

Kernel-Hack-Drill: Environment For Developing Linux Kernel Exploits


Alexander Popov

■ positive technologies



May 22, 2025

Teaser



Who Am I

- Alexander Popov
- Linux kernel developer since 2012
- Maintainer of some free software projects
- Principal Security Researcher and Head of
 - Open Source Program Office at  **positive technologies**
- Conference speaker:

Zer0Con, OffensiveCon, H2HC, Nullcon Goa, Linux Security Summit, Still Hacking Anyway, HITB, Positive Hack Days, ZeroNights, HighLoad++, Open Source Summit, OS Day, Linux Plumbers...

a13xp0p0v.github.io/conference_talks



It Is An Honor For Me To Be Speaking In This Hall

- This hall at PHDays is named after
[Alexander Stepanovich Popov](#)
- He is a great physicist, who invented
the radio receiver in May 1895
- I would call him a true **Russian hacker!**
- It is an honor for me to be giving a talk here



Agenda

- ① The bug collision story
- ② About **CVE-2024-50264**
- ③ A new approach to exploiting it
- ④ How **kernel-hack-drill** helped to achieve this



How It Began

- I first found and exploited a bug in `AF_VSOCK` in 2021:
Four Bytes of Power: Exploiting CVE-2021-26708 in the Linux kernel
a13xp0p0v.github.io/2021/02/09/CVE-2021-26708.html
- In spring 2024, I was fuzzing the kernel with a customized syzkaller
- I found another bug in `AF_VSOCK` in April 2024
- I minimized the reproducer, disabled KASAN and
got instant null-ptr-deref in a kernel worker
- Postponed this bug

Bug Collision

- I decided to look at this bug again in autumn 2024
- Results were promising but then...

Bug Collision

- I decided to look at this bug again in autumn 2024
- Results were promising but then...
- Got bug collision with Hyunwoo Kim ([@v4bel](#)) and Wongi Lee ([@qwerty](#))
- They disclosed this bug as **CVE-2024-50264** and used it at kernelCTF
- Their patch turned my PoC into null-ptr-deref

```
Diffstat (limited to 'net/vmw_vsock')
-rw-r-- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c 1
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
index ccbd2bc0d2109a..fc5666c8298f7b 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
@@ -1109,6 +1109,7 @@ void virtio_transport_destruct(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
    struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans;
    kfree(vvs);
+
+    vsk->trans = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_transport_destruct);
```

Continue Anyway

- The exploit strategy by [@v4bel](#) and [@qwerty](#) looked very complicated
github.com/google/security-research/pull/145/files
- I had some different ideas and decided to continue my research anyway
- I chose **Ubuntu Server 24.04** with a fresh OEM/HWE kernel (**v6.11**) as the target



Viktor Vasnetsov: The Knight at the Crossroads (1878)

- The bug was introduced in August 2016 (commit 06a8fc78367d, Linux v4.8)
- Race condition in `AF_VSOCK` sockets between `connect()` and a POSIX signal
- `CONFIG_USER_NS` is not required
- UAF on `virtio_vsock_sock` object (`kmalloc-96`)
- Memory corruption: UAF write in a kernel worker
- It has a lot of nasty limitations for the exploitation
 - **The worst bug** for the exploitation that I've ever seen

Reproducing CVE-2024-50264: Immortal Signal Handler

- @v4bel & @qwerty used **SIGKILL**
- My fuzzer found another approach, which amazed me

```
struct sigevent sev = {};
timer_t race_timer = 0;
sev.sigev_notify = SIGEV_SIGNAL; /* Notification type */
sev.sigev_signo = 33; /* Secret NPTL Signal (see nptl(7)) */
ret = timer_create(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &sev, &race_timer);
```



- Native POSIX Threads Library makes internal use of signal 33
- Syscall wrappers and glibc functions **hide this signal** from applications
- So I can use **timer_settime()** for **race_timer**
 - It gives **control of timing**: at which moment signal should interrupt **connect()**
 - It is invisible for the exploit process and **doesn't kill it**

