of RBAC.
- **Key idea**
 - ▶ An access control policy formalizes the permissions to perform actions on (protected) resources.
 - ▶ We leave these open as types whose elements are not fixed.
 - ▶ Elements specified during combination with design language (via subtyping from existing types).

Users, Roles and Typed Permissions



- **Left hand part**: essentially standard RBAC
- **Right hand part**: permissions are factored into the ability to carry out actions on resources.
 - ▶ **Resource** is the base class of all model elements representing protected resources (e.g. “Class”, “State”, “Action”).
 - ▶ **Actions** of a “Class” could be “Create”, “Read”, “Delete” ...


Hierarchies over Users, Roles and Actions



- **UserHierarchy**: Users (and groups) are organized in groups.
- **RoleHierarchy**: Roles can be in an inheritance hierarchy.
- **ActionHierarchy**: E.g., “FullAccess” is a super-action of “Read”.
- **ActionDerivation/ResourceDerivation**: Details technical & omitted.


Note: hierarchies modeled using UML-aggregation associations.

Authorization Constraints



- A **permission** can be restricted by an **authorization constraint**.
E.g., **user is account owner and amount is less than 1,000 CHF**.
- This **assertion** describes an additional condition that **must hold** in order to grant access. Condition on:
 - ▶ the **state of the resources** of the assigned actions,
 - ▶ **properties of method arguments** (name of the calling user), or
 - ▶ **global system properties** (time, date)


Roles and Users



- Users, Roles, and Groups (here none) defined by stereotyped classes.
- Hierarchies defined using inheritance.
- Relations defined using stereotyped associations.

NOTE: User administration is **not** a design-time issue and in practice is **not** part of a design model. Such assignments are made by system administrators after system deployment.

Permissions



- Modeling permissions require that actions and resources have already been defined.


Possible only possibly after language combination. (Coming up!)

- A permission binds one or more actions to a single resource.
- Concrete syntax could directly reflect abstract syntax

Specify two relations: $\text{Permission} \Leftrightarrow \text{Action}$ and $\text{Action} \Leftrightarrow \text{Resource}$.


- Alternative: use association class to specify one ternary relation.
 - Attributes of association relate permissions with actions.
 - Actions identified by resource name and action name.

Permissions (cont.)



- Represented as an **association class** connecting a **role** and a **class** (**model anchor**).
 - Permission (**action references**) may assign **actions** to **(1)** the model anchor or **(2)** its sub-elements.
- E.g., the first action says that users have permission to read meetings. We will see this means they may execute all side-effect free methods and access all attribute ends of meetings.

Authorization Constraints



- Expressions are given in an OCL subset
 - ▶ constant symbols: *self* and *caller* (authenticated name of caller)
 - ▶ attributes and *side-effect free* methods
 - ▶ navigation expressions (association ends)
 - ▶ Logical (*and*, *or*, *not*) and relational (*=*, *>*, *<*, *<>*) operators
 - ▶ Existentially quantified expressions
- **Example:** “`caller = self.owner.name`”


Secure Components

- Role-Based Access Control
- Generalization to SecureUML

 **Component modeling and combination**


A Design Modeling Language for Components

- **ComponentUML**: a class-based language for data modeling.




- Example design: group meeting administration system.

Each **meeting** has an **owner**, **participants**, a **time**, and possibly a **location**. Users carry out operations on meetings like **create**, **read**, **edit**, **delete**, or **cancel** (which **notifies** the participants).



Combination with SecureUML



1. Combine syntax of both modeling languages

Merge abstract syntax by importing SecureUML metamodel into metamodel of ComponentUML.

Merge notation and **define well-formedness rules** in OCL.


E.g., restrict permissions to those cases with stereotype «Entity».

2. Identify protected resources
3. Identify resource actions
4. Define action hierarchy


First task is (mostly) automated. Remainder are creative tasks. They constitute what we have called a **dialect** or **glue**.

Defining a Dialect

Security Modeling Language = SecureUML




System Design Modeling Language = Component UML



What are the resources and actions of ComponentUML?

Defining a Dialect



- **Resources** identified using **subtyping**.
- **Resource actions** defined using **named dependencies** from resource types to action classes (either Atomic Action or a subtype of Composite Action).

Action Hierarchy


resource type	action	subordinated actions (with <i>blue</i> atomic actions)
Entity	full access	<i>create</i> , <i>read</i> , <i>update</i> and <i>delete</i> of the entity
Entity	read	<i>read</i> for all attributes and association ends of the entity <i>execute</i> for all side-effect free methods of the entity
Entity	update	<i>update</i> for all attributes of the entity <i>add</i> and <i>delete</i> all association ends of the entity <i>execute</i> for all methods with side-effects of the entity
Attribute	full access	<i>read</i> and <i>update</i> of the attribute
Association End	full access	<i>read</i> , <i>add</i> and <i>delete</i> of the association end

OCL formulae used to formalize hierarchy. E.g., following states that the composite action *EntityFullAccess* is larger than the actions *create*, *read*, *update*, and *delete* of the entity the action belongs to.

context EntityFullAccess inv:

**subordinatedActions = resource.actions->select(
name="create" or name="read" or name="update" or name="delete")**

Modeling a Security Policy



1. All users can create new meetings and read all meeting entries.
2. Only owners may change meeting data or delete meeting entries.
3. However, a supervisor can cancel any meeting.

Road Map

- Motivation and objectives
- Background
- Secure components

Semantics

What do all these boxes and arrows actually mean?

Here we provide just a **sketch**. Full details provided in TOSEM paper.

- Generating security infrastructures
- Secure controllers
- Experience and conclusions

SecureUML formalizes two kinds of AC decisions

- **Declarative AC** where decisions depend on **static information**: the assignments of users u and permissions (to actions a) to roles.

AC decision formalized by $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC} \models \phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$, where

- ▶ \mathfrak{S}_{RBAC} is a **first-order structure** formalizing the **static (RBAC) information**
- ▶ $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$ is a **first-order formula** formalizing that **user u can perform action a**


- **Programmatic AC** where decisions depend on **dynamic information**: the satisfaction of authorization constraints in current system state.

AC decision formalized as $\mathfrak{S}_{St} \models \phi_{st}^p$, where

- ▶ \mathfrak{S}_{St} is a **first-order structure** formalizing the **system state**
- ▶ ϕ_{st}^p is a **first-order formula** formalizing a **restriction on permission p**

- Decisions combined. Roughly $\langle \mathfrak{S}_{RBAC}, \mathfrak{S}_{St} \rangle \models \phi_{AC}(u, a)$, where ϕ_{AC} states that u has permission to execute a and the associated authorization constraint holds.

Declarative AC



- Order-sorted signature $\Sigma_{RBAC} = (\mathcal{S}_{RBAC}, \mathcal{F}_{RBAC}, \mathcal{P}_{RBAC})$.


$$\mathcal{S}_{RBAC} = \{Users, Subjects, Roles, Permissions, Actions\} ,$$

$$\mathcal{F}_{RBAC} = \emptyset ,$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{RBAC} = \{\geq_{Subjects}, UA, \geq_{Roles}, PA, AA, \geq_{Actions}\} ,$$

- *Users* is a subsort of *Subjects*.
- Types as expected, e.g., *UA* has type *Subjects* \times *Roles*.
- *UA*, *PA*, and *AA* correspond to identically named associations in metamodel.
- $\geq_{Subjects}$, \geq_{Roles} , and $\geq_{Actions}$ name hierarchies on users, roles, and actions.

Declarative AC (cont.)