CVE-2024-50264: Code Performing UAF Write

- This function is called **in kworker** after `virtio_vsock_sock` is freed

```
static bool virtio_transport_space_update(struct sock *sk,
                                         struct sk_buff *skb)
{
    struct virtio_vsock_hdr *hdr = virtio_vsock_hdr(skb);
    struct vsock_sock *vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
    struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans;           /* ptr to freed object */
    bool space_available;

    if (!vvs)
        return true;


    spin_lock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock); /* proceed if 4 bytes are zero (UAF write non-zero to lock) */
    vvs->peer_buf_alloc = le32_to_cpu(hdr->buf_alloc); /* UAF write 4 bytes */
    vvs->peer_fwd_cnt = le32_to_cpu(hdr->fwd_cnt);   /* UAF write 4 bytes */
    space_available = virtio_transport_has_space(vsk); /* UAF read, not interesting */
    spin_unlock_bh(&vvs->tx_lock);                   /* UAF write, restore 4 zero bytes */
    return space_available;
}
```



- There is no pointer dereference in freed object

CVE-2024-50264: UAF Write

struct virtio_vsock_sock



UAF Write: Data Control

- About `virtio_vsock_sock.peer_buf_alloc` value control from userspace:

```
/* Increase the range for the value that we want to write during UAF: */
uaf_val_limit = 0x1lu; /* can't be zero */
setsockopt(vsock1, PF_VSOCK, SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MIN_SIZE,
            &uaf_val_limit, sizeof(uaf_val_limit));
uaf_val_limit = 0xffffffffflu;
setsockopt(vsock1, PF_VSOCK, SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE,
            &uaf_val_limit, sizeof(uaf_val_limit));

/* Set the 4-byte value that we want to write during UAF: */
setsockopt(vsock1, PF_VSOCK, SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE,
            &uaf_val, sizeof(uaf_val));
```

- About `virtio_vsock_sock.peer_fwd_cnt` value control from userspace:

- It represents the number of bytes pushed through `vsock` using `sendmsg()`/`recvmsg()`
- Zero by default (4 zero bytes)

Not So Fast: CVE-2024-50264 Limitations

- ➊ Vulnerable `virtio_vsock_sock` client object is allocated together with the server one

- It's bad for cross-cache attack



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- ➊ Vulnerable `virtio_vsock_sock` client object is allocated together with the server one
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- ➋ Reproducing this race condition is very unstable



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbKEdmPPxy4>

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- ➍ Null-ptr-deref happens in kworker right after UAF write



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- ➎ If this kernel oops is avoided, another null-ptr-deref happens in kworker after `VSOCK_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (8 sec)



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- ➎ If this kernel oops is avoided, another null-ptr-deref happens in kworker after `VSOCK_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (8 sec)
- ➏ Kworker hangs if `virtio_vsock_sock.tx_lock` is not zero



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hbKEdmPPxy4>

Not So Fast: CVE-2024-50264 Limitations



Challenge

Now you can see why this was the worst bug
for exploitation I had ever seen

Exploit Strategy of @v4bel & @qwerty

- ① Large-scale BPF JIT Spray populating a significant portion of the physical memory



Exploit Strategy of @v4bel & @qwerty

- ① Large-scale BPF JIT Spray populating a significant portion of the physical memory
- ② SLUBStick technique github.com/IAIK/SLUBStick
 - Using timing side channel to determine number of objects in the active slab
 - Allocating the `virtio_vsock_sock` client and server objects in different slabs
 - It's possible by making them the `last` and `first` objects in slabs



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③ Dirty Pagetable technique

web.archive.org/web/20250226150503/https://yanglingxi1993.github.io/dirty_pagetable/dirty_pagetable.html

- Cross-allocator attack reclaiming slab with UAF object for Page Table Entry
- UAF write to PTE to make it possibly point a BPF JIT region



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- ④ Inserting the privilege escalation payload into BPF code



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④ Inserting the privilege escalation payload into BPF code

⑤ Socket communication to trigger the privesc payload



WOW LOOKS COMPLICATED



CAN I DO IT DIFFERENTLY?

My First Ideas on Exploit Strategy

- Try UAF write to some kernel object
- Should I search kernel objects in `kmalloc-96`?
- **No!** Ubuntu Server 24.04 has:
 - `CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y`
 - `CONFIG_SLAB_BUCKETS=y`
 - `CONFIG_SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL=y`
- I will try cross-cache attack

Possible Target for UAF Write: struct cred

struct virtio_vsock_sock (80 bytes, 2 items)


0	
8	spinlock_t tx_lock==0
16	u32 peer_fwd_cnt
24	u32 peer_buf_alloc
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	
80	8-byte hole
88	8-byte hole
96	
104	spinlock_t tx_lock==0
112	u32 peer_fwd_cnt
120	u32 peer_buf_alloc
128	
136	
144	
152	
160	
168	
176	8-byte hole

struct cred (184 bytes)

0	
8	kuid_t uid != 0
16	gid_t sgid
24	kuid_t euid
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	
80	
88	
96	
104	struct key *process_keyring
112	struct key *thread_keyring
120	struct key *request_key_auth
128	
136	
144	
152	
160	
168	
176	



Target for UAF Write: struct cred (No Way)



Target for UAF Write: struct msg_msg

- Why? Because I like it
- I first used it as a UAF target object in 2021

a13xp0p0v.github.io/2021/02/09/CVE-2021-26708.html

- It was a novel approach back then
- I decided to create something new again



virtio_vsock_sock vs msg_msg

struct virtio_vsock_sock (80 bytes)

0	
8	spinlock_t tx_lock==0
16	
24	u32 peer_buf_alloc
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	
80	8-byte hole
88	8-byte hole

kernel hang
on spinlock



struct msg_msg (96 bytes)

0	
8	struct list_head *prev != 0
16	long int m_type
24	size_t m_ts
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	
80	
88	



Bypassing the Unwanted msg_msg.m_list Corruption

- `msg_msg.m_list.prev` would be interpreted as non-null `tx_lock`
- `virtio_transport_space_update()` would hang in `spin_lock_bh()`
- Need to initialize `msg_msg.m_list.prev` **after** the UAF write
- Can we postpone placing `msg_msg` in the message queue?
- Yes!

Spray msg_msg Allowing m_list Corruption (Novel Technique!)

- ① Fill the message queue almost completely before sending the target `msg_msg`

- The message queue size is `MSGMNB` (16384 bytes)
- Send 2 clogging messages of 8191 bytes each
- 2 bytes left in the queue, don't call `msgrecv()`



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0XVCz6nekJc>

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② Spray target `msg_msg` objects

- Call the `msgsnd()` syscall in separate pthreads
- Kernel allocates target `msg_msg` and `msgsnd()` blocks



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③ Perform UAF write, corrupt `msg_msg.m_list` as you want

④ Perform `msgrecv()` for clogging messages

- Now the kernel can add sprayed `msg_msg` to the queue
- The **kernel fixes** the **corrupted** `msg_msg.m_list` pointers!



virtio_vsock_sock vs msg_msg

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struct msg_msg (96 bytes)

0	
8	struct list_head *prev == 0
16	long int m_type
24	size_t m_ts
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	
80	
88	



Nice Trick, What's Next?

- ➊ I managed to overwrite `msg_msg.m_ts` and make kernel fix up `msg_msg.m_list`
 - This technique is also useful for **blind overwriting of msg_msg**
 - No kernel infoleak is needed — the kernel will restore the corrupted pointers

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 - No kernel infoleak is needed — the kernel will restore the corrupted pointers
- ➋ To use this trick, I needed to perform cross-cache attack
 - `virtio_vsock_sock` lives in one of 16 `kmalloc-rnd-?-96` slab caches (`CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES`)
 - `msg_msg` lives in `msg_msg-96` slab cache (`CONFIG_SLAB_BUCKETS`)

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 - `msg_msg` lives in `msg_msg-96` slab cache (`CONFIG_SLAB_BUCKETS`)
- ➌ **Problems:**
 - I needed to learn how cross-cache attacks work on the latest Ubuntu kernel
 - Testing exploit primitives together with this crazy race condition was **painful**

Solution That Makes Researcher's Life Easier



Unstable race condition creating problems?

Use a testing ground for developing
the exploit primitives!