- A SecureUML model straightforwardly defines a Σ_{RBAC} -structure \mathfrak{S}_{St} .
 - Users (Roles, ...) in model \mapsto elements of set Users (Roles ...).
 - Associations (e.g., between users & roles) \mapsto tuples in associated relations (e.g., UA).
- $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$ formalizes **standard RBAC semantics** (here without hierarchies)
 - “Can **user** u perform **permission** p ?”
 $\phi_{RBAC}(u, p) \iff (u, p) \in AC$, where $AC := PA \circ UA$.
 - **is refined to:** “Does **user** u have the permission to carry out **action** a ?”
 $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a) \iff (u, a) \in AC$, where $AC := AA \circ PA \circ UA$, i.e.
 - In first-order logic:

$$\phi_{RBAC}(u, a) \iff \exists r, p : UA(u, r) \wedge PA(r, p) \wedge AA(p, a)\}$$

- **AC Decision Problem** is: $\mathfrak{S}_{RBAC} \models \phi_{RBAC}(u, a)$.

Adding Hierarchies



- Additional ordering relations** $\geq_{Subjects}$, \geq_{Roles} , and $\geq_{Actions}$:
 - $\geq_{Subjects}$ interpreted by reflexive, transitive closure of *UserHierarchy*, where a group is larger than all its contained subjects.
 - \geq_{Roles} and $\geq_{Actions}$ are interpreted analogously using *RoleHierarchy* and *ActionHierarchy*.
- ϕ_{RBAC} now formalizes $\geq_{Actions} \circ AA \circ PA \circ \geq_{Roles} \circ UA \circ \leq_{Subjects}$
 i.e., $\phi_{RBAC}(u, a) = \exists s \in Subjects, r_1, r_2 \in Roles, p \in Permissions, a' \in Actions.$
 $u \leq_{Subjects} s \wedge UA(s, r_1) \wedge r_1 \geq_{Roles} r_2 \wedge$
 $PA(r_2, p) \wedge AA(p, a') \wedge a' \geq_{Actions} a ,$

Authorization Constraints

- Authorization constraints are OCL formulae, attached to permissions.

business hours: $\text{time.hour} \geq 8$ and $\text{time.hour} \leq 17$

caller is owner: $\text{caller} = \text{self.owner.name}$

- Straightforward translation into sorted FOL, e.g.,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{hour}(\text{time}) &\geq 8 \wedge \text{hour}(\text{time}) \leq 17 \\ \text{caller} &= \text{name}(\text{owner}(\text{self})) \end{aligned}$$

- The signature Σ_{St} for constraints is determined by the design modeling language


\mathcal{S}_{St} : sort for each class in the system model.

\mathcal{F}_{St} : function symbol for each attribute, side-effect free method, and n-1 association.

\mathcal{P}_{St} : predicate symbol for each m-n association.


Constraint Semantics

- A system **snapshot** during execution defines a state.



- In general, finitely many objects of each class C , each with its own attribute values and references to other objects.
- Interpretation idea
 - ▶ Each sort interpreted by a finite set of “objects”.
 - ▶ Attributes and references define functions (or relations) from objects to corresponding values.
 - ▶ Currently executing object of class C gives interpretation for $self_C$.
- A constraint ϕ_{St} is satisfied iff $\mathfrak{S}_{St} \models \phi_{St}$.

Semantic of Combinations



- SecureUML semantics has a fixed static part plus a stateful part, dependent on the notion of state defined by design modeling language.
- What is the combination's semantics?

Intuitively: system with access control should behave as before, except that certain actions are disallowed in certain states.

Formally: semantics defined in terms of labeled transition systems.

- Minimal assumptions required on semantics of design language:

Semantics must be expressible as an LTS, whose states provide a structure for interpreting OCL assertions.

Semantic Requirements of Design Language

Semantics definable as a LTS $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$

- set Q of nodes consists of Σ_{St} -structures
- edges are labeled with elements from a set of actions A
- $\delta \subseteq Q \times A \times Q$ is transition relation

System behavior defined by traces as is standard:

$s_0 \xrightarrow{a_0} s_1 \xrightarrow{a_1} \dots$ is a trace iff $(s_i, a_i, s_{i+1}) \in \delta$, for all i , $0 \leq i$.