Kernel Hack Drill

- Open-source project: github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hack-drill
- Provides test environment for developing the Linux kernel exploit primitives you need
- Includes a good step-by-step setup guide in the README (kudos to the contributors!)
- A bit similar to github.com/hacktivesec/KRWX, but
 - Much simpler
 - Contains interesting PoC exploits



<https://www.pngall.com/wp-content/uploads/4/Drill-Machine-PNG-Free-Download.png>

Kernel Hack Drill Contents: Kernel Module

① [drill_mod.c](#)

- A small Linux kernel module
- Provides `/proc/drill_act` file as a simple interface to userspace
- Contains nice vulnerabilities that you control

② [drill.h](#)

- Header file describing the `drill_mod.ko` interface

③ [drill_test.c](#)

- Userspace test for `drill_mod.ko`
- It also passes if `CONFIG_KASAN=y`

```
#define DRILL_N 10240
#define DRILL_ITEM_SIZE 95

struct drill_item_t {
    unsigned long foobar;
    void (*callback)(void);
    char data[]; /* C99 flexible array */
};

enum drill_act_t {
    DRILL_ACT_NONE = 0,
    DRILL_ACT_ALLOC = 1,
    DRILL_ACT_CALLBACK = 2,
    DRILL_ACT_SAVE_VAL = 3,
    DRILL_ACT_FREE = 4,
    DRILL_ACT_RESET = 5
};
```

Kernel Hack Drill Contents: PoC Exploits (Part I)

① `drill_uaf_callback.c`

- UAF exploit invoking a callback in the freed `drill_item_t` struct
- Performs control flow hijack and gains LPE



<https://www.printables.com/model/78077-drill-guide>

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② `drill_uaf_w_msg_msg.c`

- UAF exploit writing data to the freed `drill_item_t` struct
- Performs a cross-cache attack, overwrites `msg_msg.m_ts`
- Enables out-of-bounds read of the kernel memory



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③ `drill_uaf_w_pipe_buffer.c`

- UAF exploit writing data to the freed `drill_item_t` struct
- Performs cross-cache attack, overwrites `pipe_buffer.flags`
- Implements the Dirty Pipe attack and gains LPE



<https://www.printables.com/model/78077-drill-guide>

Kernel Hack Drill Contents: PoC Exploits (Part II)

⚡ In collaboration with [@Willenst](#) (thanks for the contribution!)

⑤ `drill_uaf_w_pte.c`

- UAF exploit writing data to the freed `drill_item_t` struct
- Performs a cross-allocator attack
- Overwrites [Page Table Entry \(PTE\)](#)
- Implements the Dirty Pagetable attack and gains LPE



<https://www.printables.com/model/78077-drill-guide>

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⑥ [drill_uaf_w_pud.c](#)

- UAF exploit writing data to the freed `drill_item_t` struct
- Performs cross-allocator attack
- Overwrites [Page Upper Directory \(PUD\)](#)
- Implements the Dirty Pagetable attack via huge pages (LPE)



Kernel Hack Drill Contents: PoC Exploits (Part II)

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⑦ More PoC exploits will come soon!



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Cross-Cache Attack in Kernel Hack Drill

Standard cross-cache procedure, see the code: [kernel-hack-drill/drill_uaf_w_msg_msg.c](#)



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- ① Collect the needed info in /sys/kernel/slab: `cpu_partial=120, objs_per_slab=42`



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- ③ Allocate `(objs_per_slab * cpu_partial)` objects (for the partial list)
- ④ Create a slab with the UAF object: allocate `objs_per_slab` objects



Cross-Cache Attack in Kernel Hack Drill

Standard cross-cache procedure, see the code: [kernel-hack-drill/drill_uaf_w_msg_msg.c](#)

- ① Collect the needed info in `/sys/kernel/slab`: `cpu_partial=120, objs_per_slab=42`
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- ⑨ Reclaim the page with UAF object: spray target objects
- ⑩ Exploit UAF



Debugging Cross-Cache Attack: Kernel Patch

```
diff --git a/ipc/msgutil.c b/ipc/msgutil.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
     msg = kmem_buckets_alloc(msg_buckets, sizeof(*msg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL);
     if (msg == NULL)
         return NULL;
+    printk("msg_msg 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)msg);

     msg->next = NULL;
     msg->security = NULL;

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
@@ -3140,6 +3140,7 @@ static void __put_partials(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *partial_slab)
     while (slab_to_discard) {
         slab = slab_to_discard;
         slab_to_discard = slab_to_discard->next;
+        printk("__put_partials: cache 0x%lx slab 0x%lx\n", (unsigned long)s, (unsigned long)slab);

         stat(s, DEACTIVATE_EMPTY);
         discard_slab(s, slab);
```

- `__put_partials()` calls `discard_slab()`, which moves the slab to the page allocator

Debugging Cross-Cache Attack: Console Output and GDB

- Legend: kernel log, stdout, GDB session (with bata24/gef)

```
[ 49.755740] drill: kmalloc'ed item 5081 (0xffff8880068878a0, size 95)
[+] current_n: 5082 (next for allocating)
4) obtain dangling reference from use-after-free bug
[+] uaf_n: 5081

gef> slab-contains 0xffff8880068878a0
[+] Wait for memory scan
slab: 0xfffffea00001a21c0
kmem_cache: 0xffff88800384e800
base: 0xffff888006887000
name: kmalloc-rnd-14-96  size: 0x60  num_pages: 0x1

[ 51.371255] __put_partials: cache 0xffff88800384e800 slab 0xfffffea00001a21c0
[ 51.463570] msg_msg 0xffff8880068878a0
```

- The `drill_item_t` object `0xffff8880068878a0` in slab `0xfffffea00001a21c0` is reallocated as `msg_msg`

In My Humble Opinion



**RECENT
SLAB HARDENING
FEATURES**

**KERNEL FEATURES
THAT MAKE
CROSS-CACHE ATTACKS
COMPLETELY STABLE**

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Cross-Cache Attack: Adoption to AF_VSOCK Exploit

- The vulnerable `virtio_vsock_sock` client object is allocated together with the server one
- It is harmful for the attack (**Limitation #1**):
 - Not closing server `vsock` prevents complete freeing of UAF slab
 - Closing server `vsock` breaks UAF
- How can we cope with it?
 - @v4bel and @qwerty used the **SLUBStick** technique

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- How can we cope with it?
 - @v4bel and @qwerty used the **SLUBStick** technique
 - **My idea:** what if we hit `connect()` with a signal **very early**?

Race Conditions Are Awful/Awesome

I used one more race condition to exploit the main race condition

- ① Hit `vsock connect()` with the "immortal" signal 33 after 10000 ns
- ② Check whether the race condition succeeded:
 - The `connect()` syscall should return "Interrupted system call"
 - Connecting to server `vsock` from another test client `vsock` should succeed
- ③ If that is true, only a single vulnerable `vsock` was created
- ④ **Limitation #1** (paired object creation) is bypassed
- ⑤ Cool, the cross-cache attack for `vsock` is unlocked!



AF_VSOCK Exploit Speedrun

- This smart testing of `signal` vs `connect()` state also made the exploit **much faster**
 - The UAF write can now be triggered **once per second** instead of ~~once per many minutes~~
 - **Limitation #2** (unstable race condition) is mitigated
 - **Limitation #5** (kworker oops in 8 sec) is bypassed
- To counter **Limitation #4** (kworker oops just after UAF), I used one more race condition
 - Idea by @v4bel and @qwerty
 - Call `listen()` for vulnerable `vsock` just after `connect()` provoking UAF
 - If we are lucky, `listen()` executes before UAF-kworker and prevents null-ptr-deref
 - This is the **main source of instability** of the whole exploit 😞

Not So Fast: CVE-2024-50264 Limitations

- ① Vulnerable `virtio_vsock_sock` client object is allocated together with the server one
- ② Reproducing this race condition is very unstable
- ③ UAF write happens in kworker within few μ s after `kfree()`
- ④ Null-ptr-deref happens in kworker right after UAF write
- ⑤ If this kernel oops is avoided, another null-ptr-deref happens
in kworker after `VSOCK_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (8 sec)
- ⑥ Kworker hangs if `virtio_vsock_sock.tx_lock` is not zero