Combination with SecureUML

- Combining Δ with SecureUML yields LTS $\Delta_{AC} = (Q_{AC}, A_{AC}, \delta_{AC})$.

► $Q_{AC} = Q_{RBAC} \times Q$, combines system states with RBAC

Here Q_{RBAC} denotes universe of all finite Σ_{RBAC} -structures.

► $A_{AC} = A$ is unchanged.

► Transition function defined by

$$\delta_{AC} = \{((q_{RBAC}, q), a, (q_{RBAC}, q')) \mid (q, a, q') \in \delta \wedge \langle q_{RBAC}, q \rangle \models \phi_{AC}(u, a)\}$$

- In δ_{AC} , just those traces with prohibited actions are removed.
- This account is both general and independent of UML.

Example: SecureUML + ComponentUML

- ComponentUML as an LTS $\Delta = (Q, A, \delta)$
 - ▶ Q is the universe of all possible **system states**: interpretations over the signature Σ_{St} with finitely many objects for each entity.
 - ▶ Family of **actions** A defined by methods and their parameters.
E.g., the action (set_{at}, e, v) denotes setting the attribute at of entity e to value v .
 - ▶ δ defined by **(transition-system) semantics** of methods themselves.
E.g., above setter action would lead to a new state where only the term representing e is changed to reflect the update of at with v .
- Combined semantics $\Delta_{AC} = (Q_{AC}, A_{AC}, \delta_{AC})$ as just described.

Road Map

- Motivation and objectives
- Background
- Secure components
- Semantics

Generating security infrastructures

- Secure controllers
- Experience and conclusions

Generating Security Infrastructures

Generating EJB Infrastructures.

- ▶ Motivation
 - ▶ Basics of EJB and EJB access control
 - ▶ Generation rules
-
- Generating .NET infrastructures.


Why Transform?

Decreases burden on programmer.

Faster adaption to changing requirements.

Scales better when porting to different platforms.

Correctness of generation can be proved, once and for all.

 enables a faster, cheaper, and more secure development process.

Example: Transformation for Enterprise Java Beans architecture.

EJB: Declarative AC

```
<method-permission>
  <role-name>Supervisor</role-name>
  <method>
    <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
    <method-intf>Remote</method-intf>
    <method-name>cancel</method-name>
    <method-params/>
  </method>
</method-permission>
```

- Deployment descriptors record information for declarative AC.
- EJB supports only vanilla RBAC without hierarchies, where protected resources are individual methods.


EJB: Programmatic AC

```
if( !(ctxt.isCallerInRole("SuperVisor")
    || ctxt.getCallerPrincipal.getName().equals(
        getOwner.getName()))){
throw new AccessControlException("Access Denied");
}
```

Assertions use programmatic access control support of EJB Server to access security-relevant data of current user, e.g., his name or his roles.

Transformation Rules

RBAC



For each atomic action a :

- determine the corresponding EJB method(s) m .
- compute the set of Roles R that have access to the action a :

$$R := \{r \in \text{Roles} \mid (r, a) \in \geq_{\text{Actions}} \circ AA \circ PA \circ \geq_{\text{Roles}}\} .$$



generate the deployment-descriptor code (with $R = \{r_1, \dots, r_n\}$):

```
<method-permission>
  <security-role>r1</security-role>
  ...
  <security-role>rn</security-role>
  <method>m</method>
</method-permission>
```

Transformation Rules: Assertions

For each atomic action a on a method m :

- compute the set of permissions P for this action:

$$P := \{p \in \text{Permissions} \mid (p, a) \in \geq_{\text{Actions}} \circ \text{AA}\}$$