Not So Fast: Cross-Cache Attack is Too Late

- UAF write in kworker happens within few μs after `kfree(virtio_vsock_sock)`
- The cross-cache attack is too slow



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- To deal with **Limitation #3**, I also used a well-known technique by **Jann Horn**
googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/03/racing-against-clock-hitting-tiny.html
- Hit kworker with a timer interrupt that has **many** epoll watches created for `timerfd`



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`timerfd_settime(timerfd, TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET, &retard_tmo, NULL)`
- This made my race condition window around **80 times longer**



Achieved msg_msg Out-Of-Bounds Read

- vsock UAF changes the `msg_msg` data size from 48 bytes to 8192 (`MSGMAX`)
- Cool, `msgrcv()` performs out-of-bounds read of kernel memory
- What does infoleak provide?
 - A kernel address `0xffffffff8233cfa0`
 - GDB shows that it is pointer to `socket_file_ops()`
 - Which kernel object stores it? It's `struct file!`
 - It contains `f_cred` pointer, which also leaked
- This infoleak works with high probability



artifact from Hermitage

WHAT'S INSIDE?

What's Next?



The most interesting / difficult part of the research

Then I needed arbitrary address writing
for privilege escalation.

I wanted to implement data-only attack
without control flow hijacking.

How About Dirty Page Table Attack?

- Good description:

web.archive.org/web/20250226150503/https://yanglingxi1993.github.io/dirty_pagetable/dirty_pagetable.html

- Attacking page tables requires **knowing the physical address** of kernel text/heap

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- How about bruteforcing?
 - **No**, I can trigger UAF around **5** times before the kworker dies — not enough
- How about a KASLR info leak from `msg_msg` out-of-bounds read?
 - **Ok**, let's give it a try!

KASLR on X86_64 (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY)

- VM run #1

```
gef> ksymaddr-remote  
[+] Wait for memory scan  
0xffffffff98400000 T _text  
  
gef> v2p 0xffffffff98400000  
Virt: 0xffffffff98400000 -> Phys: 0x57400000
```

- VM run #2

```
gef> ksymaddr-remote  
[+] Wait for memory scan  
0xffffffff81800000 T _text  
  
gef> v2p 0xffffffff81800000  
Virt: 0xffffffff81800000 -> Phys: 0x18600000
```

- Virtual address minus physical address:

- VM run #1: 0xffffffff98400000 – 0x57400000 = 0xffffffff41000000
- VM run #2: 0xffffffff81800000 – 0x18600000 = 0xffffffff69200000

- 0xffffffff41000000 != 0xffffffff69200000

- Sorry, leaking the virtual KASLR offset **doesn't help** against the physical KASLR

Physical KASLR Versus Virtual KASLR on X86_64



Physical KASLR



Virtual KASLR

imgflip.com

Still Needed to Invent Arbitrary Address Writing Primitive

① Dirty Page Table Attack?

- Requires page allocator feng-shui to leak the kernel physical address
- No, would be too complicated

② Turn UAF write to some kernel object into arbitrary address writing?



- Not so easy... Exhausting!
- Looked through dozens of different kernel objects
- Read dozens of kernel exploit write-ups
- Tried [Kernel Exploitation Dashboard](#) by Eduardo Vela & KernelCTF team
- Then focused on [pipe_buffer](#) kernel object



Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer

- We can make `pipe_buffers` of similar size with `virtio_vsock_sock`:
 - Relocate the write end of the pipe
 - `fcntl(pipe_fd[1], F_SETPIPE_SZ, PAGE_SIZE * 2);`
 - The object size becomes: `2 * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) = 80`
 - Suitable for `kmalloc-96`, like `virtio_vsock_sock`
- Attacker-controlled bytes of `vsock` UAF write change `pipe_buffer.flags`
- It's the original **Dirty Pipe attack** by Max Kellermann dirtypipe.cm4all.com
- Even doesn't need an infoleak
- **One shot, wow, let's try!**

Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer



First of All, Drill!

- Created a Dirty Pipe prototype in **kernel-hack-drill**
- See the code: [kernel-hack-drill/drill_uaf_w_pipe_buffer.c](#)

- Performs cross-cache attack: reclaims `drill_item_t` as `pipe_buffers`
- Exploits UAF write to `drill_item_t` struct:
 - ★ Controlled bytes at offset **24**
- Attacker-controlled bytes modify `pipe_buffer.flags`
- Implements the Dirty Pipe attack
- LPE in **one shot** without infoleak





<https://www.pngall.com/wp-content/uploads/4/Drill-Machine-PNG-Free-Download.png>

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in kworker after `VSOCK_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (8 sec)
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Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer



Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer

I can do `splice()` from file to pipe starting from zero `offset` to bypass **Limitation #6!**

struct virtio_vsock_sock (80 bytes)

0	
8	spinlock_t tx_lock==0
16	
24	u32 peer_buf_alloc
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	

struct pipe_buffer (40 bytes, 2 items)


0	
8	unsigned int offset==0
16	const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops
24	unsigned int flags
32	
40	
48	
56	
64	
72	




Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer (No Way)

Oh no, `pipe_buffer.ops` gets corrupted by 4 zero bytes of `peer_fwd_cnt`!

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struct pipe_buffer (40 bytes, 2 items)



Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer (No Way)

- Oh no, `pipe_buffer.ops` gets corrupted by 4 zero bytes of `peer_fwd_cnt`!
 - Changing `peer_fwd_cnt` requires sending data through vsock
 - But successful `vsock connect()` makes the UAF **impossible**
 - **No way** to execute the original **Dirty Pipe attack** 😞

Target for UAF Write: struct pipe_buffer (No Way)

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 - Changing `peer_fwd_cnt` requires sending data through vsock
 - But successful `vsock connect()` makes the UAF **impossible**
 - **No way** to execute the original **Dirty Pipe attack** 😞
- **Suddenly I got a bright idea**

What If?




New hope

What if I allocate 4 `pipe_buffers` in `kmalloc-192`?

Target for UAF Write: Four pipe buffers


- Oh no, `pipe_buffer.ops` is corrupted by 4 zero bytes!



Target for UAF Write: Four pipe_buffers

- Oh no, `pipe_buffer.ops` is corrupted by 4 zero bytes!
- The kernel crashes if I read from the pipe
- Idea: I discarded the first `pipe_buffer` before UAF
- In that case the bad `pipe_buffer.ops` isn't used!
- How to do it without changing `offset`:

```
splice(pipe_fds[i][0], NULL,  
      temp_pipe_fd[1], NULL, 1, 0);  
  
read(temp_pipe_fd[0],  
     pipe_data_to_read, 1);
```




Target for UAF Write: Four pipe_buffers

- Made `flags` of `pipe_buffer` #3 zero by using `splice()` from file

```
splice(temp_file_fd, &file_offset,  
      pipe_fds[i][1], NULL, 1, 0);
```

- [+] Corrupted `pipe_buffer.page!` YES!
- `kernel-hack-drill` helped to develop it



Last Revenge From Physical KASLR

- We don't know where the kernel text is inside `vmemmap`
- We can't point `pipe_buffer.page` to kernel code 😞
- Let's shoot to the leaked `struct cred` in the kernel heap
- I can calculate the offset of `struct page` pointing to `cred`:

```
#define STRUCT_PAGE_SZ 64lu
#define PAGE_ADDR_OFFSET(addr) (((addr & 0xfffffffflu) >> 12) * STRUCT_PAGE_SZ)
uaf_val = PAGE_ADDR_OFFSET(cred_addr);
```

- Don't need to know the `vmemmap_base`!
 - [!] I overwrite only 4 lower bytes of `pipe_buffer.page`
- Randomized `vmemmap_base` address has only 2 random bits in lower bytes

Bruteforce 2 Bits

- In case of **fail** reading from pipe simply returns "**Bad address**"
- In case of **success** reading from pipe gives **struct cred** contents



- Finally, I write zero pipe, overwrite **euid** and **egid**, and **I AM ROOT**

Demo Time



Conclusion

- Bug collision is painful
- But finishing the research anyway is rewarding
- Try my open source project
github.com/a13xp0p0v/kernel-hack-drill
- **kernel-hack-drill** is a useful testing environment
for Linux kernel security researchers
- Contributors are always welcome!



Thanks / Спасибо!

Enjoy the conference!

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