- for each $p \in P$, compute the set of roles $R(p)$ assigned to the permission p :

$$R(p) := \{r \in \text{Roles} \mid (r, p) \in \text{PA} \circ \geq_{\text{Roles}}\}$$

- Check, if one of the $p \in P$ has an authorization constraint attached.


 if yes, include at the start of the method m the assertion:

$$\text{if } (!(\bigvee_{p \in P} \left(\left(\bigvee_{r \in R(p)} \text{ctxt.isCallerInRole}(r) \right) \wedge \text{Constraint}(p) \right)))$$

throw new AccessControlException("Access denied."); ,

where $\text{Constraint}(p)$ is attached constraint (or *true*) in Java syntax.

Example




generates both RBAC configuration data and Java code:

```
<method-permission>
  <role-name>User</role-name>
  <role-name>Supervisor</role-name>
  <method>
    <ejb-name>Meeting</ejb-name>
    <method-intf>Remote</method-intf>
    <method-name>setStart</method-name>
  </method>
</method-permission>
```

```
public void setStart(Date start)
{
  if (!((ctxt.isCallerInRole("User") ||
    ctxt.isCallerInRole("Supervisor"))
    && ctxt.getCallerPrincipal.getName().equals(
      getOwner().getName()))))
    throw new AccessControlException("Access
    denied.");
  ...
}
```

Overall Model



Generates 179 lines of XML and 268 lines of Java.
 Which would you rather maintain or port?

Generating Security Infrastructures

- Generating EJB infrastructures.


 **Generating .NET infrastructures.**

.NET versus EJB (from the AC perspective)

- Like with EJB, the protected resources are the component methods.
- .NET also supports both declarative and programmatic access control.
- Declarative access control is not configured in deployment descriptors, but by method “attributes”, which name the allowed roles.
- Programmatic access control is conceptually similar to EJB.
For our purposes, the differences are only in the method names.

 Transformation function must be changed only slightly.

Example



generates the following C#-code:

```

[SecurityRole("User")]
[SecurityRole("SuperVisor")]
public void setStart(Date start){
    if (!((ctxt.isCallerInRole("User")
        || ctxt.isCallerInRole("Supervisor"))
        && ctxt.OriginalCaller.AccountName ==
        getOwner().getName()))
        throw new UnauthorizedAccessException("Access
        denied.");
    ...
}
  
```

First two lines are “attributes”, naming the allowed roles.

Road Map

- Motivation and objectives
- Background
- Secure components
- Semantics
- Generating security infrastructures

Secure controllers

- Experience and conclusions

What are Controllers?

- A **controller** defines how a system's behavior may evolve.
Definition in terms of **states** and **events**, which cause state transitions.
- Examples
 - ▶ An **application** changes its state according to clicks on menu-entries in the user interface.
 - ▶ A **washing machine** goes through different washing/drying modes.
 - ▶ A **control process** that governs the launch sequence of a rocket.
- Mathematical abstraction: a transition system or some (hierarchical or parallel) variant.

Modeling Controllers

- **Focus:** a language for modeling controllers for **multi-tier architectures**.
- **Model-View Controller** is a common pattern for such systems.

Visualization tier: for **viewing** information. Typically a browser.


Persistence tier: where data (**model**) is stored, e.g., a data-base.

Controller tier: manages **control** flow of application and dataflow between visualization and persistence tier.

- Our models must link “controller classes” with (possibly persistent) state with visualization elements.


Abstract Syntax — ControllerUML

Metamodel (MOF):




- A **StateMachine** formalizes the behavior of a **Controller**.
- The statemachine consist of **states** and **transitions**.
- Two state subtypes: **SubControllerState** refers to a sub-controller, **ViewState** represents an user interaction.
- A transition is triggered by an **Event** and the (optionally) assigned **StateMachineAction** is executed during the state transition.

Controller Example




MainController's Statechart




Dialect as a Bridge

- Security Modeling Language = SecureUML




- System Design Modeling Language = ControllerUML



What are ControllerUML's protected resources? (States, Actions, ...?)

Dialect Definition

- Define **resources** and **actions**:



- Define **action hierarchy**:


- ▶ **State.activateRecursive**: **activate** on the state, **activateRecursive** on all substates, and **execute** on all actions on outgoing transitions
- ▶ **Controller.activateRecursive**: **activate** on the controller and **activateRecursive** on all states of the controller

Result is a vocabulary for defining permissions on both **high-level** and **low-level** actions.

Semantics


- It is not difficult to give a transition system semantics to a controller.
- Our general schema then provides a semantics for combination with SecureUML.
- See TOSEM paper for details.

Example Policy: Permissions




1. All users can create new meetings and read all meeting entries.

Example Policy: Permissions



2. Only the owner of a meeting may change meeting data and cancel or delete the meeting.

Example Policy: Permissions



3. However, a **supervisor** can **cancel** any meeting.

Generation (sketch)

- Generate web applications based on the Java Servlet platform.
Each controller implemented as a **servlet**.
- Servlets process HTTP requests and create HTTP responses.
 - ▶ Support RBAC, but only for requests from outside web server.
 - ▶ Ill-suited for multi-tier (controller) based applications.
 - ▶ We overcome this using programmatic access control.
- Assertions added as preconditions to methods for process activation, state activation, and action execution.
- Tool generates complete controller and security infrastructure.
Business logic and view element “stubs”, for later elaboration.

Road Map

- Motivation and objectives
- Background
- Secure components
- Semantics
- Generating security infrastructures
- Secure controllers

 **Experience and conclusions**

Current Status

Foundational:

- Developed idea of **Model Driven Security**.
- General schema and various instances.




Practical/Tool: Prototype built on top of ArcStyler MDA Tool.

- Generators for J2EE (Bea EJB Server) and .NET.
- Industrial version developed by Interactive Objects Software GmbH.
- More recently, ActionGUI, developed with IMDEA Software.

Positive experience:

- In following, we briefly describe one of our case-studies: **E-Pet Store**.
- Standard J2EE example: an e-commerce application with web front-ends for shopping, administration, and order processing.

Pet Store Case Study




- Requirements analysis: Use Case Model identifying 6 roles (2 kinds of customers, 4 kinds of employees) and their tasks.
- Use Cases and their elaboration in Sequence Diagrams paved the way for the design phase.
 - ▶ 31 components
 - ▶ 7 front-end controllers
 - ▶ 6 security roles based on the Use Case roles.
- Security policy based on **principle of least privilege**.


Typical requirement: Customers need to read all catalog data, to update their own customer data, to create purchase orders, and to read their own purchase orders.

Let us look at a few snapshots from the model


Shopping




Back Office




Component Model (partial)




Sequence Diagram for Checkout Use Case



Role Model



Example of some permissions



Case Study — Evaluation

Model

6 roles
60 permissions
15 authorization constraints



System

5,000 lines XML (overall 13,000)
2,000 lines Java (overall 20,000)

**Which would you
rather maintain?**




Evaluation (cont.)


- Expansion due to high-abstraction level over EJB.
Analogous to high-level language / assembler tradeoffs.
Also with regards to comprehensibility, maintainability, ...
- **Claim:** Least privilege would be not be practically implementable without such an approach.
- Effort manageable: 2 days for designing access control architecture (overall development time: 3 weeks).
- MDS process provides conceptual support for building models
 - ▶ Fits well with a requirements/model-driven development process.
 - ▶ Provides a good transition from semi-formal to formal modeling.

Current and Future Work

- Explore the parameter space.
 - ▶ Security/privacy properties.
 - ▶ Modeling languages.



- Exploit well-defined semantics.
 - ▶ Analysis possible at model level.
Examples: model-consistency, model checking.
 - ▶ So is a verifiable link to code.



⇒ applications to building certifiably secure systems!

Literature

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